Aratuc vs. COMELEC 88 SCRA 251 FACTS: On April 7, 1978, election for the position of Representative to the Batasang Pambansa were held throughout the Philippines. The cases at bar concern only the results of the elections in Region XII which comprises the provinces of Lanao Del Sur, Lanao Del Norte, Maguindanao, North Cotabato and Sultan Kudarat, and the cities of Marawi, Iligan and Cotabato. Tomatic Aratuc sought the suspension of the canvass then being undertaken by Regional Board of Canvassers in Cotabato City and in which, the returns in 1,966 out of 4,107 voting centers in the whole region had already been canvassed showing partial results. A Supervening Panel headed by Commissioner of Election Hon. Venancio S. Duque had conducted the hearings of the complaints of the petitioners therein of the alleged irregularities in the election records of the mentioned provinces. On July 11, 1978, the Regional Board of Canvassers issued a resolution, over the objection of the Konsensiya ng Bayan candidates, declaring all the eight Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan candidates elected. Appeal was taken by the KB candidates to the Comelec. On January 13, 1979, the Comelec issued its questioned resolution declaring seven KBL candidates and one KB candidate as having obtained the first eight places, and ordering the Regional Board of Canvassers to proclaim the winning candidates. The KB candidates interposed the present petition. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Comelec has committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction. HELD: “As the Superior administrative body having control over boards of canvassers, the Comelec may review the actuations of the Regional Board of Canvassers, such as by extending its inquiry beyond the election records of the voting centers in questions.” “The authority of the Commission is in reviewing such actuations does not spring from any appellant jurisdiction conferred by any provisions of the law, for there is none such provision anywhere in the election Code, but from the plenary prerogative of direct control and supervision endowed to it by the provisions in Section 168. And in administrative law, it is a too well settled postulate to need any supporting citation here, that a superior body or office having supervision and control over another may do directly what the latter is supposed to do or ought to have done.
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Maceda vs. Energy Regulatory Board G.R no. 96266 FACTS: Private respondents filed an application for oil price increase was granted by public no. the provisional increase. On December 18, 1990 the court dismissed the petition and reaffirm ERB’s provisional increase without hearing pursuant to Sec. 8 of E.O no. 172. Prior to the issuance of said order, a hearing was conducted but the petitioner failed to appear at said hearing .The petitioner contends that the provisional increase in the prices of petroleum violated due process for having been issued without notice and hearing. ISSUE: Whether or not ERB orders granting provisional oil increase without prior notice is valid. HELD: Yes, it is valid. While E. O 172, a hearing is indispensable, it does not preclude the board from ordering ex-parte, a provisional increase, subject to final disposition of whether or not: to make it permanent; to reduce or increase it further; to deny the application. Sec. 3, par. e is akin to temporary restraining order. It outlines the jurisdiction of the grounds for which it may decree a price adjustment, subject of notice and hearing. However, under Sec. 8, it may order the price increase provisionally, without need of hearing, subject to final outcome of the proceeding. The Board is not prevented from conducting a hearing on the grant of provisional authority, however, it cannot be stigmatized later if it failed to conduct one.
Maria Elena Malaga, et al. vs. Manuel R. Penachos Jr. et al. 2
GR No. 86695 September 3, 1992 FACTS: The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-qualification, Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) caused the publication for an Invitation to Bid for the construction of a Micro Laboratory Building. The notice announced that the last day for submission of prequalification requirements (PRE-C1) was 2 December 1988, and that the bids would be opened on 12 December 1988 at 3 pm. Petitioners Malaga and Najarro submitted their PRE-C1 at 2pm of 2 December 1988 while petitioner Occena submitted on 5 December 1988. All three were not allowed to participate in the bidding because their documents were considered late, having been submitted after the cut-off time of 10 am of 2 December 1988. On 12 December, petitioners file a complaint with the RTC against the chairman and PBAC members, claiming that although they submitted their PRE-C1 on time, the PBAC refused without just cause to accept them. On the same date, respondent Judge Labaquin issued a restraining order prohibiting PBAC from conducting the bidding and awarding the project. On 16 December, defendants filed a motion to lift the restraining order on the ground that the Court was prohibited from issuing restraining orders, preliminary injunctions and preliminary mandatory injunctions by PD No. 1818, which provides: “Section 1. No court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order… in any case, dispute, or controversy involving an infrastructure project… of the government… to prohibit any person or persons, entity or government official from proceeding with, or continuing the execution or implementation of any such project…” Plaintiffs argue against the applicability of PD No. 1818, pointing out that while ISCOF was a state college, it had its own charter and separate existence and was not part of the national government or of any local political subdivision; that even if PD No. 1818 were applicable, the prohibition presumed a valid and legal government project, not one tainted with anomalies like the project at bar. On 2 January 1989, the RTC lifted the restraining order and denied the petition for preliminary injunction. It declared that the building sought to be constructed was an infrastructure project of the government falling within the coverage of PD 1818. ISSUE: Whether or not the ISCOF is considered a government instrumentality such that it would necessarily fall under the prohibition in PD 1818. HELD: Yes, the 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as follows: Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and GOCC’s. The same Code describes a chartered institution thus: Chartered Institution—refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This includes state universities and colleges, and the monetary authority of the state. It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered institution and is therefore covered by PD 1818. HOWEVER, it is apparent that the present controversy did not arise from the discretionary acts of the administrative body nor does it involve merely technical matters. What is involved here is non-compliance with the procedural rules on bidding which required strict observance. PD 1818 was not intended to shield from judicial scrutiny irregularities committed by administrative agencies such as the anomalies in the present case. Hence, the challenged restraining order was not improperly issued by the respondent judge and the writ of preliminary injunction should not have been denied.
Beja Sr. vs. Court of Appeals 3
207 SCRA 689 FACTS: Fidencio Beja Sr. an employee of Philippine ports authority, hired as Arrastre supervisor in 1975. and later on appointed as terminal supervisor in 1988. On October 21, 1988, the General Manager, Rogelio A. Dayan filed administrative case against Beja Sr. and Villaluz for grave dishonesty. Grave misconduct willful violation of reasonable office rules and regulations and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Consequently they were preventively suspended for the charges. After preliminary investigation conducted by the district attorney for region X, administrative case no. 11-04-88 was considered closed for lack of merit. On December 13, 1988 another administrative case was filed against Beja by the PPA manager also for dishonesty grave misconduct violation of office rules and regulations, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and for being notoriously undesirable. Beja was also placed under preventive suspension pursuant to sec. 412 of PD No. 807. The case was redocketed as administrative case n o. PPA-AAB-1-049-89 and thereafter, the PPA indorsed it to the AAB for appropriate action. The AAB proceeded to hear the case and gave Beja an opportunity to present evidence. However, on February 20, 1989, Beja filed petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental. Two days later, he filed with the ABB a manifestation and motion to suspend the hearing of administrative case no. PPA-AAB-1-049-89 on account of the pendency of the certiorari proceeding before the court. AAB denied the motion and continued with the hearing of the administrative case. Thereafter, Beja moved for the dismissal of the certiorari case and proceeded to file before the Court for a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. ISSUE: Wether or not the Administrative Action Board of DOTC has jurisdiction over administrative cases involving personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager of the Philippine Ports Authority, an attached agency of DOTC. HELD: The PPA General Manager is the disciplining authority who may, by himself and without the approval of the PPA Board of Directors, subject a respondent in an administrative case to preventive suspension. His disciplining powers are sanctioned not only by Sec.8 of PD no. 857 but also by Sec. 37 of PD no. 807 granting the heads of agencies the “Jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary actions against officers and employees in the PPA. With respect to the issue, the Court qualifiedly rules in favor of the petitioner. The PPA was created through PD no. 505 dated July 1974. Under the Law, the corporate powers of the PPA were vested in a governing Board of Directors known as the Philippine Ports Authority Council. Sec. 5(i) of the same decree gave the council the power “to appoint, discipline and remove, and determine the composition of the technical staff of the authority and other personnel”. On December 23, 1975, PD no. 505 was substituted by PD no. 857 sec. 4(a) thereof created the Philippine Ports Authority which would be attached to the then Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communication. When Executive order no. 125 dated January 30, 1987 reorganizing the Ministry of Transportation and Communication was issued, the PPA retained its attached status. Administrative Code of 1987 classiffied PPA as an attached agency to the DOTC. Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, the other two being supervision and control and administrative supervision, “Attachment” is defined as the “lateral relationship between the department or its equivalent and the attached agency or corporation for purposes of policy and program coordination”. An attached agency has a larger measure of independence from the Department to which it is attached than one which is under departmental supervision and control or administrative supervision. This is borne out by the “lateral relationship” between the Department and the attached agency. The attachment is merely for policy and program coordination.” With respect to administrative matters, the independence of an attached agency from the department control and supervision is furthermore reinforced by the fact that even an agency under a Department’s administrative supervision is free from Departmental interference with respect to appointments and other personnel actions “ in accordance with the decentralization of personnel functions” under the administrative Code of 1987. The Law impliedly grants the general Manager with the approval of the PPA board of Directors the power to investigate its personnel below the rank of Assistant Manager who may be charged with an administrative offense. During such investigation, the PPA General Manager, may subject the employee concerned to preventive suspension. The investigation should be conducted in accordance with the procedure set out in Sec. 38 of PD no. 807. The Decision of the Court of Appeal is AFFIRMED as so far as it upholds the power of the PPA General Manager to to subject petitioner to preventive suspension and REVERSED insofar as it validates the 4
jurisdiction of the DOTC and/or the AAB to act on administrative case no. PPA –AAB-1-049-89. The AAB decision in said cased is hereby declared NULL and VOID and the case is REMANDED to the PPA whose General Manager shall conduct with dispatch its reinvestigation.
Ursal vs. CTA 101 Phil. 209 FACTS: Genaro Ursal as City Assessor of Cebu in the exercise of his powers assessed for taxation certain real properties of Consuelo Noel and Jesusa Samson in the City of Cebu, and 5
that upon protest of the taxpayers, the Cebu Board of Assessment Appeals reduced the assessments. It also shows he took the matter to the Court of Tax Appeals insisting on his valuation; but said Court refused to entertain the appeal saying it was late, and, besides, the assessor had no personality to bring the matter before it under section 11 of Republic Act No. 1125, which reads as follows: SEC. 11. Who may appeal; effect of appeal. — Any person, association or corporation adversely affected by a decision or ruling of the Collector of Internal Revenue, the Collector of Customs or any provincial or city Board of Assessment Appeals may file an appeal in the Court of Tax Appeals within thirty days after the receipt of such decision or ruling. ISSUE: Whether or not Genaro Ursal as City Assessor of Cebu have the personality to resort to the Court of Tax Appeals on his valuation on the taxes of Consuelo and Jesusa Samson. HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals, the petitioner has no personality to bring before the CTA. Supreme Court stressed out that “The rulings of the Board of Assessment Appeals did not "adversely affect" him. At most it was the City of Cebu 1 that had been adversely affected in the sense that it could not thereafter collect higher realty taxes from the abovementioned property owners. His opinion, it is true had been overruled; but the overruling inflicted no material damage upon him or his office. And the Court of Tax Appeals was not created to decide mere conflicts of opinion between administrative officers or agencies.” Republic Act No. 1125 creating the Court of Tax Appeals did not grant it blanket authority to decide any and all tax disputes. Defining such special court's jurisdiction, the Act necessarily limited its authority to those matters enumerated therein.
Sea-Land Service Inc. vs. Court of Appeals 357 SCRA 441 FACTS: Sea-Land Service Incorporated (SEA-LAND), an American international shipping company licensed by the Securities and Exchange Commission to do business in the Philippines entered into a contract with the United States Government to transport military 6
household goods and effects of U. S. military personnel assigned to the Subic Naval Base. From the aforesaid contract, SEA-LAND derived an income for the taxable year 1984 amounting to P58,006,207.54. During the taxable year in question, SEA-LAND filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) the corresponding corporate Income Tax Return (ITR) and paid the income tax due thereon of 1.5% as required in Section 25 (a) (2) of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) in relation to Article 9 of the RP-US Tax Treaty, amounting to P870,093.12. “Claiming that it paid the aforementioned income tax by mistake, a written claim for refund was filed with the BIR on 15 April 1987. However, before the said claim for refund could be acted upon by public respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue, petitionerappellant filed a petition for review with the CTA docketed as CTA Case No. 4149, to judicially pursue its claim for refund and to stop the running of the two-year prescriptive period under the then Section 243 of the NIRC. “On 21 February 1995, CTA rendered its decision denying SEALAND’s claim for refund of the income tax it paid in 1984.” On March 30, 1995, petitioner appealed the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals to the Court of Appeals. After due proceedings, on October 26, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision dismissing the appeal and affirming in toto the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has committed grave abused of discretion. HELD: The Supreme Court denied the petition for lack of merit. The Court sees no reason to reverse the ruling of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals. The Supreme “Court will not set aside lightly the conclusion reached by the Court of Tax Appeals which, by the very nature of its function, is dedicated exclusively to the consideration of tax problems and has necessarily developed an expertise on the subject, unless there has been an abuse or improvident exercise of authority.” Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err or gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing the petition for review
Far East Bank and Trust Company vs. Court of Tax Appeals 477 SCRA 49 FACTS: Far East Bank and Trust Company herein referred to as the petitioner is a domestic banking corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of Philippine laws. In the early part of 1992, the Cavite Development Bank [CDB], also a domestic banking corporation, was merged with Petitioner with the latter as its surviving entity [under] the merger. Petitioner 7
being the surviving entity, [it] acquired all [the] assets of CDB During the period from 1990 to 1991, CDB sold some acquired assets in the course of which it allegedly withheld the creditable tax from the sales proceeds which amounted to P755,715.00. In said years, CDB filed income tax returns which reflected that CDB incurred negative taxable income or losses for both years. Since there was no tax against which to credit or offset the taxes withheld by CDB, the result was that CDB, according to petitioner, had excess creditable withholding tax. Thus, petitioner, being the surviving entity of the merger, filed this Petition for Review after its administrative claim for refund was not acted upon. ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the Court of Appeals and Court of Tax Appeals are not based on Facts and the Law. HELD: The petition is denied and the Decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. The Court stressed out that “The findings of fact of the CTA, a special court exercising particular expertise on the subject of tax, are generally regarded as final, binding and conclusive upon this Court, especially if these are substantially similar to the findings of the CA which is normally the final arbiter of questions of fact. The findings shall not be reviewed nor disturbed on appeal unless a party can show that these are not supported by evidence, or when the judgment is premised on a misapprehension of facts, or when the lower courts failed to notice certain relevant facts which if considered would justify a different conclusion”
Yamane vs. BA Lepanto Condominium Corp. 474 SCRA 258 FACTS: Respondent BA-Lepanto Condominium Corporation (the “Corporation”) is a duly organized condominium corporation constituted in accordance with the Condominium Act, which owns and holds title to the common and limited common areas of the BA-Lepanto Condominium (the “Condominium”), situated in Paseo de Roxas, Makati City. Its membership comprises the various unit owners of the Condominium. The Corporation is authorized, under Article V of its 8
Amended By-Laws, to collect regular assessments from its members for operating expenses, capital expenditures on the common areas, and other special assessments as provided for in the Master Deed with Declaration of Restrictions of the Condominium. Proceeding from the premise that its tax liability arose from Section 3A.02(m) of the Makati Revenue Code, the Corporation proceeded to argue that under both the Makati Code and the Local Government Code, “business” is defined as “trade or commercial activity regularly engaged in as a means of livelihood or with a view to profit.” It was submitted that the Corporation, as a condominium corporation, was organized not for profit, but to hold title over the common areas of the Condominium, to manage the Condominium for the unit owners, and to hold title to the parcels of land on which the Condominium was located. Neither was the Corporation authorized, under its articles of incorporation or by-laws to engage in profit-making activities. The assessments it did collect from the unit owners were for capital expenditures and operating expenses. The protest was rejected by the City Treasurer, insisting that the collection of dues from the unit owners was effected primarily “to sustain and maintain the expenses of the common areas, with the end in view of getting full appreciative living values for the individual condominium occupants and to command better marketable prices for those occupants” who would in the future sell their respective units. Thus, she concluded since the “chances of getting higher prices for well-managed common areas of any condominium are better and more effective that condominiums with poor managed common areas,” the corporation activity “is a profit venture making”. The CA reversed the RTC and declared that the Corporation was not liable to pay business taxes to the City of Makati. ISSUE: Whether or not the City of Makati may collect business taxes on condominium corporations. HELD: No. The coverage of business taxation particular to the City of Makati is provided by the Makati Revenue Code (“Revenue Code”), enacted through Municipal Ordinance No. 92-072. The Revenue Code remains in effect as of this writing. Article A, Chapter III of the Revenue Code governs business taxes in Makati, and it is quite specific as to the particular businesses which are covered by business taxes. At no point has the City Treasurer informed the Corporation, the RTC, the Court of Appeals, or this Court for that matter, as to what exactly is the precise statutory basis under the Makati Revenue Code for the levying of the business tax on petitioner.
Montes vs. Civil Service Board of Appeals 101 Phil. 490 FACTS: Petitioner-appellant was on and before January, 1953, a watchman of the Floating Equipment Section, Ports and Harbors Division, Bureau of Public Works. In Administrative Case No. R-8182 instituted against him for negligence in the performance of duty (Dredge No. 6 under him had sunk because of water in the bilge, which he did not pump out while under his care), the Commissioner of Civil Service exonerated him, on the basis of findings made by a committee. But the Civil Service Board of Appeals modified the decision, finding petitioner guilty 9
of contributory negligence in not pumping the water from the bilge, and ordered that he be considered resigned effective his last day of duty with pay, without prejudice to reinstatement at the discretion of the appointing officer. Petitioner filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to review the decision, but the said court dismissed the action on a motion to dismiss, on the ground that petitioner had not exhausted all his administrative remedies before he instituted the action. ISSUE: Whether or not there that the case at bar requires a need to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking for affirmative relief in court? HELD: The doctrine of exhaustion, of administrative remedies requires where an administrative remedy is provided by statute, as in this case, relief must be sought by exhausting this remedy before the courts will act. (42 Am. Jur. 580-581.) the doctrine is a device based on considerations of comity and convenience. If a remedy is still available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be made to the courts, not only to give the administrative agency opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly, but also to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the courts.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Appeals GR No. 119761, August 29, 1996 FACTS: Fortune Tobacco Corporation ("Fortune Tobacco") is engaged in the manufacture of different brands of cigarettes. The Philippine Patent Office issued to the corporation separate certificates of trademark registration over "Champion," "Hope," and "More" cigarettes. The initial position of the CIR was to classify 'Champion,' 'Hope,' and 'More' as foreign brands since they were listed in the World Tobacco Directory as belonging to foreign companies. However, Fortune Tobacco changed the names of 'Hope' to 'Hope Luxury ' and 'More' to 'Premium More,' thereby removing the said brands from the foreign brand category. RA No. 7654 was enacted 10
and became effective on 03 July 1993. It amended Section 142(c)(1) of the NIRC. About a month after the enactment and two (2) days before the effectively of RA 7654, Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37-93 ("RMC 37-93") Reclassification of Cigarettes Subject to Excise Tax, was issued by the BIR. Fortune Tobacco requested for a review, reconsideration and recall of RMC 37-93. The request was denied on 29 July 1993. The following day, or on 30 July 1993, the CIR assessed Fortune Tobacco for ad valorem tax deficiency amounting to P9, 598, 334. 00. On 03 August 1993, Fortune Tobacco filed a petition for review with the CTA. The CTA upheld the position of Fortune Tobacco and adjudged RMC No. 37-93 as defective. ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of the due process of law. HELD: A reading of RMC 37-93, particularly considering the circumstances under which it has been issued, convinces us that the circular cannot be viewed simply as a corrective measure or merely as construing Section 142(c)(1) of the NIRC, as amended, but has, in fact and most importantly, been made in order to place "Hope Luxury," "Premium More" and "Champion" within the classification of locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brands and to thereby have them covered by RA 7654. In so doing, the BIR not simply interpreted the law; verily, it legislated under its quasi-legislative authority. The due observance of the requirements of notice, of hearing, and of publication should not have been then ignored. The Court is convinced that the hastily promulgated RMC 37-93 has fallen short of a valid and effective administrative issuance.
Tio vs. Videogram 151 SCRA 208 FACTS: Valentino Tio is a videogram operator who assailed the constitutionality of PD 1987 entitled “An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board” with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. The PD was also reinforced by PD1994 which amended the National Internal Revenue Code. The amendment provides that “there shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax.” The said law was brought about by the need to regulate the sale of videograms as it has adverse effects to the movie industry. The proliferation of videograms has significantly 11
lessen the revenue being acquired from the movie industry, and that such loss may be recovered if videograms are to be taxed. Tio countered that there is no factual nor legal basis for the exercise by the President of the vast powers conferred upon him by the Amendment and that there is an undue delegation of legislative power to the President. ISSUE: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of power. HELD: It cannot be successfully argued that the PD contains an undue delegation of legislative power. The grant in Sec 11 of the PD of authority to the Board to "solicit the direct assistance of other agencies and units of the government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the heads or personnel of such agencies and units to perform enforcement functions for the Board" is not a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or discretion as to its execution, enforcement, and implementation. "The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter, no valid objection can be made." Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of the Board to solicit such assistance is for a "fixed and limited period" with the deputized agencies concerned being "subject to the direction and control of the Board." That the grant of such authority might be the source of graft and corruption would not stigmatize the PD as unconstitutional. Should the eventuality occur, the aggrieved parties will not be without adequate remedy in law.
Pelaez vs. Auditor General 15 SCRA 569 FACTS: From Sept 04 to Oct 29, 1964, the President (Marcos) issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities – this is purportedly in pursuant to Sec 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides that the President of the Philippines may by executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province, sub-province, municipality, [township] municipal district or other political subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any province into one or more subprovinces. The VP Emmanuel Pelaez and a taxpayer filed a special civil action to prohibit the auditor general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs are unconstitutional. He said that Sec 68 of the RAC has been impliedly repealed by Sec 3 of RA 2370 which provides 12
that barrios may "not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected" and the "recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated." Pelaez argues, accordingly: "If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?" The Auditor General countered that only barrios are barred from being created by the President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that t a municipality can be created without creating barrios. Existing barrios can just be placed into the new municipality. This theory overlooks, however, the main import of Pelaez’ argument, which is that the statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to create municipalities, each of which consists of several barrios. ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by virtue of Sec 68 of the RAC. HELD: Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. In the case at bar, the power to create municipalities is eminently legislative in character not administrative.
Tadlip vs. Borres, Jr. 474 SCRA 441 FACTS: This case involves a parcel land of land situated in Mambajao, Camiguin which was issued OCT No. P-106, Emancipation Patent No. A-028380 by the MAR to Eusebio Arce. The land was formerly owned by Angel Madarieta. Subsequently, a Deed of Transfer under PD 27 was executed by Angel Madarieta, as represented by his wife, Pelagia Madarieta and Eusebio Arce. Six years later Arce died and was succeeded by two minors and Tadlip, his nephew, assumed the responsibility of tilling the land. Tadlip caused the reallocation of the disputed land. Respondent, as PARAD of DARAB issued an order dated 3 April 1998 granting the petition of complainant reallocating the land to him and heirs of Arce. However, the title was never transferred to the complainant and the heirs of Arce because unknown to them respondent 13
rendered another Order dated 26 January 1999 cancelling the registration of the same OCT No. P-106 and ordering the issuance of a TCT ex parte in favor of Madarieta. He also approved the motion of execution filed by Madarieta. ISSUE: Whether the respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law. HELD: Respondent's non-observance of the DARAB Rules on notice and hearing and his grant to Madarieta of her motion for execution pending appeal in effect deprived complainant of the land he tills and the source of his income. Complainant woke up one day not knowing that the emancipated land which he thought was already reallocated to him was lost by order of respondent. He was not given the chance to defend his claim over the property. This is tantamount to deprivation of property without due process of law, a constitutional guarantee available to every individual. The actual review of the subject issuance of the respondent should be undertaken in the proper judicial proceedings and not by this Court at this time via an administrative action. Nevertheless, respondent's culpability under the Code of Professional Responsibility is indubitable. As a lawyer, the IBP determined, and we subscribe to such determination, that respondent violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states: Canon 1A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for legal processes. While the duty to uphold the Constitution and obey the laws is an obligation imposed upon every citizen, a lawyer assumes responsibilities well beyond the basic requirements of good citizenship. As a servant of the law, a lawyer should moreover make himself an exemplar of others to emulate. A member of the bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional obligations. Hence the Code of Professional Responsibility, promulgated on 21 June 1988, was not meant to govern the conduct of private practitioners alone, but of all lawyers including those in government service. This is clear from Canon 6 of the said Code. Lawyers in government service are public servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the public service. Thus they should be more sensitive in the performance of their professional obligations, as their conduct is subject to the ever-constant scrutiny of the public. Respondent, as a Provincial Adjudicator of the DARAB, was reposed with a higher gravamen of responsibility than a lawyer in private practice. The recommended penalty of two months suspension is too light under the circumstances, and a penalty of six (6) months' suspension more appropriate. As held in recent cases, the penalty for a judge found to be guilty of gross ignorance of the law is six (6) months.
COMELEC vs. Español 417 SCRA 554 FACTS: During the May 11, 1998, Florentino A. Bautista, Lakas candidate for Mayor of Kawit, Cavite. He executed an Affidavit-Complaint charging the incumbent Municipal Mayor Atty. Federico “Hit” Poblete and other candidate of violation of paragraphs(a) and (b) of Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code (vote buying) and filed the same with the Law Department of the COMELEC.COMELEC’s Law Department filed an Information against the respondents with the Regional Trial Court of Cavite. In the meantime, Gerardo Macapagal and Inocencio Rodelas filed a criminal complaint for violation of Section 261(a) of the Omnibus Election Code (vote selling) against the witnesses of Florentino A. Bautista. An information was filed before the RTC.COMELEC now claims that it has the “exclusive power” to review, motu proprio or through an appeal, the “recommendation or resolution of investigating officers” in the preliminary 14
investigation since it has “exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses and to prosecute the same” and to review their commendation or resolution of investigating officers. ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC exclusive power to prosecute election cases? HELD: Under Article IX, Section 2(b) of the Constitution, the petitioner is empowered to investigate and, when appropriate, prosecute election offenses. The grant by the Constitution to the petitioner of the express power to investigate and prosecute election offenses is intended to enable the petitioner to assure the people of a fine, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible election. Under Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code, the petitioner, through its duly authorized legal officers, has the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the Omnibus Election Code, and to prosecute the same. The petitioner may avail of the assistance of the prosecuting arms of the government but as held in Margarejo vs. Escoses until revoked, the continuing authority of the Provincial or City Prosecutors stays
15
Mauricio Cruz vs. Stanton Youngberg GR No. L-34674 October 26, 1931
FACTS: Petitioner attacked the constitutionality of Act No. 3155, which prohibits the importation of cattle from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands. It was enacted for the purpose of preventing the introduction of cattle diseases into the Philippine Islands from foreign countries. The Act provides: “SECTION 1. After March thirty-first, nineteen hundred and twenty-five existing contracts for the importation of cattle into this country to the contrary notwithstanding, it shall be strictly prohibited to import, bring or introduce into the Philippine Islands any cattle from foreign countries: Provided, however, That at any time after said date, the Governor-General, with the concurrence of the presiding officers of both Houses, may raise such prohibition entirely or in part if the conditions of the country make this advisable or if decease among foreign cattle has ceased to be a menace to the agriculture and livestock of the lands.”
ISSUE: Whether or not the power given by Act No. 3155 to the Governor-General to suspend or not, at his discretion, the prohibition provided in the act constitutes an unlawful delegation of the legislative powers.
HELD: No. The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made. The Governor-General is authorized to lift the prohibition, with the consent of the presiding officers of the legislature, if he should determine after a fact-finding investigation that there was no longer any threat of contagion from cattle. The lifting of the ban would have been effected through a contingent regulation based on the prescribed contingency, to wit, the finding that foreign cattle would no longer contaminate the local livestock.
16
SALVADOR A. ARANETA, ETC., ET AL. vs. THE HON. MAGNO S. GATMAITAN, ET AL. G.R. Nos. L-8895 and L-9191, April 30, 1957 Facts: The League of Municipal Mayors of municipalities near the San Miguel Bay, between the provinces of Camarines Sur and Camarines Norte, manifested in a resolution that they condemn the operation of trawls in the said area and resolving to petition the President of the Philippines to regulate fishing in San Miguel Bay. In another resolution, the same League of Mayors prayed that the President ban the operation of trawls in the San Miguel Bay area. In response to the pleas, the President issued EO 22 prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay but the EO was amended by EO 66 apparently in answer to a resolution of the Provincial Board of Camarines Sur recommending the allowance of trawl-fishing during the typhoon season only. Subsequently, EO 80 was issued reviving EO 22. Thereafter, a group of Otter trawl operators filed a complaint for injunction praying that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Director of Fisheries be enjoined from enforcing said executive order and to declare the same null and void. The Court held that until the trawler is outlawed by legislative enactment, it cannot be banned from San Miguel Bay by executive proclamation and held that the EOs 22 and 66 are invalid. Issues: Whether or not the President has authority to issue EOs 22, 66 and 80. Whether or not the said Executive Orders were valid as it was not in the exercise of legislative powers unduly delegated to the President. Held: Yes. Under sections 75 and 83 of the Fisheries law, the restriction and banning of trawl fishing from all Philippine waters come within the powers of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. However, as the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources exercises its functions subject to the general supervision and control of the President of the Philippines, the President can exercise the same power and authority through executive orders, regulations, decrees and proclamations upon recommendation of the Secretary concerned. Hence, EOs 22,66 and 80 restricting and banning of trawl fishing from San Miguel Bay are valid and issued by authority of law. For the protection of fry or fish eggs and small immature fishes, Congress intended with the promulgation of the Fisheries Act, to prohibit the use of any fish net or fishing devise like trawl nets that could endanger and deplete our supply of seafood, and to that end authorized the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to provide by regulations and such restrictions as he deemed necessary in order to preserve the aquatic resources of the land. When the President, in response to the clamor of the people and authorities of Camarines Sur issued EO 80 absolutely prohibiting fishing by means of trawls in all waters comprised within the San Miguel Bay, he did nothing but show an anxious regard for the welfare of the inhabitants of said coastal province and dispose of issues of general concern which were in consonance and strict conformity with the law.
17
Grego vs. COMELEC GR. No. 125955, June 19, 1997 FACTS: On Oct. 31. 1981, private respondent Basco was removed from office as Deputy sheriff by the court upon finding of serious misconduct in an administrative complaint. Ran for councilor in the second district of Manila and had won the race for 3 term. On his final term, an election protest was filed against him by petitioner Grego, seeking to disqualify him on the ground that he was removed previously in an office as a result of an administrative case. On May 14, 1995, COMELEC ordered the parties to submit memoranda, but before the parties able to comply the directive, the Board of Canvassers proclaimed Basco as duly elected councilor and took his oath of office. Petitioner contends that, respondent COMELEC should have suspended the proclamation. Such act according to the petitioner violated the provision of sec. 6 of R.A 6646, which prohibits the proclamation of the elected candidate by the COMELEC pending final judgment on the case filed, uses the word may, therefore giving discretion to order the suspension of the proclamation. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent COMELEC violated the provision of R.A 6646 when it did not suspend the proclamation of the petitioner as the elected councilor pending final judgment of the case filed against it. HELD: It did not. The use of the word “may” in sec.6 of R.A 6646 indicates that the proclamation is merely directory and permissive in nature and confers no jurisdiction. What is merely mandatory, according to the provision itself, is the continuation of trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest. The rule or regulations should be within the scope of the authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the basic law prevails because said rule or regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic. Since section 6 of R.A 6646, the law which section 5 of Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure seeks to implement, employed the word “may”, it is, therefore improper and highly irregular for the COMELEC to have used instead the word “shall” in its rules.
18
People vs. Maceren 79 SCRA 450 FACTS: This is a case involving the validity of a 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing in fresh water fisheries, promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law. On March 7, 1969 Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlito del Rosario were charged by a Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1.It was alleged in the complaint that the five accused in the morning of March 1, 1969 resorted to electro fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz. Upon motion of the accused, the municipal court quashed the complaint. The prosecution appealed. The Court of First Instance of Laguna affirmed the order of dismissal. The lower court held that electro fishing cannot be penalize because electric current is not an obnoxious or poisonous substance as contemplated in Section 11 of the Fisheries Law and that it is not a substance at all but a form of energy conducted or transmitted by substances. The lower court further held that, since the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, the executive and judicial departments cannot consider it unlawful. It is noteworthy that the Fisheries Law does not expressly punish .electro fishing. Notwithstanding the silence of the law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the Commissioner of Fisheries, promulgated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84, prohibiting electro fishing in all Philippine waters. On June 28, 1967 the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the Fisheries Commission, issued Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1, amending section 2 of Administrative Order No. 84, by restricting the ban against electro fishing to fresh water fisheries. ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing the Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1. HELD: The Court ruled in the affirmative. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those orders are not warranted under the Fisheries Commission, Republic Act No. 3512. The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. In other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis. That law punishes (1) the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance, or explosive in fishing; (2) unlawful fishing in deep-sea fisheries; (3) unlawful taking of marine molusca, (4) illegal taking of sponges; (5) failure of licensed fishermen to report the kind and quantity of fish caught, and (6) other violations. Nowhere in that law is electro fishing specifically punished. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. Thus, the lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself. 19
Bautista vs. Juinio 127 SCRA 329 FACTS: Letter of Instruction No. 869, issued on May 31, 1979the response to the protracted oil crisis that dates back to 1974 memorandum circular No. 39, provides fort the penalties. Letter of Instruction No. 869 banning the use of the private vehicles with H and EH plates on weekends and on holidays 12am Saturday morning to 5am Monday morning, 1am of the holiday to 5am of the day after the holiday. Memorandum Circular No. 39 has penalties of fine, confiscation of vehicles and cancellation of registration. The exempted vehicles are service trucks, Diplomatic, Consular Corps, and tourist cars. Petitioners contended that Memorandum Circular No. 39, issued by the Minister of Public works, Transportation and Communications (Alfredo L. Juinio), and then respondent Land Transportation Commissioners (Romeo Edu), is unconstitutional on the ground that is violative of the non-delegation of legislative powers. However respondent contend that said Memorandum Circular No. 39 were adapted pursuant to the land transportation and traffic code. ISSUE: Whether or not Memorandum Circular No. 39 is ultra vires HELD: Memorandum Circular No. 39 cannot be held ultra vires as long as the fine imposed is not less than ten or more than fifty pesos, as to the suspension of registration to the suspension of registration, it is valid. However as to the impounding of a vehicle finds no statutory justification, it must be made clear that a penalty even if warranted can only be imposed in accordance with the procedure required by law.
20
Metropolitan Traffic Command vs. Gonong 187 SCRA 432 FACTS: On 10 August 1989, Lawyer Dante s. David filed a complaint before the regional Trial Court alleging that the license plate of his car issued by the Land Transportation Commission now Land Transportation Office, was removed by the agents of herein Petitioner while the car was parked somewhere in Escolta, Manila. The complainant further alleged that the car was not illegally parked. Ultimately complainant and private respondent David raised the issue that there was no local ordinance or law to justify the removal of his car rear plate number, thus praying for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or a writ f preliminary injunction by the court. On 14 August of the same year, prayer for the issuance of TRO was granted however, after series of hearing, the writ of preliminary injunction was issued. Parties –in-interest told to present their respective memoranda before the ruling shall be issued. Subsequently, the respondent judge ruled that LOI 43 in which the defendant had invoked, did not empower it to detach or remove or confiscate the plates of any vehicle which are caught illegally parked outside of the designated parking area (s), further declares that LOI 43 only authorizes the agents of MTC –WTD to tow or remove vehicles or motor vehicles whenever it causes traffic congestion. Undaunted of the defeat, Petitioner brought the case before the Supreme Court when it should have been properly raise first, before the Court of Appeals in which the latter has a concurrent jurisdiction to review the decision of the Regional Trial Court when the validity of a statute is put into test. On the ground of public interest, the highest tribunal had decided to take cognizance of the case. On 6 February 1990 a temporary restraining order was issued. Private respondent argued that Presidential decree 1605(Granting the Metropolitan Manila Commission Central Powers Related to Traffic Management, Providing Penalties, and for other Purposes) repeals letter-ofInstruction 43, however the contention of petitioner herein was, the question statute remains in full- force despite the issuance if PD 1605, and further contends that PD 1605 shall be considered as special law because it is limited in territorial application. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not Letter-of-Instruction 43 is valid? (2) Whether or not the removal or confiscation of the plate number of any vehicle found to be illegally parked is sanctioned by LOI 43? HELD: On the first issue, the highest tribunal resolves that, letter-of-Instruction 43 is valid. However, applicable only against motor vehicles that have stalled in the streets due to some involuntary reasons and not against those who intentionally breaks traffic laws. Resolving the second issue, the Court holds that the applicable law to justify the removing and confiscating the plate number of any vehicle intentionally parked by the owner in an area not designated as parking sides is Presidential decree 1605. The court found out that the provisions of the two statutes do not clash each other, LOI 43 deals with motor vehicles that have stalled on public roads because of involuntary cause while PD 1605 deals with motor vehicles that have deliberately parked in a place which is not designated as parking area. Accordingly, the petition was DISMISSED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court, branch 8, Manila was affirmed. The temporary restraining order issued by the Supreme Court on February 9 1990 was lifted.
21
LUZON POLYMERS CORPORATION vs. CLAVE 209 SCRA 711, G.R. No. 51009, June 10, 1992 Facts: This special civil action of certiorari questions the administrative grant of an emergency allowance of fifty pesos to the employees of a corporation with a capital stock of one million pesos. The emergency allowance of employees in the private sector has its origin in Presidential Decree No. 390, granting said allowance to government employees. Subsequent to the promulgation of P.D. No. 390, then President Marcos issued Letter of Instructions No. 174 to implement the policy enunciated in said decree in the private sector. He directed the Secretary of Labor "to take such measures as may be necessary to ensure orderly and effective response by employers in the private sector." To explain the meaning and scope of application of LOI No. 174, on March 11, 1974, the Department of Labor issued an Interpretative Bulletin. P.D. No. 525 was issued making mandatory the payment of emergency allowance under LOI No. 174. petitioner, a corporation with an authorized capital stock of P1 million and total assets of P2,656,793.45 as of December 31, 1974, was named a respondent in a complaint for underpayment of emergency allowance filed before Regional Office No. 4 of the Department of Labor in 1976 by the Luzon Polymers Labor Union (FFW) on behalf of 185 of its members. Alleging that since February 1974, regular employees of petitioner corporation who were members of the union had been receiving P1.15 daily or P30.00 monthly emergency allowance, complainant-union contended that its members were entitled to P50.00 monthly emergency allowance inasmuch as their employer's total assets were over and above P1 million. Petitioner claimed that since it had fully complied with LOI No. 174, it had not underpaid its employees. Noting that petitioner corporation had total assets of more than one million in 1973 and 1974 or P1,920,529.04 and P2,676,793.45, respectively, Officer-in-Charge and Assistant Secretary Vicente Leogardo, Jr. ruled that petitioner had not fully complied with LOl No. 174. Petitioner appealed to Secretary Ople but the latter dismissed the appeal for lack of merit in the order of February 21, 1978 and directed petitioner "to pay the difference of P20.00 as awarded in the appealed order." Hence, petitioner elevated the case to the Office of the President which, through Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo C. Clave, likewise dismissed the appeal in an undated decision. Issue: Whether or not the Department of Labor exercised a valid quasi-legislative power when it issued their interpretative bulletin. Held: No. The second requisite for a valid administrative regulation was not complied with, which says that “it must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature”. The Supreme Court stated that, LOI No. 174 mandates the grant of P50 a month emergency allowance for employees of "enterprises capitalized at P1 million to P4 million or more" and P30 for employees of "enterprises capitalized at P100,000 to P1 million." While the determinative factor for the amount of emergency allowance is simply the capitalization of the employer concerned. The problem lies in the fact that the same provision of LOI No. 174 categorizes an enterprise capitalized at P1 million as under both the P50 and the P30 brackets of emergency allowance. This grey area, however, was clarified by the Interpretative Bulletin on LOI No. 174 issued by the Department of Labor. Sec. 5 states that an employer has to pay the fifty-peso allowance "where the authorized capital stock of the corporation, or the total assets in the case of other undertakings, exceeds P1 million" or thirty pesos "where the authorized capital stock of the corporation, or the total assets in the case of other undertakings, is not less than P100,000 but not more than P1 million." Clearly then, the petitioner falls under the bracket of employers required to give a thirty-peso monthly emergency allowance under LOI No. 174 in view of the undisputed fact that it is a "domestic corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws" with an authorized capital stock of one million pesos. While said administrative interpretation of LOI No. 174 is at best merely advisory for it is only the courts which have the power to determine what LOI No. 174 really means, said Sec. 5 of the Interpretative Bulletin 22
was adopted in P.D. No. 525 Sec. 7 of the said Rules has not conformed with the standards that P.D. No. 525 prescribes. Having been based on an erroneous decision of the Office of the President, it is further rendered obnoxious by the principle that an administrative agency like the Department of Labor cannot amend the law it seeks to implement.
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, COURT OF TAX APPEALS and COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 112024, January 28, 1999 Facts: Petitioner, Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom), a commercial banking corporation duly organized under Philippine laws, filed its quarterly income tax returns for the first and second quarters of 1985, reported profits, and paid the total income tax of P5,016,954.00 by applying PBCom's tax credit memos for P3,401,701.00 and P1,615,253.00, respectively. Subsequently, however, PBCom suffered net loss of P25,317,228.00, thereby showing no income tax liability in its Annual Income Tax Returns for the year-ended December 31, 1985. For the succeeding year, ending December 31, 1986, the petitioner likewise reported a net loss of P14,129,602.00, and thus declared no tax payable for the year. But during these two years, PBCom earned rental income from leased properties. The lessees withheld and remitted to the BIR withholding creditable taxes of P282,795.50 in 1985 and P234,077.69 in 1986. On August 7, 1987, petitioner requested the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, among others, for a tax credit of P5,016,954.00 representing the overpayment of taxes in the first and second quarters of 1985. Thereafter, on July 25, 1988, petitioner filed a claim for refund of creditable taxes withheld by their lessees from property rentals in 1985 for P282,795.50 and in 1986 for P234,077.69. Pending the investigation of the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue, petitioner instituted a Petition for Review on November 18, 1988 before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). The petition was docketed as CTA Case No. 4309 entitled: "Philippine Bank of Communications vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue." The CTA decided in favor of the BIR on the ground that the Petition was filed out of time as the same was filed beyond the twoyear reglementary period. This is in reference to the Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 7-85 issued on April 1, 1985. The circular states that overpaid income taxes are not covered by the two-year prescriptive period under the tax Code and that taxpayers may claim refund or tax credits for the excess quarterly income tax with the BIR within ten (10) years under Article 1144 of the Civil Code. Respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue, through the Solicitor General, argues that the two-year prescriptive period for filing tax cases in court concerning income tax payments of Corporations is reckoned from the date of filing the Final Adjusted Income Tax Return, which is generally done on April 15 following the close of the calendar year. Respondent Commissioner also states that since the Final Adjusted Income Tax Return of the petitioner for the taxable year 1985 was supposed to be filed on April 15, 1986, the latter had only until April 15, 1988 to seek relief from the court. Further, respondent Commissioner stresses that when the petitioner filed the case before the CTA on November 18, 1988, the same was filed beyond the time fixed by law, and such failure is fatal to petitioners cause of action. A motion for Reconsideration was denied and the appeal to Court of Appeals was likewise denied. Thus, this appeal to Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not the BIR exercised a valid quasi-legislative power when it issued Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 7-85. Held: No. Supreme Court stated that the Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 7-85 is clearly inconsistent with the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code. Further, the Supreme Court said that “A memorandum-circular of a bureau head could not operate to vest a taxpayer with a shield against judicial action. For there are no vested rights to speak of respecting a wrong construction of the law by the administrative officials and such wrong interpretation could not place the Government in estoppel to correct or overrule the same.” A valid administrative regulation must comply with the following requisites: (1) its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature; (2) it must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature; (3) it must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure, and (4) it must be reasonable. In the case at bar, the BIR have not complied with the second requisite as it was ultra vires with the NIRC.
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Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Torres 212 SCRA 298 FACTS: On 01 June 1991, DOLE Secretary Ruben Torres as a result of published stories the abuses suffered by Filipina housemaids particularly in Hong Kong suspended the placement and recruitment by the private recruitment agencies. The DOLE itself and POEA took control of the recruitment and deployment of Filipina helpers bound to Hong Kong. On 01 July 1991, DOLE Secretary ordered the administrator of POEA to use the facilities of the agencies for the purpose. On 10 July DOLE Secretary issued memorandum Circulars no. 30 series of 1991 seeking accreditation by the Philippine government from recruitment agencies based in Hong Kong. On 01 August of the same year, POEA Administrator issued MC no.37 series of 1991 on the processing of domestic helpers after the request for accreditation was responded positively by recruitment agencies in based in Hong Kong. On 02, September 1991, petitioner, through its counsel, filed a petition to annul the DO 16 and MC 30 and 37 thus, preventing the Department of Labor and Employment and the Philippine Overseas and Employment Administration to implement the issuances. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not respondents committed a grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing the circulars? (2) Whether or not the issuances violates the constitution and against the regimes of reasonableness, fairness and equality? (3) Whether or not the issuances complies the requirement of publication for its validity? HELD: Resolving the first issue, the court finds that the circulars are valid exercise of the rulemaking power of DOLE Secretary as delegated to the executive Branch of the Government. Applying article 36 the regulatory power of the Secretary of Labor to restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement as well as deployment of Filipino abroad. Executive order 797 issued on May 01, 1982 further provides the DOLE’s regulatory functions to regulate the deployment of foreign Filipino workers. The issuances of those circulars are therefore valid exercise of quasilegislative power of the agency, it cannot be considered as unconstitutional or oppressive or unreasonable. Resolving the last issue, the issuances are legally invalid, defective and it cannot be enforced for lack of publication requirement as codified under section 2 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and section 3 and 4 chapter 2 of the administrative code of 1987. Lack of publication is an essential requisite for the validity of the law. (Tanada v. Tuvera) Accordingly, the prohibition was granted. The issuances were all suspended pending the compliance of publications as required by law.
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Philippine Interisland Association of the Philippines, et al. vs. CA, et al G.R no. 100481 FACTS: Private respondent United Harbor Pilots’ Association of the Philippines is the umbrella organization of groups rendering pilotage services in different ports of the country. The Philippine Ports Authority is a government agency created pursuant to P.D 857, vested with the power to control, supervise pilotage and the conduct of pilots in any port district. It has also the power to impose, fix, prescribe, increase or decrease such rates charges or fees, for the services rendered by the authority or by any private organization within the port. These consolidated petitions of harbor pilots to secure enforcement of E.O 1088, which fixes the rates of pilotage services and the efforts of the PPA and its officials, petitioners herein, to block enforcement of the said E.O ISSUE: Whether or not E.O 1088 issued by Pres. Marcos (for purpose of increasing existing pilotage fees) is a valid statute and could not be revoked by the PPA, who has the power to impose, fix, prescribe, increase or decrease such rates, charges or fees. HELD: YES, rate fixing orders previously issued by the PPA were in the nature of subordinate legislation, promulgated by it is the exercise of delegated power. Hence, could be amended or revised by law. President Marcos in the exercise of legislative powers could delegate the ratemaking power to the PPA, so he can exercise it in specific instances without thereby withdrawing the power vested by PD 857.
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VALENTINO L. LEGASPI vs. THE HONORABLE MINISTER OF FINANCE and THE HONORABLE COMMISSIONER and/or THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE G.R. No. L-58289, July 24, 1982 Facts: In 1982, after the lifting of Martial Law, Legaspi, then incumbent member of the interim Batasang Pambansa, petitioned to declare Presidential Decree 1840 “granting tax amnesty and filing of statement of assets and liabilities and some other purposes” unconstitutional. He argued that said decree was promulgated despite the fact that under the Constitution ‘(T)he Legislative power shall be vested in a Batasang Pambansa’ (Sec. 1, Article VIII) and the President may grant amnesty only ‘with concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa. In this case, there was no concurrence given by the IBP. Legaspi averred that since Martial Law is already lifted, the president can no longer arbitrarily enact laws. At the same time, Legaspi averred that Amendment No. 6, which provides legislative powers to Marcos, is invalid because that is no longer allowed after the lifting of the ML. Issue: Whether or not the President can validly grant tax amnesties without the concurrence of the Batasan Pambansa in the exercise of his power to legislate. Held: The Supreme Court ruled PD 1840 to be valid. Legaspi argued that PD 1840 is invalid for it did not enjoy the concurrence of the Batasan. He relies on Article 7, Sec 11 of the Constitution which provides that “The President may, except in cases of impeachment, grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, remit fines and forfeitures and with the concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa, grant amnesty.” The Supreme Court noted that Article 7, Sec. 11, applies only when the President is exercising his power of executive clemency. In the case at bar, PD 1840 was issued pursuant to his power to legislate under Amendment No. 6. It ought to be indubitable that when the President acts as legislator as in the case at bar, he does not need the concurrence of the Batasan. Rather, he exercises concurrent authority vested by the Constitution.”
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Bito – Onon vs. Fernandez 350 SCRA 732 FACTS: Petitioner Bito- Onon is the duly elected barangay chairman of Tacras, Narra, Palawan and is the Municipal Liga Chapter President of the Municipality of Narra. Private respondent Elegio Quejano Jr is the duly elected barangay chairman of Rizal, Magsaysay, Palawan and is the Municipal Liga Chapter President of the Municipality of Magsaysay. Both candidates were running for the position of Executive Vice president in the August 23, 1997 election for the Liga ng Barangay Provincial Chapter of the Province of Palawan. Onon was proclaimed the winner, prompting Quejano to file a post proclamation protest with the Board of Election Supervisors (BES), which was decided against him. Quejano then filed a petition for review with the RTC. Onon moved to dismiss the petition claiming that the RTC has no jurisdiction, that the supplemental guidelines for the 1997 Liga ng mga Barangay election issued by the DILG on August 11, 1997 in its memorandum circular (MC) No. 97-193, providing for the review of decisions or resolutions of the BES by the regular courts of law is an ultra vires act and is void for being issued without or in excess of jurisdiction, as its issuance is not a mere act of supervision but rather an exercise of control over the Liga’s internal organization. The RTC denied Onon’s motion to dimiss saying that the Secretary of the DILG is vested with the power of general supervision of LGU’s and the promotion of local autonomy and monitor compliance thereof by said units. The RTC added that DILG circular No. 97-193 was issued by the DILG Secretary pursuant to his rule-making power. Onon argues that the “Supplemental Guidelines for the 1997 signed united Election of the National Chapter of the Liga ng mga Barangay ” contradicts the “Implementing Rules and Guidelines for the 1997 General Elections of the Liga ng mga barangay Officers and Directors” and is therefore invalid, that the Liga is not a LGU, that the issuance of MC No. 97-193 or the supplemental rules and guidelines for the conduct of the 1997 Liga election had the effect of modifying, altering, and nullifying the rules prescribed by the National Liga Board. ISSUE: Whether or not the DILG has the power to issue a memorandum circular intended to govern the election of the Liga. HELD: NO. The Liga is a government organization, being an association federation, league or union created by law or by authority of law, whose members are either appointed or elected government officials. Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 of the DILG so far as it authorizes the filing of a petition for review of the decision of the BES with the regular courts in a post proclamation electoral protest is of doubtful constitutionality.
27
National Liga ng mga Barangay vs. Paredes 439 SCRA 130 Facts: DILG, appointed as interim caretaker to administer and manage the affairs of the Liga ng mga Barangay in giving remedy to alleged violations made by the incumbent officer of the Liga in the conduct of their elections, issued 2 memorandum circulars which alter, modify, nullify or set aside the actions of the Liga. Petitioner contends that DILG’s appointment constitutes undue interference in the internal affairs of the Liga, since the latter is not subject to DILG control and supervision. Respondent judge contends that DILG exercises general supervisory jurisdiction over LGUs including the different leagues based on sec. 1 of Admin. Order No. 267 providing for a broad premise of the supervisory power of the DILG. Issue: WON DILG Secretary as alter-ego of the President has power of control over the Liga ng mga Barangay. Held: No. Sec. 4, Art. X of the Constitution provides that the President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local government, which exclude the power of control. As the entity exercising supervision over the Liga, the DILG’s authority is limited to seeing to it that the rules are followed, but it cannot lay down such rules itself nor does it have the discretion to modify or replace the same.
28
De Jesus vs. Civil Service Commission 471 SCRA 624 Facts: Sec. 13 of the Local Water utilities Administration (LWUA) Charter (PD 198, as amended) expressly allowed the director of water districts to be granted per diems, and shall receive no other compensation for services to the district. CSC issued Resolution No. 95-4073 ruling that it is illegal for any LWUA officer or employee who sits as a member of the board of directors of a water district to receive and collect any additional, double or indirect compensation from said water districts except per diems pursuant to Sec. 13 of PD 198 as amended. CSC based its ruling on Sec.8, Art IX (B) of the 1987 Constitution which is deemed included the power to “promulgate and enforce policies on personnel actions.” Petitioners argue that CSC had no plenary jurisdiction to construe any provision of PD 198 on matters pertaining to compensation and other benefits of water district directors based on Sec.8 of the decree authorizing LWUA to appoint any of its personnel to sit on the board of director of a water district that has availed financial assistance from LWUA and any such personnel so appointed is entitled to enjoy the rights and privileges pertaining to a regional director. The present controversy originated from an administrative case filed with the SCS for violations of RA 6713. Issue: WON CSC has plenary jurisdiction to motu proprio construe PD 198 as amended. Held: No. For the Court to sustain them would be to allow the board of an admin agency, by merely issuing a resolution, to derogate the broad and extensive powers granted by the Constitution to the CSC.
LWUA has quasi-judicial power only as regards rates or charges fixed by water districts, which it may review to establish compliance with the provisions of PD 198.
29
FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION vs. ERC G.R. 161113, August 9, 2005 Facts: Section 34 of RA 9136 (EPIRA), imposes Universal Charge upon end-users of electricity, a charge imposed for the recovery of stranded cost. ERC issued its Implementing Rules and Regulations defining Universal Charge refers to the charge, if any, imposed for the recovery of Stranded Debts, Stranded Contract Costs of NPC and Stranded Contract Costs of Eligible Contracts of Distribution Utilities and other purposes pursuant to Section 34 of the EPIRA. National Power Corporation-Strategic Power Utilities Group (NPC-SPUG) filed with Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) a petition for the availment from the Universal Charge of its share for Missionary Electrification. The ERC decided the NPC’s petition authorizing it to draw up to P70, 000, 000.00 from PSALM for its 2003 Watershed Rehabilitation Budget subject to the availability of funds for the Environmental Fund component of the Universal Charge. On the basis of the said ERC decisions, Panay Electric Company, Inc. (PECO) charged Romeo P. Gerochi and all other end-users with the Universal Charge as reflected in their respective electric bills starting from the month of July 2003. Petitioners submit that the assailed provision of law and its IRR which sought to implement the same are unconstitutional on the following grounds: 1. The universal charge provided for under Section 34 of the EPIRA and sought to be implemented under Sec. 2, Rule 18 of the IRR of the said law is a tax which is to be collected from all electric end-users and self-generating entities. The power to tax is strictly a legislative function and as such, the delegation of said power to any executive or administrative agency like the ERC is unconstitutional, giving the same unlimited authority. The assailed provision clearly provides that the Universal Charge is to be determined, fixed and approved by the ERC, hence leaving to the latter complete discretionary legislative authority;2. The ERC is also empowered to approve and determine where the funds collected should be used; 3. The imposition of the Universal Charge on all end-users is oppressive and confiscatory and amounts to taxation without representation as the consumers were not given a chance to be heard and represented. Issue: Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power to tax on the part of the ERC. Held: No, there is no undue delegation of powers to the ERC. The EPIRA is complete in all its essential terms and conditions, and it contains sufficient standards. Although Sec. 34 of the EPIRA merely provides that within one (1) year from the effectivity thereof, a Universal Charge to be determined, fixed and approved by the ERC, shall be imposed on all electricity end-users, and therefore, does not state the specific amount to be paid as Universal Charge, the amount nevertheless is made certain by the legislative parameters provided by the law itself when it provided for the promulgation and enforcement of a National Grid Code, and a Distribution Code. In making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the two conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or even her subordinate. In such instance, he is not subject to the power of control and direction of the President. He is acting as the agent of the legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect. The Secretary becomes the means or tool by which legislative policy is determined and implemented, considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather data and information and has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate them. His personality in such instance is in reality but a projection of that of Congress. Thus, being the agent of Congress and not of the President, the President cannot alter or modify or nullify, or set aside the findings of the Secretary and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. Congress simply granted the Secretary the authority to ascertain the existence of a fact. If it is exists, the Secretary, by legislative mandate, must submit such information to the President who must impose the 12% VAT rate. There is no undue delegation of legislation power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law.
PCFI vs. Sec. of Education Culture and Sports 30
153 SCRA 622 FACTS: On 21 February 1987, the Task Force on Private Education under the Department of Education Culture and Sports had recommended to the DECS several measures or courses of actions congruent to the government’s policy regulating private colleges in the country. On the said proposal it stipulates that Private schools may increase school fees from 15-20% without a prior approval from DECS provided that the school shall not exceed the total amount of school fees of One Thousand Pesos. Petitioner herein, questioned AO 37 and sought for reconsideration on the basis that the increase was too high or exorbitant. On 10 April 1987, on the basis that education is a matter of right and considering the public clamor, DECS secretary issued a modified administrative order authorizing back all Private Higher Educational Institutions (PHEI) to implement an increase of 10-15% rate in the payment of school fees. Discontented with the reconsideration prayed for, complainant-petitioner seeks for presidential intervention to suspend the implementation of the modified AO 37 however; no response was made by the President of the Philippines. On 20 May 1987, petitioner herein, elevates the matter to the Supreme Court seeking to prevent the implementation of the said order. Thus, the filing of petition for prohibition on the ground of public interest, seeking to resolve the following questions before the Supreme Court; ISSUES: (1) Whether or not Administrative Order 37 issued by DECS Secretary has legal basis? (2)Whether or not Administrative Order 37 issued by DECS Secretary curtailed the due process clause enshrined in the constitution? HELD: On the first issue, the court resolves that under section 57 Batas Pambansa Bilang. 232 or the Education Act of 1982 empowers the Department of Education Culture and Sports to regulate the educational systems in the country such as the power to promulgate, administer, supervise educational systems. Furthermore, under Sec. 70 of the same act, contemplates on the Rule-Making power of the Minister of Education Culture and Sports. Ultimately the court holds that the power to prescribe school fees is implied with the regulatory power exercised by the Secretary of Education. To resolve the second issue, the court is in affirmative that in the exercise of the rule-making (quasi-legislative) power of the secretary of education (formerly Minister of Education) prior notice and hearing are not essential for the validity of the issuance. Accordingly, the petition for prohibition was DISMISSED for lack of merit. However, the court reiterates that the rule-making power of the Secretary of Education to prescribe school fees for private school shall not be exercise unreasonably, further stressed that any issuances will be subjected by the Supreme Court power of review.
Tañada vs. Tuvera 146 SCRA 446 31
FACTS: This case involved a number of Presidential Decrees which the petitioners claim that had not been published as required by law. The respondents argued that while publication is necessary as a rule, it was not so when it is “otherwise provided”, as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. On April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of the decrees. The petitioners went to the Court for reconsideration or clarification of the said decision. ISSUE: (1) Whether or not a law before it becomes effective need not be published when it is otherwise provided; and (2) What are laws to be published? HELD: The answer to the first issue is in the negative. The term “otherwise provided” as enshrined in the Civil Code on the publication requirement, refers to the date of effectivity and not on the publication. As to the second issue, all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instruction issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.
Rubenecia vs. CSC 244 SCRA 640 32
FACTS: Teachers of Catarman National HS filed before MSPB administrative complaint against petitioner Rubenecia, the School Principal: dishonesty, nepotism, oppression, and violation of Civil Service Rules. MPSB investigation: charged Rubenecia, required him to answer. Rubenecia did not file answer, requested instead to be furnished with copies of the documents submitted by complainants. CSC Regional Director invited him to visit their office to identify and pick up the document that he might need but he deferred, saying he still had enrollment problems. Later, CSC Regional Office reiterated that he answer but he reiterated request that he be provided with copies of supporting documents. Hearing scheduled but complainants did not appear, nor did he file his answer though he was there. On the same day, Regional director issued order that the case was deemed submitted for resolution on the basis of the documents filed. Rubenecia wrote to Chairman of CSC for his dismissal. Regional Director submitted to MSPB the investigation report but before MSPB could render a decision, CSC issued RESOLUTION 93-2387 which provided, among other things, that cases then pending before the MSPB were to be elevated to the Commission for decision. In accordance with the Resolution, Rubenecia’s case was elevated to CSC. CSC: GUILTY, dismissed from service. MR (lack of jurisdiction), denied "I. VIOLATION OF CIVIL SERVICE RULES AND REGULATIONS: The records show that Rubenecia committed the said offense. He himself admitted that he did not accomplish his DTR but this was upon the suggestion of the Administrative Officer. Rubenecia cannot use as an excuse the alleged suggestion of an Administrative Officer. As the principal of a national high School, he is expected to know the basic civil service law, rules and regulations. II. DISHONESTY: The Commission finds Rubenecia liable. He was charged for misrepresenting that he was on 'Official Travel' to Baguio City to attend a three-week seminar and making it appear in his CSC Form No. 7 for the month of October 1988 that he has a perfect attendance for that month. Rubenecia in order to rebut the same simply reiterated previous allegation that he attended the SEDP Training in Baguio City during the questioned months without even an attempt on his part to adduce evidence documentary or testimonial that would attest to the truth of his allegation that he was indeed in Baguio during those weeks for training purposes. A mere allegation cannot obviously prevail over a more direct and positive statement of Celedonio Layon, School Division Superintendent, Division of Northern Samar, when the latter certified that he had no official knowledge of the alleged 'official travel' of Rubenecia. Moreover, verification with the Bureau of Secondary Schools reveals that no training seminar for school principal was conducted by DECS during that time. It was also proven by records that he caused one Mrs. Cecilia Vestra to render service as Secondary School Teacher from January 19, 1990 to august 30, 1991 without any duly issued appointment by the appointing authority. III. NEPOTISM: With respect to the charge of Nepotism, Rubenecia alleged that he is not the appointing authority with regard to the appointment of his brother-in-law as Utilityman but merely a recommending authority. With this statement, the commission finds Rubenecia guilty. it should be noted that under the provision of Sec. 59, of the 1987 Administrative Code, the recommending authority is also prohibited from recommending the appointment to non-teaching position of his relatives within the prohibited degree. IV. OPPRESSION: Rubenecia is also guilty of Oppression. He did not give on time the money benefits due to Ms. Leah Rebadulla and Mr. Rolando Tafalla, both Secondary Teachers of CNHS, specifically their salary differentials for July to December 1987, their salaries for the month of May and half of June 1988, their proportional vacation salaries for the semester of 1987-1988, and the salary of Mr. Tafalla, for the month of June, 1987. Rubenecia did not even attempt to present countervailing evidence. Without being specifically denied, they are deemed admitted by Rubenecia. V. INSUBORDINATION: He is not liable for Insubordination arising from his alleged refusal to obey the 'Detail Order' by filing a sick leave and vacation leave successively. The records show that the two applications for leave filed by Rubenecia were duly approved by proper official, hence it cannot be considered an act of Insubordination on the part of Rubenecia when he incurred absences based on an approved application for leave of absence. Rubenecia is therefore found guilty of Dishonesty, Nepotism, Oppression and Violations of Civil Service Rules and Regulations. WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission hereby resolves to find Ruble Rubenecia guilty of Dishonesty, Nepotism, Oppression and Violation of Civil Service Rules and Regulations. Accordingly, he is meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service." ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the CSC had authority to issue its Resolution No. 93-2387 and assume jurisdiction over the administrative case against petitioner; and (2) Whether or not petitioner had been accorded due process in connection with rendition of CSC Resolution No. 94-0533 finding him guilty and ordering his dismissal from the service. 33
HELD: (1) Yes it has authority to issue the said resolution and YES it has jurisdiction over the administrative case. RUBENECIA: Since MSPB was a creation of law, it could only be abolished by law and not by CSC. The questioned resolution in sum does the following: 1. Decision in administrative cases appealable to the Commission pursuant to Section 47 of the present Civil Service Law may now be appealed directly to the Commission itself and not to the MSPB. 2. Administrative cases already pending on appeal before the MSPB or previously brought directly to the MSPB, at the time of the issuance of Resolution No. 93-2387, were required to be elevated to the Commission for final resolution. The functions of the MSPB relating to the determination of administrative disciplinary cases were, in other words, re-allocated to the Commission itself. WHY RELOCATE: to "streamline the operation of the CSC" which in turn required the "simplification of systems, cutting of red tape and elimination of [an] unnecessary bureaucratic layer." The previous procedure made it difficult for cases to be finally resolved within a reasonable period of time. The change, theretofore, was moved by the quite legitimate objective of simplifying the course that administrative disciplinary cases, like those involving petitioner Rubenecia, must take. We consider that petitioner Rubenecia had no vested right to a two-step administrative appeal procedure within the Commission, that is, appeal to an office of the Commission, the MSPB, and thereafter a second appeal to the Civil Service Commission itself (i.e., the Chairman and the two (2) Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission), a procedure which most frequently consumed a prolonged period of time. It did not abolish the Merit System Protection Board, and if it did, he is not an employee of MSPB to be a real-party-in interest. He cannot argue that he was not notified that his case was elevated to CSC because (a) CSC Resolution 93-2387 did not require individual written notice sent by mail to parties in administrative cases pending before the MSPB; (b) CSC Resolution 93-2387 was published in the Manila Standard so it would be deemed substantially complied; and (c) it was Rubenecia himself who insisted on pleading before the Commissioner (he filed MTD before commissioner and not before MSPB). History of the Merit System Protection Board: PD 1409 created in the CSC the Merit Systems Board and gave it power to hear and decide administrative cases. If the Board orders the removal of the public officer, it would be subject to automatic review of the CSC. All other decisions of the Board are subject to appeal to the CSC. 1987 Admin Code recreated the Merit System Board as Merit System Protection Board (MSPB) which was intended to be an office of the Commission like any other 13 offices in the CSC. MSPB was made a part of the internal structure and organization of the CSC and thus a proper subject of organizational change which CSC is authorized to undertake under SECTION 17 of the CIVIL SERVICE LAW. (2)YES. Due Process = Notice + Opportunity to be heard. NOTICE: Formal charge which contained the essence of the complaint and the documents in support thereof that had been furnished to Rubenecia + testimony of the principal witnesses against him given during the preliminary hearing. ON THE NONFURNISH OF SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS: he was given the opportunity to obtain those documents but he did not avail of it + he sent a formal letteranswer to CSC Chair controverting the charges against him and submitted voluminous documents in support of his claim of innocence. MR CURED WHATEVER PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS DEFECT: MR gave him opportunity to be heard. ON FINDINGS OF THE CSC: “The settled rule in our jurisdiction is that the finding of fact of an administrative agency must be respected, so long as such findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or even preponderant. It is not the task of an appellate court, like this Court, to weigh once more the evidence submitted before the administrative body and to substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency in respect of sufficiency of evidence.” In the present case, in any event, after examination of the record of this case, we conclude that the decision of the Civil Service Commission finding Rubenecia guilty of the administrative charges prepared against him is supported by substantial evidence.
PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION vs. COA 302 SCRA 241 FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure to annul Decision No. 2447 dated July 27, 1992 of the Commission on Audit (COA) denying Philippine International Trading Corporation's (PITC) appeal from the disallowances made by 34
the resident COA auditor on PITC's car plan benefits; and Decision No. 98-048 dated January 27, 1998 of the COA denying PITC's motion for reconsideration. The PITC is a governmentowned and controlled corporation created under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 252 on July 21, 1973, primarily for the purpose of promoting and developing Philippine trade in pursuance of national economic development. On October 19, 1988, the PITC Board of Directors approved a Car Plan Program for qualified PITC officers. Under such car plan program, an eligible officer is entitled to purchase a vehicle, fifty percent (50%) of the value of which shall be shouldered by PITC while the remaining fifty percent (50%) will be shouldered by the officer through salary deduction over a period of five (5) years. Maximum value of the vehicle to be purchased ranges from Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) to Three Hundred and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P350,000.00), depending on the position of the officer in the corporation. In addition, PITC will reimburse the officer concerned fifty percent (50%) of the annual car registration, insurance premiums and costs of registration of the chattel mortgage over the car for a period of five (5) years from the date the vehicle was purchased. The terms and conditions of the car plan are embodied in a "Car Loan Agreement". Per PITC's car plan guidelines, the purpose of the plan is to provide financial assistance to qualified employees in purchasing their own transportation facilities in the performance of their work, for representation, and personal use. The plan is envisioned to facilitate greater mobility during official trips especially within Metro Manila or the employee's principal place of assignment, without having to rely on PITC vehicles, taxis or cars for hire. On July 1, 1989, Republic Act No. 6758 (RA 6758), entitled "An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation and Position Classification System in the Government and For Other Purposes", took effect. Section 12 of said law provides for the consolidation of allowances and additional compensation into standardized salary rates save for certain additional compensation such as representation and transportation allowances which were exempted from consolidation into the standardized rate. Said section likewise provides that other additional compensation being received by incumbents as by of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the standardized salary rates shall continue to be authorized. The legislature has similarly adhered to this policy of non-diminution of pay when it provided for the transition allowance under Section 17 of RA 6758 which reads: Sec. 17. Salaries of Incumbents. — Incumbents of position presently receiving salaries and additional compensation/fringe benefits including those absorbed from local government units and other emoluments the aggregate of which exceeds the standardized salary rate as herein prescribed, shall continue to receive such excess compensation, which shall be referred to as transition allowance. The transition allowance shall be reduced by the amount of salary adjustment that the incumbent shall receive in the future. Based on the foregoing pronouncement, petitioner correctly pointed out that there was no intention on the part of the legislature to revoke existing benefits being enjoyed by incumbents of government positions at the time of the virtue of Sections 12 and 17 thereof. There is no dispute that the PITC officials who availed of the subject car plan benefits were incumbents of their positions as of July 1, 1989. Thus, it was legal and proper for them to continue enjoying said benefits within the five year period from date of purchase of the vehicle allowed by their Car Loan Agreements with PITC. ISSUE: Whether or not the contention of COA is not valid. HELD: The repeal by Section 16 of RA 6758 of "all corporate charters that exempt agencies from the coverage of the System" was clear and expressed necessarily to achieve the purposes for which the law was enacted, that is, the standardization of salaries of all employees in government owned and/or controlled corporations to achieve "equal pay for substantially equal work". Henceforth, PITC should now be considered as covered by laws prescribing a compensation and position classification system in the government including RA 6758. This is without prejudice, however, as discussed above, to the non-diminution of pay of incumbents as of July 1, 1989 as provided in Sections 12 and 17 of said law. Wherefore, the Petition is hereby GRANTED, the assailed Decisions of the Commission of Audit are set aside. RA 6758 which is a law of general application cannot repeal provisions of the Revised Charter of PITC and its a mandatory laws expressly exempting PITC from OCPC coverage being special laws. Our rules on statutory construction provide that a special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication; that a statute, general in character as to its terms and application, is not to be construed as repealing a special or specific enactment, unless the legislative purpose to do so is manifested; that if repeal of particular or specific law or laws is intended, the proper step is to so express it.
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Balbuna vs. Hon. Secretary of Education GR No. L-14280, November 29, 1960 FACTS: The action was brought to enjoin enforce of Department Order No. 8, s. 1955 issued by the Secretary of Education, promulgating rules and regulations for the conduct of compulsory flag ceremony in all schools, as provided in Republic Act No. 1265. Petitioners, who are members of the Jehova's Witnesses, contend that the said Department Order denied them 36
freedom of worship and speech, among others. They also contend that the order is not valid for it was not published in the Official Gazette as required by law. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the Department Order is invalid. 2. Whether or not RA 1265 constitutes undue delegation of legislative power. HELD: (1) No, the contention that assailed Department Order has no binding effect; not having been published in the official gazette is without merit. The assailed order being addressed only to the directors of Public and private schools and educational institutions under their supervision, cannot be said to be of general application, requiring previous publication in the Official Gazette before it could have binding force and effect. (2) No, the requirements constitute an adequate standard.
Gregorio B. Honasan II vs. Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the DOJ 427 SCRA 46 FACTS: Before the Court is the motion filed by petitioner to cite respondent DOJ Panel of Investigating Prosecutors (respondent for brevity) in contempt of court for alleged blatant disregard and defiance of the agreement of the parties with this Court to maintain the status quo before the filing of their petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. On September 22, 2003, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary 37
restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction against respondents alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Panel for assuming jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation on the charge of coup d’etat against petitioner. Respondents filed their respective comments and petitioner his reply thereto. An oral argument on the case was held on November 18, 2003. Parties submitted their respective memoranda as required by the Court. On April 13, 2004, the Court rendered a decision dismissing the petition and upholding the concurrent jurisdiction of the respondent to conduct the preliminary investigation. Petitioner received a copy of the decision on April 22, 2004, thus he has until May 7, 2004 to file his motion for reconsideration. ISSUE: Whether or not the DOJ has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation on petitioner pursuant to Section 3, Chapter I, Title III, Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 in relation to P.D. No. 1275, as amended by P.D. No. 1513. HELD: In compliance with the Court’s Resolution dated November 18, 2003, respondent had stopped from further proceeding with the preliminary investigation while the case is pending before the court. Respondent issued its assailed order requiring petitioner to submit his counteraffidavit after receipt of the Court’s decision dated April 13, 2004 upholding respondent’s authority to conduct the preliminary investigation on the charge of coup d’etat against petitioner. Although the Court’s decision dated April 13, 2004 is not yet final as of the date of the issuance of the said assailed order, the court finds no contemptuous intent on the part of respondent to impede the administration of justice. As respondent has explained in its Comment, the charges against petitioner was filed with the DOJ in August 2003 and since then, the preliminary investigation has been pending, thus with the Court’s decision upholding their jurisdiction, respondent issued the assailed order taking into account petitioner’s right to a speedy disposition of his case. Clearly, respondent’s intention is to give respondent all the opportunity to controvert the accusation against him and to adduce evidence in his behalf. The Court finds respondent’s explanation satisfactory and does not see the act of respondent as contumacious, as herein earlier defined by the Court. Petitioner asserts in his Motion that he received on April 22, 2004, a copy of the Court’s decision upholding respondent’s authority to conduct preliminary investigation, and that he has until May 7, 2004 to file his motion for reconsideration. However, verification with the Court’s docket section reveals that petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration only on June 8, 2004, or thirty days late. The Court’s decision dated April 13, 2004 has already attained finality as of May 8, 2004. Hence, there is no longer any impediment for respondent to proceed with the preliminary investigation and for petitioner to comply with the respondent’s order to submit his counter-affidavit. Petitioner’s motion to cite respondent in contempt of court is DENIED. Respondent is required to give petitioner a fresh period from receipt of this Resolution to submit his counter-affidavit.
PPA Employees Hired After July 1, 1998 vs. COA 469 SCRA 397 Facts: PPA has been paying its officials and employees COLA and amelioration allowance equivalent to 40% and 10%, respectively, of their basic salary pursuant to various legislative and administrative issuances. During the last quarter of 1989, the PPA discontinued the payment thereof in view of Corporate Compensation Circular (CCC) No. 10 prescribing the implementing rules and regulations of R.A. No. 6758 otherwise known as the Salary Standardization Law which integrated said allowances into the basic salary effective July 1, 38
1989. However, the Supreme Court in the case of Rodolfo de Jesus, et al. vs. COA, G.R. No. 109023 dated August 12, 1998, declared CCC No. 10 as ineffective and unenforceable due to non-publication. Consequently, the PPA Board of Directors passed Resolution No. 1856 directing the payment of COLA and amelioration backpay to PPA personnel in the service during the period July 1, 1989 to March 16, 1999, the date of publication of CCC No. 10. “Doubting the validity of said Resolution, the PPA Auditor requested the opinion of the General Counsel on the propriety of the payment of the backpay. In fully concurring with the recommendation of the then Director, CAO II, the General Counsel ruled that ‘in order for a PPA employee to be entitled to backpay representing COLA and amelioration pay equivalent to 40% and 10% respectively, of their basic salary, the following conditions must concur: (1) he has to be an incumbent as of July 1, 1989; and (2) has been receiving the COLA and amelioration pay as of July 1, 1989.’ Aggrieved, PPA sought reconsideration of the said advisory opinion which was denied by the General Counsel in a 1st Endorsement dated September 13, 2001, since she found no cogent reason to set aside the earlier opinion. The PPA Auditor accordingly ruled against the grant of the subject backpay. The COA ruled that “in the absence of effective integration of the COLA and amelioration allowance into the basic salary in 1989, the inevitable conclusion is that they are deemed not integrated from the time RA 6758 was promulgated until DBM-CCC No. 10 was published in March 1999.” During that period, it thus disallowed the disputed allowances on the ground that these fell under the second sentence of Section 12 of RA 6758. It held that only officials hired on or before July 1, 1989 was entitled to receive back pay equivalent to the additional compensation (COLA and amelioration allowance) mentioned. Issue: Whether or not herein petitioners who were hired by the Philippine Ports Authority on various dates after July 1, 1989 -- are entitled to the payment of back pay for cost of living allowance (COLA) and amelioration allowance? Held: Court held that the COLA of government employees from 1989 to 1999 was not “deemed integrated into their salaries.” This means that the COLA during that period is a legally demandable and enforceable right. Employees of government-owned and controlled corporations, whether incumbent or not, are entitled to the COLA from 1989 to 1999 as a matter of right. Hence, in consonance with the equal-protection clause of the Constitution, and considering that the employees were all similarly situated as to the matter of the COLA and the amelioration allowance, they should all be treated similarly. All -- not only incumbents as of July 1, 1989 -- should be allowed to receive back pay corresponding to the said benefits, from July 1, 1989 to the new effectivity date of DBM-CCC No. 10 -- March 16, 1999. The principle of equal protection is not a barren concept that may be casually swept aside. While it does not demand absolute equality, it requires that all persons similarly situated be treated alike, both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. Verily, equal protection and security shall be accorded every person under identical or analogous circumstances. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Commission on Audit ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
Rodolfo S. De Jesus, et al. vs. Commission on Audit 294 SCRA 152, G.R. No. 149154, June 10, 2003 Facts: The Board of Directors (BOD) of the Catbalogan Water District granted to themselves RATA, rice allowance, productivity incentive, anniversary, and year-end bonus and cash gifts, as authorized by Resolution No. 313 of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA). The COA disallowed and ordered the refund of these allowances as they are not allowed by P.D. No. 198, the Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973.
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Issue: Whether COA is vested with authority to disallow release of allowance not authorized by law even if authorized by the LWUA. Held: Art. IX, Sec. 2 D of the Constitution mandates the COA to audit all the government agencies, including government-owned and controlled corporations (GOCC) with original charters. The COA is vested with authority to disallow illegal or irregular disbursements of government funds. A Water District is a GOCC with a special charter since it is created pursuant to special law, PD 198. The COA can disallow allowances not authorized by law, even if authorized by the LWUA. Considering that the disallowed allowances were received in good faith, without knowledge that payment had no legal basis, the allowances need not to be refunded.
Senate of the Philippines vs. Ermita GR 169777, April 20, 2006 FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by issuing E.O. 464 “Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes”. Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional. In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the 40
attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wiretapping, and the role of military in the so-called “Gloriagate Scandal”. Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. ISSUE: Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid and constitutional? HELD: No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case. Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected. The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.
People of the Phil. vs. Que Po Lay 94 Phil. 640 FACTS: The appellant was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of US dollars, US checks and US money orders amounting to about $7000 but failed to sell the same to the Central Bank as required under Circular No. 20. Circular No. 20 was issued in the year 1949 but was published in the Official Gazette only on Nov. 1951 after the act or omission imputed to Que Po Lay. Que Po Lay appealed from the decision of the lower court finding him guilty of violating Central Bank Circular No. 20 in connection with Sec 34 of RA 265 sentencing him to suffer 6 months imprisonment, pay fine of P1, 000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. 41
ISSUE: Whether or not publication of Circular 20 in the Official Gazette is needed for it to become effective and subject violators to corresponding penalties. HELD: It was held by the Supreme Court, in an en banc decision, that as a rule, circular and regulations of the Central Bank in question prescribing a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective. This is based on the theory that before the public is bound by its contents especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published for the people to be officially and specifically informed of such contents including its penalties. Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the decision appealed from and acquits the appellant, with costs de oficio.
People vs. Veridiano II 132 SCRA 523 Facts: Private respondent Benito Go Bio, Jr. was charged w/ violation of BP 22. Before he could be arraigned, Go Bio, Jr. filed a Motion to Quash the information on the ground that the information did not charge an offense, pointing out that at the time of the alleged commission of the offense, w/c was about the 2nd week of May '79 (date of issue of the check), BP 22 has not yet taken effect. The prosecution opposed the motion contending, among others, that the date of the dishonor of the check, 9/26/79, is the date of the commission of the offense. Resolving the motion, the court granted the same and held that BP 22 cannot be given a retroactive effect to apply to the case. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner submitting for review respondent Judge's dismissal of the criminal case. 42
HELD: When private resp. Go Bio, Jr. committed the act complained of in May '79 (at the time he issued the check-- the law penalizes the act of making or drawing and issuance of a bouncing check and not only the fact of its dishonor), there was no law penalizing such act. Following the special provision of BP 22, it became effective only on 6/29/79. The copy editor of the OG made a certification that the penal statute in question was made public only on 6/14/79 and not on the printed date 4/9/79. Differently stated, 6/14/79 was the date of publication of BP 22. Before the public may be bound by its contents especially its penal provisions, the law must be published and the people officially informed of its contents. For, it a statute had not been published before its violation, then, in the eyes of the law, there was no such law to be violated and, consequently the accused could not have committed the alleged crime. The effectivity clause of BP 22 states that "This Act shall take effect 15 days after publication in the OG." The term "publication" in such clause should be given the ordinary accepted meaning, i.e., to make known to the people in general. If the legislature had intended to make the printed date of issue of the OG as the point of reference, then it could have so stated in the special effectivity provision of BP 22.
Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. vs. Department of Finance Secretary 238 SCRA 63 Facts: Petitioner Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. is a domestic corporation whose members, individually or collectively, are engaged in the buying and selling of copra in Misamis Oriental. On the other hand, respondents represent departments of the executive branch of government charged with the generation of funds and the assessment, levy and collection of taxes and other imposts. It alleges that prior to the issuance of Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC) 47-91 on June 11, 1991, which implemented Value Added Tax (VAT) Ruling 190-90, copra was classified as agricultural food product under Section 103(b) of the National Internal Revenue Code and, therefore, exempt from VAT at all stages of production or distribution. The petitioner contends that the Bureau of Food and Drug of the Department of Health and not the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) is the competent government agency to 43
determine the proper classification of food products. It cites the opinion of Dr. Quintin Kintanar of the Bureau of Food and Drug to the effect that copra should be considered "food" because it is produced from coconut which is food and 80% of coconut products are edible. The respondents, on the contrary, argue that the opinion of the BIR, as the government agency charged with the implementation and interpretation of the tax laws, is entitled to great respect. Likewise, petitioner claims that RMC No. 47-91 is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution because while coconut farmers and copra producers are exempt, traders and dealers are not, although both sell copra in its original state. Petitioners add that oil millers do not enjoy tax credit out of the VAT payment of traders and dealers. Thus, the present petition for prohibition and injunction seeking to nullify Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 47-91 and enjoin the collection by respondent revenue officials of the Value Added Tax (VAT) on the sale of copra by members of petitioner organization. Issues: 1. Is copra an agricultural food product for purposes of the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), thus exempting the petitioner from payment of the Value Added Tax (VAT)? 2. Whether or not the opinion of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue should be accorded respect in interpreting the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code. 3. Is RMC No. 47-91 violative of the equal protection clause? 4. Are oil millers exempt from payment of the Value Added Tax (VAT)? Held: 1. In the case at bar, we find no reason for holding that respondent Commissioner erred in not considering copra as an "agricultural food product" within the meaning of Section 103(b) of the NIRC. As the Solicitor General contends, "copra per se is not food, that is, it is not intended for human consumption. Simply stated, nobody eats copra for food." That previous Commissioners considered it so is not reason for holding that the present interpretation is wrong. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue is not bound by the ruling of his predecessors. To the contrary, the overruling of decisions is inherent in the interpretation of laws. Under Section 103(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code, the sale of agricultural non-food products in their original state is exempt from VAT only if the sale is made by the primary producer or owner of the land from which the same are produced. The sale made by any other person or entity, like a trader or dealer, is not exempt from the tax. On the other hand, under Section 103(b) the sale of agricultural food products in their original state is exempt from VAT at all stages of production or distribution regardless of who the seller is. The reclassification had the effect of denying to the petitioner the exemption it previously enjoyed when copra was classified as an agricultural food product under Section 103(b) of the National Internal Revenue Code. 2. The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. In interpreting Section 103(a) and (b) of the National Internal Revenue Code, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue gave it a strict construction consistent with the rule that tax exemptions must be strictly construed against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the state. Moreover, as the government agency charged with the enforcement of the law, the opinion of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, in the absence of any showing that it is plainly wrong, is entitled to great weight. Indeed, the ruling was made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in the exercise of his power under Section 245 of the NIRC to "make rulings or opinions in connection with the implementation of the provisions of internal revenue laws, including rulings on the classification of articles for sales tax and similar purposes." 3. The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. There is a material or substantial difference between coconut farmers and copra producers, on the one hand, and copra traders and dealers, on the other. The former produce and sell copra, the latter merely sell copra. The Constitution does not forbid the differential treatment of persons so long as there is a reasonable basis for classifying them differently. 44
4. It is not true that oil millers are exempt from VAT. Pursuant to Section 102 of the National Internal Revenue Code, they are subject to 10% VAT on the sale of services. Under Section 104 of the Tax Code, they are allowed to credit the input tax on the sale of copra by traders and dealers, but there is no tax credit if the sale is made directly by the copra producer as the sale is VAT exempt. In the same manner, copra traders and dealers are allowed to credit the input tax on the sale of copra by other traders and dealers, but there is no tax credit if the sale is made by the producer. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
People vs. Santos 62 Phil. 300 Facts: The Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, by virtue of the authority vested in him by section 4 of Act No.4003 issued Administrative Order No. 2 Section 28 relative to fish and game provides as follows: "28. Prohibited fishing areas. collect, gather, take, or remove fish and other sea products from Philippine waters shall be allowed to fish, loiter, or anchor within 3 kilometers of the sore line of islands and reservations over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval or military authorities of the United States, particularly Corregidor, Pulo Caballo, La Monja, El Fraile, and Carabao, and all other islands and detached rocks lying between Mariveles Reservation on the north side of the entrance to Manila Bay and Calumpan Point Reservation on the south side of said entrance: Provided, That boats not subject to license under Act No. 4003 and this order may fish within the areas mentioned above only upon receiving written permission therefor, which permission 45
may be granted by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce upon recommendation of the military or naval authorities concerned. "A violation of this paragraph may be proceeded against under section 45 of the Federal Penal Code." The herein accused and appellee Augusto A. Santos is charged with having ordered his fishermen to manage and operate the motor launches Malabon II and Malabon III registered in his name and to fish, loiter and anchor within three kilometers of the shore line of the Island of Corregidor over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military authorities of the United States, without permission from the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce. Issues: Whether or not violation of section 28 of administrative order No. 2 can give rise to criminal prosecution. Held: Act No. 4003 does not contain a provision prohibiting boats not subject to license to fish within the stipulated areas without the written permission of the Secretary. Since the act itself does not contain such prohibition, the rules and regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture to carry into effect the provisions of the law cannot incorporate such prohibition. For the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold that the conditional clause of section 28 of Administrative Order No. 2, issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, is null and void and without effect, as constituting an excess of the regulatory power conferred upon him by section 4 of Act No. 4003 and an exercise of a legislative power which has not been and cannot be delegated to him. Wherefore, inasmuch as the facts with the commission of which Augusto A. Santos is charged do not constitute a crime or a violation of some criminal law within the jurisdiction of the civil courts, the information filed against him is dismissed, with the costs de oficio. So ordered.
US vs. Panlilio 28 Phil. 300 Facts: The accused is charged for violation of section 6 of Act No. 1760 committed by the accused in that he ordered and permitted his carabaos, which, at the time, were in quarantine, to be taken from quarantine and moved from one place to another on his hacienda. An amended information was filed. It failed, however, to specify the section of Act No. 1760 alleged to have been violated, evidently leaving that to be ascertained by the court on the trial. The defendant was notified in writing on February 22, 1913, by a duly authorized agent of the Director of Agriculture, that all of his carabaos in the barrio of Masamat, municipality of Mexico, Pampanga Province, had been exposed to the disease commonly known as rinderpest, and that said carabaos were accordingly declared under quarantine, and were ordered kept in a corral designated by an agent of the Bureau of Agriculture and were to remain there until released by further order of the Director of Agriculture. It further appears from the testimony of the witnesses. for the prosecution that the defendant fully understood that, according to the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, he was not to remove the animals, or to permit anyone else to 46
remove them, from the quarantine in which they had been placed. In spite, however, of all this, the carabaos were taken from the corral by the commands of the accused and driven from place to place on his hacienda, and were used as work animals thereon in the same manner as if they had not been quarantined. Issues: Whether or not violation of Administrative orders issued by the department of agriculture constitute a criminal offense. Held: Nowhere in the law, however, is the violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture prohibited or made unlawful, nor is there provided any punishment for a violation of such orders. Section 8 provides that "any person violating any of the provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand pesos, or by imprisonment for not more than six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court, for each offense." 'A violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, as authorized by paragraph (c), is not a violation of the provisions of the Act. The orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, while they may possibly be said to have the force of law, are not statutes and particularly not penal statutes, and a violation of such orders is not a penal offense unless the statute itself somewhere makes a violation thereof unlawful and penalizes it. Nowhere in Act No. 1760 is a violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture made a penal offense, nor is such violation punished in any way therein.
Pesigan vs. Angeles 129 SCRA 174 Facts: Executive Order 626-A, a law prohibiting the transportation of carabao and carabeef from one province to another subject to confiscation and forfeitures by the government, was published in the Official Gazette dated June 14, 1982. Petitioners Anselmo and Marcelo Pesigan transported 26 carabao and a calf from Camarines Sur to Batangas on April 2, 1982. Issue: WON an administrative regulation with a penal sanction not published is enforceable. Held: No. An Executive Order prohibiting and penalizing transportation of carabaos from one province to another cannot be enforced before its publication in the Official Gazette. Said Executive Order should not be enforced because it is a penal regulation published more than 2 months later in the Official Gazette. It became effective only 15 days thereafter as provided in Art 2 of the Civil Code and Sec 11 of the Revised Admin. Code.
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Justice and fairness dictates that the public must be informed of that provision by means of publication before violators of the Exec. Order can be bound thereby.
Peralta vs. CA 462 SCRA 382 Facts: Petitioner Israel G. Peralta (PERALTA) is the Director/Officer-in-Charge of the PPA, Regional Office No. XII, Cotabato City. On the other hand, private respondent Nida Olegario (OLEGARIO) holds a permanent position of Budget Officer I in the same office. On March 23, 1995, PERALTA issued an Order, directing OLEGARIO and a co-employee Visitacion U. Enilo, to cease and desist from performing their duties and functions effective April 1, 1995 and to ‘go on leave with or without pay, as the case may be’, on the ground of insufficiency in the release of allotment under the plantilla of the office. On March 24, 1995, OLEGARIO sought the opinion of the Civil Service Commission (CSC), Cotabato City, anent the legality of the aforesaid Order. In a letter dated March 27, 1995, the CSC informed PERALTA that OLEGARIO, being a government employee holding a permanent appointment, cannot be removed or separated from the service without valid cause. In the same letter, the CSC declared that the assailed Order is illegal because going on leave is a matter of personal choice and decision of the employee concerned. The CSC further held that the alleged insufficiency of cash allotment for salaries is 48
not among the valid grounds provided by law for removing/separating employees from the service. It also advised PERALTA to cease and desist from enforcing the void Order. Issue: Whether or not, the authority to issue opinions and rulings by CSC regarding personnel management for both national and local government agencies within their jurisdiction is binding to the said government agencies. Held: It is clear from the provisions of Section 13 of P.D. No. 807 and Section 16(15), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of E.O. No. 292 that the Regional Offices of the CSC are empowered to enforce Civil Service laws, rules, policies and standards on personnel management or personnel actions of national and local government agencies within their jurisdiction, and to enforce the same laws, rules, policies and standards with respect to the conduct of public officers and employees. From this power necessarily flows the authority to issue opinions and rulings regarding personnel management in both national and local government agencies. Moreover, these opinions and rulings perforce bind the aforementioned government agencies, otherwise, the authority given by law to these Regional Offices would become useless and said Regional Offices can be rendered impotent by government agencies which can simply choose to ignore their opinions and rulings on the convenient ground that they are not binding. In the present case, the provision of law being enforced by the Regional Office of the CSC is Section 36 of P.D. No. 807 and Section 46 of E.O. No. 292 which both provide that no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law and after due process. Hence, the ruling of the CSC Regional Office that the memorandum of Peralta, dated March 23, 1995, directing private respondent Nida Olegario to cease and desist from performing her duties and functions and advising her to go on leave with or without pay is contrary to existing Civil Service law and rules, is binding upon petitioner. WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is denied.
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Natividad 458 SCRA 441 Facts: On May 14, 1993, private respondents filed a petition before the trial court for the determination of just compensation for their agricultural lands situated in Arayat, Pampanga, which were acquired by the government pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 (PD 27). The petition named as respondents the DAR and Land Bank. After trial, the court rendered the judgment in favor of petitioners and against respondents, ordering respondents, particularly, respondents DAR and the LBP, to pay these lands owned by petitioners and which are the subject of acquisition by the State under its land reform program, the amount of THIRTY PESOS (P30.00) per square meter, as the just compensation due for payment for same lands of petitioners located at San Vicente (or Camba), Arayat, Pampanga. Respondent DAR is also ordered to pay petitioners the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as Attorney’s Fee, and to pay the cost of suit.
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Issue: Whether or not private respondents should have sought the reconsideration of the DAR’s valuation of their properties thus exhausting administrative remedies first before filing a petition for the determination of just compensation directly with the trial court. Held: Petition Denied. The records reveal that Land Bank’s contention is not entirely true. In fact, private respondents did write a letter to the DAR Secretary objecting to the land valuation summary submitted by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office and requesting a conference for the purpose of fixing just compensation. The letter, however, was left unanswered prompting private respondents to file a petition directly with the trial court. At any rate, in Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals, we declared that there is nothing contradictory between the DAR’s primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, which includes the determination of questions of just compensation, and the original and exclusive jurisdiction of regional trial courts over all petitions for the determination of just compensation. The first refers to administrative proceedings, while the second refers to judicial proceedings. In accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR to determine in a preliminary manner the just compensation for the lands taken under the agrarian reform program, but such determination is subject to challenge before the courts. The resolution of just compensation cases for the taking of lands under agrarian reform is, after all, essentially a judicial function. Thus, the trial court did not err in taking cognizance of the case as the determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the courts of justice.
Philippines Veterans Bank vs. CA 322 SCRA 139 Facts: Petitioner Philippine Veterans Bank owned four parcels of land in Tagum, Davao, which are covered by TCT Nos. T-38666, T-38667, T-6236, and T-27591. The lands were taken by the DAR for distribution to landless farmers pursuant to the R.A. No. 6657. Dissatisfied with the valuation of the land made by respondents LBP and the DARAB, petitioner filed a petition for a determination of the just compensation for its property. The petition was filed on January 26, 1994 with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Tagum, Davao, which on February 23, 1995, dismissed the petition on the ground that it was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period for filing appeals from the orders of the DARAB. Issue: Whether or not the primary jurisdiction vested to DAR to adjudicate agrarian related matters is in contrary to the jurisdiction of the RTC.
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Held: There is nothing contradictory between the DAR primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate "agrarian reform matters" and exclusive original jurisdiction over "all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform," which includes the determination of questions of just compensation, and the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC over (1) all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowner, and (2) prosecutions of criminal offenses under R.A. No. 6657. The first refers to administrative proceedings, while the second refers to judicial proceedings. In accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR as an administrative agency to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid for the lands taken under the CARP, but such determination is subject to challenge in the courts. The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts is not any less "original and exclusive" because the question is first passed upon by the DAR, as the judicial proceedings are not a continuation of the administrative determination. For that matter, the law may provide that the decision of the DAR is final and unappealable. Nevertheless, resort to the courts cannot be foreclosed on the theory that courts are the guarantors of the legality of administrative action. Accordingly, as the petition in the Regional Trial Court was filed beyond the 15-day period provided in Rule XIII, 11 of the Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, the trial court correctly dismissed the case and the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the order of dismissal.
DARAB vs. Lubrica 457 SCRA 800 G.R. No. 159145, April 29, 2005 FACTS: Federico Suntay (deceased) has filed a petition for fixing and payment of just compensation of his land covered by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or the otherwise known as R.A. 6657. The initial payment offered by DAR through the Land bank of the Philippines (LBP) is at Four Million Two Hundred Fifty-One Thousand One Hundred Forty-One Pesos and 68/100 (P4,251,141.68), however it was not agreed by Federico Suntay and appealed for a much higher compensation. After a period of summary Administrative proceedings of the matter the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (RARAD) rendered a decision in favor of Mr. Suntay of the land valued at One Hundred Fifty-Seven Million Five Hundred Forty-One Thousand Nine Hundred Fifty-One Pesos & 30/100 (P157,541,951.30). However LBP contested the decision of the RARAD and filed a petition for just compensation at the RTC of San Jose Occidental Mindoro against Mr. Suntay, DAR and RARAD. Unfortunately the move of the LBP was not considered 51
by RTC because LBP failed to pay the docket fee as required by the court on a certain period before the court had to take action on the matter. On the other hand RARAD had issued writ of execution for the payment of Four Million Two Hundred Fifty-One Thousand One Hundred Forty-One Pesos and 68/100 (P4,251,141.68) by the LBP to Mr. Suntay. Instead of paying the land compensation, LBP had filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction [16] before the DARAB on September 12, 2001 against Suntay and RARAD. The petition, docketed as DSCA No. 0252, prayed for the nullification of the following issuances of the RARAD. On September 12, 2001, the DARAB issued an Order enjoining the RARAD from momentarily implementing its January 24, 2001 Decision and directing the parties to attend the hearing for the purpose of determining the propriety of issuing a preliminary/permanent injunction. At this instance, On September 20, 2001, Josefina Lubrica, the successor-in-interest of Suntay, filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Prohibition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66710. The petition, impleading DARAB and Land Bank as respondents, sought to enjoin DARAB from further proceeding with DSCA No. 0252, mainly on the theory that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, which confers adjudicatory functions upon the DAR, does not grant DAR jurisdiction over special civil actions for certiorari. On the same day, the Court of Appeals granted Lubrica's prayer for a temporary restraining order. This notwithstanding, DARAB issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction on October 3, 2001, directing RARAD not to implement its January 24, 2001 Decision and the other orders in relation thereto, including the Writ of Execution. ISSUE: Whether or not the DARAB has to take cognizance to act in the Certiorari petition of the LBP with regards to the writ of execution issued by the RARAD against the LBP. HELD: NO. The Supreme Court had held that the DARAD has no jurisdiction to act on any petition on certiorari lodge on them because being a quasi-judicial court they have limited powers. Jurisdiction or the legal power to hear and determine a cause or causes of action must exist as a matter of law. It is settled that the authority to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus involves the exercise of original jurisdiction which must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law. It is never derived by implication. Indeed, while the power to issue the writ of certiorari is in some instance conferred on all courts by constitutional or statutory provisions, ordinarily, the particular courts which have such power are expressly designated. In the case at bar, the absence of a specific statutory grant of jurisdiction to issue the said extraordinary writ of certiorari, the DARAB, as a quasi-judicial body with only limited jurisdiction, cannot exercise jurisdiction over Land Bank's petition for certiorari. Neither the quasi-judicial authority of the DARAB nor its rule-making power justifies such self-conferment of authority. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. No costs.
PCGG vs. Peña 159 SCRA 556, L-77663, April 12, 1988 Nature of quasi-judicial function Powers of the PCGG A body exercising quasi-judicial function is co-equal with the RTC FACTS: This is a case about the Presidential Commission on Good Government, created through E.O. 1, charging it with the task of assisting the President in regard to the recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by the Marcoses, including the power to issue freeze orders or sequestration of all business enterprises owned by them upon showing of a prima facie case. March 25, 1986 –PCGG issued an order freezing the assets, effects, documents and records of two export garment manufacturing firms: American Inter-fashion Corporation and De Soleil Apparel Manufacturing Corporation. 52
June 27, 1986 –PCGG designated the OIC, Saludo, and Yeung Chun Ho as authorized signatories to effect deposits and withdrawals of the funds of the two corporations. Sept. 4, 1986 –PCGG designated Yim Kam Shing as co-signatory, in the absence of Yeung Chun Ho and Marcelo de Guzman, in the absence of Saludo. Feb. 3, 1987 –Saludo, in a memorandum, revoked the authorizations previously issued upon finding that Mr. Yim Kam Shing was a Hong Kong Chinese national staying in the country on a mere tourist visa. The PCGG Commissioner approved the memorandum. Shortly, thereafter, Saludo withdrew funds from Metrobank against the accounts of the two corporations for payment of the salaries of the staffs. Yeung Chung Kam, Yeung Chun Ho and Archie Chan instituted through Yim Kam Shing an action for damages with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against the said bank, PCGG, the Commissioner and OIC Saludo with the RTC, questioning the aforesaid revocation of the authorization as signatory previously granted to Yim Kam Shing. RTC issued TRO. PCGG filed a motion to dismiss with opposition to Yim’s prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction on the ground that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the Commission or over the subject of the case. RTC judge denied PCGG’s motion to dismiss and granted Yim’s prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. Hence this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the PCGG. HELD: The Supreme Court held that RTC and the CA for that matter have no jurisdiction over the PCGG in the exercise of its powers under the applicable Executive Orders and Art. XVIII, sec. 26 of the Constitution and therefore may not interfere with and restrain or set aside the orders and actions of the Commission. Under section 2 of the President's Executive Order No. 14 issued on May 7, 1986, all cases of the Commission regarding "the Funds, Moneys, Assets, and Properties Illegally Acquired or Misappropriated by Former President Ferdinand Marcos, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their Close Relatives, Subordinates, Business Associates, Dummies, Agents, or Nominees" whether civil or criminal, are lodged within the "exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan" and all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to, such cases necessarily fall likewise under the Sandiganbayan's exclusive and original jurisdiction, subject to review on certiorari exclusively by the Supreme Court.
Powers of the PCGG E.O. 1 created PCGG, charging it to assist the President in the recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by the Marcoses, including sequestration and provisional takeover of all business enterprises owned by them as well as conduct investigations, require submission of evidence by subpoena, administer oaths, punish for contempt. Freedom Constitution (Proc. No. 3) mandated the President to “…recover ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime….” Quasi-Judicial Function As can be readily seen, PCGG exercises quasi-judicial functions. In the exercise of quasijudicial functions, the Commission is a co-equal body with regional trial courts and “co-equal bodies have no power to control the other.” However, although under B.P. 129, the CA has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgment…of regional trial courts and quasi-judicial bodies, E.O. 14 specifically provides in section 2 that "The Presidential Commission on Good Government shall file all such cases, whether civil or criminal, with the Sandiganbayan which shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction thereof." Necessarily, those who wish to question or challenge the Commission's acts or orders in such cases must seek recourse in the same court, the Sandiganbayan, which is vested with exclusive and original jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan's decisions and final orders are in turn subject to review on certiorari exclusively by this Court. 53
Cariño vs. The Commission on Human Rights (CHR) 204 SCRA 483 (G.R. No. 96681, December 2, 1991) FACTS: On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teachers, among them members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what they described as "mass concerted actions" to "dramatize and highlight" their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter's attention. According to them they had decided to undertake said "mass concerted actions" after the protest rally staged at the DECS premises on September 14, 1990 without disrupting classes as a last call for the government to negotiate the granting of demands had elicited no response from the Secretary of Education. The "mass actions" consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peaceable assemblies, etc. Through their representatives, the teachers participating in the mass actions were served with an order week, with more teachers joining in the days that followed. Among those who took part in the "concerted mass actions" were the eight (8) private respondents herein, teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, who had agreed to support the non-political demands of the MPSTA. 54
However, the Secretary of Department of Education Culture and Sport (DECS) were administratively charged them on the basis of the principal's report and had given them five (5) days to answer the charges. They were also preventively suspended for ninety (90) days "pursuant to Section 41 of P.D. 807".They filed correspondingly to the Commission on Human Rights for the DECS violation of their peaceful assembly and replacement of them by the other teachers without validly informing them. The CHR summons the DECS personnel but the latter declared that the complaint states no cause of action and that the CHR has no jurisdiction over the case. ISSUE: The threshold question is whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has the power under the Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice, or even a quasijudicial agency, which has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights. HELD: The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter. The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.
Lastimosa vs. Vasquez 243 SCRA 497, G.R. No. 116801, April 6, 1995 FACTS: Petitioner Lastimosa has urged the wisdom of this court to decide on the validity of the of the preventive suspension order issued by the Honorable Ombudsman and his Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas against her and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar for allegedly failing to act on the Ombudsman order to file “ Attempted rape charges” against the Mayor of Santa Fe Rogelio Ilustrisimo in Cebu based on complaint filed by Jessica Villacarlos-Dayon, a public health nurse of Santa Fe, Cebu, for frustrated rape and an administrative complaint for immoral acts, abuse of authority and grave misconduct. The complaint was assigned to a graft investigation officer who, after an investigation, found no prima facie evidence and accordingly recommended the dismissal of the complaint. After reviewing the matter, however, the Ombudsman, Hon. Conrado Vasquez, disapproved the recommendation and instead directed that Mayor Ilustrisimo be charged with attempted rape in the Regional Trial Court. The case was eventually assigned to herein petitioner, First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Gloria G. Lastimosa. However, the petitioner refused the order of the Ombudsman to file attempted rape because based on her preliminary investigation it is only an act of lasciviousness that the Mayor of Santa Fe will be charged accordingly. The Ombudsman by the 55
continuous acts of defiant by the petitioner issued preventive suspension order for grave misconduct and to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt for "refusing and failing to obey the lawful directives" of the Office of the Ombudsman. ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to ask assistance or to call on the Provincial Prosecutor to assist it in the prosecution of the case for attempted rape against Mayor Ilustrisimo. HELD: The office of the Ombudsman has the power to "investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." This power has been held to include the investigation and prosecution of any crime committed by a public official regardless of whether the acts or omissions complained of are related to, or connected with, or arise from, the performance of his official duty; it is enough that the act or omission was committed by a public official. Hence, the crime of rape, when committed by a public official like a municipal mayor, is within the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute. In the existence of his power, the Ombudsman is authorized to call on prosecutors for assistance. Sect. 31 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (R.A. No. 6770) provides: Designation of Investigators and Prosecutors. — The Ombudsman may utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate of deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him as herein provided shall be under his supervision and control. (Emphasis added)
International Broadcasting Corporation (IBC) vs. Jalandoon G.R. No. 148152, November 18, 2005 FACTS: Jose Jalandoon filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission a petition to make his claim of twenty percent (20%) of share stocks of IBC. However, the SEC refused to render decision because its jurisdiction to decide the case was now transferred to RTC by virtue of R.A. 8799. The herein petitioner filed an appeal to the CA which has acquired a favorable decision enjoining the SEC to render decision of the petitioners’ claimed. The SEC and IBC eventually have filed a petition for judicial review or a review on certiorari on the case at bar by this court. ISSUE: Whether or not the SEC has the jurisdiction to decide on the issue of the share of 20% stocks claimed by the petitioner to the IBC HELD: NO. the supreme court ruled that as of August 9, 2000 which is the effectivity of RA 8799, the case was not considered pending because the SEC had not decided whether the 56
Republic who by virtue of the sequestration of the PCGG of the IBC will now be the new party to be impleaded as party of interest. In other words, the case will fall within the circumstances described in RA 8799 and thus, a controversy considered as intra-corporate issues shall now lodge at the RTC pursuant to the mandate under RA 8799.
Syquia vs. Board of Power and Water Works 74 SCRA 212 Facts: Ruiz, Enriquez and Moses filed three (3) separate complaints with Board of Power and Waterworks charging Syquia as administrator of the South Syquia Apartments with the offense of selling electricity without permit and franchise and alleging that Syquia billed them for their electricity consumption in excess in the MERALCO rates. In her answer, Syquia questioned the jurisdiction of the Board, saying that she is not engaged in the sale of the electric power but merely passes to the apartments tenants as the end-users their legitimate electric current bills in accordance with their lease contracts. Issue: Whether or not the Board Power and Waterworks has Jurisdiction over the said case. Held: Respondent Board as a regulatory board manifestly exceeded its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and adjudicating the complaints filed by the respondents against petitioner. Respondent Board acquired no jurisdiction over petitioner’s contractual relations with respondents-complainants as her tenants, since petitioner is not engaged in a public service nor in the sale of electricity without permit or franchise. Respondents’ complaints against being charged the additional cost of electricity for common facilities used by the tenants give rise to a 57
question that is purely civil in character that is to be adjudged under the applicable provision of the Civil Code and not by the respondent regulatory board which has no jurisdiction but by the regular courts of general jurisdiction. Respondent board in resolving the complaints against the petitioner and requiring her to absorb the additional rising cost of electricity consumed for the common areas and elevator service even at a resultant loss of fifteen thousand (15,000.00) a year arrogated the judicial function. Its orders were beyond its jurisdiction and must be set aside as null and void.
Manila Electric Company vs. Court of Appeals 271 SCRA 417 Facts: Private respondent CCM Gas Corporation is a customer of petitioner Manila Electric Company. On May 23, 1984, it was billed P272, 684.81 for electric consumption for the period of April 22, 1984 to May 22, 1984. The account was due on May 29, 1984, but CCM Gas withheld payment until its question concerning the purchased power adjustment was answered. It demanded to know how the item for purchased power adjustment in the amount of P213, 696.00 had been arrived at. As no information was forthcoming, CCM Gas brought this case in the Regional Trial Court. On October 14, 1985, MERALCO filed, by leave of court, an amended answer in which it raised, as special and affirmative defenses, the lack of jurisdiction of the trial court. The trial court dismissed the case and lifted the injunction it had issued on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction. As basis for its holding that the matter was cognizable by the Board of Energy, it cited allegations in the complaint that the purchased power adjustment was “arbitrarily and unilaterally imposed without the benefit of any public hearing and therefore the same was not only unconstitutional but also oppressive and excessive.
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Issue: Whether or not Board of Energy has jurisdiction to question of determining the breakdown and itemization of the purchased power adjustment billed by an Electric power company. Held: CCM Gas is not invoking the jurisdiction of the Board of Energy to regulate and fix the power rates to be charged by electric companies but the regular court’s power to adjudicate cases involving violations of rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. CCM Gas did not question the fact that the law (P.D 1206) vest upon the BOE Supervision, control and jurisdiction to regulate and fix power rates, it also did not question the fact that the purchased power adjustment was decided by the Board of Energy and it did not, before the Trial Court, question the purchased power adjustment formulated by the BOE. Trial Court concluded that CCM Gas was not questioning before it the purchased power adjustment in question but simply to demand a “breakdown and itemization” on which MERALCO based the purchased power adjustment amount of P213, 696.00 which it was trying to collect from CCM Gas, it is clear that the question of determining such breakdown and itemization is not a matter that in any way pertains to BOE’s supervision, control and jurisdiction. The question CCM Gas rose before the trial court is a matter foreign to the functions of BOE because it falls within the field of judicial determination and adjudication. Thus, it is the trial court, indeed, and not the BOE, that has jurisdiction to entertain civil action such as the case at bar and, after trial, render final judgment therein.
RCPI vs. Board of Communications 80 SCRA 471 Facts: The case at bar is about two petitions from private respondent Diego Morales and Pacifico Innocencio that prays for damages to petitioner RCPI for the non-delivery of telegrams informing them of the deaths of close relatives which allegedly caused them inconveniences, mental anguish and additional expenses. After hearing, the Board of Communications in both cases held that the service rendered by petitioner was inadequate and unsatisfactory and imposed upon the petitioner in each case a disciplinary fine pursuant to Section 21 of Commonwealth Act 146. Petitioner contest that respondent Board has no jurisdiction to entertain and take cognizance of complaints for injury caused by breach of contractual obligation arising from negligence and injury caused by quasi delict which accordingly, it should be ventilated in the proper courts and not in the Board of Communications. Issue: Whether or not the Board of Communications has jurisdiction over claims for damages allegedly suffered by private respondent for failure to receive telegrams sent thru the petitioner RCPI.
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Held: The Public Service Commission and its successor in interest, the Board of Communication being a creature of the legislature and not a court, can exercise only such jurisdiction and powers as are expressly or by necessary implication, conferred upon it by statute. The functions of Public Service Commission are limited and administrative in nature and it has only jurisdiction and power as are expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it by statute. As successor in interest of the Public Service Commission, the Board of Communications exercises the same powers, jurisdiction and functions as that provided for in the Public Service Act for the Public Service Commission.
GLOBE Wireless Ltd. vs. Public Service Commission 147 SCRA 269 Facts: Private Respondent Antonio B. Arnaiz addressed a message to Maria Diaz in Madrid, Spain filed with the Telegraph Office of the Bureau of Telecommunication which was forwarded to petitioner Globe Wireless Ltd. for the transmission thereto. Petitioner sent it to American Cable and Radio Corporation in New York which in turn transmitted to Empresa Nacional de Telecommunicaciones in Madrid. However, the latter mislaid the message resulting to its nondelivery. Private Respondent sent to the Public Service Commissioner, Enrique Medina an unverified letter-complaint relating the incident. Petitioner questioned the PSC’s jurisdiction over the subject matter of the letter-complaint, even as it denied liability for the non-delivery of the message to the addressee. PSC finds petitioner responsible for the inadequate and unsatisfactory service complained which orders them to pay a fine amounting to P200,000.00 and likewise required to refund to the remitter of the undelivered message. Issue: Whether or not Public Service Commission has jurisdiction. Held: The Public Service Commission is hereby given jurisdiction over the grantee only with respect to the rates which the grantee may charge the public subject to international 60
commitments made or adhered to by the Philippines under Section 5 of RA 4630. Jurisdiction and powers of administrative agencies limited to those expressly granted or necessarily implied from those granted in the legislation creating such body. Too basic in the administrative law to need citation of jurisprudence is the rule that the jurisdiction and powers of administrative agencies, like respondent Commission, are limited to those expressly granted or necessarily implied from those granted in the legislation creating such body, and any order without or beyond such jurisdiction is void and ineffective. Petition is granted. Order was set aside.
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co. vs. WMC Resources International Pty. Ltd. 412 SCRA 101 Facts: On July 12, 2000, WMC, by a Sale and Purchase Agreement,[4] sold to herein petitioner Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company its shares of stock in WMCP and Hillcrest, Inc. for $10,000,000.00. Petitioner requested the approval by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary of the transfer to and acquisition by it of WMCPs FTAA on account of its (petitioners) purchase of WMCs shares of stock in WMCP. The Tampakan Companies notified the Director of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB) of the DENR of the exercise of their preemptive right to buy WMCs equity in WMCP and Hillcrest, Inc., seeking at the same time the MGB Directors formal expression of support for the stock transfer transaction. Petitioner wrote, by letter the DENR Secretary about the invalidity of said agreement and reiterated its request for the approval of its acquisition of the disputed shares. WMCP and WMC, respondents herein, by letters to the MGB, proffered their side. Several other letters or position papers were filed by the parties with the MGB or the DENR. Petitioner filed before the Makati RTC a complaint against herein respondents WMC, WMCP, and the three corporations comprising the Tampakan Companies, for specific performance, annulment of contracts, contractual interference and injunction. Defendants-herein respondents filed before 61
the Makati RTC a Joint Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction and that petitioner is guilty of forum Shopping and failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Issue: Whether or not MGB has jurisdiction. Held: The questioned agreements of sale between petitioner and WMC on one hand and between WMC and the Tampakan Companies on the other pertain to transfer of shares of stock from one entity to another. But said shares of stock represent ownership of mining rights or interest in mining agreements. Hence, the power of the MGB to rule on the validity of the questioned agreements of sale, which was raised by petitioner before the DENR, is inextricably linked to the very nature of such agreements over which the MGB has jurisdiction under the law. Unavoidably, there is identity of reliefs that petitioner seeks from both the MGB and the RTC.
Boiser vs. Court of Appeals 122 SCRA 945
Facts: Boiser, the petitioner has been operating a telephone system in Tagbilaran City and other municipalities in the province of Bohol since April 15, 1965, doing business under the name and style of Premiere Automatic Telephone Network. Sometime in August, 1965, the petitioner and private respondent Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) entered into a contract denominated as "Interconnecting Agreement" whereby PLDT bound itself to provide Premiere with long distance and overseas facilities through the use of the PLDT relay station in Mandaue City, Province of Cebu. The arrangement enabled subscribers of 62
Premiere in Bohol to make or receive long distance and overseas calls to and from any part of the Philippines and other countries of the world. Petitioner on the other hand had the obligation to preserve and maintain the facilities provided by respondent PLDT, provide relay switching services and qualified radio operators, and otherwise maintain the required standards in the operation of facilities under the agreement. On February 27, 1979, without any prior notice to the petitioner, respondent PLDT issued a "circuit authorization order" to its co- respondents, PLDT employees Roman Juezan and Wilson Morrell to terminate the connection of PLDT's relay station with the facilities of the petitioner's telephone system in the province of Bohol. Petitioner avers that this order was in gross violation of the aforecited "Interconnecting Agreement.", the petitioner was compelled to seek judicial relief. It instituted Civil Case No. 17867 with the then Court of First Instance of Cebu now a Regional Trial Court, for injunction and damages.
Issue: whether or not respondent Judge has the authority in trying and hearing the case considering the issue is of the complaint for which the said order was issued properly devolves within the jurisdiction of the National Telecommunication Commission.
Held: The petition for writs of certiorari and prohibition is granted. The issuance of the order devolves within the jurisdiction of the National Telecommunications Commission and not with the regular courts. The questioned resolution of the Court of Appeals is set aside.
Davao New Town Development Corporation vs. COSLAP 459 SCRA 491 Facts: This is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction with temporary restraining order to annul the Resolution of 63
public respondent Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) in COSLAP Case No. 98-343 and to restrain COSLAP from enforcing the same for lack of jurisdiction. Subject of the instant petition is a huge tract of land consisting of 131.2849 hectares situated at Sto. Niño, Tugbok, Davao City, which was a portion of a bigger landholding belonging to the late Roman Cuison, Jr. The latter mortgaged the property to the Philippine Banking Corporation (Bank), which, after emerging as the highest bidder in the foreclosure proceedings, consolidated its ownership over the property and subdivided the land into two parcels, namely: the first, covered by TCT No. T-162663; and the second, covered by TCT No. T-162664, which is the property subject of the instant dispute (“Cuison property”). Sometime in 1989, the government acquired the Cuison property for distribution to the beneficiaries of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Among the beneficiaries were herein private respondents who are members of the Sto. Niño Farmers Cooperative (SNFC), Association of Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries (ARBA) and Nagkahiusang Mag-uuma ng Ramie (NAMAR-FADC-KMP). Private respondents were individually issued with certificates of land ownership awards (CLOAs). After compulsory acquisition proceedings, the certificate of title issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. CL-850 issued in the names of the aforesaid organizations. Claiming that the disputed property had already been classified as “urban/urbanizing” and therefore beyond the coverage of the CARP, the Bank filed a complaint docketed as DARAB Case No. XI-10-12-DC-93 on September 23, 1993 with the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator. Named respondents were the Regional Director for Region XI of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer, the Register of Deeds of Davao City, SNFC, ARBA and NAMARFADC-KMP. Respondent officials therein and SNFC stood by their assertion that the Cuison property was agricultural as per certification issued on June 30, 1990 by the Regional Officer of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). In addition, they questioned the city zoning ordinance classifying the Cuison property as “urban/urbanizing” for being without the approval of the HLURB. Evidence presented by the Bank consisted of a certification issued by the HLURB on October 13, 1993 correcting its prior classification that the Cuison property was agricultural and a written official classification from the Davao City Zoning Administrator stating that Resolution No. 984, Ordinance No. 363, series of 1982 categorized the Cuison property as “urban/urbanizing.” Issue: whether or not COSLAP has jurisdiction on the said case. Held: The petition for certiorari is granted. The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudicatory Board (DARAB) has the jurisdiction over the case. The Cuison property was not agricultural land and, therefore, outside the coverage of the CARP.
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National Federation of Labor vs. Eisma 127 SCRA 419
Facts: Private respondent Zamboanga Wood Products. Respondent Judge Carlito A. Eisma then of the Court of First Instance, now of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City, was of the view that it is a court and denied a motion to dismiss filed by petitioners National Federation of labor and Zambowood Monthly Employees Union, its officers and members. It was such an order dated July 20, 1982 that led to the filing of this certiorari and prohibition proceeding. In the order assailed, it was required that the officers and members of petitioner union appear before the court to show cause why a writ of preliminary injunction should not be issued against them and in the meanwhile such persons as well as any other persons acting under their command and on their behalf were "temporarily restrained and ordered to desist and refrain from further obstructing, impeding and impairing plaintiff's use of its property and free ingress to or egress from plaintiff's Manufacturing Division facilities at Lumbayao, Zamboanga City and on its road right of way leading to and from said plaintiff's facilities, pending the determination of the litigation, and unless a contrary order is issued by this Court. The record discloses that petitioner National Federation of Labor, on March 5, 1982, filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment, Labor Relations Division, Zamboanga City, a petition for direct certification as the sole exclusive collective bargaining representative of the monthly paid employees of the respondent Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc. at its manufacturing plant in Lumbayao, Zamboanga City. 3 Such employees, on April 17, 1982 charged respondent firm before the same office of the Ministry of Labor for underpayment of monthly living allowances. 4 Then came, on May 3, 1982, from petitioner union, a notice of strike against private respondent, alleging illegal termination of Dionisio Estioca, president of the said local union; unfair labor practice, non-payment of living allowances; and "employment of oppressive alien management personnel without proper permit. 5 It was followed by the union submitting the minutes of the declaration of strike, "including the ninety (90) ballots, of which 79 voted for yes and three voted for no." 6 The strike began on May 23, 1982. 7 On July 9, 1982, private respondent Zambowood filed a complaint with respondent Judge against the officers and members of petitioners union, for "damages for obstruction of private property with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or restraining order." 8 It was alleged that defendants, now petitioners, blockaded the road leading to its manufacturing division, thus preventing customers and suppliers free ingress to or egress from such premises. 9 Six days later, there was a motion for the dismissal and for the dissolution of the restraining order and opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction filed by petitioners. It was contended that the acts complained of were incidents of picketing by defendants then on strike against private respondent, and that therefore the exclusive jurisdiction belongs to the Labor Arbiter pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 227, not to a court of first instance.10 There was, as noted earlier, a motion to dismiss, which was denied. Hence this petition is for certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not respondent judge has the authority in trying and hearing the said case.
Held: The writ of certiorari is granted. The issuance of Presidential Decree No. 1691 and the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, made clear that the exclusive and original jurisdiction for damages would once again be vested in labor arbiters and not vested in regular courts.
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Hydro Resources Contactors Corporation vs. National Irrigation Administration 441 SCRA 614
Facts: In a competitive bidding conducted by the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) sometime in August 1978, Hydro Resources Contractors Corporation (Hydro) was awarded Contract MPI-C-2involving the main civil work of the Magat River Multi-Purpose Project. The contract price for the work was pegged at P1,489,146,473.72 with the peso component thereof amounting to P1,041,884,766.99 and the US$ component valued at $60,657,992.37 at the exchange rate of P7.3735 to the dollar or P447,361,706.73. On November 6, 1978, the parties signed Amendment No. 1of the contract whereby NIA agreed to increase the foreign currency allocation for equipment financing from US$28,000,000.00 for the first and second years of the contract to US$38,000,000.00, to be made available in full during the first year of the contract to enable the contractor to purchase the needed equipment and spare parts, as approved by NIA, for the construction of the project. On April 9, 1980, the parties entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) whereby they agreed that Hydro may directly avail of the foreign currency component of the contract for the sole purpose of purchasing necessary spare parts and equipment for the project. This was made in order for the contractor to avoid further delays in the procurement of the said spare parts and equipment. Work on the project progressed steadily until Hydro substantially completed the project in 1982 and the final acceptance was made by NIA on February 14, 1984. During the period of the execution of the contract, the foreign exchange value of the peso against the US dollar declined and steadily deteriorated. Whenever Hydro’s availment of the foreign currency component exceeded the amount of the foreign currency payable to Hydro for a particular period, NIA charged interest in dollars based on the prevailing exchange rate instead of the fixed exchange rate of P7.3735 to the dollar. Yet when Hydro received payments from NIA in Philippine Pesos, NIA made deductions from Hydro’s foreign currency component at the fixed exchange rate of P7.3735 to US$1.00 instead of the prevailing exchange rate. Upon completion of the project, a final reconciliation of the total entitlement of Hydro to the foreign currency component of the contract was made. The result of this final reconciliation showed that the total entitlement of Hydro to the foreign currency component of the contract exceeded the amount of US dollars required by Hydro to repay the advances made by NIA for its account in the importation of new equipment, spare parts and tools. Hydro then requested a full and final payment due to the underpayment of the foreign exchange portion caused by price escalations and extra work orders. In 1983, NIA and Hydro prepared a joint computation denominated as the “MPI-C-2 Dollar Rate Differential on Foreign Component of Escalation.” Based on said joint computation, Hydro was still entitled to a foreign exchange differential of US$1,353,771.79 equivalent to P10,898,391.17. NIA filed its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim raising laches, estoppel and lack of jurisdiction by CIAC as its special defenses. NIA also submitted its six (6) nominees to the panel of arbitrators. After appointment of the arbitrators, both parties agreed on the Terms of Reference as well as the issues submitted for arbitration.
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Issue: whether or not Construction Industry Arbitration Commission has jurisdiction on the said case. Held: The petition is GRANTED. It would be preposterous for NIA to have the power of granting claims without the authority to verify the computations of such claims.
Southern Cross Cement Corporation vs. Cement Manufacturers Assoc. of the Phil. 465 SCRA 532 Facts: The DTI sought the opinion of the Secretary of Justice whether it could still impose a definitive safeguard measure notwithstanding the negative finding of the Tariff Commission. After the Secretary of Justice opined that the DTI could not do so under the SMA, the DTI Secretary then promulgated a Decision wherein he expressed the DTI’s disagreement with the conclusions of the Tariff Commission, but at the same time, ultimately denying Philcemcor’s application for safeguard measures on the ground that the he was bound to do so in light of the Tariff Commission’s negative findings. Philcemcor challenged this Decision of the DTI Secretary by filing with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus seeking to set aside the DTI Decision, as well as the Tariff Commission’s Report. It prayed that the Court of Appeals direct the DTI Secretary to disregard the Report and to render judgment independently of the Report. Philcemcor argued that the DTI Secretary, vested as he is under the law with the power of review, is not bound to adopt the recommendations of the Tariff Commission; and, that the Report is void, as it is predicated on a flawed framework, inconsistent inferences and erroneous methodology. The Court of Appeals Twelfth Division, in a Decision penned by Court of Appeals Associate Justice Elvi John Asuncion, partially granted Philcemcor’s petition. The appellate court ruled that it had jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari since it alleged grave abuse of discretion. While it refused to annul the findings of the Tariff Commission, it also held that the DTI Secretary was not bound by the factual findings of the Tariff Commission since such findings are merely recommendatory and they fall within the ambit of the Secretary’s discretionary review. It determined that the legislative intent is to grant the DTI Secretary the power to make a final decision on the Tariff Commission’s recommendation. On 23 June 2003, Southern Cross filed the present petition, arguing that the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction over Philcemcor’s petition, as the proper remedy is a petition for review with the CTA conformably with the SMA, and; that the factual findings of the Tariff Commission on the existence or non-existence of conditions warranting the imposition of general safeguard measures are binding upon the DTI Secretary. Despite the fact that the Court of Appeals’ Decision had not yet become final, its binding force was cited by the DTI Secretary when he issued a new Decision on 25 June 2003, wherein he ruled that that in light of the appellate court’s Decision, there was no longer any legal impediment to his deciding Philcemcor’s application for definitive safeguard measures. He made a determination that, contrary to the findings of the Tariff Commission, the local cement industry had suffered serious injury as a result of the import surges. Accordingly, he imposed a definitive safeguard measure on the importation of gray Portland cement, in the form of a definitive safeguard duty in the amount ofP20.60/40 kg. bag for three years on imported gray Portland Cement. 67
Issue: Whether or not CTA has jurisdiction in the said case. Held: The petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction over Philcemcor’s petition, as the proper remedy is a petition for review with the CTA conformably with the SMA, and; that the factual findings of the Tariff Commission on the existence or non-existence of conditions warranting the imposition of general safeguard measures are binding upon the DTI Secretary.
Angara v. Electoral Commission 63 PHIL 139 FACTS: In the election of September 17, 1935, petitioner Angara and the respondents Ynsua, Castillo, and Mayor were candidates voted for the position of members of the National Assembly for the district of Tayabas. On October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the National Assembly. On December 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8, which in effect, fixed the last date to file election protests. On December 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before Electoral Commission a “motion of protest” against Angara and praying among other things, that Ynsua be named/declared elected member of the National Assembly or that the election of said position be nullified. On December 9, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution stating that the last day for filing protest is on Dec. 9. Angara contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of contested elections to the National Assembly and the SC therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case. ISSUE: Whether or not the Rules of Proceedings adopted by the Electoral Commission in election contest of which it was the “sole judge” is validly prescribed by such commission? HELD: Yes, it is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred. The incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power must be deemed by necessary application to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission. The Supreme Court emphasized that in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the SC as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries. That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority. That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the other two departments of the government. That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly.
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Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava 105 Phil. 173 FACTS: A petition was filed by the petitioner for prohibition and injunction against Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office. On May 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June 27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office. The petitioner contends that one who has passed the bar examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office and that the respondent Director’s holding an examination for the purpose is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law. The respondent, in reply, maintains the prosecution of patent cases “ does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge and training as a matter of actual practice so as to include engineers and other individuals who passed the examination can practice before the Patent office. Furthermore, he stressed that for the long time he is holding tests, this is the first time that his right has been questioned formally. ISSUE: Whether or not the appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and the prosecution of patent application, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law. HELD: The Supreme Court held that the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their opposition thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. Moreover, the practice before the patent Office involves the interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be established in accordance with the law of evidence and procedure. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court but also embraces all other matters connected with the law and any work involving the determination by the legal mind of the legal effects of facts and conditions. Furthermore, the law provides that any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or decision of the director. Thus, if the transactions of business in the Patent Office involved exclusively or mostly technical and scientific knowledge and training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial body, but rather to a board of scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the case. 69
Agusmin Promotional Enterprises, Inc. vs. CA 117 SCRA 369 FACTS: Agusmin Promotional Enterprises, Inc. organized by Guiang, Liceralde and six (6) others, which was then issued a consolidated timber license. Guiang and Liceralde, due to some differences with the majority group in the corporation, requested the Secretary of Agriculture and National Resources that they be allowed to withdraw their respective forest areas under their original timber licenses from the consolidated timber license of Agusmin and consolidated them with he timber license of Pedreo B. De Jesus and Sulpicio Lagnoda. The request was referred to the Director of Forestry who declared that the request is beyond his jurisdiction. Guiang, Liceralde and De Jesus formed a corporation known as the P.B. De Jesus & Co., Inc. Agusmin interposed and appealed from the decision of the Secretary stating that it was appealing said decision to the Office of the President. ISSUE: Whether or not the right for procedural due process has been violated by the Executive Secretary? HELD: No, in deciding administrative questions, technical rules of procedure are not strictly enforced and due process of law in the strict judicial sense is not indispensable, little, if any, useful purpose could be gained in further discussing these issues because Letter of Instruction No. 172, which ordered the cancelation of the timber issued to Agusmin, in effect, reversed and set aside the said decision of the Executive Secretary before the same become final and enforceable. In the words of the CA, the said decisions did not acquire and finality. Administrative rules of procedure would be construed liberally in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their respective claims and defenses. There is no denial of due process if the decision was rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
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Carmelo vs. Ramos 6 SCRA 836 FACTS: The Mayor of Manila created a committee to investigate the anomalies involving the license inspectors and other personnel of the License Inspection Division of the Office of the City Treasurer and of the License and Permits Division of the said office. He named Jesus Carmelo as chairman. The committee issued subpoenas to Armando Ramos requiring him to appear before it in connection with an administrative case but Ramos refused to appear. Claiming that Ramos’ refusal tended to impede or obstruct the administrative proceedings, petitioner filed with the CFI a petition to declare Ramos in contempt. The trial court dismissed the petition. It held that there is no law empowering committees created by municipal mayors to issue subpoenas and demand witnesses testify under oath and that to compel Ramos to testify would be to violate his right against self-incrimination ISSUE: Whether or not the said committee is empowered to subpoena witnesses and ask for their punishment in case of refusal HELD: NO. The rule is that Rule 64 (Contempt) of the Rules of Court applies only to inferior and superior courts and does not comprehend contempt committed against administrative officials or bodies like the one in this case, unless said contempt is clearly considered and expressly defined as contempt of court, as is done in paragraph 2 of section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code.
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Pascual vs. Board of Examiners 28 SCRA 344 FACTS: In the initial hearing of the Board of Medical Examiners on the charge against Arsenio Pascual, Jr., counsel for complainants announced that he would present Pascual as his first witness. Pascual objected relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself. The Board took note, but stated that he will still testify as such witness in the next hearing. Pascual filed an action for prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction against the Board with the CFI of Manila. The complainants in the administrative case, Salvador Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton, filed a motion for intervention. Lower court ruled in favor of Pascual. ISSUE: Whether in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged malpractice, the Board can compel the person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his consent. HELD: No. The lower court's decision follows the principle in Cabal v. Kapunan, about an adminstrative case, that the accused in a criminal case may refuse not only to answer incriminatory questions but also to take the witness stand. While the matter there referred to an administrative case, there is clearly the imposition of a penalty. The present case is not dissimilar. The self-incrimination clause is applicable to a proceeding that could possibly result in the loss of the privilege to practice the medical profession.The Board is mistaken that the clause is limited to allowing a witness to object to questions the answers to which could lead to a penal liability. That is just one aspect of the right. The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence. In Chavex v. CA, defendant has a right to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand.
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Tolentino vs. Inciong 91 SCRA 563 Facts: Private respondent Domingo Cinco filed a verified complaint with the then NLRC charging petitioner Arcadio Tolentino with violating the Constitution of the Batangas Labor Union (BLU) by refusing, as its president, to call for the election of officers. NLRC issued an order directing the BLU to hold its election of officers within 20 days from receipt. BLU filed a petition with the CFI for prohibition with a writ of preliminary injunction against private respondent Cinco, NLRC and the Sec. of Labor, seeking to annul and to prohibit NLRC and the Sec. of Labor from enforcing it. Setting instead the application for heaving, Judge Jaime Delos Angeles afterwards reserved his resolution on the matter at issue in view of the intricate legal questions raised therein. Private and judge then was served a copy of a subpoena issued by respondent Inciong requiring them to appear at the NLRC to explain why they should not be held in contempt for trying to use old society tactics to prevent a union election duly ordered by the commission. Issue: WON a labor official's power to hold a person for contempt for refusal to comply with its order can be extended to trial court judges. Held: No. Courts exist precisely to assure that there is compliance with the law, which is the essence of judicial power. Courts like any other governmental agencies, must observe the limits of its jurisdiction, thus said judge reserved his resolution in view of the intricacies of the legal questions raised after hearing the arguments on the propriety of issuing the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for. The proper step for an administrative official then is to seek a dismissal of the case before the court precisely on the ground that the matter did not fall within the domain of the powers conferred on it. Citing the judge for contempt is an affront to reason as well as a disregard of well-settled rules.
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Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations G.R. No. L-49496 FACTS: This case involved a motion for new trial of the National Labor Union, Inc. The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., prays for the vacation of the judgment rendered by the majority of the Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial, and avers, among others, that (1) Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, 1938, there was shortage of leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the National Labor Union Inc., is entirely false and unsupported by the records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather; (2) the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army; (3) the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal; and (4) the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations. ISSUE: Whether or not the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations is granted. HELD: The Court ruled in the affirmative. The interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved. Thus, the failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth. There are primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character: 1. The right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof;
2. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented; 3. That of having something to support its decision; 74
4. The evidence must be substantial; 5. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; 6. Judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision; and 7. Should render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved and the reason for the decision rendered.
Digested by: Lacastesantos, Regin Eral F. LLB II-A Montemayor vs. Bundalian 405 SCRA 264 FACTS: Private respondent (Luis Bundalian) accused petitioner (Edillo Montemayor), of accumulating unexplained wealth, in violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3019, that results to his dismissal as Regional Director of the Department of Public Works and Highway. Petitioner explained that in view of the unstable condition of the government service in 1991, his wife inquired from her family in the US about their emigration. After the investigation, the PCAGC concluded that a petitioner’s acquisition of the subject property was manifestly out of proportion to his salary, it has been unlawfully acquired. That it recommended petitioner’s dismissal from service. ISSUE: Whether or not he was denied of due process in the investigation before the PCAGC HELD: We find no merit in his contentions. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain one’s side or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently met. 6In the case at bar, the PCAGC exerted efforts to notify the complainant of the proceedings but his Philippine residence could not be located.7 Be that as it may, petitioner cannot argue that he was deprived of due process because he failed to confront and cross-examine the complainant. Petitioner voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the PCAGC by participating in the proceedings before it. He was duly represented by counsel. He filed his counter-affidavit, submitted documentary evidence, attended the hearings, moved for a reconsideration of Administrative Order No. 12 issued by the President and eventually filed his appeal before the Court of Appeals. His active participation in every step of the investigation effectively removed any badge of procedural deficiency, if there was any, and satisfied the due process requirement. He cannot now be allowed to challenge the procedure adopted by the PCAGC in the investigation.
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Zambales Chromite Mining et al vs. Court of Appeals 94 SCRA 261 FACTS: Zambales Chromite Mining filed an administrative case before the Director of Mines Gozon to have them be declared the rightful and prior locators and possessors of 69 mining claims in Sta. Cruz, Zambales. They are asserting their claim against the group of Martinez and Pabiloña. Gozon decided in favor of Martinez et al. ZCM appealed the case before the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. During pendency, Gozon was assigned as the Sec. of Agriculture and Natural Resources. He did not inhibit himself from deciding on the appeal but he instead affirmed his earlier decision when he was still the director of mines. ZCM then appealed before the CFI of Zambales. The CFI affirmed the decision of Gozon. It held that the disqualification of a judge to review his own decision or ruling (Sec. 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court) does not apply to administrative bodies; that there is no provision in the Mining Law, disqualifying the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources from deciding an appeal from a case which he had decided as Director of Mines; that delicadeza is not a ground for disqualification; that the ZCM did not seasonably seek to disqualify Gozon from deciding their appeal, and that there was no evidence that Gozon acted arbitrarily and with bias, prejudice, animosity or hostility to ZCM. ZCM appealed the case to the CA. The CA reversed Gozon’s finding and declared that ZCM had the rights earlier attributed to Martinez et al by Gozon. Martinez et al appealed averring that the factual basis found by Gozon as Director of Mines be given due weight. The CA reconsidered after realizing that Gozon cannot affirm his own decision and the CA remanded the case to the Minister of Natural Resources. Now both parties appealed urging their own contentions; ZCM wants the CA’s earlier decision to be reaffirmed while Martinez et al demanded that Gozon’s finding be reinstated. The CA denied both petition. ISSUE: Whether or not Gozon can validly affirm his earlier decision w/o disturbing due process. HELD: The SC annulled the decision of Gozon calling it as a mockery of justice. Gozon had acted with grave abuse of discretion. In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out to be a farce, the reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no different view or there would be no real review of the case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case. The SC affirmed the 2nd decision of the CA.
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Anzaldo vs. Clave 119 SCRA 353 FACTS: Dr Anzaldo, 55, had been working in the National Institute of Science and Technology for 28 years. She was holding the position Scientist Research Associate IV when she was appointed as Science Research Supervisor II. Her appointment was approved by the CSC in 1978. The position was previously held by Dr Kintanar who recommended Dr Venzon to his position. Dr Venzon contested the position. Dr Afable, the one who appointed Anzaldo, averred that Anzaldo’s appointment was approved by the NIST evaluation Committee which gave 88 points to Anzalado and 66 points to Venzon. The issue was elevated to the Office of the president by Venzon. Clave was then the Presidential Executive Assistant. Pursuant to PD 807 or the Civil Service Decree, Clave referred the issue to the CSC. Clave was also holding the chairmanship of the CSC. Clave issued Res 1178 appointing Venzon to the contested position. After the denial of her motion for the reconsideration of that resolution, or on January 5, 1980, Anzaldo appealed to the Office of the President of the Philippines. Since Clave was holding the office of PEA he just affirmed his decision as the CSC chairman. ISSUE: Whether or not there is due process in the case at bar. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Anzaldo. When PEA Clave said in his decision that he was “inclined to concur in the recommendation of the Civil Service Commission”, what he meant was that he was concurring with Chairman Clave’s recommendation: he was concurring with himself. It is evident that Anzaldo was denied due process of law when Presidential Executive Assistant Clave concurred with the recommendation of (himself) Chairman Clave of the Civil Service Commission. Due process of law means fundamental fairness. It is not fair to Anzaldo that PEA Clave should decide whether his own recommendation as Chairman of the CSC, as to who between Anzaldo and Venzon should be appointed Science Research Supervisor II, should be adopted by the President of the Philippines.
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Corona vs. CA 214 SCRA 378 FACTS: On May 15, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 25 creating a Presidential Committee on Public Ethics and Accountability. Pursuant to the mandate of A.O. No. 25, former DOTC Secretary Rainerio Reyes issued Office Order No. 88-318 creating the Administrative Action Board (AAB) “to ac, decide and recommend to the Secretary appropriate measures on cases of administrative malfeasance, irregularities, grafts and acts of corruption in the Department.” In line with the said order series of complaints where then filed in the AAB. Bungubung as one of the respondents filed his answer and questioned the jurisdictional competence of the AAB on the ground that it was the General Manager of the PPA who had jurisdiction over the case. ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of the DOTC and/or the AAB has jurisdiction over administrative cases involving personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager of the PPA? HELD: That the DOTC Secretary, acting as alter ego of the President, has jurisdiction over PPA personnel like the private respondents herein, is correct only to a certain extent. The DOTC Secretary’s jurisdiction is circumscribed by the aforequoted provisions of the PPA Charter and the Civil Service Law which give him only appellate jurisdiction over disciplinary matters involving personnel below that of Assistant General Manager. He does not have the power to initiate proceedings against a subordinate official of the PPA; otherwise, we shall witness the absurd spectacle of the DOTC Secretary acing as complainant-initiator of an administrative case which later falls upon him to review.
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Caoile vs. Vivo 125 SCRA 87 FACTS: The case at bar involves five aliens namely Teban, Jose, Felipe, Vicente, Santos all surnamed Caoile, who have wrongfully managed to enter and remain in the Philippines since 1961.The Philippine consul at HongKong issued certificates to enable them to travel directly to the Philippines. The board allowed the admission into this country of the five alleged Caoile brothers on the assumption that they are Filipinos under the principle of jus sanguinis. On January 24, 1962 the Secretary of Justice, acting in the public interest, pursuant to section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Memorandum Order No. 9. In that order, he directed that in view of the fact that “for the past several years, the Board of Commissioners of immigration has not yet met collectively to discuss and deliberate on the cases coming before it”, “all decisions purporting to have been rendered by the Board of Commissioners on appeal from, or on review motu proprio of, decisions of the board of special inquiry” were set aside. In compliance with the Secretary’s directive, the Commissioner of Immigration ordered an immigration officer to study and review the proceeding and the evidence as to the admission of Teban, Felipe, Santos, and Vicente. ISSUE: Whether or not there is grave abuse of discretion? HELD: The complainants cannot say that there is grave abuse of discretion in this case. If the petition were treated as one of the declaratory relief as to his rights or duties under the Immigration Law, with the object of attaining curative or preventive justice, still it was premature and anticipatory because in his case there was yet no controversy which was ripe for adjudication. Before seeking judicial intervention, appeal to Minister of Justice from decision of immigration board should have been sought. And since the Commissioners of Immigration are under the Department of Justice and, in this case, they followed the Secretary’s Order setting aside the individual actions of the former Commissioners, the aggrieved parties should have exhausted their administrative remedies by appealing to the Secretary before seeking judicial intervention.
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Cruz vs. Minister of Labor and Employment 120 SCRA 15, No. L-56591 Facts: On November 21, 1979, respondent bank Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) filed an application for clearance to terminate the services of its remittance clerk, Ma. Lourdes Cruz, for gross negligence which was opposed by the latter by filing a complaint for illegal dismissal. On February 11, 1980, the Regional Director resolved the case by lifting petitioners’ preventive suspension and directing the bank to reinstate her with full back-wages. In support of his order, the Director held that the record is bereft of any substantial proof tending to show that Lourdes Cruz has committed act of gross negligence as imputed to her. Issues: Whether or not the petitioner was not given the chance to be heard and was she was denied due process? Held: Petitioner's claim that she was denied due process is likewise without basis. She was given the chance to explain and exonerate herself of the charges during the investigation. It was incumbent upon her to prove her innocence but she failed to do so. Her allegation in her complaint that she acted only in obedience to her superior's order is an obvious after thought which should not be given credence. She failed to adduce an iota of evidence to support her allegation. Nevertheless, the courts agreed with respondent Minister's order of reinstating petitioner without backwages instead of dismissal which may be too drastic. Denial of backwages would sufficiently penalize her for her infractions.
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Cordero vs. Public Service Commission 121 SCRA 249, No. L32489 Facts: Petitioners have taken this appeal from a decision of the respondent Public Service Commission authorizing the private respondents to sell ice and supply cold storage for the province of Batangas and the City of Lipa. The petitioners are holders of a certificate of public convenience to operate an ice-plant in the municipality of Bauan and to sell the ice produced therein in the municipalities of Bauan and Mabini, province of Batangas. In assailing the validity of the decision appealed from, the petitioners contend that the decision is null and void due to the lack of the requisite notice of hearing. The respondents, on the other hand, contend that petitioners may not complain that they were not notified of the hearing inasmuch as the notice of hearing was published in two newspapers of general circulation in the province of Batangas; and that the requirement of individual notices to the affected parties appearing in the list attached to the notice of hearing could not have been complied with by the private respondents inasmuch as no such list was attached to the notice of hearing issued by the hearing officer; besides, the usual practice in the hearing of cases in the respondent Commission was not to send such individual notices to affected parties. Issues: Whether or not there was proper notice of hearing was published? Held: Respondent applicant contends that the publication of the notice of hearing in 2 newspapers of general circulation in the province of Zambales is notification not only to the interested parties, but to the whole world in general. This is inaccurate. The order required, in addition to publication, individual notice to the operators affected by the application and whose names appeared in the list attached to the order. The requirement, therefore, is not in the alternative, but conjunctive. It cannot be disputed that this requirement of the Public Service Commission itself in connection with an application for a certificate of public convenience, is within the power of the Commission to impose. The inadequate notification to the interested parties in this case, which resulted in the oppositors' failure to be present during the hearing, deprived them of their day in court. The decision rendered in disregard of said right, consequently, is null and void.
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M.F Violago Oiler Tank Tracks vs. NLRC 117 SCRA 544, No. L-56950-51 Facts: Five drivers who used to work for the petitioner filed complaints with the Regional Office of the National Labor Relations Commission at San Fernando, Pampanga for illegal dismissal, reinstatement with backwages, and such other benefits as they may be entitled to under the law. According to the complainants, Mr. Miguel F. Violago, proprietor of an oil-tank trucking business, withdrew the trucks driven by them for no just cause and without prior clearance from the Ministry of Labor. M. F. Violago Oiler Tank Trucks alleged that all the charges filed by the complainant against herein respondent are maliciously false and perjuriues, the truth of the matter being that said complainants Teofilo de Leon, Ricardo Pasco, Amado Mariano were allegedly suspected/caught by the Petrophil authorities of using device to cheat in receiving and delivering fuel from the compound to the points of delivery and by reason thereof, they were prohibited or banned from entering the Petrophil compound at Pandacan, Metro Manila, thus, as they were not allowed anymore to enter the compound, they abandoned the trucks they were respectively operating. The respondent Commission rendered a decision on April 30, 1980 affirming the arbiter's decision but deleting the awards of emergency living allowances to Felipe Cruz and Zosimo Sacdalan and the award of service incentive leave pay to all complainants. Instead of the award of separation pay, the petitioner was ordered to reinstate the complainants with full backwages until actually reinstated. Issues: Whether or not the Labor Arbiter violated due process in rendering the decision? Held: Labor arbiter who scheduled a complaint for hearing and heard the same before the answer was filed violates due process. We note that the respondent commission adopted the labor arbiter's findings verbatim and merely added three short paragraphs in its decision which modified the awards with one sentence justifications for each change. The court agreed with the petitioner that the conclusions of the arbiter are "patently erroneous and devoid of logical and justifiable consideration." The arbiter called the petitioner's defense that it never dismissed the complainants from employment a mere "theory", inspite of the fact that this defense constituted the crucial issue of the case before him.
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Mayon Hotel & Restaurant vs. Adana 458 SCRA 609, G.R. No. 157634 Facts: Petitioner Mayon Hotel & Restaurant is a single proprietor business registered in the name of petitioner Pacita O. Po, whose mother, petitioner Josefa Po Lam, manages the establishment.The hotel and restaurant employed about sixteen (16) employees. Due to the expiration and non-renewal of the lease contract for the rented space occupied by the said hotel and restaurant at Rizal Street, the hotel operations of the business were suspended on March 31, 1997. The operation of the restaurant was continued in its new location at Elizondo Street, Legazpi City, while waiting for the construction of a new Mayon Hotel & Restaurant at Peñaranda Street, Legazpi City. Only nine (9) of the sixteen (16) employees continued working in the Mayon Restaurant at its new site, the 16 employees filed complaints for underpayment of wages and other money claims against petitioners. Executive Labor Arbiter Gelacio L. Rivera, Jr. rendered a Joint Decision in favor of the employees. Issues: Whether or not respondents illegally dismissed? Held: On this point, we note that the Labor Arbiter and the CA are in accord that at the time of the filing of the complaint, respondents had no cause of action to file the case for illegal dismissal. According to the CA and the Labor Arbiter, the lay-off of the respondents was merely temporary, pending construction of the new building at Peñaranda Street. But while the closure of the hotel operations in April of 1997 may have been temporary, we hold that the evidence on record belie any claim of petitioners that the lay-off of respondents on that same date was merely temporary. On the contrary, we find substantial evidence that petitioners intended the termination to be permanent.
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Pefianco vs. Moral 322 SCRA 439, G.R No. 132248 Facts: Secretary Gloria filed a complaint against respondent for dishonesty and grave misconduct due to pilferage of some historical documents and the keeping of it on the respondents’ possession. Respondent then receive a copy of the resolution finding her guilty of administrative offenses of dishonesty and was ordered dismissed from the service. Respondent did not appeal the judgment and instead filed for Petition for the Production of the DECS investigation Committee Report. The Petition was, however denied. She then filed a Reiteration for DECS Committee Report and DECS Resolution, Secretary Gloria moved to dismiss the mandamus case principally for lack of cause of action, but the trial court denied his motion. Thus, he elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion to the trial court. The appellate court sustained the trial court and dismissed Secretary Gloria’s petition for lack of merit holding that -Petitioner Gloria acted prematurely. Issues: Whether or not the respondent is entitled to be informed of the findings of the investigation against him? Held: A respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed against him-he is only entitled only to the administrative decision based on substantial evidence presented against her during the hearings of the investigation committee. There is no law or rule which imposes a legal duty on petitioner to furnish respondent with a copy of the investigation report.
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Police Commission vs. Lood GR No. L-34637 February 24, 1984 Facts: Respondent Ibea had been dismissed from the police service by the then Mayor Braulio Sto. Domingo pursuant to the decision of petitioner commission finding him guilty of serious irregularity in the performance of duty on complaint of Jose Lee, Jr. Respondent thereafter filed his complaint with respondent court seeking his reinstatement. He was sustained by respondent court. Issue: Whether or not the respondent Ibea was deprived of administrative due process. Held: No. The record amply shows that petitioner’s decision was supported by substantial evidence consisting of the affidavit-complaint and the documentary evidence duly marked by the board as exhibits for the complainant. As uniformly held by the Court, it is sufficient that administrative findings of fact are supported by evidence on the record, or stated negatively, it is sufficient that findings of fact are not shown to be unsupported by evidence. As expounded by Justice Laurel in the leading case of Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations, substantial evidence is all that is all that is needed to support an administrative finding of fact, and substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
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Batongbacal vs. Associated Bank G.R. No. 72977 December 21, 1988 Facts: Petitioner Bienvenido R. Batongbacal, a lawyer who was admitted to the Bar in 1952, began his banking career in 1961 as manager of the Second Rizal Development Bank. On November 2, 1966, he transferred to the Citizens Bank and Trust Company. He was appointed assistant vice-president. On October 14, 1975, Citizens Bank and Trust Company merged with the Associated Banking Corporation. On March 15,1983, the bank's board of directors met and approved the resolution that the bank officers at the Head Office and the Branches with corporate rank of manager and higher be required to submit immediately to the President their courtesy resignations. Issue: Whether or not an employer bank may legally dismiss its assistant vice-president for refusal to tender his courtesy resignation which the bank required in line with its reorganization plan. Held: While it may be said that the private respondent's call for courtesy resignations was prompted by its determination to survive, we cannot lend legality to the manner by which it pursued its goal. By directing its employees to submit letters of courtesy resignation, the bank in effect forced upon its employees an act which they themselves should voluntarily do. It should be emphasized that resignation per se means voluntary relinquishment of a position or office. Adding the word "courtesy" did not change the essence of resignation. That courtesy resignations were utilized in government reorganization did not give private respondent the right to use it as well in its own reorganization and rehabilitation plan. There is no guarantee that all employers will not use it to rid themselves arbitrarily of employees they do not like, in the guise of "streamlining" its organization. On the other hand, employees would be unduly exposed to outright termination of employment which is anathema to the constitutional mandate of security of tenure. The record fails to show any valid reasons for terminating the employment of petitioner. There are no proofs of malfeasance or misfeasance committed by petitioner which jeopardized private respondent's interest. The latter's allegations that petitioner was "purged" because he sabotaged the bank and that he "contributed, directly or indirectly" to its downfall are mere subjective conclusions unsubstantiated by hard facts. To clothe with legality petitioner's dismissal for his failure to submit his letter of courtesy resignation is to add a ground for termination of employment to the provisions of the Labor Code.
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Progress Homes vs. NLRC G.R. No. 106212 March 7, 1997 Facts: Petitioner Progress Homes Subdivision (Progress Homes), is a housing project undertaken by the Ermelo M. Almeda Foundation, Inc., a non-stock organization duly registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). When it engaged in constructing low-cost housing units for low-income employees, it named its project "Progress Homes Subdivision" in Camarines Sur. The other petitioner, Ermelo Almeda, is the President and General Manager of Progress Homes and the owner of the land where the Progress Homes Subdivision is located. Private respondents allegedly were among the workers employed by petitioners in their construction and development of the subdivision from 1986 to 1988. They were paid varying salaries. Private respondents filed before the NLRC Arbitration Branch a petition for reinstatement, salary adjustment, ECOLA, overtime pay and 13th month pay. On December 27, 1991, the Labor Arbiter in Legazpi City forthwith issued a decision in favor of private respondents. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter's decision. Issue: Whether or not the NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion in upholding the Labor Arbiter’s decision. Held: It was speculative and conjectural on the part of the NLRC to declare petitioners' argument as "mere alibi." The employment contract presented by petitioners, while admittedly defective, did not refer to any of the private respondents. No evidence was presented to show that petitioners engaged the services of private respondents. As regards the matter of evidence, it is clear that the Labor Arbiter relied solely on the bare allegations of the parties in their position papers in rendering his now assailed decision.
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Velasquez vs. Hernandez G.R. No. 150732 August 31, 2004 Facts: In a letter dated 25 September 1996, the Assistant Schools Division Superintendent of the DECS-CAR, (Cordillera Administrative Region) sent a letter to petitioner (in G.R. No. 150732) Tomas G. Velasquez, informing him of the alleged infractions committed by respondent, Helen B. Hernandez, such as soliciting, accepting, and receiving sums of money, in exchange for transfer or promotion of complainant teachers. Acting on the letter, petitioner Velasquez convened a fact-finding committee to determine the veracity of the alleged violations of respondent and to render a formal report and recommendation. On 15 November 1996, the Committee issued an Investigation Report recommending the filing of administrative and criminal complaints against respondent. After due proceedings, the CSC issued Resolution No. 00-1375, dated 13 June 2000, finding respondent guilty of the charges against her and ordering her dismissal from the service. Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the resolutions of the CSC. Issue: Whether or not CSC erred in rendering judgment against her in violation of her right to due process in administrative proceedings. Held: Administrative proceedings are governed by the "substantial evidence rule." A finding of guilt in an administrative case would have to be sustained for as long as it is supported by substantial evidence that the respondent has committed the acts stated in the complaint or formal charge. As defined, substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion. This is different from the quantum of proof required in criminal proceedings which necessitates a finding of guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The Ombudsman, in ordering the withdrawal of the criminal complaints against respondent was simply saying that there is no evidence sufficient to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt which is a condition sine qua non for conviction. Ergo, the dismissal of the criminal case will not foreclose administrative action against respondent.
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Philippine Merchant Marine School vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 112844 June 2, 1995 Facts: PHILIPPINE MERCHANT MARINE SCHOOL, INC. (PMMSI), was established in Manila in 1950 to train and produce competent marine officers. It offers a two-year course in Marine Engineering (A.M.E.) and a four-year course in Marine Transportation (B.S.M.T.). For several times prior to 1985 respondent Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) disapproved petitioner's requests for renewal permit/recognition. Sometime in 1986 the DECS received a complaint from Felixberto B. Galvez, president of petitioner's Faculty Association, NAFLU-KMU, concerning the issuance of summer permit to petitioner and of its holding of classes for courses not recognized by the Government. On 27 August 1991, DECS Secretary Cariño issued a Closure Order. Issue: Whether or not public respondents’ decisions have no substantial evidence to support them. Held: Substantial evidence has been defined to be such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. A perusal of the questioned resolutions of the Office of the President reveals that they are based on the records of the case which constitute substantial evidence, proving distinctly not only petitioner's consistent failure to meet the DECS' minimum standards for maritime institutes and correct its deficiencies but also its continued operation and offering of maritime courses despite the lack of permit.
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American Tobacco Co. vs. Director of Patents 67 SCRA 286 FACTS: This is a petition for mandamus, with preliminary injunction. The petition challenges the validity of Rule 168 of the Revised Rules of Practice before the Philippine Patent Office in Trademark Cases, as amended authorizing Director of Patents to designate ranking official of said office to hear “inter partes” proceedings. Said rule likewise provides that all judgments determining merits of case shall be personally and directly provided by the Director and signed by him. In accordance with the amended rule, the Director of Patents delegated the hearing of petitioners’ cases to hearing officers, respondents herein. Petitioners filed their objections to the authority of the hearing officers. ISSUE: Whether or not the amendment of Rule 168 is illegal and void because under the law, the Director must personally hear and decide the “inter partes” cases. HELD: The power conferred upon an administrative agency to which the administration of a statute is entrusted to issues such as regulations and orders as may be deemed necessary. In the case at bar, while the hearing officers may make preliminary rulings on the myriad of questions passed at hearings of cases, the ultimate decision on the merits of all issues and questions is left to the Director of Patents. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is dismissed. With cost against petitioners.
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Skyworld Condominium Owners Assoc., Inc. vs. SEC 211 SCRA 565 FACTS: This is a petition to review the decision of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) en banc. The petitioner primarily assails the allegedly unauthorized action of Special Prosecutor Norberto Ruiz of the Prosecution and Enforcement Department of SEC, to decide the consolidated petitions for revocation of certificate of registration. Mr. Ruiz, after studying the substantial evidence, prepared a resolution and presented to PED Director Elnora Advento before the Commission en banc, which approved the same. A motion for reconsideration was filed before the PED, but was denied. The petitioner filed a notice of appeal. The motion was denied for lack of merit. ISSUE: Whether or not the SEC may delegate its authority to hear cases before it. HELD: In the consolidated cases, the Commission empowered the PED to conduct the hearing and to decide on the revocation of the certificate of registration. The task was assigned to Mr. Ruiz for and in behalf of the Commission. The Commission can validly delegate the authority to exercise the specific powers assigned to it by law, by virtue of Section 6, PD No. 902-A. Petition is dismissed for lack of grave abuse of discretion committed by the public respondent. The order revoking and cancelling the certificate of registration of petitioner corporation is affirmed.
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Ablaza vs. CIR 126 SCRA 246 FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari to declare null and void the decision, order, and resolution of respondent CIR. The Association filed a complaint before CIR, against Cerisco Blackcat Trading, for salary differential, pursuant to the statutory minimum wage law, overtime pay, and reinstatement of backwages. CIR declared Cerisco Blackcat Trading in default for failure to file its answer or any responsive pleading within the reglementary period, provided by law. Petitioner, Victoria Ablaza claimed she was totally unaware of the existence of any suit for a sum of money against her as she has not been lawfully summoned and informed of any such case. She claimed also Cerisco Blackcat Trading is a mere trade name and CIR never acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. ISSUE: Whether or not CIR has jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. HELD: Section 9, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that when persons associated in business are sued under a common name, and service, may be effected upon all the defendants by serving upon any of them or upon the person in-charge of office or place of business maintained in the common name. Petition dismissed. Decision affirmed.
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Villadolid vs. Inciong 121 SCRA 205 FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari to renew the order of the Deputy Minister of Labor affirming the Order of May 2, 1979 for reinstatement with backwages issued by the Regional Director Francisco Estrella. Villadolid claimed he was illegally dismissed and as premised by management of JRM, affiliate of Copacabana, for breach of trust especially on an entrapment scheme of relaying business transaction to competitor. ISSUE: Whether or not Villadolid was deprived of due process of illegal dismissal. HELD: The Court had occasion to hold that there is no violation of due process where the Regional Director mere required the submission of position papers and resolved the case summarily thereafter. The order of the Deputy Minister of Labor was not violative of Section 9, Article 10 of the Constitution, which requires statement of facts and conclusion of law upon which it is based. The Deputy Minister was in full accord with the findings of the fact by the Regional Director; there was no necessity of discussing anew the issues raised therein. Both petitions for certiorari were denied. No costs.
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NEECO II vs. NLRC 461 SCRA 169 FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals affirming the Resolution dated August 31, 2000 of the NLRC. Private respondent in 1978 was hired as a driver and assigned at petitioner’s sub-office at Quezon, Nueva Ecija. On January 15, 1996 Danilo de la Cruz, petitioner’s General Manager terminated private respondent’s services on the ground of abandonment. On September 26, 1999, Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring private respondent illegally dismissed. Petitioner filed its appeal memo with public respondent; the latter dismissed it for lack of merit. NLRC affirmed in toto the decision of Labor Arbiter Faustino Darlucio, dated August 31, 2000, Reconsideration was met with equal lack of success. ISSUE: Whether or not Labor Arbiter abuse his discretion conferred upon him by the Rules in not conducting a formal hearing on the case. HELD: Section 4, Rule V of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, under said rule, the Labor Arbiter is given the latitude to determine the necessity of a formal hearing. Instant petition denied with modification regarding monetary claims against petitioner.
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Javier vs. COMELEC 144 SCRA 194 FACTS: The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa in the May 1984 elections. The former appeared to enjoy popular support, but the latter had the advantage of being the nominee of the KBL. On May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections, the bitter contest between the two came to a head when Severa, follower of the petitioner was ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latter’s men. Owing to what he claimed where attempts to railroad the private respondent’s proclamation, the petitioner went to the COMELEC to question the canvass of the election returns. His complaints were dismissed and the private respondent was proclaimed winner by the Second Division of the said body. The petitioner then went to court, arguing that the proclamation was void because it was made only by a division and not by the COMELEC en banc as required by the Constitution. Meanwhile on the strength of his proclamation the private respondent took his oath as a member of the Batasang Pambansa. ISSUE: Whether or not the proclamation made by the Second Division valid. HELD: The questioned decision of the Second Division of the COMELEC dated July 23, 1984, proclaiming private respondent, Arturo F. Pacificador as the duly elected assemblyman of Antique, should be set aside for the legal reason that all election contests, without any distinction as to cases or contests, involving members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa fall under the jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc pursuant to Sections 2 and 3 of Article XII (6) of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, the commission of the Second Division of COMELEC, Commissioner Jaime Opinion, being a lawyer, and known law partner of the respondent, when ordered to inhibit, refused to inhibit, thus divesting the second division of the necessary vote for the questioned and rendering the proceeding null and void.
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Civil Aeronautics Board vs. PAL 63 SCRA 524 FACTS: On May 12, 1970, PAL had an excess of twenty (20) passengers from Baguio to Manila who cannot be accommodated in its regular flight. To accommodate this twenty passengers, PAL required the aircraft operating flight 213 (Tuguegarao to Manila) to pass Baguio City on its way to Manila and pick up these passengers. Claiming that PAL should have first obtained permission of the Civil Aeronautics Board before operating flag stop and that such failure is a violation of RA No. 776; the CAB imposed a fine of P5, 000.00 upon PAL in a resolution. ISSUE: Whether or not the Civil Aeronautics Board is authorized to impose penalty (fines). HELD: The CAB shall have the general supervision and regulation of, and jurisdiction and control over air carriers as well as their property, property rights, equipment, facilities, and franchise in so far as may be necessary in so far as carrying the provisions of RA No. 776. It has the power to issue, deny, amend, revise, alter, modify, cancel, suspend, or revoke, in whole or in part, upon petition on complaint, or upon its own initiative any temporary operating permit or certificate of public convenience and necessity. The CAB can review, reverse, revise or modify or affirm on appeal the administrative decisions of the civil aeronautics administrator on matters pertaining to imposition of civil penalty or fine in connections to violation of any provision of this Act or rules and regulations issues thereunder.
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Bautista vs. Board of Energy 169 SCRA 167 FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction seeking to annul and set aside (a) the order of respondent Board of Energy dated June 11, 1986 in BOE Case No. 86-133 authorizing respondent applicant Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) to adapt and implement provisionally the revised rate schedules applied for and (b) the order of respondent BOE dated June 18, 1986 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. On May 30, 1986, MERALCO filed with BOE a verified application for an upward revision rates. MERALCO also prayed for an ex parte provisional approval of the proposed rates by reason that under its existing rate schedules, it expects to incur a total deficit from its 1986 operations in the amount of P918,317,000.00 and that its operating income is not enough to pay the interests and amortization of its foreign loans. On June 9, 1986, petitioners Perla C. Bautista and Greater Manila Federation of Jeepney Operators and Drivers Association filed an opposition to the application to the application for increase in rates, and prayed that no provisional approval shall be granted by the BOE. They alleged that they are adversely affected by the increase in rates of MERALCO. But on June 11, 1986, BOE ordered the provisional increase in the rates of MERALCO. Petitioners moved for reconsideration on June 16, 1986 but were denied by BOE on June 18, 1986. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction on July 10, 1986. They agreed that the authority of the BOE to grant provisional approval without hearing is not absolute, but subject to the due process clause of the Constitution and that their opposition to the grant of provisional approval should be set for hearing for MERALCO to present a prima facie case on the issue of urgent public need. ISSUE: Whether or not the BOE acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it provisionally approved ex parte the application for increase in rates of MERALCO in its order dated June 11, 1986. HELD: When the BOE provisionally authorized private respondent MERALCO’s application without hearing it merely exercised a prerogative granted to it by law. Energy Boards like he Energy Regulatory Board are authorized by law to grant relief upon refilling of an application, petition, or complaint or at any stage thereafter and without need of prior hearing but it shall call a hearing within 30 days thereafter for determination of its final decision.
San Luis vs. CA 174 SCRA 258 97
FACTS: The instant petition for certiorari and mandamus and/or appeal by certiorari assails the appellate court’s ruling that mandamus lies to compel the reinstatement of a quarry superintendent in the provincial government of Laguna who was initially detailed or transferred to another office, then suspended and finally dismissed following his exposé of certain anomalies and irregularities committed by government employees in the province. Engineer Mariano L. Berroya, and been the quarry superintendent in Laguna since May 31, 1959. In April and May, 1973, he denounced graft and corrupt practices by employees of the provincial government of Laguna. On July 20, 1973, Gov. Felicisimo San Luis, issued an order to transfer Berroya to the Office of the Provincial Engineer. On October 25, 1973, the Civil Service Commission ordered that Berroya be reverted to his regular position of quarry superintendent. But instead of complying with the order of the Civil Service Commission, the governor on December 12, 1973, suspended Berroya for alleged gross discourtesy, inefficiency and insubordination on February 26, 1974. The Civil Service Commission reiterated its order for the immediate reversion of Berroya to his former position, and ruled the one (1) year suspension illegal. In the interim, respondent-appellant provincial governor issued an order on April 81, 1977 dismissing Berroya for alleged neglect of duty, frequent unauthorized absences, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of duty and abandonment of office, which order of dismissal was appealed by Berroya to the Civil Service Commission. On January 29, 1979, the Civil Service Commission declared the dismissal unjustified, exonerating Berroya of charges and directing his reinstatement as quarry superintendent. Berroya’s petition for reinstatement having been denied by the governor despite orders for reinstatement by the Civil Service Commission and despite factual antecedents’ aforestated he filed on May 27, 1980 the antecedent Civil Case No. SL1834 for Mandamus to compel his reversion to the position of quarry superintendent with basic salaries of the entire period of suspension and dismissal and for moral and exemplary damages and expenses of suit. ISSUE: Whether or not the courts can review the facts or the decisions rendered by the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the President. HELD: Since the decision of the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the President had long become final and executor y the same can no longer be reviewed by the courts. It is well established in our jurisdiction that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies, rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata.
Delfin vs. Inciong 192 SCRA 151 98
FACTS: On February 11, 1964 Atlantic Container Corporation (Atlantic) and Federation of Democratic Labor Unions (FEDLU) executed a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) which was amended on August 31, 1964, claiming that Atlantic and its General Manager, private respondent Roberto Jacinto, refused to implement the CBA, and its amendment, petitioners and FEDLU struck on February 16, 1966 and filed a case with the CIR charging Atlantic, Roberto Jacinto and Hedy Jacinto for unfair labor practices on November 16, 1972. CIR rendered its decision on the case stating that Atlantic and Roberto Jacinto were guilty of unfair labor practices, to cease and desist from committing the same and reinstate the striking complainants without loss of seniority and privileges. Considering, however, that not all the complainants evinced their desire to prosecute the case, the award is extended to only those who testified and presented their respective manifestation of prosecuting their causes of action. Petitioners were ordered reinstated on November 27, 1972 and December 6, 1972, the Atlantic Container Employees Organization and FEDLU filed motions to reconsider aforesaid decisions for the reinstatement of all petitioners herein, but the CIR denied the motions for being pro forma and for having been filed out of time. When the CIR was abolished, their case was transferred to the NLRC where the NLRC Arbiter Jose T. Collado rendered a decision that Atlantic, Roberto Jacinto, et al. were ordered jointly and severally to reinstate complainants without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, but again not all petitioners were included for reinstatement. The respondents filed an appeal with the NLRC to set aside the decision of NLRC Arbiter Jose Collado and dismiss the complaint for unfair labor practices which was gained by NLRC on September 15, 1976. The dismissal was based on the following grounds: (1) res judicata in which their case to as barred by a prior judgment; (2) the petitioners cause of action has prescribed; and (3) that Atlantic and Inland Industries, Inc. were distinct and separate entities. The petitioners then appealed to the Secretary of Labor through respondent Deputy Minister Amado Inciong, but the respondent affirmed the decision of the NLRC. On July 3, 1989, petitioners filed petition charging public respondents NLRC and Minister Amado Inciong with grave abuse of discretion in annulling the decision of the Labor Arbiter and ordering the dismissal of the complaint for unfair labor practices. ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC and respondent Minister Amado Inciong acted with grave abuse of discretion in annulling the decision of the Labor Arbiter and ordering the dismissal of the unfair labor practice complaint. HELD: Since the judgment has become final and executory the subsequent filing of another unfair labor practices charged against Atlantic for the same violations committed during its existence, is barred by res judicata, the bringing of the same action in the name of the individual members of the union will not take out the case from ambit of the principle of res judicata.
Nasipit Lumber Co., Inc. vs. NLRC 177 SCRA 93 99
FACTS: this case involved the alleged of thief wherein Private respondent Juanito Collado was employed as security guard on September 9, 1970 he was assigned as 1st sergeant of the NALCOs security force at Nasipit, in the course of Collado employment or on august 20 1976, four crates of lawanit board containing 1,000 panel were stolen from petitioner premises, Collado was implicated in the theft and was thereafter place under preventive suspension, on September 8,1976 NALCO file a petition for clearance to dismiss Collado with office of Regional Office No. X, Collado filed a motion for the reconsideration on the ground not given an opportunity to rebut the false finding or adduce evidence in his favor. But the acting Secretary of Labor Amadog Enciong issued an order affirming the order of officer in charge Roy Seneres granting Petition application for clearance to dismiss Collado. On October 9, 1978, Collado filed a complaint before the Butuan District Labor Officer for unjust dismiss and reinstatement with back wages and benefit. ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of the respondent Collado is valid HELD: It is sufficient if the employer has some bases to lose confidence or that employer has reasonable ground to believe or to entertain the moral conviction that the nature of his participation therein rendered him absolutely unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position. On the other hand, the dropping qualified theft charges against Collado is not binding upon a labor tribunal the sensitivity of Collado job or a security guard vis-a-vis the cause of his dismissal cost him his to be rehired to the same position reinstatement is not proper where termination of employment was due to breach of trust and confidence.
Medalla vs. Sayo 103 Phil. 587
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FACTS: Petitioner, Dr. Eustaquio M. Medalla, Jr, is the chief of clinics of the Caloocan City general Hospital, Caloocan city. Private respondent Dr. Honorato G. Mackay was the Resident Physician thereat. When the position of assistant, hospital administrator of the Caloocan City general hospital became vacant upon the resignation of the incumbent, former Caloocan city mayor Alejandro A. Fider designated and subsequently appointed, as assistant hospital administrator private respondent Dr. Mackay, a Resident Physician in said hospital. Petitioner, Dr. Medalla, Jr, Protested Dr. Mackay designation and subsequent appointment alleging among others that, chief of clinics, he (Medalla) was next-in-rank, the then acting city Mayor Virgililo P. Robles, who succeeded former mayor, now Assemblyman Alejandro A. Fider, in his 4th endorsement dated September 20,1978, sustained Mackay appointment state that as of April 18, 1978 when Dr. Honorato G. Mackay was promoted to assistant hospital administrator from his previous position of Resident Physician, he was next in rank to the said higher position by reason of his having completed all academic requirements for the certificate in Hospital administration contrary to the claim of Dr. Eustaquio Medalla, Jr. in his letter of May 2, 1978. ISSUE: Whether or not that appointment of Dr. Honorato G. Mackay as assistant hospital Administrator is valid HELD: when a presidential act is challenged before the court of justice, it is not to be implied there from that the executive is being made subject and subordinate to courts the legality of his acts are under judicial review, not because the executive is inferior to the courts, but because the law is above the chief executive himself, and the court seek only to interpret, apply or implement it a judicial review of the President decision of a case of an employee decided by the civil service board of appeals should be viewed in this light and the bringing of the case to the courts should be governed by the same principles as govern the judicial review of all administrative act of all administrative officer. The court may always examine into the exercise of power by a ministerial officer to the extent of determining whether it is a legal power that could have been granted to him and whether it has been exercised in a legal manner. And under the civil service section 19 (3) of the civil service PD no. 807 the recruitment of selection of employees for promotion is drawn from the nix-in-rank.
Ortua vs. Singson Encarnacion 59 PHIL. 440
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FACTS: On January, 1920, the petitioner Fortunato Ortua filed an application with the Bureau of Land for the purchase of a tract of land situated in the Municipality of San Jose province of Camarines Sur. An investigation conducted by the bureau of land but it was rejected on the ground that the petitioner is a Chinese citizen, Fortunato Ortua contest that he was a Filipino citizen, born in 1885 in Lagonoy, Camarines Sur and being a natural son of Irene Demesa a Filipina and Chinese father, but he was sent to china to study and return to the Philippine when he was 21 years of age. ISSUE: Whether or not the Petitioner may Purchase of tract Public land, due to the question of his citizenship HELD: One condition for the purchase of a track of public agricultural land provided by the Public land law, act no. 2874, in its section 23 and 88, is that the purchaser of land shall be a citizen of lawful age of the Philippines Island or of the United States. One or born in the Philippines of a Filipina mother and Chinese father, educated in china who returned in the Philippines when he was 21 years of age is presumptively a Philippine citizen. Has not by his own acts expressly or impliedly repudiated his Philippines citizenship and chosen Chinese citizenship, but has always considered himself to a Filipino and has elected to remain as a Philippines citizen therefore that a clear error of law resulted in not considering of a Philippine and so qualified under the Public land and to Purchase Public agricultural land.
Industrial Power Sales, Inc. vs. Sin Suat 160 SRCA 19 FACTS: This case involve the bidding of 8 unit trucks, line construction, left hand drive, complete and special factory build, series of 1965 brand new, for the use of the bureau of 102
telecommunication Pursuant to requisition no. 18792 dated march 9, 1965. The bidding took place on May 15,1965, among the bidders were IPSI and DELTA, the bid deliberated on by the committee on award, and authorized representative of the bureau of communication, and the committee thereafter recommended the award to IPSA at 52,00 each. On june11, 1965 the DELTA protested the award to IPSI by telegram sent to the bureau of communication claim that the truck offered by IPSI were not factory build and the next move of DELTA was to filed with the office of the secretary of general services a letter of protest against the Proposed award to IPSI accompanied by a protest bond in the amount of 44, 000 executed by the meridian assurance corporation, thereon acting secretary Puma Sin Suat indorse on September 3, 1965 to the director of the bureau that only the DELTA corporation has complied with the technical specification originally called for Requisition No. 1982792 dated 9,1965, only approved by Abad. The award should be made to DELTA at a price equal to that offered by IPSI, IPSI filed with the Quezon city court of first instance on September 21, 1965 with application for preliminary prohibition and mandatory injunction which was docketed as case no Q 9477 and a bond in the amount of 100, 000 given by capitol insurance & surety co.INC. ISSUE: Whether or not that the DELTA corporation has complied with the requisition no. 1982792 HELD: Before said action may be entertained in the court of justice, it must be shown that all the administrative remedies prescribed by law or ordinance have been exhausted, and second that the administrative decision may properly be annulled or set aside only upon a clear showing that the administrative official or tribunal has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Therefore the respondent secretary his act must be nullified and the trial court judgment upholding those acts must be set aside
Sherwill Development Corporation vs. Sitio Sto. Niño Residents Assoc. Inc. 461 SCRA 517 FACTS: This is a Petition for Review on certiorari assailing the order of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa city, Branch 205 dismissing civil action no. 02-237 on the ground of litis pendentia 103
any forum shopping. The petitioner Sherwill development corporation is the registered owner of two farce of land in Muntinlupa, Rizal. Lot 88 is covered by transfer of certificate of title no. 131918 consisting of 8,774 square meters while lot 86, with an area of 16,766 square meters, is covered by TCT no. 131919 both lots form part of the Muntinlupa estate, while the title thereon were issued by the Registry of Deeds of Rizal on September 24, 1913. On October 16, 2002, the petitioner filed a complaint for Quieting of title against respondent Sitio Sto. Niño Residents Association Inc. (SSNRAI), Nilda Devilleres and the lands management Bureau (LMB) ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the fraud had been committed in securing such title. 2. Whether or not the ground of litis pendentia and forum shopping insofar as SP Civil No. 02-237 is concerned are applicable HELD: The director of lands original certificate of title over the same authority of the director of lands to investigate conflicts over public and is derived from section 91 of the Public land act. In fact, it is not merely his right but his specific duties to conduct investigations of alleged fraud in securing patents and the corresponding title. While title issued on the basis of a patent is as indefeasible as one judicially secured, such indefeasibility is not a bar to an investigation by the director of lands as to how such title had been acquired, if the purpose of such investigations to determine whether or not fraud had been committed in securing such title, in order that the appropriate action for reversion may be filed by the government. As a rule then, courts have no jurisdiction to intrude upon matters properly falling within the powers of the LMB. The court ruled that the petitioner action was barred by the pendency of the proceedings before the LMB for litis pendentia to lie; the following requisites must be satisfied 1.) Identity of parties or representation in both cases; 2.) Identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for; 3.) The relief must be founded on the same facts and the same basis and identity of the two preceding particulars should be such that any judgment, which may be rendered in the other action, will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata on the action under consideration. To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the test applied is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present or whether final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in pendentia barred the filing of SP Civil Action No. 02-237, the RTC correctly dismissed the same on the additional ground of forum sopping.
Abejo vs. Dela Cruz 149 SCRA 670, May 19, 1987 FACTS: Spouses Jose and Aurora Abejo are the principal stockholders of the corporation Pocket Bell Philippines, Inc. and the purchaser Telectronic Systems, Inc. of 133,000 minority 104
shareholdings (for 5 million) and of 63,000 shares registered in the name of Virginia Braga and covered by five stock certificates endorsed in blank by her for P1,674.450.00 and Spouses Agapito Braga and Virgina Braga, erstwhile majority stockholders holding 56% of the outstanding stock and voting power of the corporation Pocket Bell. In 1982, Telectronics requested the corporate secretary to register and transfer to its name and those of its nominees the total 196,000 Pocket Bell shares but Norberto Braga (son of Agapito), the corporate secretary refused to register the aforesaid transfer of shares in the corporate books asserting that their claim preemptive rights over the Abejo shares and that Virginia Braga never transferred her 63,000 shares to Teletronics but had lost the five stock certificates representing those shares. The intertwined actions between the protagonists, centered on the question of jurisdiction over the dispute which were culminate in filing two cases at bar. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC AND SEC HAS THE ORIGINAL AND EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER THE PRINCIPAL STOCKHOLDERS OF POCKET BELL. HELD: Under Section 5 of Presidential Decree 902-A, the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the said case clearly fall within the SEC. As stressed by the Solicitor General on behalf of the SEC, the Court has held that “Nowhere does the law (P.D. 902-A) empower any Court of Instance (RTC) to interfere with the orders of the Commission and any ruling by the trial court on the issue of ownership of the share of stock is not binding on the commission for want of jurisdiction.
Commissioner of Customs vs. Navarro No. L-33146, May 31, 1977 FACTS: Private respondents Juanito S. Flores and Asiatic Incorporated are importers of 1,350 cartons of fresh fruits which importation was seized by the Bureau of Customs on November 4, 1966. Said importation was classified as non-essential consumer commodities, they are banned by Central Bank Circulars Nos. 289,294 and 295 as prohibited importation or importation 105
contrary to law and made subject to forfeiture proceedings by Petitioner Bureau of Customs. It was only on January 12, 1967 that the warrant of seizure and detention was issued. The respondents contend that the issuance of warrant was only an attempt to divest the respondent Judge of jurisdiction over the subject matter on the case. On March 7, 1967 respondent Judge Pedro S. Navarro issued an order for the release of the articles in question, thus preventing Bureau of customs from proceeding with the auction sale. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent court acquires jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture cases for violation of the Tariff and Customs Code. HELD: No, The question of seizure and forfeiture is for the administrative in the first instance and then the commissioner of Customs. This is the field where the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction controls. Thereafter an appeal may be taken to the Court of Tax Appeals. A Court of First Instance is thus devoid of competence to act on the matter. There is further judicial review, but only by the Supreme Court in the exercise of its certiorari decision. Consequently, a Collector of Customs when sitting in forfeiture proceedings constitute a tribunal upon which the law expressly confers jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions touching the forfeiture and further disposition of subject matter of such proceedings.
GMA Network, Inc. vs. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation 470 SCRA 727, September 23, 2005 FACTS: On May 6, 2003, GMA, Inc. filed a complaint for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against ABS-CBN, SKY CABLE, HOME CABLE AND SUN CABLE. Alleging that respondents are engaged in unfair competition and that on February 1, 2003 the cable companies re-channeled GMA’s broadcast. In addition, the Sky and Sun cable are wholly owned subsidiaries of Sky Vision Corp. which allegedly controlled by Lopez, Inc. and Home 106
Cable wholly- owned subsidiaries by Unilink, which is owned by Mediaquest Holding, Inc. controlled by PLDT Group. In pursuant to a Master Consolidation Agreement, the ownership, rights and interest in Sky Vision and Unilink were placed under a holding company owned by Benpres Group, owned by Lopez Inc. and also Benpres and ABSCBN owned 33.5 % thereof is owned by PLDT Group. That the re-channeling of its cable television broadcast resulted to damages to GMA business operation. That re-channeling of GMA from channel 12 to 14 in SKY CABLE AND SUN CABLE results to noticeable dropouts and spillover of extraneous sound and in clear visual transmission resulting in distorted and degraded visual presentation and also shows no signal and snowy reception and that it did not occur in the shows of defendant ABSCBN on the channels of the defendant cable companies. On July 15 2003, Sky Cable and Sun Cable moved for dismissal of complaint on the grounds of litis pendentia and forum-shopping that there was a similar case pending before National Telecommunication Commission that involves same cause of action and same parties except for ABS-CBN. Respondent Sky Cable and Sun Cable also asserted that the NTC has the primary jurisdiction. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE NTC HAS PRIMARY JURISDICTION OVER PETITIONER’S COMPLAINT. HELD: The petition is denied. The complaint failed to state a cause of action against ABS-CBN and the other respondents. The wrongful acts complained of and upon the damages prayed for are based, have to do with the operation and ownership of the cable companies. So the factual matters undoubtedly pertain to the NTC and not with the regular courts.
Industrial Enterprises, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals 184 SCRA 426, April 18, 1990 FACTS: Industrial Enterprises, Inc. was granted a coal operating contract by the Government through the Bureau of Energy Development (BED) for exploration of two blocks in Eastern Samar and IEI also applied with the Ministry of Energy for a coal operating contract in Giporos Area. That later it was advised that in line with the objective of rationalizing the country’s over all-coal supply-demand balance, the Giporos Area and Bagacay Area should be awarded to Mining and Industrial Corporation (MMIC). Then on, IEC and MMIC executed a Memorandum of 107
Agreement, IEC assigned and transferred to MMIC all its rights and interests in the two coal blocks which are subject of IEC’s coal operating contract. However, IEC thereafter filed an action of rescission of the Memorandum of Agreement with damages against MMIC and the Minister of Energy Geronimo Velasco before the RTC Makati, branch 150.alleging that MMIC took over the subject coal blocks even before the Memorandum had finalized and approved by BED. It found out that the President of both IEC and MMIC is Jesus S. Cabarrus. In a summary judgment, coal operation contract was in favor of IEC and ordered to BED to issue its written affirmation but the Court of Appeals reverse RTC’s decision that it is BED has the power to decide the controversies relative to the exploration, exploitation and development of coal blocks. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE BUREAU OF ENERGY JURISDICTION OVER SAID ACTION AND NOT THE CIVIL COURT.
DEVELOPMENT
HAS
HELD: It was ruled that the cause of action by IEI is not merely the rescission of the Agreement but the reversion or return to it of the operation of the coal blocks. That the decision of the rescission of the Trial Court, inter alia, declared the continued efficacy of the coal operating contract to IEC’s favor and directed to the BED to give due course are matters properly falling within the domain of the BED, and not with the civil court.
Garments and Textile Export Board vs. Court of Appeals G.R No. 114711. February 13, 1997 FACTS: American Inter-Fashion Corporation is a corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing and exporting garments who were awarded initial export allocation quota. Before AIFC’s incorporation, private respondent in G.R no. 115889, Glorious Sun, engaged the same, was also a recipient of export allocation quota, who was found guilty of misdeclaration and its stockholders and officers were disqualified to engaged in export garment. As a result its export quotas were given to AIFC. Glorious Sun filed for the annulment of registration with the SEC. GTEB thereafter deferred the release of the export quota allocation. AIFC filed petition for the 108
restoration of the cancelled export authorization. Petitioner AIFC contends that, respondent GTEB cancellation of AIFC’s EQ’s is a confiscation of property without due process. It further argues that E.O 537 did not gives the GTEB any powers, nor any jurisdiction to hear and decide actions and in as much as the litigants were private (AIFC and Glorious Sun) it has no jurisdiction over the case. ISSUE: Whether or not GTEB have the power and authority to grant or cancel export authorizations.
or
HELD: Yes, it has. GTEB as an administrative agency has in its favor the presumption that it has regularly performed its official duties, including those which are quasi-judicial in nature, so much so in the exercise of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Thus, the power and jurisdiction to adjudicate on the questions of AIFC’s entitlement to the export allocations (be it export quotas or export authorization), which includes the discretion to grant and disapprove said export allocations, belongs solely to GTEB, and not to the regular courts.
Government Service Insurance System vs. CSC 204 SCRA 826, December 11, 1991 FACTS: Maria Asuncion Salazar was employed by the GSIS as a casual laborer on 1963. She became permanent as a designation of stenographer in 1974. Thereafter, she was promoted to Confidential Technical Assistant Aide. On her GSIS Service Record however, revealed that she was appointed on December 9, 1975 in the position of Confidential Executive Assistant in the office of GSIS President and General Manager Roman A. Cruz, Jr. on a permanent status. Then was then promoted to Technical Assistant III, but unfortunately the position she held were terminated by the newly appointed President and General Manager of the GSIS for the reason that her position was co-terminous with the term of the appointing authority. She filed a petition 109
for reconsideration with the GSIS Board of Trustees, but it was denied. Thereafter, she filed a petition for reconsideration of the denial with the Review Committee, which referred the same to the Merit Systems Promotion Board and the CSC. In a resolution, the CSC directed the immediate reinstatement of Salazar with back salaries. The Board however affirmed her termination. She then filed a motion for reconsideration of the Board's order and manifested that the Commission already resolved her petition on July 22, 1987. On June 30, 1988, the Board set aside its previous Order affirming her dismissal in view of the Commission's prior resolution of the case. The GSIS also filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the board and stated that the CSC is a higher administrative appellate body on matters concerning of the removal of officers and employees from the service. The Board cannot in any manner modify or alter the determinations and actions of the Civil Service Commission. Then they appealed but the CSC denied the motion for reconsideration. ISSUE: Whether or not the CSC has jurisdiction to review the said case. HELD: CSC has no jurisdiction over the said case, under Presidential Decree No. 1409 it states that the Merit Systems Board provides a Merit Systems Board that has the function “to Hear and Decide cases brought before it by officers and employees who feel aggrieved by the determination of appointing authorities involving appointment, promotion, transfer, detail, reassignment and other personnel actions, as well as complaints against any officers in the government arising from abuses arising from personnel actions of the these officers or from violations of the merit system.” It is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it is proved that another body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter. PD No. 1409 clearly provides that the Merit Systems Board shall take cognizance of appeals from parties aggrieved by decisions of appointing officers involving personnel action. The Commission therefore cannot take original cognizance of the cases specified under Section 5 of P.D. 1409, except in the case specified under Section 9 (j) of the Civil Service Decree which directly gives it such power, to wit: SECTION 9. Powers and Functions of the Commission. The Commission shall administer the Civil Service Commission and shall have the following powers and functions: j) Hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it in accordance with Section 37 or brought to it on appeal;
System Plus Computer College of Caloocan City vs. Local Gov’t. of Caloocan City 408 SCRA 406 FACTS: Petitioner System Plus Computer College was established in 1997. It is a non-profit and non-stock educational institution, it enjoys tax exemption on its buildings from the local government but it does not cover the parcels of land which petitioner is renting in the amount of P5, 000.00 monthly from Consolidated Assembly, Inc. and Pair Management. Petitioner requested to extend the tax exemption on the said parcels of land invoking Article VI, Sec. 28(3) of the 1987 Constitution and other provisions in Local Government Code. The request was denied by the respondent on the ground that the subject parcels of land were owned by Consolidated Agency and Pair Management and that it is not used exclusively for educational purposes. On February, 1999 the petitioner entered into separate agreements from Contract of 110
lease to donations. But still respondent again denied the application for tax exemption. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a Petition for Mandamus with the RTC. ISSUE: (1) WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER MAY AVAIL THE ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IN REGULAR COURTS. (2) WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER VIOLATED THE DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES. HELD: The court ruled that before seeking the intervention of the courts, it is a precondition that petitioner should first avail of all the means afforded by the administrative processes. The petitioner cannot bypass the authority of the concerned administrative agencies and directly seek redress from the courts even on the pretext of raising a supposedly pure question of law without violating the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Hence, when the law provides for remedies against the action of an administrative board, body, or officer, as in the case at bar, relief to the courts can be made only after exhausting all remedies provided therein. Otherwise stated, before seeking the intervention of the courts, it is a precondition that petitioner should first avail of all the means afforded by the administrative processes.
Paat vs. Court of Appeals 266 SCRA 167 January 10, 1997 Facts: On May 19, 1989, the truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman while on its way to Bulacan from San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan was seized by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources personnel in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest products found concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) in Aritao, Cagayan, issued an order of confiscation of the truck and gave the owner thereof fifteen (15) days within which to submit an explanation why the truck should not be forfeited. However, private respondent failed to submit the required explanation. On June 22, 1989, the Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan of DENR sustained petitioner of Layugan’s action of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree 111
No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277. Subsequently, the case was brought by the petitioners to the Secretary of DENR. Pending resolution of the appeal, a suit for replevin was filed by the private respondents against petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2 of Cagayan which issued a writ ordering the return of the truck to private respondents. Issue: Whether an action for replevin to recover a movable property which is the subject matter of an administrative forfeiture proceeding in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources violates the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Held: Yes. This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before court’s judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of court’s intervention is fatal to one’s cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action. This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without its practical and legal reasons, for one thing, availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. It is no less true to state that the courts of justice for reasons of comity and convenience will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the case.
Hoskyns vs. National City Bank of New York 85 Phil. 201 December 29, 1949 Facts: J. E. H. Stevenot, a citizen of the United States and of the State of California, died in New Caledonia on June 8, 1943, while serving as an officer of the U. S. Army. He was survived by his widow, Elma Kimball and two daughters, Myre Gene and Shirley Joanne, who are all at present in the United States. For more than ten years immediately prior to his death, J. E. H. Stevenot had been a resident of the Philippines and upon his death left real and personal properties situated therein which he acquired during his married life. On April 19, 1943, while in California, Stevenot executed a private written instrument in which he appointed himself as trustor or trustee of his properties. The deed of trust provided that Stevenot should himself have a life interest in the trust properties and that after his death the income and corpus should go principally to his wife and family. The trust indenture provided finally that upon Stevenot's death, Wells Fargo Bank and Union Trust Co. should succeed as trustee for the properties located in 112
the United States and the National City Bank of New York at Manila for the properties in the Philippines. Both of these trustees accepted the trust. After Stevenot's death, administration proceedings were commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila, H. P. Hoskyns, plaintiff in the instant action, being appointed as administrator. The action for declaratory relief prays that the court "determine the question of construction or validity of the declaration of trust and for the declaration of the rights and duties of the defendant hereunder." Issue: Whether an aggrieved party may institute an action in court without first resorting to an administrative remedy. Held: No. The courts are given discretionary power to refuse to make a declaration of rights in any case where the declaration is not necessary and proper at the time under all the circumstances. The reason for this rule is that a declaratory judgment proceeding is intended to supplement, and not to be a substitute for, or supersede, other existing remedies, in use at the time of the enactment of the declaratory judgments acts; it may be used as an alternative or auxiliary to other proceedings for an executory judgment; and it is within the discretion of the court to permit such an action or proceeding to be maintained where another remedy is available to plaintiff. As a general rule, however, to justify such an action the situation must be such that adequate relief is not presently available through the means of other existing forms of action or proceeding, and, conversely, jurisdiction for a declaratory judgment ordinarily will not be entertained where another equally adequate and appropriate remedy is already available for the issues or rights sought to be determined and declared, as where another equally serviceable statutory remedy has been specially provided in cases of similar import, and particularly where such statutory remedy is exclusive.
Estrada vs. Court of Appeals 442 SCRA 117 November 11, 2004 Facts: Alfredo Estrada, Renato T. Canilang and Manuel C. Lim, as concerned citizens and taxpayers, filed on July 31, 1996, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City, a complaint for Injunction and Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order against Bacnotan Cement Corp. (BCC), Wawandue Fishing Port, Inc. (WFPI), Jeffrey Khong Hun as President of WFPI, Manuel Molina as Mayor of Subic, Zambales, and Ricardo Serrano as Regional Director of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). They alleged that WFPI and the Municipality of Subic entered into an illegal lease contract, which in turn became the basis of a sub-lease in favor of BCC which is a violation of the first lease because the cement plant is not related to the fish port business of WFPI and it is a nuisance because it will cause pollution, endanger the health, life and limb of the residents and deprive them of the full use and enjoyment of their properties. On the other hand, 113
defendants WFPI/Khong Hun and BCC both alleged that the complaint states no cause of action and the plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. Issue: Whether the instant case falls under the exceptional cases where prior resort to administrative agencies need not be made before going to court. Held: No. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that resort be first made with the administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to a court of justice for review. If a remedy within the administrative machinery is still available, with a procedure pursuant to law for an administrative officer to decide the controversy, a party should first exhaust such remedy before going to court. A premature invocation of a court’s intervention renders the complaint without cause of action and dismissible on such ground. The reason for this is that prior availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. Comity and convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with. The matter of determining whether there is…pollution of the environment that requires control, if not prohibition, of the operation of a business establishment is essentially addressed to the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR which, by virtue of Section 16 of Executive Order No. 192, series of 1987 has assumed the powers and functions of the defunct National Pollution Control Commission created under Republic Act No. 3931. Under said Executive Order, a Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) under the Office of the DENR Secretary now assumes the powers and functions of the National Pollution Control Commission with respect to adjudication of pollution cases. As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases where the special law provides for another forum. Clearly, the claim of petitioners that their immediate recourse to the regular courts is justified because the DENR is powerless to grant them proper relief is without basis.
Batelec II Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. EIAB 447 SCRA 482 December 22, 2004 Facts: Petitioner BATELEC II is an electric cooperative authorized to distribute electric power in Rosario, Province of Batangas. Private respondent Puyat Steel Corporation (PSC) is a galvanizing steel sheet company in the Philippines having been established in 1956 embarked to build a modern galvanizing plant utilizing a state-of-the-art non-oxidizing furnace-type process, the first of its kind in the country. As this new plant would entail a delivery voltage of 69 kilovolts (kv), PSC commenced negotiations for the supply of said energy requirement with BATELEC II. They entered into an agreement wherein BATELEC II shall handle the construction of the needed 69 kv transmission lines. BATELEC II vouched to complete the installation of the needed facilities by April 1997 but botched in making good its part of the bargain and the scheduled completion was never fulfilled even several months after the targeted date. Thus, on November 17, 1997, PSC filed with the Bureau an application for direct 114
connection with the NPC which granted PSC’s application and also made the determination that BATELEC II was neither technically nor financially capable of supplying the 69 kv of power supply to PSC. Consequently, private respondent PSC filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 87, Rosario, Batangas to enjoin petitioner BATELEC II from committing acts that would prevent direct power connection between respondents PSC and the NPC. Displeased, BATELEC II filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the Bureau for issuing a resolution allegedly sans the benefit of a hearing and for its alleged failure to resolve inter alia the issue of NPC’s disqualification from distributing electric power directly to consumers within the franchised area of BATELEC II. Said appeal was dismissed, one of the grounds is that there was failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Issue: Whether the principle of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies in this case. Held: Yes. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate administrative authorities to accord them the prior opportunity to decide controversies within their competence before the same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review. It is presumed that an administrative agency, if afforded an opportunity to pass upon a matter, will decide the same correctly, or correct any previous error committed in its forum. Furthermore, reasons of law, comity and convenience prevent the courts from entertaining cases proper for determination by administrative agencies. Hence, premature resort to the courts necessarily becomes fatal to the cause of action of the petitioner. In the present case, there is nothing in the records to show that petitioner availed of administrative relief before filing a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. It did not appeal the Bureau’s Resolution dated 16 March 1998 to the Secretary of Energy, which under Section 8 in relation to Section 12 of Rep. Act No. 7638 has the power over the bureaus under the Department. It has not, as well, suggested any plausible reason for direct recourse to the Court of Appeals against the Resolution in question. Neither has petitioner shown that the instant case falls among the recognized exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Morcal vs. Laviña 476 SCRA 508 November 29, 2005 Facts: Petitioner Angelita Morcal, with her sister Ildefonsa and other members of their family occupied, cleared and planted seasonal crops on a parcel of unregistered land with an area of 4,840 square meters, situated at Barangay Cagsiay, Mauban Quezon up to the time it was declared as public land on May 14, 1941. Having been in possession of the said land for almost forty (40) years, petitioner filed Free Patent Application No. (IV-3) 14661 in 1976. However, on September 11, 1990, private respondents Antonio Laviña (now deceased) and Teresita Laviña protested the free patent application. Subsequently, on August 10, 1993, Regional Office No. IV of the DENR decreed that the patent applied by petitioner will cover only one-half 1/2 of the lot particularly the southern portion thereof, as recommended by Land Management Officer III Dan August S. Noche and directed The Spouses Antonio and Teresita Laviña are directed to file the appropriate public land application covering the other half of the lot in question particularly the northern portion thereof. Petitioner then filed with the Regional Trial Court a civil action which later on dismissed it then appealed to the Court of Appeals which also dismissed the appeal. 115
Issue: Whether the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies to the instant case. Held: Yes. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that resort be first made to the administrative authorities in cases falling under their jurisdiction to allow them to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their competence. This is because the administrative agency concerned is in the best position to correct any previous error committed in its forum. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, we see no urgent need for judicial intervention. Note that the case arose from the protest filed by respondents against petitioner’s free patent application for the subject unregistered agricultural land. Clearly, the matter comes within the exclusive primary jurisdiction of the DENR in the exercise of its quasi-judicial powers. The impugned Orders of the DENR Regional Office are subject to review by the DENR Head Office. Petitioner cannot circumvent this procedure by simply invoking a supposed loss of faith in the said agency.
Municipality of La Trinidad vs. CFI of Baguio 123 SCRA 81 FACTS: One Mario Damilo wrote Mayor Cipriano Abalos a letter- complaint charging respondent Dorothy Oidi assistant municipal treasurer of La Trinidad, with "dishonesty and grave misconduct in her business transactions with others and particularly against me." Upon receipt of the complaint, Mayor Abalos issued an order dated November 5, 1970, suspending Oidi from office effective November 6, 1970. Simultaneously, the mayor referred the complaint to petitioner municipal council of La Trinidad for investigation. On December 16, 1970, the municipal council issued a resolution declaring Dorothy Oidi "resigned from office for the good of the service, effective November 6, 1970. Meanwhile, respondent Oidi instituted a petition for mandamus plus damages, with prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, to set aside the November 5, 1970 order of Mayor Abalos as well as the resolution of respondent municipal council dated December 16, 1970. The case was docketed as Special Civil Case No. 2779 of the Court of First Instance of Baguio-Benguet. In their answer, petitioners, the respondents therein, sought the dismissal of the case on ground of want of jurisdiction of the court for failure of respondent Oidi, the petitioner therein, to exhaust all available administrative remedies. 116
Respondent court, instead of dismissing the case, conducted a hearing to determine the propriety of the issuance of the writ prayed, and shortly after, it issued the challenged order granting the prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction upon the filing of a bond in the sum of P2,000.00. Frustrated in their move to have the said order reconsidered,petitioner filed a petition.This petition seeks to annul and set aside (1) the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by the respondent Court of First Instance of Baguio- Benguet in Special Civil Action No. 2779, ordering petitioner Cipriano Abalos, municipal mayor of La Trinidad, Benguet, to recognize respondent Dorothy Oidi "as the legitimate assistant municipal treasurer of La Trinidad, Benguet, and to approve payment of her salaries from November 6, 1970 to the present and thenceforward, " and (2) the order denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration. ISSUES: Whether or not it is true that no recourse to courts can be had until all administrative remedies have been exhausted, and that special civil actions against administrative officers should not be entertained if superior administrative officers can grant relief. Whether or not the above rule is absolute. HELD: While it is true that no recourse to courts can be had until all administrative remedies have been exhausted, and that special civil actions against administrative officers should not be entertained if superior administrative officers can grant relief, the rule is not absolute. It is subject to certain exceptions. It is not applicable where the questions involved are essentially judicial, where the controverted act is patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or where the respondent officer acted in utter disregard of due process. The petition filed by respondent Oidi before respondent court contains allegations which remove the case from the ambit of the general rule. She repeatedly asserted therein the want of authority of Mayor Abalos to order her suspension from office and the similar lack of authority of the members of the municipal council to conduct an administrative investigation against her and to order her dismissal from the service. Said averments indisputably make out a legal question that is properly addressed to a regular court of justice rather than to an administrative body. What is more, her claim that she was denied the right of due process makes the rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies inapplicable.
Valmonte vs. Belmonte 170 SCRA 256 FACTS: Petitioners are practitioners in media. As such, they have both the right to gather and the obligation to check the accuracy of information the disseminate. For them, the freedom of the press and of speech is not only critical, but vital to the exercise of their professions. The right of access to information ensures that these freedoms are not rendered nugatory by the government's monopolizing pertinent information. The information sought by petitioners in this case is the truth of reports that certain Members of the Batasang Pambansa belonging to the opposition were able to secure "clean" loans from the GSIS immediately before the February 7, 1986 election through the intercession of the former First Lady, Mrs. Imelda Marcos. On June 26, 1986, Valmonte, joined by the other petitioners, filed the instant suit. On July 19, 1986, the Daily Express carried a news item reporting that 137 former members of the defunct interim and regular Batasang Pambansa, including ten (10) opposition members, were granted housing loans by the GSIS. Separate comments were filed by respondent Belmonte and the Solicitor General. After petitioners filed a consolidated reply, the petition was given due course and the parties were required to file their memoranda. The parties having complied, the case was deemed submitted for decision. In his comment respondent raises procedural objections to the issuance of a writ of mandamus, among which is that petitioners have failed to exhaust 117
administrative remedies. Respondent claims that actions of the GSIS General Manager are reviewable by the Board of Trustees of the GSIS. Petitioners, however, did not seek relief from the GSIS Board of Trustees. It is therefore asserted that since administrative remedies were not exhausted, then petitioners have no cause of action. To this objection, petitioners claim that they have raised a purely legal issue, viz., whether or not they are entitled to the documents sought, by virtue of their constitutional right to information. Hence, it is argued that this case falls under one of the exceptions to the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. ISSUE: Whether or not the instant case falls under one of the exceptions to the principle of administrative remedies.
HELD: Among the settled principles in administrative law is that before a party can be allowed to resort to the courts, he is expected to have exhausted all means of administrative redress available under the law. The courts for reasons of law, comity and convenience will not entertain a case unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum. However, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to settled exceptions, among which is when only a question of law is involved [Pascual v. Provincial Board, 106 Phil. 466 (1959); Aguilar v. Valencia, et al., G.R. No. L-30396, July 30, 1971, 40 SCRA 210; Malabanan v. Ramento, G.R. No. L-2270, May 21, 1984, 129 SCRA 359.] The issue raised by petitioners, which requires the interpretation of the scope of the constitutional right to information, is one which can be passed upon by the regular courts more competently than the GSIS or its Board of Trustees, involving as it does a purely legal question. Thus, the exception of this case from the application of the general rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is warranted.
Tan vs. Veterans Backpay Commission 105 Phil. 377 FACTS: On March 5, 1957, petitioner-appellee, Maria Natividad vda. de Tan filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a verified petition for mandamus seeking an order to compel the respondent-appellant Veterans Back Pay Commission: (1) to declare deceased Lt. Tan Chiat Bee alias Tan Lian Lay, a Chinese national, entitled to backpay rights, privileges, and prerogatives under Republic Act No. 304, as amended by Republic Act No. 897; and (2) to give due course to the claim of petitioner, as the widow of the said veterans, by issuing to her the corresponding backpay certificate of indebtedness. The lower court rendered decision in favor of the Petitioner. Against the decision, the respondent instituted this appeal averring once more, in its assignment of errors, the special and affirmative defenses that the petitioner failed to exhaust available administrative remedies; that the suit is, in effect, an action to enforce a money claim against the government without its consent; that mandamus will not lie to compel the exercise of ﾍ a discretionary function; and that the Republic Act Nos. 304 and ﾍ 897 already referred to were never intended to benefit aliens. ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner needs to exhaust Administrative Remedies before resorting to court proceeding. 118
HELD: It is further contended by the Commission that the petitioner should have first exhausted her administrative remedies by appealing to the President of the Philippines, and that her failure to do so is a bar to her action in court. The respondent Commission is in estoppel to invoke this rule, considering that in its resolution reiterating its obstinate refusal to abide by the opinion of the Secretary of Justice, who is the legal adviser of the Executive Department, the Commission declared that the opinions promulgated by the Secretary of Justice are advisory in nature, which may either be accepted or ignored by the office seeking the opinion, and any aggrieved party has the court for recourse, thereby leading the petitioner to conclude that only a final judicial ruling in her favor would be accepted by the Commission.
Laganapan vs. Asedillo 154 SCRA 377 FACTS: This is an appeal from the judgment, dated 16 October 1967, of the Court of First Instance of Laguna in Civil Case No. SC-719, which ordered the respondents to reinstate the petitioner to his former position of chief of police of Kalayaan, Laguna, with back salaries from his dismissal up to his actual reinstatement. The petitioner Solano Laganapan was appointed chief of police of the municipality of Kalayaan, Laguna on 4 January 1960, with a compensation of P660.00 per annum, by the respondent Mayor Asedillo. On 1 July 1960, his salary was increased to P720.00 per annum, and he was extended an appointment which was approved as provisional under Sec. 24(c) of Republic Act No. 2260 by the Commissioner of Civil Service. However, on 16 February 1967, the petitioner was summarily dismissed from his position by respondent Mayor Elpidio Asedillo, on the ground that his appointment was provisional and that he has no civil service eligibility. The petitioner was told to surrender his firearm and other office equipment to the Municipal Treasurer of Kalayaan, Laguna who was also informed of petitioner's dismissal on the same day. Hence, on 16 March 1967, the petitioner filed a petition for mandamus, quo warranto with preliminary mandatory injunction against respondents Mayor Elpidio Asedillo, the Municipality of Kalayaan, Laguna, and Epifanio Ragotero, before the Court 119
of First Instance of Laguna, docketed therein as Civil Case No. SC-719, seeking his reinstatement to the position of chief of police of Kalayaan, Laguna, with back salaries and damages. In answer, respondents Mayor Elpidio Asedillo and Epifanio Ragotero claimed that the appointment of the petitioner, being merely temporary in character, and the petitioner having no civil service eligibility, his services could be terminated with or without cause, at the pleasure of the appoint power; and that the petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner needs to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing the action for quo warranto and mandamus in court. HELD: The appellants contend that the appellee should have first exhausted all administrative remedies before he reported to the courts. They suggested that the appellee should have appealed the order of dismissal to the Commissioner of Civil Service in view of the provisions of Sec. 16(i) and Sec. 16 of Republic Act No. 2260 which grant the Commissioner of Civil Service the final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all permanent officers and employees in the competitive or classified service; and to hear and determine appeals instituted by any person believing himself to be aggrieved by an action or determination of any appointing authority contrary to the provisions of the Civil Service Law and rules. While there are precedents which hold that before a litigant can bring a matter to court, it is necessary that he first exhaust all the remedies in the administrative branch of the government, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a hard and fast rule. It has been repeatedly held that the principle requiring previous exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable where the question in dispute is purely a legal one; where the controverted act is patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction; where the respondent is a department secretary, whose acts as an alter ego of the President, bear the implied or assumed approval of the latter; where there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention; or where the respondent has acted in utter disregard of due process. The rule does not also apply where insistence on its observance would result in nullification of the claim being asserted; and when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
Alzate vs. Aldana 107 SCRA 298 February 29, 1960 Facts: Petitioner, wrote to the respondent Director of Public Schools claiming that taking into account his 24 years service he was entitled under R.A. 842 an automatic salary increase of 4 rates. The respondent denied the request, contending that in the adjustment, only the actual number of years of service as such secondary principal would be considered and that he would entitled to only one rate salary increase and such petitioner was not entitled to the benefit of Public School Salary act. The endorsement of denial was receive by the petitioner on April 14, 1958, he requested for a reconsideration of the aforementioned ruling, this letter of reconsideration by the respondent Bureau on May 23, 1958. It appears that on May 30, 1958 was submitted to Dr. Aldana, Dr. Bernardino and Dr. Guiang of the same Bureau. On June 11, 1958, petitioner, not having received any ruling on his request for reconsideration and fearing that the amount appropriated for the payment, if not disbursed or committed before expiration of the fiscal year on June 30, 1958, would reverted to the general funds of the Government, filed a mandamus proceeding in the CFI for the purpose indicated. Issue: Whether or not that the petitioner must exhausted all administrative remedies before coming to court, and that the lower court had not acquired no jurisdiction over the case. 120
Held: No. it appears from the petition that the reason for filing it without awaiting the final action on the part of the respondent Director of Public Schools was the urgency of preventing the automatic reversion as of July 1, 1958, after the expiration of then current fiscal year, whatever action may thereafter be taken by respondent, even if favorable to petitioner would be of no avail after the reversion of the funds appropriated for the purpose of salary adjustment. Hence, he claims that to require him to exhaust the administrative remedies would, in the circumstances of the case, in effect amount to a nullification of his claim.
Cipriano vs. Marcelino 43 SCRA 291, February 28, 1972 Facts: Petitioner served as a clerk in the office of municipal treasurer from January 1, 1963 to January 15, 1966, at a monthly salary of eighty pesos (P80). On the latter date she resigned. Because the respondent municipal treasurer, upon her severance from service, refused to pay her salary corresponding to the period from September 1, 1965 to January 15, 1966, inclusive (P349), as well as the commutation equivalent of her accumulated vacation and sick leaves (P600). Petitioner filed with the CFI for mandamus to compel the said municipal treasurer to pay her the total amount of P949. She also asked for moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and cost suit. Issue: Whether or not she can file such action without exhausting all administrative remedies. Held: Yes, we held time and time again that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not without exception, not is it a condition precedent to judicial relief. The principle may be disregarded when it does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. It may and should be relaxed when its application may cause great and irreparable damage. It is altogether too obvious that to require the petitioner Cipriano to go all the way to the President of the Philippines on appeal in the matter of the collection of the small total of nine hundred forty-nine pesos would not only be oppressive but would patently unreasonable. By the time her appeal 121
shall have been decided by the President, the amount of much more than P949, which is the total sum of her claim, would in all likelihood have been spent.
De Lara, Jr. vs. Cloribel 14 SCRA 269, May 31, 1965 Facts: Plaintiff was granted a timber license to log over an area in Claveria, Misamis Oriental, during the non-renewal of plaintiff’s license, P & B Enterprises co., inc., filed a similar application. Having been approved over a forest area also situated in Claveria, Misamis Oriental, immediately constructed a logging road which extended partially within the area covered by the plaintiff’s timber concession. Plaintiff now secured for renewal of its timber license where the company protested such approval as it would cause conflict to the portion of the area. The Director of Forestry overruled the protest, hence the same appealed to the Sec of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Pendency of the protest, plaintiff continued his logging operation and trespass the construction made by the company. Hence, this instant action for injunction and damages before the court of first instance which granted an ex parte writ of preliminary investigation. Issue: Whether or not the court of first instance committed a grave abuse of discretion in issuing ex parte the writ of preliminary injunction. Held: the court did not commit grave abuse of discretion as such general rule may be relaxed when its application may cause great and irreparable damage which cannot otherwise prevented except by taking the opportune appropriate court action. The rule is inapplicable if it should appear that an irreparable damage and injury will be suffered by a party if he should 122
await, before taking court action, the final action of the administrative official concerned on the matter.
National Development Company vs. The Collector of Customs 9 SCRA 429, October 31, 1963 Facts: Petitioner is engaged in shipping business is the owner of SS Doña Nati was penalized by the collector of customs for not manifested a cargo of RCA victor tv set which they alleged a violation under section 2521 of the tariff and custom code. According to the petitioner, the said item is not considered cargo because it is a personal belonging of a medical doctor of SS Doña Nati. The collector of customs denied their explanation instead penalized them with P5,000.00 and thereafter threaten them of revocation or deny clearance of the vessel. Issue: whether or not the collector of customs acted in utter disregard of the petitioner due process. Held: Yes. the respondent has committed grave abuse of discretion without giving the petitioner proper due process as cited in the case of “Ang Tibay vs. CIR, 69 Phil 635” states that there are cardinal rules to be followed and one of which is the conduct of the proper investigation. Moreover, the court sustained the resort to judicial action without first appealing the collector’s decision to the commissioner of customs, saying that such appeal was not a “plain, speedy and adequate remedy in ordinary course of law as would prevent petitioners from taking the present action.
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Arrow Transportation Corp. vs. Board of Transportation 63 SCRA 193, March 21, 1975 Facts: the petitioner and private respondent Sultan rent-a-car corp. are both domestic corp. The former has a certificate of public convenience to operate public utility bus, air-conditioned and auto truck services. On September 12, 1974, Sultan rent-a-car filed a petition with the respondent board a license to operate, a similar services. Eight day after, the board issued an order granting provisional permit to operate to Sultan rent-a-car. It was contested by the petitioner on the ground that the issuance of permit is void due to absence of public hearing and publication. Issue: whether or not the board order of permit to operate the private respondent is illegal and a violation of procedural due process. Held: according to this, the petition, to repeat, cannot prosper because of the following reasons: 1. The argument set forth, while impressed with plausibility; do not suffice to justify the grant of certiorari. Moreover, the doctrine announced in the PLDT vs. Medina is a frail and substantial support and gives way to decisions of this court that have an even more specific bearing on this litigation. 2. The decision consideration is the existence of the public need. as shown in the case, respondent board on the basis of demonstrable data, being satisfied of the pressing necessity for the grant of the provisional permit. 124
3. The procedural due process in the case at bar was equally explained based on the issuance of execution order no. 101 as party stated hereunder: xxxx it is the policy of the state, as swiftly as possible to improve the deplorable condition vehicular traffic, obtain maximum utilization of existing public motor and eradicate the harmful and unlawful trade of clandestine operators..xxxxx
Tiangco vs. Lauchang 9 SCRA 125 FACTS: The case is all about a parcel of land located at Lot No. 10, Block No. 2 of the Tambobong Estate in the Municipality of Malabon, Province of Rizal, Philippine Islands, was formerly leased by the Archbishop of Manila to one Matea Suarez. The lot contains an aggregate area of 480 meters. On September 11, 1906, Matea Suarez sold her leasehold interest in the land for the sum of P200.00 to Anacleto Lauchang, father of the plaintiff-appellee and appellant Faustina Lauchang. When Anacleto died in 1923, his daughter, the plaintiff, took over and since then has been occupying said property paying rents therefor to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila up to August 31, 1927 when further payment of rents was suspended because the Archbishop of Manila sold the Tambobong Estate to the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. The evidence further shows that Asuncion Hizon had been occupying 82 square meters of the lot in question in the northwestern portion since 1929; Jacinto Tiangco, 91 square meters in the southwestern portion since 1938; and Jose Lazaro, 113 square meters in the northeastern portion since 1940. Plaintiff appellee and appellant is occupying the southwestern part of the lot containing an area of 194 square meters. All of the claimants-occupants have their respective houses on the lot in question. ISSUE: Whether or not the exhaustion of all administrative remedies is tenable. HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that Asuncion Hizon is a sub-lessee of Faustina Lauchang, the plaintiff. With respect to Jacinto, the evidence shows that at first he used to pay Faustina Lauchang P1.00 per month until he connected plaintiff's water pipe with his main water pipe in 125
the middle of the year 1938. Since then Tiangco has not been paying any rental to the plaintiff. As to Jose Lazaro, his testimony is to the effect that he had been occupying the portion of 113 square meters upon an annual rent of P12.00. The Supreme court constrained to modify the decision appealed from by (1) declaring plaintiff-appellee and appellant Faustina Lauchang to have the preferential right to buy the whole of Lot No. 10 of Black No. 2 of the Tambobong Estate and (2) ordering the Division of Landed Estates of the Bureau of Lands, successor of the Rural Progress Administration which was abolished by Executive Order No. 376, the Land Tenure Administration, or the agency or instrumentality of the Government concerned to sell said lot to her." The question raised by the parties was correctly decided by the Court of Appeals in its amended decision or judgment sought to be reviewed wherein the pertinent parts of the opinion of this Court rendered in Santiago, et al., vs. Cruz, et al., G.R. No. L-8271-72, 29 December 1955, are quoted. The proposition advanced by the petitioners that this Court should depart from the strict application of the order of preference laid down in the cases decided by it cannot be sustained, because unlike in this case where the respondent owns no other realty except an inchoate right over the lot in litigation, in the case of Gutierrez vs. Santos, G.R. No. L12253, 28 March 1960, the lessee had four (4) lots the total area of which was 3,279 square meters, aside from the then litigated lot, which was more than sufficient to answer for the needs of the lessee and his family. Furthermore, the 480 square meters lot being inadequate for the needs of an already growing family of the respondent (consisting of 7 children all of age and 7 grandchildren), petitioners Lazaro and Tiangco bought or became co-owners of lots in Malabon, Rizal, as evidenced by TCT No. 58148 and 61615, issued by the Register of Deeds in and for the province of Rizal. The contention of the petitioners that the action brought in the Court of First Instance of Rizal should have been dismissed for lack of cause of action, in view of respondent's failure to exhaust all administrative remedies is untenable. It is well to recall that the lot, subject of the litigation, is not a part of the public domain, but of private ownership acquired by the Government for resale to private persons, and for that reason any aggrieved party may bring an action in court without the need of exhausting all administrative remedies.
Corpus vs. Cuaderno 4 SCRA 749 FACTS: On 7 March 1958, the petitioner-appellant, R. Marino Corpus, then holding the position of "Special Assistant to the Governor, In-Charge of the Export Department" of the Central Bank, a position declared by the President of the Philippines on 24 January 1957 as highly technical in nature, and admitted as such by both the present litigants, was administratively charged by several co-employees in the export department with dishonesty, incompetence, neglect of duty and/or abuse of authority, oppression, conduct unbecoming a public official, and of violation of the internal regulations of the Central Bank. On 18 March 1958, the Monetary Board suspended the petitioner from office effective on said date and created a three-man investigating committee composed of Atty. Guillermo de Jesus, chairman, and Atty. Apolinar Tolentino, Assistant Fiscal of the City of Manila, and Professor Gerardo Florendo, senior attorney of the Central Bank, members. In its final report dated 5 May 1959, the investigating committee, "after most extensive hearings on which both complainants and respondents were afforded all opportunity to submit their evidence, and after a most exhaustive and conscientious study of the records and evidence submitted in the case", made the following conclusion and recommendation: "In view of the foregoing, the Committee finds that there is no basis upon which to recommend disciplinary action against respondent, and therefore respectfully recommends that he be immediately reinstated." Nevertheless, on 20 July 1959, the Monetary Board approved the following resolution: "After an exhaustive and mature deliberation on the report of the aforesaid fact-finding committee in conjunction with the entire records of the case and representations of both complainants and respondent, through their respective counsel; and further, after a thorough review of the service record of the respondent, particularly the various cases presented against him, object of Monetary Board Res. No. 1527 dated August 30, 1955, which 126
all involve fitness, discipline, etc. of respondent; and moreover, upon formal statement of the Governor that he has lost confidence in the respondent as Special Assistant to the Governor and In-Charge of the Export Department (such position being primarily confidential and highly technical in nature), the Monetary Board finds that the continuance of the respondent in the service of the Central Bank would be prejudicial to the best interests of the Central Bank and, therefore, in accordance with the provisions of Section 14 of the Bank Charter, considers the respondent R. Marino Corpus, resigned as of the date of his suspension." ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of petitioner is valid. HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that the appeal of the Central Bank authorities to be clearly untenable. In the first place, the loss of confidence ground, on which the dismissal is sought to be predicated, is a clear and evident afterthought resorted to when the charges, subject-matter of the investigation, were not proved or substantiated. The Monetary Board nowhere stated anything in the record which the committee failed to consider in recommending exoneration from the charges; it nowhere pointed to any substantiation of the charges; it, therefore, relied only on the statement of the loss of confidence made by Governor Cuaderno. We find in the particular set of facts herein that the alleged loss of confidence is clearly a pretext to cure the inability of substantiating the charges upon which the investigation had proceeded. The court, therefore, cannot rely on the so-called "loss of confidence" as a reason for dismissal. And inasmuch as the charges against petitioner were unsubstantiated, that leaves no other alternative but to follow the mandate that —"No public officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law" (Sec. 4, Art. XII, Constitution of the Phil.)Since in the interest of the service reasonable protection should be afforded civil servants in positions that are by their nature important, such as those that are "highly technical", the Constitutional safeguard requiring removal or suspension to be "for cause as provided by law" at least demands that their dismissal for alleged "loss of confidence", if at all allowed, be attended with prudence and deliberation adequate to show that said ground exists. In the second place, the argument for the Monetary Board ignores the self-evident fact that the constitutional provisions merely constitute the policy determining, primarily confidential, and highly technical positions as exceptions to the rule requiring appointments in the Civil Service to be made on the basis of merit and fitness as determined from competitive examinations, but that the Constitution does not exempt such positions from the operation of the principle emphatically and categorically enunciated in section 4 of Article XII, that —"No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law." and which recognizes no exception. The absolute rule thus propounded is repeated almost verbatim in Section 132 of the Central Bank Charter (Rep. Act 265) that provides in equally absolute terms that —"No officer or employee of the Central Bank subject to the Civil Service law or regulations shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law." It is well to recall here that the Civil Service Law in force (Rep. Act No. 2260) divides positions into three categories: competitive or classified; non-competitive or unclassified service; and exempt service, the last being expressly excluded from the scope of the Civil Service Act (sec. 3, R. A. 2260). In view of section 3 and 5 of the same law, providing that — "SEC. 3 Positions Embraced is the Civil Service. — The Philippine Civil Service shall embrace all branches, subdivisions and instrumentalities of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations, . . ." "SEC. 5. The non-competitive service. — The non-competitive or unclassified service shall be composed of positions expressly declared by law to be in the non-competitive or unclassified service or those which are policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature." (R.A. 2260) it is indisputable that the plaintiff Corpus is protected by the Civil Service law and regulations as a member of the non-competitive or unclassified service, and that his removal or suspension must be for cause recognized by law (Unabia vs. Mayor, 53 Off. Gaz., 132; Arcel vs. Osmeña, L-14956, Feb. 27, 1961; Garcia vs. Executive Secretary, L19748, Sept. 13, 1962). The tenure of officials holding primarily confidential positions (such as private secretaries of public functionaries) ends upon loss of confidence, because their term of office lasts only as long as confidence in them endures; and thus their cessation involves no removal. But the situation is different for those holding highly technical posts, requiring special skills and qualifications. The Constitution clearly distinguishes the primarily confidential from the highly technical, and to apply the loss of confidence rule to the latter incumbents is to ignore and erase the differentiation expressly made by our fundamental charter. Moreover, it is illogical that while an ordinary technician, say a clerk, stenographer, mechanic, or engineer, enjoys security of tenure and may not be removed at pleasure, a highly technical officer, such as an economist or a scientist of avowed attainments and reputation, should be denied security and be 127
removable at any time, without right to a hearing or chance to defend himself. The entire objective of the Constitution in establishing and dignifying the Civil Service on the basis of merit, would be thus negated. Of course a position may be declared both highly technical and confidential, as the supreme interests of the state may require. But the position of plaintiffappellant Corpus is not of this category. The decision in De los Santos vs. Mallare, 87 Phil. 289, relied upon by the appellant Bank, is not applicable, since said case involved the office of city engineer, that the court expressly found to be "neither primarily confidential, policy determining nor highly technical" .
Regino vs. Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology 443 SCRA 56 FACTS: Petitioner Khristine Rea M. Regino was a first year computer science student at Respondent Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology (PCST). Reared in a poor family, Regino went to college mainly through the financial support of her relatives. During the second semester of school year 2001-2002, she enrolled in logic and statistics subjects under Respondents Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa Baladad, respectively, as teachers. In February 2002, PCST held a fund raising campaign dubbed the “Rave Party and Dance Revolution,” the proceeds of which were to go to the construction of the school’s tennis and volleyball courts. Each student was required to pay for two tickets at the price of P100 each. The project was allegedly implemented by recompensing students who purchased tickets with additional points in their test scores; those who refused to pay were denied the opportunity to take the final examinations. Financially strapped and prohibited by her religion from attending dance parties and celebrations, Regino refused to pay for the tickets. On March 14 and March 15, 2002, the scheduled dates of the final examinations in logic and statistics, her teachers -- Respondents Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa Baladad -- allegedly disallowed her from taking the tests. According to petitioner, Gamurot made her sit out her logic class while her classmates were taking their examinations. The next day, Baladad, after announcing to the entire class that she was not permitting petitioner and another student to take their statistics examinations for failing to pay for their tickets, allegedly ejected them from the classroom. Petitioner’s pleas ostensibly went unheeded by Gamurot and Baladad, who unrelentingly defended their positions as compliance with PCST’s policy. On April 25, 2002, petitioner filed, as a pauper litigant, a Complaint for damages against PCST, Gamurot and Baladad. In her Complaint, she prayed for P500,000 as nominal damages; P500,000 as moral damages; at least P1,000,000 as exemplary damages; P250,000 as actual damages; plus the costs of litigation and attorney’s fees. On May 30, 2002, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of petitioner’s failure to exhaust 128
administrative remedies. According to respondents, the question raised involved the determination of the wisdom of an administrative policy of the PCST; hence, the case should have been initiated before the proper administrative body, the Commission of Higher Education (CHED). ISSUE: Whether the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable. HELD: The Supreme Court ruled, Respondents anchored their Motion to Dismiss on petitioner’s alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies before resorting to the RTC. According to them, the determination of the controversy hinge on the validity, the wisdom and the propriety of PCST’s academic policy. Thus, the Complaint should have been lodged in the CHED, the administrative body tasked under Republic Act No. 7722 to implement the state policy to “protect, foster and promote the right of all citizens to affordable quality education at all levels and to take appropriate steps to ensure that education is accessible to all.” In Factoran Jr. v. CA, the Court had occasion to elucidate on the rationale behind this doctrine: “The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for reasons of law, comity, and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available administrative remedies have first been resorted to and the proper authorities have been given the exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable when there is competence on the part of the administrative body to act upon the matter complained of. Administrative agencies are not courts; they are neither part of the judicial system, nor are they deemed judicial tribunals. Specifically, the CHED does not have the power to award damages. Hence, petitioner could not have commenced her case before the Commission. The exhaustion doctrine admits of exceptions, one of which arises when the issue is purely legal and well within the jurisdiction of the trial court. Petitioner’s action for damages inevitably calls for the application and the interpretation of the Civil Code, a function that falls within the jurisdiction of the courts. In sum, the Court holds that the Complaint alleges sufficient causes of action against respondents, and that it should not have been summarily dismissed. Needless to say, the Court is not holding respondents liable for the acts complained of. That will have to be ruled upon in due course by the court a quo. WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the assailed Orders REVERSE
Demaisip vs. CA 106 Phil. 237 FACTS: The first applicant for a fishpond permit covering Lots Nos. 233, 236 and 237 of Dumangas Cadastre, Iloilo, was the late Geronimo Destacamento who filed his application on April 1, 1927. On Dec. 31, 1930, the Fishpond Permit No. F-624-B granted to the late Geronimo Destacamento expired, because he failed to make any improvements on the lots and to pay the required rentals. Before his death on December 19, 1928, Geronimo Destacamento without the knowledge and consent of the Director of Forestry, executed a deed of sale covering the lots in question in favor of Serafin Villanueva, an act which was illegal and contrary to the rules of the permit granted him. In a letter dated December 19, 1928, the District Forester of Iloilo, notwithstanding the existence of the aforesaid deed of sale, requested Serafin Villanueva to apply for a fishpond permit over the same lots. In spite of the request, Villanueva neglected and failed to file his application for a fishpond permit, such that no permit was ever granted to him before or after the expiration of the permit of the late Geronimo Destacamento. It appears that on October 15, 1935 the herein complainant Gaudencio G. Demaisip filed with the Fish and Game Administration a fishpond permit application which was given No. 2285 for the same lots Nos. 233, 236 and 237 of Dumangas Cadastre, containing an area of 13.9859 hectares of public mangrove forest land located in Sitios Buang and Balabag, barrio Buang, Dumangas, Iloilo. By March 6, 1936, the Demaisip had complied with all the pre- requisites necessary for the issuance of a fishpond permit, namely, payment of annual rental of P21 and posting of a surety bond in the sum of P350. On March 19, 1936, when the fishpond permit in favor of Gaudencio Demaisip was ready to be issued, Serafin Villanueva executed a deed of sale covering the lots in question in favor of the herein defendant Luis E. Buenaflor; shortly thereafter or in the same month, the latter started to occupy the land, and introduced improvements thereon consisting of a big dam 27 meters long, 4 meters high, across the Balabag River, worth P1,600. According to the result of an investigation conducted by a representative of the Fish and Game Administration, the dam deprives other fishponds leased from the government of 129
fresh or flowing water and was illegally constructed because it violated a rule of that Office prohibiting the introduction of any improvements on the land applied for before the issuance of a permit. It was only on May 21, 1936, or 7 months after Demaisip had filed an application, that Luis Buenaflor also filed his application for the area in question with the Iloilo branch of the Fish and Game Administration, the Director of Fish and Game Administration was called upon to decide who of the conflicting claimants — Luis Buenaflor or Gaudencio G. Demaisip — had a better right to be regarded as the lessee of the land in question pursuant to Section 63 of Act No. 4003. ISSUE: Whether or not the exhaustion of all administrative remedies is tenable. HELD: The plaintiff did not appeal from the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to the President of the Philippines when he reversed the decision of the Director of Fish and Game Administration, and ruled that the lease application of Demaisip should be denied and that of defendant Buenaflor be given due course upon compliance with certain requirements, but such failure cannot preclude the plaintiff from taking court action in view of the theory that the Secretary of a department is merely an alter-ego of the President. The presumption is that the action of the Secretary bears the implied sanction of the President unless the same is disapproved by the latter. It is therefore incorrect to say that plaintiff's action should not be entertained because he has failed to exhaust first all the administrative remedies available to him.
Calo vs. Fuertes 5 SCRA 397; 115 Phil. 393 FACTS: The case is all about a Cadastral Case No. 84, Butuan City, entitled Francisco C. Calo, claimant- contestant, vs. H. A. No. 86871 (E-40476) Delfin C. Fuertes, applicantrespondent, the Director of Lands rendered on 12 April 1956 an opinion denying and dismissing former's claim and contest against the Homestead Application No. 86871 (E-40476) of Delfin C. Fuertes, ordering him to vacate the premises within sixty days from receipt of a copy of the opinion, and stating that upon finality thereof homestead patent would be issued to Delfin C. Fuertes. His request for reconsideration having been denied by the Director of Lands on 25 January 1957, Francisco C. Calo brought to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources the case, docketed as DANR case No. 1549. On 28 February 1958 the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources modified the opinion of the Director of Lands— . . . in the sense that Delfin C. Fuertes should reimburse Francisco C. Calo of the difference between the value of the improvements the latter introduced on the land in controversy and the value of the consequential benefits derived by him therefrom within thirty (30) days from advice by the Director of Lands who is hereby directed to determine the aforementioned difference within sixty (60) days from receipt of a copy of this decision. Still dissatisfied with the above opinion, Francisco C. Calo asked the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to reconsider it but the latter denied reconsideration thereof. Hence, on 1 August 1958 Francisco C. Calo appealed to the President of the Philippines, but on 8 August 1958 he withdrew it before the President of the Philippines could act thereon. On 22 August 1958 Francisco C. Calo filed in the Court of First Instance of Agusan a petition for writ of certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction praying that the enforcement of the opinions of the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources be enjoined; that if a bond be needed for the purpose he was willing to file it; that after hearing the injunction be made final and permanent; that the respondent Delfin C. Fuertes pay him P18,000 as damages and attorney's fees and costs of the suit; that he be declared the owner entitled to possess the parcel of land subject of the litigation; and for any other just and equitable relief. 130
ISSUE: Whether or not the exhaustion of all administrative remedies is tenable. HELD: The withdrawal of the appeal taken to the President of the Philippines is tantamount to not appealing at all thereto. Such withdrawal is fatal, because the appeal to the President is the last step he should take in an administrative case. The appellant's contention that, as the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources is the alter ego of the President and his acts or decisions are also those of the latter, he need not appeal from the decision or opinion of the former to the latter, and that, such being the case, after he had appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources from the decision or opinion of the Director of Lands he had exhausted all the administrative remedies, is untenable. Furthermore, a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court lies only when "there is neither appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." In the case at bar, appeal from an opinion or order by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to the President of the Philippines is the plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to the petitioner. The judgment appealed from already had become final and cannot be reviewed. The appeal is dismissed, with costs against the petitioner-appellant.
Bartulata vs. Peralta 59 SCRA 7 Facts: In the case herein, petitioner began his service in the armed forces of the Philippines on January 15, 1924 upon his enlistment in the Philippine Constabulary. When the Pacific war broke out in 1941, he held the rank of sergeant in the Philippine Constabulary. When the order for surrender to the enemy was issued by the high command of the USAFFE, he refused to surrender and, instead, he joined the 108th Infantry, 10th Military District, a guerrilla organization in Mindanao. This guerrilla outfit was recognized on February 13, 1943 by the Headquarters, Philippine Ryukyus Command of the United States Armed Forces, which recognition was later revised to take effect as of September 16, 1942. While in the service of the aforementioned guerrilla outfit, petitioner Bartulata was promoted to the rank of third lieutenant effective November 1, 1942, and to second lieutenant effective April 1, 1943. His name, rank (2nd Lt.) and serial number (0-24220 PA) appeared in the Roster of Reserve Officers in the Headquarters, Mindanao Zone Military Police Command, Philippine Army, per General Order No. 358, dated June 28, 1946, Army Headquarters APO 75. After the war, petitioner still carrying the rank of 2nd Lieutenant, continued to render service under the postwar Philippine Army. He was assigned as Junior Officer of the 62nd Military Police Command (PA). As second lieutenant he was paid his salaries and allowances and was allowed to wear his uniform as such officer. His services ended when he was honorably discharged, effective January 31, 1947, as a second lieutenant. On September 1, 1956, petitioner Bartulata filed an application for retirement pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 340, as amended. Since he had rendered more than 25 years of continuous military service, his application was approved and officially announced in paragraph 13, Special Order No. 126 of General Headquarters, Armed Forces of the Philippines, dated December 19, 1957, retiring him with the rank of Staff Sergeant effective January 31, 1947, the date when he was separated from the service. Contending that he should be retired as second lieutenant instead of staff sergeant, petitioner Bartulata, on several occasions, requested re-adjustment of his retirement rank, but said requests were denied by General Headquarters, Armed Forces of the Philippines, and by the Secretary of National Defense, upon the ground that his name does not appear in the approved reconstructed roster of his guerrilla outfit, and as such it is "conclusive that his service 131
was not recognized or that the recognition of his guerrilla status was revoked.” Thereupon, Bartulata sought relief from the lower court, but the latter, on the basis of the stipulation of facts submitted by the parties and the other documents admitted by them, dismissed his petition as stated in the beginning of this opinion. Hence, this appeal. Issue: Whether or not he should be retired with the rank of staff sergeant as contended by respondents, or with the rank of second lieutenant as claimed by petitioner? Whether the petitioner must, “exhausted all administrative remedies" available to him before coming to court? Held: this Court, speaking of the probative weight of the revised roster, said that the entries in the Army's roster of recognized guerrillas, assuming them to be the official acts of duly authorized public officers, are merely prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. In other words, this roster or list is not to be considered the sole and exclusive evidence of the government's recognition of guerrilla services. As there is nothing in the law making inadmissible other proof of such recognition, where they are material and relevant. Further, this Court said that the recognized roster (drawn up primarily for backpay purposes) must yield to the initial roster (which in that case showed that Aragon was already serving six months before the Leyte landing of the liberation troops). In the case now before this Court, respondents' theory must be rejected. This Court holds that the Philippine Government had recognized not only herein petitioner's wartime and post-liberation services in the Army, but also his rank as 2nd lieutenant. The recognition was made when his name was included in the initial roster of the 108th Infantry, 10th Military District; when he was given backpay for services rendered as second lieutenant from April 1, 1943 to May 15, 1945; when he was paid his salaries and allowances as second lieutenant; when he was allowed to wear the uniform as such officer; and when he was honorably discharged with the rank of second lieutenant on January 31, 1947. Even the approval of petitioner's retirement application indicated a clear showing of the recognition of petitioner's guerrilla and post liberation services. It will be noted that in Special Orders No. 126, which officially announced the approval of his retirement, it is stated that he had completed 23 years and 15 days of service. And it will also be noted that in the stipulation of facts, respondents admit that petitioner had rendered more than 23 years of continuous military service. These 23 years and 15 days of service cover the period from January 15, 1924 (date of original enlistment) up to January 30, 1947 inclusive, as the records do not show that he had rendered further military service. If the petitioner, as contended by the respondents, had not served under the 108th Infantry, 10th Military District, nor was he a member thereof or that his guerrilla status was revoked, his wartime services, dating as early as October 1, 1942 and ending May 15, 1945, could not have been included in the computation of his military service. The inclusion of the period from October 1, 1942 to May 15, 1945 in petitioner's military service record simply means his guerrilla services with the 108th Infantry, 10th Military District, the only guerrilla outfit he was known and shown to have served in, was duly recognized by the authorities of the Philippine Army. The fact that his name may not be included in the roster of recognized guerrillas of the Philippines that is kept by the authorities of the United States Government should not matter. What should matter are the records of the Philippine Government regarding his military activities, including his services in the guerrilla during the last World War II. We hold that on the basis of the evidence, amply and adequately showing the Philippine government's due recognition of petitioner's guerrilla services, it is but fair and legal, that he be accorded all the rights, the benefits and the privileges that are due him as a recognized guerrilla to be retired with the rank of second lieutenant, which was his rank when the afore-quoted Executive Order No. 121, confirming it, was promulgated, and which was the rank that he was holding when honorably discharged from the Army. Respondents, however, would contend that the present action should be dismissed because petitioner "has not exhausted all administrative remedies" available to him before coming to court. Respondents would want petitioner to appeal his case to the Office of the President before availing of court processes. In a long line of decisions, this Court has held that the doctrine requiring the previous exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable where the respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the President, bear the implied or assumed approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by him. The present proceedings having been brought against the Secretary of National Defense, respondents' contention is clearly untenable.
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Tan vs. Director of Forestry 125 SCRA 302 Facts: The Bureau of Forestry issued an advertisement for public bidding for a certain tract of forest land in Olongapo, Zambales. The public forest land consists of 6,240 hectares and located within the former US Naval Reservation comprising 7,252 hectares of timberland. Petitioner submitted his application in due form along with nine other applicants. Thereafter, President Carlos P. Garcia issued a directive to the Director of the Bureau of Forestry to draft a proclamation establishing the said area as a watershed forest reserve for Olongapo and that the bids received for the issuance of timber license be rejected. The Secretary of Agriculture and National Resources sustained the recommendations of the Director of Forestry who concluded that it would be beneficial to the public interest if the area is made available for exploitation under certain conditions. Finally, the area was awarded to petitioner. Ravago Commercial Company and Jorge Lao Happick filed motions for reconsideration which were denied by the Director of Forestry. Ravago appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, which later on, declared the license issued to petitioner by Director of Forestry as null and void. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Issue: Whether or not petitioner has not exhausted all administrative remedies Held: YES. Considering that the President has the power to review on appeal the orders or acts of the respondents-appellees, the failure of the petitioner to take that appeal is failure on his part to exhaust his administrative remedies. From the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources complained of, petitioner had a plain, speedy and adequate remedy by appealing to the Chief Executive. Certiorari is not a substitute for appeal as held time and again, it being a time honored and well known principle that before seeking judicial redress, a party must exhaust the administrative remedies available.
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Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod ng mga Magtitinda ng Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntinlupa, Inc. vs. Dominguez 205 SCRA 92 Facts: The Municipal Government of Muntinlupa, thru its Mayor Santiago Carlos, entered into a contract with petitioner for the latter’s management and operation of its New Muntinlupa public Market. The contract provides for a 25 year term renewable for a like period unless sooner terminated and/or rescinded by mutual agreement of the parties. Subsequently, Mayor Ignacio Bunye, Mayor Carlos’ successor, claiming to be particularly scandalized by the 50-year term of the agreement, contrary to the provision of Section 143, paragraph 3 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, and the patently inequitable rental, directed the review of the contract. Consequently, the Municipal Council approved a Resolution abrogating the contract. Petitioner filed with the RTC of Makati a complaint for breach of contract, specific performance with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against the Municipality and its officers. The writ applied for was denied, the KBMBPM officers resisted the attempts of Bunye and company to complete the take-over. The matter was elevated to the Supreme Court but it was remanded to the Court of Appeals. Thereafter, Amado Perez, Gerneral Manager of KBMBPM, filed with the Ombudsman a complaint charging Bunye and his co-petitioners of harassment, oppression, abuse of authority and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for taking over the management of the public market. On October 1998, respondent Madriaga and Coronado, accompanied by the Bunye and the latter’s heavily armed men forcibly broke open the doors of the offices of petitioners purportedly to serve upon petitioners the Order of respondent Secretary of Agriculture and to implement the same by taking over and disbanding the incumbent Board of Directors of KBMBPM. Petitioners claim that the Order served on them was not written on the stationary of the Department, does not bear its seal and is a mere Xerox copy. Thereafter, petitioners filed a petition praying that respondents refrain, cease and desist from enforcing the questioned Order and that the order be declared null and void. Issue: 1. Whether or not the issued Order was valid 2. Whether or not the petitioners needed to exhaust administrative remedies available 134
Held: (1) NO. There is an established procedure for the removal of directors and officers of cooperatives. It is likewise manifest that the right to due process is respected by the express provision on the opportunity to be heard. But even without said provision, petitioners cannot be deprived of that right. The procedure was not followed in this case. Respondent Secretary of Agriculture arrogated himself the power of the members of the KBMBPM who are authorized to vote to remove the petitioning directors and officers. He cannot take refuge under PD 175 which grants him the authority to supervise and regulate all cooperatives. An administrative officer has only such powers as are expressly granted to him and those necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. These powers should not be extended by implication beyond what may be necessary for their just and reasonable execution. (2) NO. The rule is well-settled that this requirement does not apply where the respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the President, bear the implied approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by him. This doctrine of qualified political agency ensures speedy access to the courts when most needed. There was no need to appeal the decision to the Office of the President; recourse to the courts could be had immediately. Moreover, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies also yields to other exceptions, such as when the question involved is purely legal, as in the instant case, or where the questioned act is patently illegal, arbitrary or oppressive. Such is the claim of petitioners which, as hereinafter shown, is correct.
Valencia vs. Court of Appeals 401 SCRA 666 Facts: In the case herein, petitioner acquired two parcels of land which he entered into civil law leases with Glicerio Henson and Fr. Andres Flores. Henson instituted Crescenciano and Mariano Friasto to work on the property while Fr. Flores appointed the Friases, plus some others, as farmhands. However, in Fr. Flores’ lease contract, there was a stipulation that he was prohibited from installing a leasehold tenant thereon. No such prohibition existed in Henson’s contract. When Fr. Flores’ lease period expired, Valencia ordered his farmhands to vacate the lot. The farmhands refused to do so, and actually even secured CLTs over the land in their names. Catalino Mantac, one of the farmhands, subsequently entered into a leasehold contract undertaking to have a profit sharing agreement with Valencia. After 12 years, DAR investigated the matter and found that the right of the farmhands to the land ceased upon termination of the lease contracts except to as regards to Mantac, with whom Valencia entered into a tenancy agreement. As such, it was recommended that the CLTs given to the other farmhands be cancelled. However, the regional office disregards the investigation report and ruled that the farmhands had a right to continue on the land until otherwise ordered by the court. On appeal to the office of the president, then Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona upheld the ruling of the DAR, with the modification that is acquired by Valencia as homestead be excluded from the coverage of PD 27. Valencia then appealed to the CA contending that the Exec. Sec. erred in recognizing the farmhands as tenants, and disallowing him and his 7 compulsory heirs from exercising their right of retention under R.A 6657. However, the CA dismissed the case. Issue: Whether or not a contract of civil law lease prohibit a civil law lessee from employing a tenant on the land subject matter of the lease agreement. Held: YES. Sec. 6 of RA 3844 does not automatically authorize a civil law lessee to employ a tenant without the consent of the landowner. The lessee must be so specifically authorized. A different interpretation would be most unfair to the hapless and unsuspecting landowner who entered into a civil law lease agreement in good faith only to realize later on the he can no longer gain possession of his property due to the installation of a tenant by the civil law lessee. 135
On the other hand, under the express provision of Art. 1649 of the civil code, the lessee cannot assign the lease without the consent of the lessor, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary. In the case before us, not only is there no stipulation to the contrary, the lessee is expressly prohibited from subleasing or encumbering the land, which includes installing a leasehold tenant thereon since the right to do so is an attribute of ownership. Doctrine: The right to hire a tenant is basically a personal right of landowner, except as many be provided by law. Inherent in the right of landholders to install tenant is their authority to do so; otherwise, without such authority civil law lessees as landholders cannot install a tenant on the landholding tenancy relationship has been held to be of a personal character. Deforciants cannot install lawful tenants who are entitled to security of tenure. A contract of civil law lease can prohibit a civil law lessee from employing a tenant on the land subject matter of the lease agreement. Essential requisites of a tenancy relationship: (1) The parties are the landowner and the tenant;(2) The subject is agricultural land;(3) There is consent;(4) The purpose is agricultural production;(5) There is personal cultivation; and (6) There is sharing of the harvests between the parties. An allegation that an agricultural tenant tilled the land in question does not make the case an agrarian dispute. Claims that one is a tenant do no not automatically give rise to security of tenure. The elements of tenancy must first be proved in order to entitle the claimant to security of tenure. The principal factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent. Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship. The security of tenure guaranteed by our tenancy laws may be invoked only by tenants de jure, not by those who are not true and lawful tenants. The act of subletting to third persons extinguishes the agricultural leasehold relations, as this constitutes an abandonment of the landholding due to the absence of personal cultivation. Obiter: Social justice is for the deserving, whether he be a millionaire in his mansion or a pauper in his hovel. It is never justified to give preference to the poor simply because they are poor, or reject the rich simply because they are rich, for justice must always be served for the poor and the rich alike according to the mandate of law. Interpretare et concordare legeslegibus est optimus interpret and imodus. – Interpreting and harmonizing the laws with laws is the best method of interpretation.
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Land Car Inc. vs. Bachelor Express 417 SCRA 307 Facts: In the case herein, petitioner filed with the Regional Office of the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB), Region XII, a verified application to operate a public utility bus service from Davao City to Cagayan de Oro City via Butuan City. Respondents, themselves grantees of certificates of public convenience, opposed petitioners application alleging that the route applied for was sufficiently being served by them, and that cutthroat competition would only result if petitioners application were to be favorably acted upon. On 29 October 1999, the LTFRB rendered its decision granting petitioners application and directing the issuance of the corresponding Certificate of Public Convenience. Respondent’s motion for reconsideration was denied in the board’s resolution of 27 January 2000. Respondents then appealed to the Office of the Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC). On 05 June 2000, the DOTC Secretary reversed the decision of the LTFRB. This time, it was petitioners turn to move for reconsideration of the DOTC Secretary’s resolution. The motion, however, was denied by the DOTC Secretary in his order of 30 August 2000. Respondents thereupon moved for the immediate implementation by the LTFRB of the decision of the DOTC Secretary. On 03 October 2000, the LTFRB granted respondents motion and directed petitioner to cease and desist from operating its buses along the contested route. On 07 October 2000, petitioner filed a letter-appeal to the Office of the President seeking to set aside the resolution and order, dated 05 June 2000 and 30 August 2000, respectively, of the DOTC Secretary. Petitioner then likewise filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, docketed C.A.-G.R. SP No. 61159, questioning the same resolution and order of the DOTC Secretary subject of the letter-appeal addressed to the Office of the President. Upon advice of its new counsel, however, petitioner filed a notice of withdrawal of its petition for certiorari (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 61159) pending with the appellate court. The appellate court did not act upon the notice of withdrawal of the petition (C.A. G.R. SP No. 61159) but, instead, dismissed, in its resolution of 09 November 2000, the petition for failure of compliance with Section 1, Rule 42, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on non-forum shopping. On 20 October 2000, the Office of the President issued a memorandum directing that the execution of the resolution and order of the DOTC Secretary, dated 05 June 2000 and 30 August 2000, respectively, be meanwhile stayed. On 15 January 2001, respondents filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, docketed C.A.-G.R. SP No. 62619, assailing the Memorandum Order of the Office of the President. Respondents argued that the Office of the President had no jurisdiction to issue the assailed order in the absence of any law providing for an appeal from the DOTC to the Office of the President, adding that petitioner was guilty of forum shopping in addressing a letter-appeal to the Office of the President. On 18 June 2001, the Court of Appeals granted respondents’ 137
petition for certiorari basically on the ground that petitioner was guilty of forum shopping. It ordered the dismissal of the appeal filed by petitioner before the Office of the President and reinstated the resolution and order of the DOTC Secretary enjoining petitioner from operating its buses along the contested route. Issue: whether or not appellate court has decided a question in a way not in accord with applicable jurisprudence Held: In order to deter the evils of forum shopping, Circular 28-91, dated 08 February 1994, issued by the Supreme Court requires that every petition filed with the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals must be accompanied by a certification of non-forum shopping. Administrative Circular 04-94, made effective on 01 April 1994, expands the certification requirement to include cases filed in court and quasi-judicial agencies below the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. Ultimately, the Court adopted paragraphs (1) and (2) of Administrative Circular No. 0494 to become Section 5, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Significantly, to curb the malpractice of forum shopping, the rule ordains that a violation thereof would constitute contempt of court and be a cause for the summary dismissal of both petitions without prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against the counsel of the party concerned. Undeniably, there is identity of cause of action and reliefs sought between the petitioners letter-appeal filed with the Office of the President and the petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals (C.A. G.R. SP No. 61159). The DOTC resolution and order, dated 05 June 2000 and 30 August 2000, respectively, were sought to be set aside in both appeals filed by petitioner. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies empowers the Office of the President to review any determination or disposition of a department head. The doctrine allows, indeed requires, an administrative decision to first be appealed to the administrative superiors up to the highest level before it may be elevated to a court of justice for review. Thus, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be had by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on the matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be priorly exhausted before the courts judicial power is invoked. The appellate court correctly ruled that the action of a department head bears only the implied approval of the President, and the latter is not precluded from exercising the power to review the decision of the former pursuant to the Presidents power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices. The Office of the President validly acquired jurisdiction over the case upon the filing therewith of the appeal by herein petitioner, and said jurisdiction is not lost by the subsequent recourse by the petitioner of the certiorari proceedings before the Court of Appeals. Jurisdiction which has attached in the first instance continues until the final resolution of the case. Incongruently, the appellate court, while recognizing to be valid the exercise of jurisdiction by the Office of the President, ordered the dismissal of the appeal pending with the said office based on forum shopping. The decision of the appellate court ordering the dismissal of the appeal taken to the Office of the President is clearly flawed. It is the latter, not the appellate court, which could dismiss the case pending before that office. It also behooves courts of justice, if only for reasons of comity and convenience, to shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress is completed so as to give the administrative office every opportunity to correct its error and to properly dispose of the case. In fact, the appellate courts order to dismiss the appeal pending with the Office of the President could well constitute an undue intrusion into a valid exercise of jurisdiction by the President over acts of subordinates within that office.
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Antonio Carpio vs. The Executive Secretary GR No. 96409, February 14, 1992 FACTS: In 1990, RA 6975 entitled "AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" was passed. Carpio, as a member of the bar and a defender of the Constitution, assailed the constitutionality of the said law for he figured that it only interferes with the control power of the president. He advances the view that RA 6975 weakened the National Police Commission by limiting its power "to administrative control" over the PNP thus, "control" remained with the Department Secretary under whom both the NPC and the PNP were placed. ISSUE: Whether or not the president abdicated its control power over the PNP and NPC by virtue of RA 6975. HELD: The President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. This presidential power of control over the executive branch of government extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk. Equally well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of the President, is the "Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency". As the President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in person, he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members. Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, "all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person on the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive." Thus, and in short, "the President's power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive department." Additionally, the circumstance that the NAPOLCOM and the PNP are placed under the reorganized DILG is merely an administrative realignment that would bolster a system of coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local executives and the integrated law enforcement agencies and public safety agencies created under the assailed Act, the funding of the PNP being in large part subsidized by the national government. 139
National Development Company and DOLE Philippines Inc. vs. Wilfredo Hervilla GR No. L-65718, June 30, 1987 FACTS: The antecedent of this is an action for the recovery of possession and damages filed on December 20, 1973 by Wilfredo Hervilla against DOLE Philippines involving four lots with a total area of four hectares. On June 1, 1962, Wilfredo Hervilla, claiming to be the successor-ininterest of his brother, Hernane Hervilla who vacated these properties, [in favor of the former], filed with the District Land Office of the Bureau of Lands in General Santos City Free Patent Application for the said lots. On April 1, 1963, Candido de Pedro, as claimant and occupant, filed with the Bureau of Lands, Manila, his free patent application, having planted agricultural plants. On April 27, 1968, Hervilla filed an ejectment suit against DOLE, successor-in-interest of Candido de Pedro. Counsel of Hervilla wrote the District Land Officer requesting for the investigation of the said lots, to which a report was rendered and an order was issued as to the adjustment of the said title numbers. The trial court dismissed the action for recovery, to which was appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the trial court decision and declared that the issuance of the patent title by the Bureau of Lands to Candico de Pedro is null and void.. A motion for reconsideration was filed and subsequently, a motion for new trial was filed for the purpose of submitting original certificate of titles which was issued to the DOLE predecessor-ininterest by the Bureau of Lands while the case was pending. The two motions were denied. Thus this petition for review on certiorari. ISSUES: Whether or not the court in a deciding a case involving recovery of possession declare null and void title issued by an administrative body or office during the pendency of such case? HELD: In the administration and disposition of public lands are committed by law to the Director of Lands primarily, and, ultimately, to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. The jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands is confined to the determination of the respective rights of rival claimants to public lands or to cases which involve disposition and alienation of public lands. The jurisdiction of courts in possessory actions involving public lands is limited to the determination of who has the actual, physical possession or occupation of the land in question (in forcible entry cases, before municipal courts) or, the better right of possession (in accion publiciana, in cases before Courts of First Instance, now Regional Trial Courts. In the case at bar, the petitioners possession of the lands in question has been confirmed by the issuance of Free Patents in favor of their predecessor-in-interest. By this act, nothing more is left for the courts to pursue. Thus, the private respondent's cause of action has been rendered moot and academic by the decision of the Director of Lands. Defendants' possession of the lands disputed, for purposes of the free patents, has been confirmed in the administrative case. The administrative branch of the government has thus already spoken. Its action has lapsed into finality. Accordingly, plaintiffs' claim of possession is lost. Moreover, records do not show that private respondent Wilfredo Hervilla ever filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the 140
Director of Lands issuing free patent over the lands in dispute in favor of petitioners' predecessor-in-interest. Neither did he appeal said decision to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, nor did he appeal to the office of the President of the Philippines. In short, Hervilla failed to exhaust administrative remedies, a flaw which, to our mind, is fatal to a court review. The decision of the Director of Lands has now become final. The Courts may no longer interfere with such decision. The decision of the Appellate court is reversed and set aside.
ATLAS CONSOLIDATED MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs Hon. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., and ASTERIO BUQUERON GR no. 75501, September 15, 1987 FACTS: On February 9, 1972, Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation registered the location of its "Master VII Fr." mining claim with the Mining Recorder of Toledo City. On September 10, 1973, private respondent Asterio Buqueron registered the declarations of location of his "St. Mary Fr." and "St. Joseph Fr." mining claims with the same Mining Recorder. On October 15, 1973, Atlas registered the declarations of location of its "Carmen I Fr." to "Carmen V. Fr. " with the same Mining Recorder. Boquerón’s "St. Mary Fr." and "St. Joseph Fr." were surveyed and the survey plans thereof were duly approved by the Director of Mines and Geo Sciences. Notice of Buqueron's lease application was published in the February 22 and 28, 1977 issues of the Evening Post. During the said period of publication, petitioner filed an adverse claim against private respondent's mining claims on the ground that they allegedly overlapped its own mining claims. After hearing, the Director of Mines rendered a decision, dated April 17, 1978, which give preferential rights to Buqueron in his claim except the areas covered by the adverse claim to which Atlas Consolidated has preferential rights. Atlas appealed to the Minister of Natural Resources who rendered a decision on November 10, 1978 reversing the decision of the Director of Mines. Subsequently this matter was appealed to the Executive Secretary, which reversed the decision of the Minister and reinstated the decision of the Director of Mines. Thus this petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not findings on facts based on substantial evidence by an administrative official can be disturbed or overturned during appeals? HELD: This Court has repeatedly ruled that judicial review of the decision of an administrative official is of course subject to certain guide posts laid down in many decided cases. Thus, for instance, findings of fact in such decision should not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence, but review is justified when there has been a denial of due process, or mistake of law or fraud, collusion or arbitrary action in the administrative proceeding, where the procedure which led to factual findings is irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest. A careful study of the records shows that none of the above circumstances is present in the case at bar, which would justify the overturning of the findings of fact of the Director of Mines which were affirmed by the Office of the President. On the contrary, in accordance with the prevailing principle that "in reviewing administrative decisions, the reviewing Court cannot reexamine the sufficiency of the evidence as if originally instituted therein, and receive additional 141
evidence, that was not submitted to the administrative agency concerned," the findings of fact in this case must be respected. As ruled by the Court, they will not be disturbed so long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if not overwhelming or preponderant. This petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision of the Office of the President, is hereby AFFIRMED.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM (DAR) vs DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS) GR No. 158228, March 23, 2004 FACTS: In controversy are Lot No. 2509 and Lot No. 817-D consisting of an aggregate area of 189.2462 hectares located at Hacienda Fe, Escalante, Negros Occidental and Brgy. Gen. Luna, Sagay, Negros Occidental, respectively. On October 21, 1921, these lands were donated by the late Esteban Jalandoni to respondent DECS (formerly Bureau of Education). Consequently, titles thereto were transferred in the name of respondent DECS under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 167175.On July 15, 1985, respondent DECS leased the lands to Anglo Agricultural Corporation for 10 agricultural crop years, commencing from crop year 1984-1985 to crop year 1993-1994. The contract of lease was subsequently renewed for another 10 agricultural crop years, commencing from crop year 1995-1996 to crop year 2004-2005. On June 10, 1993, Eugenio Alpar and several others, claiming to be permanent and regular farm workers of the subject lands, filed a petition for Compulsory Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage with the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Escalante. After investigation, MARO Jacinto R. Piñosa, sent a "Notice of Coverage" to respondent DECS, stating that the subject lands are now covered by CARP and inviting its representatives for a conference with the farmer beneficiaries.6 Then, MARO Piñosa submitted his report to OIC-PARO Stephen M. Leonidas, who recommended to the DAR Regional Director the approval of the coverage of the landholdings. On August 7, 1998, DAR Regional Director Dominador B. Andres approved the recommendation. DECS appealed the case to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform which affirmed the Order of the Regional Director. Aggrieved, respondent DECS filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which set aside the decision of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not Private Agricultural lots donated to the Department of Education is subject to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program and can be distributed to farmerbeneficiaries identified by the administrative agency? HELD: Yes, agricultural lots previously held as alienable and disposable subsequently donated to the DECS which is not exclusively for educational purposes but was leased to Anglo Agricultural Corporation is not exempted from the coverage of the CARP but is subject to distribution for farmer-beneficiaries identified by the DAR, the administrative agency authorized to do so. the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform placing the subject lands under CARP coverage, is REINSTATED.
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OSIAS ACADEMY and MONICA R. DE CASTRO vs THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, et al. GR No. 83257-58; December 21, 1990 FACTS: on January 19 & 21, 1981, the respondents, Eva Cayetano et al, filed a complaint for money claim with the Department of Labor against Osias Academy for underpayment of ECOLA. An inquiry was forwarded to the Bureau of Labor Standard as to the correct wages to teacher who works for 5 days in a week, to which the Bureau of Labor Standard. The Regional Director, considered the employees as falling under group 4 where the rest day is not considered paid, thus dismissing the complaint. The decision was appealed to the Secretary of Labor and employment, who through the Undersecretary reversed the order of the Regional director, stating that the respondents-petitioner were under paid and they are classified as monthly employees. Thus this petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and urgent prayer for restraining order. ISSUE: Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction by the Department of Labor and Employment in issuing a order awarding the private respondent salary and allowance differentials? HELD: No, it is Well established is the principle that findings of administrative agencies which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but even finality. Judicial review by this Court on labor cases do not go so far as to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the Deputy Minister and the Regional Director based their determinations but are limited to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion For Certiorari to lie, there must be capricious arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power, the very antithesis of the judicial prerogative in accordance with centuries of both civil and common law traditions. The abuse of discretion must be grave and patent and it must be shown that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or despotically (Purefoods Corp. v. NLRC, 171 SCRA 415 [1989]; Buiser v. Leogardo, Jr., 131 SCRA 151 [1984]), which is not obtaining in the present case. The petition is dismissed and appealed order is affirmed.
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Sierra Madre Trust vs. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources 121 SCRA 384 Facts: On July 26, 1962, the Sierra Madre Trust filed with the Bureau of Mines an Adverse Claim against LLA No. V-7872 (Amd) of the Jusan Trust Mining Company over six (6) lode mineral claims, with the office of the Mining Recorder of Nueva Vizcaya, and all situated in Sitio Maghanay, Barrio Abaca Municipality of Dupax, Province of Nueva Vizcaya. The Director of mines dismissed the claim, and Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources affirmed the decision the latter. Issue: Whether or not the Director of Mines lapsed in validly locating the mining claims. Held: No. The officers of the Executive Department tasked with administering the Mining Law have found that there is neither encroachment nor overlapping in respect of the claims involved. Accordingly, whatever may be the answers to the questions will not materially serve the interests of the petitioner. In closing it is useful to remind litigation prone individuals that the interpretation by officers of laws which are entrusted to their administration is entitled to great respect.' In his decision, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources said: "This Office is in conformity with the findings of the Director of Mines that the mining claims of the appellees were validly located, surveyed and registered."
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Lacuesta vs. Herrera 62 SCRA 115 Facts: On a disputed fishpond by the petitioners and respondents, the court rendered judgment that they are partners of the said fishpond having contributed money, property and effort thereto in pursuance of their partnership agreement. The respondents then appealed to the office of the President, said office dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision appealed from. Issue: Whether or not the decision of the Office of the President and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources is binding in the courts. Held: Yes. When there is no showing that there was fraud, collusion, arbitrariness, illegality, imposition or mistake on the part of the Office of the President or a department head, (such as the Secretary of Agriculture ad Natural Resources in the present case), in rendering their questioned decisions or of a total lack of substantial evidence to support the same, such administrative decisions are entitled to great weight and respect and will not be interfered with by the courts.
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Dangan vs. NLRC 127 SCRA 706 Facts: The petitioner started her employment with the respondent Tierra Factors Corporation. From July 20, 1981 to October 1, 1981, the petitioner went on maternity leave. On October 3, 1981, the corporation transferred Dangan from her temporary assignment in the Billing Section to Secretary to the Technical Training Senior Manager with office at Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila. It was at this juncture that she filed the first complaint for illegal demotion. The Arbiter dismissed the case and was affirmed by the NLRC. Issue: Whether or not the findings of the quasi – judicial agencies can be accorded with finality. Held: Yes, when supported with substantial evidence. It is perhaps timely to reiterate wellsettled principles involving decisions of administrative agencies. Findings of quasi-judicial agencies which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but at times even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence.
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Gravador vs. Mamigo 20 SCRA 742 Facts: The petitioner Pedro Gravador was the principal of the Sta. Catalina Elementary School in Negros Oriental on August 15, 1964 when he was advised of his separation from the service on the ground that he had reached the compulsory retirement age of 65. The controversy on the petitioner's date of birth arose as a result of the conflicting records of the Division of Schools of Negros Oriental. The pre-war records show his date of birth to be November 26, 1897. On the other hand, the post-war records, state that the petitioner was born on Dec. 11, 1901. According to the trial court, the post-war records were intended to replace the pre-war records and therefore the correct date of birth of the petitioner is December 11, 1901. The respondents now contend that the trial court erred in placing full reliance on the post-war records to establish the date of birth (December 11, 1901) of the petitioner. They argue that these records were made only because it was thought that the pre-war records had been lost or destroyed, but as some pre-war records had since been located, the date contained in the pre-war records should be regarded as controlling and that the finding of the Superintendent of Schools that the petitioner was born on November 26, 1897 is an administrative finding that should not be disturbed by the court. Issue: Whether or not the findings of fact of administrative officials are binding on the courts. Held: Yes. Factual findings of administrative officials are binding on the courts if supported by substantial evidence. It is a settled rule of administrative law, but whether there is substantial evidence supporting the finding of the Superintendent of Schools is precisely the issue in this case. The school official based his determination of the petitioner's age on the pre-war records in the preparation of which the petitioner does not appear to have taken a part. On the other hand, the petitioner post-war records which he personally accomplished to prove the date of his birth.
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Hutchison Ports Philippines Limited vs. Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority 339 SCRA 434 Facts: Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) conducted bidding for the private sector, to develop and operate a modern marine container terminal within Subic Bay Freeport Zone. After review and evaluation, petitioner Hutchison Ports Philippines Limited (HPPL) was awarded as the winning bidder. The office of the president set aside the award and ordered a new bidding. Issue: Whether or not the Office of the President can set aside award made by SBMA. Held: The SBMA Board of directors and other officers are subject to the control and supervision of the Office of the President. All projects undertaken by SBMA require the approval of the President of the Philippines under Letter of Instruction No. 620, which places SBMA under its ambit as an instrumentality. Even when it is declared as the winning bidder, it cannot be considered as final and unassailable. The approval of the Office of the President is necessary.
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Trendline Employees Association-Southern Philippines Federation of Labor vs. NLRC G.R. No. 112923, May 5, 1997 FACTS: The case stemmed from a deadlock in negotiations between the Union and private respondents regarding the former’s demand for an increase of P25.00 daily wages, as mandated by the minimum wage law, which the latter refused to grant. Thus, the Union filed a notice of strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation and Mediation Board (NCMB) on account of deadlock in collective bargaining, violation of labor standards, and unfair labor practices. Consequently, under the auspices of NCMB Executive Conciliator/Mediator Pilar Tamboboy, conciliation proceedings were conducted. She invited the parties for a series of talks wherein private respondent Eduardo Yap indicated to petitioners that the demands set forth in their proposal could not be accommodated without reducing manpower and that Trendline would be forced to cease operations if retrenchment is not resorted to. The Union thereafter proposed the following amounts as retrenchment payment, to wit: (a) payment of one month salary for every year of service; (b) payment of 13th month pay; and (c) salary payment for the month of July based on the number of days worked. Respondent Yap accepted this proposal in spite of limited resources, and as proof of his intention to comply with his part of the bargain, he even secured loans from the bank and other creditors to pay the retrenchment benefits of all union officers and members. When the details of the retrenchment program had been finally ironed out, respondent alleged that the union officers and members “abandoned” their work and waited for the payment of their respective retrenchment benefits. Twenty-six of them, including the President, Treasurer and three Directors accepted, upon execution of quitclaim and release waivers, the grant under the supervised payment conducted by the National Conciliation and Mediation and Mediation Board. However, private respondents interpreted this act as an abandonment of work and thus were constructively dismissed. The Union filed before the SubRegional Arbitration Branch XII, Iligan City, a complaint against private respondents for unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal, with claims for damages and attorney’s fees. Labor Arbiter Nicodemus G. Palangan upheld the validity of petitioners’ dismissal. On appeal, this was affirmed in toto by the NLRC. Their motion having been denied, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not the factual findings of NLRC, being a quasi-judicial agency, are supported by substantial evidence. HELD: According to the Supreme Court, “It should be stressed, to the point of being repetitive, that the factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRC are generally accorded, not only respect but, at times, finality if such are supported by substantial evidence. In the case at bar, the Court is compelled to deviate from this well-established rule on the ground that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC misappreciated the facts, thereby impairing petitioners’ right to security of tenure as guaranteed by the Constitution and the Labor Code. Petitioners argue that they never abandoned their jobs; instead, they were prevented by security guards from entering the workplace. This assertion was completely rejected by Labor Arbiter Palangan when he stated that “security guards are not appropriate officials to make a decision for the management of respondent” and the petitioners’ allegation was refuted by the joint affidavit of the security concerned. He also denied petitioners’ imputation of partiality when he gave more credence to said joint affidavit than the sworn complaint of the individual employees. There is, however, nothing on record which would justify the Labor Arbiter’s conclusions. He glossed over the fact that the security guards were under the control of private respondents who alone could have authorized their actions. The security guards may not be the “appropriate officials” but, certainly, they acted as agents of the respondents. For a retrenchment to be valid, three requisites must concur, as provided for under Article 283 of the Labor Code, namely: (1) The retrenchment is 149
necessary to prevent loses and the same is proven; (2) Written notice to the employees and to the DOLE at least one month prior to the intended date thereof; and (3) Payment of separation pay equivalent to one month or at least ½ month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In this case, the respondent quasi-judicial agency failed to establish substantial evidence due to the following: (1) Private respondent failed to prove the existence of a just and valid cause for dismissing petitioners;(2) Conciliator Tamboboy took the statement at its face value and never required Yap to substantiate his claim; (3) What it shows is that private respondents led its employees to believe that the company was suffering losses when this allegation has not at all been substantiated; and (4) Evidently, there was bad faith on the part of private respondents which should not be countenanced as being prejudicial and oppressive to labor. In view of the foregoing finding that retrenchment was unnecessary to prevent alleged business losses which were never adequately proved by private respondents, the Court no longer finds any need to discuss whether the remaining requisites outlined under Article 238 are present. Hence, the petition was granted. The challenged decision of respondent NLRC and that of Labor Arbiter Nicodemus G. Palangan are set aside.”
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Tres Reyes vs. Maxim’s Tea House G.R. No. 140853, February 27, 2003 FACTS: Maxim’s Tea House had employed Ariel Tres Reyes as driver, and he was assigned to its M.H. del Pilar Street, Ermita, Manila Branch. Among his duties was to fetch and bring to their respective homes the employees after the restaurant closed for the day. In the wee hours of the morning of September 27, 1997, he was sent to fetch some employees of Savannah Moon, a ballroom dancing establishment in Libis, Quezon City to which he complied. But while cruising at the speed of 50 to 60 kilometers per hour towards Meralco Avenue, he noticed a ten-wheeler truck coming his way at full speed despite the fact that the latter’s lane had a red signal light on. He maneuvered to avoid a collision, but nonetheless the van he was driving struck the truck. As a result, seven of his passengers including him sustained physical injuries and both vehicles were damaged. The management of Maxim’s required Ariel Tres Reyes to submit, within fortyeight hours, a written explanation as to what happened. He complied but his employer found his explanation unsatisfactory and as a result he was preventively suspended for thirty (30) days and eventually terminated for cause. Thus, Ariel Tres Reyes filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the National Labor Relations Commission in the National Capital Region, an action which he was entitled to avail under the Labor Code of the Philippines. The Labor Arbiter sustained the validity of his dismissal and found that he was grossly negligent in failing to avoid the collision. This decision of the Labor Arbiter led to his filing of a “Motion for Partial Reconsideration”, instead of filing the requisite pleading for appeal, with the National Labor Relations Commission, whereby, the NLRC opted to treat his motion as an appeal. In its decision, the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter on the ground that there was no negligence on his part. Respondents moved for reconsideration of the decision, but said motion was denied by the Commission. This led the respondents to file a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, and the appellate court decided in favor of the employer. Hence, Ariel Tres Reyes file a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, setting aside the decision of the Third Division, National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). ISSUE: Whether or not the factual findings of NLRC as a quasi-judicial body coincide with those of the Labor Arbiter and supported by substantial evidence. HELD: The findings of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter are contradictory in this case, so the Supreme Court delved into the records and examined for itself the questioned findings. Even though factual findings of quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC, particularly when they coincide with those of the Labor Arbiter and if supported by substantial evidence, are accorded respect and even finality by the Supreme Court. According to the Supreme Court, “the record shows that the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter primarily involved the submission of position papers by the parties. No trial-type hearing was conducted at all by the Labor Arbiter. Thus, the finding of the Court of Appeals that the latter was in a better position to evaluate the evidence as he had the better position to evaluate the evidence as he had the better opportunity to observe the demeanor of the parties at the hearing has no leg to stand on. Moreover, based on the police traffic accident investigation report, we are convinced that the accident was the fault of the ten-wheeler truck’s driver. On seeing the signal light change to red, this driver stepped on his brake, not just once but three times, but his truck could not stop. Since the truck was on the wrong lane, petitioner’s van, which was in its proper lane with the green light smashed into the out-of-control truck. This episode led to petitioner’s dismissal which, in our view, is unjustified.” Furthermore the court said that, “in sustaining the Labor Arbiter’s finding the petitioner was grossly negligent, the appellate court stressed that the cited episode was the second vehicular accident involving the petitioner, and as such it ”may clearly reflect against his attitudinal character as a driver. We note, however, that the Commission found that in the first vehicular accident involving petitioner “he was the victim of the reckless and negligent act of a fellow 151
driver.” We agree with the NLRC that an imputation of habitual negligence cannot be drawn against petitioner, since the earlier accident was not of his own making.”
Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. vs. Commissioner of Customs No. L-19337, September 30, 1969 FACTS: Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. was engaged in the production and milling of centrifugal sugar for export, the produced sugar was being placed in container known as jute bag which were not locally made. Thus, in 1957, it made two importations of jute bags. There were 44,800 jute bags in the first importation, and 75,200 in the second importation. These importations were made free of customs duties and special import tax upon the petitioner’s filing of Re-exportation and Special Import Tax Bond conditioned upon the exportation of jute bags within one year from date of importation. The first was imported on January 8, 1957 and the second on February 8, 1957. But it only exported 33,647 out of 120,000 jute bags that it imported. The remaining 86,353 jute bags were exported after the expiration of the one-year period but within three years from their importation contrary to the Administrative Order 66 and 389 issued by the Bureau of Customs. Due to the petitioner’s failure to show proof of the exportation of the balance of 86,353 jute bags within one year from their importation, the collector of Customs of Iloilo required it to pay the amount of 28,629.42 representing the customs duties and special import tax due thereon, which amount paid under protest. The petitioner demanded the refund of the amount it had paid, on the ground that its request for extension of the period of one year was filed on time, and that its failure to export the jute bags within the required one-year period was due to delay in the arrival of the vessel on which they were to be loaded and to the picketing of the Central railroad line. Alternatively, it asked for refund of the same amount in the form of a draw back under section 106(b) in relation to section 105(x) of the Tariff and Custom Code. On June 21, 1960, the collector of Customs of Iloilo, after hearing, rendered judgment denying the claim for refund. Because of this judgment the petitioner appealed to the Commissioner of Customs who upheld the decision of the Collector. Eventually, a petition for review was filed with the Court of Tax Appeals which affirmed the decision of the Commissioner of Customs. ISSUE: Whether or not the Bureau of Customs as an administrative body is allowed to resolve questions of law in the exercise of it quasi-judicial function as an incident to its power of regulation. HELD: According to the Supreme Court “Considering that the Bureau of Customs is the office charged with implementing and enforcing the provisions of our Tariff and Customs Code, the construction placed by it thereon should be given controlling weight. In applying the doctrine or principle of respect for administrative or practical construction, the courts often refer to several factors which may be regarded as bases of the principle, as factors leading the courts to give the principle controlling weight in particular instances, or as independent rules in themselves. These factors are the respect due the governmental agencies charged with administration, their competence, expertness, experience, and informed judgment and the fact that they frequently are the drafters of the law they interpret; that the agency is the one on which the legislature must rely to advise it as to the practical working out of the statute, and practical application of the statute presents the agency with unique opportunity and experiences, or improvements in the statute; x x x.” Hence, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
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De Jesus vs. People No. L-61998, February 22, 1983 FACTS: Ananias Hibo was a defeated candidate of the Nacionalista Party for the office of mayor of the Municipality of Casiguran, Sorsogon, in the local elections of January 18, 1980. He filed with the COMELEC a complaint charging Rogelio de Jesus, then COMELEC Registrar of Casiguran, with the violation of the 1978 Election Code. Copy of the complaint was sent to the Ministry of Justice (now Department of Justice) which endorsed the same to the Provincial Fiscal of Sorsogon for investigation. Noting that Rogelio De Jesus was being charged in relation to his office, Asst. Fiscals Manuel Genova and Delfin Tarog, in their capacity as deputized Tanodbayan prosecutors, conducted an investigation. Thereafter Fiscal Genova issued a resolution, finding the existence of a prima facie case against Rogelio De Jesus for violation of Section 29 and Subsections[x] and [mm] of Section 178 of the Election Code of 1978. The case was raffled to the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan. Rogelio De Jesus filed a motion to quash the information, contending that neither the Tanodbayan nor Sandiganbayan has the authority to investigate, prosecute and try the offense charged in the information, the same being an election offense over which the power to investigate, prosecute and try is lodged by law in the COMELEC and the Court of First Instance. In its opposition, the prosecution maintained the Tanodbayan’s exclusive authority to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, and consequently, the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction to try and decide the charges against Rogelio De Jesus. The COMELEC, having learned of the pendency of the case, entered its appearance as amicus curiae, and through its law department manager, Atty. Zoilo Gomez, Jr. submitted a memorandum supporting Rogelio De Jesus’ stand. Nonetheless, the Sandiganbayan issued the questioned resolution denying the motion to quash. Rogelio de Jesus’ motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. ISSUE: Which of these entities have the power to investigate, prosecute and try election offenses committed by a public officer in relation to his office – the Commission on Elections and the Court of First Instance [now the regional trial court] or the Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan? HELD: Only the Commission on Elections is exclusively vested with the power to investigate, prosecute and try election cases committed by a public officer in relation to his office. The grant to the COMELEC of the power, among others, to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of election offenses is not without compelling reason. The evident constitutional intendment in bestowing this power to the COMELEC is to ensure the free, orderly and honest conduct of elections, failure of which would result in the frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public officials in relation to their office would thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this clear constitutional mandate. Hence, the Supreme Court set aside the resolution of the Sandiganbayan and dismissed the Criminal Case against Rogelio De Jesus. The COMELEC was directed to forthwith conduct an investigation, and if the evidence so warrants, to prosecute the complaint against Rogelio De Jesus before the proper court of first instance.
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Placer vs. Villanueva Nos. L-60349-62, December 29, 1983 FACTS: The City Fiscal of Butuan City and his assistants filed in the City Court of Butuan the informations regarding the fourteen (14) Criminal Cases. These informations, except the last four, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 12219, 12220, 12221 and 12222, were certified to by the respective investigating fiscals. The infromations in Criminal Cases Nos. 12219 and 12220 bore the certification of 3rd Assistant Fiscal Felixberto Guiritan, while the information in Criminal Cases Nos. 12221 and 12222 were certified to by 2nd Assistant Fiscal Ernesto M. Brocoy. Following receipt of said informations, the Hon. Judge Napoleon D. Villanueva issued an order setting the hearing of said criminal cases for the purpose of determining the propriety of issuing the corresponding warrants of arrest. After said hearing, Hon. Judge Napoleon D. Villanueva issued the questioned orders, requiring petitioners to submit to the court the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and other documentary evidence in support of the informations to aid him in the exercise of his power of judicial review of the findings of probable cause by petitioners. Petitioners filed two separate motions for reconsideration of said orders, contending that under P.D. Nos. 77 and 911, they are authorized to determine the existence of a probable cause in a preliminary examination/investigation, and that their findings as to the existence thereof constitute sufficient basis for the issuance of warrants of arrest by the court. Hon. Judge Napoleon D. Villanueva denied said motions and reiterated his order to petitioners to submit the supporting affidavits and other documents within five (5) days from notice. Hence, petitioners filed this petition for certiorari and mandamus to set aside the aforesaid orders and to compel Hon. Judge Napoleon D. Villanueva to issue the warrants of arrest in Criminal Cases Nos. 11209-12222. Meanwhile, Hon. Judge Napoleon D. Villanueva, in addition to his duties as presiding judge of Branch I of the City Court of Butuan, was also assigned to preside over Branch II of said court, since the judge of said sala had retired from service. The informations filed by petitioners in Branch II likewise remained dormant because of Hon. Judge Napoleon D. Villanueva’s firm refusal to issue the corresponding warrants of arrest for want of affidavits of the witnesses. Petitioner’s urgent motion disclosed that no warrants had been issued in 113 informations. Hon. Judge Napoleon D. Villanueva received the Supreme Court Resolution requiring him to comment on the petition. However, interpreting the same as a denial of a petition itself, Hon. Judge Napoleon D. Villanueva issued an Omnibus Order directing petitioners to submit immediately the supporting affidavits and other evidence in Criminal Cases Nos. 12209-12222. Having failed to secure a reconsideration of said Omnibus Order, petitioners finally submitted the required affidavits and documents in order to avoid further delay in the prosecution of these cases. This move on the part of the petitioners would have rendered the instant petition moot and academic. But while Hon. Judge Napoleon D. Villanueva gave due course to some of said cases either by issuing the warrants of arrest or taking some other appropriate action, he refused to issue warrants in five (5) Criminal Cases, and instead ordered the records thereof remanded to the City Fiscal. Petitioners therefore filed a motion with the Supreme Court to restrain Hon. Judge Napoleon D. Villanueva from enforcing the orders subject of the main petition and compel him to accept, and take cognizance of, all the informations in his court. ISSUE: Whether or not the Judge is compelled to issue warrants of based on fiscal’s certification of the existence of probable cause as provided by P.D. 911. HELD: According to the Supreme Court, “There is thus no dispute that the judge may rely upon the fiscal’s certification of the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest. But does such certification bind the judge to come out with the warrant? We answer this query in the negative. The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial function; it calls for the exercise of judicial discretion on the part of the issuing magistrate. As provided by the provisions of the Rules of Court, the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant or order of arrest. If on the face of the information the judge finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal’s certification and require the submission of the 154
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of a probable cause.” Hence, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition.
Cojuangco, Jr. vs. PCGG GR Nos. 92319-20, Oct. 2, 1990 FACTS: This case is about the power of the Presidential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG) to conduct a preliminary investigation. On November 28, 1989, President Corazon C. Aquino directed the Solicitor General to prosecute all persons involved in the misuse of coconut levy funds. Pursuant to the above directive the Solicitor General created a task force to conduct a thorough study of the possible involvement of all persons in the anomalous use of coconut levy funds. On January 12, 1990, the Solicitor General filed two criminal complaints with respondent PCGG. The PCGG assigned both complaints to prosecutor Cesario del Rosario for preliminary investigation. The latter scheduled both cases for hearing. Del Rosario prepared a subpoena dated January 16, 1990 setting the preliminary investigation on January 29, 1990 at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon as to respondents Maria Clara Lobregat, Jose Eleazar, Felix Duenas Jr., and Salvador Escudero, III, and on January 31, 1990 at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon as to petitioner Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., Rolando de la Cuesta, and Hermenegildo Zayco. At the scheduled preliminary investigation on January 31, 1990 petitioner appeared through counsel. Instead of filing a counter-affidavit, as required in the subpoena, he filed two motions addressed to the PCGG, namely; (1) a motion to disqualify/inhibit PCGG; alternatively, a motion to dismiss; and (2) motion to have the PCGG itself hear or resolve Cojuangco's motion to disqualify/inhibit PCGG alternatively, motion to dismiss. Prosecutor del Rosario denied both motions and declared the proceedings closed and the cases submitted for resolution. On February 27, 1990, the PCGG issued an order denying petitioner's motions and required him, together with all the respondents in I.S. Nos. 74 and 75 to submit counter-affidavits within five (5) days from receipt thereof. Petitioner did not submit the required counter-affidavit. Instead, he filed in this Court on March 12, 1990 the herein petitions for prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction. He alleges that the PCGG may not conduct a preliminary investigation of the complaints filed by the Solicitor General without violating petitioner's rights to due process and equal protection of the law, and that the PCGG has no right to conduct such preliminary investigation. Likewise, on July 6, 1990, Maria Clara Lobregat and Jose R. Eleazar, Jr. filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and a Motion to Admit Petition to Intervene wherein they ask that the PCGG desist from further proceeding with the preliminary investigation of I.S. Nos. 74, 75, 77, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, and 84 charging the intervenors and other respondents, including petitioner, with violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019) in connection with the, coconut levy funds. The intervenors question the authority of the PCGG to conduct a preliminary investigation of the said cases. They maintain that even assuming that the PCGG has such authority; the same cannot be delegated to a prosecutor or his assistants. ISSUE: Whether or not the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) has the power to conduct a preliminary investigation of the anti-graft and corruption cases filed by the Solicitor General against Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and other respondents for the alleged misuse of coconut levy funds. HELD: The Court ruled in the affirmative. Sections 2(b) and 3(a) of Executive Order No. 1 and Sections 1 and 2 of Executive Order No. 14, it is clear that the PCGG has the power to investigate and prosecute such ill-gotten wealth cases of the former President, his relatives and associates, and graft and corrupt practices cases that may be assigned by the President to the PCGG to be filed with the Sandiganbayan. No doubt, the authority to investigate extended to the PCGG includes the authority to conduct a preliminary investigation. Thus, it is also noted that under Section 15(11) of Republic Act No. 6770, among the powers vested on the Ombudsman is to investigate and to initiate the proper action for recovery of ill-gotten wealth and/or unexplained wealth amassed after February 25, 1986 and the prosecution of the parties involved therein. The Court agrees with the contention of the public respondent PCGG that this provision is a tacit recognition that the authority of the PCGG to conduct preliminary investigation of ill-gotten wealth and/or unexplained wealth amassed before February 25, 1986 is maintained. 155
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF: ANDREW HARVEY, JOHN SHERMAN and ADRIAAN VAN DEL ELSHOUT vs. HONORABLE COMMISSIONER MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION GR No. 82544 June 27, 1994
FACTS: Petitioners were arrested on 27 February 1988 by agents of the CID by virtue of Mission Orders issued by respondent Commissioner. Petitioners were suspected alien pedophiles. Seized during petitioner’s apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of the suspected child prostitutes shown in salacious poses as well as boys and girls engaged in the sex act. There were also posters and other literature advertising the child prostitutes. On 7 March 1988, Warrants of Arrest were issued by respondent against petitioners for violation of Sections 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. On the same date, the Board of Special Inquiry III commenced trial against petitioners. On 22 March 1988, petitioners filed a Petition for Bail which, however, respondent denied considering the certification by the CID physician that petitioners were healthy. On 4 April 1988 petitioner Andrew Harvey filed a Manifestation/Motion stating that he had "finally agreed to a self-deportation" and praying that he be "provisionally released for at least 15 days and placed under the custody of Atty. Asinas before he voluntarily departs the country." On 7 April 1988, the Board of Special Inquiry — III allowed provisional release of five (5) days only under certain conditions. However, it appears that on the same date that the aforesaid Manifestation/ Motion was filed, Harvey and his co-petitioners had already filed the present Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s detention is valid notwithstanding that there is no provision in the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 nor under Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, which legally clothes the Commissioner with any authority to arrest and detain petitioners pending determination of the existence of a probable cause leading to an administrative investigation.
HELD: Yes. The deportation charges instituted by respondent Commissioner are in accordance with Section 37(a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, in relation to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. Section 37(a) provides in part: “The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation or any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien…” Section 37(a) is not constitutionally proscribed. The specific constraints in both the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions, which are substantially identical, contemplate prosecutions essentially criminal in nature. Deportation proceedings, on the other hand, are administrative in character. An order of deportation is never construed as a punishment. It is preventive, not a penal process. Moreover, The requirement of probable cause, to be determined by a Judge, does not extend to deportation proceedings. There need be no "truncated" recourse to both judicial and administrative warrants in a single deportation proceeding. What is essential is that there 156
should be a specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested and deported, that a fair hearing be conducted (Section 37[c]) with the assistance of counsel, if desired, and that the charge be substantiated by competent evidence. Thus, Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code explicitly provides: “Sec. 69. Deportation of subject of foreign power. A subject of a foreign power residing in the Philippines shall not be deported, expelled, or excluded from said Islands or repatriated to his own country by the President of the Philippines except upon prior investigation, conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent, of the ground upon which such action is contemplated. In such a case the person concerned shall be informed of the charge or charges against him and he shall be allowed not less than 3 days for the preparation of his defense. He shall also have the right to be heard by himself or counsel, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to cross-examine the opposing witnesses.” The denial by respondent Commissioner of petitioners' release on bail, also challenged by them, was in order because in deportation proceedings, the right to bail is not a matter of right but a matter of discretion on the part of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation. Thus, Section 37(e) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 provides that "any alien under arrest in a deportation proceeding may be released under bond or under such other conditions as may be imposed by the Commissioner of Immigration." The use of the word "may" in said provision indicates that the grant of bail is merely permissive and not mandatory on the part of the Commissioner. As deportation proceedings do not partake of the nature of a criminal action, the constitutional guarantee to bail may not be invoked by aliens in said proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is dismissed and the Writ of Habeas Corpus is hereby denied.
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ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE COCONUT DESICCATORS vs. PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY GR No. 110526 February 10, 1998 FACTS: On November 5, 1992, seven desiccated coconut processing companies belonging to the APCD brought suit in the Regional Trial Court to enjoin the PCA from issuing permits to certain applicants for the establishment of new desiccated coconut processing plants. Petitioner alleged that the issuance of licenses to the applicants would violate PCA's Administrative Order No. 02, series of 1991, as the applicants were seeking permits to operate in areas considered "congested" under the administrative order. On November 6, 1992, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order and, on November 25, 1992, a writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining the PCA from processing and issuing licenses. Subsequently and while the case was pending in the Regional Trial Court, the Governing Board of the PCA issued on March 24, 1993 Resolution No. 018-93, providing for the withdrawal of the Philippine Coconut Authority from all regulation of the coconut product processing industry. While it continues the registration of coconut product processors, the registration would be limited to the "monitoring" of their volumes of production and administration of quality standards. The PCA then proceeded to issue "certificates of registration" to those wishing to operate desiccated coconut processing plants, prompting petitioner to appeal to the Office of the President of the Philippines on April 26, 1993 not to approve the resolution in question. Despite follow-up letters sent on May 25 and June 2, 1993, petitioner received no reply from the Office of the President. The "certificates of registration" issued in the meantime by the PCA has enabled a number of new coconut mills to operate. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not PCA’s Board Resolution No. 018-93 is null and void for being an undue exercise of legislative power by an administrative body. 2. Whether or not the PCA is authorized to renounce the power to regulate implicit in the law creating it for that is what the resolution in question actually is.
HELD: 1. No. The resolution in question was issued by the PCA in the exercise of its rulemaking or legislative power. To be sure, the PCA is under the direct supervision of the President of the Philippines but there is nothing in P.D. No. 232, P.D. No. 961, P.D. No. 1468 and P.D. No. 1644 defining the powers and functions of the PCA which requires rules and regulations issued by it to be approved by the President before they become effective. 2. No. On December 6, 1982, a phase-out of some of the existing plants was ordered by the government after finding that "a mere freeze in the present capacity of existing plants will not afford a viable solution to the problem considering that the total available limited market is not adequate to support all the existing processing plants, making it imperative to reduce the number of existing processing plants." Accordingly, it was ordered: “Sec. 1. The Philippine Coconut Authority is hereby ordered to take such action as may be necessary to reduce the number of existing desiccated coconut processing plants to a level which will insure the survival of the remaining plants. The Authority is hereby directed to determine which of the existing processing plants should be phased out and to enter into appropriate contracts with such plants for the above purpose.” In plain disregard of this legislative purpose, the PCA adopted on March 158
24, 1993 the questioned resolution which allows not only the indiscriminate opening of new coconut processing plants but the virtual dismantling of the regulatory infrastructure whereby, forsaking controls theretofore placed in its keeping, the PCA limits its function to the innocuous one of "monitoring" compliance by coconut millers with quality standards and volumes of production. In effect, the PCA would simply be compiling statistical data on these matters, but in case of violations of standards there would be nothing much it would do. Instead of determining the qualifications of market players and preventing the entry into the field of those who are unfit, the PCA now relies entirely on competition — with all its wastefulness and inefficiency — to do the weeding out, in its naive belief in survival of the fittest. The result can very well be a repeat of 1982 when free enterprise degenerated into a "free-for-all," resulting in cut-throat competition, underselling, the production of inferior products and the like, which badly affected the foreign trade performance of the coconut industry. PCA Resolution No. 018-93 and all certificates of registration issued under it are hereby declared NULL and VOID for having been issued in excess of the power of the Philippine Coconut Authority to adopt or issue.
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Macalintal vs. Presidential Electoral Tribunal G.R. No. 191618, June 7, 2011 FACTS: This is case involved the constitutionality of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET). Petitioner herein, who is a member of the Philippine Bar, contends that Section 4 of Article 7 of the Constitution does not provide for the creation of the PET, and that the PET violates Section 12 of Article 8 of the Constitution. To bolster his arguments that the PET is an illegal and unauthorized progeny of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, petitioner invokes our ruling on the constitutionality of the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC). Petitioner cites the concurring opinion of Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro that the PTC is a public office which cannot be created by the President, the power to do so being lodged exclusively with Congress. Thus, petitioner submits that if the President, as head of the Executive Department, cannot create the PTC, the Supreme Court, likewise, cannot create the PET in the absence of an act of legislature. However, the Office of the Solicitor General maintains that the constitution of the PET is "on firm footing on the basis of the grant of authority to the [Supreme] Court to be the sole judge of all election contests for the President or Vice-President under paragraph 7, Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.” Petitioner next claims that the PET exercises quasi-judicial power and, thus, its members violate the proscription in Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution. ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is constitutional; (2) Whether or not the Presidential Electoral Tribunal performs a quasi-judicial function. HELD: As to the first issue, the Court ruled that the establishment of the PET simply constitutionalized what was statutory before the 1987 Constitution. Thus, a plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals a grant of authority to the Supreme Court sitting en banc. In the same vein, although the method by which the Supreme Court exercises this authority is not specified in the provision, the grant of power does not contain any limitation on the Supreme Court's exercise thereof. The Supreme Court's method of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests, through the PET, is a derivative of Section 4, Article 7 of the Constitution. As to the second issue, when the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power. the present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court, in conjunction with latter's exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts, the task of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests, with full authority in the exercise thereof. The power wielded by PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated to courts of law, expressly provided in the Constitution. On the whole, the Constitution draws a thin, but, nevertheless, distinct line between the PET and the Supreme Court. Section 4, Paragraph 7 of Article 7 of the Constitution provides: “The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.” Section 12, of Article 8 provides: “The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative function.”
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Mendoza vs. Comelec GR 188308, October 15, 2009 Facts: Petitioner Mendoza asserts that the COMELEC, exercising judicial power, conducted proceedings in the election contest within SET premises for the gubernatorial position of the Province of Bulacan, between him and the respondent Pagdanganan, without due regard to his fundamental due process rights of notice and participation. The COMELEC, claims that its decision-making deliberations are internal, confidential and do not require notice to and the participation of the contending parties. Issue: Whether or not COMELEC has judicial power. Held: No. Judicial power in our country is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. The COMELECs adjudicative function is quasi-judicial since it is a constitutional body, other than a court, vested with authority to decide election contests, and in the course of the exercise of its jurisdiction, to hold hearings and exercise discretion of a judicial nature; it receives evidence, ascertain the facts from these submissions, determine the law and the legal rights of the parties, and on the basis of all these decides on the merits of the case and renders judgment. Despite the exercise of discretion that is essentially judicial in character, particularly with respect to election contests, COMELEC is not a tribunal within the judicial branch of government and is not a court exercising judicial power in the constitutional sense; hence, its adjudicative function, exercised as it is in the course of administration and enforcement, is quasi-judicial. Under these terms, the COMELEC under our governmental structure is a constitutional administrative agency and its powers are essentially executive in nature (i.e., to enforce and administer election laws), quasi-judicial (to exercise original jurisdiction over election contests of regional, provincial and city officials and appellate jurisdiction over election contests of other lower ranking officials), and quasi-legislative (rulemaking on all questions affecting elections and the promulgation of its rules of procedure).
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Cerezo vs. People G.R. No. 185230, June 1, 2011 FACTS: This case involved a complaint for libel filed against private respondents (Juliet Yaneza, Pablo Abunda, Jr., Oscar Mapalo and Vicente Afulugencia). Finding probable cause to indict the respondents, the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office (OP-QC) filed the corresponding information against them. Respondents thereafter filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Motion to Re-evaluate Prosecution’s Evidence before the OP-QC. In its resolution dated November 20, 2003, the OP-QC reversed its earlier finding and recommended the withdrawal of the Information. Consequently, a Motion to Dismiss and Withdraw Information was filed before the RTC on December 3, 2003. During the intervening period, specifically on November 24, 2003, respondents were arraigned, and they pleaded not guilty. In deference to the prosecutor’s last resolution, the RTC ordered the criminal case dismissed (March 17, 2004 Order). Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the said Order, arguing that the November 20, 2003 OP-QC resolution has not yet attained finality, considering that the same was the subject of a Petition for Review filed before the Department of Justice (DOJ). The RTC deferred action on the said motion to await the resolution of the DOJ. On June 26, 2006, the Secretary of Justice promulgated his resolution reversing and setting aside the OP-QC’s November 20, 2003 resolution, and directing the latter to re-file the earlier Information for libel. On October 24, 2006, the RTC issued its first assailed Order granting petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, conformably with the resolution of the DOJ Secretary. The respondents filed a petition to the Court of Appeals, which the latter rendered a decision stating that the RTC violated respondents’ right against double jeopardy. Hence, the instant petition. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid termination of the case on the basis of the Order of the Trial Court dated 17 March 2004.
HELD: The Court ruled that, in resolving a motion to dismiss a case or to withdraw an Information, the trial court should not rely solely and merely on the findings of the public prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice. It is the court’s bounden duty to assess independently the merits of the motion, and this assessment must be embodied in a written order disposing of the motion. While the recommendation of the prosecutor or the ruling of the Secretary of Justice is persuasive, it is not binding on courts. In this case, it is obvious from the March 17, 2004 Order of the RTC, dismissing the criminal case, that the RTC judge failed to make his own determination of whether or not there was a prima facie case to hold respondents for trial. He failed to make an independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of the case. The RTC judge blindly relied on the manifestation and recommendation of the prosecutor when he should have been more circumspect and judicious in resolving the Motion to Dismiss and Withdraw Information especially so when the prosecution appeared to be uncertain, undecided, and irresolute on whether to indict respondents. The same holds true with respect to the October 24, 2006 Order, which reinstated the case. The RTC judge failed to make a separate evaluation and merely awaited the resolution of the DOJ Secretary. By relying solely on the manifestation of the public prosecutor and the resolution of the DOJ Secretary, the trial court abdicated its judicial power and refused to perform a positive duty enjoined by law. The said Orders were thus stained with grave abuse of discretion and violated the complainant’s right to due process. They were void, had no legal standing, and produced no effect whatsoever. The case was remanded to the RTC for evaluation on whether probable cause exists to hold respondents for trial.
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Atty. Alice Odchigue-Bondoc vs. Tan Tiong Bio G.R. No. 186652, October 6, 2010 FACTS: Respondent bought a 683-square-meter lot in the Manila Southwoods Residential Estates, a project of Fil-Estate. After finding that the said lot sold to him was inexistent, respondent filed a complaint for Estafa against Fil-Estate officials including its Corporate Secretary Atty. Alice Odchigue-Bondoc. In the Counter-Affidavit of petitioner, the latter negated the allegations of the respondent in his Complaint. On the basis of petitioner’s allegations in her Counter-Affidavit, respondent filed a complaint for Perjury against petitioner, before the Pasig City Prosecutor’s Office, which dismissed it by Resolution of June 17, 2004 for insufficiency of evidence, and denied respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration. Respondent filed a petition for review before the Department of Justice, which the latter motu proprio dismissed the petition on finding that there was no showing of any reversible error. Respondent, after having his motion for reconsideration denied, he filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari. The CA, in its decision (September 5, 2008) set aside the DOJ Secretary’s Resolution, holding that it committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its Resolution dismissing respondent’s petition for review without therein expressing clearly and distinctly the facts on which the dismissal was based, in violation of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution. The petitioner alleged that the requirement in Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution applies only to decisions of courts of justice; and that the constitutional provision does not extend to decisions or rulings of executive departments such as the DOJ. ISSUE: Whether or not Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution extends to decisions or rulings of executive departments such as the DOJ. HELD: The Court ruled in the negative. A preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding since "the prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused." A prosecutor does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged [of] a crime and to enable the [prosecutor] to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the [prosecutor] makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the prosecutor. A preliminary investigation thus partakes of an investigative or inquisitorial power for the sole purpose of obtaining information on what future action of a judicial nature may be taken. Thus, the Secretary of Justice in reviewing a prosecutor’s order or resolution via appeal or petition for review cannot be considered a quasi-judicial proceeding since the "DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body." Henceforth, Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution does not thus extend to resolutions issued by the DOJ Secretary.
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Republic vs. Extelcom 373 SCRA 316 Facts: National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) granted Bayantel the provisional authority to operate a Cellular Mobile Telephone System/Service (CMTS) on its own initiative applying Rule 15, Section 3 of its 1987 Rules of Practice and Procedures. Respondent Extelcom contends that the NTC should have applied the Revised Rules which were filed with the Office of the National Administrative Register where the phrase “on its own initiative” were deleted and since the 1993 Revised Rules were filed with the UP Law Center. Issue: WON the 1993 Revised Rules which was filed in the UP Law Center is the law in force and effect in granting provisional authority. Held: No. There is nothing in the Administrative Code of 1987 which implies that the filing of the rules with the UP Law Center is the operative act that gives the rules force and effect. The National Administrative Register is merely a bulletin of codified rules. Publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is a condition sine qua non before statutes, rules and regulations can take effect.
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Gonzales vs. Rosas GR 145363, February 23, 2004 Facts: Sec. 9 RA 4670 provides that administrative charges against a teacher shall be heard initially by a committee composed of the corresponding School Superintendent of the Division or a duly authorized representative who should at least have the rank of a division supervisor. Under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from decisions of the Court of Tax Appeals and quasi-judicial agencies should be taken to the Court of Appeals. Petitioner Gonzales, a public school teacher was facing a complaint for grave misconduct, dishonesty and estafa. Respondent Rosas, then DECS-National Capital Region Director dismissed petitioner from the service based from the initial administrative proceeding conducted by Nagpacan, the Administrative Officer III of City Schools Petitioner filed an administrative complaint for violation of Sec. 9 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers against the respondents before the Office of the Ombudsman instead of a judicial relief for resolution of the jurisdictional issue and declaration of nullity of the administrative proceeding. Petitioner filed with the CA a special civil action for certiorari on the ground that the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in adopting Director Baliton's memorandum recommending the dismissal of her complaint against the DECS officials for want of merit. The CA dismissed the case as the proper remedy was a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioner contends that she could not file a petition for review under Rule 43 as it only pertains to appeals from the Court of Tax Appeals and quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals, implying that the Office of the Ombudsman is not a quasi-judicial agency. Issue: Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman is a quasi-judicial agency. Held: Yes. The Office of the Ombudsman is a quasi-judicial agency covered by the procedure outlined in Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. As a rule, appeals from decisions of quasi-judicial agencies, such as the Office of the ombudsman, in administrative disciplinary cases, should be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43.
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Philippine National Oil Company vs. Court of Appeals, et al. GR No. 109976 April 26, 2005
FACTS: Then BIR Commissioner Bienvenido Tan entered into a compromise agreement with PNOC for the payment of the latter of P93, 955, 479.12 total tax payment on the earnings and/or yields from PNOC’s money placements with PNB, which represents 30% of the basic tax. The agreement is a result of the PNB failing to withhold the 15% final tax on the interest earnings and/or yields from the money placements of PNOC with the said bank, in violation of PD No. 1931, which withdrew all tax exemptions of GOCC’s. The BIR also demanded from the PNB, as withholding agent, for the payment of the final tax interest earnings and/or yields from PNOC’s money placement with the bank, from 15 October 1984 to 15 October 1986, in the total amount of P376, 301, 133.33. BIR Commissioner Tan explained that the compromise was in accordance with the provisions of EO No. 44, Revenue Memorandum Order No. 39-86, and RMO No. 4-87. Private respondent Tirso Savellano then filed a petition for review ad cautelam with the CTA and claimed therein that BIR Commissioner Tan acted “with grave abuse of discretion and/or whimsical exercise of jurisdiction.” PNOC averred that the BIR Commissioner’s discretionary act in entering into the compromise agreement had legal basis under EO No. 44 and RMO No. 39-86 and RMO No. 4-87. The PNB asserted that the BIR Commissioner’s decision to accept the compromise was discretionary on his part and, therefore, cannot be reviewed or interfered with by the courts. Subsequently, the new BIR Commissioner Jose Ong demanded that PNB pay deficiency withholding tax on the interest earnings and/or yields from PNOC’s money placements, in the amount of P294, 958, 450.73. PNB filed a Motion to Suspend the Collection of Tax by the BIR. It alleged that despite its request for reconsideration of the deficiency withholding tax assessment, BIR Commissioner Ong sent another letter demanding payment of the P294, 958, 450.73. The CTA rendered a decision declaring the compromise agreement between the BIR and the PNOC and PNB as without force effect and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is ordered to enforce the assessment against PNB which has become final and unappealable by collecting the deficiency withholding tax, plus interest totaling P294, 958, 450.73. The CTA denied the Motions for Reconsideration filed by PNOC and PNB and the CA affirmed the decision.
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not deficiency taxes of PNOC could not be the subject of a compromise under EO No. 44. 166
2. Whether or not the CTA has no jurisdiction to question the compromise agreement entered into by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. 3. Whether or not the Commissioner of Internal Revenue cannot unilaterally annul tax compromises validly entered into by his predecessor.
HELD: 1. Yes. E.O. No. 44 granted the BIR Commissioner or his duly authorized representatives the power to compromise any disputed assessment or delinquent account pending as of 31 December 1985, upon the payment of an amount equal to 30% of the basic tax assessed; in which case, the corresponding interests and penalties shall be condoned. PNOC's tax liability could not be considered a delinquent account since (1) it was not selfassessed, because the BIR conducted an investigation and assessment of PNOC and PNB after obtaining information regarding the non-withholding of tax from private respondent Savellano; and (2) the demand letter, issued against it on 08 August 1986, could not have been a deficiency assessment that became final and executory by 31 December 1985. Given that PNOC's tax liability did not constitute a delinquent account or a disputed assessment as of 31 December 1985, then it could not be compromised under E.O. No. 44. 2. No. It is generally true that purely administrative and discretionary functions may not be interfered with by the courts; but when the exercise of such functions by the administrative officer is tainted by a failure to abide by the command of the law, then it is incumbent on the courts to set matters right, with the Supreme Court having the last say on the matter. The discretionary power of the BIR Commissioner to enter into compromises cannot be superior over the power of judicial review by the courts. In this case, the BIR Commissioner's authority to compromise, whether under E.O. No. 44 or Section 246 of the NIRC of 1977, as amended, can only be exercised under certain circumstances specifically identified in said statutes. The BIR Commissioner would have to exercise his discretion within the parameters set by the law, and in case he abuses his discretion, the CTA may correct such abuse if the matter is appealed to them. 3. No. The new BIR Commissioner, Commissioner Ong, had acted well within his powers when he set aside the compromise agreement, dated 22 June 1987, after finding that the said compromise agreement was without legal basis. It had been declared in Hilado v. Collector of Internal Revenue, et al. that an administrative officer, such as the BIR Commissioner, may revoke, repeal or abrogate the acts or previous rulings of his predecessor in office. The construction of a statute by those administering it is not binding on their successors if, thereafter, the latter becomes satisfied that a different construction should be given.
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APPENDICES
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APPENDIX A Case List for Administrative Law Prepared by: Leo Angelo Lacar Chapter 1 – General Considerations 1. Aratuc vs. COMELEC, 88 SCRA 251 2. Maceda vs. ERB, GR Nos. 95203-05, Dec. 18, 1990; 192 SCRA 363 Chapter 2 – Administrative Agencies 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
Malaga vs. Penachos, Jr., 213 SCRA 516 Beja, Sr. vs. CA, 207 SCRA 689 Ursal vs. CTA, 101 Phil. 209 Far East Bank and Trust Company vs. CA, 477 SCRA 49 Sea-Land Service, Inc. vs. CA, 357 SCRA 441 Yamane vs. BA Lepanto Condominium Corp., 474 SCRA 258 Montes vs. Civil Service Board of Appeals, 101 Phil. 490
Chapter 3 – Powers of Administrative Agencies 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
Smart Communications, Inc. vs. NTC, 408 SCRA 678 Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. CA, 261 SCRA 236 Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation vs. Amante, 453 SCRA 432 Tio vs. VRB, 151 SCRA 208 Associated Communications & Wireless Services-United Broadcasting Networks vs. NTC, 397 SCRA 574 6. United States vs. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil. 1 7. Ynot vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 659 8. Pelaez vs. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569 9. Tadlip vs. Borres, 474 SCRA 441 10. COMELEC vs. Español, 417 SCRA 554 Chapter 4 – The Quasi-Legislative Power 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
Cruz vs. Youngberg, 56 Phil. 234 Araneta vs. Gatmaitan, 101 Phil. 328 Grego vs. COMELEC, 247 SCRA 481 People vs. Maceren, 79 SCRA 450 Bautista vs. Juinio, 127 SCRA 329 169
6. Metropolitan Traffic Command vs. Gonong, 187 SCRA 432 7. Luzon Polymers Corporation vs. Clave, 209 SCRA 711 8. Philippine Bank of Communications vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 302 SCRA 241 9. Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Torres, 212 SCRA 298 10. Philippine Interisland Shipping Association of the Philippines vs. CA, 266 SCRA 489 11. Legaspi vs. Minister of Finance, 115 SCRA 418 12. Bito-onon vs. Fernandez, 350 SCRA 732 13. National Liga ng mga Barangay vs. Paredes, 439 SCRA 130 14. De Jesus vs. CSC, 471 SCRA 624 15. Freedom from Debt Coalition vs. ERC, 432 SCRA 157 16. Phil. Consumers Foundation, Inc. vs. Sec. of Education Culture and Sports, 153 SCRA 622 17. Tañada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 18. Rubenecia vs. CSC, 244 SCRA 640 19. Phil. International Trading Corp. vs. COA, 309 SCRA 177 20. Balbuna vs. Sec. of Education, 110 Phil. 150 21. Honasan II vs. Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the DOJ, 427 SCRA 46 22. PPA Employees Hired After July 1, 1998 vs. COA, 469 SCRA 397 23. De Jesus vs. COA, 294 SCRA 152 24. Philippines vs. Ermita, GR No. 169777, April 20, 2006 25. People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640 26. People vs. Veridiano, 132 SCRA 523 27. Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. vs. Department of Finance Secretary, 238 SCRA 63 28. TOMMI vs. BOT, 117 SCRA 597 29. People vs. Santos, 62 Phil. 300 30. US vs. Panlilio, 28 Phil. 300 31. Pesigan vs. Angeles, 129 SCRA 174 32. Peralta vs. CA, 462 SCRA 382 Chapter 5 – The Quasi-Judicial Power 1. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Natividad, 458 SCRA 441 2. Philippines Veterans Bank vs. CA, 322 SCRA 139 3. DARAB vs. Lubrica, 457 SCRA 800 4. PCGG vs. Peña, 159 SCRA 556 5. Cariño vs. Commission on Human Rights, 204 SCRA 483 6. Lastimosa vs. Vasquez, 243 SCRA 497 7. International Broadcasting Corporation vs. Jalandoni, 475 SCRA 446 8. Syquia vs. Board of Power and Water Works, 74 SCRA 212 9. Manila Electric Company vs. CA, 271 SCRA 417 10. RCPI vs. Board of Communications, 80 SCRA 471 11. Globe Wireless Ltd. vs. Public Service Commission, 174 SCRA 269 12. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company vs. WMC Resources International Pty. Ltd., 412 SCRA 101 13. Boiser vs. CA, 122 SCRA 945 14. Davao New Town Development Corporation vs. COSLAP, 459 SCRA 491 15. National Federation of Labor vs. Eisma, 127 SCRA 419 16. Hydro Resources Contractors Corporation vs. NIA, 441 SCRA 614 17. Southern Cross Cement Corporation vs. Cement Manufacturers Association of the Philippines, 465 SCRA 532 18. Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 19. Phil. Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, 105 Phil. 173 20. Agusmin Promotional Enterprises, Inc. vs. CA, 117 SCRA 369 21. Carmelo vs. Ramos, 6 SCRA 836 22. Pascual vs. Board of Examiners, 28 SCRA 344 23. Guevara vs. COMELEC, 104 Phil. 268 24. Tolentino vs. Inciong, 91 SCRA 563 25. Dumarpa vs. Dimaporo, 177 SCRA 478 26. PLDT vs. Tiamson, 474 SCRA 761 27. Uichio vs. NLRC, 273 SCRA 35 170
28. Ang Tibay vs. CIR, 69 Phil. 635 29. Montemayor vs. Bundalian, 405 SCRA 264 30. Zambales Chromite vs. CA, 94 SCRA 261 31. Anzaldo vs. Clave, 119 SCRA 353 32. Corona vs. CA, 214 SCRA 378 33. Caoile vs. Vivo, 125 SCRA 87 34. Cruz and RCBC vs. MLE, 120 SCRA 15 35. Cordero vs. Phil. Service Commission, 121 SCRA 249 36. M.F. Violago Oiler Tank Trucks vs. NLRC, 117 SCRA 544 37. Mayon Hotel & Restaurant vs. Adana, 458 SCRA 609 38. Pefiano vs. Moral, 322 SCRA 439 39. Police Commission vs. Lood, 127 SCRA 757 40. Batongbacal vs. Associated Bank, 168 SCRA 600 41. Progress Homes vs. NLRC, 269 SCRA 274 42. Velasquez vs. Hernandez, 437 SCRA 357 43. Phil. Merchant Marine School Inc. vs. CA, 244 SCRA 770 44. American Tobacco Co. vs. Director of Patents, 67 SCRA 286 45. Skyworld Condominium Owners Assoc., Inc. vs. SEC, 211 SCRA 565 46. Ablaza vs. CIR, 126 SCRA 246 47. Valladolid vs. Inciong, 121 SCRA 205 48. NEECO II vs. NLRC, 461 SCRA 169 49. Javier vs. COMELEC, 144 SCRA 194 50. Civil Aeronautics Board vs. PAL, 63 SCRA 524 51. Bautista vs. Board of Energy, 169 SCRA 167 52. San Luis vs. CA, 174 SCRA 258 53. Delfin vs. Inciong, 192 SCRA 151 54. Nasipit Lumber Company, Inc. vs. NLRC, 177 SCRA 93 Chapter 6 – Judicial Review 1. 2. 3. 4.
Medalla vs. Sayo, 103 Phil. 587 Ortua vs. Singson Encarnacion, 59 Phil. 440 Industrial Power Sales, Inc. vs. Sinsuat, 160 SCRA 19 Sherwill Development Corporation vs. Sitio Sto. Niño Residents Association, Inc., 461 SCRA 517 5. Abejo vs. Dela Cruz, 149 SCRA 670 6. Commissioner of Customs vs. Navarro, 77 SCRA 264 7. GMA Network, Inc. vs. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, 470 SCRA 727 8. Industrial Enterprises, Inc. vs. CA, 184 SCRA 426 9. Garments and Textile Export Board vs. CA, 268 SCRA 258 10. GSIS vs. CSC, 204 SCRA 826 11. System Plus Computer College of Caloocan City vs. Local Gov’t. of Caloocan City, 408 SCRA 406 12. Paat vs. CA, 266 SCRA 167 13. Hoskyns vs. National City Bank of New York, 85 Phil. 201 14. Estrada vs. CA, 442 SCRA 117 15. Batalec II Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. EIAB, 447 SCRA 482 16. Morcal vs. Laviña, 476 SCRA 508 17. Municipality of La Trinidad vs. CFI of Baguio, 123 SCRA 81 18. Valmonte vs. Belmonte, 170 SCRA 256 19. Tan vs. Veterans Backpay Commission, 105 Phil. 377 20. Mangubat vs. Osmeña, 105 Phil. 1308 21. Laganapan vs. Asedillo, 154 SCRA 377 22. Alzate vs. Aldana, 107 Phil. 298 23. Cipriano vs. Marcelino, 43 SCRA 291 24. De Lara vs. Cloribel, 14 SCRA 269 25. National Development Co. vs. Collector of Customs, 9 SCRA 429 26. Arrow Transportation Corporation vs. BOT, 63 SCRA 193 27. Tiangco vs. Lauchang, 9 SCRA 125 28. Corpus vs. Cuaderno, 4 SCRA 749 29. Regino vs. Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology, 443 SCRA 56 30. Demaisip vs. CA, 106 Phil. 237 171
31. Calo vs. Fuertes, 5 SCRA 397; 115 Phil. 393 32. Bartulata vs. Peralta, 59 SCRA 7 33. Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 125 SCRA 302 34. Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod ng mga Magtitinda ng Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntinlupa, Inc. vs. Domiguez, 205 SCRA 92 35. Valencia vs. CA, 401 SCRA 666 36. Land Car, Inc. vs. Bachelor Express, Inc., 417 SCRA 307 37. Carpio vs. The Executive Secretary, 206 SCRA 290 38. National Development Company vs. Hervilla, 151 SCRA 520 39. Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation vs. Factoran, 154 SCRA 49 40. DAR vs. DECS, 426 SCRA 217 41. Osias Academy vs. DOLE, 192 SCRA 612 42. Sierra Madre Trust vs. Sec. of Agrarian and Natural Resources, 121 SCRA 384 43. Lacuesta vs. Herrera, 62 SCRA 115 44. Dangan vs. NLRC, 127 SCRA 706 45. Gravador vs. Mamigo, 20 SCRA 742 46. Hutchinson Ports Philippines Ltd. vs. SBMA, 339 SCRA 434 47. Trendline Employees Association-Southern Philippines Federation of Labor vs. NLRC, 272 SCRA 172 48. Tres Reyes vs. Maxim’s Tea House, 398 SCRA 288 49. Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. vs. Commissioner of Customs, 29 SCRA 617 50. De Jesus vs. People, 120 SCRA 760 51. Placer vs. Villanueva, 126 SCRA 463 52. Oceanic Bic Division vs. Romero, 130 SCRA 392 Additional Cases: 1. 2. 3. 4.
Cojuangco, Jr. vs. PCGG, GR Nos. 92319-20, Oct. 2, 1990; Roman Cruz vs. People, GR No. 110436, June 27, 1994; Harvey vs. Miriam Defensor Santiago, GR No. 82544, June 28, 1988; Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators vs. PHILCOA, GR No. 110526, February 10, 1998 5. Macalintal vs. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, GR No. 191618 (June 7, 2011); 6. Mendoza vs. COMELEC, GR No. 188308 (Oct. 15, 2009); 7. Cerezo vs. People, GR No. 185230 (June 1, 2011); 8. Atty. Alice Odchigue-Bondoc vs. Tan Tiong Bio, GR No. 186652 (Oct. 6, 2010); 9. RP vs. EXTELCO, GR No. 147036 (Jan. 15, 2002); 10.Gonzales vs. Rosas, GR No. 145363 (Feb. 23, 2004); and 11.PNOC vs. CA, 457 SCRA 32
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APPENDIX B Case Assignment for Administrative Law Cases Prepared by Leo Angelo N. Lacar Aballe: Aratuc vs. COMELEC, 88 SCRA 251 Beja, Sr. vs. CA, 207 SCRA 689 Ursal vs. CTA, 101 Phil. 209 Sea-Land Service, Inc. vs. CA, 357 SCRA 441 Far East Bank and Trust Company vs. CA, 477 SCRA 49 Abilla: Smart Communications, Inc. vs. NTC, 408 SCRA 678 ACWSU Broadcasting Networks vs. NTC, 397 SCRA 574 Ynot vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 659 TOMMI vs. BOT, 117 SCRA 597 Roman Cruz vs. People, GR No. 110436, June 27, 1994 Albrecht: Yamane vs. BA Lepanto Condominium Corp., 474 SCRA 258 Montes vs. Civil Service Board of Appeals, 101 Phil. 490 Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. CA, 261 SCRA 236 Tadlip vs. Borres, 474 SCRA 441 COMELEC vs. Español, 417 SCRA 554 Alzate: Araneta vs. Gatmaitan, 101 Phil. 328 Philippine Bank of Communications vs. CIR, 302 SCRA 241 Luzon Polymers Corporation vs. Clave, 209 SCRA 711 Legaspi vs. Minister of Finance, 115 SCRA 418 Freedom from Debt Coalition vs. ERC, 432 SCRA 157 Antanani: Rubenecia vs. CSC, 244 SCRA 640 Phil. International Trading Corp. vs. COA, 309 SCRA 177 Honasan II vs. Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the DOJ, 427 SCRA 46 Balbuna vs. Sec. of Education, 110 Phil. 150 Arbison: PPA Employees Hired After July 1, 1998 vs. COA, 469 SCRA 397 De Jesus vs. COA, 294 SCRA 152 Philippines vs. Ermita, GR No. 169777, April 20, 2006 People vs. Veridiano, 132 SCRA 523 Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. vs. Department of Finance Secretary, 238 SCRA 63 Asistido: People vs. Santos, 62 Phil. 300 US vs. Panlilio, 28 Phil. 300 Peralta vs. CA, 462 SCRA 382 Philippines Veterans Bank vs. CA, 322 SCRA 139 173
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Natividad, 458 SCRA 441 Bucoy: Tio vs. VRB, 151 SCRA 208 Pelaez vs. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569 Bautista vs. Juinio, 127 SCRA 329 People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640 Bito-Onon vs. Fernandez, 350 SCRA 732 Cabreros: DARAB vs. Lubrica, 457 SCRA 800 PCGG vs. Peña, 159 SCRA 556 Cariño vs. Commission on Human Rights, 204 SCRA 483 International Broadcasting Corporation vs. Jalandoni, 475 SCRA 447 Lastimosa vs. Vasquez, 243 SCRA 496 Cemine: Malaga vs. Penachos, Jr., 213 SCRA 516 Cruz vs. Youngberg, 56 Phil. 234 Harvey vs. Miriam Defensor Santiago, GR No. 82544, June 28, 1988 Assoc. of Phil. Coconut Desiccators vs. PHILCOA, GR No. 110526, February 10, 1998 PNOC vs. CA, 457 SCRA 32 Hussin: Syquia vs. Board of Power and Water Works, 74 SCRA 212 Manila Electric Company vs. CA, 271 SCRA 417 RCPI vs. Board of Communications, 80 SCRA 471 Globe Wireless Ltd. vs. Public Service Commission, 174 SCRA 269 Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company vs. WMC Resources International Pty. Ltd., 412 SCRA 101 Indig: Maceda vs. ERB, GR Nos. 95203-05, Dec. 18, 1990; 192 SCRA 363 Grego vs. COMELEC, 247 SCRA 481 Philippine Interisland Shipping Association of the Philippines vs. CA, 266 SCRA 489 Garments and Textile Export Board vs. CA, 268 SCRA 258 Commissioner of Customs vs. Navarro, 77 SCRA 264 Ishmael: Boiser vs. CA, 122 SCRA 945 Davao New Town Development Corporation vs. COSLAP, 459 SCRA 491 Southern Cross Cement Corporation vs. Cement Manufacturers Association of the Philippines, 465 SCRA 532 National Federation of Labor vs. Eisma, 127 SCRA 419 Hydro Resources Contractors Corporation vs. NIA, 441 SCRA 614 Jamsuri: Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 Phil. Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, 105 Phil. 173 Pascual vs. Board of Examiners, 28 SCRA 344 Carmelo vs. Ramos, 6 SCRA 836 Agusmin Promotional Enterprises, Inc. vs. CA, 117 SCRA 369 Kalbit: Guevara vs. COMELEC, 104 Phil. 268 Dumarpa vs. Dimaporo, 177 SCRA 478 Uichio vs. NLRC, 273 SCRA 35 PLDT vs. Tiamson, 474 SCRA 761 Oceanic Bic Division vs. Romero, 130 SCRA 392 Lacar: People vs. Maceren, 79 SCRA 450 Tañada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 Ang Tibay vs. CIR, 69 Phil. 635 Cojuangco, Jr. vs. PCGG, GR Nos. 92319-20, Oct. 2, 1990 Atty. Alice Odchigue-Bondoc vs. Tan Tiong Bio, GR No. 186652 (Oct. 6, 2010) Macalintal vs. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, GR No. 191618 (June 7, 2011) Cerezo vs. People, GR No. 185230 (June 1, 2011) Lacastesantos: 174
Montemayor vs. Bundalian, 405 SCRA 264 Zambales Chromite vs. CA, 94 SCRA 261 Caoile vs. Vivo, 125 SCRA 87 Corona vs. CA, 214 SCRA 378 Anzaldo vs. Clave, 119 SCRA 353 Ladjabassal: Cruz and RCBC vs. MLE, 120 SCRA 15 Cordero vs. Phil. Service Commission, 121 SCRA 249 Pefiano vs. Moral, 322 SCRA 439 Mayon Hotel & Restaurant vs. Adana, 458 SCRA 609 M.F. Violago Oiler Tank Trucks vs. NLRC, 117 SCRA 544 Lee: Police Commission vs. Lood, 127 SCRA 757 Batongbacal vs. Associated Bank, 168 SCRA 600 Phil. Merchant Marine School Inc. vs. CA, 244 SCRA 770 Velasquez vs. Hernandez, 437 SCRA 357 Progress Homes vs. NLRC, 269 SCRA 274 Lopez: American Tobacco Co. vs. Director of Patents, 67 SCRA 286 Skyworld Condominium Owners Assoc., Inc. vs. SEC, 211 SCRA 565 NEECO II vs. NLRC, 461 SCRA 169 Valladolid vs. Inciong, 121 SCRA 205 Ablaza vs. CIR, 126 SCRA 246 Manuel: PCFI vs. Sec. of Education Culture and Sports, 153 SCRA 622 United States vs. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil. 1 Metropolitan Traffic Command vs. Gonong, 187 SCRA 432 Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Torres, 212 SCRA 298 Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation vs. Amante, 453 SCRA 432 Mariano: Javier vs. COMELEC, 144 SCRA 194 Civil Aeronautics Board vs. PAL, 63 SCRA 524 Delfin vs. Inciong, 192 SCRA 151 San Luis vs. CA, 174 SCRA 258 Bautista vs. Board of Energy, 169 SCRA 167 Morados: De Jesus vs. CSC, 471 SCRA 624 National Liga ng mga Barangay vs. Paredes, 439 SCRA 130 Pesigan vs. Angeles, 129 SCRA 174 Tolentino vs. Inciong, 91 SCRA 563 Mendoza vs. COMELEC, GR No. 188308 (Oct. 15, 2009) Gonzales vs. Rosas, GR No. 145363 (Feb. 23, 2004) RP vs. EXTELCO, GR No. 147036 (Jan. 15, 2002) Nillas: Nasipit Lumber Company, Inc. vs. NLRC, 177 SCRA 93 Medalla vs. Sayo, 103 Phil. 587 Ortua vs. Singson Encarnacion, 59 Phil. 440 Sherwill Development Corporation vs. Sitio Sto. Niño Residents Association, Inc., 461 SCRA 517 Industrial Power Sales, Inc. vs. Sinsuat, 160 SCRA 19 Oliveros: Abejo vs. Dela Cruz, 149 SCRA 670 GMA Network, Inc. vs. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, 470 SCRA 727 Industrial Enterprises, Inc. vs. CA, 184 SCRA 426 GSIS vs. CSC, 204 SCRA 826 System Plus Computer College of Caloocan City vs. Local Gov’t. of Caloocan City, 408 SCRA 406 Saguin: Paat vs. CA, 266 SCRA 167 Hoskyns vs. National City Bank of New York, 85 Phil. 201 Estrada vs. CA, 442 SCRA 117 Morcal vs. Laviña, 476 SCRA 508 175
Batalec II Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. EIAB, 447 SCRA 482 Señosa: Municipality of La Trinidad vs. CFI of Baguio, 123 SCRA 81 Valmonte vs. Belmonte, 170 SCRA 256 Tan vs. Veterans Backpay Commission, 105 Phil. 377 Laganapan vs. Asedillo, 154 SCRA 377 Mangubat vs. Osmeña, 105 Phil. 1308 Usin: Alzate vs. Aldana, 107 Phil. 298 Cipriano vs. Marcelino, 43 SCRA 291 De Lara vs. Cloribel, 14 SCRA 269 Arrow Transportation Corporation vs. BOT, 63 SCRA 193 National Development Co. vs. Collector of Customs, 9 SCRA 429 Uy: Tiangco vs. Lauchang, 9 SCRA 125 Corpus vs. Cuaderno, 4 SCRA 749 Calo vs. Fuertes, 5 SCRA 397; 115 Phil. 393 Demaisip vs. CA, 106 Phil. 237 Regino vs. Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology, 443 SCRA 56 Vega: Bartulata vs. Peralta, 59 SCRA 7 Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 125 SCRA 302 Land Car, Inc. vs. Bachelor Express, Inc., 417 SCRA 307 Valencia vs. CA, 401 SCRA 666 Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod ng mga Magtitinda ng Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntinlupa, Inc. vs. Domiguez, 205 SCRA 92 Wee: Carpio vs. The Executive Secretary, 206 SCRA 290 National Development Company vs. Hervilla, 151 SCRA 520 Osias Academy vs. DOLE, 192 SCRA 612 DAR vs. DECS, 426 SCRA 217 Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation vs. Factoran, 154 SCRA 49 Yu: Sierra Madre Trust vs. Sec. of Agrarian and Natural Resources, 121 SCRA 384 Lacuesta vs. Herrera, 62 SCRA 115 Hutchinson Ports Philippines Ltd. vs. SBMA, 339 SCRA 434 Gravador vs. Mamigo, 20 SCRA 742 Dangan vs. NLRC, 127 SCRA 706 Zambales: Trendline Employees Association-Southern Philippines Federation of Labor vs. NLRC, 272 SCRA 172 Tres Reyes vs. Maxim’s Tea House, 398 SCRA 288 Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. vs. Commissioner of Customs, 29 SCRA 617 Placer vs. Villanueva, 126 SCRA 463 De Jesus vs. People, 120 SCRA 760
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