think it was that g reat 20th Century philosopher, Casey Stengel, who said, “It is very difficult make predictions, especially especially about the future.” So, in this issue, issue, in which we depa rt a bit from our broad-based content and focus on one issue he future e will shy away from making predictions. We do, however, provide a glimpse of what might be. The Armor School’s subject matter experts on training, training, doctrine, doctrine, technology, and com bat development ha ve p rovided articles articles that throw onto the table some ideas of of where the Armo Force might be headed and p aint a picture o its capabilities. Almost anything is possible, given the resources. We hope these articles prompt discussion and prod readers to submit reactions reactions that w ill contribute to the d iscussion. iscussion. There are a few givens. The Army will shrink over the next handful of years, and Armor will keep pace proportionally. While comprising only .1 percent the active force structure, the M ounted Combat Arm of Decision will still provide percent of the active combat battalions available available to p ut on the ground against a future enemy. These battalions will deploy from a predominantly CONUS-based Army and will fight as a component of a combined arms team that is part of a joint force. The
By
Order
of
th
Secretary of
he
Army:
restructuring of this force and the sustainment of it at a level of peak readiness will be accomplished in an environment of constrained resources. Thus, each man and each weapon system will count heavily toward the success of future operations, perhaps more so than before. Goo d training training in the application of future technology will be absolutely critical. critical. The k ey executors of the future Armor Force are the Armor and Cavalry soldier and his leaders. Thus, while great weapon systems, such as the M1A2 featured on our cover and in th article article starting on page 26, stir our hearts and minds, we canno t forget forget that they take a man to employ them proficiently on the battlefield. Very appropriately, then, this year‘s annual Armor Conference has as its theme “The ArmodCavalry Soldier” (See (See p. 12). At the same time we look to the future, let’s cast an eye to the past and examine the legacy left us by those who put steel on target target a half-century ago. Congratulations to the men of the 7th Armored and 8th Armored Divisions Divisions as they celebrate their 50th ann iversary. iversary. Well done “Luck “Luckyy Se ve nth and “Tornado. “Tornado. JC
Official:
4?4&#dU& GORDON SULLIVAN General, United States Army Chief Chie f of Staff
MILTON H. HAMILTON Administrative Assistant tu the Secretar Secr etary y of of the th e Army Army
Th e Professional Developme Deve lopment nt Bulleti Bulletin n of the Armor Branch PB- 17-92-2 Editor4n-Chief
LTC PATRICK J. COONEY
Features Glasno&.and Glasno&.and
Managing Editor JON JO N T. CLEME CLE MENS NS
Commandant
MG THOMAS C. FOLEY
ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published bimonthly by the U.S. Army Armor Center, 4401 Vine Grove Road, Fort Knox, 40121. Disclaimer: he information contained in ARMOR ARMOR represents the professional opinions of the authors and does not necessarily reflect offici off icial al Army Army or TRADOC-position, TRADOC-posi tion, nor does does it change or supersede any information informati on presented presented in other official Army publications. official distribution is limited to on copy for each armored brigade headquarters, armored cavalry regiment headquarters. armor battalion headquarters. headquarters. armored cavalry squadron headquarters, reconnaiss reconnaissance ance squadron headquarters, armored cavalry troop. troop. amo a morr company. company. and motorized brigade headquarters of the United States Army. Army. In addition, Army Army libraries, li braries, Army and DOD schools, HQ DA and MACOM staff agencies with responsibility responsibil ity for armored, direct fire, ground combat systems, organizations, and the training trainin g of personn personnel el for such organizations may request two copies by sendng a military letter to the editor-inchief. Authorized Content: ARMOR will print only those materials for which th U.S. Army Armor Center has proponency. That pmponency includes: includes: all a ll armored, armored, direct-fir di rect-fire e ground combat systems that do not serve primarily as infantry carriers; all weapons used exclusively in these systems or by CMF 19-series enlisted soldiers; any miscellaneous miscell aneous items of of equipment equip ment which armor and armored cavalry organizations use exclusively; training for all SC 124. 128. an 12 officers and for all CMF-19-series enlisted solders; an information concerning the training, logistics, history, and leadership of armor and armored cavalry units at the brigadelregiment level and below, to indude Threat units at those levels. Material may be reprinted, provided Credit is given to ARMOR and to author, except where copyright is indicated.
March-April 1992, Vol.
then some
The Army’s Key Emerging Emergin gTechnologi Techn ologies es by Captain (P) Edward W. Payne 13
The Armored Gun System by DTAFR, DCD,
TSM-AGS
15
Training Traini ng With Technolo Technology: gy: Armor 2000 and Beyond by Lou Edmondson
20
Survivability Is the Best Argument For a Two-Man Two-Man Tank Tank by Captain Mike Newell
23
Do We Really he Night? by Josef Schroeder
26
The Future Is Now (A Profile of the M lA 2 Abram Abrams) s) by Captain Timothy Garth
29
Doctrine Doctri ne vs. Technology, by Captain (P) Tom Arielly
31
Future Army Combat Forces Captain Michael Howe
35
Creeping Overwatch by Captain Robe Robert rt L. Jones
37
The Impact of Germa German n Reunificat Reu nification ion on the Future of the German German Armor Armor Force by Lieutenant Colonel Wolfgang Hahne, German Army
43
The “Lucky “Lu cky Seventh”: S eventh”: Assigned Assi gned to Three Three Armies, Seven Differen Diff eren Corps Corps During It wwll Campaign Campaign From Normandy Normandy to the th e Baltic
45
‘Tornado ‘Tor nado”” Trained Cadre Cadre Then Then Raced Raced Across Europ Like Thundering Thunde ring Herd (8th AD)
47
The Spirit of the Cavalry translated by Lieutenant Colonel Donald C. Snedeker
49
General James . Polk P olk Dies at 80
Blueprint for the Future
Departments 2 2
Letters Contacts Armor Hotline Commander’s Hatch
12 50
52
Driver’s Sea Armor Conference Schedule Bustle Rack Rack Books
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Armor Badge Should Deplct Service Accurately Dear sir:
Congratulations on, once again, going for the Armor Badge. In response to Mr. Reichley's letter (November-December 1991 Annor) of course. way back to it should be retroacbive all WW if anyone is left to receive it An the soldier sewed n Armor in tw or more wars, senrice should be depicted
But, let's go or it onc again!
GEORGE S. PATTON MG USA, Ret. South Hamilton, Mass.
Editor-in-Chief
Lieutenant Colonel Patrick J. Cooney
Continued on Page
2249
Vivian Thompson
2610
Mary Hager
2610
Production Assistant Contributing Artist SP Jody Harmon
2610
KY 40121-5210. K ~ o x ,KY
N
AT
M . Fort
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ARMOR HOTLINE
ARMY ARMOR
U.S.
2249
Managing Editor Jon T. Clemens Editorial Assistant
ARMOR
Dear Sir: have read your magazine fo number of years an have tended to enjoy and an the writings m y r learn submitted to you. It is this previous positive experience that added to my surprise at a far less than complete review of Desert Viczory: Th Wa Kuwaif, written by Jon Clemene of your staff.
Be advised please that this this is not the first time the badge application has been submitted. have personal knowledge of least two, and there may be more.
A R M O R EditorialOffices
MAILING ADDRESS:
Incomplete Review
exactly as it is now shown on the Combat Infantry Badge, with stars appropriately mounted.
SN 464-TANK
Armor Hotline is a 24-hour service to provide assistance w it questions concerning doctrine, training, organizations. and equipment the Armor Fom.)
SCHOOL
Commandant
(A'IZK-CG) 212
Assistant Assistant Commandant
(ATSB-AC)
Thomas C. Foley
BG James L. Noles
7555
Deputy Assistant Commandant
COL Dwight A. Beck
(ATSB-DAC) 1050
Command Sergeant Major CSM Jake Fryer COL Phares
4952
(ATSB-MA) 8346
Noyes
Command and S h f f Department COL John John B. Sylvester Sylvest er
1055
I1
Directorate of Training Developments
COL Joseph D. Molinari
Directorate of Combat Developments Bryla COL Edward NCO Acodemy/Drill Sergeant School CSM John J. Beck
Reserve Component Spt Div William S. Richards
LT
Directorate Readiness
Total Armor Force
COL Dennis Denni s H. Long
TRADOC System Manage for Armored Gun System COL Eugene D. Colgan
ARMOR
5855
(ATSB-WP)
Weapons Department Department COL E. G. Fish
(ATSB-CS)
(ATSB-TD) 7250
5050 (A'IZK-NC) 5150 (A'IZK-PIE)
5953
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March-April 1992
Glasnost
nd then some
There was something strangely familiar about T-72 Number 11039, all right. Among hundreds of other oth er armored vehicles parked at a former East German Army NCO school, where deactiv de activated ated Warsaw Warsaw Pact vehicles were parked for inspection insp ection under the CFE Treaty, Treaty, this tank sported on its glacis plate both the insignia of the U.S. U.S. Armor Branch and a red, blue, and a nd yellow Armor patch from the Armor Center! LTC Donald Snedeker. of the On-Site Inspection Agency Europe, took the photos and sent them to ARMOR.
Armor Hotline Takes Your Call Th Armor Hotline has recently been updated to provide the Total Armor Fwce with a more extensive
service than previously offered. This senrice indudes a call-in capability to ask questions, and to retrieve messages from Armor Center organizations. A number of voice mailboxes have been installed on the Armor Hotline (DSN: 464-TANK, commercial: 502624-TANK) in order to maximize maximize its use. The system provides an initial greeting, then refers the caller to a list of Fort Knox organizations and to a list of subjects. Callers may then select any of the organizations, subjects, in order to leave or retrieve messages. he numbers at right can be used on a touch tone phone to access these organizations or subjects. Callers using rotary dial phones will not be able to access these numbers, but will be asked in the initial greeting to stay on the line and leave a voice message. Important Import ant messages messages will be placed in the initial init ial greeting so that rotary dialers will receive this information. Personnel are reminded to leave their name, rank, unit, phone p hone number, number, and a nd address when when they leave a message. Additionally, personnel personn el should remember that this is an unsecure line. Classified information cannot be left on or retrieved from from the Armor Armor Hotline.
ARMOR
March-April
1992
Mail Bo Number
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33
Subject
Initial Greeting List of US MRM C Organizations Organizations List of Subject Su bject Areas Areas Calendar of Events Command and Staff Departmen Directorate or Combat Developments Developments Directorate of Training Development Development Weapons Department Maintenance Department TRADOC System Manager for Armored Gun Systems Armor Magazine/Armor Association Directorate of Total Armor Force Readiness G-S/Directora G-S/Directorate te of Plans, Training, Training, and a nd Mobilization 12th Cavalry Cavalry Regiment Regime nt st Armor Training Brigade NCO Academy/Drill Sergeant School Armor Branch Safety Office Reserve Component Component Support Suppo rt Division School and Course Messages Messages Safety-of-Use Message Total Armor Force Training Support Division Armor Unit Readiness Problems Armor Crewman Response Hotline General Delivery Delivery
Thomas C. Foley Commanding General U.S.Arm y Armor Armor Center
MG
The Future Battlefield The theme theme of this issue iss ue is the Armor Force in the year 2000 and beyond. Regardless Regardle ss of the continuing continuin g budget cutbacks and reductions reduction s in force structure, I can assure you that the Armor and Cavalry forces in the next century will be a vital member member of the combined arms Th threat that we face in the next century will certainly certai nly be high tech. Presently there ar several countries which have fielded main battle tanks with advanced target acquisition capabilities and sophisticated fire control systems. This technology will continue to spread throughout the world and we must be ready to defeat de feat it. the future armored crewman armor operations will become more like the operations of fighter fig hter aircraft, extremely high tempo, anticipating and countering enemy actions, massin to destroy key enemy elements and quickly dispersing to deny enemy counterattacks. In short, a continuous but dramatic acceleration accelerati on of the trend of fast fas t paced maneuver which which goes back to the beginnings beginn ings of the t he armor and cavalry forces. cannot imagine more challenging or exciting environment ment in which to be a soldier or leader. Though Though the principles principle s of of war will remain unchanged armor leaders will be required to possess whole new array
of skills. Just as the founders found ers of the armor force in the 1930s ad to ecome experts in the demands and pabiliti pabi lities es f a mechanized force tomorrow’s armor leader must be the absolute master of of the application application of advanced technologies which th key to winning winning the combine arms battle. Cavalry forces in the next century will be as vital as they were in th days of Hannibal. reconnaissance squadrons of our armored and light cavalry regiments will go deep dee p into the enemy’s rear area and identify his center cent er of gravity. They They will continucont inuously track these formations, gather essential essentia l informatio information, n, and bring aviation and other fires upon them. At the same time the other squadrons will identify the routes and avenues which allow us to engage the enemy upon ground of choosing. In defensiv operations the reconnaissance squadron will identify the enemy’s second echelon, track its movements, avoid an decisive engagements, and bring fires bear upon upon it while while the other squadrons track the enemy’s first echelon. 7he 7h e basics of how how the the cavah fights fights will not not change chan ge but the the pace will certainly be faster and the battles shorter but ar ntense. Tank battalions provide decisive combat. The The arrival arriva l of the main battle batt le
tank on the battlefield defines decisive operations. This has held true since th First World War and and will contin continue ue well into the next century. The cavalry will provide real-time intelligence and set the conditions for decision. The main main battl tank battalions will maneuver against the enemy’s weakness to destroy des troy him. him. Future weapons systems will allow us us to shoot accuacc urately rately faster, faster, move move massed tank formations rapidly across the field, and maintain constant automated communications with not only the maneuver elements, bu also all the other members of the combined combined arms team. Just as in th 1930s he first reaction of many armor leaders will be to re sist sis t new technolog technologies ies and preserve tactics, techniques, and procedures which proven and familiar. But also, as in the 1930s. he victories v ictories o th future belong to to those far sighted sight ed enough to harness me unfamiliar developments making soldiers masters of of the battlefield. battlef ield. Future battles will certainly be high tech. Armor and cavalry will be in these battles, and as always they will play the decisive roles. We must be smart smart in in how we we evolve evol ve to th future battlefield. battlefie ld. We must forge tomorrow’s tomorrow’s thunderbolt thunderb olt today today in order to maintain our edge tomorrow. tomorrow. FORGE FORGE TH THUNDERBOLT!
ARMOR
March-April
1992
Letters Continued from page
Clemens’ ‘cogent Quotes’ bo repeated a number numb er of remarkabl rema rkably y shortsighted. gant. gan t. and militarily naive comments comments made by the author Norman Friedman. was dumbfounded that statements like Third World countries are unlikely to defeat competently handled First World World forces forces unless they modernize moderni ze their societies’ societies’ were printed prin ted without rebuttal. reb uttal. The tens of thousands of Frenchmen and Americans that lost their lives in the thirty-year war for Southeast Asia might tend to disagree. No, we did not lose the war in Vietnam, but Third World North Vietnam certainly win it
CS M Jake Fryer Fryer Command Sergeant Major S. Army Armor Center
‘+
Clemens goes on to quote Friedman with ‘...any society wishing to stand up to Westso em Forces will have to modernize ciety itself has to change t must produce a larger leadership and technic technically ally adept class.’ class.’ Soviet field commanders who had their armored columns stopped and effectively destroyed by illiterate men firing 90 year-old Lee-Enfield rifles and 1950s-era RPG-7 rocket launchers would have sincerely wished for guidance of Mr. Friedman on subsequent forays into the mountains of Afghanistan. Technology and education are definite combat multipliers, but they are ar from the be-all end-all components of victory that Friedman describes. As always, t is the desire, will, and fortitude fortitud e of the individual soldier that more often decide victory. The Iraqi Ira qi Army, Army, as a whole, simply did no want to fight the Coalition Forces. Had those hungry, sporadically equipped, and poorly supplied soldiers fought with courage and conviction that an able leader and righteous cause would have given them. the sands of Babylon might mig ht still be wet with the blood of the Coalition Forces.
Farewell th Force Since I was twelve years old, dreamed of, and aspired to be tanker. The day after graduation from high school in a small rural community community in central cen tral Pennsylvania, I entered the U.S.Army to be al l o an armored crewman with all worldly possessions, which consisted consisted of of a toothbrush. toothbrush . In a very short years, I’ve served in every crew and leadership position available avai lable t an enlisted soldier in Armor and cavalry. In this, last “Driver’s Seat” column, reflect on career as very profitable (memories-not
Self-satisfaction with our own success is dangerous. Blanket approbation approb ation of of our o ur
technology, education level, and military ability is tantamount spitting in face of the many examples in history when those factors were less than relevant to the outcome of a particular campaign. We have reason to be proud of our accomplishments in Southwest Asia, but we can never believe that our relatively advanced society society is free pass to military success, regardless of the enemy. LT. Armor Ft. Polk, La
RUMRILL
ARMOR
March-April
9!
money) and rewarding experience. I’d like to thank the many soldiers I’ve had the privilege of serving with and for. I hope in some small way I’ve made contributions to soldiers and their organizations. Now, as I retire from our great with a feeling o Army, do it with knowing there are dynamic young soldiers and capable enlisted leaders follow in my footsteps, and in the footsteps footste ps of those I’ve followed. TANKS!
Forge The Thunderbolt!
The Army’s Key Em erging erging Techno ogies ogies by Captain (P) Edward W. Payne Th Technology Base Master Plan (ATBMP) outlines 14 key emerging technologies that will give th future Annor Force Forc e the capabilicapab ilities it will need to win win future futu re wars.
Figure
future combat systems.
ATBMP serves as “top down” guidance to all Army laboratories: Research, Development, Engineering Centers (RDEC), and other technology-based organiza-
More
lethal. high-velocity projectiles will become available as new propulsion technologies developed.
VELOCITY
1970
Gu
The Department of the feels that the development d evelopment and application of these technologies techno logies will increase the capability of of future vehicles and soldiers, helping to insure their survivability, -lethality, mobility, and deployability. Despite decreasing budgets, the Army appears to have decided to continue investing in key Historically, the Army devotes 25 percent of of its technology-based technolog y-based IC sources to further the development of key key emerging technologies that allow Forces technological advantage on th future battlefield. These 14 key emerging technologies derived from the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) attlefield Development Plan Plan (BDP), and and the technologies that are believed to represent the greatest barriers to successful succe ssful development development o
Thermal
Today 20 Propulsion Technology tions. This article discusses the ke emerging technologies and the impact we believe these technologies will have on Armor Force modernization and performance. Some results this
Scattering Cdlls Nonlinear/ Processes BROADBAND SacrificialCoatings Sacrificial Coatings
Protection
1980
mearch have already been integrated into fielded soon-to-be fielded fielded systems. Perhaps the most important of of these technologies is protectiodethality. The goal of lethality “killing” th enemy. The technology is oriented tolasers, ward electric guns (Figure and munitions. These technologies will allow future combat systems to deliver delive r a killing mecha mechanis nism m to the target at its it s most most vulnerable v ulnerable time and position, from as far away as possible, and with with the lowest cost and and logistic lo gistic burden. The applications of of this technology include smart munitions, electromagnetic (EM) rail guns, electrothermal chemical (ETC) uns, propellants,an unconventional munitions, such as fuel-air explosives. The goal of protection is the inverse of lethality. letha lity. These technologies enhance the countermeasures that prevent the enemy from killing killin g us us (Figure (Figu re Protection
1990
2000
Armor Technology
2010 1960
Today
2000
Soldier Protection From Laser
Figure 2. Th ballistic protection of armored vehicles continue to be improved improved materials are fielded. Soldier protectio n from from la ser weapons will continue to be improved as more effective materials am developed, e.g., eye protection.
ARMOR
March-April
1992
Figure Advanced materials fo am or wil provide increased protection at reduced cost.
~2
gg
1990
technologies technolo gies range from from improving im proving the ballistic protection of m o r s to the electronics electronic s and and munitions necessary for a Vehicle Integrated Defensive System (VIDS). products prod ucts of protection technologies include insensitive munitions: nuclear, biological, chemical chemic al NEE) equipment; equipm ent; and laser eye-safe goggles. Defense Advanced Research Research Projects Agency's @ARPA) Kinetic Energy, Armor, an Vehicle Survivability Programs are greatly enhancing the developments in this
arena. These technologies combine le-
thality thal ity of of the future fut ure battlefield wit the Survivability o future systems and the soldi s oldiers ers who who will ma these sys-
tems.
Another technology closely related to survivability is advanced materials and material processing, processing, such as advanced metals, ceramics, composites, and hybrid materials for future combat vehicles, aircraft, and personal armor. Examples are ductile ceramics, light-weight and high strength com-
Traditional: Optimized for range, payload, maintenance , cost, etc.
Faceted: Make.surfaces arge and flat com pared t wavelength Align Align surfaces to com bine spikes Direct spikes to favorable angle "Apodi2e"facets
Blended Blended (contoured) Eliminate spikes altogether, but at risk of larger RCS for most angles compared to facets
iewing Angle
-----
Threshold
Figure The effect of various shapes on the signature of radar cross sections at various viewing viewing ang les.
ARMOR
March-April 1992
posites, advanced polymerdelastorners and and novel electro-optical elect ro-optical materials. New materials are being developed for heavy applications, which ba llisar producing improvements in ballistic performance and and cost reductions (Figure 3) Materials with high specific strength are being produced as materials for more more efficient weapons platforms. Ceramics in diesel engines are significantly reducing the weight and may totally remove remov e the need for a cooling system. The potential advantages of of these t hese materials are lighter weight, increased system performance, a significant significa nt enhancement of maneuverability and an increase in operational effectiveness. The Army has already fabricated a Bradley Fighting Vehicle Ve hicle hull of of composite comp osite materials that resulted in greater than percent reduction in system weight. Future demonstrations of of this technology include the FY97 Composite Armored Vehicle (CAV) Advanced Technology Transition Demonstrator. If If successful, success ful, this this technology will make the Future Scout Vehicle (FSV) (FSV ) and and the Future Fut ure Main Main Battle Tank (FMBT) more more strategically strategica lly deployable, while increasing their survivability. Another contributor to survivability is low observable technology. Al though most of of these t hese programs ar classified, this "stealth technology. It could be used to reduce the signature of of battlefield battlefi eld assets below the detection threshold threat sensors (Figure 4). Lo observable technolog most effective effec tive whe when n designed desi gned into a system. The development f the technologies will permit a combination of optimal shaping, radar absorbing material, designs, design s, whic which h minimize thermal therma l and and acoustic acous tic signatures; and the apptopriate manufacturing processes should greatly reduce the battlefield tlef ield signature f the system. This technology has the potential to make combat vehicles nearly undetectable,
Figure 5. Low Ob
servable Technology. Numerous cornponents of military vehicles or aircraft, e.g. helicopters, helicopters,contribute to radar detection. Survivability will continue to be dramaticallyimproved as means to reduce detectable radar cross section are developed.
OO
,75
.25-
10 15 20 Range (km)
25
Typical Typical Rad arFlareSpots on a Helicopter
Radar Cross Section and Survivability
increasing combat effectiveness and survivability. The application of of this technology will will allow combat vehicles to be lighter, while significantly increasing the soldier's probability o surviving combat (Figure 5) Systems such as the Future Scout Vehicle, the Armored Gun System (AGS), and the Future Main Battle Tank (FMBT) could rely heavily on low observable technology to increase incre ase survivability. key key to t o all survivability and lethality systems is microelectronics, photonics, and acoustics. These technolArmy systems for ogies underpin signal acquisition, communication, Computation, and processing. The capabilities these technologies determine the limits limit s of performance for systems such as smart weapons, fire control systems, sys tems, warning warning receivers, intelligence collection devices, and other sensors. The potential advantages of these technologies technolog ies include th reduction of the magnetic m agnetic signature signa ture of vehicles; small, hig high h defmition, color flat-panel displays for gu sights and helmet mounts mounts:: and integrate inte grate m i m -
future Army electronics for RSTAEMK RSTA EMK3I 3I systems systems This technology includes second-generation second-generation FLIRs, which which will provide improved improved
Past
the electronics of X-ROD, "smart" kinetic energy tank round. Nearly all systems advanced signal processing an computing to perform a variety of tasks in command control, position/navigation, position/navigation, electronic intelligence FLINT), reconnaissance, automatic target recognition ( A m , Figure ). control, guidance and control, communications, and traininn. These T hese technologies allow for the simkation and modeling of command and contro con trol, l, hardware hardware systems, and wargaming to reduce reduce training costs cos ts and to improve readi-
cwrent
Figure Processing technology developmentsar critical capabilities or brilliant weapons. resolution in sights and will improve combat identification range determinations. nations. This T his technology will be used in second-generation tank sights, and
ment and testing. testing.
Future to
provide provide AT
operational
ness (Figure Optical and digital processing provide more power for battlefiel battl efield d manageme management nt and an d weapons systems. These technologies will provide an advance the Standard Army
Vetronics Architecture (SAVA), th standard electronics modules for all future combat combat systems systems.. Other qpl q plica ica tions of this technology include the the computers and and processors of th Global Positioning System (GPS), Intervehicular Information System (IVIS) and the Close Combat Test Bed (CCTB) at Ft. Knox. technology closely related to the capabilities of future computers com puters and and information processors is artificial intelligence (AI). AI ca be applied to
ARMOR
March-April 7992
1990
2000
201
2020
Figure 8. AI Application
AI, battle eleirLand Battle Management. Coordinated nents will will operate m ore effectively. Effectiveness Effectiveness is mea sured by Lanchester Equation mefficients that describe combatant strength and forecast battle outcome.
Sensors mondor wear Embedded AI redicts breakdowns
1990
1995
2000
FigUte AI Appli rognoscation tics. AI-based prognostics, in conjunction with with embed ded sensors, will reduce annual maintenance cost per vehicle (am reduce downtime) through more efficient scheduling of 2005 preventive maintenance.
‘igUW 10
Re
tuction of th numIe of crew in fu ure combat vehi:les dictates th neassity of the appliation of AI in the iutomation of nany crew tasks.
improve battlefield manageme management nt (Fig8) intelligence analysis, autonoure mous weapons and vehicles, an other systems. AI the potential to coordinate dinate an an AirLand AirLand Operat Operation, ion, makin makin the elements engaged in th battle
ARMOR
more effective. AI-based prognostics, in conjunction conjunct ion with embedded sensors, will reduce annual maintenance costs pe vehicle through through more effeceffe ctive scheduling schedul ing of preventive maintenance (Figure 9) The effectiv effe ctive e use of
March-April 1992
AI decision aids will improve the man-machine interface and improve combat effectiveness. application of this technology is the research being done to reduce crew workload (Figure 10). The joint joi nt Human Engineering LabDACOM project, Integrated Two-Man Crew Station (lTCS) AI to automate a utomate many will employ AI the crew’s routine duties, freeing it to concentrate on on more more critical crit ical matters. Artificial intelligence intellige nce will help determine the capabilities of future robo ro boti tic c systems. On the battlefield, tele-operated tele-operat ed and autonomous vehicles can be deployed in reconnaissance (Figure countermine opentions, rearming, refueling, sentry duty, environmental sensing, and route planning. Already, robotics technology exists exis ts to create cre ate systems with with th ability to perform routine tasks such as ammunition handling, refueling, assembly line activities, material handling, and explosive ex plosive ordnance disposal. Robots have potential as force multipliers, decoys, and for the retrieval of damaged vehicles. Robotic simulators will will provide safe, low low cos realistic troop training. Robotics have the potential to enhance automotive crew crew functions, functions , ammunition loading, target acquisition, and maintenance prognostics and diagnostics. Current uses of robotic rob oticss in the Armor Force include incl ude the development developm ent of the main main battle tank autoloader, autoloade r, and the development of the Tactic Ta ctical al Unmanne Ground Vehicle (TUGV). Current TUGV programs, such as TACOM’s computer-assisted remote driving, DARPA’ DARPA’ss autonomous autonomo us navigation, navigati on, and MICOM’s mission module mod ule research potentially will will give robots he same capabilities as manned manned systems. Robotics also have the potential to increase force fo rce effectiveness effectivene ss and soldier survivability survivabili ty by augmenting the force and the current inventory. Many Many of o f the technologies technologie s discussed a dvances ces of so fa will depend on the advan power generation, storage and conditioning. To facilitate use with electric guns, ground-based lasers, and electric drives, dri ves, very large, repeated repeated
energy pulses will be required. Power generation, storage, and conditioning research involves the reduction in size and increased efficiency of of batterie b atteries, s, capacitors, switches, resistors, inductors, and compulsators. Advancements Advancements in capacitor capac itor technology have reduced the size siz e of a energy store from 63 cubic meters to 0.9 0.9 cubic meters. Fuel cells, similar to those used on the NASA NA SA shuttles sh uttles,, have the potentia to power future combat vehicles. Smaller, more more efficient e fficient power supplies are necessary before the more more lethal weapon weapon systems syste ms can be integrated into future combat vehicles. These technologies also have the potential to increase tactical and strategic strateg ic mobility mobility by decreasing the s e and weight weight required to power combat vehicles. Electric Electri c drives will make combat vehicles more responsive respons ive and maneuverable, while decreasing the logistics burden. Advanced propulsion technologies will also increase the maneuverability of future combat vehicles. These technologies address increasing power-toweight and power-to-volume ratios in vehicular platform platform performance, and efficiencies efficien cies of their propulsion systems. Research is looking into replacing the mechanical transmiss tran smission ion with an electric electri c drive (Figure 12). 12 ). Other
Remotalv driven reconnaissance vehicle
1995
2000
Figure 12
Electric Drive:
port the use of electric driws
10
r
2005
Figure 11
201
Robotic reconnaissance will provide an expanded point of view mand of the battlefield from rehtiwely safe vantage point.
critical critica l ingredients of this th is technology include research into active suspension, lightweight track, an methods of reducing fuel consumption (Figure 13). 13). Advancements Advancements in this this technology technology have already allowed the size th power-pack for the next generation tank to be reduced by 50 percent. Current propulsion research works with with diesel, diesel, turbine, turbin e, an allelectric s y s t e m s . This technology has the po tential to increase vehicle survivability survivabi lity through signature reduction, increased crosscountry speed, and increased vehicle range. range. Smaller more more efficient effici ent propulsion systems will increase reliability, availability avail ability,, maintainability, and durability (RAh4-D).
chemgrn
Today '0.g.. evolving AlPS
Time
Dollar-Years Parameter
S c u m Jumps. Advances everal technologiessupgreatly ease logistics fuel burdens. i s
com-
Directed energy weapons (DEW) may represent ultimate future weapon system. There are significant technological barriers to the advancement ment of large-scale large-s cale directed directe d energy systems. These baniers include size and weight reduction, power requirements, higher energy/power input and better control of of the radiated beam. However, the short sho rt time of flight of these systems, limited only by the potenti al to speed of light, offer novel potential cause damage and disruption to enemy forces. Lasers, radio frequency directed energy, and particle beam technologies techno logies have made possible possibl e the nearly instantaneous projection of large bursts of of energy ene rgy into targets. Di rected energy weapons may may cause damage to mechanical and electronic systems by by ablation, ablatio n, melting, shock an spall, and and interfere in terference nce with with circuitry and information networks. These systems may cause damage to humans by incapacitation, tissue damage, and blinding. blinding. Application App licationss of directed energy technology include laser rangefinders rangefin ders and low energy lasers las ers designed to disrupt optics (Stingray and and Laser Countermeasure System). Other applications of of this technology technology will include inclu de nonlethal systems used used to temporarily disrupt the operations enemy systems, making them them useless. High power microwaves ar being considered for us in countermine erations. DE esearch has unimagin-
ARMOR
March-April 1992
Advanced Mobility Sys erns Dramatic Payoffs:
CrHkal Technologies:
N I . 4 1
Figure 13 edge of the battlefield battlef ield (Figure 14). assess the enemy’s The ability strength strength,, location, location, and and movement, and the ability communicate coordinate one’s forces over great distances, argue convincingly for th development developme nt of technologies technolog ies to be used in space. Space technologies will result in active and and passive sensors, on-board signudata processors with real-time real-time delivery of information, and communication relays from satelsat ellites. Current Current application f spacebased technologies ar th Global Po sitioning System (GPS and JSTARS.
able potential and may may eventually event ually bring combat vehicles into the realm of what used be science fiction. There ar other technologies that have less obvious relationships to to the development developmen t of future future armor combat systems. However, these technologies must be developed if are to win on the future battlefield. battlefield. Future space-based systems wil provide surveillance, communications, weatherherrain data, positioning, and targeting capabili capa bilities ties.. When When merged, they will provide a tactical tactica l commander with a comprehensive knowl~
Navigation
Communications PS
-Microelectronics *ECM (AntiJam) *Signal Processing Processing *Photonlu
Meter Caprcity
Intelligence Processin *Man-PorlaMeCommuni~h
Remote Sensing of the Battlefield Technologies
eMuIti-Sensor Furlon eArtificla1 eArtificla1 lntelllgenc *Signal Processin *Microelectronics
-Ta ctica l
Wemth Wemther er IntdligcMce
---.Rain, ---.Rain, Rain Rate *Humidity and Wind Pmfllo --Map and Terrain Information Information Soil Moisture *Deep Fire ContrdlRSTA
Satelllte Launch u)
Figure 14. Space Technology Innovations. The Army’s use of space will greatly improve the battlefield management of communications intelligence, position locations. remote sensing, and ability to strike deeply behind enemy positions.
ARMOR
March-April 1992
In another program, Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP), he Army has fielded specialized ground terminals designed to process signal and imagery intelligence in support corps corps and and division operations. This program program provide pro videss method method of passing satelli sat ellite-de te-derived rived information to the tactical commander. There ar two technologies that deal directly with improving soldier performance. Biotechnology involves the techniques technique s .of manipulating manipulating and and controlling living cells, an the exploitation of biological processes proc esses and products. Current Current uses of of biotechnology include include the use of of microorganisms microorg anisms dissolve oil slicks sl icks and and to control insects sects in in agricu agriculture lture,, in lieu of harmful pesticides. Biotechnology is also used to genetically engineer spider silk. which which has potential potentia l applicati applications ons in body armor. Future applications of biotechnology include the use bioSenson for the detection of chemical/biological agents, the development better vaccines, and bioengineered i l l enhance soldier rations, which w performance. Neuroscience technology hivedgates how information is processed the body. body. Th brain is very effective at detecting, recognizing, categorizing, categorizing, and discriminating between objects and events even ts i ou environment, and then then deciding deciding on on a c e of action. action. Neuroscience technology is attemptin mimic this ability. better understanding derstand ing of of the brain will allow a more more effecti effective ve interaction between between ma and machine, enhancing based systems syst ems and and robotics. Perhaps the most overlooked of technologies is advanced manufactechnology deal with th turing. This technology production of goods in more resource resource-effi -efficien cientt manner manner.. Better manufacturing techniques techni ques have have the potential to increase product life, life, reliability, relia bility, maintainability, maintainability, and and cost savings. These product enhancements will be reached through the use of advanced
materials, increased automation, and systems integration. The Department of of the Army over research and development lo cations, staffed wit with h some s ome of of the t he best scientists scientis ts and and technicians in the world, committed to the the technolog t echnologies ies that will most enhance the capabilities of th future force. Lethality, survivability (including mobility, agility, and penetration), deployability deployability and sustainability ar th TRADOC priorities for the Future Main Battle Tank Although these prioritie prio ritie (FMBT). Although change slightly for other vehicles, consistent consist ent with roles and missions, mission s, the technology base is supporting ou needs. Lethality increases will be realized through microelectronics, microelec tronics, photonics, and acoustics; advanced signal processing an computing; protectioflethality and directed energy technologies. The protection aspect of survivability will be enhanced with pm-
tectiodle tecti odlethali thality, ty, low low observables, botics, pmtectiodlethality and advanced vanced materials m aterials and and materials materi als processing. Tactical mobility will be increased by advances in power generation, storage storag e and and conditioning, conditi oning, and ad vanced vanced propulsion technologies. need need for fo r strategic deployability deploya bility will attained through advanced materiand material processing. Sustainability will be enhanced through advanced propulsion; power generation storage sto rage and conditioning, and biotechnology. of these technologies, when combined to develop de velop the optimal combined combined arms fighting force, l e m t t Armor Force will on the future futu re battlebatt lewi an survive on field. NOTE: The
definitions these technologies and all the the figur es ar from the Army Technology Base Master Plan.
1992 Armor Conference Schedule Schedule Ma 1992 "The Atmor/Cavalry Soldier" 5-7
Tuesday,
May 1992
Event 0900-2200 0800-1 1530-1 1645-1 30 1800-2OoO 2030-2200
Registration Displays Honorary Honorary Colonels Colonels of the Regiment Retreat Ceremony Ceremony Korean War Armor/Cavalry Units CG's Garden Party Buffet RegimentalAssemblies RegimentalAssemblies Wednesday,
0630-0730
0700-lo00 0800-081 0815-09 0910-0930 0930-1 1030-1 30 130-1 00 1200-1 1300-1 1530-1 1800-2200 1800 1900 0800-1
0800-1200 1200-1315 1330-1530 1530-1 45 0800-1 00
12
Brick Mess TB HQ Conf Rm Brooks Field Qb
Brick Mess
Brick Mess Gaffey #2 Gaffey Audioriu Gaffey Auditorium Gaffey A u d i i u m Gaffey Auditorium Gaffey Auditorium
Gaffey A u d i i u m Gaffey Auditorium Patton Museum Armor Hall TBD
May 1992
Armor Association Executive Council Presentations Chief of Armor Luncheon Presentations Farewell Remark Displays
.POC for General officers billeting: P~O~OCOIf f b , DSN 464-2744/6951, commercial (502)624-2744/6951. .Limited mited on-post on-po st billeting bille ting may be available for other personnel. Contact DEH, ME. Easter, DSN 464-31381 3943, commercial (502)624-31381 3943.
oPOC equipment displays: DCD, 1LT Bymgton, DSN 464-125W1838, commercial (502)624-1250/1838. .Overall POC for Armor Conference: 464-1050/1441,
May 1992
Standt o Breakfa Breakfast st Late Registration Welcome/Opening Keynote Address Break Report Force Presentation Armor Assn. General Membership Mtg. Lunch Presentations Panel Armor Association Banquet Cocktails Banquet Displays Thursday,
0630-0800
Location
CPT(P) Edward W. Payne is 1980 graduate of of th United States Military Academy and has a Masters Degree in Organic Chemistry from Purdue University. He has atte a ttende nded d AOBC, AOBC, AOAC, CAS3, Ranger and Airborne Schools. He has served serv ed as a tank tan k platoon leader, leader, support platoon plato on leader, leader, tank company XO headquarters company XO, XO, and tank company commander in 5-32 Armor, Armor, 24th ID (Mech). His most recent assignment was was as an Assistant Professor of Chemistry Chemistry United States Military Academy. emy. He is currently curren tly servin as Chief, Technical Techni cal Developments Branch, Directorate of Combat Developments, Ft. Knox, Ky.
Brick Mess Gaffey Audiionk~m Brick Mess
Gaffey Auditorium Gaffey Auditorium TE
commercial (502)624-1050/1441. .Confer .Conferenc ence e uniform unif orm is batt battle le dress uniform; banquet is coat and tie; garde party is BDU, casual, or Class with short sleeve shirt and open collar. collar. .Tickets for social functions will be sold during registration. Ticket sales will smp promptly at lo00 hn. Ma soda1 events 92 estimated cost $60.00). .Transportation .Transportation to and from Standiford Field, Louisville, Louisv ille, Ky., will be available on a limited basi basis. s. .Security clearance noCfications for this conference not necessary be cause this conference s undassified. omsit requests foreign nationals must be submitted through their embassies in time allow fo normal processing.
ARMOR
March-April
1992
Th Armored System by Directorate Total Armor Armor Force Readiness, Diriectorate of Combat Combat Developments, and TRADOC System Manager for Armored Gu
The climatic events in Europe over the last, hree years have expanded the potential for f or contingencies conting encies n any area in the world. The problem, now and in the future, fut ure, is the cascading casc ading of modem weapons systems syste ms into the Third World countries count ries.. Coupled with with technology transfer, many countries continue to modernize their weapons inventory. There 28 countries that have more than 1,OOO main battle changing commitments tanks. confronted by lethal and high-tech threat dictate dictat e that we we be able to ded eploy ploy highly mobile and lethal forces rapidly. Th Armored Gu System answers th need for a rapidly deployable, lightly annored system that can support the contingency forces in offensive, defensive and MOUT lose combat operat op erations ions with with CE an direct fire that is accurate and lethal. The is not solely a direct fire support asset for the dismounted infantry nor is it a light tank to replace the main battle tank. The AGS AGS is is a readily ded eployable, versatile and flexible fire support support and maneuver maneuver asset that provides signif si gnifican icantt combat power when when and where MBT's are not available. The AGS's enhanced mobility mobility and high volume of firepower permit permit light forces to mass firepower quickly. This mobile direct fire support can fire an tipersonnel, tipersonn el, antimateriel, antimate riel, and antitank ammunition. Basic loads can be
ARMOR
March-April
tailored
for th
mission with a HEAT, SABOT, HEP, AF'ERS an smoke to destroy the expected targets during the mission. The Armored Gun System has had a long evolutionary history. In 1978 it began as the DARPA funded High Survivability Test Vehicle-Light, or HSTV-L. In 1980, the InfanSheridan drops with troops at Fort Bragg. Officials expect setry School cornlect its replacement this spring. pleted the cost and Operational were redefined, and in August of Analysis (COEA) on the Mobile Pro1990, the Army Acquisition Executive tected Gun System (MPGS). Th Misdesignated designated the AGS AGS a projec projectt under sion Element Need Need stateme sta tement nt that the Program Program Executive Exec utive Officer y establishe established d a need need to replace replace mored mored Syste Systems ms Manager Manager for the purthe M551 was approved by by Departpose of acquirin acquiring g a weapon weapon system. syste m. ment of Defen Defense se (DOD). In In 1989, 1989 , the XVIII XVIII Airborne Corps stated its urgent need to replace the Sheridan. a result, a General Officer Steering Committee Committee (GOS (GOSC) C) convened, convened, d the need need for an AG AGS S and and outlined the resource requirements for an acquisition acquisiti on progr program. am. The requirements
1992
The program program is supported throughout the Army an in Congress. you read this, this , the Source Selection Selection Board is reviewing all submitted proposals and working toward a contract award date in the spring 1992.
13
The AGS ha operational requirements in the areas of deployabili dep loyability, ty, lethality, survivability, survivabi lity, and sustainabilsustainab ility, ity, in in that order of of priority. priority.
enhance the survivability surviv ability of th vehicle by by using sound sound tactics, tactic s, techniq techniques, ues, d pe du re s.
Sustalnablllty
Key Key to AGS AGS equipped equipped units' mission accomplishment is its deployability. The The AGS AGS must be capable of Lo Velocity Drop (LVAD) rom th (2-17 (2-17 if if that that system is availab ava ilable le durin fielding. LVAD from a C-130 is desired rather than required to reduce the technical and program schedule risks. After deployment deployment by LVAD, it must be able to fight immediately after aft er derigging. derigging . The AGS AGS must be strateroll-odroll-off capable from gic and tactical transport aircraft.
Lethality The AGS AGS will mount the the government furnished X M 3 5 105-mm gun. It can fire all North North Atlantic Atlantic Treaty Or ganization (NATO) standard an Armament Enhancement Initiative ammunition. This gives the AGS AGS the the capability to engage a myriad of targets, targe ts, from tanks to personnel to bunkers. Th control will be roughly equivalent to the M6OA3. The system will have either a four-man crew or three-man crew with autoloader. It also will have 7.62mm coax coax machine gun, the commander's weapon weapon station stati on will be able to mount th M2 machine gun th Mark 19 grenade launcher.
Suwhrablllty The AGS AGS will have greate gr eaterr mobility mobili ty than the Sheridan and may incorporate crew protection features similar to those of the Abrams. It also will have three levels of armor protection to meet meet various various threats. The base vehicle is level level 1, and and there will be tw additional add-on annot packages. Add-on armor must be able to be installed quickly quickly and and easily by the crew. mored Gu System commanders must
14
Sustainability will be critical to an contingency contingency force. We We may may not hav th luxury of a DESERT with its long build-up build-u p time and phisticated air and sea port facilities. be constrained, lift assets thereby restricting spare! parts flow and limiting the deployment of maintenance assets. To this end, the AGS will have a power pack pack that can be removed and replaced quickly. It will be able to do like-vehicle like-vehicle recovery. recovery. Moddiagnostic methods methods will contrib contribute ute to system maintainability. Built-in Test Equipment (BITE) will be used to the maxim maximum um extent possible possi ble and it must be able to sustain a percent operational availability rate. The AGS AGS will deploy deploy as an integral part of a combined arms team to any contingency area and provide direct support to airborne, assault, and light infantry as a mobile reaction force. That force for ce with the AGS is capable of of containing containing and repulsing a penetration penetration by threat armored forces through counterattac counterattack k by fire. Also, it will provide a lethal presence that forces the enemy enemy to mass, thereby exposing himself himself to attack attack b air and indirect The system system is i s capable capab le o night forced entry operations and can support the light force at squad through division level with with direct dire ct Units can be employed as AGS pure or ca be task organized to suit the mission. mission. When When inserte inserted d (LVAD) night with with the initial infantry infan try elements, the AGS can secure an airfield complex, block high high speed avenues aven ues of approach or react rapidly to block enemy enemy penetrations. penetrati ons. Whe When n inserted with with the t he follow-on forces by airland airl and or roll-on/roll-off roll-on/ roll-off operations, units can conduct hasty attacks to destroy threat positions and obstacles, enhance security through reconnaissance, block high speed avenues
approach and serve as reaction force. Follow-on Follow-on missions include inclu de platoon- to battalion-size operations, including limited offensive operations, also defense, security, restoration of comman command d and contro co ntrol, l, extended trolling, trollin g, convoy convoy escort, rear area security, rity , and and non-combatant evacuation evacuation
@ E O ) assistance.
The current force calls for 300 systems to be built over a period of sevfirst unit equipped will eral years. be the 3-73 Armor (Airborne), a light armor battalion battalio n of the 82nd Airborne Divisio Division, n, in in 1998. The AGS AGS will replace its M551A1 ( ' I T S ) Sheridans. Next year, the 2nd AC will be reorganized but will not receive the AGS until after 1998. In this light cavalry organization, the will give those units the staying power for day and night all weather operations. operatio ns. The AG AGS S will help the light cavalry units win th recod counterrecon battle, and cause massed targets for the tactical air, attack helihese light copters, and indirect be most effective cavalry units will at providing reconnaissancdcounterreconnaissance, delay, raid, and exploitation operations. Light Light cavalry gives the contingency force commande manderr a force for ce capable capable of perf p erfumi uming ng similar missions and roles as armored cavalry units. This This new new reality of force projection demands that we we resolve resolve the problem of how we we project project a force that i both deployable deployable and lethal enough to defend against or deter attacks by a determined enemy. In the past, we have concentrated on forces that rapidly deployable. deployable. In doing so, we have had to sacrif s acrifice ice lethality. The The AG AGS S will provide tenacious lethality to the contingency force that will will enable enable these forces to set the conditions for fo r the battle an to allow the commander to shape the battlefield. The troopers 3-73 Armor in Panama Southwest Asia have have laid the foundatio fo undation n of this th is er of light armor and cavalry. We must must continue contin ue to build upon their efforts.
ARMOR
March-April
1992
Training With Technology: Armor 2000 Beyond by
Lou Edrnondson
Racing across the frozen winter landscape, the gunner suddenly recognizes hi target in the primary sight sig ht of the MlA2. He checks weapon system status, zeroes his aimpoint, and lases for range to the target, th turret of a T-72 almost hidden hidden in a drainage dra inage ditch to his left front, 3200 meters away. Meanwhile, the driver slews the machine into a 45degree turn, keeping th tank’s frontal armor facing th enemy. Excited frre commands echo on the intercom system just before th first round goes out, rocking the tank and inundating the crew in wave of blast and and sound. Almost Almost instan instantly, tly, the target disintegrates in a blinding flash of light. motion ceases, and the lights lig hts go Al motion on. The gunner notices that he is perspiring. The crewmen, still riding an adrenaline rush, talk nervously about their close call. But this was not real. This was simulation. simulati on. The crew was not inside a tank, virtual reality facility that may may be a lot closer clo ser than you think. In the past 100 years, we have gone from telephones and talking movies to VCRs, VCRs, teleconferencing, teleconferencing, and interac int erac tive video games. games. Applied science scie nce and technology, racing racing along at increasing speed, have produced cornucopia goods and services, spurring greater and greater productivity and advancement. It is hard to imagine that, about 100 years ago, the U.S. Pa tent Office O ffice foresaw a new age when when there woul would d be nothing left lef t to invent, inve nt, “when human improvement must stop.”
ARMOR
It hasn’t and it won’t. Only those are ready for it will be able to keep up. The U.S. Army Armor Force has made the commitment be ready, se forth its blueprint for the future in study called Armor 2000. The study defines how Armor’s roles and missions will evolve, in keeping with the evolution evolutio n of AirLand Operations. major part of the stud concerns the increasing use of hig technology for training. approach the 21st century, technology promises to change change the way Armor fights, and ho it acquires, manages, and communicates information. But the greatest greatest impact of technology will be on training. training . The scope of this tential change is staggering. At Fort Knox alone, th advent of of technologytechnologybased training will will affect affect the 30,000 soldie rs attending Armor and Cavalry soldiers th Armor School’s resident courses each year, and and thousands more in nonresident training. We enter this era e ra wit an attitude enthusiasm, rather than apprehension. While many many training training challenges challen ges lie ahead, we should realize that armored forces have gained unprecedented esresult of DESERT STORM. teem as a result Programs such as Armor 2000 guarantee that we build on that success, succ ess, combining the the traditional traditional resourcefulness of soldiers and our civilian work force force wit an f technological advances to develop an effective training training progr program am for the 21st cence n-
tury. The following ar a few of the technology-based developments developme nts that w i l l determine how Armor trains in the year 2000 and beyond.
March-April 1992
VIDEO TELETRAINING Breaklng the Distance Barrier Long before the information age, a student sent in his money and received. by return mail, the very very first fir st correspondence course. Over the years, correspondence courses have remained a popular and effective way to gain knowledge. But in the past 10 years, electronic training media have begun to replace the written packets that arrived in a student’s mailbox. Corporations and and universities the world over have been been quick quick to recognize the instructional potential broadcast media to extend instruction to people in their homes and other places outside the workplace. Since the early ’80s. fo example, AT&T and the National Technological University have used television to offer training programs and advanced degrees people in widely-dispersed locations. These transmissions, which originate at the corporation’s h hom ome e office and on the campuses campus es of the participating universities, are delivered live via satellite directly to the techniprofessio nals and managers at cal professionals their work sites sites and to students stud ents at regional campuses. Trainers Trainers and educators educat ors know know that television is an efficient and effective means of of delivering information. information. It lets let s you you reach many groups of of people people at the the same time, when when it is i s needed, and to gain access to experts anywhere in the world. These capabilities ad to a more efficient, faster delivery of resources. Today, military trainers ar faced with with a similar simil ar chdlenge, to provide quality training
15
for an ever-increasing ever-incre asing number number of globallyaispersed globallyaispers edsoldiers Currently, the National Guard and th U.S. Army Reserve (NGKJSAR) make up 50 percent perc ent of of the Armor Force. These units must have have continucont inuing training to en= that they can be committed to battle because they will be essential to an future operation such as DESERT STORM.' The Armor Force is committed to ensure that its NGRJSAR forces are just as capable of playing a combat role as their Active Ac tive Componen Componentt (AC) counterparts. The NGIUSAR NGIUSAR urgently need more effective training methods because they have so little time to lrajn an because these units ar so dispersed geographically. geographically. Future training needs most likely will require a multimedia approach, to include television. Video Teletraining (VIT), one approach that maximizes the potential of television, tele vision, might well play a strong role in meeting the need to train and learn at distance. type f electro is el ectronic nic conferencing that uses advanced telecommunication. An instructor in one location tion telecasts telecast s to one or more more remote student sites si tes where where students st udents respond via audio audi o and vide video. o. The effectiven effect iveness ess f this electro ele ctronic nic presentation presenta tion of of mate rial has already been tested on th Kentucky National Guard. Under TRADOC TRADOC guidance, guidance, the Basic Basi c Non commissioned Officer Course (BNCOC) (BNCOC) was delivered deliv ered directly to 19 local armories a rmories and Army bases using a satellite-based satellite-ba sed distribution system. delivery proved successful: in fact, the students at the remote sites performed significantly better than than the control group student stu dents, s, who learned using using traditional traditio nal instruction. There ha been an extremely positive reaction from students, instructors, and training program managers. It is significa sign ificant nt to note that more than 90 percent of Kentucky soldiers soldie rs taking the the BNCOC BNCOC e via V'IT were able to pass pas s the examinations on the first try, while only approximately 65 16
percent passed on the fmt in the traditio traditional nal classm cla ssm m.2 The benefits of ar well documented reduced travel costs, presentation of timely instruction instructio n to greater number number of students, student s, consistency of message delivery, i n m e d access to subject matter experts, and more more cost-effective cos t-effective use of of talents, skills, and expertise exp ertise because because so many more soldiers ar sharing these resources. Currently, Fort Knox as two selfex contained studios studi os in operation plore V'IT technology. The Armor School is no determining determi ning which which leslessons ar best trained trained with video. By the year 2000, television-based instruction, instructi on, coupled with with print support and other resources, could provide the NG/USAR NG/USAR with with the same highqu hig hquali ality ty instruction active duty soldiers receive, but without the need need for sols oldiers to leave home stations, except for the equipment-intensive equipment-intensive training that must be conducted at the Armor School.
COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMMUNICATIONS Managed Communications Communications for the Soldier
Inside armories across the United Europe, oldiers at comStates and puter terminals can access the latest information informati on n the Future Main Battle Tank. An instructor at Fort Knox answers questions on the tank's underarmor auxiliary power unit within minutes. requirement for advanced communications has has always existed. exis ted. Th Army is not excluded from this need. as many benefits, it Although VT does no provide for further communication between between the soldiers and and the instructor stru ctor between between telecasts, telecast s, or after the telecast is completed. In the year ZOO0 and beyond, be yond, computer-mediated communications munications (CMC) (CMC) may may well well serv s erv as an adjunct program to fill this void. One the newer technologies technolo gies in dis
tance training, is a means of sending instruction and communicating with students from different locations at different times, using computer network? CM supports electronic mail (E-mail), the transmittal transmittal of a message from one terminal to a storage location where it can be retrieved later from another termina terminal: l: messaging, which allows allow s two users at distant terminals to communicate in in realre altime; and a nd conferencing, conferen cing, which which usually includes both E-mail and messaging capabilities, capabilitie s, and and may may involve other users at a t multiple termina terminals. ls. network, soldiers and their instructors, using personal computers, are linked linked by by modems and phone lines to a central host computer. All participate in the classfrom an location, and soldiers soldie rs and instru ins tructo ctors rs can use the system to receive or leave leav e messages. messages. CM Jlows instructors to carry on electronic classroom instruction with soldiers separated separate d by by time zones and and physical physi cal distance dist ance.. The network network would would allow soldiers to work together in groups, to questions their peers and the instructor, and to informally share training experiences. Instructors could could conduct small-group instruction, provide prompt feedback on performance, or give remedial instruction. For example, soldiers could discuss how how to t o evaluate eval uate terrain following V'IT class on Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, B attlefield, then then receive rec eive immediate critiques from an expert. The instructor could direct his classes to write company, battalion, or brigade OFQRDs, OFQRDs, discuss disc uss their thei r OPORDs OPORDs wit their peers, and then receive feedback from the instructor. Individually, soldiers could access technical data on tanks and gunnery. Another advantage adva ntage of of CMC systems is that the CMC class could be open day, seven days a week, 24 hours easily accommodating the time schedules ule s of NG/US NG/USAFt AFt soldiers soldi ers at their th eir home home stations The question que stion is not whether we should use CMC but how best to us
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it. CMC has not yet fully developed its potential, but recent technical advancements, along with with increased increas ed computer literacy, literacy, make it wort ou attention as we move toward the year 2000.
DIGITAL VIDEO INTERACTIVE Th Clvil Wa M e e t s Super Nintendo collaborative collaborat ive project between historian Ken Bums (Emmy-award winner far is series “The Civil War”) and the Center for Interactive Educational tional Technology (CIET) (CIET) at George Mason University uses computers in another innovative way to teach and ‘T he Civil War Interactive” attrain. ‘The tempts to return history to an oral-visual tradition, but in a completely new form, one to which students stu dents culturally responsive. responsive. The design of this multimedia multimedia application applicatio n recognizes the importance importanc e of narrative narrative in the study o history, the role of film in relating narrative, and the unique nonlinear features of multime multimedia. dia. The multimedia environment gives students th unique opportunity to simultaneously gather gather and explore the the primary primary s documents, photos, and data from which which the narrativ narratives es are derived. Students can then trace the numerous relationships among the events, linking ideas and and recording reco rding observations as they move easily easily among the many sources.
Perhaps most important, the project acknowledges acknowledges the nee help students develop skills in historical inquiry that they will be able abl e to decipher narrative, interpret documents, and derive meaning from historical events? If the optimistic prediction for this multimedia approach prove true, Digital Video Interactive (DVI) may revolutionize revolution ize interactive course-. DVI is a firs firstt step step in digimultimedia multimed ia development. development. It will be able to incorporate anything from text to full-motion full-motion video, and and will have the potential potentia l to expand the usefulness usefulne ss of PCS.
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DVI technology is based on a simple DVI s imple concept: Il presentation materials are stored together togethe r on on a random random acces ac ces device, such as a hard disk or CD by the ROM, nd accessed difectly by user’s computer? The possibilities possibilitie s for using using DVI in military training train ing are great. Soldiers could receive wargaming training in expo exportable rtable DVI DVI packages covering a virtually limitless array of subject areas. No additional equipment or modifcati modif cations ons woul would d be necessary. There would be savings both in terms of dollars doll ars and in travel time, both both key consideratio cons iderations ns for NGWSAFt units. DVII obviously has applications DV applic ations activeduty training as well. This powerful tool offers many military training benefits: soldiers can can receive rece ive training on their own or ha th at their home stations; advantages of Computer-Assisted Instruction and Interactive Inte ractive Video Disc with with the the added plus of of full-motion full-motion video; the speed the capacity of information storage are increased; DVII provides the variety of DV of attribu attributes tes text, audio, stills, sti lls, and motion video needed needed to maintain interest intere st when when soldiers need to practice skills. Although DVI technologies are still sorting themselves out, this multimedia technology could significantly fect future training requirements.
EMBEDDED TRAINING Train Where You Fight Simulations Simulatio ns combine the best of interactive teractiv e instruction instructi on with high high levels leve ls of involvement, stimulation, stimulatio n, challenge, and success. Typically, simulations are used when when the cost cos t o alternative alternativ e training systems are prohibitively hibitively high, when when it is impossible to study the concepts of of inter interest est in risks are “real time,” or when great enough to require demonstration of competence in a controlle contr olled, d, rela tively risk-free environment. l?te Army made made extens ex tensive ive use of stand-alone stand-alon e simulations simulatio ns in such de-
March-April 1992
vices as the Conduct of Fire Trainer and Simulation Simulation Networking Networking (SIMNET). In the near term, ar working fielding vehicle-appended simulators, such as the Tank Weapons Simulatio n System and the Gunnery Simulation Thru-Sight Video. good these stand-alone s tand-alone an appended training devices are, Armor 2000 an future programs will push technology technology even even further furt her bring the real world closer to the Armor soldier this case, so close that the technology is part of the tank. This is the concept behind embedded training (ET). Embedded training is intended to be a fundamental fundamental characteristic characteris tic the tank itself, designed, developed, tested, and fielded as an operational component. Embedded training is unique because it provides standardized hands-on tmining for the soldier in the field, on the soldier’s own equipment. It will be capable of of training individual, crew-functional, an force-level collective tasks, and can be tailored to a wide variety o off locales and missions. Embedded training uses simulations f realistic mission mission scenarios scen arios and provides “realtime” cues to which the soldier must respond, usin using g the actua equipment. Fo example, example, if the Armor Force Force had had been using apabilities during the build-up to DESERT STORM, could have programmed its systems with with the actual digitize terrain data the future battlefield while still home station waiting for deployment. Platoon, company, or battalion level exercises could have been trained in motor pools before de ployment. The benefits benefi ts of of ET ar significant *Training occurs primarily in the soldier’s field location, at crew positions using using actual controls and disPlays
ET system can provide training while the vehicle is moving, as in tactical engagement simula simulation tion *ET can can store store and retrieve retriev e performance data for an immediate after-action review (AAR) *A
T standard standardizes izes training trai ning y elimi elimi nating or reducing the need for other training devices in the units, and is expected to provide training equal to, better than, planned stand-alone or appended training devices. he real plus of ET is that soldiers will literally “train as they will fight,” using using the same operational operationa l controls during training that they would use in combat. Embedded training for the Forc e will will continue to focus focu s o Armor Force gunnery, tactics, driving, and maintenance. nance. Embedded training simulation simula tion will allow soldiers soldie rs to acquire, acq uire, identify, and engage targets; plan, coordinate, and employ combat power, exploit mobility capabilitie capabi litiess of the vehicle: an perform checks and and fault isolation for systems hardware. Some current Anny systems already have have limited ET capabilities, including the Army’s Army’s Patriot Pat riot and Improved HAWK missile systems. Embedded Training is under development develo pment for other systems, such as the Forward Area Air Defense Non-line-of-Sight System (FAAD-NLOS) and the Improved 155mm 155mm Self-Propelled Self-Propelle d Howit zer. Embedded training also the preferred training technology to support the Armored Systems Modernization (ASM) (ASM) program, which includes incl udes si new new vehicles v ehicles scheduled sche duled to replace repl ace existing armored systems. envisioned, ET systems will be tailored to the needs of ASM vehicle vehic le crew operation maintenance tasks. Armor School is pushing the designFuture Main Battle Batt le Tank to ers include in their original orig inal design, and the test beds for ur ASM effort and subsequent vehicle prototypes will include ET One major testbed, contract effort that will provide ET capabilities, is the Extended Range Gunnery Fire Control Demonstration System. This is a state-of-the-art state-of-the-artfire control system system being designed to support the Future Main Battle Tank. It will contain computer-generated training exercises equivalent to a Tank Table VIII in difficulty.
Armored Vehicle Technologies sociated and Teledyne Continental Motors Motors are currently under contract to design the th e Common Common Chassis Ch assis Ad vanced vanced Technology Technolo gy Training Demon strator (CCA’ITD). Their designs for this testbed must be able to integrate th fire control system with the fire control simulator. simula tor. If If approved, a pproved, the CC A” D, with with its commo common n chassis, will support all future programs the training and combat modes. VIRTUAL REALITY
Simulating Experience
Imagine visiting General Schwartzkopf kopf in his headquarter hea dquarterss in Saudi bi as he planned next attack the Gulf or meeting meeti ng with with Colonel Creighton Abrams in 1944 as prepam to lead the 37th Tank Battalion and the loth Armored Infantry Battalion Battalio n in in its it s counterattack countera ttack to take take Juvelize and break up the German advance in in the th e Arracourt tank battles: or interacting with Patton in the battle of St. Mihiel and in the Meuse-Argonne offensive, where he proved his high competence for command. This kind of realism, called virtual reality, is what the Armor Armor soldie sol dierr can look forward to beyond the year 2000. development developm ent in computer technology is as exciting as virtual reality. Virtual reality is a technology that allows a user to interact with a computer-generated replica f the real world. world. Sensory input, provided via a visor, glove, and perhaps a treadmill, feed the senses information about the environment. The computer-generated sensory input responds respon ds both both to the simulated world world and to the user’s movements in that world. The result is an experience approximating the realworld world environment, environm ent, but without the danger or expense that might be associated with gaining th Same experience in the real world. In 1978, the Department Dep artment of Defense developed a 3-D display simulator as part of a project called th Visually Coupled Airborne Space Simulator for pilot training. outgrowth of
this work eventually even tually produced the Super Cockpit, one of of the th e earliest earli est military applications virtual reality. In 1984, the Human Inter I nterface face Reservch Reservch Laborato Laboratory ry at NASA’s Ames Research Center developed the first lightweight, stereoscopic. headmounted display based on miniature liquid crystal display (LCD) onitors. Although no past current systems complete virtual realities, SIMNET is an impartant impa rtant farerunner to a virtual reality system. SIMNET provides a multisensory (sight and sound immersion in a syntheti synt hetic c environment which soldiers interact with many other participants. But the user’s windows into the virtual world small a shell representing an MlAl Abrams prestank helps improve the sense ence. SIMNET falls short virtual reality in part because the interaction in SIMNET limited to interactions between players? The data base representing the worl worl in which a SIMNET exercise exer cise takes place is dynamic and cannot be af fected by the players. For example, the terrain data base is i s not affected b operator-induced actions: if an artillery round explodes, it does not leave hole in the ground. Moreover, SlTvI.NET two-dimensional. To address this issue, the Army Project Manager for Training Devices (PM TRADE) has funded several research projects8 One involves looking at the integration integrat ion of low-cost low -cost head-mounted displays with with several sev eral image genengene ntors, including SIMNET? Perhaps the most obvious virtual reality real ity technology techno logy in in support o Armor training would be to enhance training simulations. These enhancements could provide for large-sale training exercises exercise s and training in strategy egy and an d tactics and could allow armor soldiers to take part in a combined arms training exercise. greater challenge fo virtual redity technology techn ology may may be to provide prov ide a re alistic battlefield for the individual foot soldier, to develop a virtual environment using automated
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No development in computer technology is as exciting as virtual reality. Virtual reality is a technol technology ogy that allows a user to interact with a computer-generated computer-generated replica repli ca the real world. sandtables. Researchers are focusing on this challenge, challeng e, along with with greater realism for existing ex isting simulators. Virtual reality, reality , when when well done, do ne, should provide users a sense se nse of of having ha reallife experiences, like the “holodeck” “Star Trek The Next Generation.” Such Such learning occurs at an essential level. It will make fundamental changes in attitudes attitu des and and behavior much more likely than with an other technology.
COMPUTER AUTOMATION FOR THE SOLDIER The Persian Gulf added to an existing requirement for simulators that ca be deployed with troops. The Army Communications Electronic Command Research, Development and and Engineering Eng ineering Center and Soldier C3 Program Offices O ffices in New Jersey are a re designing “soldier’s computer” that may may meet this need. It I t is a fully fu lly portable, lightweig lig htweight, ht, hands-free compute system designed for individual soldiers. device will contain a helmetmounted display, pocket-size computer, hand-held joystick, a voice and data radio, and a Global Positioning System. It will integrate other systems, such as night vision devices and numerous types of sensors. soldie sol dierr will be be able abl e to to view a ma depicting infohation such as friendly and enemy positions positi ons or contaminated areas. Then he can input battlefield battlef ield status information and transmit the data to a centralized data base so that other soldiers s oldiers an units can Helmet-mounted displays displa ys would would permit crew members to move away from from fured computer stations while maintaining maintaining access to their computer. This capability capab ility woul would d allow a driver, driv er, for example, to maneuver his vehicle with his head out out of the hatch. He could dismount and move away from
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the vehicle while still interacting with its computers via radio link or wire. Coupled with the appropriate software, the “soldier’s computer” could provide training to the soldier when and where he needs it. On-the-job training would be easier easie r because soldiers could take the computer-based coursewar courseware e with them them into in to the field and could also interact with an in structor struct or via the radio link. Repair manuals could be stored disk, dis k, rather than than on paper, and could be kept at the squad or platoon level, making transmission to the soldier rapid and reliable. More diagnostics and repair could be conducted in th field. Soldiers could get expert guidance from remote locations. Radios would permit per mit the to send voice or text messages through the communications networks to the subject subject matter experts providing the guidance. Subject matter experts could even snap pictures and transmit them back. Although not projected for implementation until the mid- to late1990s. the soldier’s computer promises to make the best use of technoltechn ology to solve problems enhance training capabilities.
TOWARD THE FUTURE The soldier’s computer, an other developments d evelopments will will help Armor maintain its edge. The entire Armor Force takes pride in the quality of training it provides, and in the strides it has made in melding training with technology. It also realizes that much work lies ahead in maintaining main taining quality while forging ne instructional methods. In a time of shrinking budgets and growing demands, the key challenge for military trainers will be to find the most most effectiv ef fective, e, efficie eff icient nt uses of technology to supplement nd in some cases, to supplant raditional nstruction. That is the driving force behind
March-April1992
Armor 2000 and beyond
as
we meet
the challenge of of the future fut ure head-on.
Notes 1. Armor 2000
Total Armor Force (white
paper distributed at the last Armo r Conference).
2. Interactive Video Teletraining. A Breakthrough Training Strategy for the National Guard and Reserves, Program Status Briefing, Ma 1991. Recent Re3. Wells. Rosalie. ’Review search on Leamen and Learner Support in Distance Education Delivered by Computer-Mediated Communications.” Symposium on Research in Distance Education. May 1991. 4. Fontana. Lynn A.. The Civil War InteracInteractive. Instruction Delivery Systems, NovlDec 1991. 5. Ripley. David G. VI “A Digital Multimedia Technology.” Joumal of Computing in Higher Education. Winter 1990. 6. ‘Virtual Reality: A Primer A Discussion of Defiitions and Possible Applications for Military Training Systems.” Barcus. George. Barcus Theme. Dunn-Roberts, Richard R., Proceedings Intersetvicefindustry Training Systems Conference 1991. Op. Cit. 8. Op. Cit.
Bibliography Fort Knox Combat Developm ents. Directorat of Combat Developnents. Fort Knox. Kentucky, Fiial Draft, September 1990. Armored Systems Modernization (ASM) Program Economic Analysis (EA) Final Report, ‘IRADOC Program Integration Office-ASM. Combined Arms Combat Developments Activity (CACDA). Fort Leavenworth, Kan., May 1990.
Th Threat, AirLand Battle, and AFV White Paper (U), Headquarters. Department the Army, ODCSOPS. May 1987 (Secret/NFLD). The Fading Thrcak Soviet C onventional Mili tary Power in Decline, Report of the Defense Policy Panel the Committee on Armed Services, House of R epresentatives, 9 July 1990.
Lou Edmondson is an education specialist specialist assigned to Futures Branch, Directorate of Training Development, USAARMS.
Backto
1918?
viva Th Best Argument For a Two-Man Tank by Captaln Mlke Newell The recent decision to disconnect the Block III tank program from the d Systems Systems Moderni Modernizat zation ion program, an to scale back tank research and development efforts, efforts , has created a window of opportunity to explore new future main battle tank (FMBT) concepts that incorporate future technologies an have combat capabilities capabi lities that far fa r exceed those of the Block tank. Electromagnetic guns, active armor and protection, voice activated computers, automatic fire control, and head-up displays just a few of the technologies available for exploitation the future main battle tank. Some of these technologies could lead to educing the number number of crewmen crewm en required to operate the tank. There ar a number of significant signif icant advantages that evolve from a twoma tank design. They include: increased survivability, the possibility of decreased total combat casualties in an engaged tank unit, and, depending on the design, increased agility agilit y and deployabili deployability. ty. y intent inten t in in this this article is to show the advantages an the feasibility of FMBT concept with with two-man crew. ny future MBT design is likely to place reduced crew in the tank hull, mount an external gun, have an automatic loader, and depend depend on indirect indire ct optics for viewing. On On a conventional turreted tank, the most exposed area of the tank, the turret, contains the maprity of the crew. In the future, especially with with the advent of of smart topattack weapons, it will be prohibitively expensive (both in weight and cost) to continue to protect the turret of a tank. Th best answer seems to
to put the crew down into the hull, most protected part of the tank. This will require an external exte rnal gu with an automatic loader. loader. This Th is crew position and the proliferation proliferation of blinding battlefield lasers will force us to use indirect vision optics to view the battl area Because there isn’t enough room room for four crewmen in the hull of tank, the crew will be reduced to wo or three. This is the basic FMBT design used throughout y discussion discu ssion The basic rationale fo two-man two-man tank is brutally simple. survivable tank is potentially three-man tank Survivability is than a three-man th critical issue. Two-man tanks ot be cheaper to build, operate, or into these arguments man. Sliding dilutes the hue advantages of of a twoma tank t saves lives and is more combat combat effective! effectiv e! The question questi on hounding the two-man tank design in the minds of doubters tw effectively fight th tank in sustained combat operations? The ability to fight a well is a component of two-man tank tank survivability. If can’t be fought effectively, all the survivability advantages in the world won’t make it an effective combat system. he increased srwivability srwivab ility of of a twoma tank is a product of reduced crew compart compartment ment e and a smaller tank silhouette. In 1991, The Rand Corporation completed a study on future tank systems designs called “An Ex ploration of Integrated Ground Weapons Concepts for Armor/Anti-Annor Missions.” Included in this study stu dy is two-man tank design and a number of three-ma three-man n tank designs, all incorporatincorpora t-
in n e a t term (4-5 years) technologies
and equivalent capabilities. This study indicates that the crew compartment f two-man crew, seated twoabreast, is significantly smaller than an three-man crew configuration. This should be apparent apparent to most of us. Generally, the two-man crew compartment design is 30 percent smaller than the most workable three-man crew compartment design, two crewback. This Th is up and one crewman back. reduction in size occurs in the length of the crew compartment, reducing the probability of an antitank anti tank weapo weapo striking the crew compartment from frontal oblique, flank, and overhead (the most most vulnerable vulne rable angles) attacks. f the probability of of a round hitting h itting crew compartment is reduced, the probability of of crew casualties is als reduced. In the Rand study, the twoma tank wa 30 inches, or 10 percent shorter than three-man tank. Thispresents a 10 percent smaller flank and top aspect (the (th e most vulnerable) target to the enemy. enemy. This reduced target signature signat ure makes makes a two-man tank more more difficult diffic ult to to acquire acqui re an more difficu diff icult lt to hit. The combination combinat ion of a reduced probability probability of acquiring ac quiring the hitting the if it’s acquired, tank, tank and striking the crew compartment if th tank is hit equals greater survivability. Another potential advantage of th two-man tank is it be more heavil armored than a three-man three- man tank equal weight, In other words, a 45ton, two-man tank can have more armor protection than three-man tank that weighs 45 tons, and still have have a smaller s maller silhouette. This smaller small er silhouette allows consequently more
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World War
World War
RENAULT P-MAN CREW
SHERMAN HAD
protection for given tank weight weight.. The weight savings savin gs incurred by reducing the length of the tank by percent can be turned around and put back in the tank in the form more armor protection. The weight savings gained enables the two-man tank to have roughly percent more armor protection by weight than th three-man tank. The Th e use of very high density armors enables the two-man tank to add additional armor protection without losing the size advantage. This obviously makes it more difficult to penetrate a two-ma two-ma tank if it is acquired and and hit. hit. This T his additional addition al armor protection, combined with the increased survivability brought about by the smaller tank silhouette and crew compartment, should result resul t in poten tially even greater tank survivability. Alternatively, an advantage of of the two-man tank design could be be a lightlig htwith the same protection levtank with els as a larger three-man tank. In th Rand Rand study, stu dy, although all the tank designs where developed with with equal armor protection levels, the two-man tank design was percent lighter than the lightest three-man tank design. Given equal protection levels, a number the smaller, lighter tank of potential advantages. The two-man tank tank could have increased cross-cou cross -counntry, road, and dash speeds as well as having reduced fuel consumption. major argument for lighter twoincrease in tank would be th tactical mobility and strateg ic strategic armor
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DESERT STORM
S-MAN CREW
deployability. Al these advantages gained while still retaining the survivability advantages of a smaller crew compartment and smaller tank silhouette. The argument that a two-man tank capable of reducing total armor crew casualties is self-explanatory. self-explanatory. The concept conc ept of of a two-ma tank crew reduces the number of tank crewmen in tank unit by a third, versus a threema tank. F u t m tank units equipped with two-man tanks would have fewer total armor crewmen exposed to enemy fire and therefore have the po tential for a third less casualties than units equipped with three-man tanks. There are wo main questions about the two-man tank concept we we don't don 't have the complete answer to yet. (Two-man tank detractors would call these potential disadvantages!) Can a two-man tank crew maneuver the tank, acquire and engage targets, and exerci exercise se command command and control contro l of of the t he tank (and tank unit for leaders)? And, ca a two-man tank crew remain combat effectiv e ffective e during sustained combat operation oper ations? s? Although Although we don't have the complete answer to these two questions, there is a body body of research r esearch that strongly suggests that a two-man tank design is fully fu lly capable of executin al assigned tactical missions. During the the summer of 1990, th German Ministry of Defense con ducted the first round of the 2x Experiments. Experiments. These These experiments, experiments, s ported ported by by some personnel personn el from th
March-April 1992
WESTERN MBTs
U.S.
D
CREWS
Army, tested the concept of a
two-man tank using modified Leopard two-man tank demonstrators. VT 2x Experiments are field trials with maneuver, gunnery, and forceon-force on-f orce tests of two-man two-man tanks tank s fro single tank level to platoon level. During the test the two-man crews successfully demonstrated the ability maneuver, acquire and engage targets, command the tank, and control a tank platoon simultaneously in scenarios lasting up to hours. After the fm t round of of experiments, experiments, the German Army concluded the twoma tank concept was feasible and warranted further testing. The second round of VT 2x Experiments are scheduled to begin in early 1993. Also 1990, joint PM-TRADE/NTC study was conducted at TACO using the Vetronics Crew Display Demonstrator (VCDD). (VCDD). The study involved volv ed OPFOR OPFOR personnel personnel from from the NTC and was designed to test the feasibility of using using two-man combat vehicles in the NTC. NTC. The study con cluded that two-man tanks were feasible if automated gunnery functions were incorporated in an OPFOR vehicle. Both Both tests concluded that a t w e m a n tank is feasible through at least platoon toon leader leade r level and and for f or at least 24 hours of continuous con tinuous combat operations. Some existing and near-term technology improvements are re quired The VT 2x tests found that 360-degree vision is required for both
21
crewmen, as well as duplicate driving, viewing, and weapons weapons controls. co ntrols. These technologies exist today. Th PM TRADE/NTC study found that an automated acquisition and engagement system was required. Automatic target tracking and engag engagement ement technology is being developed de veloped for the LOSAT program and has been demonstrated
ed (CCTB) at Fort Knox, Kentucky. The autotr acking proU.S. has a working autotracking gram, and the Japanese have already included automatic tracking on on their the ir new Type 90 tank. The technology is here! We have the capability capabilit y to build an operationally effective two-man tank prototype proto type within within five years tank that of our research says is fightable for at least 24 hours of of sussu stained operations suitable for command and control activities through through at a t least platoon platoon leader. l eader. The question we know know a lot les about is how well will a two-man crew perform in continuous contin uous combat over an extended period of time. Very little has been done to study the effects of continuous operations greater than hours hour s on on two-man crews. The 1979 British ENDURA test CONFIDENTIAL) is the only test that has taken taken a hard look at reduced crew capability in continuous operations. They determined that there were no tasks required of a tank crew that can’t be executed e xecuted by a two-man tank crew; the smaller the crew is, the more time it takes the crew to complete all the required tasks. In 96hour tactical tactic al mission mission profile, prof ile, used to test M1A2 performance, a three-man tank crew with current tank technology would expect to get less than three hours a day to eat, sleep, and do personal hygiene. two-man tank crew would get even less. We all realize this is unacceptable. The most time consuming tasks that a tank crew must perform are: .Maintain air, ground, and NBC curity .Maintain communications .Perf .Perfor orm m vehicle vehic le maintenance maintena nce 22
.Rearm the tank .Refuel the tank There are near-term technology improvements that can increase the free time of tank crewm crewmen en to a desired level. example, automating the air, ground, and NBC NBC seclrrity sec lrrity requirerequi rement increases incre ases th free time for a tank crew member to slight s lightly ly more more than six hours day. Active vehicle vehic le defense systems are being developed that include these automated security capabilities. An enhanced M1A2 style Intervehicular Information System (IVIS) can give the crew an automated radio rad io watch watch capability. active vehicle v ehicle defense system system and IVIS, in conjunction with the new “cordless” less ” Combat Vehicle Vehicle Crewmen Crewmen helmet technology, tec hnology, may do away with security and radio watch as we know it now. In the future, tank crewmen have the capability to monitor an automated security commo system tem while they perform other crew tasks.
Vehicle maintenance tasks will be reduced through through the t he use of of maintemain tenance prognostic and diagnostic mod ules. These ar not exotic new new techt echnology, they are current systems that ar included on the MlA2. These modules modu les warn warn the crew of impending component failures, the component can be replaced before it fails. This saves the crew time performing unscheduled maintenance mainten ance on the tank. two-man crew would require some type of on-board power tools to accomplish quickly difficult crew maintenance tasks (changing track!). Automated rearm and refuel systems reality today. he Force can do automated refueling at 30 mph at O fe t, we we can cert ce rtai ainl nl do it stationary on on the ground,) Extra crews and maintenance crew chiefs may not necessary. With basic, near-term technology improvements, we give give the crewmen of of a two-man tank over eight hours of free fre e time time a day. That’s more than a mwman on four-man tank gets now
Arguments against a two-man/high tech tank most often revolve around the perceived perceive d inability inabi lity of of a two-ma crew to p e r f m all the tasks required of the crew in combat or the reliability of all the ‘high tech gadgets” gadge ts” on th tank. These The se shouldn’ shouldn’tt be the most important issues. The issues iss ues we need to focus on are the potential survivability, mobility, and deployability ad vantages of two-man tank design! High techn t echnology ology,, which which has some risk, is necessary to enable a two-man crew to fight the tank as effectively as more robust robus t three-man three-man crew could. Every indication says they’ll do just that. If technology is critical to realizing the tremendous potential advantages of the two-man tank, then have to make it it reliable. reliable. And we can! Remember when when laser rangefmders, digital fire control computers, an turbine engines were “unreliable” high tech “gadgets? In each of these cases, high technology ha demonstrated that th real benefits gained worth the potential risks. It’s time ar worth to quit qui t fighting fight ing a good good idea just because caus e we’re uncomfortable uncomforta ble with with the t he technology involved. we don’t accept some technological risk, and push push the outside outs ide of the tank performance envelope, we will never capture th tremendous future combat call tank! pabilities pabil ities of this thing
Captain Mike Newell was commissioned from the United States Military Academy in 1980. He served as a platoon lea der, der , troo XO and squadron maintenance officer at Fort Hood, Texas; as a tank company commander and HHC commander in Germany; and as a small group instructor at the Armor School. He is currently an ORSA project officer in the Directorate of Combat Developments at Fort Knox.
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Really
lll~ration
SPC Jcdy
Night? by Josef
Schroeder
From From the the swamps swamps of Vietnam to th Iraq, the Army has has learned learned sands f Iraq, the importance of seeing effectively at night. We developed and fielded fie lded the frrst generation of starlight starli ght scopes an image intensifier (I*) systems in Southeast Asia. These systems added a new dimension to land warfare, allowing us to fight the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces on ou own Opera tion DESERT STO STORM RM terms. Operation reaf re affm fmed ed the importance importance of conducting ground ground campaigns campaign s on a 24-hour 24-ho ur basis. Army Chief of Staff Staff GEN GEN Gordon R. Sullivan recently voiced is concern with ou night vision capabilities in a pointed pointe d question: question: “D we really the night?”
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discover the answer, the Armor School examined an armor battalion/ through a warfighting warfigh ting lens task force through (the battalion commander’s combat perspective). perspective). The study study focused on the task force structure in terms of tanks, scouts, an support elements.
he Threat he first step in the study was a comparison of ou capabilities and vulnerabilities and those of of a variet of threats, threats, Commonwealth Commonwealth of of IndeIndependen pendentt States (CIS) “SovietlRussian” and regional. That comparison showed showed that the countri co untries es employing the doctrine doctrine of the former Soviet Union turn night into day through extensive use of flares and reliance on infrared sights and devices. However, the CIS is beginnin beg inning.to g.to install thermal
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equipment on attack helicopters, and some reconnaissance elements. In additio ad dition, n, the CIS seem to have reduced the thermal and radar signatures on on its tanks (T-72s and T80s) by making making simple simple changes such as adding rubber skirts around the hull an turret. By insulating and reducing the hot spots n a tank,opposing gunners have fewer visual cues for target identification. Most regional threats primarily use CIS equipm equipment, ent, with with U.S. night vision goggles ( N V G s ) and some U.S. thermal-equipped mal-equippe d weapon weapon systems. systems. In DESERT DESERT STORM for for example Iraq had Dutch-manufactured N V G s . Friendly nations such as the Egyptians, tians, through the M60A3 buy, now have its thermal technology. It is becoming obvious that not only CIS selling selling its best equipment, equi pment, but the
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If we do not have long-range identification capability, crews will fire when they detect target; if the target is friendly, the result could be fratricide. Chinese and others also willing to sell their best equipment. As result, can expect a worldwide prolifem tion of thermal and I2 I 2 devices. They will be available to any country or terrorist organization that can afford them.
Current U.S. Capabillty In the
annor battalidtask force, night vision capability ranges from the unaided human eye to thermal devices. Most crew-sewed weapons in the task force have thermal sights, sights , but their capability ranges from poor to adequate (the , tank fleet). NVGs and driver viewers for combat vehicles primarily use I* technology, which which provides some additional capability, bu the same range limitations first noted in the Vietnam conflict. Essentially, little new new capability cap ability has been fielded field ed since the mid-1980s. Current U.S. thermal technology Consists first-generation commonmodule forward looking infrared systems (FLIRS), with detector amys ranging from 60 channels (M-3 CFV) to 120 channels (M6OA3, M1) to 180 channels (AH64). odules with with fewer few er detectors provide less information and detail an have reduced reduced range to identify. Second-generationFLIRS, which could be availabl av ailable e in the mid-19%, mid-19%, could increase the number of detectors tors to t o 1O 1,OOO-detector will greatly enhance image defmition, to about the same as future high definition television sets, and will inwhich targets ca crease the range at which be identified. All U.S. tanks M60A3, MlAl, and M1A2 with with commander’s indein dependent thermal viewer (CITV) 120-chann el thermal us the same 120-channel sight. Most tankers recognize that the Tank Thermal Sight on the M6OA M6OA3 3 is bette be tte than the Thermal Imaging System (TIS) on the MlAl.
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U.S.
sigh t, when when compared to The M6OA3 sight, the MlAl presents a more detailed image to the gunner. Even though both have 120channel 120ch annel detector, detector, the signal to noise ratio of the ?T is better. The uses a small tube whose curvature results in part of the image always being slightly out of focus. This image passes through splitte rs and lenses which which rebeam splitters duce the total amount of light from the image. Consequently, the gunner increases the image conlrast causing low resolution targets to disappear. Th l ’ T S does not have this handicap since its image is displayed directly onto an image intensifier intensifie r tube tube screen, rather than through a monocular sight. The screen is easier easie r to view view for fo r long periods of time. The sight sigh t on the CITV M1A2 also features improved image presentation, providing more detail detail than the gunner’s TIS. The future does no look bright for th Armor Force. We expect only limited improvement in the armor nd cavalry fleet. A key development would have been the introduction intro duction of th CITV, he position location/navigation (POSNAV), nd inhavehicular information system ( I V I S ) on the MlA2, MlA 2, but it appears that only only 62 of these tanks will be produced. (POSNAV and would allow the crew to easily navigate and know their position at night) The only other programmed improvement for tanks an scouts will be the addition of global positioning systems (GPS), which also will improve ou night navigation.
U.S. Tank Force vs Threat comparison of ou t ities with those of various threats shows that we currently hav an edge in night vision. visio n. Onl concerted effort, however, will allow us to keep that advantage. This will be particularly true against regional threats, who
could very quickly have capabdity equal or superior to current equipment. ment. We could fall fa ll behind if if we fail to program funds field field new new technology while threat countries and or ganizations take advantage of the pron of Weste Westem m techno technolo logy, gy, including thermal equipment, available on the open market. The crucial area, which we need decisive decisi ve edge, is in identifying targets beyond the maximum effective range ou weapons. That range is generbe 3,000 meters fo ally considere the MlAl and 3,750 meters for the CFV. If we do d o not have a long-range identification capability, crews will if the when they detect a target; if target is fkiendly, the result could be fratricide. Historical data indicates that htricide occurs mainly at night or during limited visibility. ability also need an edge in to maneuver quickly, accurately, and confidently night. This means we must know precisely unit’s position and vehicle’s position in relation to the unit: unit: anything less accurate increases the chance of fratricide vehicular accident. In addition the major concerns of target identification, fratricide. and night navigation discussed above, we also face vulnerabilities related to thermal and radar signature, chemical operations, and task force support. Tanks and scout vehicles have incorporated very little thermal or radar signatm reduction technology. Both the MlAl and the CFV have an especially distinct and bright thermal signature. Flat surfaces on tanks an CFVs further increase their radar signatures. Those who have used NVGs during chemical operations o perations know know that chemical operations cannot be conducted effectively at night because NVGs ar not comp compatible atible with with the protective mask. Task force support operations ar only rarely trained and conducted under blackout conditions.
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Few Few suppo s upport rt units are given enough NVGss or navigation NVG naviga tion device de vicess (GPS).
What
Be Th Future?
as recome m r mended mended several sever al immediate actions tc correct these vulnerabilities. For tanks, the following actions can be taken: .Fiel .Field d more more than th 62 MlA2s cur rently programmed. .Imple .Implemen mentt the tuneup. Night Night Vision Vision Labs believes b elieves that the performance of the gunner’s TIS ca be improved by tuning up the electronics so they ar operating at peak efficiency, producing a sight that is as good as th ‘ITS on the M6OA3. This would be done by an Night Vision Electro Optical Lab (NVEOL) ea deployed worldwide to work on every tank. .Field second-generation FLIR with with increased increase d magnification and 480-channel detector a m y , possibly with a 16-power n a m w field field of of view. This would would allow the gunner to iden tify targets out to the maximum range of th main gun. .Repla .Replace ce the driver’s driver ’s viewer with a thermal viewer, thus allowing the driver to to drive d rive nearly as fast at night as in the day. Hi capability would no be limited to clear weather and available illumination. He would would als able to select sel ect routes that would would be provide cover an concealment. .Employ combat identification e This would allow gunners to shoot with with confidence confid ence at targets that can currently be detected but not identified. Without a CID, the gunner ha wait until the enemy closes clos es to within within identificat id entification ion range. .Red .Reduc uce e thermal therma l signatur sign ature e and radar cross section. The thermal signature could be reduced by cooling the engine exhaust wit with h shieldin similar to that used on helicopter. or Scouts: .Fie .Field ld GPSs with compass, compass, POSNAV, and IVIS on all scout vehicles, to allow them readily navigate
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night and also know where the rest their unit is at any one time. .Upgrade CFVs an H M M W V s with second-generation FLIRS with very high magnification (2O-power, for example) and a Combat Identification Device.
For Combat Support: .Ensure .Ensure that that NVGs are completely compatible with with the protective prot ective mask and that they are adaptable to equipment in al types of of units (for example, the tinting of some buck windshields prevents the driver from seeing out while wh ile wearing NVGs). NVGs). .Ensure .Ensure that that more support units have GPS. Training Fixes: .Implemen .Implementt more extensi exte nsive ve target targ et identification training. Tank Crew Gunnery Skills Test (TCGST) should/must include thermal vehicle identification.NVEOL conducted four to five fiv e hours of target ID training training durdu ring a test at Yuma Proving Grounds. The result the crews were able to detect targets by by their exhaust gas signatures. .Thermal camouflage can be created by simple s imple methods, such as using wet burlap to produce black/cold area oil that looks ike a hot spot. .Teach .Teach crew crewss how to set up thermal sights/devicesfo lowcontrast lowcontr ast targets improving both both acquisition acquisi tion range and detection range. .Impro .Improve ve training devices and and simulators, that they include inclu de enhanced thermal target training capability. This could be accomplished by by showing lowcontrast targets under battlefield haze. haze. For example, ex ample, the thermal targets targ ets on the Unit Conduct Co nduct of Fire Trainer (VCOFI‘) today very clear and distinct. Th proposals outlined here help the armor battalion/task battalion /task force maintain its superiority super iority in night-vision capability. But not forever. forever. Advancing technoltechno logy, much much of it available availab le to potentia threats around the world, will some
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da ender our erhaps soon current equipment second-rate. We must must pursue pursu e new new programs program s and field new new and and improved improved equipment, equipment, wit emphasis on POSNAV, second-generation thermal sights, signature reduction, and training to enhance OUT proficiency in night operations. And we must begin now to guard against the da when we no longer “own the night.”
References: the Chapman, Clifford W. State rt in Thermal Imaging Modules: Common Modules, Proceedings th Electro-Optical Laser Conference/Symposium, ference/Symposium, November 1979. R. Paul Orentas, Oren tas, Ferdinand Zegel, Jaime Gonzalez, Desert Shield Guide anuary 1991
Mr. Josef Schroeder is an Operations Research Analyst for the Directorate of Combat Developments, Armor Center, ReservFort Knox, Ky. As ist, LTC Schroeder is the commander of the 3rd Bn, 399th Armored Regt., 2nd Bde, 100th Dwision, Ft. Campbell and Hopkinsville, Ky. He was commissioned in Armor as a Distinguished Distinguished Military Graduate from the University vers ity of Minnesota Minne sota in 1970. He has served as an armor and recon platoon leader wit 2-32 Armor, 3rd AD, Germany; company commander, 15th Bn, 4th Training Bde, Ft Knox, Ky.; and Armor Test Office r with with the Armor Engineer Board, also at Ft. Knox. is 1986 graduate of the Command and General Staff College. His reserve assignments include battalion S3 and XO; and brigade S4 and S3 ,2nd Bde, 100th Dw.
The Future Is Profile
th
M1A2
Abrams
by C aptain Tlmothy Tlmothy G arth one can ikgue the effectiveness of the l Abrams Abrams tank during Op emtion DESERT STORM. The level of firepower, mobility, survivability, and ease operation of the ensured a quick, decisive victory in Southwest Asia. This tank is the latest nd greatest, right? No quite, young trooper. Waiting for its debut with the soldiers of the 1990s is a tank more advanced than the MlAl he M1A2 Abrams Main Battle Tank. Th M1A2 Abrarns Tank looks like just jus t another Abram Abramss variant, vari ant, an evolutionary step in U.S. tank production. However, it more a giant leap forward in tank technology. Nothing like the M1A2 has ever reached the soldier. In the age electronics and data management, the the M1A2 M1A2 gives gives the tanker more more lethality, leth ality, fightability, fig htability, and use. Let’s look at its compoease nents.
Intewe hicular Information Information System (IVIS) S
th tank crew communicate with other tanks, including higher and lower echelons, using using digital data burst communications. Operations orders, overlays, reports, calls for fm, and other information can be sent by by digital di gital data burst through the SINCGARS radios.
PosItIon/NavIgatIon Svstem (POSMAV) The
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PositioWavigation
System
system that gives the crew its position in a military grid grid reference referen ce system system format. This system does not depen on satellites or any other external devices for maintaining location. Input from the POSbJAV is used vehicle location location and, when when combined with with the the laser rangefmder nd enemy and other far target locaknown. IVIS tions IVIS sends sends friendly tank positions to other tanks every 15 minutes, or 100 meters movement. With With this t his information, tankers will always know the position other vehicles in their unit, even even without visua contact.
Commander‘s Independent Thermal Viewer (CITV) Th CITV allows the tank commander to search for and engage targets independently independent ly of the gunner tank commander commander can auto scan and search a sector he has chosen, or scan manually with the Commander’s Control Control Handle Handle Assembly (CCHA). (CCHA). Once the commander identifies a target, he merely presses the designate button, and the main main gun gun is is aligned with the CITV and the target. targ et. The gunner can can engage eng age this target while the commander commander searches search es for the
next target. This “Hunter-Killer” apability greatly g reatly enhances the abilities the MIA2 crew to destroy multiple enemy targets. With the CITV’s stadia stad ia reticle, the commander can estimate range and engage a target even if the laser rangefinderis rangefinder is inoperative.
Improved Impro ved Commander’ Weapon Station (ICWS) ”l e ICWS has improved vision vision blocks blocks that give gi ve the tank commander commander a full fu ll 360de 36 0degre gree e vie view w outside th tank. Each vision block has overlapping view and directed energy weap we ap ons protection.
The C ore Tank The internal and external structure of th M1A2 hull and turret are the same as the MlA1. Inside this battleproven, highly survivable structure i a totally totally new concept in tank systems. The basic wiring the tank is i s a allnew new digital digital system. The 1553 data bu of the MIA2 MIA2 allows each Line Replaceable placeable Unit (LRU)/comp (LRU)/component onent to share a communication link an operate as a system. The 1553 15 53 data data bus allows enormous amounts of data to
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lMPROVED lMPRO VED WEAPON WEAPON STAT ION
flow through the tank, providing the tank and its crew information not previously available. This electronic wonder provides degree of of redundancy, and, therefore, improved survivability. All display panels in the M1A2 ar new. new. The Commander’s Integrated Integra ted Display (CID) contains Screens for IVIS CITV functions. The tank
COMMANDER’S COMMAND ER’S INDEPENDENT INDEPENDENT THERMAL VIEWER (CITV)
commander can look on the CID view view operations opera tions orders, replTS, repl TS, or map overlays. He can also draw overlays and send them through IVIS. Radio setup and control is another feature done through the CID. The CID can provide backup for both the gunner’s and driver’s driver’ s panels. The Gunner’s Control and Display Panel (GCDP) (GCDP) contains readouts of
Interior of the M1A2
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data the
gunner needs needs.. All ballisti inputs, both automati automaticc and manual, can accessed on the GCDP. The GCDP can also back up CID functions. ?he Driver’s Integrated Display (DID) is a single panel that replaces th three driver’s panels on the M l A l . The driver can use the steer-to indicator to follow the come set by the tank commander through IVIS and
control is better identification friend foe. Real time information will be provided through a display screen instead of long radio transmissions. The MlA2’s increased engagement and target destruction capabilities put it head and shoulders sho ulders above the current tanks FUTURE NOW!
Captain Timothy Garth was commissioned in 1982 from ROTC at Ol Dominion University, Norfolk, gradu-
ClTV dome on left turret front identifies th M1A 2 version
the FQS/NAV. He can use the backup function accomplish limited tank commander (CID) unctions if required The Dual Axis Head Assembly @AHA) in the GP enables the M1A2 to more accurately track and engage evasive evasiv e targets, both on the ground and in the air. When used with planned ammunition improvements,
GunnMs Control and Dsplay Panel (GCDP)
Dnver’s Integrated Display Panel
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th M1A2 becomes a more lethal component of of the future fu ture battlefield. battlef ield. M1A2 enhance the warfghting capability of the Armor Force of the future. fut ure. Greater Greate r comman and control realized by this system will increase ou ability to mass and commit decisive combat power on the battlefield. side benefit increased command command and
and the Materiel Acquisition Acquisition Management Manage ment Course, Course, he h e has served as a platoon pl atoon leader leader company XO, and support platoon leader in 2-8 Cav, 1st Cav Division, Ft. Hood, Texas; as battalion S4 and company commander in 3-64 Armor, 3d ID FRG; and as a test offiier at TEXCOM Armor and Engineer Board at Ft. Knox. He is i s currently the logistics officer in the TRADOC System Manager for Armored Gun System Ft KMX. (TSM-AGS)
Commanders Integrated Dsphy (CID)
Weapon Stalnn (ICWS) lrrprwed Commander’sWeapon
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Should we not focus on developing these technologies, and then formulate our doctrine to take advantage of them? Should we shift to “Technology Based Requirements System?”
Doctrine Technology Blueprint the Future by Captaln (P Tom Arlelly
“We cannot expect the enemy to oblige by planning his wars to suit our weapons; we must plan our weapons to fight war where, when, and how the enemy chooses.” Vice Admiral Ch arles Turne USN, 89.5-I956
This issue of ARMOR focuses on technological adadvances vances we expect to over the next 20 years. What changes will these innovations cause in doctrine? For that matter, what what is the th e relationship relatio nship between technology and doctrine? Volumes have been written on this subject, and this short article artic le won’t won’t answer these questions. Change is the natural order of things technology will always evolve, and doctrine is not im mutable. mutable. However, we we must remain focused focuse d o fundamental fundam ental principles princip les of of warfare warfare in in shaping shaping doctrine trin e to apply new technologies technol ogies in in a way that allows al lows us to execute that doctrine better. The relationsh rela tionship ip between technological advances an doctrine is dynamic. The two are so intertwined it is sometimes difficult to determine which which one drives the other. Rapidly Rapidly evolving weapons technology often drives initial countermeasures into the tactics, techniques, and procedures area, while the engineers work frantically frantica lly to to come up with with technological countermeadevelopment o M h e r sures. This in turn drives the development doctrinal doctrina l and and technological counter-countermeasures, and the cycle cyc le begins anew. anew. The Cold War years were defined by by this th is type of weapons competition between East and West.
This relationship between technology and doctrine will be even more dynamic in the t he future. future. Rapid technc logical logical change change will will e revolu revolutio tionar nary y weapo weapons ns systems having a signif si gnifican icantt impact on the “how” of war fare. But will they radically radica lly change the “what” of of warfare? The Concept-Based Concept -Based Requirements Syst System em s the cornerstone the current Army Army acquisition acquisit ion
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system. Simply put, CBR postulates that requirements (hardware development) should be driven by the wa we expect to fight (doctrindconce (doctrin dconcepts). pts). Is CBRS CBRS valid today’s world? Technology advances at a pace almost most defying comprehension. The lethargic le thargic DOD acquisition system virtually insures that “emerging” technologies will be obsolete before incorporated into fielded weapons system. system. Stealth, St ealth, directed energy w e a p ons, composites, advanced acquisition systems, and precision, long-range munitions ar reshaping the dythese technologies, and and then formulate take advantage of them? Should we shif nology Based Based Requirements Requireme nts System?” System?”
doctrine a “Tech-
Th future Army an Armor Force must be capable of strategic stra tegic response to crises through power projection e must must rapidly generate overwhelming force to feat threats to national interests globally, or in miral Joy’s words, fight where, when and how the At the same time, we are ar e entering an era severely constrained resomes. forces will be smaller, based largely in CONUS, and have limited funds for research, development, and procurement. procurement. It is absolutely essential to focus the acquisition process those essential systems critical to the execution of the CBRS provides that Army’s warfighting doctrine. CBRS focus of effort. If a anyth nything ing,, we must insure we mak the “C” in CBRS work. cri tical assumption in CBRS is sound course, he critical doctrine, whic which h supports the “concept“ “con cept“ portion portion of CBRS. Current AkLand Battle doctrine sound. Th ongoing revisions of FM 100-5 will be evolutionary, not revolutionary in nature, providing a true azimuth for requirements development. bottom line is the need to focus ur technological efforts on providing us with with capabilit ca pabilities ies that give us the ability abil ity to apply combat power more efficiently effici ently an
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effectively. we develop a technologically technological ly advanced advanced system system that require more people to operate or.maintain, and/or only operates within well defined paramewith then we we hav have e wast wasted ed precio precious us ters, then tangible increase in capabi c apability lity (remember (remember the SGT York?). The single constant in this doctrine/technology doctrine/technology =lationship is the principles of war. These nine principles are immutable; they will always alw ays be applicable to warfare, fare, regardless of of other o ther variables. There are those who who say that technology technology may may drive drive changes to to th principles of war hat on the modern battlefield, some of thse principles are no longer valid. personally disagree with this point of view, but but it is one that needs exploration. Certainly, technology will impact the application applicati on of the principles principle s of of war and and their interint errelationships, but they will remain fundamentally valid. These principles are th bedrock upon which we must base requirement requirementss developmen development. t. We canno af ford to become enamored with “systems” an lose sight of the fundamental essence of the application appl ication o military power. principles war guided Alexander and will continue to shape sh ape future wadare. must strive to develop and acquire technologies that enhance our ability to apply these principles more effectively. advance, So as weapons technologies continue will our doctrine be forced to evolve? evolve? Certainly, but the effect effect depends on on where you you sit. Armor platoon leaders and company commanders will remain focused on the violent application applic ation of of combat power to destroy the enemy. The fundamental fundamen tal character of their the ir fight will not radically change, although it will occur more
If we develop technologically advanced system that requires more people operate or maintain, andor only operates within well defined parameters, then we have wasted precious resources with no tangible increase in capability (remember the SGT York?). rapidly and violently violently than than ever before. be an armor leader will be more challengingan more demanding. tank or cavalry platoon So what? platoon leade or a company or troop commander, focus on learning lea rning your trade. Having your “head in the game” when when it comes to the business of warfighting is fa more critical to the the future futur e missions f our our Army Army than than a detailed detai led technical understanding unders tanding of a weapons system capabilcapab ilin th words ity. Ends, means Ardant Picq, “(t)he instruments of battle bat tle are valuable only if one knows how to t o use them.” armor
leaders, ou responsibility is to ensure that
we remain focused on the fundamental fundame ntal principl principles es o
w a r f m shaping our doctrine and and tactics tactics and that we apply new new technologies technologie s in a way that allows us to better execute that doctrine n other words, to ensure
e don’t don’t bec becom ome e e d with with “sys “system tems” s” an lose sight of fundamental essence of of mobile armored combat.
Captain om Arielly was commissioned in Armor from the U.S. Military Academy in 1980. He was assigned the 2L Cavalry, Cavalry, 2d AD , and sewed as a cavalry platoon leader, troop XO support platoon leader, and After attending AOAC, he served as the regimental maintenance Compa Company ny officer in 2d ACR and as mander in the 2L2 ACR. He is currently chief, Cavalry Doctrine and Literature, Armor/Cavalry Tactics Division, Command and Staff Department, USAARMS.
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Fu ure Ar
Combat Forces
by’Captain Michael L. Howe Introduction United States military forces are approaching proaching a crossroad cross road in development. Operation DESERT STORM was one f the few wars that did not produce produ ce forced development of of new new weapons, logistic systems, communication systems, or industrial indus trial processes; rather it co nfme nf me d the process process of of research and and development in accordance with perceived perceived threat. However, the existence of an on-line, readily identifiable military military threat upon upon which to base military force development may no be a determinant for the foreseeable future. With development develop ment and fielding fielding lead-times of of up to 15 years for some of of the most most advanced advanced military hardware, it will become increasingly difficult, if not impossible, impossible, to make prudent prude nt decisions decisions based on traditional quantifmble factors associated with the enemies of the past. past. Enterin
the 21st century, a small military force must not become a national security vulnerability. The future United States’ military forces forc es must must have th capability to deploy, then fight and secure victory victory while using using reduced resources. Inherently, armor/mechanized anized forces must must remain the fighting base of the United United States States
was developing.
Between Between World World War and 1939, the United States State s faced a period similar to the decision crossroad the military is facing today. the United States, national policy, the public mood, mood, and
March-April 1992
Genen
Heinz Guderian ai gued in the 1930s armored shouli be at the core of th army his natioi
Fighting Theory Theory
Blitzkreig in Practice: The panzers roll into Poland, 1939.
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budget constraint con straintss brought about wa planning planning based on on the concept conce pt of of limited war in terms term s of numbers numbers of of participants, areas and forces. However, no fighting doctrine was developed support the strategic theory.’ Many nations faced similar si milar decisions decision s about the focus foc us of their armed forces. choice for fo r most became one of of develdeveloping the weapons invented through necessity during World War an an thereby building army based on mechanized forces force s of armored vehicles or maintaining infantry force based on wheel transportation foot marching. Perhaps Perhap s no no nation faced face d a great as Germany rebuilding task during that period. Following a near total disarmament as a consequence World War I, Germany had had to decide de cide n a fighting concept for for its i ts army nd then then build a force capable of executing that concept. conc ept. One of of Germany’s Germany ’s main proponents of armored warfm was General Heinz Guderian. Many of Gudenan’s Gudena n’s arguments, used to convince the German German military to adopt th tank as its decisive ground combat weapon, remain remain applicable to the decisions facing the U.S. Army today. Borrowing heavily from from the writings and theories of B.H. Liddell Hart an
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Fuller, Guderian formed his th armor force around concepts th principles of protection, fire an movement. These ar very similar Fuller's functions of battle as described in the th e following passage: J . F . C .
When two men fight. whatever th stake be, they have got to guard, to hit, and to move. Whether they are armed or unarmed, or whether they are fighting on foot, on horseback or from within machine, these three functions remain constant. Multiply the two men to any number and and the result is exactly the same. Therefore, it follows that all organizati organization on to tactically efficient, must must express these three ficnctions, and the more readily, rapidly and efectively it does so, the more perfect it is in itsev. The things which enable the soldier to give effect to functions guarding, hitting and moving amely means protec-
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r of the Panzerwaff Panzerwaff he early early G etman atmomd atmomd Mid-1930s force tands on the deck of a Pzkw in the distinciive uniform uniform of that force, which included padded beret, later discanied. The Krupp-bu ilt light tank was esse ntially a l@ ht/y armored m achine gu canier. Although it was obsolete for combat as early as 1940, it was ith later modifications s a command used for training and tank. tion. weapons and means
movement have generally called the physical elements war, and ou of their combined use, tactics, or the art ighting is evolved. d e s c r i i hese functions are un changing principles war. war. The The basic concepts concepts remain remain unchanged unchanged even today, providing a means means to examine e xamine the capabilit capab ilities ies f military forces wit common considerations. review of Guderian's principal concepts affms th the primacy of armored forces Army's ground ground combat role? role?
Armor Attacks Guderian felt those outside the membership in the mechanized mechanized groun combat forces of of the ended imagine an mor/mecha mor/m echaniz nized ed attack as massive numbers of tanks speeding across the battlefield, crushing wire barriers, smashing machine guns spewing weapons fm To Guderian, such tactics tact ics were were one us for armor forces forces,, however, they were not th true function of those forces. He felt the events even ts of of uast wars as well as fic-
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March-April1992
Gud erian felt felt that until new and better better method of making successful ground attack, other than mass infantry assault, was developed, Germany had to continue to maintain the belief that armor/mechanized forces roperly employed ould become the best means available for ground combat. titious depictions o off armor combat were impressed impressed on the minds of the critic cri ticss of armored forces that they pictured an armor attack as tanks steadily rolling forward to crush the enemy beneath their lracks whenever and wherever the commander ordered, regardless gardles s of the tactical or operational situation. Guderian insisted that th versatility and effectiveness effective ness o an armored force was often underestimated. He felt that most military mil itary personnel considered armor forces to be blind and deaf, incapable incap able of of holding ground they had captured, and completely vulnerable to antiarmor defenses. fenses. Guderian’s Guderian’s critics critic s insisted that antiarmor antiarm or defenses defens es were no longer susceptible to surprise, and that the modem weapons an artillery of the period were always thought to maintain perfect accuracy and reliability. them, defenses defens es were impervious impervio us to To them, the degrading effects effe cts of of casualties, casual ties, smoke, fog, trees or other obstacles, and ground ground contours. conto urs. Guderian’s critics believed that sta state te of the detection systems, combined with faultless optical systems, seemed to make the defense of of the period all-seeing all-seein g and all-knowing. all-knowing. This scenario s cenario presented a picture in which which armor systems s ystems had no future. If that had been so Guderian would would have faced a situation situati on where where all new tactics tactics for old weapons should have have been scrapped, scrapp ed, while at the same time allowing the world to continue with with the consequ consequences ences of po sitional warfare as practiced during World I. However, However, Guderian felt that until a new new and and better method of making a successful ground attack, other othe r than a mass infantry assault, assa ult, was developed, developed, Germany Germany had to continue
to maintain the belief that armor/ mechanized forces roperly employed would become the best means means available ava ilable for ground combat, Guderian ignored the contention that the older a weapon became the less effectiv effe ctive e it was because of of newly newly developed countermeasures. He stated, Tity the artillery! It is aheady hundreds of years old. Pity the force! Ag is creeping up it.”4 Guderian insisted that weapon effectiveness was relative to the effectiveness of of the countermeasures employed against it, He felt that an weapon was effective only long as the military military was was willin to make maximum use of latest technological developments developments and and thus remain at the peak of performance. His point of of view was’that was’ that he tank tank had not been surpassed by other weapon technology and therefore would would become the “archit “ar chitect ect for victory.’’
Protection One of of the primary advantages advanta ges Guderian stressed was was the the protection gained from a r m d vehicles against enemy weapons fire. He felt the struggle of men men to overcdme the eff effects ects of enemy weapons fire had existed throughout military history; insisting the contest conte st betwe between en armor and missile had and would result in advantages and disadvantages fo each contender, Guderian felt that ffor or each type of armor developed a missile had been developed in order to defeat that armor. The constant con stant strugg struggle le betwe between en armor and missile did did not detrac from the value of armor forces. force s. He believed that if it i t did, armies could do no bet-
ter than to send soldiers into battle with no other protection than their cloth uniforms. Guderian held that in armored warfare, if an army could equip a force with with reasonably protecprotective armor, then commit that force against an enemy defense in an area avoiding the mass of the enemy antiarmor armo r weapons, then that force force woul inevitably be successful. He further contended that if army could equip a force forc e with armor invulnerable to enemy uccess was almost guaranteed. Guderian emphasized that once an attacking force passed the enemy main defensive belt, the armor forces would fight and destroy the enemy’s unarmored forces in unprotected rear areas resulting in decisive victory.
Movement Guderian, only movement brought victory. He felt armor forces provided the best means to bring troops into contact with the enemy. Guderian stressed that the ability to move faster fast er than than the the enemy was was the ke to military success. Fo him, had that capability. armor forces had Movement established th conditions for combat and enabled an army to achieve decisive results. Guderian re alized armor forces could no successfully attack in all situations. They could not storm fortifications, nor could they operate well in obstruction-filed terrain. However, Guderian insisted annor forces could only be looked upon as having even more attacking power than than other oth er arms of the military and was not considered cons idered to be the answer for all operational situa~~
ARMOR
March-April 1992
which could not. So also today, country which possesses fe industries and manufacturesfew ufacturesfew will be virtually impotent to resist invasion.
tions. He stressed that the ability to fm and move, as posed to firing from fixed psitions, would enable armor forces to prevent an enemy from reestablishing a defensive position an finally to overcome th enemy defense.
Armor forces force s of today incorporate the th e computer, as well as advanced electronics, as basic shessed equipment. Guderian, the effectiveness of armor/mechanized forces w i l l only decline when when the military mil itary no longer invest in vestss in maintaining upto-date equipment.
Fire
Guderian Guderian felt the main advantage of armor fmes ability to bring firepower to bear while actually advancing against and through the enemy. Notes sa armor's weapons fire as intended to destroy specific J.F.C. Fuller, British military theoretician, enemy enemy vehicles, vehicles, personnel, personne l, and 'Maorice Matloff. "The American inspired inspi red the Germ an doctrine doctr ine mobile of warfare. Wa, 919-1945," in A p c h equipment, not merely to un Practice of Wur, MiTheory press or pound enemy into chael Howad, Bloanington. Ind.: based conventional weapons as well submission. Fo Guderii, the ability University Press. 1975). p. and as equipment personnel. to actually advance against an enemy .P.C. Funer, ~ u c h i m urfme. (washingArmor/mechanized forces provide unwhile bringing firepower to bear to D.C.: Infantry J o u d Inc. 1943). p. 55. matched crosscountry, all-weather a quality unique to th armor force. 3Closclyadapted from. General Heinz m e r mobility while maintaining excellent fmHe felt that armor forces were im, Pumer Lccldcr. (Washington D.C.: Zengcr Publishing Co., 1952). p. 39. on-road movement capability. By exest weapon weapon for for the attack. Basing his 41bid. p. 42 amining the other branches of th beliefs in opposition to proponents of Army using the same considerations cretanks 'J.F.C. Fuller. (Westpat, Cum.: Greenwood Press. 1983). 5. one comes to the same same conclusions. ated in order to enable the infantry to attack, Guderian concluded that it folConclusions lowed that a weapon weapon that allowed all owed others to advance had to be the primary Captain Michael L. Howe As J.F.C.Fuller stated in his lectures weapon of the army. was commissioned in Armor
Armor Today Today, many of those same advan-
tages stressed by Guderian remain remain
characteristics characteris tics of modern modern armor forces. Most significant, annor forces continue to fulfill the primary elements of wa as described by Fuller rotection, fire,and movement ar therefore best suited to constitute the basis for a fighting doctrine for the future. The armor/mechanized forces provide more protection against direct and indirect fire weapons than an other weapon weapon capable capa ble of movement ment and attac a ttack. k. Armor/mechanized forces provide superior firepower, with capability to destroy all land
34
arm~red arfare?
As the present age is largely mechanical one so will the wars hi age take on a similar complexion, because m ilitary organization follo ws civil organization as industry is the
lows that in the future only industrialized countries will be able to wage or ganized warfare with success. When war depended on horsejlesh, did during the Middle Ages, a country which possessed few good horses stood a poo r chance chance against against a country country possessing plentifil supply. Similarly in those distant days, a country which which coul couldd produc producee a r was all powerful when compared to country
from OCS, Ft Benning, Ga., in 1984. e sewed as a tank platoon leader in 4th ID Ft. Carson, Colo.; support platoon leader and S4 in 2-68 Armor, Baumholder, Germany; and company commander Troop F, 1-12 Cav, and as a force design officer at Ft Knox, Ky. He is currently attending Georgetown University in graduate studies in national security. He will be assigned as an ROTC instructor at Georgetown in September 1992. is a graduate of the Armor Officer Basic and Advanced Courses and CAS3.
ARMOR
March-April
1992
Creeping Overwatch by Captain Robert
Jones
During a recent rotation to the National Training Center, National Guard units practiced a variation of the platoon movement movement by successiv successive e bound technique. The variation, frequently called “creeping “creeping overwatch,” w was as a solution the tactical problem of advancing over open terrain. Creeping overwatc overwatch h is simply the logical extension extensi on of movement by succes succes sive bounds. The current doctrine teaches two two methods for a platoon conducting bounding overwatch: alternatin bounds and successi suc cessive ve bounds. Both techniques us the section as th basic unit for movement. Creeping overwatch adds a third movement technique to the traditional two methods described describe d in the manual, extending the technique successive successiv e bounds to a one-tank bounding element. In creeping overwatch, the platoon leader orders the lead section to bound one tank at a time. time. As he bounding tank maneuvers forward, forward , the platoon leader
retains 75 percent of hi combat power in overwatch. This is better than the normal 50 percent available when The lead tank bounds forward about 50 meters (see Figure 1) When the lead tank is set, the platoon leader orders the second vehicle in the bounds, the platoon leader still ha 75 percent of his combat power in in overoverwatch, one tank forward and two tanks back (Figure Once the section is established forward, the platoon leader bounds the trail section. The platoon leader leader bounds both tanks n the trail section together if the enem no d on either of the lead lead tanks Figure
3). If the enemy intends to contest cont est the i l l platoon’s platoon’s forward forward movement, movement, he w fm most likely likely ope when when the fm enters enter s his engagement engagement area. If the t he enemy has not not fired fired by by the time the second secondtankenters tank enterstheengagementarea,
WING TANK BOUNDS
IRECT FIRE
OVER WATC
Figure
it probably safe to bound the trail element as a section. There ar several tradeoffs in th setechnique. The first and most most obvious o bvious disadvantage to this technique is that it is slow. The boundingtanks houldonly bound 50 meters, and and it takes the plawhole platoon forward 50 meters. The 500-meter guideline allows the tanks in overwatch overwat ch to cover the lead tank wit machinegun machinegun fm s to repel a close infanambush. It also allows the overwatching tanks to provide accurate fires 2000 meter forward of main the bounding tank. Even mom time is involved involv ed if if the bounding tank mus evade an ATGM, ATGM, the “Sagger Dance” adding time to each each bound. And And finally, finally, the time that the overwatch element spends one position increases the overwatch element’s vulnerability to enemy artillery fms. n the positive side, sid e, creeping overwatch is the most secure movement technique to maneuver a tank platoon forward. The technique risks the smallest element elemen t forward forward prior to contact. It provides provide s the platoon leader with with the with maximum maximum firepower firepo wer to deal anticipatedenemyaction.Thetechniquealso allows the platoon leader to maintain maintain forward forw ard momentum momentum under fire. using direct fires to destroy at least suppress suppress enemy enemy AT weapons, the platoon can maneuver maneuver even when when very litlittle cover is available. This technique does not ignore the importanc portance e of of the the wingman wingman concept to each tank’s survival. The wingman must have a clear view of of his h is partner at all times in order to even consider using using this technique. The original concept of this technique pctically dictates that the whole platoon will have ha ve an an almost identica iden ticall sight sigh t picture. As with with any overwatch technique, the platoon platoon leader ~~
ARMOR
March-April
1992
35
movement, implies that enemy contact is very likely lik ely and that the platoon leader should should know the direction direction from which which he expects attack. platoon leader, when when he decide decide initiate this technique, should move the platoon into a f i r n g line and give an orientation. platoon leader's lea der's choice of of this this movemovement technique technique dictates dictates against moving moving forward by alterna al ternate te boun bounds ds because alternate bounds ar inherently less se cure than successive bounds bounds The company commander ca use creepi cre eping ng overwatch to gain gain ground under fire by designating desi gnating the boundin platoon and maintaining 13 of his 14 tanks in overwatch. This leaves the commanderwith 93 percent of his combat power kill kil l the enemy. enemy. The withering erin g frrepawer available from a tank company or tank team will go a long way toward helping the bounding vehicle comple complete te his bound. bound. Creeping overwatch deserves a place professional toolbag as the third method of movement under the heading of bounding boundi ng overwatch. Although Although thi technique is technically boundingoverwatch with movement by successive bounds, the specif specifics ics of the technique make it an important variation from from the method prescribed FM 7-15. Creeping overwatch is an excellent excellent movement movement technique when the security of of the force is threatened, threatened,bypass bypass isnot possible, possible, an the unit unit must continue conti nue to to gain ground. ground.
DIRECT FIRE OVERWATCH
PLATOON LEADER
Figure must avoid masking the overwatching element's fires he first wo bounding vehicles move forward. This means wingman will normally bound fust, followed by by the the second vehicle in the section. platoon leader can initiate creeping overwatch overwatch from from any formation format ion and
en th bound back in that formation. Fo example, if the the platoon is moving moving in echelon left, and the platoon leader initiates creeping overwatch, the platoon platoon should shoul d end its bound back in an echelon left formation. have drawn the platoon line formation because this technique, with its very slow and secure
Captain Robert L. Jones was commissioned in Armor Armor from USMA in 1983. He has served as a tank platoon leader and tank (COHO RT) compan compan XO with 266 Armor. H e commanded commanded Charlie Company, 4-69 Armor in Kitzingen, Germany, and is currently assigned as an a n armor company combat trainer at the National Training Center.
ARMOR
March-April1992
The The Impact of Germ German an Reunification Reunific ation On th the e Future of the t he Germ German an Armor Forces by Lieutenant Lieutenant Colonel Colonel Wolfgang Hahne, German German Army What will happen after unification? What will German
Reunification created great hope and a new new perspective perspective for Germany, but it is clear cle ar now now that th at..we have underestimated some of of the difficulties. difficul ties. Unemployment risen, the budget deficit has increased, interest rates are up nd taxes are up, too. The basic idea for unification is, that the people in the former German Democratic Democratic Republic Repub lic ar the real losers of World War I1 because they suffered 47 47 years under the repression of the Soviets and never had a chance leave their country. Therefore, these people need help and confidence, and and we decided to take ta ke all al l of them them kind of job, job , including soldiers an kind without looking at a t what they they had been doing in the past. e integr int egrate ate the state statess of the old GDR, replacing a communist command mand economy with a democratic democ ratic system tem and a fre f ree e market economy are also facing the problem of uniting two armies that radically differ in or ganization, tactics, equipment, and and training.
left bers of the that service servic e before re unification, which took place on on 3 October O ctober 1990. This left 130,000 to be integrated into the 470,000-member Bundeswehr. So far, the integration process has revealed a tremendous number of
unity mean or peace an security in the heart of Europe?
will Germany revert to old pattern of behavior, or has it learned the lesson of history?
Germany will remain linked to the United States in close friendship and partnership, which is of vital importance importance for Germany, and this means we will remain in NATO. Germany will be a free democratic country, country, with sovereignty based on our constitution and basic law Germany will also remain a Federal state, now with five more eastern states. (See shaded area on ma
below.)
oland
Uniting Two Armies Armies Before unification, the Nationale Volksmee of the the GDR had a strength of of about 170,000 men. men. The unification treaty fixed very unfavorable conditions condi tions on on the adoption of sol40,000 memdiers from from th east,
CrechOsbvakia
The New Germany with unification, Germany added the five eastern states (shaded (shad ed area), which include about 16 million additional people and a 70.000 square
mile area. The nation now in-
cludes about 80 million people and an area of 225,000 square miles.
ARMOR
March-April
1992
witzerland
Austria
erman Forces
problems that had not been
foreseen:
.Equipm .Equipment ent and weapons of th NVA were less efficient than we had thought .Barra .Barracks cks were in a desolate deso late state, compared to Western standards.
Through 1994
470,00(
600.000
minusm0,m
--
370,000 I
m
BW
:Future German :Forces m m
L---..-d .The styl st yle e of command more closely resembled the Russian, rather than West Flgure German, command tradition. traditio n. .Many of Bundeswehr officers members members of the the old NVA. and noncommissioned officers officer s took a this 3,500-officer requirement, half decidedly negative attitude toward ro the Bundeswehr West, l West, E a s t German their countexparts iin n the the so only about 2,000 of the former NVA NV A officers officers will be needed. Army. asThe Bundesw Bundeswehr ehr West had imagine the kind of social social problems, sume the cost of the Bundeswehr East acceptance problems, and organizafrom its annual budget. tional problems we have inherited by .Some of missions of the old dismissi dismissing ng more more than 40,000 officers off icers ha no counterpart counterpart in in the Bunrepresenting almost the entire officer deswehr he operation of power corps of the East German Army. plants and ay nurseries, for example. The history and traditions of the Added Added to these these problems of of reunifiNV officer corps reflect a long pecation were the requirements of th riod of Soviet domination. domination. In 1957, ll will restrict ‘2-Plus4 Treaty” which office off icers rs who who were Wehrmach Wehrmach the size.of the unified German Army officers during WWII were dismissed. to 370,00 370,000 0 men men by 1994. Given that Officers were sent to the Soviet Union Union the Bundeswehr Bund eswehr had 470,000 memfor training indoctrination. Th bers and added 130,000 from the east, officers were recruited from German this will will mean mean a force fo rce reduction o soldiers who who had deserted deserted to the Rus230,000 from the Bundeswehr by by the sians during Wwn and younger younger men men compliance date. The plan calls for who had already been influenced by the Bundeswehr to reduce its strength Soviet thinking. As a result, ax to 370,000, including 50,000 former faced with with integratin integrating g an officer officer corps members (See Fig. 1). of almost Russian character. Beyond the matter of numbers, there These differences broad and sigis the problem of structure struc ture and and organinificant, affecting tactical doctrine, zation. third of the members style styl e of of command, and the relationwere officers: in contrast, only seven ships between officers, NCOs, nd enpercent of the Bundeswehr are offilisted men. men. The The Bundeswehr Wes cers. (A NCO corps, as we know it, as influenced influenced by the traditions traditions of the did not exist. the NVA, NCOs were former Wehrmacht and ou NATO alus drivers and cooks, Specialists lies. By the tradition tradit ion of of the for example ot subordinate leadleadWehrmacht, mean tactical doctrine, ers. Officers were! responsible for style of command, and relations many many of the duties duti es ur NCOs among among officers, officers, NCOs, NCOs, and enlisted en listed sume.) men. men. In contrast, contrast, the NVA NVA institutioninstitutionApplying the Bundeswehr’s seven alized alized some of the worst charact characteriserispercent guideline to the remaining tics of of Soviet Sov iet organization: organization: 50,000 members the VA results in a requirement fo only 3,500 offiThe styl style e of command command in th NV cers, not the 40.000 40.000 to 50,000 who involved detailed orders ord ers from from higher
to lower levels le vels of comman command, d, with junior leaders having only a very narrow range of decisionmaking. In contrast, the Bundeswehr delegates much more authorit authority y to lower ranks, reflecting Geran military tradition since the middle middl e of of the last century. tury. Every leader lead er ha to decide independently on the activities being canied cani ed out on his level. He gets only broad directives explaining his objective or th desired result and latitude de cide how how that result i s achieved. This is the heart of the concept of “aufhagstaktik,” or mission orders. 0A we adopt these new officers from th NVA, also inherit an ideological problem. All the officers of the East German Army were members th Socialist Unity Party Germany (SED).They were! all communists. However, since end of the 1970s. the populati popu lation on of the G had realized realize d that their theory of the state sta te clashed more more and more with with so cial and economic reality, and their communist communis t beliefs beliefs had become become a hollow ritual. ritual. When yo talk to these forforofficers today, they recognize and admit that history history proved proved the superio superiority rity of the Western conception of the world and its i ts way of life. life. But But in their own justific just ificatio ation, n, they they also say that socialism or communism was a good and and noble utop ut opia ia The younge younge officers of the former will free themselves themselv es more quickly from their ideology than than the older old er ones, and and the majority of the th e officers officers of of the t he former former East German Army who will finally integrate during the next year will be older older than than 35.
Weapons an Equipment Along with many former members of the NVA, we have inherited inherited their equipment equipment and weapons (see (se e Fig. Fig. 2). Some of of it can very well be used used by us, but there ar considerable problems with heavy weapons. Tracked
ARMOR
March-April
1992
Weapons and Equipment Absorbed from the East German Army ( M a p Equipment
Appronmh Totah)
2,000 Main Battle Tanks 2.40 0 Infanby Fighting Fighting Vehides 320 Self-propelled Howitzer 400 Towed Howitzers 270 Rocket Launchers 30 Mortars 900 Twin AA Guns 1,500 Recon Vehides
will not need this additional equipment, except in a few cases. The Bundeswehr plans, for example, to adopt 76 of the NVA’s BM infantry fighting vehicles vehicles until enoug enough h Marder 2 Improved IFVs become available in 1994.
50 Cargo Helicopters
26,000 RPGs 163,OOO Submachine Guns 450 Antitank Missiles Recovery Tanks
Figure vehicles have steel tracks, rather than rubber tracks, as th NV did not move tracked vehicles vehicles on publi roads. However, this is i s very very often the case in the West, and and the steel-tracked steel-tracked equipment will ruin blacktop roads. Safety standards are very different, too. For example, all of vehicles must must have dual braking systems: theirs do do not not have this. Their ammunition propellants have considerable mercury content, content, whic which h produce producess hazardous vapors. To us these weapons, we would have to develop new munition with safer propellants. Most combat vehicles cannot exceed km/hr in reverse, a fatal weakness when when changing changing positions and unacceptable for an kind of reconnaissance use. Many f the the Soviet-designed vehicles depend on on large amounts of asbestos in their their construction. We are taking this out of the vehicles hicles we plan plan to conti continue nue using. In addition, addition, we would would have to add thermal sighting equipment to vehicles cle s and, f course, replace replace all the radio systems for compatibility. Al in all, the cost of many of these changes changes would be too prohibitive, and moreover, over, the Bundeswehr Bundeswehr would become spare parts from the So dependent viets. Finally, with the downsizing of forces in Europe under the CF Treaty, a treaty whic which h reduces reduces level of conventional conventional forces in in Europe, we
ARMOR
The Bundeswehr plans, for example, to adopt 764 of the NVA’s BM infantry fighting vehicles until enough Marder Improved IFVs become available in 1994.
will also be able to us
former NVA rifles, rifl es, NBC NBC protective clothing and equipment, equipm ent, shoulder-fired shoulder-fir ed surfaceto-air missiles, water treatment plants, maintenance vehicles, and some other equipment. Barracks facilities were were in a desolate state. Little had been spent to keep up the buildings here had always been a shortage short age f building building materials in the the GD nd barracks blocks appear a gloomy gray, with falling plaster and poorly functioning toilets and shower moms In 1991, the Bundeswehr spent 55 million marks fo renovation of barracks in the five states states of of the former GDR. GDR. UnfortuUnfor tunately, nately, this money money was obtained from the building building funds of of the Bundeswehr. Now, what will become of what used to be the East East German Army? The new new Federal Federal Armed Armed Forces Forces Eastern Command will have 50,000 men, men, including the remaining personnel of the the East Germa Army an 1,500 officers and NCOs of the Bundeswehr. The Corps East will include territorial troops, in order to save staff and personnel. We We will also al so combine Army and territorial troops in th West by 1994. This will be part of reduction to 370,000 men. In spite of all these problems, we ar optimisti optim istic c and and hopeful that, that, in a few years, years, we will have have overcome the differenc fer ences es between between East East and West and united, intact Bunemerged with deswehr.
Misslons: Then and Now Under the 1949 constitution, whic whic allowed the reestablishment reestablishment of armed
March-April 1992
forces in 1956, the Germans and their allies agreed that the new G m a n forces force s woul would d be used only in d defens efens of German and NATO NATO territ ter ritory ory,, i th event of an attack attack by the the Warsaw Warsaw Pact. Now Now that the the threat from the old Soviet Union has changed, changed, we we need a new new strategic strategic concept. The army’s fu ture missions missions will will focus o three areas:
.Defen .Defense se of Germany’s fronti frontiers ers mostly as an integral part of the alli ance, but on occasions under national command. .Participation in actions actions at the pe riphery of alliance allian ce territory. .Participation in UN and possibly even WE missions, once the appropriate legal foundations have been es tablished. Th m y ’ s main task, however, will remain that of directly protecting protecti ng the people and state sta te of of Germany.
Future Tactlcs and Strategy To be successful in defending Germany, ur forces will have to maintain strong 0penti0~1eserves so that we can concentrate to prevent a successful attack. Along extended sectors, this will mean that a relatively small part of the force for ce will perform perform reconnaissance, guard, and cover missions, maintaining surveillance s urveillance over wide areas and and bei being ng d to react react immediately immediately to border violations. This force must be strong enough to shape the battlefield for decisive operations, but will have to accept high high risks risks in those sectors. We cannot deploy strong forces along ou entire border as we did in the past. past. Once the weaker covering forces ca identify the enemy’s main main effor effort, t, we will will have strong reserves sufficient to sustain decisiveoperations. Fo situatio situations ns at the periphery of Europe, we will need specially specially organized and trained military mili tary forces at a higher state sta te of of readiness than those poised to
defend Central Europe. Europe. These forces for ces will need to be mobile mobile and sustainabl at long distances. Although the future NAT NATO O struct structure ure and the multinational multinationa l corp are i l l decided yet, there no doubt we w take part in the NATO multinational force structure.
will do the same w with ith military military district commands (WBKs). However, they will remain in a position to split up into two separate commands discharge their own own particular particular functions in time war. Once oriented primarily toward plementi plementing ng the German German Defense Plan,
ple of dividing, most maneuver brigades will be at around 60 percent of their authorized peacetime standing strengths. limited limited number of the standing maneuver brigades, combined with with appropriate combat combat port, logistic logistical, al, and and medical medical troops will form the backbone a force for action on short warning. Reservists will play a muc greater role role in the the new new German Army. Al though there will be fewer reservists, there will be need for higher quality reservists, as they will ma about 50 syst of the the prim primar ary y w tems. The reservist reser vist will now be at the heart of the ne G m a n Army, rather than on the periphery.
~ ~ ~ ~ - = UPPORT
Figure
Peacetim e Organization Organization Corps/lerritorial Level
Figure Future German Army Force Structure
ar faced with reduction in the Size of the army tremendous increase crea se in the temtory it has to cover. Yet we want to retain an adequate number of of major combat formations, which which will increase demands o on n the command and control system. This problem problem could could only be solved by adopting new command structure, called Army Structure 5. The idea behind Army Structure is to merge the Army Field Forces Forces with with the Temtori Tem torial al Army, a merger merger made made possible possible by changes in in the overall overall security setting and driven driven by by the the need reduce the number an size f commands. commands. This fusion reflected in the Army’s streamlinedpeacetime organization Corps headquarters organizations will merge with with temtoria temt oriall commands to form one command command in peacetime Division Division headquarters headquarters organizations 40
th Bundeswek Bundes wek is i s undergoing undergoing
trans-
formation, gradually becoming oriented toward training and reconstitution. Applying the so-called princi-
Peacetime Organization
shows the peacetime organization of corpsherritorial corpsherrito rial comcommands, and Figure the organization of divisiodWF.%Ks. divisiodWF.% Ks. Each Each division/WBK sion/WBK has command command of 2-3 mechanized brigades, light infantry regiment with lraining capacity for reservist reser vists, s, and and a varying number number of VBKs.
DivisionMlBK Level
Figure
ARMOR
March-April 1992
ACTIVE
PARTLY ACTlVl
CADRED
18
calls for 28 maneuver neuver brigades, brigade s, three of of them them stands tanding, fully cadred, one standing mounta mountain in infantry brigade, the stands tanding Franco-German brigade, and three airborne airborne brigades, brigades, two of of them standstan dng (Fig.
all, under Army Structure the Armor Forces will go from the current 74 tank battalions to 46 active, 18 partly active, and four cadre (Fig. 6).
The German Armor Farces will be affected most most by the th e reductions reduct ions in in th German Army. Two active (parent) tank battalions will belong to each of the three active mechanized infantry brigades. Two more tank battalions, one an an active ac tive unit and one a partly active build-up unit, will belong to each of the 18 partly active mechanized infantry brigades. Two cadre tank battalions will belong to the two cadre mechanized infantry brigades. Over-
Army Structure Maneuver Brigades Brigades The structure of ar mored reconnaissance Figure forces in Army Structure In summary, Structure leaves the is not et, but there indicaarmy with: tions this branch branch will retain at least le ast The same number of corps and and terthe same strength as it had under th previous army organization because of ritorial commands. .Eigh .Eightt divisi divisions ons and WBKS, rather the greater need need for reconnaissance to the current divisions divis ions and and five 12 protect flanks and overwatch areas. WBKS. We will also need need a stronger stron ger air-transtotal of 28 maneuver brigades portable component given the future fut ure instead of of the th e current 48. potential missions mission s of of German German forces. The elimin eliminati ation on of 115 fully or partly active battalions. .The elimin eliminati ation on of 166 cadre battalions. (Fig. 7) Under Army Structure there is sufficient flexibility to task-organize task-organize on short notice, notice , combining combining standing airmobile and mechanized units and necessary combat support and combat service support elements.
Army Structure
3X
EOPARD2
1OX
LEOPARD2
LEOPARDlA5
6X LEOPARD 1 A5
X
LEOPARD2
Germ an Armor Forces Figure
ARMOR
March-April 1992
R
F
R
G
E
IntegratingActive and Build-up Batt field trials helped decide ho to integrate parent and cadre battalions in the armor forces force s and mechanized infantry. In In peacetime, peac etime, the “build-up “buil d-up battalion” remains under the control of the active act ive battalion, batta lion, which which is re sponsible for mobilizing its non-active counterpart when when needed (Figs. 9). The active battalion’s commander is responsible for both units, and his active unit includes the cadre for the build-up unit. On mobilization, th active battalion commander moves moves to comman command d the build-up battalion, ba ttalion, while his subordina sub ordinate te takes over the active activ e unit
41
Conclusion Faced with the problem a substantially smaller German an fewer Allied forces stationed statio ned in Germany, we must be able to accomplish much much more more difficult diffic ult missions over a larger area. Planning is clearly determined mined by the intention to ensure full integration into the Alliance. With the reorganization, the German Army will have have adequate standing forces to enable participation in IRF/RFW an UN missions. Within the Bundeswehr, our major challenges downsizing, building Corps in the East, and integratin the NV forces into the Bundeswehr. The basic features ar on streamlined command structure, and greater importance of reservists. We know know that neither the Germans mans alone nor the West Europeans together can manage these challenges. Only with close clos e cooperation from from our allies, particularly our American friends, we can meet these challenges.
Stnrcture corns erkorial Command WBK Battalio ns (A&e/Pa rtly Active) Active) Ba ttalions (Cadred) (Cadred)
3
12 28
14 385
27
515
349
Figure
Bulld-up" Through Partltloning
r-
15
NCOS.25
-43TOTAL
Features: -BuikiupbaMbnnotaclive On battalion commander
Mobilizationwith one organization
only hope to have the kind success success you you have have had in your 200 history. In opinion, our years greatest advantage is that we all want as possia united Germany ble.
Integrated
ca
PARENT UNIT
crisis
Figure
42
NCO training company
Parent Deputy
cmdrbeawnes btitd-~pb a n b
takes command of parent bn
Figure
BUILDUP UNI
Lieutenant Colonel Wolfgang Hahne, German liaison officer to the Armor School, has over 30 years of active commissioned service, beginning as a tank platoon leader of a Leopar unit. He has served as tank battalion commo officer, company commander, battalio XO an nd tank battalion commander. At various times in his career, has also served as an instructor at the officer school and the Combat Arms School.
ARMOR
March-April1992
50th Anniversary
D ivision on 7th Armored Divisi
Armored
cars and halftracks of th
AD return enemy fire near Epemay. France. August 1944.
The “Lucky “Lu cky Seventh”: Seventh”: Assi A ssigned gned to to ThreeThre e-Armies, Armies, D uring ng Its WWlI Campaign Seven Different Corps Duri From N ormandy to the Balt With headquarters in tent and good deal borrowed equipment, the Armored Division started life at Camp Polk, Louisiana, on March 1942. Le by MG Lindsay McDonald Silvester, the “Lucky Seventh” whipped itself into fighting trim with maneuv ers i Louisiana and Texas.
World War I1 Campaigns Northern France Rhineland Arde nne lsace Central Europe
ARMOR
The division arrived California’s Desert Training Center No. 2. for maneuver training on March 1943, followed by assignment to Fort Benning, Ga., on August. By April 1944, the division Camp Myles Standish, Standish, Mass., in preparation fo debarkation.‘ Staged Cam p Shanks, N Y., Y., the division departed New York on June 1944, ar rived in England week later, and landed in France on August 1944.
At times assigned to the First, Third, and Ninth Armies and seven different corps, the “Lucky Seventh” fought i the battle Chartres within a week
March-April1992
after crossing the Normandy beachhead, then attacked toward the Seine‘ River, securing bridgehead at Melun on 24 August 1944. Driving rapidly, the division crossed the Marne River
World War
II Commanders:
Linds ay McD. Sihrester MG Lindsay March 1942-November 1944
MG Robert W. Hasbrouck
November 1944-Sept. 1945
BG Truman Boudinot September September 194
43
Of th ”Lucky Seventh” 7th AD’S campaign in Europe during 1944 ranged a m s s extremes of termin and temperature. In September, it moved into Holland‘s flat canal country, above. And in one of th Worst winters in European history, it took part in the reducof th ‘Bulge” before having a chance rest stmet scene efit in February 1945. At left, Bastogne during th Ardennes fighting.
Chateau-Thierry Chateau-Thierry on 27 August, then the Meuse at Verdun on the 31st. Short of fuel, the division divisio n rested on its arms until September Septembe r when when it tacked force the Moselle, crossing units under heavy fire September, which had to be subsequently withdrawn. The remainder of of Septemthe division’s CCA, CCB, ber sa and CCR heavily engaged in attempts to force fo rce the river against tough tough GerGerman defenders. Relieved Relieved by the 5th Infantry Division on 24 September, September, the Seventh sidestepped to Holland and attacked from Oploo four days later against heavy opposition opposition to force a comdor west of of th Maas River. October was characterized characterized y tough fighting, fighti ng, gains and reversals as th division tried to gain ground and take canal canal crossings in Holland. ‘Ihe German German Ardennes offensive offen sive caught the division preparing to drive
44
from from Linnich, Lin nich, Germany, on the Roer River. Elements were committed to the defense defen se of of St. Vith on 16 December. German attacks forced a withdrawal on 21 December and the loss of Manhay on Christm Christmas as Eve. The division retook Manhay on 27 December then turned its sector over to the 75th Infantry Division Divisi on on the 29th. Attacking through mines and deep snow toward St. Vith on January 1945, the division captured Born house-to-house fighting the next day. CCB attacked through CCA to clear campaign St. Vith on 23 January. ”le campaign ended by February, and the “Bulge” was reduced. The division spent the rest res t of of the month month on a badly-needed badly-needed rehabilitation. March, the division started clearing the zone west of the Rhine River River between between Bonn and Remagen, Remagen, crossing crossin g the Rhine on 25 March and attacking the next day. It captured the Edersee Ederse e D m intac intactt and and secured secured cross-
ings over the Eder River on March. The Seventh Sevent h helped reduce the Ruhr Pocket over the next tw weeks against against determined determined oppositio opposition. n. I e division assembled Gottingen on he 30th. April, and 30th. began began the drive from the Elbe to the Baltic, which it reached May. There, the division made contact w i t h advancing Soviet Army forces and was in that region when hostilities ended on 7 1945 (see “Your Mission is to Contact the Russians...”, ARMOR,March-April 1989). In four campaign camp aigns, s, the “Lucky Seventh” had suffered 898 killed in tion, 3,811 3,81 1 wounded in in action, actio n, whom later died 20 their wounds. The “Lucky “Lucky Seventh” Seventh” returned home home Hampton Roads on October 1945 and and inactivated at Camp Patrick Henry, Va., on the same day. Prepared by the ARMOR St#.
ARMOR
March-April
1992
50th Anniversary 8th Armored Division
“Tornado” Trained Trained Cadre, Cadre, Then Raced Across Europe Like Thundering Herd
The “Thundering “Thunderi ng Herd” played a cruc crucia iall role role in World War 1 . It pro vided soldiers sol diers for the expansion of of the Armored Force, and it later distinguished itself in battle as th “Tornado.” In 1942, the United States Army wa trying rapidly and efficiently to expand pand its its armored forces. High level military planners realized the need for an armored unit to train cadre personnel, who would then form the core of other armored divisions. General Or ders Number 19, Headquarters, Armored Force, officially activated the 8th Armored Division on 1 April 1942, 1942, at Fort Knox, Kentucky, as this training division. On 18 April 1942, BG Grimes, th 8 t h ’ ~ommanding ~ommanding general outlined its mission to the division’s officers: o provide complete c cadres, adres, officers and enlisted enlisted men, for new new divisions. The primary purpose is to train, organize and prepare these divisional cadres. We are a training division as distinguished from an active division.” Throughout April, May, and June, full. strength, and instructors trained. n 13 and 14 June, the individual indiv idual units received their standards at retreat ceremonies. The “Thunderin “Thundering g Herd” remained at Fort Knox until January 1943. During that time, incoming personnel fresh from from civilian civilian life rigorrig orously trained in the new concepts concepts o armored warfare. More than 10,000 cadre personnel learned their business
ARMOR
March-April
Shermans of the 8th AD tire tire on German positions positions near K irchellen, irchellen, Germany, March 1945
with the 8th and moved on to form cadre of the 9th through the 14th mored Divisions. In January 1943, the division division moved moved to Camp Camp Campbell, C ampbell, Kentucky. Almost immediately, the 8th sent more than
1992
4,000 men men directly direct ly to Tunisia to re place losses suffered by U.S. tankers. The division continued its training mission until February 1943. Then, War Department Training Memorandum dum Number 2,19 2, 1943 43,, directed the 8th 8th
45
to cease training cadre. Officers of the 20th Armmd Division assumed responsibility for their unit’s training, and the 8th began to train filer replacements for existing existi ng units. Early in in March March 1943, 1 943, the ‘“lhunder‘“lhun dering Herd” moved moved to Fort Fo rt Polk, Louisiana, and joined the Third Army. Its training mission complete, the 8th began th Mobilization Training ProSeptembe r 1943, it had gram. By September completed transition to th ne “light” armored division. During the next months, the division prepared for combat by participating in field exerc i s e s and full scale manuevers in Texas and and Louisian Louis iana a March March 1944 brought 1200 replacements straight from civilian universities: they were members of of the t he Army Specialized Training Program. However, a War Department levy tasked the 8th to once again provide replacement fillers. Almost al of the privates and privatvat- fm t class departed departed for overseas assignments. That April, the division was reinforced reinforce d by an influx influ x of former aviation cadets. th spent the rest of spring sp ring and summer honing honing its skills for combat. On Election Day, 7 November 1944, the “Thundering Herd” sailed out of York harbor aboard the ships Samaria, USAT George George W . Goethals, USAT Marine Devil, and the St. Cecelia. During the convoy to gland, gland, the men men of the 8th practice lifeboat lifebo at drill, dril l, exercised, and and studied French German. On 19 November, the division disembarked Plymouth and Southampton Southam pton and quickly moved to Tidworth Barracks. The preparations fo war increased intensity. Humorously, the “Thundering Herd” celebrated Thanksgiving Day Day on the fourth Eriday of of November. The frozen turkeys drawn from quartermaster stocks did not thaw in time for the more traditional Thursday holiday. The Division hosted British orphans for Christmas Day Day 1944, and and received reports reports of of the the “Battle “Battle of the Bulge.” Finally, on New Year’s Day, the divi46
r,
8t
AD ‘Hellcat“ tank destroyers line a street in Rheinberg. Germany. March
sion received orders to move quickly to the continent. On 13 January 1945, the 8th mored mored Division joined joine d the XX Corps, Third Army, Pont-a Mousson, France, and received the code name ‘‘Tornado.” Combat Command sisted the 94th Infantry Division in re ducing th German German salient sa lient between the Moselle and S a a r Rivers. After fieme fighting against crack enemy units, th “Thundering “Thun dering Herd” wo high praise from MG Walton Walker, Corps commander. 19 February, the joined the XV Corps, Ninth Army, and relieved the 7th British Armored Division in the vicinity vicin ity of of Brackterbeek, Brackterbeek, Holland. Soon after, the division took part in “Operation Grenade” eliminate enemy resistance resistan ce west west of of the the Roer River. Once the XVI Corps gained a crossing site, the ‘Thndering Herd” drove on to the Rhine River. Combat Comman Command d B assisted assis ted the 35th Infantry Division in seizing the Wesel Bridge and Rheinberg. This cut enemy resistance sistance west west of the Rhine. The Th e 8th Army the fmt Ninth unit armored wa to cross the Rhine. On 28 March, it attacked east to penetrate German defense along the Rhine-Heme Canal. April, it had reached Paderbom, Germany. Germany. The Th e division divisio n then then turned southwest and helped reduce enemy
1945.
resistance resistance in the Ruhr Pocket. Pocket. There, The re, the division distinguished itself in des perate fighting. n 11 April, the 8th joined the XI Corps and conducted offensive offens ive operations to destroy any resistance in th Harz Mountains. SHAEF announced VDay on 8 May 1945 and and brought the war in Eu rope to an official officia l end. With With hostilities hostil ities concluded, the ‘Thundering Herd” moved moved to occupaocc upation tion duty in Czechoslovaki Czechos lovakia a There the 8th began a metamorphosis. An Army points system designated men to retum retum to the states stat es or remain in occupation. Men Men left for other units, and replacements arrived. On 19 September, the 8th began began the long trip home. Th US West Point, USS LaTeune, US Vulcania Victory, US Excelsior Victory, US Norway Victory, and the US Victory Hood carried the division home. The 8th Armored Division wa deactivated Camp Patrick Henry, Virginia, on 13 November November 1945.
This unit history was re searched and prepared John Buckheit during his temporary assignment to ARMOR Magazine in Summer 990.
ARMOR
March-April 1992
Th
Spirit
the Cavalry
selected and translated by Lieutenant Colonel Donald
Quotations from Combat Formation and Combat Operations of the Cavalry by Ba on w n Malzahn, Malzahn, Rittmeister and Company Comander, Ulan Regiment von Schmidt (1st Pomeranians) No. 4, Berlin, 1913.
Training "A unit is properly trained if
it can accomplish it does not have to
Snedeker
these are the essentials for superiority in a firefight."
Combined Arms Warfare "The effective combination combination of all element in accomplishing the mission in combat is secured through thorough schooling in i n peacetime.
what is required in war and if rid itself of bad ba d haba habas s on the field fiel d of of battle b attle leamed lea med on the fiel f ield d of of training training." ."
"Mounted "Mounted artillery artil lery frequently supports reconnaissance; sance; artillery artill ery fire will often force an enemy to give away its it s presence and strength."
"From start to finish, must be emphasized that all training must be calculated calcula ted in terms of war Since, in war, only onl y what is simple promises success, only simple formations are to be taught and used."
Leadership
"Following "Followi ng the regulations regulat ions of the Great King (Frederick the Great), Great ), it is emphasized that the entire tir e training traini ng of of Cavalry is founded on the conscientious tiou s and meticulous training trainin g of of the individual individu al man and horse; and that only upon this basis alone is built the training trainin g of of all larger formations up to the Cavalry Division." "Unit "Unit training trai ning exercises can never completely complete ly make up for failures in individual training. This must be reinforced reinforce d during every period of of instruction." "Only "Only after all al l prescribed prescribe d formations formatio ns have have been practiced to perfection by the platoons and every man knows what what he has to do, can training on the company level begin." "Essential for all training in i n the use of firearms firearms is the principle p rinciple that what one does is more important than tha n how. how. The good goo d of all a ll training traini ng exercises exercises is to develop a soldier who thinks for himself himself and acts conscientiously. The set determination to hit the target, and the faithful faithf ul effort to do one's best, even when not being observed or under supervision,
ARMOR
March-April1992
"Higher "Higher level leaders must not b be e distracted from their overall mission through the arrangement of details." "Lower "Lower level l evel leaders must be trained in responsibility and in the ability to make decisions such that they can independently go beyond beyo nd their own level of command when the battle situation requires." "Especially "Especially important for all leaders is the appropriate selection of of his own location during the fight. The leader's impact on soldiers in battle can first be gained through effective leadership and giving of orders, through personal person al attentio to their execution, and timely intervention, but especially by the skillfu ski llfull use of of terrain." "Leadership in battle with the Cavalry is more personal, more factor of the leader's personality than in i n any other branch of service. The special character of of cavalry combat with its rapid ra pid pace and its unexpected unexp ected changes of of direction directio n requires require s special qualitie q ualities s from the mounted leader leader." ." "Nowhere does 'average' leadership have an effect to the same degree as does in the Cavalry. In the Cavalry, mistakes mista kes can almost never be made good again. The short time available, the rapidity of of all actions, the inability inabil ity to call cal l back
47
mounted attack once it has begun, are decisive. No matter how good a unit is, it can't make make up for a failure in leadership." "The "The commander is not bound to a fixed position. It is a grave mistake to be glued (too close) to the un t... (I)n all cases where the regiment regiment (battalion is employed independently, the commander must be far forward. Only thus can he gain the personal appreciation of the enemy and the terrain which which i imperative for rapid decision-making. It is nonetheless to be considered conside red that he h e must, through appro priate means, means, (be) in contact with the regiment regiment and be able to deliver his orders as quickly as possible." "Every platoon should be led by an officer if possible. sible. Noncommissioned officers officer s will wi ll replace rep lace missing officers. Just as senior senio r lieutenants should be capable of commanding the company, company, so too should noncommissioned officers be trained as platoon leaders and soldiers as noncommissioned officers. Units should frequently practice the loss and temporary temp orary replacemen repla cementt f individua indiv iduall leaders." leaders." "The essential prerequisite for executing such
surprise moves (such as rapid change of of direction), other than well schooled men and horses, is attentiveness, self-confidence, and skillfulness of all leaders from platoon pl atoon leader upwards." upwards."
Tactics "Actions against the enemy's enemy's flank f lank and an d rear are especially effective in al Cavalry Caval ry operations. In cluded clude d in this sense sense are the so-called 'raids' 'raids' as practiced practic ed in an exemplary exemplary manner by the American American Cavalry general ge neral Stuart." Stuart." 'Even 'Even afte afterr a long approach march, march, hours o combat, combat, and an d bloody losses, while the sister services camp on the hard won objective, the Cavalry knows neither rest nor relaxation. Well into the night, the Cavalry rushes forward, always attempting to overtake the enemy in headlong flight and turn its flank." "The Cavalry must constantly be aware that the defense is only effective and only achieves its purpose if is executed boldly and with an offensive spirit." "More than any other branch of sewice, the Cavalry is dependent on the effects of of terrain te rrain uring
48
the approach march, changing formations, in the attack, or in the defense. defense. Only the person pe rsonal al appre ciation of the commander himsetf or of someone trusts is decisive. Maps do not generally provide the desired desire d level of of detail." detail." "Just "Just as surprising the enemy enemy is the th e true element of Cavalry, so too must the Cavalry never, under any circumstances, be surprised by th enemy." "Just "Just as important im portant as obtaining timely timel y information informat ion about the enemy is hiding from him our own organization nizati on and actions. actions. Disguising (covering) can be required to the front as well as on flanks and can be achieved offensively or defensively."
Taking Care
Man and Beast
"Leaders' concem for keeping their horses in good condition up to the start of of the battle ba ttle is an important contributor to success. success. Even in the midm iddl of the battlefield, opportunities opportunities to feed and water must be taken t aken advantage advantage of." of."
Spirit
the Ca
"When in doubt, doubt, leaders must must act accordin a ccording g to the principle: a bold decision is usually best. best. "Nothing could be worse than to wait for (more) information rather than acting acting.. Insufficient information about the enemy should never be a reason for giving up the initiative. initiative. The Cavalryman who waits for enem enemy y intelligence and orders will always arrive too late!" "Thanks to the mobility resutting from the speed of its horses, horses, the Cavalry is more capable of of surprising the enemy than any other branch of of service. This spirit (of mobility) is embodied embo died in the Cavalry Caval ry and the chances of success are thus in creased, as the effectiveness of its weapons is enhanced by its spirit. "The Cavalry should always attempt to fulfill it mission offensively, and this principle is reinforced by the words of Frederick the Great: Grea t: squadron should wait until un til it is i s attacke attacked, d, rather rath er attack the enemy first every time.' time.'
Lieutenant Colonel Donald C. Snedeker is th chief, Inspector and Escort Branch, On-Site Inspection Agency - Europe ARMOR
March-April1992
GE
General James Polk, Former For mer Com mander USAREUR and CENTAG, Dies 80 The Armor Armor community community lost one on e o its patriarchs with the passage to Fiddler's Green of General James Hilliard Polk, 80, on February 18, 1992. He died at the William Beaumont mont Medical Medical Center, Cente r, Fort Bliss, Bl iss, Texas. Texas. General Polk's distinguished disting uished career spanned spanne d more than than 37 years, culminating in his assignment as Commander in Chi Chief, ef, U.S Army Eu rope and Seventh Army, and NATO's Central Army Group commander. He was born December 13,1911, at Camp McGrath, Philippine Islands, the son of of Col. and a nd Mrs. Harding Polk. Polk was commissioned in the Cavalry upon his graduation from the United United States St ates Military Academy in 1933. He attended attend ed Cavalry School, Regular Course, and ha served in cavalry regiments by the time of World War Leaving instructorship at West Point, he attended the Command and General Staff School before assuming command command of of the the 6th Cavalry Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (Mech) of th 106th Mechanized Mechanized Cavalry Cavalry group. Later, as group XO, e participated in the Normandy invasion, the St. Lo breakout, and Third Army drive across France. Assuming command of
ARMOR
March-April
the 3rd Cavalry in September Sep tember 1944, he led it with distinction distinc tion until December 1945, consistently consist ently spearheading Genera Generall Walton H. Walker's Walk er's Corps the Third Army. Polk was decorated three times for gallantry while in command. After the war, General Polk served ta cticss at the Ground Genas chief of tactic eral School at Fort Riley, attended th Armor Force Staff College, and served a tour in the G2 Section, Sect ion, Gen eral Headquarters, Far East Command. He served as Corps G2 through three campaigns cam paigns in in the Ko rean war.
General Polk Polk graduated from the National War College Coll ege in in 1952, then ar College inserved as an Army structor structo r until 1955 next two years years found him him with th 3r mored Division at Fort Knox and then in Europe as commander of two combat commands, comm ands, chief of staff s taff,, and assistant sistan t division commander commander In July 1957, General General Polk Polk began two-year tour as assistant assista nt chief chief of staff for Plans and Operations, Operat ions, Land Forces Central Cen tral Europe, NATO NATO.. In 1959, he tetumed to the Office of th Assistant Secretary of of Defense for In-
1992
JAMES
POLK
ternational Security Affairs as director of the Policy Planning Office. August 1961 marke marked d the beginning of a series ser ies of of key command assign ments in Europe G, 4th Armored Division (Aug '61-Nov '62); U.S. Commander in Berlin (Dec '62-Aug '64); CG, Corps (Sep '64-Feb '66); Deputy Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army @ec '66-May '67); and Commander-inChief, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, also, Commander, Central Army Group, NATO (Jun '67Mar'71). General General Polk was placed on the t he U.S. U.S. Army retired list on April 1, 1971. member of the U.S. Armor Association since s ince 1933, he he was President Pres ident of the Association from May 1972 to May 1974, and received the Gold Medallion, Order George in 1986. He was also the honorary colonel of the 3d ACR. Among Among General Polk's awards awards and decorations ar the Distinguished Service Medal w/OLC, Silver Star w/OLC, w/OLC, Legion L egion of Merit M erit w/2OLC, Bronze Star Medal, and Medal. General Polk is survived by by his wife, the former Josephine Leavell, Leavell , whom whom he married in 1936; 19 36; son, James H. Polk ; a daughte daughter, r, Josephine Joseph ine Schwartz; Schwartz ; two brothers, Col. John F. Polk, USA-retired, and Captain Thomas Polk, USN-retired; and five grandchildren. Interment was was at Arlington National Cemetery, Va.
49
Delayed Desert
Damage
identify and An important ne assess hidden damage Army equipment resulting from harsh environmental extremes tremes during the Gulf conflict is undenvay at TACOM. Called DELAYED DESERT DAMAGE. or 3D. the program is designed to assess th extent of he damage and use the information as a base for engineering analysis, to revise short- and long-term maintenance policies polici es and determine funding needs. needs. The Maintenance Directorate at TACOM has the responsibilii for 3D. 3D. 'By 'By learning learni ng how equipment performed in the relentless heat and blowing sand, we improve impro ve Army readiness,' said LTC AI Lopez, maintenance director. TACOM equipment was tested for this type of environment an performed exceptionally tionally well. But the unrelenting heat and sand may have accelerated normal wear,' according to Ralph Janus, 3D action officer.
As result Operations DESERT SHIEUIISTORM, TACOM has found evidence of unique and premature wear caused by sand ingestion and other environmentally-induced factors on equipment returned to units and depots. he said. Th extent of latent hidden damage and long-term effects is being evaluated by using field experts and through a complete inspection and disassembly process of examining numerous vehide systems. Major systems systems being assessed assess ed in the 3D program include MlAl Abrams Tank, M2A1 Bradley Fightin Fighting g Vehicle, High Hi gh Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle, Vehicle, Heavy Equipment Transport, M939 5-Ton Cargo Truck, and Heavy Expanded Mobility Mobili ty TactiTruck. The results should lead to high-tech version version of the old Army program known as FITCALS. he FITCALS acronym stands for: Feel, Inspect. Inspec t. Tighten, Tighten, Clean, Adjust Lube, and Smell. Smell.'' Lopez explained. explain ed. The 3D program has already produced enough information to use in revising Defense fense Business Business operating Fund projections and to publish new maintenance proce-
dures and advisories. Th final result will enhance equipment li with a balanced
Army-wide maintenance program. program. TACOM will be publishing publishin g a special special technical bulletin outlining maintenanc maintenance e proce dures which will help units to sustain equipment. Th 3D program ach~allygoes beyond the systems mentioned. And though we are only one-thir on e-third d of the way through, we've already seen hgh dividends from ou work.' he continued. The combined input of field data an special depot inspections at Anniston, Ala., Red River, Texas, and Tooele, Utah, is being evaluated by a matrix team of engineers, technicians, specialists and other MSC representatives. So far, the data has provided provi ded enough enough information or the team to make certain certai n insightful insig htful assumptions. assumptions. "For example, 3D analysis of tactical tact ical vehides showed that sand and other environment-induce ment- induced d factors caused premature wear on brake drums, steering knucMes and internal gears Sand penetration of th seals was the most significant cause of premature wear wear.. Brake shoes exhibited scoring an cuts caused cause d by sand, sand,"" Janus noted. "We found evidence that sand entered many of the seals and a nd caused caused abnormal wear. Internal Intern al gears also showed signs of heat stress and unusual unusu al ; Janus added.
Changes to AR 220-1 (Unit Status Report) 3-5 December 1991. FORSCOM J5 conducted a Unit Status Report (USR) conference to provide an update upda te on changes to AR 220-1. The revise rev ised d R 220-1 22 0-1 pertains to both th Active and R e s e w Components ponent s and becomes effective 16 April 1992. Some of the primary changes are: Change reports are now required whenever there is a change in the status of a resource resource area versus a change change in the over-
all rating. All equipment reportable on DA Form 2406 will be considered in detennining Equipm E quipment ent Readiness (ER). (ER). Previously only Equipment Readiness Code (ERC) "A' equipment was considered. C-4 ERC Line ldentfication Numbers (LINs), considered war stoppers, will be listed lis ted on Equipment Shortage Shor tage (ESRAT) card. card. Units alerted for deploym de ployment ent in support of contingency operations will submit a USR 24 hours prior to deployment deplo yment date. A Mission Accomplishment Estimate (MAE) (MAE) will be determined determined for all units. USAR units will submit a USR quarterly, quarterly, and roundout round out units will also submit "Assessment Memorandum" to their Active Component (AC) unit each quarter. AC commanders with an assigned roundout unit will wil l comment monthl on th impact of having a roundout unit. unit. For information concerning this article, write or call the Directorate of Total Total Armor Force Readiness, AlTN: ATZK-TFR (CPT Reilly or Mr Wolff), Wolff), F Knox, Ky. 401215000, phone: DSN 464-1961 464-TANK, commercial (502)624-TANK.
Branch Immaterial CS he Bra Branc nch h Imm Immat ater eria iall Of icer icer School (OCS) is conducted at Fort Benning, Ga.. by the 3d 3 d Battalion (OCS), (OCS), 11th Infantry Regiment. This is the Active Component's only O C S , and annually commissions about 45 officers into 16 different branches. This intense 14-week program offers se lected soldiers warrant officers an excellent opportunity to secure a commission. Throughout program, officer candidates undergo rigorous physical training and extensive leader and ethical development. Candidates are chalienged and assessed in numerous leadership positions, both in garrison and in tactical training environments. Commanders Commanders at all appropriate appropriate levels are encouraged to identify and assist interested applicants prepare selection administration, as well as submit endorsements to application packets. AR 351-5, (U.S. Army Officer
ARMOR
March-April 1992
Candidate School) contains program information mation and application nstructions. ns tructions.
Functional Area (FA) 53 Update The Computer science School at the U. . Army Signa Si gnall Center, Fort For t Gordon, Ga. is developing a new course to support FA 53 (systems automation) automa tion) officers. The Systems Automation Course (SAC) II is being developed to prepare FA 53 officers, currently serving in branch related assignments for upcoming FA .53 .5 3 assignments. This course will quickly bring an officer upto-date with current c urrent automation technolog and Army automation automation issues. I t will also provide him with the critical skills that will be required n his next assignme assignment. nt. SA II is four weeks, weeks, four days long an should be scheduled enroute to an officer's next FA 53 assignment. The first scheduled course date is January 1993. with courses co urses being conducted on a quarterly basis thereafter. Th requirements to attend the course are:' 1) be on orders to a FA 53 assignment, assignment, (2) be in the grade of MAJM AJ, and and ) have have d utsi utside de of F 53 for at least the last l ast three years For further information on this new course. please contact CPT Prantl at DSN 780-3236 or through DDN as 'prantlegordon-emh2.army. don-emh2.army.mil". mil". To reques r equestt seats in this course or other FA 53 assignment information, please contact MAJ Welch at DSN 221-2759 or through DDN as "WeIchdWhoffman-emh1 "WeIchdWhoffman-emh 1 army.mil".
Awards $1.2 Billion Truck Contract TACOM recently awarded fiw-year. $1.2 $1.2 billion billio n contract contr act to the Texas-based Stewart and Stevenson Services, Inc., to build a new family family of 2-1 R- and 5-ton tactical trucks. Known as the ne Family of Medium Tactical Tactic al Vehicles (FMTV) (FMTV),, they planned for introduction to troops in October 1993. The trucks will replace the M44-series 21R-ton trucks and M39- and M809-series 5-ton trucks now in use by the Army. Ma rine Corps, and Air Force, and will supplement the newer M939-series 5-ton trucks. The company company will wil l bui b uild ld 1 O truc tr ucks ks approximately 60 percent will be 2-1/2-ton, and 40 percent 5-ton versions ver th next five f ive years he trucks win have fun-time all-whee~ drive and an improved suspension system offering better better off-mad mobility than the existing istin g vehicles The 2-1/2-ton version will hav e four-wheel design and will come in only a van and a cargo-truck variant. variant.
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The 5-ton version wi'll use six wheels wheels and a nd will include cargo models ne of which will have a materiel-handling crane dump truck, a wrecker, and a tractor. Several add-on kits will be available to make the vehicles suitable for special roles, such as deep-water fording and operation in Arctic regions. All cargo models models and 5-ton dump confiiuconfi iurations will be air-droppable and deployable deployable by a Low-Altitude Parachute Parachute Extraction System (LAPES). In a LAPES deployment, a parachute pulls the pallet-mounted truck from the rear of a cargo plane flying about 20 feet above the ground. Th trucks will also be helicopter transportab transportable. le. Significant FMTV performance improvement features features include: onew axle design by Rockwell Intemational, in i n which some of the drive-reduction gears are contained within each wheel hub. This change reduces the size of th differential housing, thereby improving crosscountry mobility by providing more vehicle ground clearance, clearance, increasing increas ing wheel travel trav el and reducing the weight of the axle. .extra .extra-wi -wide de Michelin Michel in steel-belt steel -belted ed radialradi alply tires tire s (called the Supersingle), Supersingle), which will provide improved traction and longer tire life, and will eliminate the need for dual wheels. ocentral tire inflation system by Eaton Corporation, which will allow he driver to change tire pressure from inside the cab, making it possible to maximize traction on paved highways, sand sand,, cross-country terrain, and when immobilized in mud or snow. onew onew,, lightweight six-cylinder tu*charged diesel engine by Caterpillar Caterpilla r (lighter than current engines, yet delivers more horsepower). horsepower). The 2-1R2- 1R-ton ton will us a 225hp version of the engine; the 5-ton truck will use a 290-hp version n Allison-built, Alliso n-built, electronically electro nically controlled, control led, seven-speed automatic bansmission that is lighter, smaller, easier to maintain, and has fewer parts. Other improvements wi'll result in dramatic reduction in FhUV lifecycle costs. The trucks will us the same instrumentation and controls, a common three-man and many of the same mechanical and electrical elect rical components. components. A built-in diagnostic system wiN allow th driver to monitor vehicle operations from a dash-mounted display display and know at glance if a mechanical or electrical problem problem occurs.
The transmission will have its own dagnostic computer that will alert the driver to problems problems by displaying a code. That code will save the mechanic time by identifying what needs to be fixed. Mechanics Mechanics will be able to repair new trucks easier and faster because of their
March-April 1992
cab-over-eng cab-over-engine ine design des ign in which the ca tilts forward to faciliate quick engine and transmission removal an installation. According to COL C OL Larry Day, Day, FMTV project manager, current plans call for th Army to buy 102,000 trucks over the next 30 years. Th over its life is estimated to be about a $20 billion acquisition," Day said. 'In 'In operation opera tion and support costs alone, we will save $40 billion. So for every buck we invest, we will get two back in ost savings.
Reunions The 11th Annored Cardry Regiment (Blackhorse) will hold its 23rd annual reunion at Fort F ort Knox. Knox. . June Jun e 19-20, 19- 20, 1992. 1992. This reunion is open to all Blackhorse Troopers, commissioned, noncommissioned, warrant, or enlisted from any period of service. For additional information write: The Secretary, Blackhorse Association, Association, P:O. Box 11. Fort Knox, Ky. 40121, or call Bill Squires, (502) 351 5738. The 1st Infantry Division 75th Anniver-
sary Commemoration and Reunion will be
held June 7 and 8 at Ft. Riley. Former members of division interested in participating ticipa ting may contact Major William E. McCormick. Cormi ck. Public Affairs Affairs Officer, Bldg. 405, 405, 1st Infantry Infant ry Division Divis ion (Mech) (Mech) and Ft. Ft. Riley, Ft. Riley, Kan. 66442-5000, phone DSN 856-3032. commercial (913) 239-3032.
The 11th Armored Cavalry's veterans of Vietnam and Cambodia will host its seventh reunion, 14-16 Aug 1992 199 2 in San Antonio. Texas, Texas, a the Holiday Inn Rivewalk, North. Contact: Ollie Pickral, 1602 Lame, Richardson, Texas 75080-3406, phone: (214) 235-6542. The 11th Armored Division will hold its reunion 19-23 August 1992 In Louisville. Ky. Ky. For more information, contact Alfred P f e i i . 2328 Admiral Admir al St.. St.. Aliquippa. Ali quippa. Penn. 15001. The 740th Tmk Battalion will hold it an nual reunion September 3-6 in Dallas, Texas. Contact Harry F. Miller. 2150 6th Avenue N. #102, Seattle, Wash. 98109, phone (206) 283-8591. 283-8591. If your so or daughter attended Fort Knox High School, please help us locate them. them. In particular, particular, we are ar e looking for th classes clas ses of '58, '59, '60, and an d '61 to join us in
a reunion to be held at Ft. Knox July 24-25 1992. 1992. For more information contact Dick Thorton. Thorton. High School Public Relations Relations Office, 7501 7 501 Missour Miss ourii St., St., Ft. Knox. Ky. 40121 or phone (502) 624-5621
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Marine AMTRAC firing on a town from the Han River beach, September 1950
Korean War Memoir a Journalist-Soldier Offers a New Perspective On the Present Force Memoir of K o r e a Th Coldest Ww: Poc ket Books, Books, Simon and by Jim Brady. Pocket Schuster Schu ster Inc.. Inc.. 1991. New York, Ne York. 294 pages. $5.50.
eight months later. Brady describes both his heroic actions while on several combat patrols and his relief from fear each time another paml was canceled.
Jim Braws book on his tour of duty during Korean War offers us an uncommon view of a forgotten solder. Our nation's journalists have written little about this war. Jim Brady, a Marine rifle platoon leader turned journalist, offers us a glimpse of the life of a combat soldier in Korea. Jim Brady was born in New York City in 1928. 1928. When he was 19 1 9 years old and a sophomore in college, Brady enlisted in the Marine Corps Reserve Platoon Leaders Class to amid being drafted into the Army. Three weeks after his graduation from college and his commission as a Marine Reserve lieutenant, on 25 June 1950. North Koreans launched a major attack s the 38th para parallel llel By Thanksgiving of 1951, LT Bra* found himself as a rifle rif le platoon leader on the front lines of the Korean War. War. Following Follo wing his eight months of duty as rifle platoon leader, a rifle company and a battalion battalion intelligence officer, LT returned home, left the service, and pursued a weer in print journalism. journalism. His credentials include being the publisher of Women's Wear Dairy and Harpers Bazaar, editor in chief of Ne York magazine, and associate publisher of the Ne York Post newspaper. newspaper. His H is combat experience, experience, combined with his journalistic experience, provide fo an extraordinary view of he combat solder in Korea. In this book. Brady attempts to honestly assess and come to grips with his performance from the day he gets off the replacement plane in Korea, to day he boards ocean liner to return home,
hose have the privilege sewing as a platoon leader in today's service. Bt-ady's book is especially useful. found myself making constant comparisons between myself and Brady. and also between the Marine Corps of 1951 and the Army of 1991. In the forty years that separates these comparisons, came away realizing that not much has changed in the way th individual feels or performs. was struck, however, at th major difference between the organizations. This major difference is professionalism. Bmdy, without meaning do gives us the reason this difference in the professional caliber of the organizations. Simply put, it is rotation system employed by the services durin the Korean War. Bra*, Bra*, despite being in Korea for only eight monlhs, is constantly describing how 'green' soldiers anive, and how seasoned veterans leave. Th Marines of 1951, unlike their counterparts counterpa rts of he past an pre ser ~t ere only only abl to reach a certain level of competence, which they never exceed. Brady Brady did not attempt to make any politistatements about the war. war. However like all soldiers, he wondered aloud: e never never fght a real battl battle, e, we don't win or lose, yet guys get killed, we wrap them, and send them south south somewhere. We ea some more, we sleep some more, more of us get killed or lose leg or go blind, and there's never a real battle and still war goes on. Wouldn't you think one of us them or us. would get tired of it and just pack up and go home?"
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This book is well written, fast paced ac of on man's coming to grips with himself during duri ng an eight-month period his life. His journalistic training allows him to dispassionatel dispassionately y describe in detail life in the trenches of Korea. Korea. It makes excellent reading for al those who either participated in the K o r e a n Wa wish to compare their feelings and experiences with someone
else's.
FERRARI JOHN Captain, Armor Radcliff, Ky. U w t e n a t Rm#y's Wa Edwin Price Ramsey and Stephen Stephe n J. Rivele. Rivele. Knightsbridge Publishing Pu blishing Company, Company, New York, 1990. pages. $19.95.
It is quite appropriate we begin observing th 50th annivers ann iversary ary of of America's enby into World War II, that Colonel Edwin Ramsey's story is finally told. Lieutenant ar recounts the private, and Ramsey's sometimes lonely, war waged by Ed Ramsey from December 1941 until his collapse from exhaustion and disease in mid1945. This riveting, first person account of courage and'leadership, provides a heartrending look at the little known wa of Filipino guerrilla guerr illa forces. forces. While easy to read, this book, based on Colonel Ramseys frank personal recollections, moves along like li ke a novel with excitement, ment, action, action , and emotional encounters. Written some 50 years after the events oc curred, Colonel Ramsey has had the op? portunity to reflec re flectt on the impact of his actions and that of his command command.. It is i s an excellent example of small unit leadership impacting on higher level strategy.
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Books
Colonel Ramsey begins with a candid and forthright account of his early years in Wichita, Wichita, Kansas. These experiences, experiences, an his years at the Oklahoma Military Academy shaped the character and courage of the man who would later lead over 40,000 guerrillas against against the cr uel and brutal br utal occupation of the Philippines by Japanese Imperial Army. After enjoying, enjoying, as Ramsey states, states, 'the life of a colonial arm officer," the rigors of war become apparent during the initial air and ground action of mid-December 1941. While executing a screen for the left flank of the Allied Army, Army, Ramsey participated particip ated in the final cavalry charge in American history by the 26th Cavalry Regiment (Filipino Scouts) at Morong, 16 January 1942. Despite heroic efforts, the Allies fall fa ll back, and Ramsey and the 26th are trapped behind enemy lines. Choosing to fight rather than surrender and become a POW, Ramsey joins the fledgling resistance. resistance. Initially, the guerrillas wem somewhat scattered and uncoordinated, but through the efforts of Ramsey, Captain Jo Barker, Colonel Thorpe, and many other brave men and women women of the resistance who chose to fight, guerrillas become a force to be reckoned with. Ramsey brings to life lif e the contributions of the resistance to ward the liberation of the Philippines in exciting detail. Colonel Ramsey lays out all his fears and feeling feelings. s. Further, Further, it is fascif ascinating reading to see how an officer trained to be a cavalryman became a guerrilla, "I was going to be a guerrilla, and did not even know what that meant." The U.S. U.S. Army Field Fie ld Manual (FM) 22100, Military Leadership, states: "All men are frightened. The more intelligent they are, the more they are frightened. The couragous couragous man is the ma man n wh who o forces himself, in spite of the fear, to t o carry on." on." (GE George S. Patton). Despite Desp ite self-doubt, malaria, dysentry, hunger, injury, a typhoon, fatigue, fatigue, and a nd constant pressure from from Japanese forces, including spies, Colonel Ramsey persevered. Through this terrible struggle, he came to understand the Filipinos and their courageous desire for freedom. Though these conditions were all but impossible impossible,, Ramsey Ramsey continued to believe in his mission. Moreover, he states: 'Indeed, guerrilla work had now become become second nature to me. no longer felt strange slipping through the countryside at night, hiding out in the hills..and hills..and carrying on secret secret induction ceremonies in the barrios His will was sustained sustained by the belief that GEN MacArthur MacA rthur would return. Colonel Ramsey's courage and dedication were rewarded in October 1944 when MacArthur did return re turn to the
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Philippines. In June 1945, then LTC Ramsey received he Distinguished Service Cross from GEN MacArthur. This superb work presents lessons from 50 years ago that are relevant today, as the military works through low intensity conflict and joint doctrine, and reexamine its role in the Philippine Philippines. s. enjoyed this book immensely. recommend it to all leaders of soldiers and those interested in little known military history. DOUGLAS J. MORRISON CPT, Armor Battle Batt le Command Command Trng. Program, Program, CAC-T CAC -T Ft. Leavenworth. Kan. FalaMaple Leaf Route: Caen (Vol. is (Vol. 2) Antwerp (Vol. Schddt (Vol. 4) Victory (Vol. 5) by Terry Copp and Robert Vogel, published by Maple Leaf Route, Alma Alma,, Ontario, Canada, 1983-1988. 1983-1 988.
A five-volume series, averaging about 140 pages per book, Maple Leaf Route covers the combat history histo ry of of the Canadian Can adian forces in Northem Europe as part of Montgomery's 21st Army Group. from landings in France through end of the war in Europe. That is, the period of June 1944-May 1945. The title derives from the symbol marking the difficult road they traveled. The authors, authors, both distinguished professors fessors of history, mi te from a unique viewpoint, point, describing describing the historical role of a very significant national military force played as an inlayed element in the overall drama of two major allied powers which controlled the historic actions involved. The authors, using primary sources, have proved equal to their sometimes difficult task of sorting out the fog of war from their own side of the battle lines, and, as necessary, that on the other othe r side as well. well. The historical work work they have produced produced is very readable, straightfornard, and unadorned with superfluous superfluous and errant explanation of the many complex and questionable decisions necessary in this period perio d of of World War II. They have done the Canadians proud. This is not to imply they have failed to dig deeply into the pros and cons cons of this period of military history, but they have done so with an analytical artistry that reduces the complex to the simple for the reader. The uniquely Canadian viewpoint adds illumination on facets of the events that took place in Northem Europe in this era not seen before. Although Although the actions of of the air and naval forces are treated where necessary as part of the operations, this is a saga of the land forces, specifically, the First Canadian
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Army with its 1st and 2nd Corps, three infantry and two armored divisions, and supporting units. Also included s the st Polish Armored Division, which spent most of the combat period with the Canadians. Equal time is given to the two British corps and eight British divisions, which at one time or another fought under Canadian control. The brigades, brigades, regiments, regiments, and battalions involved are too numerous numerous to mention here, here, but it is their battles that that fill the books, and they certainly cert ainly are mentioned men tioned there. The Canadian forces actions are painted against a continuing "larger picture" background of both enemy and higher echelon deliberatio delibe rations ns and operations. Such background sketches are covered in separate chapters and in relatively small bites so as not to lose the Canadians in the larger whole. whole. An outstanding example example is found in the Antwerp volume volume covering the choice of focusing effort on Antwerp Ant werp or Arnhem. Arnhem. Tactical and strategic errors of the Canadians British, Americans, Americans, and Germans Germans pointed out with with equa equall impartiality. Howeve However, r, most of the content of the five volumes is not devoted to higher level decisions and non-decisions. but to the real heroes being mit ten about the troops at battalion and lower level wh fought the war on a personal basis. Quotes from unit war diaries and personal experiences, well selected photographs. and excellent maps depict the battles involved from the corps to the regimental level, with emphasis on the brigade bri gade and lower echelons. echelons. The use of regimental war diaries diar ies is particulary effective. Compressed as the volumes must be of the campaig to reflect the broad sweep of they cover, Mqle Leaf Route is laid out in memorable memorable and realistic fashion. fashion. It is the story of Canadians on the route to victory, and of the price they paid erhaps more than their fair share or 'the sweetest of Springs, Spring of Liberation.' Canadians of al persuasions should study well this period in their history, and doubt there is a better source than in this series of books for the Canadian Northem Europe land combat experience experiences. s. Discovered late by this American, American, the five volumes have given me a fresh look at the war in that area. An enlarged look, which has revealed some previously missing pieces of the real story of the campaign. For all Americans, Americans, these volumes served to provide a most impressive picture of Canada Canada's 's significant part in the "Crusade "Crusade in Europe.' can highly recommend rec ommend them all. LEO D. JOHNS COL, USA, Retired Midlothian, Va.
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