ADMINISTRATIVE LAW I. HISTORICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS A. Development of Administrative Law as a distinct field of public law 1. Factors Responsible for the emergence of administrative agencies. FACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE EMERGENCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
Noblejas v. Teehankee: Teehankee : It would violate the fundamental doctrine of separation of powers, by charging this court with the administrative function of supervisory control over executive officials, and simultaneously reducing pro tanto the control of the Chief Executive over such officials Garcia v. Macaraig: It is thus of grave importance to the judiciary under our present constitutional scheme of government that no judge or even the lowest court in this Republic should place himself in a position where his actuations on matters submitted to him for action or resolution would be subject to review and prior approval and, worst still, reversal, before they can have legal effect, by any authority other than the Court of Appeals or this Supreme Court, as the case may be. Needless to say, this Court feels very strongly that, it is best that this practice is discontinued.
1. Lack of time: branches are so busy 2. Lack of expertise: about pollution or energy, etc. 3. Lack of organizational aptitude for effective and continuing regulation of new developments developments in society. When society was not as complex, the trichotomy could still handle it, but when it became too complex agencies were needed.
2. The doctrine of separation of powers and the constitutional position of administrative agencies. DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION OF ADMIN AGENCIES If not, the likelihood of abuse is so great. Its not a strict separation. More of a division of functions. Where do you put the administrative agencies? NLRC, they perform legislative executive and judicial functions. They perform hybrid functions. Admin agencies do to belong strictly in either of the 3 branches
B. Definition of Terms – Administrative Law and Administrative Agency; Types of Agencies. “Administrative law is the law concerning the powers and procedures of administrative agencies, including especially the law on judicial review of administrative action. An administrative agency is any governmental authority, other than the court, and other than a l egislative body, performing rulemaking and adjudicative functions which affect the rights of private parties.” (Davis) Pangasinan Pangasinan Transportation Co v. Public Service Commission: Commission: The factors responsible for the emergence of adminstrative agencies are: (1) Growing complexities of modern life; (2) Multiplication of number of subjects needing government regulation; and (3) Increased difficulty of administering laws. Subordinate legislation – delegation to commission an administrative function which involves the use of discretion to carry out the will of the assembly. Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Comission: A board of arbitrators is not a "court" in any proper sense of the term, and possesses none of the jurisdiction which the Organic Act contemplates contemplates shall be exercised by the Supreme Court.
CJ Fernando Concurring: While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not to be enforced with pedantic rigor, the practical demands of government precluding its doctrinaire application, it cannot justify a member of the judiciary being required to assume a position or perform a duty non-judicial in character. That is implicit in the principle. Otherwise there is a plain departure from its command. The essence of the trust reposed in him is to decide. Only a higher court, as was emphasized by Justice Barredo, can pass on his actuation. He is not a subordinate of an executive or legislative official, however eminent. It is indispensable that there be no exception to the rigidity of such a norm if he is, as expected, to be confined to the task of adjudication. In Re: Rodolfo Manzano: Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for; their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence Puyat v. De Guzman: Guzman: A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the constitutional provision ineffective. All an Assemblyman need do, if he wants to influence an administrative body is to acquire a minimal participation in the "interest" of the client and then "intervene" in the proceedings. That which the Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by indirection or by a general legislative act which is intended to accomplish the objects specifically or impliedly prohibited. Notes: If it is for pecuniary gain, prohibited, if not, it is NOT prohibited.
II. CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION A. Administrative Agencies and the Executive Power of the President Article VII. Sec. 1 The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines Article VII. Sec. 17 The President shall have control of all the executive departments, departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed Agencies created by law controlled ONLY IF charter provides for it, otherwise, supervisory Supervision – Laws are faithfully executed. Control -- power to change, alter and rehect decision of the subordinate.
B. Congressional Oversight Power Acts done by Congress in the exercise of Oversight Functions may be divided into Three Categories (Macalintal v. COMELEC J. Puno Dissent): 1. Scrutiny: Based primarily on the (a) power of appropriation of Congress. The holding of a budget hearing has been the usual means of reviewing policy. (b) Congress can also ask the heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either House of Congress on any matter pertaining to their departments. departments. (c) Power of confirmation confirmation through the the CoA. 2. Investigation: This is the in aid of legislation investigations. 3 limitations (1) In aid o f legislation (2) conducted in accordance with procedure (3) persons afforded their rights. 3. Supervision: Congressional supervision allows Congress to scrutinize the exercise of delegated law-making authority, and permits Congress to retain part of that delegated authority. Congress exercises supervision over the executive agencies through its veto power. It typically utilizes veto provisions when granting the President or an executive agency the power to promulgate regulations with the force of law. These provisions require the President or an agency to present the proposed regulations to Congress, which retains a “right” to approve or disapprove any regulation before it takes effect
C. Legislative and Judicial Control of Administrative Decision-Making 1.Non-delegation 1.Non-delegation doctrine: exception is when the law is a complete fit, and comes with standards. It has been observed that SC is generally unwilling to strike down the validity of the delegation despite broadness or vagueness. Thus many begun to suggest that the courts should try an innovative approach wherein the focus of judicial inquiries should shift from statutory standards to administrative safeguards and standards. (i.e. the administrators must structure their discretionary powers thru appropriate safeguards and the standards emanate from the agency itself. This practice is being done in the US, but not yet in the Phil.) 2. Legislative control 1. Creation and abolition. - Congress can create, divide, merge, modify, or even abolish agencies. Power to abolish is not effective because administrative agencies agencies are needed. Reality is more on the creation 2. Appropriation. - Congress has budgetary power. In actual life, no appreciable effect because annual appropriation usually gets Congressional approval, otherwise, public suffers. 3. Investigatory - Effective only as an aid in legislation and cannot serve the need for constant regulation. Prescription of legislative standards. Ineffective because the standards should be flexible and those who make the standards lack the expertise. The standards must be effective and sufficient. Prescription of minimum procedural procedural requirements. There must be a shift towards having administrative standards instead to allow the agencies enough flexibility.
On the other hand, Congress may prescribe rules on administrative procedure and consider the ff: 1. Agencies are not courts – the AAs are not bound by the technical rules of procedure and evidence followed in regular courts (although they are not exempted from procedural due process) 2. Agencies are specific – the AAs are created to deal with specific problems hence, a uniform rule of procedure is not possible but only minimum procedural guidelines and general principle where the agencies can make supplementary rules. (Rules of Procedure cannot be uniform for it tends to stifle the AAs flexibility) 3. Judicial Control: Power of judicial review over decisions of administrative agencies. Radical view: Courts should review not only agency’s conclusions of law but even its determinations determinations of fact and policy. Traditional/Accepted Traditional/Accepted view: Judicial review is allowed on questions of law and jurisdiction, but not on questions of fact and policy. Courts defer to the expertise and experience of agencies in their areas of specialization. Courts are confined to seeing to it that agencies stay within the limits of their power or to checking arbitrariness in the administrative process
D. The Ombudsman: Its effectivity and visibility amidst bureaucratic abuse and irregularity. Characteristics of an Ombudsman 1. Political independence: The office of the Ombudsman is created independent, independent, in addition to strict qualification requirements, requirements, there are also certain prohibitions and disqualifications specified in RA6770 2. Accessibility and expedition: If courts are not easily available to the poor man’s reach, it becomes more imperative for the Ombudsman to be more accessible to them. He has deputies all over the country and even in the military, and may also establish offices outside MM whenever necessary. Complaints from any source is to be acted on immediately. 3. Grant of investigatory power: power to prosecute on his own initiative or upon complaint from any person. He can direct any officer or employee of the government and its subordinate agencies or instrumentalities or GOCCs with original charters either upon complaint or on his own motion to perform or expedite any act or duty required by law to stop, prevent and correct any abuses or impropriety in the performance of duties. Can cite for contempt, seek assistance of any government agency, can inspect, examine records and conduct private hearings. 4. Absence of revisory jurisdiction: cannot modify or overturn decisions of administrative agencies performing rule-making or adjudicative functions. He cannot function as an appellate or review court. Concerned Officials of MWSS v. Vasquez: The reason for the creation of the Ombudsman in the 1987 Constitution and for the grant to it of broad investigative authority, is to insulate said office from the long tentacles of officialdom that are able to penetrate judges' and fiscals' offices, and others involved in the prosecution of erring public officials. While the broad authority of the Ombudsman to investigate any act or omission which ". . . appears illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient" may be yielded, it is difficult to equally concede, however, that the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act have intended to likewise confer upon it veto or revisory power over an exercise of judgment or discretion by an agency or officer upon whom that judgment or discretion is lawfully vested. We have said that neither this Court nor Congress, and now perhaps the Ombudsman, could be expected to have the time and technical expertise to look into matters of this nature. While we cannot go so far as to say that MWSS would have the monopoly of technical know-how in the waterworks system, by the very nature of its functions, however, it obviously must enjoy an advantage over other agencies on the subject at hand
Lastimosa v. Vasquez: The Ombudsman is authorized to call on prosecutors for assistance. §31 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989.:” The Ombudsman may utilize the personnel of his o ffice and/or designate of deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him as herein provided shall be under his supervision and control .” Moreover the ombudsman has the power to punish for contempt by virtue of §15(g) of the Ombudsman Act disproving the petitioners contention that she cannot be held liable for contempt because their refusal arose out of an administrative, rather than judicial, proceeding before the Office of the Ombudsman. Neither is there any doubt as to the power of the Ombudsman to discipline petitioner should it be found that she is guilty of grave misconduct, insubordination and/or neglect of duty, nor of the Ombudsman's power to place her in the meantime under preventive suspension as given in §21(power over all elective and appointive officials except over officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary). and §22 (preventive suspension in proper cases even without giving the accused the opportunity to defend themselves since preventive suspension is not a penalty) of the Ombudsman Act. BIR v. Office of the Ombudsman: There is no requirement of a pending action before the Ombudsman could wield its investigative power. The Ombudsman could resort to its investigative prerogative on its own or upon a complaint filed in any form or manner. Even when the complaint is verbal or written, unsigned or unverified, the Ombudsman could, on its own, initiate the investigation. Also, the power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. The Ombudsman Act makes it perfectly clear that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance that have been committed by any officer or employee…during his tenure. The law does not qualify the nature of the illegal act or omission of the public official or employee that the Ombudsman may investigate. It does not require that the act or omission be related to or be connected with or arise from the performance of official duty. Office of the Ombudsman v. ENOC: The law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. It has been held that the clause "any illegal act or omission of any public o fficial" is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public officer or employee.
Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. The law defines such primary jurisdiction as authorizing the Ombudsman "to take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of such cases The Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on all complaints against officers and employees of the government and to enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants. Fuentes v. Office of the Ombudsman: The Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary. Thus, the Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative complaint before his office against petitioner judge, pursuant to his power to investigate public officers. The Ombudsman must indorse the case to the Supreme Court, for appropriate action. Ledesma v. CA: this case involves the interpretation of the phrase: “Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.” Sec. 15(3), RA 6770 (Powers, Functions and Duties): refusal by any officer to comply with an order by the ombudsman to penalize an erring officer or employee is a ground of disciplinary action strong indication that the Ombudsman’s “recommendation” isn’t merely advisory but is actually mandatory within the bounds of law Estarija v. Ranada: Under RA 6770 and the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman has the constitutional power to directly remove from government service an erring public official other than a member of the Congress and the Judiciary Office of the Ombudsman v. Masing: Respondent also argues that according to the ruling in Fabella vs CA she may only be administratively dealt with according to Sec 9 of The Magna Carta of Public School Teachers. However, in Fabella, the case involved violation of the Civil Service Law, contrasted with this case, the charges were filed for violation of RA 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
III. POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES A. Legislative Function 1. Non delegation Doctrine Valid Delegation: If the law is complete when it leaves the legislature, in all its terms and provisions, in form and substance.It provides for a general rule of action under which a delegate shall proceed. Nothing must be left to the judgment of the delegate except ascertainment of existence of facts and events that render the act operational as provided by the act itself. It’s the Delegation of Power to make the law.
Invalid Delegation: If act wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy. If it has no statutory landmark, guidepost which shall control its exercise. If it is not indicative of the intendment of the legislative Conferring authority to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of law (Compania General de Tabacco v. Board of Public Utility Commission) Requisites for valid delegation: (1) Law must be complete in itself and must set forth the policy to be executed (2) Law must fix a standard, the limits which sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform. Sufficient standard: (1) Defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. (2) indicates the circumstances which the legislative command is to be effected. Form of Standard: May be (1) express (2) implied (3) embodies in other statytes on the same matter. Exceptions from the rule of non-delegation of legislative power: (a) delegation of tariff powers to the President (b) delegation of emergency powers to the President (c) Delegation to the people at large (d) Delegation to Local Governments (e) Delegation to administrative bodies. US v. Ang Tang Ho: The legislature does not undertake to specify or define under what conditions or for what reasons the gov-gen shall issue the proclamation, but says that it may be issued for any cause and leaves the question as to any cause to the gov-gen. People v. Vera: By section 11 if the Act, the legislature does not seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the various provincial boards to determine. In other words, the provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards Pelaez v. Auditor General: Since Jan. 1, 1960, when RA 2370 took effect, barrios can only be created or their boundaries be altered or their names changed by Act of Congress or of provincial board (Par. 2 & 3 respectively). the statutory denial of presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to create new municipalities. The creation of municipalities is NOT an administrative function but one which is essentially legislative in character. Edu v. Ericta: There must be a standard: at the very least the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lay down fundamental policy. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, its maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public safety. The regulations to implement policies should be:
1. Germane to the objects and purposes of the law. 2. Regulation should not be in contradiction but in conformity with the standards that the law prescribes. Free Telephone Workers Union v. Minister of Labor: The delegation to the Minister of Labor of the power to assume jurisdiction in a labor dispute likely to affect the national interest or to certify the same to the NLRC for arbitration does not constitute an undue delegation of legislative powers. BP130 cannot be any clearer, the coverage being limited to “strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest.” PHILCOMSAT v. Alcuaz: Under EO 546, the NTC should be guided by the requirements of public safety, public interest and reasonable feasibility of maintaining effective competition of private entities in communications and broadcasting facilities. Hence, the NTC in exercise of its rate-fixing power, is limited by the requirements of public safety, public interest, reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates, which conjointly more than satisfy the requirements of a valid delegation of legislative power Chiongbian v. Orbos: Power of President to reorganize stems from his duty to supervise local governments since division of regions are not for territorial or political purposes but administrative in nature Santiago v. COMELEC: To constitute valid delegation, the law must be (a) complete in itself, setting forth the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate (b) fix a standard – the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable, to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Panama Refining v. Ryan: The “declaration of policy” in Section 1 of the Act, stating that there was a national emergency, was a sufficient definition of a standard to make the statute valid. The NRA does contain clear standards for exercising executive authority to prohibit petroleum transportation when read in full context. (Dissent of Cardozo) ALA v. Schetcer Poultry Corp v. US: This code was found to be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power because: 1) private groups were given lawmaking function and discretion to make the policies. Authority wasn’t really delegated to the President. 2) It covered every sector of the economy (not like the FCC, which just deals with communications). It was an overbroad delegation of authority. There was no limitation on things that could be subject to the “codes of fair competition.” Cardozo wrote a strong concurrence saying that this was a situation of “delegation run riot”, that although Congress delegating power to executive can sometimes be ok, congress delegating power to industrial or trade associations was out of the question. ABAKADA v. Ermita: It is not a delegation of legislative power. It only delegates the ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of increased rate under the law is contingent. The legislature made the operation of the 12% rate effective Jan. 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or condition. This leaves the operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside the control of the Executive
Review Center v. Ermita: The CHED’s coverage under RA 7722 is limited to public and pri vate institutions of higher education and degree-granting programs in all public and pri vate post-secondary educational institutions. EO 566 directed the CHED to formulate a framework for the regulation of review centers and similar entities. The President has no inherent or delegated legislative power to amend the functions of the CHED under RA 7722. Federal Energy Administration v. Al Gonquin SNG: Section 232 (b) does not constitute an improper delegation of power, since it establishes clear preconditions to Presidential action, including a finding by the Secretary of Treasury that an article is being imported in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security. Moreover, even if these preconditions are met, the President can act only to the extent he deems necessary to adjust the imports so that they will not threaten to impair the national security, and Section 32 (c) sets forth specific factors for him to consider in exercising his authority.
2. Permissible Delegation a. Ascertainment of Fact Lovina v. Moreno: The mere fact that an officer is required by law (1) to inquire the existence of certain facts, and (2) to apply the law thereto, in order to determine what his official conduct shall be, and the fact that these acts may affect private rights do not constitute an exercise of Judicial Power Statutes may give non-judicial officers the power (i) to declare the existence of facts which call into operation the statute’s provisions, and (ii) to ascertain appropriate facts as a basis for procedure in the enforcement of particular laws. Such functions are merely incidental to the exercise of power granted by law to clear navigable streams of unauthorized obstructions.
b. Filling in of Details Alegre v. Collector of Customs: For necessity and as a means of enforcement and execution.
c. Administrative Rulemaking In rule making, administrative agencies are not directly answerable to the people since administrative officers were not elected by the masses.
(1)"Agency" includes any department, bureau, office, commission, authority or officer of the National Government authorized by law or executive order to make rules, issue licenses, grant rights or privileges, and adjudicate cases; research institutions with respect to licensing functions; government corporations with respect to functions regulating private right, privileges, occupation or business; and officials in the exercise of disciplinary power as provided by law. (2)"Rule" means any agency statement of general applicability that implements or interprets a law, fixes and describes the procedures in, or practice requirements of, an agency, including its regulations. The term includes memoranda or statements concerning the internal administration or management of an agency not affecting the rights of, or procedure available to, the public. (3)"Rate" means any charge to the public for a service open to all and upon the same terms, including individual or joint rates, tolls, classifications, or schedules thereof, as well as commutation, mileage, kilometerage and other special rates which shall be imposed by law or regulation to be observed and followed by any person. (4)"Rule making" means an agency process for the formulation, amendment, or repeal of a rule. (5)"Contested case" means any proceeding, including licensing, in which the legal rights, duties or privileges asserted by specific parties as required by the Constitution or by l aw are to be determined after hearing. (6)"Person" includes an individual, partnership, corporation, association, public or private organization of any character other than an agency. (7) "Party" includes a person or agency named or admitted as a party, or properly seeking and entitled as of right to be admitted as a party, in any agency proceeding; but nothing herein shall be construed to prevent an agency from admitting any person or agency as a party for limited purposes. (8)"Decision" means the whole or any part of the final disposition, not of an interlocutory character, whether affirmative, negative, or injunctive in form, of an agency in any matter, including licensing, rate fixing and granting of rights and privileges.
There is a need for publication and public participation. Rule – an agency statement which implements or interprets the law Book VII, Administrative Procedure Sections 1-9, Administrative Code of 1987 Section 1. Scope. - This Book shall be applicable to all agencies as defined in the next succeeding section, except the Congress, the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, military establishments in all matters relating exclusively to Armed Forces personnel, the Board of Pardons and Parole, and state universities and colleges. Section 2. Definitions. - As used in this Book:
(9)"Adjudication" means an agency process for the formulation of a final order. (10)"License" includes the whole or any part of any agency permit, certificate, passport, clearance, approval, registration, charter, membership, statutory exemption or other form of permission, or regulation of the exercise of a right or privilege. (11)"Licensing" includes agency process involving the grant, renewal, denial, revocation, suspension, annulment, withdrawal, limitation, amendment, modification or conditioning of a license. (12)"Sanction" includes the whole or part of a prohibition, limitation or other condition affecting the liberty of any person; the withholding of relief; the imposition of penalty
or fine; the destruction, taking, seizure or withholding of property; the assessment of damages, reimbursement, restitution, compensation, cost, charges or fees; the revocation or suspension of license; or the taking of other compulsory or restrictive action. (13)"Relief" includes the whole or part of any grant of money, assistance, license, authority, privilege, exemption, exception, or remedy; recognition of any claim, right, immunity, privilege, exemption or exception; or taking of any action upon the application or petition of any person. (14)"Agency proceeding" means any agency process with respect to rule-making, adjudication and l icensing. 1."Agency action" includes the whole or part of every agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief or its equivalent or denial thereof.
(2) Every rule establishing an offense or defining an act which, pursuant to law, is punishable as a crime or subject to a penalty shall in all cases be published in full text. Section 7. Distribution of Bulletin and Codified Rules. - The University of the Philippines Law Center shall furnish one (1) free copy each of every issue of the bulletin and of the codified rules or supplements to the Office of the President, Congress, all appellate courts and the National Library. The bulletin and the codified rules shall be made available free of charge to such public officers or agencies as the Congress may select, and to other persons at a price sufficient to cover publication and mailing or distribution costs. Section 8. Judicial Notice. - The court shall take judicial notice of the certified copy of each rule duly filed or as published in the bulletin or the codified rules.
1. Limits to Rule-Making Power Sec 3. Filing –Every agency shall file file with UP Law Center 3 certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of the effectivity of this code which are not filed within 3 months from that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons.
(2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall carry out the requirements of this section under pain of disciplinary action. (3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and shall be open to public inspection.
1. It must be within the scope of authority 2. Must not be inconsistent with law 3. Must be germane to the objects and purposes of the law Olsen v. Aldanese: The Legislature has not defined what shall be the standard or the type of leaf or manufactured tobacco which may be exported to the United States, or even specified how or upon what basis the Collector of Internal Revenue should fix or determine the standard. All of that power is delegated to the Collector of Internal Revenue
Sec 4. Effectivity In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by them
Syman v. Jacinto: Memo order is void because it is inconsistent with law, since the RAC specifically provides for an appeal to the commissioner before he can review the case.
Sec 5. Publication and Recording. - The University of the Philippines Law Center shall:
Toledo v. CSC: Commission later promulgated the Revised Civil Rules which was published on the OG. Sec 5, Rule 6 provided – a prohibition on the appointment of 57 year olds and above in the service RA 2260 however contained no provision prohibiting appointment in the Gov’t service of any person who’s already 57 years old. This prohibition was entirely a creation of the CSC.
(1) Publish a quarter bulletin setting forth the text of rules filed with it during the preceding quarter; and (2) Keep an up-to-date codification of all rules thus published and remaining in effect, together with a complete index and appropriate tables. Section 6. Omission of Some Rules. (1) The University of the Philippines Law Center may omit from the bulletin or the codification any rule if its publication would be unduly cumbersome, expensive or otherwise inexpedient, but copies of that rule shall be made available on application to the agency which adopted it, and the bulletin shall contain a notice stating the general subject matter of the omitted rule and new copies thereof may be obtained.
People v. Maceren: The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself.
CIR v. CA: All administrative issuances must be in harmony with the law and must NOT modify it. In this case, it was an act of administrative legislation. Landbank v. CA: Sec 16 of RA 6657 provides that deposit must be made only in cash or in LBP bonds. DAR exceeded the limits of its power to enact rules that allowed the opening of a trust account in behalf of the land owner. Function of promulgating rules and regulations may be exercised only for the purpose of carryinf the provisions of the law into effect. Admin regulations cannot extend the law and amend a legislative enactment.
GMCR v. Bell Telecommunications: EO 146 organized NTC as a 3-man commission. Thus all memo circulars negating the collegial nature of NTC are illegal. Administrative regulations derive their validity from the statute that they intend to i mplement. APDC v. Philippine Coco Authority: The PCA is charged with the duty of carrying out the State’s policy to promote the rapid integrated development of the coco industry. By limiting the scope of registration to merely monitoring volumes of production in effect abdicates its r ole provided by law. PBC v. CIR: NIRC provides that a taxpayer may file a claim only within 2 years. Circular extended the prescriptive period. This cannot be done.
2. Publication and Effectivity Ppl v Que Po Lay: Said circular, particularly its penalty provision, did not have any legal effect and bound no one until its publication in the Official Gazette or after Nov. 1951, or 3 months after appellant's conviction of its violation. Appellant could not be liable because the circular was not binding at the time he was found to have failed to sell the foreign exchange in his possession thereof Tanada v. Tuvera: Effect of Having No Date of Effectivity: Where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date, the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication
Effect of Having its Own Date of Effectivity: Date only refers to effectivity, but which does not preclude requirement of publication [MEANING, while the law would be effective according to the date provided, it must still be published prior] Purpose of Publication: Due Process To give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever. NOT INCLUDED: Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published PASEI v. Torres: Sec. 3. Filing. — (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center, three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above provided.
Republic v. EXPRESS Telecommunications: The fact that the 1993 Revised Rules were filed with the UP Law Center on February 3, 1993 is of no moment. There is nothing in the Administrative Code of 1987 which implies that the filing of the rules with the UP Law Center is the operative act that gives the rules force and effect. The National Administrative Register is merely a bulletin of codified rules and it is furnished only to the Office of the President, Congress, all appellate courts, the National Library, other public offices or agencies as the Congress may select, and to other persons at a price sufficient to cover publication and mailing or distribution costs. Still, publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is a condition sine qua non before statutes, rules or regulations can take effect Nasecore v. ERC: Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. GMA v. MTRCB: With regards to Memo Circular 98-17 – the Administrative code of 1987, particularly Section 3, requires each agency to file with the Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR) of the UP Law Center three certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Administrative issuances not published or registered with the ONAR are ineffective and may not be enforced. The memo here which provides for penalties for offenses of exhibiting programs without a valid permit has not been registered with the ONAR as of 1/27/2000 It is the unenforceable since it hasn’t been registered – petitioner not bound by said circular and should not have been meted with the sanction provided RP v. Shell: Strict compliance with the requirements of publication cannot be annulled by a mere allegation that parties were notified of the existence of the implementing rules concerned.
3. Penal Regulations The law itself must declare the act as punishable and must also define or fix the penalty for the violation. Admin bodies cannot make penal rules as they are exclusive to the legislature and cannot be delegated. For an administrative regulation to have the force of penal law, (1) the violation of the admin regulation must be made a crime by the delegating statute itself; and (2) the penalty for such violation must be provided by the statute itself (Perez v. LPG) Ppl v. Que Po Lay supra
4. Interpretative Rules Legislative Rules Promulgated pursuant to its quasi-legislative/ rulemaking functions Creates a new law, a new
Interpretative Rules Passed pursuant to its quasi-judicial capacity Merely clarifies the
policy, with the force and effect of law Needs publication
meaning of a pre-existing law by inferring its implications Need not be published
Hilado v. CIR: An administrative officer cannot change a law enacted by congress. A regulation that is merely interpretative of the statute when once determined to have been erroneous becomes a nullity. Victorias v. SSC: When an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it MAKES a new law with the force and effect of a valid law and partakes the nature of a statute. When it renders an opinion, it merely interprets a statement of policy. These are merely advisory for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means. Peralta v. CSC: Administrative construction is NOT necessarily binding upon the courts. Action of an admin agency may be set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law or abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with the letter and spirit of a legislative enactment.
5. Examples of Rule-Making in Various Agencies American Tobacco v. Director of Patents: Power and authority granted to the Director suggests that the Director has the administrative flexibility necessary for the prompt expeditious discharge of its duties. Hence he can allow any hearing officer to hear the parties Dagan v. PHILRACOM: Validity of an administrative issuance hinges on the ff requisites: (1) Promulgation must be authorized by the legislature (2) Promulgated in accordance with prescribed procedure (3) Within the scope of authority given by the legislature (4) Must be reasonable. Petitioners argue that Philracom’s guidelines have no force and effect for lack of publication and failure to file copies with the University of the Philippines (UP) Law Center as required by law. As a rule, the issuance of rules and regulations in the exercise of an administrative agency of its quasilegislative power does not require notice and hearing. In Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, this Court had the occasion to rule that prior notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of rules or regulations issued in the exercise of quasi-legislative powers since there is no determination of past events or facts that have to be established or ascertained (?)
d. Fixing of Rates, Wages, Prices Admin Code Section 9. Public Participation. - (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule.
(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon. (3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed. Generally: The power to fix rates is a quasi-legislative function. However it becomes judicial when the rate is applicable only to an individual. Is Notice and Hearing required? Only when it is a contested case. Otherwise it can be dispensed with. Legislative Rate-Fixing: Applies to all, notice and hearing may be dispensed with unless law requires otherwise Quasi judicial Rate- Fixing: Applies to particular persons, requires notice and hearing Panay Autobus v. Phil Railway: The legislature has delegated to the Public Service Commission the power of fixing the rates of public services, but it has not authorized the Public Service Commission to delegate that power to common carrier or other public service. The rates of public services like the Philippine Railway Co. have been approved or fixed by the Public Service Commission and any change in such rates must be authorized or approved by the Public Service Commission after they have been shown to be just and reasonable. KMU Labor Center v. Garcia: The power to fix rates can’t be delegated to a common carrier or other public service. The latter may propose new rates, but these will not be effective w/o the approval of the administrative agency. Ynchausti v. PUC: But in fixing the rate, it would not be fair to the public to base it upon a peak cost, and, for the same reason, it would not be fair to the owner of the property to place it upon a minimum cost. Neither would it be fair to either party to base the rate upon any abnormal condition. A just rate must be founded upon conditions which are fair and reasonable both to the owner and the public. What are considered in gixing rates? (1) Present valuation of all the property of a public utility (2) The fixed assets. The property then is deemed taken and condemned by the public at the time of filing of the petition.
Vigan Electric v. PSC: . Such rate-fixing was based on an audit report – that petitioner is making a profit of more than 12% of its invested capital, which is denied by Vigan Electric. Obviously, the latter is entitled to cross-examine the maker of said report, and to introduce evidence to disprove the contents thereof and/or explain or complement the same, as well as to refute the conclusion drawn therefrom by PSC. In other words, in making said finding of fact, PSC performed a function partaking of a quasi-judicial character the valid exercise of which demands previous notice and hearing. Philcomsat v. Alcuaz: In case of a delegation of ratefixing power, the only standard which the legislature is
required to prescribe for guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be implied. Under EO 546, the NTC should be guided by the requirements of public safety, public interest and reasonable feasibility of maintaining effective competition of private entities in communications and broadcasting facilities. Hence, the NTC in exercise of its rate-fixing power, is limited by the requirements of public safety, public interest, reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates Manila International Airport Authority v. Airspain: As an attached agency of the DOTC, the MIAA is governed by the Administrative Code of 1987.23 The Administrative Code specifically requires notice and public hearing in the fixing of rates: BOOK VII. – Administrative Procedure: SEC. 9. Public Participation. - … (2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon.
e. Licensing Function Admin Code Section 17. Licensing Procedure. - (1) When the grant, renewal, denial or cancellation of a license is required to be preceded by notice and hearing, the provisions concerning contested cases shall apply insofar as practicable. (2) Except in cases of willful violation of pertinent laws, rules and regulations or when public security, health, or safety require otherwise, no license may be withdrawn, suspended, revoked or annulled without notice and hearing. Admin Code Section 18. Non-expiration of License. Where the licensee has made timely and sufficient application for the renewal of a license with reference to any activity of a continuing nature, the existing license shall not expire until the application shall have been finally determined by the agency. Gonzalo Sy v. Central Bank of the Philippines: A license is a special privilege, a permission or authority to do what is within the terms. It is not in any way permanent, vested or absolute. A license granted by the state is revocable. As a consequence of the power to grant licesnes, the State and its instrumentalities have the power to recoke it. The absence of an expiry date does not make it perpetual, and it cannot last beyond the life of the basic authority under which it was issued.
B. Judicial Function Definition: The power of the administrative agency to determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply, in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself Admin Code Section 10. Compromise and Arbitration. - To expedite administrative proceedings involving conflicting rights or claims and obviate expensive litigations, every agency shall, in the
public interest, encourage amicable settlement, comprise and arbitration. Admin Code Section 11. Notice and Hearing in Contested Cases. (1) In any contested case all parties shall be entitled to notice and hearing. The notice shall be served at least five (5)days before the date of the hearing and shall state the date, time and place of the hearing. (2) The parties shall be given opportunity to present evidence and argument on all issues. If not precluded by law, informal disposition may be made of any contested case by stipulation, agreed settlement or default. (3) The agency shall keep an official record of its proceedings. Section 12. Rules of Evidence. - In a contested case: (1) The agency may admit and give probative value to evidence commonly accepted by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their affairs. (2) Documentary evidence may be received in the form of copies or excerpts, if the original is not readily available. Upon request, the parties shall be given opportunity to compare the copy with the original. If the original is in the official custody of a public officer, a certified copy thereof may be accepted. (3) Every party shall have the right to cross-examine witnesses presented against him and to submit rebuttal evidence. (4) The agency may take notice of judicially cognizable facts and of generally cognizable technical or scientific facts within its specialized knowledge. The parties shall be notified and afforded an opportunity to contest the facts so noticed. Section 13. Subpoena. - In any contested case, the agency shall have the power to require the attendance of witnesses or the production of books, papers, documents and other pertinent data, upon request of any party before or during the hearing upon showing of general relevance. Unless otherwise provided by law, the agency may, in case of disobedience, invoke the aid of the Regional Trial Court within whose jurisdiction the contested case being heard falls. The Court may punish contumacy or refusal as contempt. Section 14. Decision. - Every decision rendered by the agency in a contested case shall be in writing and shall state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. The agency shall decide each case within thirty (30) days following its submission. The parties shall be notified of the decision personally or by registered mail addressed to their counsel of record, if any, or to them. Section 15. Finality of Order. - The decision of the agency shall become final and executory fifteen (15) days after the receipt o f a copy thereof by the party adversely affected unless within that period an administrative appeal or judicial review, if proper, has been perfected. One motion for reconsideration may be filed, which shall suspend the running of the said period.
a. Power to issue subpoena, declare contempt Note: Subpoena – All agencies with quasi-judicial functions have the power to issue a subpoena even if the
charter is silent on the power. It is implied in investigatory functions. It is the lifeblood of investigatory power. Contempt – The enabling statute must expressly provide power of contempt. If there is no power then the agency must go to the R TC because the power to cite contempt is inherently judicial. Evangelista v. Jarencio: An administrative agency may be authorized to make investigations, not only in proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature, but also in proceedings whose sole purpose is to obtain information upon which future action of a legislative or judicial nature may be taken 9 and may require the attendance of witnesses in proceedings of a purely investigatory nature. An administrative subpoena differs in essence from a judicial subpoena. Clearly, what the Rules speaks of is a judicial subpoena, one procurable from and issuable by a competent court, and not an administrative subpoena. Administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in the course of investigations, whether or not adjudication is involved, and whether or not probable cause is shown and even before the issuance of a complaint. The purpose of the subpoena is to discover evidence, not to prove a pending charge, but upon which to make one if the discovered evidence so justifies. The administrative agency has the power of inquisition which is not dependent upon a case or controversy in order to get evidence, but can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated or even just because it wants assurance that it is not. Requisites of a valid subpoena: (1) within the authority of the agency; (2) the demand is not too indefinite; and (3) the information is reasonably relevant. Guevara v. COMELEC: Although the negotiation has resulted in controversy, it merely refers to a ministerial duty which COMELEC has performed in its administrative capacity in relation to the conduct of elections ordained by our Constitution. It only discharged a ministerial duty; it did not exercise any judicial function. Such being the case, it could not exercise the power to punish for contempt as postulated in the law, for such power is inherently judicial in nature.
Catura v. CIR: To paraphrase Justice Laurel, the power to investigate, to be conscientious and rational at the very least, requires an inquiry into existing facts and conditions. The documents required to be produced constitutes evidence of the most solid character as to whether or not there was a failure to comply with the mandates of the law. It is not for this Court to whittle down the authority conferred on administrative agencies to assure the effective administration of a statute, in this case intended to protect the rights of union members against its officers. The matter was properly within its cognizance and the means necessary to give it force and effectiveness should be deemed implied unless the power sought to be exercised is so arbitrary as to trench upon private rights of petitioners entitled to priority
Tolentino v. Inciong: The competence “to hold any person in contempt for refusal to comply” certainly does not extend to a judge of the CFI
b. Warrants of Arrest, Administrative Searches 1987 CONSTITUTION: ARTICLE III – BILL OF RIGHTS Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 1973 CONSTITUTION: ARTICLE IV – Bill of Rights Section 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and whatever purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as maybe authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. Notes: The provision (repeated in all 3 constitutions) is an expressed guarantee against unwarranted violations of the privacy and security of persons and their properties. 1987 version is a verbatim adaptation of the ’35 one, with additional phrases, and some were removed from the ’73 version. 1.The phrase “determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law” was removed in the 1987 Constitution from the ’73 to eliminate what had happened during the Marcos regime wherein the military could arrest any one only on mere suspicion. 2. The phrase “of whatever nature and for any purpose” was retained (addition if compared to ’35). 3. The phrase “shall be inviolable” replaced the phrase “shall not be violated” as appearing in the ’73 putting the phrase in positive. 4. The phrase “to be determined personally by the judge” This is to give more responsibility to the judge who will issue the warrant of arrest and be accountable for it. Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board: “The Constitution does not distinguish between warrants in a criminal case and administrative warrants in administrative proceedings.” Vivo v. Montesa: The warrants of arrest issued by the Commissioner are void because: (a) the arrests were not administrative arrest that are valid but instead were for the sole purpose of investigation and before a final order of deportation had been issued, where the brothers had
been ordered exactly for the purpose of showing cause why they should not be deported. The consequence of such orders of arrest is the operation of the Constitutional limitation that (b) the power to determine probable cause for warrants of arrest is limited to judges exclusively. Santos v. Commissioner: The contention of the Solicitor General that the arrest of a foreigner is necessary to carry into effect the power of deportation is valid only when, as already stated, there is already an order of deportation. To carry out the order of deportation, the President obviously has the power to order the arrest of the deportee But, certainly, during the investigation, it is not indispensable that the alien be arrested Salazar v. Acachoso: Art. 38 of the Labor Code is void because only a judge may issue warrants of search and arrest. The POEA administrator or the Secretary of Labor not being judges may not issue search or arrest warrants. Camara v. Municipal Court: Camara has been charged with a crime for his refusal to permit housing inspectors to enter his leasehold without a warrant. There was no emergency demanding immediate access; in fact, the inspectors made three trips to the building in an attempt to obtain Camara’s consent to search. Camara had a constitutional right to insist that the inspectors obtain a warrant to search and that appellant may not constitutionally be convicted for refusing to consent to the inspection See v. Seattle: The businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a constitutional right to go about his business free from unreasonable official entries upon his private commercial property.
4. What is moral, and educational 5. What is sacrilegious 6. Adequate and efficient instruction 7. Reasonableness as an implied standard 8. To promote simplicity, economy or efficiency 9. Maintain monetary stability
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE Section 16. Publication and Compilation of Decisions. (1) Every agency shall publish and make available for public inspection all decisions or final orders in the adjudication of contested cases. Section 19. Appeal. - Unless otherwise provided by law or executive order, an appeal from a final decision of the agency may be taken to the Department head. Section 20. Perfection of Administrative Appeals. (1) Administrative appeals under this Chapter shall be perfected within fifteen (15) days after receipt of a copy of the decision complained of by the party adversely affected, by filing with the agency which adjudicated the case a notice of appeal, serving copies thereof upon the prevailing party and the appellate agency, and paying the required fees. (2) If a motion for reconsideration is denied, the movant shall have the right to perfect his appeal during the remainder of the period for appeal, reckoned from receipt of the resolution of denial. If the decision is reversed on reconsideration, the aggrieved party shall have fifteen (15) days from receipt of the resolution of reversal within which to perfect his appeal.
c. Imposition of Fines and Penalties
(3) The agency shall, upon perfection of the appeal, transmit the records of the case to the appellate agency.
Oceanic v. Stranahan: (1) Subject matter must be within the control of Congress (2) Penalty is administrative or civil NOT criminal (3) Must be expressly conferred to an administrative official.
Section 21. Effect of Appeal. - The appeal shall stay the decision appealed from unless otherwise provided by law, or the appellate agency directs execution pending appeal, as it may deem just, considering the nature and circumstances of the case.
CAB v. PAL: though it is true that the power to impose fines is a judicial function, administrative agencies empowered by legislation to regulate certain sectors are empowered to impose administrative fines.
Section 22. Action on Appeal. - The appellate agency shall review the records of the proceedings and may, on its own initiative or upon motion, receive additional evidence.
Scoty’s Department Store v. Micaller: Sec. 25 of RA 875, entitled Penalties, provides that any person who violates Sec. 3 of this act shall be punished by a fine of P100-P1000, or by imprisonment of 1 month to 1 year, or both. Any other violation which is declared unlawful shall be punished by a fine ranging from P50-P500 for each offense, at the court’s discretion. SC: The above provision is general in nature since it doesn’t specify the “court” that may act when the violation charged calls for the imposition of the penalties. That word (court) cannot refer to the CIR, for to give that meaning would be violative of the safeguards guaranteed to every accused by the Constitution.
C. Judicial Determination of Sufficiency of Standards: 1. Interest of Law and Order 2. Public Interest 3. Justice, Equity, and substantial merits of the case
Section 23. Finality of Decision of Appellate Agency. - In any contested case, the decision of the appellate agency shall become final and executory fifteen (15) days after the receipt by the parties of a copy thereof. Section 24. Hearing Officers. (1) Each agency shall have such number of qualified and competent members of the base as hearing officers as may be necessary for the hearing and adjudication of contested cases. (2) No hearing officer shall engaged in the performance of prosecuting functions in any contested case or any factually related case. Section 25. Judicial Review. (1) Agency decisions shall be subject to judicial review in accordance with this chapter and applicable laws.
(2) Any party aggrieved or adversely affected by an agency decision may seek judicial review. (3) The action for judicial review may be brought against the agency, or its officers, and all indispensable and necessary parties as defined in the Rules of Court. (4) Appeal from an agency decision shall be perfected by filing with the agency within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof a notice of appeal, and with the reviewing court a petition for review of the order. Copies of the petition shall be served upon the agency and all parties of record. The petition shall contain a concise statement of the issues involved and the grounds relied upon for the review, and shall be accompanied with a true copy of the order appealed from, together with copies of such material portions of the records as are referred to therein and other supporting papers. The petition shall be under oath and shall show, by stating the specific material dates, that it was filed within the period fixed in this chapter. (5) The petition for review shall be perfected within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the final administrative decision. One (1) motion for reconsideration may be allowed. If the motion is denied, the movant shall perfect his appeal during the remaining period for appeal reckoned from receipt of the resolution of denial. If the decision is reversed on reconsideration, the appellant shall have fifteen (15) days from receipt of the resolution to perfect his appeal. (6) The review proceeding shall be filed in the court specified by statute or, in the absence thereof, in any court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions on venue of the Rules of Court. (7) Review shall be made on the basis of the record taken as a whole. The findings of fact of the agency when supported by substantial evidence shall be final except when specifically provided otherwise by law. Section 26. Transmittal of Record. - Within fifteen (15) days from the service of the petition for review, the agency shall transmit to the court the original or a certified copy of the entire records of the proceeding under review. Th record to be transmitted may be abridged by agreement of all parties to the proceedings. The court may require or permit subsequent correction or additions to the record.
A. In Rule-Making, price, wage or rate-fixing B. In Adjudication of Cases 1. Due Process a. Cardinal Primary rights Cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in administrative proceedings:
(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's cause and submit evidence in support thereof; (2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) The decision must have something to support itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial; (5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate; (7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue involved, and the reason for the decision rendered. (Ang Tibay v. CIR) Asprec v. Itchon: For due process to be satisfied, the law only requires that parties be given notice of the trial and an opportunity to be heard. Presence of a party at trial is not its essence. As found, Asprec was given notice o f such trial and actually agreed upon the date. However he forfeited his right to be heard due to his absence during the hearing Vinta v. NLRC: In labor cases, this Court has consistently held that due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or a right to be heard. The requirements of due process are deemed to have been satisfied when parties are given the opportunity to submit position papers. The holding of an adversarial trial is discretionary on the labor arbiter and the parties cannot demand it as a matter of right Bachrach v. CIR: The right of the party to confront and crossexamine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings before administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is a fundamental right, which is part of due process. If without his fault, this is violated, he can have the direct examination stricken off the record. UP Board of Regents v. CA: Due process does not always entail notice and hearing prior to deprivation of a right. Hearing may occur after deprivation as in emergency cases. Rivera v. CSC: The law, in prescribing a process of appeal to a higher level, contemplates that the reviewing officer is a person different from the one who issued the appealed decision. Otherwise the review becomes a farce and meaningless. Pefianco v. Moran: Moreover, there is no law or rule which imposes a legal duty on petitioner to furnish respondent with a copy of the investigation report. On the contrary, we unequivocally held in Ruiz v. Drilon that a respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed against him. He is entitled only to the administrative decision based on substantial evidence made of record, and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence presented against her during the hearings of the investigation committee. Respondent no doubt had been accorded these rights. NAPOLCOM v. Bernabe: Due process as a constitutional precept does not always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of
Montemayor v. Bundalian: Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense for it is enough that the party is given the chance to be heard before the case against him is decided
Uy v. COA: Notice to enable the other party to be heard and to present evidence is not a mere technicality or a trivial matter in any administrative proceedings but an indispensable ingredient of due process.
American Inter-Fashion: There is no retroactive effect of curing the evidential flaw.
It would be unfair for COA to hold former Governor Paredes personally liable for the claims of petitioners amounting to millions of pesos without giving him an opportunity to be heard and present evidence in his defense
Samalio v. CA: But administrative bodies are not bound by the technical niceties of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law. They're not strictly applied, and administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. Administrative tribunals exercising QJ powers are unfettered by the rigidity of certain procedural requirements, subject to the observance of fundamental and essential requirements of due process Goss v. Lopez: The total exclusion from the educational process for more than a trivial period, and certainly if the suspension is for 10 days, is a serious event in the life of the suspended child. At the very minimum, therefore, students facing suspension and the consequent interference with a protected property interest must be given some kind of notice and afforded some kind of hearing Matthews v. Eldridge: 3 factors vis a vis Goldberg v. Kelly (1) Potential Deprivation (2) Fairness and reliability of the existing pretermination procedures (3) Public interest.
b. Notice and Hearing 1. When Required It is required: (1) When the law specifically requires it (2) When it affects a persons status and liberty (UP Bar) NADECOR v. Collector: Rocha was not given an opportunity to prove that the television set complained of is not a cargo that needs to be manifested as required by Section 2521 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Decisions must be supported by evidence gathered from a hearing especially when they impose a fine. Bautista v. WCC: We rule that the respondent Commission gravely abused its discretion in ignoring and in not passing upon the issue of denial of due process squarely presented by claimant's counsel. The very rules of the Commission require the giving of reasonable notice of hearing to each party interested by service upon him personally or by registered mail of a copy thereof at his last known post office address or if he is represented by a counsel, through the latter (Sec. 2, Rule 15, Revised rules of the WCC, 1973 Equitable Banking v. NLRC: While it is true that the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied in administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side, meetings in the nature of consultation and conferences such as the case here, however, may not be valid substitutes for the proper observance of notice and hearing. For having violated private respondent Sadac's right to due process, and considering that his repeated request for a hearing was left unheeded, Petitioner Bank is liable in the amount of P5,000.00
2. When Not Required Not required when: (1) Urgent reasons (2) Discretion is exercised by an officer vested with it upon an undisputed fact. (3) It involves the exercise of discretion and there is no grave abuse (4) When rules to govern future conduct of persons or enterprise, unless law provides otherwise (5) In the valid exercise of police power Suntay v. People: When discretion is exercised by an officer vested with it upon an undisputed fact such as the filing of a serious criminal charge against a passport holder, hearing may be dispensed with for the cancellation of the passport Bisschop v. Galang: Extension of stay of aliens is purely discretionary on the part of the immigration authorities. Hence formal hearing may be dispensed with. Moreover, a letter advising Bisschop to depart in 5 days is a mere formality and far from final. It is only advisory for him to depart.
Pollution Adjudication Board v. CA: Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like that here presented precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland waters of the Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted litigation over the ultimate correctness or propriety of such orders has run its full course, including multiple and sequential appeals such as those which Solar has taken, which of course may take several years. It is a constitutional common place that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the exercise of police power
c. Form and Promulgation of Judgment Indias v. Phil. Iron Mines: The order, it is true, does not make its own discussion of the evidence or its own findings of fact, but such is not necessary if the court is satisfied with the report of its examiner or referee which already contains a full discussion of the evidence and the findings of fact based thereon. The situation differs if the court disagrees with the report in which case it should state the reasons for its disagreement. If it is in full accord with the report, it is purposeless to repeat what the referee or examiner has already found in it. Such is the present situation. The court approved the report of the hearing examiner "after a perusal of the record of the case." This presupposes that it has examined the evidence and found no justification for modifying his findings and conclusions. This is a substantial compliance with the law.
Serrano v. PSC: Art. VIII, Sec. 12 does not apply to the Public Service Commission. The obligation to state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which the decision is based i s incumbent on a court of record. The Public Service Commission is not a court of record within the meaning of the constitutional provision. The Seven Cardinal Primary Rights pronounced therein must be respected, the last of which is that “quasi-judicial tribunals,” and the Public Service Commission is one of them, “should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
Arocha v. Vivo: Retyping dates on the face of documents, w/o further evidence of record, is not enough to convict the member of the BoC of maliciously antedating their decision. There’s a presumption of regularity in official actuations. Falsification of documents carries serious implications and must be proved clearly beyond reasonable doubt. The operative date of the Commissioners’ action is that when the resolution of exclusion was voted and adopted by them as a Board, regardless of the date when the decision was prepared, written, and signed.
Solidhomes v. Laserna: The constitutional mandate (Sec 14 Art 8), which provides that, “no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which it is based.” does not preclude the validity of memorandum decisions, which adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals.
Neria v. Commission of Immigration: In this case, August 2, 1961 was the date when the BSI concluded its hearing of case, deliberated on it, and voted for his admission as a citizen of the Philippines. August 2, 1961 was also the date when the decision in extenso was rendered. That date and not September 4, 1961, therefore, is the date of promulgation of the decision of the BSI, which decision should "prevail and shall be final ... unless reversed by the Board of Commissioners after a review by it, motu proprio of the entire proceedings within one year from the promulgation of said decision." Computing the one-year period from August 2, 1961, the Board of Immigration Commissioners had until August 2, 1962 within which to review the proceedings motu proprio.
The memorandum decision to be valid can’t incorporate the findings of fact and conclusion of law of the lower court only by remote reference, which is to say that the challenged decision is not easily and immediately available to the person reading the memorandum decision. For the incorporation to be allowed, it must provide for direct access to the facts and the law being adopted, which must be contained in a statement attached to said. The memorandum decision should embody the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the lower court in an annex attached to and made an indispensable part of the decision. Additional condition: this kind of decision may be resorted to only in cases where the facts are in the main accepted by both parties and easily determinable by the judge and there are no doctrinal complications involved that will require an extended discussion of the laws involved. DOH v. Camposano: However, the actual exercise of the disciplining authority’s prerogative requires a prior independent consideration of the law and the facts. Failure to comply with this requirement results in an invalid decision. The disciplining authority should not merely and solely rely on an investigator’s recommendation, but must personally weigh and assess the evidence gathered. The President’s endorsement of the records of the case for the “appropriate action” of the health secretary did not constitute a directive for the immediate dismissal of respondents. Like that of President Ramos, the decision of Secretary Reodica should have contained a factual finding and a legal assessment of the controversy. American Tobacco v. Director of Patents: The power to decide resides solely in the administrative agency vested by law. But this does not preclude a delegation of the power to hold a hearing on the basis of which the decision of the administrative agency will be made. Albert v. Gangan: The COA decision merely stated conclusions of law. Facts and circumstances, as well as the why’s, the what’s and the how’s of the disallowance, were patently missing, inaccurate or incomplete. The COA cannot just perform its constitutional function of disallowing expenditures of government funds at sheer discretion. There has to be factual basis why the expenditure is alleged to be fraudulent or why was there a misrepresentation.
Arocha Rule: Voting must be within the 1 year period. The writing of the decision extensor related back to the date of voting
Go Yu Tak Wai v. Vivo: This Court held that "the operative date of the Commissioners' action is that when the resolution of exclusion was voted and adopted by them as a Board, regardless of the date when the decision in extenso was prepared, written and signed" because "the decision in extenso must relate back to the day when the resolution to exclude was adopted. It suffices that the Commissioners should review the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry and deliberate upon it within one year from the promulgation of the Board of Special Inquiry's decision and that the minutes of their deliberation should reflect the action which they took within the said statutory period. Sichangco v. Board of Commissioners: Under Sec 27 of Commonwealth Act No 613, the act of the Board of Special Inquiry can be reversed within one year from promulgation of decision. In this case, the original decision was rendered on Sept 11, 1961 while the reversal was made on Sept 4, 1962 thus within the one year period. The fact that it was sent to the minors on Oct 26, 1962 does not vitiate it since all All that the Immigration Law requires is that the decision of reversal of the Board of Commissioners be promulgated within one year from the rendition of the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry Also, Sichangco failed to provide any evidence that the Board of Comissioners acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Teehankee dissent: decision on a review motu proprio by respondent board (whether for inclusion or exclusion) must be duly put in writing and promulgated as required by substantive due process within the statutory one-year period. It should be duly promulgated.
3. Jurisdiction
Administrative agencies may only exercise such powers as are explicitly or by necessary implication conferred upon them by law. Absent such jurisdiction, their decisions would be void. Jurisdiction is conferred by law. The enabling statute should be carefully examined because the agency can validly act only if it is authorized by law. Factors: (1) If what is involved is a question of constitutionality, judicial review is available (2) Intention of Congress prevails. (3) Nature of problem involved (4) Finality of administrative decision. Feliciano v. Director of Patents: Under the provisions of the Patent Law (Republic Act No. 165), the Director of Patent has no power and authority to compel the inventors to do what the appellant is asking them to perform. What the appellant asked the Director Patents to do for him is essentially a judicial function which would require the determination or finding by a court of competent jurisdiction as to whether there was a meeting of the minds of the contracting parties before it could compel the applicant-inventors to perform what the appellant prays the court to order them to do. Go Tek v. Deportation Board: . Under existing law, the deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected (1) by order of the President, after due investigation, pursuant to RAC Sec. 69 and (2) by the Commissioner of Immigration, upon recommendation of the Board of Commissioners under Immigration Law Sec. 37. It is fundamental that an executive order for deportation is not dependent on a prior judicial conviction in a criminal case" Thus, it was held that the fact that an alien has been acquitted in a criminal proceeding of the particular charge does not prevent the deportation of such alien based on the same charge. Such acquittal does not constitute res judicata in the deportation proceedings. Conviction of a crime is not necessary to warrant deportation. Go v. Ramos: Board’s jurisdiction is not divested by the mere claim of citizenship. After a careful evaluation of the evidence, the appellate court was not convinced that the same was sufficient to oust the Board of its jurisdiction to continue with the deportation proceedings. Dela Fuente v. De Veyra: Exlusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture cases is vested in the Collector of Customs. It precludes a CFI from taking cognizance of such cases. Carino v. CHR: CHR’s powers are limited to investigation. It was not intended by the constitution to be a quasi-judicial agency. Simon v. Commission on Human Rights: On the issue of contempt powers, while the CHR is constitutionally authorized to adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof, that power should be understood to apply only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its investigatory powers such as when someone refuses to cooperate with the CHR or obey summons issued in pursuit of its investigatory work. The order to cease and desist is not investigatorial in character but rescinds from an adjudicative power which the CHR does not possess. The best CHR can do is indorse for appropriate action its findings and recommendations to any appropriate government agency and not order the cease and desist order.
Laguna Lake Development v. CA: GRule: Issues regarding pollution fall within the jurisdiction of the Pollution Adjudication Board. Exception: Whenever a specific law grants jurisdiction to another body. Union Bank v. HLURB: The jurisdiction of the HLURB to regulate the real estate trade is broad enough to include jurisdiction over complaints for specific performance of the sale, or annulment of the mortgage, of a condominium unit, with damages. Osea v. Ambrosio: This Court has consistently held that complaints for breach of contract or specific performance w/ damages filed by a subdivision lot or condominium unity buyer against the owner/developer fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB Mateo v. CA: The Civil Service Commission under the Constitution, is the single arbiter of all contests relating to the Civil service. RTCs have no jurisdiction to entertain cases involving dismissal of officers and EEs covered by the Civil Service Law. Cagayan v. Constancio Collera: ERB has the power to regulate and fix rates. But this does not carry with it the power to determine whether an electric company is guilty of overcharging customers for consumption of electric power. Arranza v. BF Homes: HLURB has jurisdiction over cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots against the developer.
4. Administrative and Judicial Proceedings Arising from the Same Facts Galang v. CA: The difference in the proceeding (one admin and one criminal) is merely physical incompatibility. They involve different causes of action and therefore can proceed simultaneously. An order of release in the cri minal action, upon the filing therein of the corresponding bail bond, would not affect the legality of the detention under a warrant of arrest or deportation issued by the Commissioner of Immigration under said section 37. Similarly, the acquittal of the accused in said criminal action would not bar his deportation under the same provision, by the Commissioner of Immigration. Co San v. Director of Patents: In the cancellation proceedings the question refers to the validity of the design patents issued to respondent Jose Ong Lian Bio, while in the criminal case the inquiry is whether Co San unfairly competed against the luggage of said respondent protected by design patent No. 7. The first is within the cognizance of the Patent Office while the second is under the CFI jurisdiction. The acquittal of San Co was not based on the cancellation of a patent, but on the opinion that San Co had not deceived or defrauded the complainant. Villanos v. Subido: A condemnatory decision in a cri minal case, even if final, by itself alone, cannot serve as basis for a decision in an administrative case involving the same facts, for the simple reason that matters that are material in the administrative case are not necessarily relevant in the criminal case. So, notwithstanding that findings in criminal cases must be beyond reasonable doubt, they cannot be conclusive for administrative purposes. There are defenses, excuses and attenuating circumstances of value in administrative proceedings which are not admissible in the trial of the criminal cases
PNR v. Domingo: The reason for the rule i s that generally acquittal in the criminal case does not carry with it relief from administrative liability. The administrative case may generally proceed against a respondent independently of a criminal action for the same act or omission and requires only a preponderance of evidence to establish administrative guilt as against proof beyond reasonable doubt of the criminal charge, as in the analogous cases provided by Art. 33 of the Civil Code. Tan v. COMELEC: The administrative case against petitioner, taken cognizance of by, and still pending with, the COMELEC, is in relation to the performance of his duties as an election canvasser and not as a city prosecutor. Hence absolution from criminal charge in Ombudsman is not a bar to an admin prosecution. Ferrer v. Sandiganbayan: Ferrer argues that the criminal case against him requires a higher quantum of proof for conviction -that is, proof beyond reasonable doubt -- than the administrative case, which needs only substantial evidence. He claims that from this circumstance, it follows that the dismissal of the administrative case should carry with it the dismissal of the criminal case. While that may be true, it should likewise be stressed that the basis of administrative liability differs from criminal liability. The purpose of administrative proceedings is mainly to protect the public service, based on the time-honored principle that a public office is a public trust. On the other hand, the purpose of the criminal prosecution is the punishment of crime. The independent nature of a criminal prosecution dictates that the Sandiganbayan must determine petitioner's criminal liability without its hands being tied by what transpired in the administrative case. The court is duty-bound to exercise its i ndependent judgment.
5. Rules of Evidence
on the inspection reports submitted by its engineers who conducted the inspection of petitioner's electric service upon orders of the Commission. 11 Said inspection reports specify in detail the deficiencies incurred, and violations committed, by the petitioner resulting in the inadequacy of its service. We consider that said reports are sufficient to serve reasonably as bases of the decision in question Bantolino v. Coca Cola Bottlers: Administrative bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical niceties of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law The submission by respondent, citing that an affidavit not testified to in a trial, is mere hearsay evidence and has no real evidentiary value, cannot find relevance in the present case considering that a criminal prosecution requires a quantum of evidence different from that of an administrative proceeding. Under the Rules of the Commission, the Labor Arbiter is given the discretion to determine the necessity of a formal trial or hearing. Hence, trial-type hearings are not even required as the cases may be decided based on verified position papers, with supporting documents and their affidavits CSC v. Colanggo: Administrative rules of procedure are construed liberally to promote their objective and to assist parties in obtaining just, speedy and i nexpensive determination of their respective claims and defenses. Section 39 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides: xxx The investigation shall be conducted for the purpose of ascertaining the truth without necessarily adhering to technical rules applicable in judicial proceedings. It shall be conducted by the disciplining authority concerned or his authorized representatives.
Rules of Evidence: GRule: Apply the specific rules of the administrative agency. In the absence thereof, apply the general rules on procedure.
The provision above clearly states that the CSC, in investigating complaints against civil servants, is not bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence applicable in judicial proceedings.
Pervasive Principle: Admin agencies are not bound by the technical rules of evidence of ordinary courts so long as due process is observed. Applies in (1) Admissibility (2) Judicial Notice (3) Quantum of Evidence.
The CSC correctly appreciated the photocopies of PBET application form, picture seat plan and PDS (though not duly authenticated) in determining whether there was sufficient evidence to substantiate the charges against the respondent. Worth noting was that respondent never objected to the veracity of their contents. He merely disputed their admissibility on the ground that they were not authenticated.
Philippine Movie Pictures Association v. Premier Production: An ocular inspection of the establishment or premises involved is proper if the court finds necessary, but such is authorized only to help the court in clearing a doubt reaching a conclusion or finding the truth. In this case, the court merely acted on the strength of the ocular inspection it conducted on the premises of Premiere. The petition for lay-ff was the lack of work and financial losses. These allegations cannot be established by a mere inspection of the place of labor especially when such inspection was conducted at the request of the interested party. Estate of Florencio Buan v. Pambusco: Distinguishable from Premiere because the survey and ocular inspection was done only to find out the truth about the adequacy of service and was not meant to supplant actual trial. The Commission’s decision was not based solely on the survey, but considered all the evidence presented by the parties. Rizal Light v. Municipality of Morong: settled is the rule that in reviewing the decision of the Public Service Commission this Court is not required to examine the proof de novo and determine for itself whether or not the preponderance of evidence really justifies the decision. As stated earlier, the Commission based its decision
V. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS Judicial review keeps the admin agency within its jurisdiction and protects substantial rights of the parties affected by its decisions. Judicial review is proper in cases of lack of jurisdiction, error of law, grave abuse of discretion, fraud or collusion, or in case the admin decision is corrupt, arbitrary or capricious
A. Factors Affecting Finality of Administrative Decisions Switchmen’s Union of North America v National Mediation Board: Where Congress has not expressly authorized judicial review, the following become highly relevant in determining
whether judicial review may nonetheless be supplied (1) the type of problem involved (2) history of the statute in question. Fortich v. Corona: Thus, the act of the Office of the President in re-opening the case and substantially modifying its March 29,1996 Decision which had already become final and executory, was in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to administrative determinations. Antique v. Zayco: Even administrative decisions must and sometime, as fully as public policy demands that finality be written on judicial controversies. Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at some definite date fixed by law. The very object for which courts were instituted was to put an end to controversy Sotto v. Ruiz: If it is a question of law, then it is within the ambit of judicial review. Uy v. Palomar: The Postmaster General here asserts that his decision is beyond judicial review of the courts the same not having been given in the Postal Law. The SC here ruled that although the allegation of the Postmaster General is correct (GENERAL RULE), the absence of statutory provisions for judicial review does not necessarily mean that access to the courts is barred the exception being decisions of such agencies that exceed its authority or are palpably wrong. Manuel v. Villena: When there is grave abuse of discretion, judicial review is available. San Miguel v. Secretary of Labor: The issue was w/n an administrative decision may be reviewed by the court. The SC here again held the GENERAL RULE is NO, since the administrative agencies possess the necessary technical expertise to make the determinations on their own. However the EXCEPTION lies when there is: (1)Lack/excess of jurisdiction (2) Grave abuse of discretion (3) Error of law (4) Collusion (5) A Decision Illegal for violating or failing to comply with a mandatory provision of law (6) A decision that is corrupt, arbitrary, or capricious.
before the end of the fiscal year to avoid the reversion of the funds. The SC here held it as another EXCEPTION to the rule since appeal to the administrative hierarchy would be unavailing considering the urgency of the situation and the damage impending. Cipriano v. Marcelino: It is altogether too obvious that to require the petitioner Cipriano to go all the way to the President of the Philippines on appeal in the matter of the collection of the small total P949, would not only be oppressive but would be patently unreasonable. By the time her appeal shall have been decided by the President, the amount of much more than P949, which is the total sum of her claim, would in all likelihood have been spent. Corpuz v. Cuaderno: The Court held that appeals to the CSC and President are merely permissive and not mandatory as there are no laws requiring appeals exclusively to the President. Hence exception De Lara v. Clorivel: rule regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies may be relaxed when its application may cause great and irreparable damage which cannot otherwise be prevented except by taking the opportune appropriate action Paredes v. CA: The SC held that the exhaustion of remedies rule is applicable as the enabling law tasked the Cabinet to review and approve any proposed revisions of rates of fees and charges. Petitioners should have availed of this easy and accessible remedy instead of immediately resorting to the judicial process as the courts. Quasha v. SEC: The SC held that with just 6 days before the deadline there was no need to exhaust administrative remedies and that they properly filed the petition with the SC without going through the prescribed procedure of filing before the SEC en banc Republic v. Sandiganbayan: this case falls under 2 exceptions on the application of the doctrine: 1) estoppel on the part of the agency by laches; 2) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal amounting to lack of jurisdiction as it was beyond the power of the PCGG to issue the search and seizure orders. PAAT v. CA: Exceptions to exhaustion:
B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Requisites: (1) Administrative agency is performing a quasi judicial function (2) Judicial review is available (3) The court acts in its appellate jurisdiction Reasons/Purposes: exhaustion.
Legal: the law prescribes procedures
for
Practical: to give an agency the chance to correct itself and for purposes of expediency Remedy: Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Cause of Action. The same must be seasonably raised or deemed waived Pascual v. Provincial Board: The SC here held that the circumstances of the case were an exception to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies as what the case pertained to was a legal question (w/n an official’s acts during his first term may be subject of disciplinary charges during his 2nd term.) Alzate v. Aldana: A mandamus was filed by the principal of the school violating the rule on Exhaustion of Administrative remedies there being the need to have dispensation of the teacher’s salaries
1. There is violation of due process; 2. Issue involved is a purely legal question; 3. The admin action is patently illegal amounting to lack/excess of jurisdiction; 4. Estoppel on the agency's part; 5. There is irreparable injury; 6. Respondent is a dept. secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the Pres bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter; 7. To require exhaustion of admin remedies would be unreasonable; 8. It would amount to nullification of the claim; 9. Subject matter is private land in land case proceeding; 10. Rule does not provide a plain, speedy & adequate remedy; 11. Circumstances indicate the urgency of judicial intervention 12. Where the claim involved is small 13. Quo Warranto (Lopez v. City of Manila) DAR v. Apex Investment: Exception in this case: circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention; and the administrative action is patently illegal and amounts to lack or excess of jurisdiction
Smart v. NTC: In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need no exhaust administrative remedies before going to court as this principle applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power. The scope of judicial power includes the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments.
Regino v. Pangasinan Colleges: The CHED does not have the power to award damages. She could not have commenced her case before the CHED. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable when there is competence on the part of the administrative body to act upon the matter complained of. CSC v. Dept of Budget and Management: The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies applies only where there is an express legal provision requiring such administrative step as a condition precedent to taking action in court. CSC is not mandated by law to seek clarification from the DBM Secretary prior to filing this action. A direct invocation of the SC's original jurisdiction may be allowed where there are special and i mportant reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition
C. Primary Jurisdiction or Preliminary Resort There is a concurrence of jurisdiction between the court and the administrative agency such that there is a choice as to which body the relief shall be sought. This doctrine does not apply where the law grants exclusive jurisdiction to a body. Requisites: (1)Admin body and regular court have concurrent and original jurisdiction (2) Question to be resolved requires expertise of administrative agency (3) Legislative intent on the matter is to have uniformity in rulings (4) Administrative agency is performing a quasi-judicial function not rule making or quasi-legislative function. Doctrine is inapplicable: (1) Agency has exclusive jurisdiction (2) Issue is not within the competence of the admin body to act on (3) Issue involved is clearly a factual question. Effect: Case is not suspended but merely suspended. Grule: Courts will not intervene if the question to be resolved is one which requires the expertise of administrative agencies and the legislative intent on the matter is to have uniformity in the rulings. It can only occur where there is a concurrence of jurisdiction between the court and the admin agency. Texas v. Abilene: Courts will not intervene if the question to be resolved is one which requires the expertise of administrative agencies and the legislative intent on the matter is to have uniformity in the rulings. It can only occur where there is a concurrence of jurisdiction between the court and the administrative agency. It is a question of the court yielding to the agency because of the latter’s expertise, and does not amount to ouster of the court. Phil Global Communications v. Relova: Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction does not apply since NTC had no competence to act on questions which were purely legal. The doctrine calls for application
when there is such competence to act on the part of an administrative body. Industrial Enterprises v. CA: However, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then r elief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court. This is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. It applies "where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body, in such case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view.
D. Standing to Challenge Legal standing means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged The technical rules on standing comes from the general doctrine of separation of powers as there is a need for an actual case or controversy before judicial review becomes available Standing as opposed to real party-in-interest: the former is a constitutional law concept which only concerns the petitioner, while the latter is a concept in procedural law which concerns both the petitioner/plaintiff and the respondent/defendant. Note: Standing issue should be resolved in i ts own. No standing. No case. It is irrelevant whether or not the case is meritorious. The merits of the case should not be a factor in the consideration of locus standi. (Association of Data Processing) Ursal v. CTA: The rulings of the Board of Assessment Appeals did not "adversely affect" the city assessor. At most it was the City of Cebu that had been adversely affected in the sense that it could not thereafter collect higher realty taxes from the abovementioned property owners. Acting Collector v. CTA: Only persons, associations or corporations whose pecuniary and proprietary interests are adversely affected by a decision of the Collector of Internal Revenue, Commissioner of Customs, or provincial or city Board of Assessments Appeals may appeal to the CTA. Lozada v. v. COMELEC: Taxpayer's suit is proper only when the act complained of, which may include a legislative enactment or statute, involves the illegal expenditure of public funds. Taxpayer's suits cannot lie upon the mere generalized interest of all the citizens because such kind of interest is so abstract in nature. Concreteness of an injury, may it be actual or threatened, makes a dispute capable of judicial resolution. As taxpayers, petitioners may not file the petition, for nowhere therein is it alleged that tax money is being illegally spent. The act complained of is the inaction of the COMELEC to call a special election, as is allegedly its ministerial duty under the constitutional provision cited, and therefore, involves no expenditure of public funds.
Oposa v. Factoran: As to the propriety of generations yet unborn, it is valid under the concept of intergenerational responsibility with respect to the right to a balanced and healthy ecology. Joya v. PCGG: The term "interest" is material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Moreover, the interest of the party plaintiff must be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and related party. Kilosbayan v. Guingona: As a general rule, a person impugning validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement. An EXCEPTION to this is transcendental importance to the public in which case the Court wants to settle the issue definitively as soon as possible. Kilosbayan v. Morato: Questions of constitutionality: legal standing. Otherwise: real party in interest (because this is a civil case) Domingo v. Carague: Petitioners have not shown any direct and personal interest in the COA Organizational Restructuring Plan. There is no indication that they have sustained or are in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its implementation. Association of Data Processing v. Camp: Petitioner satisfied the test for standing. This case rejected the "legal interest" test and established that a plaintiff may sue provided he is "injured in fact.” 1. Legal
interest test
Old test used in prior cases; CA used this test and found petitioner without standing; Court, however, held here that this test was not fit to determine standing since it already involved the merits of the case which should not be. (See above, separate issue ang standing) 2. Public
interest test
Another test used by the CA to find petitioner without standing; Court ruled, however, that this was inapplicable since the test only applied to plaintiffs who were significantly involved to have standing to represent the public 3. Case
or controversy test
Introduced in Flast v. Cohen; capacity of dispute to be presented in an adversary context and in a form capable of judicial resolution. However, Court qualified that Flast was a taxpayer's suit whereas case at bar was a competitior's suit. (see Simon v Eastern Kentucky below) 4. Injury
in fact test
Whether the plaintiff alleges that the challenged action has caused him injury in fact, economic or otherwise. Petitioner alleged probably profit loss from the new competitor. 5. Zone
of interest test
Whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question; a measure of self-restraint for the Court.
Sierra v. Morton: No injury-in-fact showed because the Petitioner asserted no individualized harm to itself or its members. Supreme Court held that the Sierra Club, in its corporate capacity, lacked standing. Lujan v. National Wildlife: Respondent failed to show 2 requisites to claim right to judicial review: 1) person must specify a final agency action that affects him; 2) person must prove that he is adversely affected by the final agency action within the meaning of regular statute. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: Standing requires a concrete, discernible injury—actual or imminent and not a "conjectural or hypothetical one"—injury in fact this is the first of 3 elements of constitutional minimum for standing: 2) causal connection between injury and act complained of; 3.) it is likely as opposed to speculative that injury will be redressed by a favorable decision
E. Ripeness Fitness of issues for judicial determination. Abbot v Gardner: The basic rationale of ripeness is (1) to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also (2) to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties. TWO-FOLD ASPECT/TEST: 1. FITNESS for judicial decision: Purely legal questions agreed upon by both parties (only questions of law; should NOT involve policy making function) 2. HARDSHIP OF PARTIES of withholding Court consideration: (1) Must be a final agency action There is no hint that this regulation is informal or only the ruling of a subordinate official, or tentative. (2) Consider: added cost to parties, possibility of instituting a criminal action against disobedient party, etc. National Automatic Laundry v. Schultz: Ripeness involves an inquiry to; 1) the finality; but also to 2) the presumption of reviewability of issues. General Ripeness Considerations are; 1) WON there is a congressional intent to negative judicial review, 2) the possibility of courts entangling themselves in abstract disagreement over administrative policies due to premature adjudication; and 3) the fitness of issues for judicial determination and hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.
VI. MODES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 1987 CONSTITUTION: Article IX Sec. 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members, any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of is submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. BP 129 Sec 9. (See Rule 43 also) The Court of Appeals shall exercise:
Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction; Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts; and Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decision, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of sub-paragraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph 4 of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
B. Certiorari Requisites: (1) Lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (2) No plain, adequate or speedy remedy. (3) Administrative agency performing a quasi judicial function. It cannot be invoked if it is a ministerial function. Purpose: To set aside and nullify proceedings. St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC: In the case of NLRC decisions, the intent of the legislature was to make a special civil action for certiorari as the proper vehicle for review. Thus, all references in the law to “appeals” from the NLRC to the SC must be interpreted to mean petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. All such petitions must initially be filed in the CA following the hierarchy of courts. Police Commission v. Bello: While findings of facts of administrative bodies are entitled to great weight and should not generally be disturbed, there is grave abuse of discretion justifying the issuance of the writ of certiorari when there is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility amounting to an evasion of positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law. Purefoods v. NLRC: It must emphatically be reiterated, since so often is it overlooked, that the special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. Villaruel v. NLRC: A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court does not include a correction of its evaluation of the evidence but is confined to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion is committed when the judgment is rendered in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner. Hadji Sirad v. CSC: Doctrine of case is that a special civil action for certiorari can only be taken when there is no other plain and speedy remedy. Here there was one as instead of going directly to the SC, an appeal from the CSC decision finding her guilty of grave misconduct could have been taken to the CA by appeal.
C. Prohibition
It is preventive and not for acts already performed. Issues on the same grounds as certiorari. Not only quasi-judicial but also ministerial. (1) Grave Abuse and (2) No other speedy remedy. Purpose: To prohibit or stop proceedings. Chua Hiong v. Deportation Board: . If the alienage of the Chua Hiong is not denied, the Board's jurisdiction and its proceedings are unassailable; if the respondent is admittedly a citizen, or conclusively shown to be such, the Board lacks jurisdiction and its proceedings are null and void ab initio and may be summarily enjoined in the courts. When the evidence submitted by a respondent is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to immediate review should also be recognized and the courts should promptly enjoin the deportation proceedings. However, it is neither expedient nor wise that the ri ght to a judicial determination should be allowed in all cases; i t should be granted only in cases when the courts themselves believe that there is substantial evidence supporting the claim of citizenship, so substantial that there are reasonable grounds for the belief that the claim is correct. In other words, the remedy should be allowed only in the sound discretion of a competent court in a proper proceeding.\ Co v. Deportation Board: While doctrine of primary jurisdiction wherein the administrative agency, such as the Deportation Board in this case, must be given the opportunity to decide the matter before it before the courts could intervene, the doctrine is not applied in proper cases where right to immediate judicial review should be recognized such as in this case as recognized in Calacday v Vivo where it stated that the Chua Hiong decision is an exception to the rule. Paredes v. CA: SC said that prohibition is granted only where no other remedy which is sufficient to afford redress is available. Here, the law itself provided that increases of rates would still have to be approved by the cabinet, since the approval was not yet given, prohibition is premature.
D. Mandamus Mandamus is an order compelling a party to perform an act arising out of a positive duty imposed by law. It will only lie against a ministerial duty when the official/agency refuses to exercise it. It will not lie to enforce a contractual obligation. Specific performance is the remedy. Requisites: (1) Duty is ministerial (2) Petitioner has a clear and controlling right (3) No other plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Blanco v. Board of Examiners: SC said that mandamus does not lie, duty of the Secretary was discretionary to confirm or not confirm the results, he had to determine w/n the results were credible. Act of confirming is NOT a ministerial duty. Ng Gioc Lu v. DFA: act of issuing a visa is discretionary, particularly because the consular office in China is in the best position to determine w/n the return of Ng Gioc Lu to the Philippines is a threat to public safety. Policarpio v. Phil. Veterans Board: Mandamus does not lie when the action calls for the review of an action or decision of a Board granted with discretion, and when such action or decision involves the construction of the law and the application of the facts thereto.
Tan v. Veterans Backpay Commission: Mandamus lies because after proving that Tan was a member of a guerilla organization recognized by the US army, it becomes ministerial to approve the release of backpay. Pangasinan v. Reparation Commission: Reparations goods were not transferred to Pangasinan because respondent did not yet sign the contract to convey the goods to the province. SC said mandamus will not lie to enforce contractual obligations. Mandamus is based on the ministerial duty imposed by law, while specific performance is based on contract. Cruz v. CA: Mandamus will not issue to (1) compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do (2) give the applicxnt anything to which he is not entitled to law. It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed. PRC v. De Guzman: Filed petition for mandamus to compel the PRC to register them as licensed physicians, but SC said that mandamus will not lie as such registration is discretionary because licenses shall be issued only to those who have “satisfactorily complied with the requirements of the Board”, the operative word is satisfactorily, the determination of satisfactory compliance is discretionary.
E. Declaratory Relief May be brought by a person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument or by a person whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation or ordinance before breach or violation of his right. The power to grant declaratory relief is discretionary with the courts and they may refuse to exercise the power to declare rights and to construe i nstruments in cases where; 1. A decision would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy which gave rise to the action; and 2. In any case where the declaration of construction not necessary and proper at the time and under all circumstances.
Requisites: (1) Subject matter must be a deed, will contract or written instrument in which the petitioner is legally interested, or governmental regulation which affects his rights. (2) Terms of the written instrument are doubtful and requires construction (3) Filed before breach. (4) Actual justiciable controversy (5) ripe for adjudication (6) administrative remedies have been exhausted, adequate means are still available through other forms of action or proceeding Azajar v. Ardalles: Azajar brought an action for declaratory relief to declare his citizenship. SC said declaratory relief is the improper remedy, there is a proper administrative procedure for the declaration of citizenship, it must be what must be resorted to. De Borja v. Villadolid: SC said declaratory relief would not lie since it should be filed before the breach of law, here there has already been a breach, he proceeded to catch fish without a license, he should have sought declaratory relief first before proceeding without a license. NDSC v. Meer: SC said that the removal of the proviso was to make the application discretionary, the law would allow the
taxpayer the remedy of declaratory relief when the tax is not yet due, but not when it is due. DR is no proper when a taxpayer questions his tax liability. Remedy is to pay first then sue afterwards for recovery so that there is no delay in collection of taxes./ Mirando v. Wellington: Requisites for the applicability of DR: 1) Justiciable controversy; 2) Adverse interests between parties 3) petitioner has Legal Interest in the controversy; 4) Ripeness. Not all are present thus it must fail for lack of sufficient cause of action.
F. Habeas Corpus The great writ of liberty is intended as a speedy remedy to secure the release of a person deprived of his liberty. Requisites: (1) There is illegal confinement or detention (2) Illegal restrain of liberty (3) Rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. Mejoff v. Director of Prison: . 2 Habeas Corpus cases – 1st, denied because his detention was necessary for the process of his deportation, 2nd was granted because it was for an unreasonable length of time (2 years), the government could have adequately found ways to repatriate him to Russia. Here, it was shown that the writ does not apply to Philippine citizens alone. Co v. Deportation Board: Habeas corpus may issue in deportation cases "in cases when the courts themselves believe that there is substantial evidence supporting the claim of citizenship, so substantial that there are reasonable grounds for the belief that the claim is correct, In other words, the remedy should be allowed only in sound discretion of a competent court in a proper proceeding. Lucien Tran v. Liwag: Habeas corpus petition mooted by the fact that he posted bail and hence is already granted liberty. Also, other events have supervened, deportation proceedings have actually taken place and hence his arrest, although initially illegal, is now legal as it is for the purpose of the proceedings.
G. Injunction as a Provisional Remedy It is an ancillary remedy provided to preserve the petitioner’s rights while the main action is pending. It may be used (1) to prevent the commission of certain acts complained of (2) Order the continued performance of some act for the purpose of preventing injury. Grounds: (1) Plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded (2) Commission or continuance of act would probably work injustice to him (3) Defendant is doing, threatens or about to do an act in violation of petitioners right which may r ended the judgment ineffective. If plaintiff wins, injunction is permanent. If he loses, dissolved. Types: i. Preliminary Mandatory Injunction – Plaintiff wants to compel defendant to do something ii. Preliminary Injunction – To prevent or to stop defendant from doing something iii. Restraining Order – Life span is 20 days then hearing is held to decide propriety of injunction iv. Permanent injunction – If plaintiff wins the case, injunction becomes permanent.
Collector v Reyes: Injunction cannot be had when a taxpayer questions his tax liability. However, SC saw an exception (Sec. 11 of RA 1125): “When in the CTA’s opinion, the collection by BIR may jeopardize the Government’s and/or the taxpayer’s interest, the court may at any stage suspend the old collection Pineda v. Lantin: CFI has no jurisdiction to grant the prohibition. Orders of the SEC commissioner may be reviewed only by the SC. Lemi v. Valencia: When the law requires a hearing before the denial of an application to operate a radio station, the seizure of the station’s radio equipment is illegal. The preliminary mandatory injunction ordering the return of the confiscated transmitter is proper. Courts should exercise great care in issuing a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction bec it requires one of the parties to perform a positive act, as opposed to merely maintaining the status quo. *Preliminary Mandatory Injunction will be granted in the following cases: (1) Cases of extreme urgency (2) Where petitioner’s right is clear (3) Relative inconvenience are strongly in his favor (4) There is a willful invasion of petitioner’s right, injury being a continuous one (5) Restore the status quo. Honda v. San Diego: Writ of injunction/prohibition may be issued against a court only by a superior court. Nocnoc v. Vera: Maranang filed in the CFI a complaint for injunction to enjoin execution. CFI granted, saying that it could take cognizance of the complaint as it was a court of general jurisdiction, despite the fact that it had no appellate jurisdiction. CFI may not enjoin the WCU. The proper forum to question the validity of WCU’s award is the Workmen’s Compensation Commission, then to the SC if appealed further. “Court of general jurisdiction” is merely descriptive and does not confer jurisdiction.
VII. EXTENT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW A. Law and Fact Distinction The distinction between law and fact is important to make because reviewing courts can look into determinations of fact by the lower courts (bodies) only if the same are unsupported by substantial evidence. If they are so supported, then the appellate courts are bound to such findings of fact. Questions of law, however, are always reviewable by the higher courts. The distinction, for practical purposes seem empty. Lawyers can validly argue that a question of fact is in fact a question of law because when the interpretation of the law is necessarily related to the determination of the facts, then they form part of the review and are too questions of law which the appellate court may look into. Dauan v. Secretary: The records of the Bureau of Lands had been destroyed so circumstantial evidence had to be introduced, and the rule now is that the conclusion drawn from these facts is a conclusion of law which the courts may review. Reyes v. Reyes: The law presumes that the worker had died in the ordinary course of his employment. The employer must present substantial evidence to overcome this presumption, which the employer failed to do. (Sufficiency of evidence to overcome a presumption of law is a question of law) Aboitiz v. Pepito: The claim only stated that the crew member was missing; thus when the petitioner failed to controvert the
claim, it only admitted that the crew member was missing, not that he was dead. Non-controversion in compensation cases (and ordinary civil cases) simply means admissions of facts, not conclusions of law. (The question of law herein is the question of whether the crew member is dead or not.)
B. Question of Law A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. What may be questioned? (1)Constitutionality of the Statute creating the agency and granting its powers; (2) Validity of the agency action if this transcends the limit established by law; (3) Correctness of the agency’s interpretation and application of the law.
Ortua v Singson Encarnacion: However, any action of the Director of Lands which is based upon a misconstruction of the law can be corrected by the courts. The question of law herein is Ortua’s citizenship Mejia v. Mapa: SC is not unmindful of the doctrine that “a decision rendered by the Director of Lands and approved by the Secretary upon a question of fact is conclusive and not subject to be reviewed by the courts.” But this does not apply herein, because here the decision of the Director was NOT approved, but was revoked by the Secretary Ysmael v. Santos: The argument against “majority” is contrary to the findings of fact of the lower court, which was based on a list of the salesmen or agents affiliated to the Union. Hence, said findings may not be disturbed in this proceeding for review by certiorari . O’Leary v. Brown Pacific Maxon: The determination of W/N the accident arose out of, or in the course of Valek’s employment is a question of law that is cognizable by the courts. The question of W/N an employer-employee relationship existed between Valak and BPMI is also a question of law All that is required is that the "obligations or conditions" of employment create the "zone of special danger" out of which the injury arose. O’Keefe v. Smith: Inferences drawn by the DC are to be accorded great weight, unless they are unsupported by substantial evidence. SC held that the DC was correct in finding that the conditions of employment created the “zone of special danger” out of which the injury arose.
C. Question of Fact A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts, or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence, considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation. Reviewing courts can look into determinations of fact by lower courts ONLY if the same are unsupported by substantial evidence. Questions of law, however, are always reviewable by higher courts.
General Rule: Finality is attached o findings of fact of some agencies when these findings are supported by substantial evidence and as long as there is no grave abuse of discretion.
agency's conclusion must be substantial in consideration of the record as a whole, even including the evidence that is not consistent with the agency's conclusion.
A question of fact is raised when the issue involved is:
Notes: Sir says you must look at the evidence at a whole, the CA (penned by Learned Hand ) ignored the examiners report.
1. W/N a certain thing exists; or
D. Questions of Discretion
2. W/N an event has taken place; or
DISCRETIONARY
3. Which version of events, among 2 or more, are correct. Gonzales v. Victory Labor Union: Employees were dismissed for pilferage. Substantial evidence rule is that findings of fact will not be disturbed on appeal as long as they are supported by substantial evidence. Acting Commissioner v. Meralco: The SC is bound by the finding of facts of the CTA, which enjoys wide discretion in construing tax statutes. The CTA is dedicated exclusively to the study and consideration of tax problems and has necessarily developed an expertise on the subject. The CTA’s determination of insulating oil as within the meaning of insulators is thus accorded respect
MINISTERIAL
Power or right conferred upon agencies to act officially under certain circumstances, according to the dictates of their own judgment and conscience and not controlled by the judgment of others
A response to a duty which has been positively imposed by law and its performance required at a time and in a manner or upon conditions specifically designated. Not dependent upon the officer’s judgment or discretion
Power to make a choice among permissive action or policies. Person or persons exercising it may choose which of several courses of action should be followed
Nothing is left to discretion. It is a simple definite duty arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist
Meralco v. NLRC: SC has ruled that the ground for an employer's dismissal of an employee needs to be established only by substantial evidence. Lameyra v. Pangilinan: Held: No substantial Evidence. SC was not convinced that the certification of the personnel officer that petitioner did not report for work from July 6, 1995 to August 6, 1995 constitutes such substantial evidence in light of the petitioner’s submission that said personnel officer precisely prevented him from signing the log book. Under these circumstances, petitioner should be given a last full opportunity to prove his contention that the termination of his services was illegal. German Marine Agencies v. NLRC: Award of sickness wages case. Whether or not petitioners actually paid the balance of the sickness wages to private respondent is a factual question. In the absence of proof that the labor arbiter or the NLRC had gravely abused their discretion, the Court shall deem conclusive and cannot be compelled to overturn this particular factual finding Velasquez v. Hernandez: Held: There was substantial evidence. SC says that 20 sworn statements of teachers are sufficient. Only 3 desisted but it is of no moment because administrative actions cannot be made to depend upon the will of every complainant who may, for one reason or another, condone a detestable act. CSC v. Cayobit: Person who said that 84% siya sa CSC exam but in truth 40% lang! Quantum of evidence required is only substantial in administrative proceedings. Hence the masterlist, being the primary record of the passers, is sufficient evidence to dismiss the employee. Office of the Ombudsman v.Santos: Case of the principal who stole Yero’s (galvanized iron sheets) Since the decision of the Ombudsman was supported by substantial evidence, the SC sustained saying: “We affirm all the other findings of the Office of the Ombudsman. The testimonial and documentary evidence contained in the records constitutes substantial evidence to prove the administrative liability of respondent,” Universal Camera v. NLRB: Dean says that this is the leading case in substantial evidence. Doctrine: The evidence supporting the
GRule: Courts have no power to substitute their own judgments with that of the administrative official. Because it is a recognition of the expertise of the agency. Except: When there is grave abuse of discretion. Laguna Tayabas Bus v. PSC: Provisional permit for buses case. Super Memory Jolter: This is the case where Sir made the historic speech about being PRECISE and CUTTING EDGE! Doctrine: Just because there was a difference or erroneous appreciation of the competing facts presented before the officer, the court will not substitute its judgment with that of the PSC. No grave abuse of discretion is present. The only time when it could be reversed (1) such order is without reasonable support in evidence (2) such was rendered in violation of the law Manila Trading v. Zulueta: CIR ordered the ER to just suspend an EE who was found guilty to breach his duty. SC says: “An employer cannot legally be compelled to continue with the employment of a person who admittedly was guilty of misfeasance or malfeasance towards his employer, and whose continuance in the service of the latter is patently inimical to his interests.” Hence, there was grave abuse of discretion in this case. Kapisanan v. Noriel and Federation of Free Workers v. Noriel: Sir says these labor cases should be studied in tandem. Basic doctrine: When the 30% requirement in the certification election has been met, then BLR is divested of the discretion to decide WON a certification election must be held. It is duty bound to grant it. If 30% is NOT met, then BLR has the discretion WON a certification election must be held when the circumstances dictate. PLDT v. NTC: NTC, as the governmental agency charged with passing upon applications for Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity in the field of telecommunications, is authorized to determine what the specific operating and technical requirements
of "public convenience telecommunications.
and
necessity" are
in the
field
of
VIII. ENFORCEMENT OF AGENCY ACTION
B. Writ of Execution; Mandamus GRule: Administrative agencies performing quasi-judicial functions have the implied power to issue writs of execution. When the law is silent, presume that the agency has the power to enforce its decisions emanating from its QJ powers.
The General Rule is that the manner in which administrative decisions are enforced are to be found in the enabling statute. Legislature does this by providing mechanisms (i.e. contempt, cease and desist) in the statute governing the agency in order to put teeth into admin actions.
Exception: When the enabling law expressly provides otherwise.
A. Res Judicata; Finality of Judgment
Vda de Corpuz v. Commanding General Phil Army: Petition for mandamus by petitioner was granted because a final and executory award entities petitioner to its enforcement according to its letter. It is not susceptible of any change or alteration by the officer charged with its implementation as the latter's duty on the matter constitutes only a ministerial act that does not call for the exercise of discretion
Requisites:1. Former final judgment; 2. Rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; 3. Judgment on the merits; 4. there being, between the first and second action:[a) identity of parties, b)subject matter and c) cause of action.
Apolega v. Hizon: As the law now stands, the power to enforce awards under the Workmen's Compensation Act is expressly vested in the Commission or the duly deputized officials in the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor (previously it was the regular courts of justice which could enforce awards)
It only applies to judicial or quasi judicial proceedings and not to the exercise of purely administrative functions. Administrative proceedings are non-litigous and summary in nature.
Note: Sir says, what if the writ of execution is ignored? Look at Vda. De Corpuz,you must file a petition for mandamus
Ipekdjian v. CTA: Board of Tax Appeal’s decisions have judicial character if they were not subsequently brought before the CFI or Court of Tax Appeals. They were in a sense judicially confirmed hence it attained the character of finality.
Ambrosio v. Salvador: The Court of First Instance cannot issue a writ of injunction or prohibition against the Court of Industrial Relations because the CIR is equal in rank with the Court of First Instance. Thus, the Injunction was an Unwarranted Interference of the Writ of Execution of the NLRC.
Nasipit v. NLRC: The principle of res judicata may not be invoked in labor relations proceedings considering that Section 5, Rule XIII, Book V of the IRR of the Labor Code provides that such proceedings are "non-litigious and summary in nature without regard to legal technicalities obtaining in courts of law Dulay v. Minister of Natural Resources: The rule of res judicata which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi judicial acts of public, executive or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction. The decisions and orders of administrative agencies rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have, upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata Note: Res Judicata is a judicial doctrine hence it only applies to quasi-judicial agencies. Phil American General Insurance Company v. CA: The cause of action in the marine protest was to enforce the administrative liability of the shipmaster/captain of M/V "Crazy Horse", its officers and crew for the wreckage and sinking of the subject vessel. The cause of action in the 2nd is to enforce the civil liability the common carrier, for its failure to unload the subject cargo within a period of time considered unreasonably long by the petitioner. No identity of CoA hence Res judicata not present. Manila Electric Co. V. Phil Consumers: Requisites for res judicata to apply (1) There must be a final judgment or order (2) Court rendering it must have jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter (3) Must be a judgment on the merits (4) Identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action.
Merano v. Tutaan: Labor Arbiter refused to enforce NLRC decision. His remedy against the refusal or inaction the LA to enforce NLRC awards/decision, is to call the NLRC’s attention to the alleged nonfeasance and NOT to file a mandamus action in CFI which has no jurisdiction to interfere with the execution of a final judgment of the NLRC. (Again because NLRC is equal with CFI) GSIS v. CSC: The grant to a tribunal or agency of adjudicatory power, or the authority to hear and adjudge cases, should normally and logically be deemed to include the grant of authority to enforce or execute the judgments. (As sir says: if it doesn’t have the power to execute, “inutile agency”) Clavano v. HLURB: Case where the HLURB modified its FINAL decision by ordering the petitioners to also pay the registration fees. Since, The decision has long become final and, has also been completely satisfied. HLURB is thus left with no other authority but to enforce the dispositive part of its Decision which it can no longer amend, modify or alter in a manner affecting the merits of the judgment.
