Introduction
In May 1927, 1927, an article articl e in the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science predicted an exciting future role for lighter than air aircraft: “Because of its size, the airship will ... act as a long-distance carrier, particularly between continents and over oceans, with the airplane furnishing feeder lines coordinating with it” 1. This was a common sentiment at the time. In 1949, however, Hugo Eckener, who had lead the German airship effort for decades, wrote that “The airship's monopoly [is] broken...The role of this aerial vehicle in commerce seems to have been ended after a brief period of glory, just as it had been developed to the point of acceptance” 2 While the reasons behind the airship's ignomious fate are at least partially understood, it is nevertheless difficult to understand their disappearance in light of existing paradigms in the social study of technology. This essay will argue that while the history of the passenger airship can be made to fit within the framework provided by the multi-level perspective, changes need to be made to the framework to accommodate its rapid decline just as it was on the verge of transitioning from niche to regime. The first section will provide a theoretical background, showing in the context of Geels' multi-level perspective that technological niches transitioning into the socio-technical regime must go through a vulnerable period. During this sensitive time, accidents, political interference, economic happenstance, and other contingencies can cause considerable setbacks for technological transitions currently underway. Evidence for this thesis will be provided using historical accounts of the rise and fall of the German, British and American airship programs. Lastly, a discussion will conclude that the case of the airship can serve to defend the multi-level perspective from certain criticisms, but only if the theory is modified to 1 Litc Litchf hfie ield ld,, 192 1927. 7. p. 79 2 Robi Robins nson on,, 197 1973. 3. p. 324. 324.
accommodate failed technologies.
Theoretical Background
Frank W. Geels' multi-level perspective implies that technological transitions do not occur easily 3. New technologies have a hard time contending with entrenched aspects of the socio-technical regime4. When transition does occur, it results from a dynamic interaction of technologies which have been developed to maturity in sheltered niches supplanting incumbent technologies due to pressure from the broader social landscape. This implies that sociotechnical regime changes are a function of just two processes: shifting selection pressures and coordination of resources in the socio-technical regime 5. By varying the levels of external landscape pressure and the state of development of niche innovations, Geels creates a kind of matrix which neatly sets out the expected transition pathways for each possible combination 6. This implies a certain determinism, in which the success of one technology over another can be explained entirely by broad socio-technical factors. So long as the it is applied only retrospectively to successful technologies, as Genus and Colls have accused it of doing 7, the multi-level perspective can maintain its implied determinism determinism by reading large-scale social causes into secondary case studies. Genus and Colls' complain that this privileging of sucessful technologies effectively leaves the black box closed 8. The implied technological
3 4 5 6 7 8
Geel Geels, s, 2001 2001.. p. 1257 1257.. Geel Geels, s, 2001 2001.. p. 1258 1258.. Geel Geels, s, 200 2007. 7. p. 400. 400. Geel Geels, s, 200 2007. 7. p. 400. 400. Genu Genuss and and Coll Colls. s. 200 2007. 7.,, p. 7. 7. Genu Genuss and and Col Colls ls.. 200 2007. 7.,,
dynamic of the MLP is far more orderly and predictable than the course of history, outside of Geels' case studies, seems to suggest. Technological transition, once initiated, does not always proceed smoothly. The case of the airship is one example of this: Airships' ascent from a narrow niche into the socio-technical regime was suddenly abandoned over the course of just a few years, despite a landscape that remained largely the same and a technology that continued to develop. To resolve this difficulty, it is first necessary to answer Genus and Coles' complaint that these concepts are ill-defined within Geels' framework 9. If regime stability comes from linkages between heterogeneous socio-technical elements 10, then a transition process can be declared finished once a technology that once existed only in a sheltered niche has gained the support and investment of a range of political, economic, cultural, social or other actors, institutions or structures. There is, however, a difficulty in attaining this status. It is not sufficient merely to court the support of powerful and well-informed decision makers in order to push a technology into a regime. As Michel Callon has shown, framing of issues between such a set of actors is a difficult and fragile process requiring a great deal of investment 11. Even formal legal arrangements exist in a complex social space 12. Any attempt at keeping socio-technical evaluations within a select elite group is therefore unlikely to suceed. The transition process must be defined, at least in part, by the acquiring of broad public support for the ascent of a technology into regime status. It cannot be assumed, however, that the public will be entirely rational as it evaluates a 9 10 11 12
Genu Genuss and and Col Coles es,, 2007 2007.. p.5 p.5 Geels, Geels, 2001, 2001, p. p. 1259. 1259. Callon, Callon, 1998. p. 6. 6. Callon, Callon, 1998. p. 8. 8.
technology. The case of the bicycle tire as demonstrated by Pinch and Bijker is illustrative of this point. The efficacy of public tires was in dispute until bicycle race served to persuade the public of their usefulness 13. This was not, however, a very scientific proof. Bicycle races were only able to prove the superiority of pneumatic tires for going as fast as possible, and yet this was sufficient to persuade the general public to adopt them 14. Studies like this reveal the public to be only boundedly rational. Public decisions, including those about technology, are influenced by influenced by media bias, cultural instability, disinformation, and emotion. Pinch and Bijker's bicycle example is of a public proof, but its existence must also permit the existence of a public disproof. If attention on pneumatic tires in a bicycle race can persuade cyclists to use them on their ride to work, then a fiery crash can certainly persuade travellers or investors that a particular means of transportation is not worthwhile. This is particularly likely to occur as a transitioning technology is gathering public support, as it is likely to be the object of public attention without yet having achieved broad entrenched public support. There is, therefore a period of vulnerability in which accidents and other bad publicity, filtered through the boundedly rational public, can serve to abort a socio-technical transition. A transitioning technology must therefore cross a confidence gap. An ill-timed and accident or negative news article occuring while this gap is being traversed can quickly turn public support against the technology. This adds an element of randomness to the transition process which has not yet been adequately accounted for within the multi-level perspective.
The Passenger Airship as a Case Study
In addition to being an excellent example of an emergent technological regime which was 13 Pinch Pinch and Bijker, Bijker, 1987. 1987. p. 45. 45. 14 Pinch Pinch and Bijker, Bijker, 1987. 1987. p. 45. 45.
rapidly and unexpectedly aborted, the passenger airship has the additional asset of being a very large and visible technology, effectively exaggerating the effects discussed in the previous section so that they can be more effectively understood. Furthermore, the history of airships before their disappearance accords well with existing thought on the multi-level perspective. Airships were, at different times and places, military weapons, propaganda tools, and tourist attractions. This accords well with Geels' assertion that radical new technologies “...usually emerge as 'hopeful monstrosities' [with] relatively low technical performance...Niches are important because they provide locations for learning processes [and also] provide space to build the social networks which support innovations”
. Further
15
evidence for this will be provided in the following case studies. It is first necessary, however, to point out that the failure of airships cannot be explained away by referene to technical inferiority when placed against airplanes. It is important to note that airships had a considerable head-start on airplanes for the development of commercial intercontinental travel 16. The first commercial airplane flights across the Atlantic were not carried out until fifteen years after the final passenger airship flights 17. While long range aircraft were still in development, the airship was the only means of flying between continents. Aerostatic lift, furthermore, is inherently more efficient than aerodynamic lift, so airships will always have a fuel economy advantage over airplanes, allowing cheaper flights and more spacious passenger quarters 18. While this paper will remain agnostic on the question of technical superiority, the following case studies will argue for an important role played by contingency in the airship's ultimate failure to establish itself as a means of passenger 15 16 17 18
Geels, Geels, 2007. 2007. p, p, 1261. 1261. Abbot Abbot and Walmsle Walmsley, y, 1998. 1998. p. 76 Walke Walker, r, 2007. 2007. p. p. 12. Robinson, Robinson, 1973. p. 325 325
transportation.
German Airships
The case of the German airship is perhaps the most effective demonstration of the fragility of technological transition. Count Zeppelin, the technology's inventor and namesake, built the first airships with minor military support 19. This constituted the airship's first real niche as an experimental military reconnaissance technology, and it was within this sheltered environment that Zeppelin was able to perfect the most basic problems of a steerable lighter than air craft. A more effective form of niche protection, however, came after the first long-distance flight of Zeppelin's fourth airship. The LZ4 flew over several German cities, with the enthusiastic cheering of crowds and canon salutes below. The flight was successful, night a storm carried it from its moorings and into a hillside, where it crashed and burned. The distress of the population on hearing of the demise of the craft they had earlier cheered for proved to be an asset, and within the first day after the loss of LZ4, Zeppelin had raised enough money through private donations to pay for a replacement 20. In Callon's terms, the zeppelin's size, visibility and prestige caused it to quickly overflow into the public consciousness rather than remaining a matter to be discussed purely by Zeppelin and the German Air Ministry
. This
21
new association of the airship with German patriotism help provide a great deal of shelter for the airship in its military niche. 22 This saw the airship through its development into a weapon which was used with marginal effectiveness during the First World War 23.
19 Robinson, Robinson, 1973. p. 18. 18. 20 Robinson, Robinson, 1973. p. 39-40. 39-40. 21 Callon Callon,, 1987. 1987. p. 8. 8. 22 Syon, Syon, 2002 2002.. p. 62 62 23 Some German military staff were were reluctant to adopt the airship due to concerns about its effectiveness, but overwhelming public support made it almost impossible to refuse their use. Robinson, 1973. p. 77.
The outcome of the wartime airship serves as evidence for Geels' theories about the requirement of technical niches to provide shelter for “hopeful monstrosities” as they are improved to the point where they can ascend into the socio-technical regime 24. The wartime niche produced significant improvements in the German airships, and motivated the Zeppelin's first intercontinental flight: a supply run from Jamboli to Khartoum 25. The terms of the armistice demanded the end of the German military airship program, forcing the zeppelin to find a new niche for further development 26. Hugo Eckener; Count Zeppelin's successor at the Zeppelin Company, devised a bold strategy of pursuing a transatlantic passenger airship line27. In Geels' terms, this would entail transitioning the airship from a technological niche into the techno-social regime. The process, as Eckener recognized, would require the procurement significant international political support and international investment. Eckener, therefore spared no opportunity to promote the airship to political and financial powerbrokers. Promotional flights included the delivery flight of LZ 126, which was intentionally planned to fly over major German cities on the way to the United Sates 28, and a round-the world flight by a long-range passenger prototype the Graf Zeppelin, on which international media and dignitaries were given seats 29. Early signs were that this strategy was effective. While no private or government investors were found for government airship line, the publicity produced significant traveller demand for tickets aboard airships 30, built relationships between Eckener
24 25 26 27 28 29 30
Geels cites military military applications as a specific specific example of a niche. Geels, Geels, 2001. p. 261. Robinson, Robinson, 1973. p. 252. 252. Robinson, Robinson, 1973. p. 259. 259. Syon, 2002. p. 107. 107. Robinson, Robinson, 1973. p. 260. 260. Robinson, Robinson, 1973. p. 268 268 Tickets on transatlantic transatlantic flights on the Hindenburg Hindenburg cost $6,500-a substantial sum sum during the Great Depression, Depression, and yet DELAG was able to sell tickets on a flight to South America every fourteen days. Robinson, 1973. p. 280.
and such important people as William Randolph Hearst and President Roosevelt 31, and earning Eckener the “enthusiastic approval of the travelling public and the growing interest of American financiers” 32. The Hindenburg, intended to be the first viable intercontinental commercial airship, completed a commercially successful first season flying between Friedrichstafen, Rio Di Janeiro and New York City. Its landings attracted considerable media attention, so photographers and reporters were frequently present for its arrivals at Lakehurst. It was because of this that when the Hindenburg spontaneously Hindenburg spontaneously burst into flames and crashed over Lakehurst, New Jersey on 2 May, 1937, the event was very well documented for the public
33
.
This had a dramatic effect on the subsequent fortunes of the German airship. The Graf Zeppelin 's 's homeward journey immediately after the disaster at Lakehurst was the last passenger airship flight ever flown 34. While the failure of the German passenger airship must be ascribed to many causes, including the rapid developments in airplane range and lifting power during the Second World War35, the Hindenburg crash Hindenburg crash nevertheless had a dramatic short-term effect. There were two years between the crash of the Hindenburg and Hindenburg and the outbreak of the Second World War, during which time no airships flew. The Hindenburg and Hindenburg and its sister-ships would have had a good chance to attract American investors during those two years. Furthermore, the Hindenburg disaster removed any association between the airship and German patriotism, thereby permitting Herman Goering to destroy the airship works during the Second World War 36. 31 32 33 34 35 36
Graf Zeppelin 's first flight to Lakehurst earned Eckener a reception at the White House. Robinson, 1973. p. 267. Robinson, Robinson, 1973. p. 288. 288. Robinson, Robinson, 1973. p. 291. 291. Robinson, Robinson, 1973. p. 294. 294. Airships were tactically tactically obsolete by the beginning beginning of the Second World War. Robinson, Robinson, 1973. p. 296. Syon, 2002. p. 202. 202.
Whether the airship would have survived through the Second World War had the Hindenburg not burned at Lakehurst is a matter for speculation, but the death of the airship apparently came before war was ever declared. This must be attributed at least in part to the Hindenburg disaster and its effect on the public perception of the airship.
British Airships
The pattern established by the Hindenburg disaster repeated itself during two separate British airship development programs. Early British airships, like their German counterparts, existed in a military niche during and immediately after the First World War. Among airshiprelated innovations pioneered during this time are the mooring mast, which allows airships to land in difficult wind conditions 37; apparatus to deploy airplanes while in flight 38; and the keelless airship, which allowed significant weight savings 39. Important British airship achievements included a world endurance record set in 19 1919 19 by NS 11, 11, which was destroyed by a lightning strike shortly thereafter 40, and he first transatlantic airship flight, which took place aboard the British R34 in 1919 41. Military governance in the post-war years prioritized economy, and so military support for the airship program was waning. Faced with the imminent destruction of their technological niche, the British airship's supporters attempted to promote the commercial potential of lighter than air craft. These efforts were dramatically defeated by the wreck of the R38, which crashed and burned over the Thames estuary in 1921, killing 44 American and British servicemen. Robinson recounts the public reaction to this: 37 38 39 40 41
Abbot Abbot and Walmsle Walmsley, y, 1998. 1998. p. 24. Abbot Abbot and Walmsle Walmsley, y, 1998. 1998. p. 63. Robinson, Robinson, 1973. p. 158. 158. Abbot Abbot and Walmsle Walmsley, y, 1998. 1998. p. 7. Robinson, Robinson, 1973. p. 164. 164.
“The deaths of so many brave men from both sides of the Atlantic brought an outcry against the rigid airship, and together with the economy drive which closed down the British airship service after August 1, 1921, the R38 disaster seemed to put paid to a costly experiment which had failed to produce any results” 42 This was not the end of British experimentation with rigid airships, however. With the commercial airplane still in its infancy, the airship remained the most effective way for Britain to access its colonies in North America, India, Africa and Australia. A sea voyage from Britain to Australia would take six weeks, while an airship flight would take only two days 43. A second British naval airship program was therefore initiated to reach overseas colonies. Two airships were constructed: One, the R100, by a private company, and the other, the R101, by the air ministry44. Landing infrastructure-a sign of growing socio-technical entrenchment- was constructed in Britain, Canada, India, South Africa and Australia before either airship flew
.
45
The R100 experienced early success: a flight to Montreal was completed without any serious incidents 46. This, however, was the R100's last flight. Like the Graf Zeppelin , R100's success was tempered by its sister-ship's failure: R101, suffering from numerous design problems, crashed and burned in a field outside of Beauvais, France on its way to India 47. The crash of the R101 “...together with a Cabinet minister and so many brave men, produced a thrill of horror and revulsion, not only in the British public but also in the Labour government”
. The
48
R100 was scrapped and British rigid airships never flew again. Catastrophe caused the 42 43 44 45 46 47 48
Robinson, Robinson, 1973. p. 173. 173. Robinson, Robinson, 1973. p. 296. 296. Robinson, Robinson, 1973. p. 297. 297. Robinson, Robinson, 1973. p. 298. 298. Abbot Abbot and Walmsle Walmsley, y, 1998. 1998. p. 89. Abbot Abbot and Waslmsl Waslmsley, ey, 1998. 1998. p. 93. Robinson, Robinson, 1973. p. 314. 314.
question of the British airship to overflow into the public sphere, which quickly rejected it as a dangerous technology.
American Airships
Unlike with civil airships in Britain and Germany which attempted to transition out of a military niche, the American transition had widespread military use as its endpoint. The import of the USS Los Angeles from Germany in 1924 set off a string of airship innovations including mid-flight water recovery 49 and improvements to the launch of scout planes from the ship 50. The eventual goal was to create an effective long-range airship scout in the Pacific 51. When the Shenandoah , the Americans' first home-built airship and the world's first helium airship flew over New York and Washington, it was greeted with ticker-tape parades below
52
,
. When
53
the Shenandoah made Shenandoah made a successful flight from Lakehurst to San Diego, Tacoma and back, it was hailed as a precursor to an American transcontinental passenger service 54. The end of the American airship began with the loss of the Shenandoah in Shenandoah in bad weather over Ohio. This did not have any significant relations affect, but it did have the notable effect of killing Commander Zachary Lansdowne-a competent commander and one of a great advocate for naval airships. The fate of the American Naval airship “would undoubtedly have taken a different course had he survived 55”. The airship program continued despite the loss of the Shenandoah , as the USS Akron had Akron had already been built and the Macon was Macon was on the way. The Akron, however, suffered a series of misfortunes. Weather damage prevented its 49 50 51 52 53 54 55
Robinson, Robinson, 1973. p. 198. 198. Robinson, Robinson, 1973. p. 240. 240. Robinson, Robinson, 1973. p. 182. 182. Robinson, Robinson, 1973. p. 191. 191. Robinson, Robinson, 1973. p. 191. 191. Robionson Robionson,, 1973. p. p. 200-201. 200-201. Robinson, Robinson, 1973. p. 206. 206.
participation in the 1932 annual fleet problem 56, and it had performed poorly on a number of scouting exercises 57. Its destruction in a storm was, according to Robinson, “the beginning of the end of the rigid airship in the United States” 58. Admiral Moffatt, another staunch advocate for the airship, was lost in the crash, and the high death toll began to turn public and military opinion against the rigid airship. Akron 's 's sistership, the Macon , performed poorly in exercises, but no funding was forthcoming to improve its methods 59. Macon crashed Macon crashed over the Pacific in 1935. There were no casualties, but as a result of the crash, Congress and the public were “convinced by an unremitting newspaper campaign that rigid airships were expensive killers and useless into the bargain”. No more American airships were built to replace the Macon.
56 57 58 59
Robinson, Robinson, 1973. p. 234. 234. Ibid bid. Robinson, Robinson, 1973. p. 238. 238. Robinson, Robinson, 1973. p. 240. 240.
Discussion and Conclusion
The three case studies mentioned in this paper all display the same pattern: airships find a supportive military niche in which three different nations were able to improve the technology until it had the capacity for intercontinental flight. This early success was illustrated by an alignment of public opinion, political accommodation and business interests as the airship began to incorporate itself into the socio-technical regime. This transition was then aborted due to dramatic accidents which quickly turned public opinion against the airship. Had the airship been commercially successful, its ascent could likely have been modelled as an example of Geels' reconfiguration pathway 60: originally adopted to solve military problems, the airship began to ascend to be a widespread form of passenger transportation and an important part of the socio-technical regime. In reality, this transition pathway was cut short by a series of accidents, which originated neither from the landscape nor from airship technology itself. The destruction of the Hindenburg, R101, R38, USS Akron and USS Macon came from random happenstance that is not accounted for in the Multi-Level Perspective. It is important to note that there were other airship accidents that did not have this effect. The American and British airship programs continued undeterred by the wrecks of the Shenandoah NS Shenandoah NS 11 respectively, and the wreck of the LZ4 actually improved the standing of the airship in Germany. That the timing of such accidents is crucial: the airship crashes which proved most devastating occurred in a crucial transitional period. Technologies are uniquely vulnerable to such blind happenstance while they attempt to cross this confidence gap. To put it bluntly with reference to the most well-known example, the Hindenburg chose Hindenburg chose the worst possible time to explode. 60 Geels, Geels, 2007. 2007. p. 411. 411.
This need not serve to dismantle the multi-level perspective, as airship development can fit into the niche model proposed by Geels despite it failed transition. To answer Genus and Coles' criticism of the multi-level perspective as overly dependent on case studies of successful technologies 61, more multi-level perspective research should be conducted on failed technologies. If Geels' framework is to be turned in this direction, however, it must allow for the added complexity produced by random contingencies as they affect a technological niche as it attempts to cross the confidence gap. So long as airship crashes, untimely deaths, personal feuds or other random events exist to upset a technology in the most vulnerable part of its transition, the multi-level perspective never be entirely predictive.
61 Genus Genus and Coles, Coles, 2007. p. 6.
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