A Monum ent to Armored W arrior arrior #A balance bala nce te am of combat arms an d services of equal importance and equal prestige. prestige. Such was the vision of MG Adna R. Chaffee, the first Chief of Armor and the “Father of the American Armored Force.” These words are now etched etche d in granite grani te in Washington, Washington, D. . to serve as both bot h a memorial to those who have fought in steel steeds steeds a nd as an inspiration to future generations generati ons of Americans who view our new monument in our nation’s capital.
Despite the fund-raising progress, the original dedication date of November Nove mber 11 1990, had to be postponed pon ed because funds were still insufficient. insufficient. Now the committee committee was up against the dea dline of the fivefiv eyear window imposed by the public law to complete the monument. In stepped stepped others to help. The Veterans of Foreign Wars Wars contributed significantly significantly through its more than 1100 posts and Ladies Auxiliaries. General Dynamics Corporation, Corporation, under the leadership of G ordon Eng-
As with all things thin gs worth waiting for, this thi s monument
land, spearheaded the defense industry endeavor,
did not come easy. easy. The orig inal idea sprang sprang up in 1983, but the proposal failed to make it through the
and our Arab allies in Operation DESERT STORM
House of of Representativ Representatives. es. Led by Congressional Congress ional liaison committee com mittee member COL Jimmie Jimmie Leach (Ret. and others, others, the t he second attempt made it through both houses of of Congress C ongress late in the last session sessi on of the 99th Congress, with the help of Senator Strom Thurmond and Representative Representa tive Floyd Spence, Spence, both b oth of South Carolina. Carolina.
combined to meet the expenses. Congratulations and special thanks go to the dozens of retired r etired officers, NCOs, and veterans vet erans who comprised comprised the Armored Forces Monument Monum ent CommitCommittee, led initially initia lly by the late la te GEN Bruce C. Clarke, followed by GEN Bruce Palmer Jr., Jr., and LTG L TG Robert Baer. Baer. Mission accomplished! And And to the thousands t housands who gave a little or a lot, who gave valuable time,
The fund-raising effort began in earnest, ably led by COL Duke Wolf (Ret.), who was to work untiringly and without compensation until the idea became solid granite. granite.
and gave gave of themselves to help he lp make this idea reality
hearty ‘Well ‘Well done.” done.” You Y ou have not only
created a granite tribute to your dee ds and th e mem ories of your comrades that will stand forever, but you have etched in the hearts of all in volved your
It is impossible to give due credit to all those who gave time and money money to this project, but some need
pride and devotion devotion to duty in havin g served your your country.
to be mentioned. mentioned. The dozens of of veterans ve terans organizations, including in cluding the 16 Armored Division Associations Associati ons and Tank Destroyer Association, donated money repeatedly. There were more than 10,000 individual contributors, most of whom were veterans, their widows, and their the ir families. families.
By Order of the Secretary of
Army:
GORDON R. SULLIVAN
Gen eral, United States Army Army Chief of Staff
The monument is a simple, elegant elega nt design, beautifully carved by the artisans of the North Ba ne Granite Company of Vermont, and is a fitting, permanent tribute to the armored warriors warriors from 191 to 1991. JC
Official:
MILTON H. H. HAMILTON HA MILTON
Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army
The Th e Professional Professional Developm Deve lopm ent Bulletin Bulletin of the Armor Branch
PB
17-91
Editor-in-Chief Editor-in-Chief
MAJOR (P PATRICK J. COONEY
Features
Man aging Editor Editor
JON
The Guns of the Cavalry
. CLEMENS CLEMENS
by Captain Michael
Commandant
Reagor
Christie’s Last Hurrah by George F. Hofmann, PhD.
MG THOMAS C. FOLEY ~
Add 200 and Flre for Effect
ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published bimonthly by the U.S. Army Armor Center, 4401 Vine Grove Road, Fort Knox, KY 401 40121 21 Disclaimer: Th information contained in ARMOR represents the professional opinions of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the official Army or TRADOC position, nor does it change or supersede supersede any information presented in other official off icial Army Army publications. Official distribution is limited to one copy fo each armored brigade headquarters, headquarters, armored cavalry regiment headquarters, armor battalion headquarters, armored cavalry squadron headquarters, reconnaissance squadron headquarters, armored cavalry troop, armor ar mor company, and motorized brigade headquarters of the United States Army. In addition, Army libraries, Army and DOD schools, DA and MACOM staff agencies with with responsibility for armored, armored, direct fire, ground combat systems, organizations, and the training of personnel for such organizations may request tw copies by sending sending a military etter to the editor-in-chief. Authorized Autho rized Content: ARMOR ARMOR will print only those materials for which the U.S. Army Armor Center has proponency. That proponency includes: all armored, direct-fire direc t-fire ground combat systems that do not serve primarily as infantry carriers; all al l weapons used exclusively exclusively in these systems or by CMF 19-series 19-se ries enlisted enlist ed soldiers; any miscellaneous items of equipment which armor and armored cavalry organizations use exclusively; training fo all SC 12A, 128, 128 , and 12C officers and for all CMF-19-series enlisted soldiers; information concerning the training, logistics, logist ics, history, and leadership of of armor and armored cavalry units at the brigadelregiment level and below, to indude Threat units at those levels. Material may be reprinted, reprinted, provided prov ided credit is given to ARMOR and to the author, except where copyright is indicated. ~~
~
~~
~~~
November-December November-December 1991, Vol. C
by Captain David 23
Company
Link and First Sergeant Anthony Anthony Hafer
(Moblle (Mobl le Combat Combat Range) Rang e)
Lieutenant C olonel Thomas R. Rozman by Lieutenant
Forward Forward Command: Command: The Wehrmacht’s Wehrmacht’s Approach Appro ach To Command and and Contro Controll In World War
by Major John F. Anta1
30
The Case for Light Cavalry
33
The Armored Force Fo rces s Monument
37 41
Major Robert
Can’t
Wottlin
There From Here: Moving the Heavy Force
by Captain H arry Schute, Jr
Th Cadre Armo Armorr Division Divis ion Concept by Colonel Joseph C. Ko pacz
Departments
48
Contacts Letters Commander’s Hatch Driver’s Sea Armor Branch NCO NCO Note Bustle Rack Armor Branch Notes Books
u
Surprised
w
u
u
Our Success?
Dear Sir: Th article in the July-August 1991 issue of ARMOR about 2/2 AC forces this Marine tanker to speak out. Of particular amazement was the author's choice c hoice of words concerning activities on the 24th of February. The phrase "due to the significant unanticipated success of ground attacks in southern Kuwait by elements of tw Marine Divisions" requires response. response. Why the surprise? We are educated at your Armor School, use tactics we learn
DIRECTORY Editor-in-Chief Cooney Major p) Patrick Managing E dito Jon T. Clemens Editorial Assistant Vivian Thompson Production Assistant Mary
Contributing Artist SP Jody Harmon
U.S. A R M Y A R M O R SCHOOL 2249
Commandant MG Thomas C. Foley
ATLK-CG)
2249
Assistant Commandant BG James James L. Nol es
(ATSB-AC) 7555
2610
Deputy Assistant Commandant COL Dwight A. Beck
2610
Command Sergeant Major CSM Jake Fryer Fryer
2610 ARMOR
b o x , KY 40121-5210.
A?TN:
ATSB-AM. Fort
ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS: To improve speed an racy in editing, manuscripts should originals or clear copies. either typed or printed ou double-spaced near-letterquality printer mode. We also accept stories on 5-1/4" floppy disks in MultiMate. WordStar. Microsoft WORD, WordPerfect, XyWrite, Xerox Writer. capand ASCII @lease include a double-spaced printout). Please tions to any illustrations submitted. PAID SUBSCRIPTIONS:
changes Bo 607. 942-6219.
Report &livery problems address to Ms. Connie Bright. Secretary-Treasurer. P.O. Knox, Ky. 40121 or call (502)942-8624, FAX (502)
UNIT DISTRIBUTION:
Report delivery problems or changes of address to Ma. Mary Hager. DSN 464-2619 commercial: (502)624-2610. Requests to be added to the free distribution list should be in the form a letter the Editor-in-Chief.
ARMOR HOTLINE
SN 464-TANK
Armor Hotline is a 24-hour service provide aasiatcmce with questions concerning doctrine. training, organiza tions. and equipn ent of the Fonx.) me
(Note: Fort Knox Defense Switch Network (DSN) prefii is 464. Commercial prefu is Area Code 502624-XXXX).
oints of Contact
ARMOR Editorial Offices
MAILING ADDRESS:
coalition air. Th CINC, with advice of our Marine Expeditionary Force commander, Lieutenant General Boomer, allocated forces and missions to combat capability. At Amy and Marine Corps level, we may be arguing about roles an missions. Down at the tactical level, doubt 2nd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division could care less which service got a tank battalion in country countr y first as long as it got there, quickly. quickly. Along with my brother tank battalion commander, could sleep at night once the 197th landed with two and on Bradley battalions.
there, and fight tanks designed and built by the lead service, the Army. We read your professional magazine. magazine. Attacking at odds of to 11 did not bother us. (I have to say that.) that.) With Wit h our Marine Air Ground Task Task Force doctrine, aviation is a integral part of any ground campaign. We supplement our lack of armor and artillery with integrated air. We were a supporting attack. We in 1st Marine Division with M-60s had no desire to fight the RGFC heavy divisions. That's your job. The lighter divisions divisions defending the border were well within our capability defeat. They had been sufficiently attrited by
Maintenance Department COL Phares E. Noyes Command and Staff Department Department COL John B. Sylvester
2121
(ATSB-DAC) (ATS B-DAC) 1050
49 52 (ATSB-MA) 8346
(ATSB-CS) 5855
Weapons Department COL E. Fish I1
S
1055
Directorate Training Developments COL Joseph D. Molinari
(ATSB-TD) 7250
Directorate of Combat Developments Developments COL Edward A. Bryla
(ATSB-CD)
NC Academy/Drill Sergeant School CSM John John J. Beck
(ATLK-NC) 5150
Reserve Component Spt Div LTC William S. Richards Directorate of Total Armor Force Readiness COL Dennis H. Long TRADOC System System M anage for Armored Gun Syste COL Eugene D. Colgan ~
ARMOR
5050
(ATLK-FIE) 5953 (ATZK-'") FAX 7585 7809 (ATSB-TS) (ATS B-TS) 7955 ~
ovember-December
~~
7997
Just because we're we're "Soldiers of the Sea" does not mean we can't still fight a ground campaign. A. B. DIGG LTC, USMC Former CO, 3d Tank Bn Task Force Ripper
Relating Relating Battlefield Battlefield Succ ess To Political Objectives Dear Sir: Dr. Dr. Brian Holden Reid Rei d has has performed a valuable senrice for the proponents of maneuver warfare warfar e by clearly outlining ou tlining the views of General Genera l J.F.C. J.F.C. Fuller ("Major ("Majo r General J.F. J.F.C. C. Fuller Full er and the Problem of MiliMi litary Movement.' ARMOR, July-August 1991). His clear explanation of the need for simultaneous offensive and defensive operations is a realization that most advocates of maneuver warfare warfar e fail to make. In a recent letter to Milirary Review (July 1991), argued that one of the failings of AirLand Battle Future doctrine (now known as AirLand Operations) was its failure to proceed beyond the thinking of the Napoleonic era. In that argument, was addressing the lack of a discussion of the fixing force by the proponents propone nts of the new doctrine. It appears that the revision of the doctrine doctrine will take Fuller to to heart and address this shortcoming. However, both Dr. Reid's article and AirLand AirLa nd Operations Operations suffer from a fatal omission he discussion of victory criteria. Dr. Dr. Reid correctly identifies that for Fuller the decisive point of attack is the rear of the enemy's army and that, ".. "...w .we e must mus t re member member that the object of militar m ilitary y operations is the destruction of the enemy's weapon power, his capacity to fulfill the tactical function, which is the prime object of the maneuver battle. His organization must be shattered." This is the CRITICAL MISTAKE that all advocates of maneuver warfare make hey fail to relate battlefield success to the achievement of political objectives. We We must m ust always alway s remember the Clauswitzian admonition admoni tion that war is a conc ontinuation of politics by other means. Before we can plan pl an for or conduct a m miliilitary campaign, we must understa und erstand nd the condition conditions s that our political leadership desires that we create. What are the conditions that should exist when combat operations are concluded? The answer to this question is key to the type and nature of military operations that we undertake. Sun Tsu would would have us believe be lieve that, in most cases, the answer to this question would cause us to attack the enemy's strategy
rather than his army. We should attack his strategy so as to convince him of its futility and the need for for him to change his political objectives. General Andrew Beaufre said it clearly when he wrote: "The "The outcome desired de sired is to force the enemy to accept the terms that we wish to impose upon him. him. In this dialectic of wills, decision is achieved when a certain effect has been produced on the enemy; when he becomes convinced that it is useless to start or alternatively continue the struggle." If our opponent changes his political objectives as a result of our military, economic, andlor political activities, then our effort has been successful. What must we do to achieve this? In my opinion, we must successfully attack the opponent's military and political centers of gravity while de fending our own. This may be his army's rear, rear, or it may be an a n individual or small group. For every conflict, the centers of gravity gravity will be different and must be identiident ified early on. An understanding of this concept of of victory victo ry uccessful attacking of the enemy's center of gravity and an d defense of our own, such that the enemy decides to change his political objectives nd the mental flexibility that it implies, is a much more sophisticated and difficult task than a simple focus on the enemy's rear. The reader of Dr. Reid's Reid' s fine summary of MG Fuller's thoughts should take with him the concept "that the entire operation should be conceived as an intellectual whole, and not viewed as a string of miscellaneous general engagements that have no relationship with one another. Each battle should be regarded as stepping stone the successful conclusion of the war and should make a distinct contributio trib ution n to the overall plan." plan." (Emphasis (Emphasis added.) If we can translate the conditions that the political leaders want to exist at the end of a conflict, as discussed earlier, into military objectives and then backward backwa rd plan and synchronize our campaign, as suggested in the above quote, quote, we can successfully attack our opponent's centers of gravity while defending our own. own. This wil cause the enemy to change his political objectives to accommodate ours and thus result in victory. The challenge to the mobile force of the future is to develop the mental flexibility refuture quired to accomplish the above. ARMOR has contributed to that process by the publication licati on of Dr. Reid's excellent summary of the thoughts of Major General J.F.C. Fuller. Keep up the good work. BRUCE B.G. B.G. CLARKE CLAR KE COL, Armor Carlisle, Pa.
ovember-December 7997
Guns of th
TD
Dear Sir: In regard to LTC Herman's letter in the July-August 1991 issue of ARMOR wherein he states that his Tank Destroyer (TD) unit in WWll had '... '...th th M1 tank destroyer wit a naval 3-inch gun, ...," can only surmise that his unit musrve had a lot of trouble trouble in obtaining obtaini ng Navy ammunition, ammunition, because it was surely the only TD unit so equipped! In fact, the M10 TD had the Army 3-inch Tank Gun M7, an adaptation adapta tion of of the towed 3-inch 3-in ch Antitank Gun M5. using the same cartridge cartri dge family, family, Neither Ne ither the gun nor the cartridge are derived from naval antecedents. The M7 Tank Gun did use cartridges whose ancestor was the ammunition used in the Army's 3-inch (15pdr) Seacoast Gun, Model of 1898. That is, the ammunition used the same cartridge case design, design, but was assembled with more modem propellant and projectiles to be used in the M7 Tank Gun, as well as in other weapons chambered to use us e the same ammunition. Caliber alone tells nothing about size, weight, performance, cost, ancestry, or much of anything anythi ng of importance about ammunition or guns. DONALD LOUGHLIN Pleasanton, Calif.
Should Tanker Badges Be Retroactive? Dear Sir: have read with interest in the past tw issues, letters from lieutenants proposing the issue of a combat tanker badge to DESERT STORM participants. applaud and support the proposal. However, none has recommended that such overdue overdue recognition for tankers be retroacr etroactive. Shame on them fo limited historical insight. As a cavalry officer in Our Most Protracted War, War, as opposed to The Brief War, we spent 10 hours of combat in i n most any given week. True, our war wasn't against agains t enemy tanks, tanks, but the RPGs were a constant cons tant fact of life li fe (and often death), as were mines and booby traps. And our armored vehicles bumed MOGAS, which when hit erupted into a deadly fireball. Many of of my comrades comrad es from th 3rd Squadron, 5th Cavalry are now remembered only only on a black granite wall in Washington, and by their families and former fellow soldiers.
Continued on Page 40
Thomas Foley Commanding General Army Armor Center
Armored Force For Future 2000 echnology Beyond (Part II) began fhis discussion technology and the Armored Force beyond th year 2000 in the September-October issue. addressed the size and misthe future force, the future sions BT and AGS systems, and how we look to take advantage technology to enhance battlefield eficiency, survivability, and mobility. continue now to examine other signifcant technology issues that merit our attention so that we can field a superb Annor Force into the next century. scouts desperately need future scout vehicle (FSV). This vehicle will have many of the advanced capabilities already discussed. Key technolo-
gies in the development the future scout vehicle will be the use of lowobservable technologies and weight, composite materials for both its structure and its armor. Other important technologies to the FSV ar in the sensor area. Hand in hand with the sensors, the FS will require very long range, secure communications with the capability to integrate data from variety of sensors and with the future main battle tank, the FS will also need to conduct ex+ h . . LUG tended autonomous ope rat^^. AirLand O perations battlefield battlefield the fu ture scout vehicle will conduct various missions for extended periods of P I V W Y V~ -W " .P Q
ARMOR
time an in locations remote from friendly forces. With the application of these technologies, the future scout vehicle will be a vital piece of equipment to the Total Army. We in the Annor Force need an allweather missile system for the FS that capability to successfully engage threat vehicles at longer fire, ranges, at an increased rate
I... and
with
..".
+ p r l i i r ~ A timp nf flioht I V Y U V V Y
.Y..V
'"U"
compared to current systems, such
TOW. 1.
11
auw1IuII
....-
C..h...A
--....l..d
IULLUG L U I I I U f l L
".," aya-
rems, there numerous other systems, what call the tools of mobile armored warfare, which will play
ovember-December 1991
vital role th future battlefield. These ar not major weapons systems. Rather, they are relatively inexpensive combat multipliers like quick erection antenna masts or items which enhance the habitat of ou fighting vehicles. A vital area for the Armored Force is our command and control subsystem. With the application of advanced sensors, and automated command, control and communication systems, overwhelming amount of tactical and operational information will flood commanders and staffs, who are already stressed by continuous operations. Armor commanders and their staffs will require a modem command and control system. They need one that will reduce soldier workloads and enhance so ldier endurance endurance as much as possible. These requirements en compassed by the need to streamline method s of in formation fusion, correlation, and presentation: to simplify methods of generating orders, overlays, and reports: and the critical critical need for increasing our command post mobility, survivability, and functionality. Many of these needs will be influenced through technological advances in electronics, communications, and artificial intelligence, and their ability to provide innovations and applications in reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition systems, robotics and space programs, and operational decision support systems. analysis over the last several years and our experience in SW have highlighted the importance of these concepts to operational effectiveness. Just now are we coming to grips with the potential benefits of real-time and near-real-ti near-real-time me information sharing between tanks and units our M1A2 testing in California. The M 1A2 is vital not only to continue tank modernization, but also because of its role as bridge to help us understand and learn to apply these capabilities. Technology will allow the Armor Force of the future make great advances not only in mission execution, ARMOR
but more dramatically in mission planning. In the future, the commander will have the capability to “fly” through a digitized digitized rendering rendering of tactically or operationally important areas of interest in order to observe terrain and the disposition of forces on that terrain. This will provide the commander and his staff with a complete mastery of his geographical and battlefield geometry as it unfolds. Advances in the integration of of battlefield intelligence and information will provide th commander’s staff with an adaptive analysis and asset management system, which will include single-, multiple-, multiple-, and a ll-source processing and analysis. This smart fusion system will have self-learning capabilities that the staff can easily adapt to changin g battlefield battlefield conditions. Last, the Armor Force’s communications will consist of of systems that are high volume, high speed, antijam, with with low interce pt probability, and ca pable of operating over extended ranges in all types of temin and weather.
In order to maintain the momentum of the attack, armor forces require fu ture systems that will incorporate advariced technologies to improve our mobility and co untermo bility capabilities. We need an improved vehiclemounted mine detection system, which will provide the capability for mounted units to detect metallic and nonmetallic mines both on and off routes of march, whether the mines were emplaced by by conven tional or remote techniques. The system would have an advanced detection array using X-ray backscattering imagers, acoustic and seismic detectors, and even electromagnetic mine detectors to determine mine location. Such system would provide the Armor Force the capability to detect all types of mines at combat speeds, rather than the lower speeds required today for mine clearing operations, and in a wider path than the width of the vehicle.
November-December 1991
scouts require the same type of capability in manportable configuration. The manportable system must have the capability to detect all types of mines at distances of to 30 me ters to allow the dismounted scout conduct effective reconnaissance. In the area of co unter mo bility, we need smart minefield system that will allow us to move the minefield automatically and defeat targets through top, bottom, or side attack at extended ranges. The o ne important “system” “system” that we cannot forget is the Armor crewman. We must ensure ou crewmen have not only the finest equipment, but also the finest self-protection equipment. We envision a follow-on to the soldier integrated protective ensemble. What we need is an Armor crewman integrated protective ensemble. This will give the individual vastly improved capabilities on the battlefield sysem c onsis ting o suite of individual weapons, to include missiles and directed energy systems: helmet integrated communication, fire control and posnav capabilities: high speed data m anagement processing processing capabili ties: laser alarm systems: and an exoskeleton contributing to enhanced mobility. The system would also include advanced encapsulated feeding, medical self help, and individual decon capabilities. We believe the concept of mission oriented protective posture (MOPP) needs to be expanded to include when to wear body armor an protective goggles. In order to further assist assist the m ounte myriad combat tasks he is assigned, robotics may be a solution. Robotics hold th promise to ease greatly the burden on the soldier to conduct sustainment operations. Robotic vehicles that can move about the battlefield under the control of a base station or work autonomously will enable systems be refueled and rearmed in more efficient manner. Think of the benefits of robotic fuel, ammunition, food, and medical vehicles, which
drive to predetermined point to m eet company of tanks to conduct resupply operations. While the crews conduct personal hygiene and draw food from robotic vehicles, other robotic vehicles control the combat vehicles and conduct resupply and rearming operations. Those vehicles requiring maintenance are repaired by robotic systems, and injured soldiers mount robotic vehicles to be transported to the aid station. Imagine the time saved and effort saved by not having the soldier conduct these routine resupply operations. In addition, robotic vehicles could conduct chemical detection missions and decon missions without exposing the soldier to deadly chemicals. They could also serve as autonomous sentries and decoys to enhance the overall lethality and survivability of force. Some of the other areas of concern in which technology can play vital role are camouflage, laser protection, and biotechnology engineering. Highly sensitive and long range sen-
sors will inundate the battlefield
the future. They will operate all areas of the electromagnetic spectrum. To thwart the enemy’s sensors, intelligence gathering capability, and smart munitions with with multi-spec tnl camouflage may be very cost effective way of increasing survivability on th battlefield. Lasers on the battlefield of the fu will not limited to ranging and designating operations. They will be used to incapacitate or even destroy. We must protect our optics and our soldiers. Some of th technologies that may prove beneficial are holographic filters, sacrificial mirrors and coatings, non-linear processes and optics, and scattering cells. Biotechnology engineering may may hold the promise of light weight personal ballistic protection with advanced fiber technology. Also, biotechnology may hold the promise of quick, effective medical self help on the battlefield. ture
Training cuts across the entire domain of lethality , survivability, surviva bility, and mobility. Without trained soldiers, leaders, and units, all of our equipment and doctrine is worthless. In these days of of scarce time, space, fuel, ammunition, and money money resources w need to be able to conduct fast-paced, combat-oriented, realistic training. Embedded training is one potential answer. It can be conducted at unit level, even up up to battalion or brigade. These operation o perationss can ru the gamut of combat missions the unit may face. Automated manuals in th vehicle are must. The crewmember needs to be e to access his man uals without leaving the vehicle and without havin to worry about the space the manuals require. He simply pushes button, and the manuals appear on the screen at his workstation. This in cludes maintenance, maintenance, SDT, CIT, field manuals, and appropriate SOPS. SOPS. Here at the Armor Center our foremost combat development tool, the Close Com bat Test Bed Bed (CCTB ), with with its simulation simulation networking technology, has already initiated the path to hardware developments for the 21st century. Recently transitioned from DARPA to Army control, this unique man-in-the-l man-in-the-loop oop distributed simulatio has great potential to accomplish more cost effective, technically difficult combat developm ents, while sub stantially reducing troop support requirements. Because it is an interactive simulation, many MANPRINT and human engineering aspects of hardware development can be addressed thoroughly. Because of the flexibility in th simulation, changes can be implemented quickly to m ake evolutiondesign changes in new hardware, address multiple courses of action regarding sensor, target acquisition or survivability packages, or pursue evolving technologies. The ability to tune both the hardware and software to greater or lesser level of fidelity gives our combat developers more in-
ARMOR
sight into into the impacts impacts f c futuristic threat capabilities.
t and
Currently, the CCTB is slated for experiments in the areas of battalion and below command and control, communications speech intelligibility, line of sight antitank development, Xro ammunition tactical employment, as well as our first endeavor to explore required operational capabilities requirements for the vehicle vehicle integrated defense system. The ASM Common Chassis Program is using CCTB technology to evaluate the design and func tionality tion ality f th FMBT Block 111) crew com partmented hull, and the composite armored vehicle program will interface its Advanced Technology Tim sfer Dem onstratio onstrations ns (AT ID) with the rapidly expanding combined arms battlefield to evaluate various emerging technologies in the late 1994-2000 imeframe. The CCTB itself is going through development phase phase to become the battlefield distributed simulation developmental facility for the h o r e d Force. This transition will bring more realism to the simulation, greater level fidelity, tunable OPFOR, and host of environmental im provements, which will make battlefield replication of Armor 2000 and beyond possible. I’d be remiss if, after this quick tour through our technological challenges, didn’t come back to th very h e a t of our vision hat armor soldiers and leaders ar the key to ou r future. am confident that we can continue provide the kind of mounted wanior who performed so magnificently in the deserts of Kuwait and Iraq. We can meet our mission demands by melding U.S. echnology echnology with American armored crewmen and ensuring they ar trained to standard. In the next issue we will examine our strategies for Combined Arms Training in th future. Forge the Thunderbolt!
November-December 7997
CS
Jake Fryer Command Sergeant Major U.S. Army Armor Center
Don’t Forget Forge t the Observer Ob server Twenty-two years ago, while serving as a scout observer with Troop, 2d Squadron, 9th Cavalry, was, by proxy, relegated to specific duties when the unit deployed to the field. These duties included, but were not limited to, ammunition pad specialist and guard, kitchen police, barrier/range guard, tank trail police, target detail, fire guard, and beer hall superintendent; additionally, was labeled “JAFO” or “worm.” It’s sad for to report that, force wide, some of observers reat soldiers whose abilities aren’t being maximized re subjected to th same abuse Jake Fryer was subjected to over two decades ago! Why do 19D stands for still believe the detail? Why do we berate these dynamic, highly talented soldiers? Maybe wa treated that way because my leaders at he time weren’t aware of th preliminary training had received prior to arriving at their unit. A 19D OSUT graduate has 1. completed basic soldierhation training, i.e., UCMJ, Code of Con-
ARMOR
duct, heritage and traditions, inspections, dismounted drill, check cashing, etc. 2. passed the APlT. 3. participated in tactical foot marches. aintained 4. cleared, loaded and m aintained M16A1 rifle. M16AI rifle. qualified w it engaged targets with an M16A1 rifIe using a PVS-4. 7. cleared, loaded, and maintained an M203 grenade launcher. 8. engaged targets with an M203 grenade launcher. 9. cleared, loaded, and maintained an machine gun. 10. engaged targets with an M60 MG.
engaged targets with an M60 MG using a PVS-4. W. 2. fi nd a subcali subcaliber ber A T 4 13. thrown a live hand grenade. 14. performed individual tactical tasks, i.e. i.e.,, react to flares, movement mov ement techniques, techniques, and camouflage. 15. used PVS-7 night vision goggles. 16. negotiated an infiltration course. 17. participated in a five-day FIX. 11
November-December 7997
used and m aintained an M17 and M25 protective mask 19. been through the gas chamber. 20 worn MOPP IV for four continucontinuous hours. 21 performed personal NBC decontamination. 22 identified chemical agents with M8 detector paper. 23 detected chemical agents with M9 detector paper. performed basic first aid tasks. 25. operated and maintained PRC-77 and vRC-64 radios. 26 operated and maintained TA-1 and TA-3 telephones. 27 had introductory training on SINCGARS radios. 28 prepared and sent radio messages and spot reports. 29 recognized friendly and Soviet vehicles and aircraft, as friend or enemy. 30 identified Soviet aircraft by name. 31. identified Soviet weapons. 32. collected route classification 18.
data.
33
read g rid coordin ates on a map.
34. determined elevation, measured distance, and identified terrain fea-
tures on a map. 35. determined determin ed azimuths with a compass compas s and converted converted magnetic magnetic and grid azimuths. 36. negotiated negoti ated a compass course. course. 37. prepared demolition charges. 38. install ins talle4re e4remove moved d dummy dummy an AP mines. 39. 39. installedhemoved installedh emoved dumm dumm M15, M19, and M.21 mines. nstalled and removed a dummy claymore mine. 41. installed dummy mechanical ambush. (M18) 42. probed probed for mines 43acquire 43ac quired d a basic knowledge knowledge of installing booby booby traps. acquired a basic knowledge of neutrali neutralizing zing enemy enemy mines and booby
traps.
45 acquired a basic knowledge of calling for and adjusting indirect fire estimatin g range. range. and estimating 46. acquired a basic knowledge of CEO1 and codes.
ground guided vehicles with hand and signals. 48 prepared DA Form 2404 an Form Form 1970 (Dispatch). (Dispatch). 49. loaded loaded vehicle smoke smoke grenade launchers. performed vehicle vehicle recovery op 50 performed erations. 51. drove an M998-series vehicle (HMMWV) at slow speeds on roads an cross country for six s ix miles. 52. performed operator's maintenance on an M998-series M998-series vehicle 53. driven an at slow speeds roads miles. cross country for 54. extinguished extingui shed a fire on an (simulated) or fording oper55 prepared an ations. 56 performed operator's maintenance on an 57. performed emergency evacuation from an 58. engaged targets with with the coax MG on an 59. cleared cleared,, loaded, and maintained maintained a 25-mm gun. 47
Armor Branch NC
loaded and unloaded 25-mm ready boxes on an M3. 61 engaged targets with th 25-mm gu on an M3. 62. performed TOW, 5-mm gun, and M24OC coax MG misfire procedures. 63. prepared prepare d a range card for an TOW missile missile launcher 64 oaded a TOW
an 65 cleared, loaded, and maintained an M24OC coax MG. an 66 had mechanical training ca MG.
Even Eve n though we could train him him better at the institutions, we rely on hi to initiate ini tiate a program program of self study. But more important impor tantly, ly, we're reliant upo the unit to maximize maximiz e on the training we've given hi and, somehow, continue to challenge hi through tough, realistic training programs ot tedious, mundane details. DON'T SERVER!
FORGET
OB-
Notes School
We are looking for senior NCOs who want receive training in tactical air operations at brigade level and below. An AS1 of Q8 is awarded for SF C-M SG s who who successful successfully ly complet th Joint Firepower Control Course. R equest eque st the school by a DA 4187 through your schools NCO.
MO
19
Tefmlnated
MO 19E terminated as an AC authorization, but continues to appear Enlisted Master File. For hose who have not transitioned to the M1, the database should reflect 19K with an AS1 of Y2 (transition required). We will continue sending soldiers with 19E to th M1TC 3 course course in in a TD Y enroute status. status.
Master Gunner Courses 2Mar92 13Apr 92 1 Jun92 13Jul92
18May92 un 92 18Aug92 29Sep92
ARMOR
ovember-December 1991
The Guns of by Captain Michael
Cavalry
Reagor
W W l l Innovation Gave Cav Commander
An Indirect Fire Advantage
,.ln
The Second Regiment Regim ent of of Dragoons, D ragoons, the Regiment of Mounted Riflemen, and the Blackhorse Regiment conjure up historiesrich historie srich with tradition, bravado, and chivalry. The Indian Wars, Mexico City, Vera Cruz, Luzon, Northern France, Rhineland, and the Gulf Warar but a few of the glorious battles and campaignsfought by determined cavalrymen. Yet, despite despi te the richness of th legends, stories, and historical documents, the artillery artille ry support is not mentioned. When did th cavalry cavalry receive its first artillery piece? What been the evolution of of regimental cavalry artillery, known affectionately as “Cavarty?” What role did Cavarty play play in Operation
ARMOR
WWII-Era M-8 Assault Gu
DESERT DESER T STORM? An finally, what is the future for Cavarty?
Th Beginning The separate separat e howitzer batteries within the three current armored cavalry regiments can can trace their thei r origin back to World War 11. LTC (Ret.) Preston Utterback, former commander, 43rd Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Group, was one of the primary advocates of organic cavalry artillery. He modified the role of of the assault gu and turned it into the cavalry’s first organic piece of artillery artill ery hardware. hardware. The following followi ng excerpt is his account accoun t of of the origin of what is i s no Cavarty:
November-December 7997
“In the summer of of 1943, attended he Mechanized Cavalry School at Fort tactical instructors Riley, Kansas. werc fresh from combat in North Africa. ull former cavalry squadron s quadron commander commander in North Africa told us then (among other things) to teach the assault gu troops tro ops how how to fire indirect indirect fire, ifpossiifposs ible. Upon assignment as he S- of 43rd Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Group, learned that our assault gu troop had fe ex-horse cavalry officers and NCOs who had had absolutely no concept co ncept on training in artillery fire methods. They had only been instructed how how to fu e direct fire with their 75-mm howitzers mounted on an M2A1 tank chassis. gained the cooperation of the com-
manding general of field artillery brigade and was assigned several artillery officers office rs and NCOs for training in indirect fire fi re procedures. During an an intense three-month period, Troop, 43rd Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Group, tnnsitioned from horse cavalry soldiers to artillerymen. “We were committed tocombat in August 1944. shall never forget our mt encounter encount er with with dug-in du g-in German German 88 8 8 guns and tanks. We countered counte red with with fronta fire, called for indirect fire from ou assault gu troop, and sent recon troop around the left flank. They dropped those 75-mm shells shell s with with pinpoint accuracy and destroyed enemy equipment and personnel far fa r beyond ou ex pectations. We used this strategy time and time again in the next nine months we spent in combat. personal knowledge, knowledge, ou as“T sault gun troop never fired direct fire fir e at the enemy. We thought th ought of of them them and used them as artillery artill ery only, and we used them them constantly. They were were artillery, used to influence battle ob jectiv jec tive e and were always there when when needed them.” The First Transition
During he postwar years, the Army extensively extensively studied studied the wartime wartime ope ntions of the mechanized cavalry groups. groups. The military leadershipdetermined leadershipdeterminedthat the cavalry structure struc turewas was not not adequatel equipped and organized for offensive or delaying operations against superior force. The reorganization in in 1948structured the armored cavalry into regiments, self-sufficient tactical units capable of operating independentlyover wide area and at great distances from other units. In order o rder to accomplish their new new misson, the armored cavalry regiment consisted of three th ree armoredcavalry reconnaissance battalions, each com posed of three reconnaissance companies, tank tank company, a headquarters
10
and headquarters company, and howitzer battery. This restructuring was the official birth of Cavarty. Since the new new reconnaissance battalions operated at extended distances from from supporting s upporting artillery units, the organic howitzer battery furnished internal nal fire support. The battery ha si self-propelled M52 105-mm 105-mm howitzers, which were built on tracked chassis. The howitzers were capable of matching the tank’s cross cross-country -country mobility, and had range of 11 kilometers. With new equipment equipme ntand new structure, the modem armored cavalry waited to test its strength. Despite Korea, the armored mored cavalry ca valry regiment, regime nt, complete compl ete with with its Cavarty, was not battle tested until the deployment of of the th ACR to the Republ Rep ublic ic of of South Sou th Vietnam Vietnam in early September 1966. Vietnam
When the ACR went into combat com bat in the Republic Republi c of Vietnam in 1966, the howitzer battery was an integral integr al component of the squadron structure. struc ture. The batteries primarily supported squadronlevel operations operati ons out of of fire bases in in th Tay Ninh, Binh Long, L ong, and Binh Duong Provinces. The squadrons s quadrons used used their battery fires primarily in suppressing and interdicting enemy activity. Occasionally, the fires were augmented by units from II Field Force Artillery. The most significant field artillery improvement made within the Cavarty during Vietnam Vietnam was w as the creation of the Regimental Fire Support Element (RFSE). Theartillery cell’srole was was fire support coordination and clearance of fires. Rotating field artillery battalions had had previousl prev iously yprovided those function for the ACR. The Th e ne RFSE thus enabled the ACR ACR tobecome tobecom e independent in artillery artille ry operations. The cavalry bond bond to t o its it s artillery in Vietnam was as strong as it was during WWII. Once again, th artillery was was the t he
ARMOR
squadron commander’s immediate asset to influence cavalry battle. In Operation FISHHOOK, MONTANA RAIDER, and others ime and time again howitzer batteries responded with accurate accurat e and timely timely fm when th cavalry cavalr y troops needed needed it. COL (Ret.) Don McKnight, squadron commanderwith the 1 ACR in Vietnam, summed it up: “I was the classic combined arms team. The battery was able to fire more missions i timely and accurate accur ate manner than than other non-organic artillery assets. The howitzer battery was MY artillery.” DESERT STORM
During the post-Vietnam period, the ACRs went through another bansition. The AirLand Battle Doctrine brought the realization that the cavalry regiments needed additional artillery support from a direct support su pport FA battalion while in the covering force area. In some cases, such as Europe, the relationships between the cavalry regiment regiment and its DS FA battalion were immediate and survived the test time. However, with 3rd ACR, the formal forma l link-up with direct support FA battalion did not occur occu r until 1990. The 3-18th 3-18th FA Battalion, general support battalion from Corps Artillery at Fort For t Sill, was designated the 3rd ACR’s direct support FA battalion batta lion for fo r DESERT SHIELD SHIELD and DESER DESERT T STORM STORM.. Both Both units units w paring for mutual NTC rotation rotati on when Operation Operat ion DESERT DESE RT SHIELD began. began. When the two unit unitss linked lin ked up in Saudi Arabia in mid-October, the 3-18th 3-18th FA Battalion came under the control of the 212th Brigade. Under the t he DESERT DESERT SHIELD SHIEL D OPLAN, the th e battalion had th mission to provide direct dir ect support to the 3rd ACR only in the th e covering force area. The 3-18th FA Battalion wa attached to the 3rd ACR under the OPLAN for DESERT STORM. nder the attached relationship, relati onship, he DS DS battalNovember-December 7997
ion commander co mmander became th regimental FSCOORD. FSCOORD. One of of his h is first firs t actions as the FSCOORD as to to assimilate the Cavarty howitzer batteries under hi command and control, move vehemently blocked by by the squadron commanders. Based upon upon the diversity divers ity of cavalry missions, the regimental commander agreed on the following artillery relationship. During fast, fluid, and long distance offensive operations, the Cavarty howitzer batteries would remain organic to their respective squadrons. The FA battalion battalio n would would move behind the lead squadron the regiment and provide supportive fires for those targets and missions too large large for the separate batteries and one squadron to attack. tack. The howitzer howit zer batteries batte ries would remain OPCON to the battalion on short offensive operations operat ions and when when massed fires were planned to prep an objective and close limits of advance were established. In the defense, or when massed fires were critical, crit ical, the Cavarty howitzer batteries would be OPCON to the FA battalion. The regiment and the 3-18 FA Battalion would always keep the cavalry howitzerbatteries batter iesoperating n their th eir respective squadron’s zone operation. The problems that arose were immediate and difficult dif ficult to resolve before DESERT STORM. STORM. First, Fir st, the Cavarty battery FDCs were not familiar with TACFIRE and wereuntrained wereuntr ained in 3-18thFA 3-18 thFA Battalion operations. Second, three separate Cavarty batteries had had their own different SOPs and standards.Third, standards.Third, being fiercely independent, the Cavarty batteries resisted any change or attempt at standardization.Fourth, standardization.Fourth, the fire support structure for calls for fire was changed to fit the new relationship. Finally, th field artillery artil lery suffered from from training distractions tracti ons from separate separat e higher headquarters,resulting n lack of combined combin ed training. This was kept to a minimum.
ARMOR
M52 105-mmSelf-Propelled Howitzer
Despite theseproblems, he 3-18th F Battalion and the Cavarty howitzer howitzer batteries worked out mos of the problems by the time DESERT STORM STORM began. Multiple live-fire exercises (LFXs) November and December helped work out some so me of of the inherent proble problems. ms. During these LFXs, the battalion TACFIRE team assisted each Cavarty battery FDC, nd the entire fire support ne wa reconstructed and confirmed. In addition, SOPs were standardized standard izedacross all six firing firi ng batteries for the first time. During th initial initi al phase of of DESERT DESE RT STORM, the three batteries remained OPCO OP CON N to theFA battalion.The3-18th battalion.The3-18 th Battalion followed the lead maneuver squadron squ adron and traveled battalion wedge wedge formation.TheCavartyhowitzer batteries moved with their respective squadrons. Under the movement plan, the 3-18thFABatta 3-18thF ABattalion lion woul would d fire f ire from battalion-sized“hip battalion-sized “hip-sho -shoot” ot”configun co nfigun tion tion if enemy contact occurred. Our action began as the regiment turned east and became the right flank of the 24th Infantry In fantry Division. Division. Several close objectives were selected, each with limits of advance. The maneuver forces would consolidate on on the objectives. As the th e regiment attacked third set of objectives, the 3-18 FA Battalion had just completed a 4-36 counterfire mission and was in the process of movin all of he batteries forward to range well well beyond the established limit of of advance when th aviation squadron requested immediate targets considerably forward of of the limit of advance. The
November-December 7997
RFSE quickly determined that all available artillery arti llery assets to the th e regiment were were on th move. An An earli ea rlier er decision decis ion not to shoot prep, due to th large number of pipeli pip elines nes with unknown gas, required all guns to be prepared to mass fires on the objective as he squadrons squadr ons closed o targets target s of opportunity. oppo rtunity. Luckily, the maneuver elements element s never requested actual fire missions during that critical period until the guns were positioned well within range of the targets. As the 3rd ACR continued contin ued its movement to th east,the th ebatteriesreverted their organic status. Because the regiment moved with two squadrons abreast, the 3-18 FA Battalion moved centered behind these squadrons, with th third line squadron following behind, bringing with it the Cavarty’s third howitzer battery. Due to communication constraints and distances involved with the movement, that third howitzer battery acted as a reserve, which is not normal artillery role. When hostilities ended, and the regiment stopped moving, the 3-18th FA Battalion wa in a position to provide fires in the entire enti re regimental area operations, while the Cavarty’s third howitzer battery was still with with its squad ron but in position to augment fires in support of th two lead squadrons. squadr ons. That is how situation remained until th 3rd ACR ACR was ordered or dered out of Iraq and moved back into S Saudi audi Arabia. As the two units left Saudi Arabia, Arabia, the 3-18th FA Battalion went in one direction, and the regiment another. Th field 11
artillery officers shook hands and vowed vowed to t o continue contin ue working working on the relationship that had had started in in the desert. However, However, people rotate, the budget gets tighter, tighte r, and and the distance d istance between Fort Sill and Fort Bliss remains a constant 62 miles. Future NTC rotations will undoubtedly undoubtedly continue co ntinue to highlight highl ight the DS FA battalion/cavalryrelationship relatio nship as an atea of weakness.
The Future of
Cavarty
Without detracting from the need to provide fire support to such an mportant maneuver element, let’s examine artillerysupportoptions. options.I proposethree viable options and and include includ e the conflictconflic ting viewpoints from previous cavalry commande comm anders rs and FSCOORDs. also list the strengths and and weaknesses weaknesses o each the proposed options. Maintain status quo (separate Cavarty howitzer battery) OPTION
Advantages
This option has the full support supp ort of the cavalry commanders comman ders whom whom I interin terviewed viewed for this article. ar ticle. CO Robert R. Ivany, the current 3r d ACR ACR commander, summarized the maneuver perspective, “Organic howitzer batteries that always move with the squadron have proven to be the best solution.” The most important advantage advantag e to this option is that it provides the squadron commander commander with with his own organ o rganic ic artillery asset. When an artillery battalion becomes becomes direct di rect support to squadronor to the regiment reg iment,,the howitzer battery, battery , i turn, becomes O K O N to the battalion. The squadron commander retains positioning authority over his h is battery when when within his maneuver area The squadron commander commander uses the artillery to directly influence his his battle. battle. The organic Cavarty battery is more timely in in its respon12
sive fires, and is more knowledgeable the peculiar peculiar needs needs and methods of it supported cavalry squadron. squadron. In addition, an organic org anic Cavarty battery establishes an habitual relationshi relatio nship p between maneuver and artillery, a relationship not seen anywhere else els e in the Army. The organic battery is larger larg er than than most other firing batteries. It has has its own sur vey section, as well as an enlarged maintenance/recovery capability. Th howitzer battery commander works in dependently of an A battalion, battalion, and therefore becomes more self-confident FA officer from from his experience. ex perience. Disadvantages Without an FA FA battalion, battali on, th FDCs the separate howitzer batteries do not have the opportunity opp ortunity habitually to work with TACFIRE system. result, they lack the training and equipment necessary neces sary to mass fires with direct support.FAbattalion. The Cav Cavarty arty howitzer batteries do not even have the capabilities or the training to mass fires with the other regimental regimen tal batteries. batter ies. If the offensive o ffensive moveme movement nt technique calls fortwo squadronsabreast, squadronsabreast, hecavarty’s third howitzer battery moves too far behind the battle to engage, and is delede legated to reserve status. Throughoutan armored cavalry regiment, the three howitzer batteries have three different SOPS or doing things, and usually three different standards. Regimental standardization among the batteries im possible because because the artillery artille ry divided among three squadrons. The fast paced cavalry scenario usually forces fo rces the the battery battery to operate from the “hip-shoot” configuration, or to operate in the split-batte split -battery ry mode. mode. These The se movement movement methods either eith er detract from timeliness of of fire response or massing of fires. Additionally, Additionally, field field artillery officers do not usually occupy squadronlevel staff staff officer office r positions. The only FA officer positions available avail able within
ARMOR
the ACR are found in the Cavarty batteries or in the FSE at regimental and squadron level. The lack of available ava ilable FA staff positions adversely affects FA officer transition and development within the Cavarty.
Reorganize Reorganize the organic squadron batteries into a direct support battalion within the ACR force structure. OPTION
Advantages A command command and control headquarters headquar ters consisting consis ting of of an organic o rganic FA FA battalion commande comm anderrand staff would provide provid e the regimental commander commander higher level of expertise expe rtise and training in in artillery arti llery matters. regimental FA battalion battalion could position and move assets faster to allow continuousfire supporttoeithera single squadron to the entire regiment. It would create the ability, in most cases, to mass fires fir es from from three th ree batteries. Al three howitzer batteries’ training in ar tillery matters would be coordinated, resulting result ing in in standardization stand ardization throughou the regiment. The regimental FA FA battalb attalion would also be responsible to coordinate the logistical support suppo rt required fo three howitzer batterie batteries. s. Finally, habitual relationships, such as those currently used with aviation assets, ass ets, would ensure ensu re familiarity wit with h specific squadron operations. Disadvantages The squadron commanders and the regimental regim ental FA commander may may disagree on field artillery arti llery utilization at the squadron level, causing disharmony. The squadron commander would lose artillery. Personnel changeover within the firing f iring batteries batteri escould become more frequent frequ ent due to the increase possible poss ible ob assignments within within the battalion.
November-December 1991
Let’s keep all the good points that no have with Cavarty and pick up th additional good poi points nts associated with standardization, FA battalion (Le. expertise, standardization, greater massing capabilities, more available tubes at all times, etc.) Deactivate the organic OPTION squadron batteries. batteries. Advantages It simply saves money at the budget is i s getting tight.
time when
Disadvantages would exist, exis t, No habitual relationship would and mutual training would not occur frequently enough to ensure proficiency. Cavalry operations are unique unique enoughtorequirecons torequi reconstant tantmutual mutual training. As corps asset, the cavalry would have to rely on slow moving and unfamiliarartillery units forits fori ts vital support Most corps artillery assets do not have the equipment personnel needed to support cavalry operations.
Conclusion DESERT STORM demonstrated the awesome capability of the modem ar moredcavalry regiment regiment wit with h the M Abrarnstankand he BradleyFighting Vehicle. Today’s armored systems easily can outrun their current organic artillery at the squadron level. The Army Seems committed toward keeping the current fast paced role of ar mored cavalry regiment intact. intact. Now, more than ever, the regiment cannot afford to operate without without the continual continual protection of artillery support. Slow moving vehicles such as he FIST-V and M109 howitzer are not being upgraded to match the speed of the cavalry; therefore, the structure Cavarty must adapt order to keep pace with with the modem battlefield. The ACR must continue cont inue to have its vital organic orga nic artillery, artill ery, but it needs to be from regimental artillery battalion. Specificmissions that require only one squadron to operate opera te independently can can
ARMOR
be supported by by an habitual battery or batteries from within the battalion. The permanent artillery adviser to regimental command com mander er would be more experienced and qualified FA officer lieutenant lieute nant colonel vice a major. The battery FDCs become better trained in battalion and TACFIRE operations. Field Field artillery artillery officersandN office rsandNCOs COs would have a greater opportunity for career care er progression and branch training. Finally, Finall y, in future campaigns and battles, supporting artillery to regiment would would fall under typical artillery artill ery roles such as reinforcing and general support reinforcing. In recent interview, intervie w, LTC James Jam es Rowan, the 3rd ACR FSCOORD FSCOORD during DESERT STORM, gave hi opinion of th future futur e of Cavarty. “A field artillery battalion organic to th regiment, would provide better fire support to the regimentbquadron. The battalion would have greater flexibility, more cohesion, cohesion, and and better min ed field artillerymen. It provides th best for th cavalry and the field artillery.” The current armored armor ed cavalry regimental fire support structure is by no means completely broken. However, Operation DESERT DE SERT STORM STORM demonstrated that modifications are needed. After every armed conflict, the cavalry has made slight adjustments to its methodology and structure. The period following DESERTSTORMis he propertime for critical examination and the proposal of minor changes. Let’s keep the good points that we now have with Cavarty and pick up the additional a dditional goo points associated with with an FA battalion ba ttalion (i.e. expertise, exper tise, standardization, greater massing capabilities, more available tubes at all times, etc.) As the U.S. Army slims down in he future, futur e, the cavalry may may not be afforded organic artillery at he squadron level. It may sound ironic, but but an organic org anic artil-
November-December 7997
lery battalion at th regimental level may better survive th impending cuts. To budgetaryexaminer, he FA battalbattalrepresents complete, intact, and recognizable recognizable military entity. Three separate howitzer batteries may appear as “excess or unnecessary” to non-cavpotitician or bureaucrat. bureaucrat. The slight modification proposed represents complete artillery support organizatio to the cavalry now. Cavalry commanders, former as well curre nt, may may resist resi st and challenge my as current, am proposal. I not advocating advocati ng stripping th cavalry of it organic artillery. I am merely recommending restructuring for futurecavalry future cavalry campaigns. campaigns. Successes of the past do d o not guarantee success for the future. The armored cavalry regibatteries into regimental field artillery battalion. I hope that may once again servewith distinguishedarmored cavalry regiment, but more specifically, in Cavarty Field Artillery Ar tillery Battalion!
Captain Michael J. Reagor is a current student of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Fellowship Program for Lead ership Development at the United States Military Academy, West Point, N.Y. His tours include tw with the 3r ACR, including Operation tion DES ERT STO RM , and and one with the 6th Infantry Division (L). H e was comcommander of C Battery, 5-1 th FA at Fort Wainwright, and the 2/3rd ACR H owitzer Battery at Fort Bliss. He is 1982 graduate graduate of the USMA.
13
,Chri ,Ch ristie’s stie’s Last
urrah urr ah
In 1941, the Army Reappraised the Christie Suspension For Use Tank Destroyers by George F. Hofrnann, PhD. the
U.S.
Army
entered World World War , its tactical and technical experts focused on a way to stop the tanks that spearheaded the The dochine that emerged created the Tank stroyer Command Christie and his son engineered this drawing of an airborne tank concept, and th need for tails of th coiled spnng suspension. fast, maneuverable count the struggle to come up with vehicle capable capable of carrying powerful concepts and suitable vehicles to antitank gun. This search for the mount a defense against the German ‘‘ideal tank destroyer” spurred reconpanzers and their tactics of blitzkrieg? sideration sideration of of the Christie Ch ristie suspension The concepts grew from from the work of system, which the Army had explored special War Department G-3 planning and rejected in the 1930s. despite despi te the staff appointed by General G eneral George C. fact that the system was adopted by Marshall in May 1941, 1 941, under unde r the the British an the Soviets.’ rection of LTC Andrew D. Bruce. The Christie suspension, patented by Charged to tackle “such unsolved the outspoken and cantankerous inproblems as measures against armored ventor J. Walter Christie, Christie , used heliforce action,” the group came up with cally-wound coil springs acting indethe concept of a separate tank dependently on each of the th e suspension’s stroyer stro yer branch branch equipped with special spec ial road wheels. While the Christie vehivehicles. The doctrine, found wanting cles purchased for tests by the Army progressed , determined that as the war progressed, in the 1930s had had not proven particupar ticutanks would not fight tanks. Instead, larly durable, there was the potential tank destroyers would would aggressively for higher speed and maneuvenbility react to armor breakthroughs. breakthrough s. At first, inherent in this type of design, desig n, somethis ne branch was equipped with thing that was not possible possib le in in the t he votowed guns and “portee” guns, field lute-bogie type of suspension suspens ion used in guns on halftracks, halftr acks, but soon the the American medium and light tanks search continued for th “ideal tank of the day. Indeed, Christie himself destroyer.” had had demonstrated demonstrated the possibilities of The War Department planning group hi machines in numerou flashy pubultimately urged development develo pment o lic exhibitions backing up hi boast lightweight tracked vehicle possessing that a tank could obtain high speed. speed and maneuverability, capable Two excellent recent studies of U.S. carrying an adequate gun, and lighter tank destroyer dochine in Wwn rethan a tank, even at the expense of
14
ARMOR
developed dunng WWII. It clearly shows de-
some protect protection: ion: The group gro up urged that in th search for more speed and maneuverability the Army reconsider Christie’s Christie’s independent coil spring suspension. This recommendation recommendation not welcomed by by the Ordnance Ord nance Branch, which had had squabble squ abbled d frequentl freq uently y with with during tests tests of his designs in in the 1930s. Ultimately, Christie sold his ideas to th British and Soviets, who further developed Christie suspension in two series of fast light tanks, the British “Cruisers” and th Russian BTs. Instead, the United States had had continued to develop de velop the volute-bogie system, which, despite its reliability, reliability , had had by the 1940s begun to reach its developmental developmental limits. limits. Ordnance tests had proved that volutebogie suspension system used in al early U.S. Army tanks would not permit the desired speed and maneuverability? Nevertheless, Nevertheless, some Ordnance personnel were “bitterly opposed” to Christie’s system. By By December 1941, however, Bruce able to get a memorandum from G-3 issued to G-4 recommending a 37-mm 37-mm Gun Motor
November-December 1991
Carriage using plates, Schilling Christie type suseliminated outpension. This deciTh Bigley Gun Motor Carriage arrives for for evaluation at Ab erdeen Prov ing Ground in side plates on each sion was influenced spring spring 1 941 . (National Archives) Archives) side sid e of the vehicle, by observations exuosing; exuosing; the long made by LTC L TC L.W helical springs. vidson of General Gener al Motors. ConseTharp, G-3 General Staff officer In the th e spring of 1941, Bigley ha quently, quently , an an engineer from GMC, Robfrom the Planning Branch and unsuccessfully attempted to sell the ert Schilling, designed designed 37-mm Gun strong supporter support er of the Christie deWar Department his acquired Christie Motor Caniage with modified sign. In October visited William chassis. The Aberdeen Proving Christie suspension? Before the OrdBigley, a private entrepreneur, who Ground test indicated the tracked venance Department could designate the had had acquired a Christi Ch ristie e tank chassis. hicle had a number of mechanical as the T42, it was redeproposed His report indicated the vehicle approblems with th power train and the signed early April 1942 to mount a peared to be an ideal self-propelled clutch-brake clutch- brake system of of control. This un and reU.S.-made U.S.-made British Brit ish 57-m mount suitable for the ’I’D Command chassis chassi s had h ad a very ver y interest in teresting ing history. history. designated as the T49. Two test vehiand capable capa ble of mounting any gun It was originally built by Christie Chri stie and cles cle s were were subsequently ordered from smaller than the 3-inch antiaircraft called the High-speed Tank, Model Buick Motors? gun. gun. The Th e following month, at Aber1937, 1938 19 38 and T12, depending deen Proving Ground, LTC Tharp inupon upo n what year modifications were Schilling’s design deviated from the spected a British cruiser tank with the made. made. The T he vehicle was fmt tested in original M1928 and M1930/31 ChrisChristie suspension. He im December 1937, and typical of Chris tie suspension by replacing the large pressed with the tank’s smooth ride tie, he staged s taged this test before befo re the pubpubroad wheels with smaller ones, adding and stable platform, noting that lic, at Westfield Airport New Jertrack support rollers, and eliminating its suspension system had been sey. An Ordnance Department obthe forward bell-cranks. The modified adopted by foreign countries. Based server was impressed with the design, however, did retain the long upon upon LTC Tharp’s reports and obser“machine’s very attractive appearhelical springs so characteristic of vations, G-3 decided to develop the ance;” but in his opinion there were Christie’s earlier vehicles. In an atChristie concept into TD In January no new design features of striking strik ing im tempt to modify the wasted hull space 1942, negotiations negotiati ons began began between portance. He concluded that the endue to the springs’ position between General Motors Corporation (GMC) -
and th Tank and Combat Vehicle Division of the Ordnance Department in order to study the details deta ils of Christie suspension patents controlled by Army Ordnance. Also considered in the negotiations was William Bigley, who had been in contact with General Motors regarding manufacturing rights of his acquired acquired Christie chas sis? It was not until the t he middle of of March that action was finally taken: then-BG Bruce, who as dissatisfied with the numerous vehicles undergoing tests by the Ordnance Ordnan ce Department, took took the initiative initia tive and conferred with W.J W.J.. Da-
ARMOR
Christie Christie tank tank chassi chassis s M i9 Corps Tank Museum
November-December 1991
tested at Westfield, Westfield, N.J. in December 193 7. (Royal Armour Armoured ed
15
gine would would easily overheat ov erheat wit added superstructure, armament and ammunition, and crew.8 After the demonstration, Christie made arrangements to ship the tank chassis to Famborough Proving Grounds in England for tests scheduled February 1938. Then-LTC G. MacLeod Ross, wh that time was involved in tank design at Woolwich, remembered Christie’s showmanship, describing him as “an escapee esca pee from Bamum and Bailey’s circus ...”9 Another observer from the Royal Tank Corps, SGT A. Norris, recalled that during the first the final drive seize test-run attempt, the up bringing the chassis to a bruising, abrupt halt. This resulted in a numbe of damaged gear components; Christie’s Christi e’s driver had forgotten to check the transmission oil. Christie was furious and refused assistance from from his British hosts, hosts , preferring instead to acquire the replacement parts an the machine himself.” Other than than its i ts speed, the chassis did not impress the British observers obser vers at Famborough; they had purchased late in 1936 a Christie Ch ristie Model Model 1930, whic whic was similar to th U.S. Army’s Medium Tank and the Combat Car T1. The British had already alread y acquired acquired enough technical information from this vehicle. Perhaps what soured th possibility possib ility of purchasing a second model was Christie’s Chris tie’s insistence that he receive $320,000 to cover actual manufacturing cost cost of parts p arts and drawings, and future manufacturing rights for current cur rent and future fut ure test model models.’ s.’ Returning to the United States, and after a few modifications, he chassis ow called Model T12 wa again subjected brief test in Octo1938 at Hempstead, Long Island. As before, an Ordnance Ordn ance Department observer was on hand to examine the vehicle. He noted that Christie’s s u s -
T67 75mm Gun Motor Carriage
pension provided excellent riding qualities and a stable fuing platform. However, there was again considerable concern regarding the effect the added weight weight of of increase armor, armaments, and crew would have on the power train.12 In March March 1939, Christie Christ ie attended an Ordnance conference on tanks which he virtually demanded the War Department let hi undertake the construction construction of of a large large number of his tanks. If not, he threatened to use organization organ ization of civilians civili ans he had had and through which sufficient number Christie tanks would be furnished to each each college col lege in the United States for training. When asked to be more specific about his proposition and then submit submit it to the Chief Chief of Ordnance, Ordnance, Christie Christi e left the the conference con ference,, announcing he would would first see se e President Roosevelt13 This This was Christie’s last official contact con tact with the U.S Army. He was not consulted consult ed in in 1941 or 1942 1 942 by
ARMOR
Icks
Collection. Patton
Museum
GEN Bruce, COL Tharp, nor GMC engineers regard to modified suspension desi design gn for th TDs. With With no military customers cu stomers and serious financial problems over an artisan’s lien lien and and attorney fees, Christie sold the chassis in August 1939 to William William Bigley. It It was destined destine d to become the Bigley Gun Motor Carriage.I4 This vehicle was powered by new 190-hp. Continental engine and new tracks. tracks. The late COL Rober J. Icks recalled Bigley bringing the vehicle ow sporting open, oddlooking looking superstructur supers tructure eof mild steel ay 1942 for an unofficial to APG proving grounds test. during the previous spring, the chassis tested poorly and was returned to its owner. That was the last time Icks and APG saw the Christie/Bigley tank chassis.15 Nevertheless, Bigley had been consulted by by GM GMC C officials of ficials regarding regardin g the Christie suspension but was advised that this system was being developed
November-December 1991
by the Buick Division. In October, however, Bigley again attempted to interest a special s pecial Army Armored Board in his vehicle. Though the Buick-designed T49 provided the mobility and maneuverability the TD Command desired, there were definite indications that summer that there would be a need to upgun the vehicle in order to enhance its firing power. July, a decision was made to mount a 75-mm gun on the second pilot model, and by the fall f all the vehicle was ready for proving ground tests. Meanwhile, special Armored Vehicle Board (also called the Palmer Board) was created by the Army Ground Forces to deal with the various A F V s created as result of Americ America’s a’s entrance entranc e into th war, and at the same time attempt to place some semblance of order orde r and control on the uniformity of equipment used by the using arms. The board, chaired by BG William B. Palmer of the mored Force, considered some 15 vehicles between October and December 1942, including the Bigley vehicle an th T49. The first fir st pilot T49, much to GEN Bruce’s gratification, survived the board‘s board‘s scrutiny. scrut iny. Whil th board as in session, redesigned second pilot T49 was redesignated in November “75-mm Gun Motor Carriage, Carriage, T67” with Christie-type suspension. The board concurred and recommended the T67 be further developed and implement “...changes as may be found necessary, with view to standardization...”as soon as possible. However, Palmer had “serious misgivings” about Bruce’s desire to develop 76-mm gu motor carriage, and requested that “take an ‘antitank’ role and give up the nimble he hide-and-seek panther lines Palmer Board believed in continuing the T49P67 development with 57mm 75-mm gun.16 n 30 October, Bigley offered his vehicle to the Palmer Board for an AP test, particularly as potential
....”
ARMOR
rejected Bigley vehicle, as tested in 1942. and considered considered by mock-up body. (Icks Collection: Collection: Patton Museu m)
Th
The board deferred consideration of this vehicle vehic le until the T67, whic embodied the modified Christie suspension in improved form, underwent underw ent its tests. Finally, Fi nally, on 20 November, the board members conferred conferre d with Bigley Bi gley regarding serious serio us concerns they had about his vehicle, based upon upon its past history. Consequently, on 24 November, GEN Palmer wrote Bigley and noted that, regarding his vehicle, “... “...no no specific speci fic combat purpos been stated: the body is not designed for any specific military purpose: and none of the requirements requiremen ts as to loading ar met.” By December, the board made its final decision on the Bigley vehicle and unanimously recommended mended its it s consideration be terminated, because the vehicle “...could not be compared with with carefully engineered military vehicles canying their full combat loads.” In addition, in the board’s opinion, the Bigley vehicle’s suspension suspe nsion was was not much much of an improvement over Christie’s earlier models, and the T49 employed the same suspension suspens ion i an improved form. None of of the the using arms represented on the board he Armored Force, Cavalry, and the Tank Destroyer Command ere interested in development velopm ent of the Bigley Gun Motor ~arriage.’~ Early in January 1943, two major events had marked marked effect ef fect on
November-December 1991
Palmer Board, with
design designs.’ s.’* * First, First , the fourth and final h tbe tbe TD gun gun took took plac plac when the 76-mm replaced repl aced the 75-mm gun. gun. Earlier E arlier in September, Ordnance had called to GEN Bruce’s attention a new new lightweight, lightw eight, high-velocity 76-m gun. This new gun would provide th TD Center with a light, highly mobile, low-silhouette, lightly armored vehicle with the striking power of th 76-mm gun. Finally, GEN Bruce’s perception of an ideal TD as achieved. The vehicle designated “76-mm Gun Motor Carriage, no,” nd eventually evolved into the M18 “Hell~at.”’~ The second and th most important technological change occurred when the Christie suspension wa replaced by an Ordnance designed torsion-bar system. This suspension would would have dramatic impact on tank designs for many decades. The decision-making process for this action rested the Subcommittee on Automotive Equipment, which formed recommendations on military characterist charac teristics ics and production capabilities and forwarded them to the Ordnance Committee for approval. On the subcommit sub committee tee were members of of the using services ser vices and Ordnance personnel, the Army’s ex perts in tank design and engineering. The Ordnance Committee Minutes (OCM) recorded important information and references referenc es on developmental events. Three influential Ordnance
17
persons sat Subcommittee on Automotive Equipment Equipment when the t he cision was made at th end of of 1942 to drop the Christie-type system and replace it with the Ordnance O rdnance design. The key subcommittee subcommitt ee member was the chairman, chairma n, BG Gladeon M. Barnes, who since 1938 had played a dominant role in Ordnance research and design. Th second key committee member was BG BG Joh K. Christmas, an engineer and tank designer. third member was LTC Joseph M. Colby, a protege prote ge of GEN GE N Barnes. Barnes. Both Barnes and Colby also acted as consultants for the Palmer Board. Later, General Colby claimed he was involved as early 1933 in designing a torsion bw, however, recalled, “I was never in the position to get funds for its development until the winter of 1942-3.*920nstead, 1942-3.*920nstead, patents patents for the torsion bar were granted to Barnes B arnes and Warren E. Preston on 17 December 1935 and on 17 November November 1936 t Barnes. It was Generals Barnes and Christmas who attended th Ordnance conference in October Octo ber 1939 whe whe Christie made his grandiose statement that he would provide his tank to every college in United States and then stormed out of the meeting, claiming he was going to see the President2I The decision us the torsion bar in the ‘I70 was made because previous experience with with the Christie Chris tie system tem demonstrated d emonstrated that the sidemounted, long, helical springs com-
After exam ining and rejecting Christie‘s coil-spri coil-spring ng suspension, Ordnan ce dec ided to use the torsion bar system on the M18 “Hellcat” ank destroyer.
promised the space needed for the crew and fighting compartment, especially light lig ht of of the fact fa ct that the gu motor carriage was was continuously continuous ly gunned. The torsion bar layout did no compromise a most critical criti cal combat combat vehicle dimension, its width, and did not cramp the interior fighting space. The torsion bars were installed horizontally, extending across the underside of the t he vehicle behind the protection of an armor plate. In addition, it was demonstrated that the torsion bar had a greater shock-absorbing capacity than th modified Christie and th earlier designed volute-bogie suspension systems. Another concern that arose as a result resu lt of experiences ex periences with Army’s Christies Chris ties during the 1930s th Army’s was that the vehicle’s wheels tended
to jump the tank tracks turns. torsion-bar suspension virtually eliminated nated this operating difficulty diffi culty?2 ?2 Thus ended the U.S U.S.. Army’s last attempt tempt to t o use the Christie Chri stie suspension. However, the confusion between the Christie and torsion-bar suspensions gave rise to mistaken identification. The official Ordnance Department History of World War I1 claimed this confusio confusion n accoun acc ounted ted “...f “...for or much much of the criticism of of the Ordnance s Christie’s or design.”723 example, when the fmt group of of “Hellcats” “Hellcats ” arrived arrive d in in England before D-Day, the CG of the 6th Armored Division, MG Robert Grow, noted, note d, “...t “...they hey ar he M18 (old T70) 76-mm gun gun on Christie Chris tie suspenth Battl ~ i o n . ” ~uring ~ Ba ttle e of the
Tw Christie designs adopted by other countries at left, the Bribsh Cruiser Mk 111; above, a Soviet BT-series tank of the 1930s. (Icks Collection: Patton Museum)
18
ARMOR
November-December 7997
Bulge, a I1 Corps Periodic Report, "Know Your Tanks," advised all unit 4th Armored Division receiving in replacement tanks that some "...with 76-mm gun Christie suspension, low low silhouette could be "...misidentified as German tanks. Th report further cautioned all unit commanders to take rious note this matter friendly fire did not engage "our tanks of this
type+
Years later, th Chief Ordnance during the war, Levin Campbell, Jr., noted that supported Christie and his designs early in the 1930s. until military requirements changed. He considered Christie a good inventor, inventor , "but like l ike many such such civilians, Christie Chri stie felt he had to go it his way." way." Christie Chri stie,, according accor ding to LTG Campbell, expected Ordnance us his designs, rather than accept ac cept military requirementsF6 Christie could not, nor would would not, accept the th e committee approach to research and development that became so prevalent after World wa r I
Notes 'George Hofmann. "The United States' Contribution to Soviet Tank Technology," V125:l Journal the Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies (RUSI) (Mar. 1980). Whitehall, London. pp. 63-8, and "The Troubled History of the Christie Tank," ARMY (May 1986). pp. 54-65. Charles M. Baily. Faint Praite: American Tanks an Tank Destroyers during World ar I1 (Archon Books: Hamden. Conn.. Conn.. 1983). and Christopher R. Gabel, Seek, Strike and Destroy: U.S. U.S. A rmy Tan k Destroy er Doctrine in World War Leav enw orth Papers No. 12. Combat Studies Institute. (USACGSC Fort Leavenw olth. Kan., Kan., Sep. 1985). Also see Baily, "Tank Destroyers," ARMOR (Jul-Aug 1979), pp. 7-13. 3Letter, MG Andrew Bruce to MG Orlando Ward, 28 Nov 1949. Folder: TD Development, Box: Tank Destroyer Center, The Andrew D. Bruc e Papers. U.S. U.S. Army M ilitary History History Institute (USAMHI). C arlisle Barracks, Pa 4Em0ry A. Dunham, Tank Destroyer Destroyer Hittw (not published), AGF H istorical Study No. 29. 1946, Record Group 337. National Archives, Washington, p. 53; Joseph E. Canning. "Faster Combat Vehicles: New Torsion-Bar Suspension Provides Greater Speed and Reliability," ability," Army Ord nanc e (Jul-Aug 1945). Pat-
ARMOR
Museum of Cavalry and Armor. Fort b o x . Ky.. 4-5. -btter. Bruce to Ward, op. cit; Memorandum, Office of the Chief of Ordnance, 0.0. 472.1/39% (G-3/46176), De 1941, Record Group 156. NA, Washington National Record Center, Suitland. Md., and Subject: Visit to he Bigley Tank. 22 Oct 41; Subject: Visit to Ab erdeen. erdeen. 13 Nov 41; Sub ject: Developm ent of 37-mm Gun Motor Carriage with Christie Suspension. Jan 42. G-3/46176. War Department General and Spec ial Staffs. Staffs. Record Group 165. NA. 6Tank Destroyer H istory cit. 'Subject: 'Subject: 57-mm Gun Motor Carriage. T49 Development Development Recommended, Ordnance Committee Minutes ( O C M ) Item Item 18039, 9 Apr 1942. RG156, NA *Subject: *Subject: Ch ristie Convertible Chassis, 0.0. 451.2511384,15 ec 1937: Subject: Demonstration Christie Tank, 0.0. 451.25f7385. 16 De 1937; Subject: Resume of Data on Christie Tank for in "Hearings." 0.0. 451.25/7467. RG 156, NA. Business 9G. MacLeod Ross. ( E l m s Court. England: Arthur H. Stockwell Ltd., 1976). pp. 147-9. 'OLett 'OLetter, er, A. N om s to Col. Peter H. H. Hordean. 23 Nov 1970. Royal Armoured Corps Tank Museum, Bwington Camp, Wareham. Dorset. England. "A.13. "A.13. El , E2 and E3: E3: Notes on Development, etter. etter. W. J. C hristie to W ar Office, 28 Feb 1938, Royal Armoured Corps Tank Museum. '*Report of Inspection of Christie Tank at Hempstead, LI.. 0.0. 451.25/8209. 10 Oc 1938 , RG156. NA. I3Subject: Conference on Christie Christie Tan 0.0. 451.25/8674,16 Mar 1939, RG156, NA 14AGREEMENT. 7 Aug 1939. betwee betwee nd William CHRISTIE CHASSIS, INC., Bigley, J. Edward Christie Files. 'b tt , Col. Col. Robert Robert J. lcks lcks to author, author, 18 Aug 1977. 16Subject: 5-mm Gun Motor Carriage (Based (Based on 5 7a n M otor Carriage Carriage T49 Chassis) Chassis) Development and Manufacture of Pilot Vehicles Recommended. OCM Item 19185, 10 Oc 1942; Minutes of the Ordnance Committee Meeting No. 51.19 Dec 1942 all RG156; "Report of Special Armored Vehicle Board" and Exhibit J, AG451. dated 13 Oct 1942, submitted Dec 1942. Records of the Adjutant General's Office, RG407. NA; Le tter, BG W.B Palmer to BG Andrew Bruce, 9 Dec 1942. and Letter, BG Andrew Bruce to BG W.B. Palmer, 26 Jan 1943, Bruce Papers. Papers. USAMHI. ""Repor ""Reportt of Spec ial Armored Vehicle Board." op cit, Exhibit 0. '*Minutes of the Ordnance Committee MeetNo. 7 Jan 1943; Subject: 76-mm Gun Motor Carriage '170 (Based on 75-mm Gun Motor Carriage T67 Chassis) Development and Manufactured of Pilot Vehicles Recommended, OC Item 19438.4 Jan 1943, RG156. NA.
ton
November-December 1991
'9Extractr of Chapter he Tank Destmyer Board. Tank Destroyer History. De 1941-1 1943. BNLX Papers, USAMHI, pp. 2-3. %etter, BG Joseph M. Colby to author. 27 Feb 1970. z'Conference on Christie Tank, 16 Mar 1939. op. cit. . r C om om b t op cit.; Constance McLaughlin Green, Harry C. Thomson and Peter C. Roots. The Ordrurnce Department: PLNling Munitions Fo (W ash ing ton : G.P. P.O. O. 1955 ). fn 10 6, p. 200. For a detailed description of the 'I70 uspension see Chapter "Suspension" War Department Technical Manual TM 9-1755B. 29 Jan 1944, Patton Patton M useum of C avalry and Armor. 23The Ordnance Department: Planning Muni200. tiom For War, p. cit. %nterview, author with MG Robert W. Grow, Retired. 17 Aug 1971: Grow Diary. 22 May 1944, Falls Church, Va zs6th Armored Division G-2 Periodic Report lt108, 28-29 ec 1944. Archives Branch, USAMHI. 261nterview. 261nterview. author with LG Levin Levin H. H. bell, Jr.. 18 Aug 1973. Annapo lis, MD.
Dr. George F. Hofmann is a businessman, historian, lecturer, and author who served in U.S. Armor in 1957-59. He holds a BS de gree in business administration and a masters in education from Xavier University, a masters in in American history and a doctorate, concentrating in diplomatic and military military affairs, from from the University of Cincinnati, where he is currently a lecturer. A number numbe r of of his articles have appeared in ARMOR, and he has also published in Army, Marine Corps Gazette, Milifary Affairs, and the Journal of the Royal United Services Instiis the author of he tute. Super Sixth, a history of the 6th Armored Division, and soon to be published by Kent State University Press, Cold War Casualty: The Court-Martial of Major General Robert Grow.
19
20 by Captain David
Fire
Effect
Link and First F irst Sergeant Sergeant Anthony Anthony Hafer
The major reason why armored crewmen find it difficult to call for and adjust indirect fire is that most units cannot conduct sustainment training cheaply and with the necessary frequency to maintain these perishable skills. Without doubt, live training is the best way to conduct this training, but resources are so scarce that only forward observers observe rs an key leaders usually get this opportunity. The Tactical Simulator Forward Observer (TSFO) is another excellent training method. TSFO is computer operated training device that projects picture of landscape with with targets targe ts on movie screen. The simulator shows the forward observer the impact of rounds bursting in th area. Unfortunately, the TSFO is large, expensive machine set up permanent location and manned by school-trained personnel. The main drawback drawback is that it gives th soldier an oblique, two-dimensional view of th battlefield. This makes it difficult for some soldiers to transition from this two-dimensional view to three dimensions on the ground. ground. So here is the challenge: create system to instruct or sustain training in calls for fire that is realistic, effective, easily resourced, and easily adapted to ny training location. The most logical starting point is the training manual that establishes th tasks, conditions, and standards. This is STP 21-24-SMCT Standard Manual of Common Tasks, task 061-2836003 (Call for and Adjust Indirect Fire). Th best reference for instrucFire P roce-30 Observed Fire tion is dures. By using this task as the foundation for training, the guidelines for execution ar now now clearly c learly established.
Stakes
agldrquu.)
<+160
FT I
Figure 1. Engineer tape an stakes mark off outer grid lines. Scale is
Now, Now, consider con sider the average avera ge area soldier can observe. For purposes of this exercise it is best not to exceed an area of nine grid squares. This consideration is directly linked to the area suitable to set up the terrain model, which which needs nee ds to be large lar ge enough to give the feeling of observing actual terrain, and also completely visible from the observation post. The scale of one foot to 25 meters is used. This makes it big enough to realistic, but small enough to be put indoors when necessary. expanded to 160 feet wide by 120 feet deep, it could provide surface large enough to train the entire tank crew individually at one time. The terrain model boundary is marked marked off on the th e ground using engineer tape to represent the outer grid lines (See Illustration 1). One of of these the se grid lines needs to be oriented to Grid North so that the soldiers sol diers can use their compasses during training. Now, either create fictional map, or use real map to design the terrain model. It is easier to create fictional map when when limited li mited resources resour ces are available.
ARMOR
foot to 25 meters.
However, for additional realism, the recterrain model ca be designed reate unit’s General Deployment Po sition, or any of th much fought fough t over terrain of of the National Training Trai ning Center. ter. This not only trains the soldiers on calling for fire bu also familiarizes them with terrain on which they may actually have to fight. Roads and streambeds strea mbeds can easily eas ily be created on on the terrain model with shovel or “weed eater.” Buildings should be built to scale inch to foot. Sandbags can substitu sub stitute te for or hill masses additional relief. Shrubs, foliage, or branches can represent forested areas. The scale the terrain model most closely approximates 1/72; buildings and vehicles vehic les fro model railroads can suffice. Two graders are required for each soldiertested. Grader number 1, the scorer, times the event and grades he soldier on checklist from the ST 24 CTT manual. Grader number the range operator, operator, plots the location of the target and th
November-December 7991
impact of of each round using the data transmitted by soldier soldie r to the FSE, and answers as the FSE. an The soldier soldie r may may the three methods to bring effective fire on th target: “Grid Coordinate,” “Polar Plot,” or “Shift from a Known Point.” Method of Operation: Although all three methods of target location can be used, I will describe the “shift from a known point” method. Tankers favor this method, and if you understand how to use it, you will be able to use the other two methods. The soldier to be tested (now called the observer) is located at one of the OP positions on the base line lin e of the course. cours e. We We will se OW2. Once again, the more realistic the OP position, the better the training. The soldier, with with a map, protractor binoculars, and a compass, receives his unit call sign, the Fire Direction Center’s (FDC) call sign, and the locations cation s of the t he Target Reference Points (TRP), and observes target. From this position, he can see the reference points on on the course. (TRPs 2, and He is given given a target tar get in the vicinity of of a TRP, in in this thi s case, three tanks vicinity of TRP 2.
He starts his initial Call for Fire with the warning order. He calls th firing unit, identifies himself and the method of adjustment he will use. (For the ing unit, we will use A 64, nd for the observer, TlO). This is how the warning order would sound: “Alpha 64, hi is Tango 10 adjust fire fir e shift shif t from from TR 2.” Direction: The observer determines and transmits the direction from is position to the target, the observer-target line (OT (O T Line). He now must calculate and send the shift by detemining the distance from his position to both the target and the TRP, then subtracting the smaller from the larger. If th distance from the observer to th target is less than than the distance from the observer to the TRP, then the range adjustment would be a “drop.” If the opposite oppo site were were true, then it would be “add.” Now, he must determine the lateral shift. The lateral shift is the distance at a 90degree angle from the OT line to the TRP. This Thi s ca be determined il angle relationship by using the formula n which: The width of the target targe t i meters. The range in lo00 meters. The mil angle between th two points.
The last part the order is th target ID, in this case, hree tanks stationary in the open. The range operator locates the target in same way way that the firing firin g unit would, except that he does it the course layout rather than on the map. The range operator goes to th TRF’ and determines a line at the same mil angle as th OT line that the observer transmitted to him. him. This T his line is drawn through the TRP and the initial measurements to locate th target along or at a 90-degree angle from it.. He now measures the range and lateral shift using he measuring stick (see Figure 2). He places the first tip of the device at the TR and the second ti on the line lin e in the direction wants to measure. He then picks up th fust tip and rotates th device 180 degrees on the second tip so that the fust tip is again on the line. Because th device is scale 100-meters wide, he no measured a distance of 20 meters. This process is repeated in the same manner to equal the distance to be measured. This distance is range change. Once he measured th distance, turns the device 90 degrees in the direction that wants the lateral shift and measures that distance in the same way. way. He now i s at the target tar get lo-
PLACE TRPs ON THE SITE TO MATCH TRPs ON THE MAP
SIMULATED ROUNDS (Sma ll plastic bags filled with sawdust)
TRPs ca
HO scale model
buildings, or just bricks or wood blocks
OOD BLOCK TANKS
igure 2. Most of the necessary equipment can be ma de easily.
ARMOR
November-December 1991
MEASURING STICK
Mad e fro 1“ square wood stock. stock. Triangle base an d legs are feet long.
Captain David Link was commissioned in Armor in 1984 from California State Polytechnical University. He has served as a tank platoon leader, tank team XO, and ad-
TR
TR
DP
gum 3.
OP
OP
OP
course layout with four OPs.
cation, as transmitted transmitte d to him by the observer. At the target location, the range erator drops simulated round, and announces “SHOT, OVER.” The observer announces “SHOT, observe s the location locat ion of of the t he OUT,” observes first round in relation to the target and transmits an adjustment if necessary. The range operator now determines line at the same mil mil angle as the OT line but through the t he point of impact o the first fir st round. This is now now the O line. Using the data transmitted transmitte d to him by the observer, observe r, he measures the the range and lateral shift and drops second simulated round. The observer continues to call adjustments, and the range operator continues to plot th location of the rounds until a round impacted within meters of the target, at which which time ti me the observer calls call s “FIRE EFFECT.” The range operator opera tor FOR EFFECT.” then then drops about five simulated rounds. The observer observes the fire, refines and calls another “FIRE ‘FOR FFECT,” if necessary, and then calls “END OF MISSION” and sends the results of of the fire to the firing units. Th soldier is evaluated on on his ability to locate the target, by he method in which he chooses choose s to adjust fire, fire , b
his bracketing, bracket ing, and by his ability abili ty to assess the results of the fire. All standards used are from STP 21-24SCMT. The equipment equipm ent used in in this t his method is either readily available or easily constructed. It can also be stored in reasonably small area. The time to set up the course is about one hour. A soldier soldi er can be trained in about 30 minutes. If used as part of skills test, soldier can be tested in minutes. Of Of course, c ourse, more than than one soldier sold ier can can be trained or tested on the terrain model at the same time. This method solves many many of the problems of of teaching Call for Fire and be made as interesting as the can instructors’ imagination will allow. It was originally designed as method evaluat e students of the Armor Ofto evaluate ficer Basic Course during Tanker Stakes. Tanker Stakes is kind “final exam” for this course in which students ar tested on the combat critical skills ski lls they they learned, and is executed by the 2d Squadron, Squadr on, 12th Cavalry. The architect of this method is Anthony Anthony Hafer, the first sergeant of A Troop, 2-12 Cavalry, Cavalr y, and is fectionately known as the Hafer Method.
ARMOR
Armor at Fort Carson; and as squadron S3 and troop commander with 2-12 Cavalry at Fort Knox. He has attended AOB, AOAC, ITV, and NBC Schools. He is currently assigned as the commander of A Troop, 2d Squadron, 12th Cavalry Regiment, administer in to the Master Gunner Courses, the Armor Officer Advanced Course, and the Cavalry Leader Course. First Sergeant Anthony Hafer joined the Wisconsin National Guard in 1964 as a tanker. During the next seven years, he worked as a m ortarman, radio operator, and demo lition lition specialist In 1972, he entered the Active Army, again as a tanker. He served in 4-69 Armor in Germany; as drill sergeant in 4th Training Brigade, Ft Knox; as battalion assistant operations sergeant in 4-73 Armor in Germany; as a drill sergeant in 1st Armor Training Brigade, Ft. Knox; as brigade assistant operations sergeant in 1st Brigade, 1st AD; and as operation sergeant, Command and Staff Department, USAARMS, Ft. Knox. H e is currently currently first first sergeant of A Troop, 2d Squadron, 1 2th Cavalry Cavalry Regiment. November-December 1991
Company
(Mobile Combat Range)
by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Thomas R. Roman Introduction The contingency operations (CONOPS) battlefields of the future may be emerging as “new base case” for Army thinking and planning. The re cent Southwest Asia (SWA) crisis might have been our first experience with with this new orientation. Deployment of substant sub stantial ial forces force s t theater with minimal training support infrastructure may may be typical t ypical of these futu future re operations. If the for ces deployed have have significant heavy force elements (armored, mechanized, or motorized forces with with organic large caliber weapon systems, such as direct fire missiles and guns), and initial commitment to the theater of operation oper ationss is followed by a prolonged presence prese nce before combat begins or political solutions are found, how does th deployed force sustain gunnery proficiency to battle standard? Lacking live fire ranges for guns and missiles might compromise readiness. when there is ample amp le an ut even when available land for gunnery in th theater, lack of targets and instrumenta tion to obtain critical performance feedback could result resul t in expensive ammunition going down range with little training value. The mobile combat range (MCR) might offer solution, using existing and emerging technology and hardThis article artic le discusses discus ses how such an asset might work, using the device of hypothetical MCR MCR unit and CONOPS scenario. The scenario assumes us of gunnery gunn ery training strategies that are part of the th e Army’s Combined Training Strategy Arms (CATS), and assumes that significant portion of any projected gunnery
ARMOR
sustainment training employs COR-like simulator with performance gate that must be met before allowing soldiers to expend expensive ammunition on range. Ideally, th simulator would be mobile and, in fu ture, ture , would would be embedded embe dded in the weapon weapon system. Combining the mo bile ranges and the simulators to support any CONOPS gunnery sustainment training would provide powerreadiness multiplier, but even th MCR by itself might provide an 80 percent training solution. It only drawback would would be added consumption of spare parts and petroleum products, which might be scarce or limited in theater.
Scenario: Operation SOUTHERN CALM The UN military response followed deterioration in the political stability of an African region vital to the United States and other industrial powers for its resources and markets. The appeal for UN help came from several smaller states in in the t he region, each major sources for th world’s re serves of number of of essential essent ial industrial resources. They saw threat to their temtorial integrity when group of neighboring neighbor ing states became increasingly bellicose in in their pronouncep ronouncements regarding their smaller neighbors and the disposition of of their valuable raw raw resources. The crisis worsened when for forces ces from two of these states entered border zone that ha been created as demilitarized as buffer region. The occupation carried out by force of about tw divisions of of armored armo red and motorized motori zed forces, backed up by more than four
November-December 1991
infantry divisions. This combined force forc e was was now ideally positioned to invade and occupy the temtory temtor y of the militarily weaker neighboring states. Both of of the t he offensively poised armies had been been involved in active operations in recent years, though not against competent heavy or mechanized forces. Their ability operate such forces effectively and sustain these operations questionable. However, during th months preceding overt military activity, as the po litical situation deteriorated, both countries had made extensive efforts to bring their forces to high state of efficiency. This was particularly true of the armored armor ed and motorized elements, and there as good reason for as this: this: much much of .the .t he border zone ideal tank tank country, consisting of flat or rolling grasslands. The situation was beginning to exhibit an eerie simiIarity to previous situations, most notably th initial stages of the Kuwait-Iraq Kuwait-Ir aq experience. There were other similarities the unanimous U.N. sanction response in the form of an embargo, and the formation of force to assure border integrity. As in the previous situation, the U.S. U.S. provi p rovided ded significant part that force. The Th e deployment and subsequent operation wa termed Operation SOUTHERN CALM.
The Genesis of Moblle Combat Combat Ranges Operation DESERT SHIELD demonstrated the importance of preplanned sustainment training. This need developed because deployed forces spent long period in Saudi Arabia uncommitted to combat opera-
problem in Saudi Arabia was range space close close to unit cantonments. Here, tankers of the 82d Airborne Airborne practice on an mprovised range early in the deployment. deployment.
tions. Effective sustainment training to maintain a high level of combat readiness and troop morale became critical. critical. Few ranges were. available avail able in Saudi Arabia, especially ranges convenient to unit cantonments. Units could, and did, obtain obta in Saudi approval to work work out areas in the desert as ad ho ranges, but with no targetry or instrumentation, such ranges did not provide effective feedback to crews, platoons, and companies. Returning to SOUTHERN CALM scenario, Central Command and Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) jointly developed a solution to the requirement. It took th form of mobile range complex, or ganized as company-size unit, capable deployment to any anticipated CONOPS theater. The necessary technology, hardwar and software to build such a capability had been maturing through several earlier TRADOC and Army Material Command initiatives, one of which which DESERT SHIELD experience had given the Army a focus for these efforts. Through an expeditious development program, the Armor and Infantry Schools adapted their CATS baseline 24
gunnery training strategies to create a modified CONOPS version that provided requirement definition definition for the mobile range. In cooperation with TRADOC’s combat development community, the first experimental unit unit was formed a year and a half after DESERT SHIELD. It as organized organize d with with the t he following characteristics: compan company-s y-size ize unit unit of of forty forty per per sonnel. .One .One hundred hund red percent perc ent and ground mobile (all elements mounted on trucks). .Reusab .Reusable, le, mobile targetry (bot static and “mover” targets designed to support precision laser and full service gunnery, and subcaliber gunnery. ~T ar ge tr y ad a laser laser shoot-ba shoot-back ck capability. .Mobil .Mobile e range control systems. .Mobil .Mobile e instrumentation instrumenta tion system. .Mobile .Mobile power source. sour ce. .Organic spare parts and maintenance capability. .Necessary software. The experimental unit spent one year working through a series ser ies of of tests, tes ts, deploying to combat training centers and Reserve Component sites and providing “instant” “instan t” ranges on various kinds terrain. Results showed that the experimental unit could successfully
ARMOR
move by air, rail, or mad, deploying with with other ot her units, and an d quickly quic kly begin begin supporting on-site gunnery sustainment ment.. The facility proved, time and again, that it could provide level of support equal to the best fixed site fa cilities. In the case units that deployed to locations with less capable ranges during the tests, the measurably improved performance crews and platoons supported by the MCR was significantly better. Army deFrom these results, ’the Army cided to form and equip 15. MC companies, based on a best assessment of of projected pro jected CONOPS needs, anticipated peacetime employment, and competition for Scarce funding in constrained fiscal environment. Company D was part of this program.
Activation of Company SOUTHERNCALM
and
Company D (Model Combat Range) was activated on 1 June 1994, at Fort Fort Stewart, Georgia. The company, with tw sister companies, immediately began began supporting units of the 24th Mechanized Division. For the next year, the division and the companies experimented experimen ted with with and refined refin ed training strategies, deployed to different austere locations, and tested the MCR concept. The division learned that th MCR MCR companies com panies offered flexibility that improved the quality of gunnery training for all gun and missile systems beyond anything previously known. known. The companies’ com panies’ ability abilit y to go virtually anywhere and reconfigure into almost infmite target arrays with unmatched feedback, were adding an edge edge to the the 24 attle readiness. Much Much of this th is enhanced training was due to the mobility of the system and its precision laser capability. Units were able to make of virtually every available training time window. window. Expedients, like a local range set up the company area for platoon gunnery using th precision laser capabil-
ovember-December 7997
ity, had become almost division standard. Thanks to this capability, the division’s gunnery proficiency had reached level previously unknown, and the ability of th the e division to deal more effectively effective ly with with schedule schedu le dynamics and personnel turmoil had also significantly improved. upcoming events were to show, th pioneering work accomplished between th 24th Mech. Mech. and its supportsuppo rting mobile range company was to repay the investment tenfold. They had had worked out the basis for a flexi ble, deployable gunnery sustainment training system and established th essential elements of significant combat multiplier.
Deployment to the Theater of Operations 24th Mech. deployed to the SOUTHERN CALM theater of operations as part of two-heavy-division contingency corps, replacing initially deployed light forces. Company D (MCR) deployed shortly after the di vision as part of its in-theater in-t heater support package. Because of various political politica l initiatives, there standoff of of several months between the U.N. forces and the forces of the threatening states. During this period, 24th ID capitalized on the earlier work it had done with with sustainment gunnery training, supported by Company (MCR). The result was smooth transition into orderly and systematic gunnery sustainment, and gunnery proficiency remained at very high level. During this period, the division adapted its sustainment training in light of intellig in telligence ence assessments of of th forces of of the wo threatening states, their tactics, organization, and equipment, and the terrain along the &ontier. Company D’s flexibilit flex ibility y proved particularly useful. With its capability
ARMOR
on almost any terrain and reto locate on
configure, it was able to represent represent virtually any anticipated threat tactical display. The shoot-back capability further enhanced realism. As result, crews and units reached particularly high state stat e of effectiveness eff ectiveness in in the
the mostest.” But deploying armies have too often found themselves sitting for long period periodss with with inadequate or nonexistent sustainment training capability and support. With older weapons systems, this not an in surmountable obstacle. But our new, less
When When the two tw o threatening states later began began military operations acros th frontier, the initial engagements proved too costly to continue.
forgiving. We must plan to sustain training, training, particularly if theater as minimal infrastructure. This article discussed one possible approach to
armored brigades, were disasters, both both brigades suffering sufferin g losses in ex cess of 70 percent of their main battle tanks within two hours of of contact. cont act. This led to reopening of negotiations and a subsequent withdrawal of aggressor forces to within their borders. Subsequent talks paved wa for more substantial substantial diplomatic initiainitiatives restore an effective peace in the region.
range. In future f uture contingency operations, w are uncertain who ou foes will be But unless we can put “steel on target,” we will not kill the enemy.
Conclusion The preceding piece of fiction may strike some as a blinding flash of the obvious. However, it is interesting most major note that th histories armies ar replete with rapid deployments to new new theater th eaterss where early combat operations were anticipated but did not develop. Sustainment training during the resulting prolonged periods of non-combat before hostilities takes an understandable third or fourth place in planning priorities. But in today’s world of complex weapons, it goes without saying that th battle efficiency of of these weapons is vital to success. These systems imply extremely fast and large-scale losses for both both sides, sides , once engaged, so gunnery sustainment training strategies ar es sential. We should anticipate sustainment gunnery training strategy requirement as the rule, rather than th exception nd plan plan for it. Planning for deployment must concentrate on on the t he perennial first order ord er o business etting there “fastest with
November-December 7997
Lieutenant Colonel Tom Rozman is currently assigned to the Collective Training Directorate, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Training, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. Before this assignment, he served on the Armored mo red Family Fam ily f Vehicles Veh icles Task Force, Department of the Army; as Chief, G-3 Training Resources, st Armored Division, U.S. Army Europe; Executive Officer, st Battalion (Mech), 46th Infantry, and 2d Battalion (Mech), 6th Infantry; and Commander, Company A, 1st Battalion (Mech), 58th Infantry. He has also served as infantry platoon leader in Korea and S3 Air of an infantry battalion at Fort Benning. LTC Rozman is a 1970 graduate graduate of of US MA and holds an MBA from the University of Massachusetts. He is a 1983 graduate of the Army Command and Gen eral Staff Staff College. 25
Forward Forward Comman The Wehrmacht’s Approach Command and Control in World Major John
ar
Anta1
“The command and control system which supports AirLand Battle doctrine must facilitate freedom to operate, delegation of authority, and leadership from any critical point on the battlefield. Plans are the initial basis for action, but commanders must expect considerable variation from plans in the course of combat.”‘ France, Ma 1940. The situation was desperate! The machine gun from th French positions on the west side of the Meuse Me use River had stopped th German assault cold. Four times the men of he 2d Battalion, 7th Rifle Regiment, 7th Panzer Division, had tried to cross to th west bank of the Meuse River four times they had the officers were dead failed. Most or wounded. One On e company had managed to get across, acros s, but but now it was stranded on th fa bank and was taking heavy casualties. No one was willing to again to cross under such withering French fire. Demoralized and stunned, the battalion hugged the cover of th east bank and waited. fast moving German staff car skidded into a position on the east bank, almost jolting its occupants out into ditch. General Erwin Rommel, the division commander, climbed down a ravine, and asked the nearest soldier soldie r for the th e location of of the battalion command post. Within minutes, Rom1 took command of the t he 2d BattalBa ttalion, 7th Rifle Regiment of the 7th Panzer Division. The fate of of the entire division’s attack depended on a rapid crossing of of the Meuse. Using he battalion’s wireless equipment, Rommel organized direct fire support from several Panzer 111s and IV and a troop of ar tillery tiller y that he he had afte r him him to this thi s decisive been racing after 26
point in the division’s division’s attack. attack . Under Rommel’ Rommel’ss direction the tanks began to plaster the French pillboxes with accurate direct fire. Organizing the battalion’s assault teams, Rommel personally lead the 2d Battalion B attalion in in a coordinated assault to cross the Meuse River. Soon, the enemy machine guns ad been silenced by the tanks, ta nks, and the assault assau lt infantry had had forced force d the river in rubber rafts. Combat engineers soon began began to construc co nstructt a pontoon bridge. The next day, his 7th F’anzer Division was racing to the west, prying open the Allied defense of France that would end with France’s surrender and the evacuation of the British Briti sh Army at Dunkirk? Rommel exercised approach to command that was an impomnt combat multiplier for the German Army. This approach, called “forward command,” wa the standard tactical command and control style in the Wehrmacht. The Wehrmacht believed approach that the “forward command” approach was an essential element to achieve tactical victory in mobile warfare. Forward command called for senior commanders to issue orders based upon upon personal pe rsonal observation and to as sume command of a subordinate unit during critical crit ical mi t in the fightinp. fightinp. _ ._.. _._._.. -~
...-
--4-----o-
The senior commander issued is orders based on direct observation and would actually assume command of a
ARMOR
20WOu9I
lower formation or unit if necessary. Rather than stifling initiative, this system tem aided agility, initiative, initiati ve, and synchronization in Wehrmacht. The purpose of this th is discussion is to describe the forward command approach approach employed by the Wehrmacht and highlight th importance of the forward command concept to German tactical success.
The Germans did not believe in orders-intensive, centralized approach to command and control. The dochine nf think” niiirk -----.--_._.-_ -_ ----. -- “ h l i t 7 ~ ~ 0lPmnnrlPrl ing leaders and decisive command. Forward command relied heavily on trained, thinking, independent leaders
----I---
November-December 1991
and unflinching trust in subordinate officers to carry out the mission within intent the senior commander. mander. This Thi s understanding permeated Wehrmacht’s approach to War.
“The tempo blitzkri blitzkrieg eg calls speedy and precise command, and its dynamic nature calls r anticipation. achieve these, the operational and To achieve higher level commanders have to be forward, not only to see for themselves what is really happening, but to ge the fee the battle. All one can add is that this command technique was no gimmick Rommel’s. but was laid down in Guderian’s Guderian’s training training m anua ls r the Panzertruppen. As Manteuffel put it,
ARMOR
always located where could see and hear what was going on in front; that is near the enemy and around myself- namely at the the foc al poin point’. t’. The Wehrmacht expected its tactical commanders, division level and below, to lead up front, sense th situation, and take decisive action without waiting for permission or further instructions. The most junior leaders were expected to take decisive action, even if that action meant changing changin g the original plan, as long as the decision was guided by the commander’s in tent. tent. Commanders at every echelon expected their superiors to take personal command command of of their units in criticri tical situations. In In this fashion, fas hion, the German man commanders co mmanders were were able abl e routinely to act faster than than their th eir opponents.
November-December 7997
Initiative The essential core th forward command approach was the subordinate commander’s dedication to th senior commander’s intent, combined with independent independ ent action. The Th e senior commander issued his orders. These were completely binding on subordinate leaders. Subordinate leaders could change the plan, act independently, and make their decisions, if those decisions achieved achieved the object of the commander’s commander’ s intent. Inactivity wa considered criminal. Leaders were expected to think and make decisions. All decisions, however, were expected to conform to the basic goal th commander. “...the basic principal of the German com27
mand system in World War was to always to make the decision de cision on on the lowest possible level of command that it could be made as quickly as possible.”4 To the Wehrmacht, the commander’s mander’s intent was not reiteration of the scheme maneuver. scheme of maneuver was considered conside red only one way, usually the initial concept on how to accomplish the mission. Initial concept con ceptss were usually based on the terrain and a nd whatever information informati on on the enemy that was forthcoming. As nformation nformat ion on the t he enemy was acquired, acquired , the subordinate subord inate was expected to act accordingly and secure the objectiv obje ctive e by the best possible means. The subordinate su bordinate leader was guided an intent that explained the mission’s object (desired end result), its importance (what will occur if th end result is not achieved), and the reasons (the desired end result will create the following situation). The understanding understa nding of this definition definit ion of initiative was vital to German tactical success. It provided the the flexibility fle xibility necessary to outthink and act faster than the enemy. Furthermore, every commander was required to understand the intent of the commander two echelons above his level le vel of command. This becam essential in making independent decisions in the heat battle, when se nior commanders comm anders either eith er could not be reached or reached in time. By clearly understanding the intent of the commanders two echelons above, a subordinate leader could th senior commander’s intent to guide his actions. actions . Guided with this intent, int ent, he could make a more more correct corre ct decision. Field Marshal Erich von von Manstein considered by many historians to be the most gifted German commander of the Second World War, described how this process pro cess was able to work in his book Lost Victories: “The granting of such independence independen ce to subordinate subord inate commanders does, of course, presuppose that members of the military milita ry hierarchy ar imbued with certain tac28
tical or operational operation al axioms. axioms. Only Only the school of the German Genera Generall Staff suppose, suppose , be said sai d to have have procan, duced such a consistency consiste ncy of outlook.9-5 Allied propaganda often portrayed the Germans as unthinking automatons. serious battle analysis, however, eve r, reveals that the soldie so ldiers rs f the Wehrmacht showed showed unbelievable initiative and excellent tactical leadership. Junior Junio r leaders were were willing willing to take risks when risks were necessary. They consistently co nsistently outthought their adversaries. More important, the overall German approach to command and control cont rol supported and n nurture urtured d thes attitudes. History proves that the thinking, independent depend ent minded minded tactical tact ical leaders lead ers o the Wehrmach Wehrmachtt consistently consistent ly outfought their opponents. That the Wehrmacht fought almost everywhere outnumbered, often in hopeless situations, and never disintegrated is a strong argument for the prowess of their tactical abilities. The forward command approach to command and control was a major or that success. Again, Von Manstein relates: “I had always been the particular
for te f German leadership to grant grant wide scope to the self-dependence subordinate commanders o allot them tasks which leave the method execution to the discreti disc retion on of of the individual. From time immemorial ertainly since the elder Moltke’s da this principle has distinguished Germ any’s military military leadership leadership from that other arm ies. The la tter, fa from giving the same latitude to subordinate commanders on th tactical plane, have always tended to prescribe, by means of long and detailed directives, the way orders should actually be carried out or to make tactical action conform to a specific pattern. the German side this system was considered a bad one. would, adm itted ly, appe ar to reduce the risk of failure the case of a mediocre commander. Yet it only too easily leads to the executant’s having to act against the exigencies of the local sit-
ARMOR
uation. Wo rst of all, in its preoccupation tion with secu rity, it w aives the opporoccur through the intunity that dependent action of subordinate commander boldly exploiting some favorable situation at a decisive moment.”
Synchronization Wehrmacht senior commanders were were trained to issue orders that synchronized the combat comba t power of of their units by effectively effec tively planning two echelons down, and thinking echelons up. Senior commanders planned wo echelons down, issuing mission-type orders that tha t specifie spec ified d what was to be done, rather than how to accomplish the mission. division issued tasks to each of its battalions. The commander usually did this personally, personally , issuing an oral order overl&king the battlefield. Each Each regiment would receive instructions for each of its battal ba ttalions ions based based on the the division plan. The regiments would then then synchronize synchron ize the elements o combat power as directed dire cted by the the division plan. In this manner, a high de gree of unity f eff e ffor ortt was achieved. achieved. Junior leaders lea ders were were expected to to take decisiv dec isive e action, acti on, guided by by the in tent. cornmande The synthesis synt hesis of of these techniques le to a powerfully focused combat force, directed by a fast-reacting fast-reacti ng chain chain o command that sought out enemy mistakes and took immediate and decisive advant adv antage age of them. them. “Divisional “Divisional operati ope rations ons were were conducte cond ucted d from from th forward position on the battlefield. The divis d ivision ion Commander Commander had had his place with the group g roup which was make the main effort (schwerpunkr). He visited the regiments several times a day. The Th e divisiona divis ionall headquarters headquarters was somewhat somew hat farthe far therr back and did not change its location duing opemti on^."^ The Germans Ger mans believed believed that the basis for command was formed by the mission and the situation. situat ion. The mission mission consis co nsisted ted of what objective was to be achieved. The order to accomplish the mission must be simple, November-December 1991
clear and definite. The order establishes the guidelines necessary accomplish the mission. It establishes what units to do: not how they are to do it. it. The method of execution execu tion is deliberately not included. Subordinate commanders are trusted to come up with with the “how.” “how.” Mission oriented oriente d discipline is demanded. This approach substituted control for guidance and trust. If the subordinates’ abilities did not meet the challenge of th situation, or if the situation required a more experienced head, the senior commander was ex pected to take command of of the subordinate unit and take decisive action. The understanding between commander and subordinate was that the senior commander’s intervention was his natural prerogative. By taking command of a subordinate unit, the senior commander could his authority and experience as a direct combat multiplier. This concept of of trust became a central principle in the Wehrmacht.
“The combat combat value of every unit depends on the quality its oficers. An average trained unit, which has its weak weak points, can still give good performance it has good commander. the same manner, well-trained and and experienced experienced unit may fail fai l under mediocre commander. The value good leadership is proved by the confidence of the troops in their leaders. the improvement improvement of their fighting fight ing qualities, and finally by success in combat.... The confidence which the troops have in their commander will give give them the assurance that his orders are correct, even the reason behind them is not fully ful ly known known.”8 .”8
Concluslon The need need to understand the concept of forward command is as important today as it was to Wehrmacht’s command style in World War The architects of the Army’s AirLand Battle doctrine recognized this and made the understanding of the t he commander’s intent a central theme of AirLand Battle doctrine. doctrine.
ARMOR
The commander “cannot depend on constant direction, but but must fight fig ht in-
dependently, depend ently, even when he cannot communicate communicate outside outside his own zone or sector. must know the intention of the commander two levels above him, understand the concept operation of his h is immediate commander, comma nder, and know the responsibilities the units on hisflanks and in support his operations.” Tactical success in in the early ea rly years of the war, however, wa not enough gain overall victory for Germany in WWII. Forward command could not overcome the overwhelming numerical superiority that opposed Germany. Fighting a war on many fronts fro nts against the entire world as too much, even for the well trained and superbly led Wehrmacht. Ke leader casualties could not be replaced fast enough. the wa dragged on, the quality of of the leadership and th quality quali ty of the soldiers as reduced to the point that tactical flexibility was greatly reduced. The German reach simply outdistanced their grasp. The perfection of the th e technique, howev however, er, is worthy of study. In an era in which th United States Army will will have to do more with with less, the technique of forward command will become a necessary element victory. FM 100-5 23 states;
“The fundamental fundamental prerequisite prerequisite fo unity effort within Army organizations is an effective system of command which relies upon effective leadership to provide purpose, direction, and motivation; motivation; emphasizes well understood common doctrine, tactics, and and techniques, as well well as sound unit standing operating procedures (SOPS);nd takes gective measures to limit the effects of friction. Leaders Leaders set the example, communicate their intent clearly, cl early, build build teamwork, promote sound sound values, accept responsibility, delegate authority, anticipate developments, take decisive action, and accept risks.” For the Wehrmacht, these goals were met by philosophy of forward command.
November-December
1991
Notes
‘Department the Amy, Field M a w 1 FM 100-5, Operations, (Washington, D.C.: May 1986). p. 21. (Hereafter referred to as FM 100-
5)
On page 22. the manual states that “if an unanticipated situation arises, canmitted rnaneuver unit commanders should understand th purpose the operation well enough to decisively, confident that they are doing what their superior commander would order done were he present. *Field Marshal Erwin R-el, Rommcl Papers. ed. by Sir B. H. Liddell Halt. trans. an Paul Findlay. (New Yo&: & Company, 1953). paraphrased from 8-1 1. 3LTC Mountcastle, “Command and Control Armor Units in Combat.” Military Military Rm’ew November 1985. p. 29. 4Generalmajor A.D.F.W. von Mellenthin. conference notes from Armored Warfare in (Columbus, Ohio: Battelle Co World War lumbus Laboratories. May 10 1979). p. 11. ’Field Marshal En vo Manstein, Lost Victories, edited an translated by Anthony G. Powell. (Novato. Calif.: Presidio Press, 1982. Original in 1955). p. 383. 61bid.,p. 383. ’Mellenthin, p. 26 *GeneralfeIdmamchd Albert Kesselring, Manual fo Command and Combat Employment Smaller Units (Based on German Erperience in World War 11). (originally ppared by the Chief Historian. Headquarters Eumpean Command United States Army, on 17 July 1952), 12. 9FM 100-5. p. 22.
Major John Anta1 is the brigade operations trainer (obsetver/controller) for the Brigade Training Team (Broncos) at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, Calif. He is an Armor officer and has commanded tank companies and tw sewed as a tank battalion operations officer in both the 2d Infantry Division (Korea) and the 1st Cavalry Division (Fort Hood, Texas). He is a 1977 graduate of the United States Military Academy, a graduate of the Airborne Ranger, and CAS’ courses, and a 1990 graduate of the Command and General Staff College. 29
Th
Light Cavalry
Case
by Major Robert J. Wottlin
We deployed an airborne corps without a corps-size covering force light cavalry regiment (LCR) C O U Mdo Mdo for the airborne corps what an armored cavalry regiment (ACR) does for a heavy corps.
....
DESERT Do the Persian Gulf War’s uccesses reaffirm the practice practic e of employing main body forces forc es without cavalry outfits with with ill-organized cavalry organizations? nizations? Satellites, aircraft, and special operations units provided vital battlefiel battl efield d information, but these hightech systems are best for long-range planning. In the fog of of battle, batt le, scouts in contact provide the most most timely in telligence to the ground commander. We continue conti nue to rely less and less les s o cavalry outfits to conduct reconnaissance and securi s ecurity ty missions. When When the enemy situation unknown, it is not sound to allow main body forces to fight the covering force battle. cavalry unit fighting the covering force battle provides early warning, reaction time, maneuver space, and information about the enemy. We deployed an airborne corps without a corps-size covering force (until the 3d AC arrived), and and divisions with ill-organized divisional cavalry squadrons. Future table of ganization for the divisional cavalry squadron will correct the divisional prob proble lem. m. The corps corps-siz -size e s still 30
exist. light cavalry regiment (La)a reconnaissance mission provides provides th could do for the airborne corps what corps commander the ability to ee 30 an armored cavalry regiment (Am) kilometers kilom eters forward of of his forces. forces. does for a heavy corps. securi sec urity ty force, force, the mobility and and combined arms organization allows a cavLight Cavalry Regiment alry outfit the ability to change quickly from defense to offense b disengagin disen gaging, g, movin moving g rapidly rapid ly over LCR using firepower, mobility, long distances, distanc es, and counterattacking and combined arms can conduct reto destroy or delay enemy forces. connaissance, connaissance , security, securit y, and and economy of-force missions as part of a light The combined arms squadrons and troops troop s of of the LCR would permit decorps’ offensive offen sive and and defensive operataching them to provide reconnaistions. cavalry regiment conducting
Th Light Cavalry Regiment
rdr[ Fig.
ARMOR
Novem ber-December 199
The regimental light cavalry squadron has the same organization as the heavy cavalry squadron, except the howitzer battery has ha s towed 105-mm cannons.
th
Cavalry Squad ron The Light Cavalry
heavy cavalry squadron, except the howitzer battery has towed 105m cannons (Figure (Figu re 2) The tank company, of course, as an AGS, but with the same organization. The light cavalry troop's scout platoons have motorcycles and H M M W V s , and tank platoons plato ons have have the AGS AGS (Figures (Figur es 4)
Force Protection
Fig. Sance and security for division and brigade operations. A light cavalry squadron or troop could deploy with a division or brigade-sue element or with with battalio ba ttalions ns operating separately Also, the LCR could provide a selfcontained force for an economy-offorce operation in the main battle area (MBA).
Light Organization The LCR organization organiza tion uses the same table of organizatio as th ACR. The
major difference between the LCR and the ACR ACR organization organi zation is the combat vehicles and weapon weapon systems. The light cavalry, cava lry, equipped with high high mo bility multipurpose wheeled vehicles ( H M M W V s ) , motorcycles, armored gun gun systems sy stems (AGS), and towed artilarti llery could enhance the light fighter's combat power. This self-contained unit would have three light cavalry squadrons, a combat aviation squadron, and a support squadron (Figure 1). The regimental light cavalry squadron has the same organization as
The Light Cavalry Troop
The survivability survivab ility of of the LCR LCR is not equal to that of the ACR, but but proper use of terrain, movement movemen t techniques, and dispersion would enhance it. Firepower and mobility are its important strengths. Cavalry commanders can mass their fires and forces on critical points to attack enemy weaknesses, gain time, and exploit successes. The air cavalry squadron (equipped with AH-58Ds or RAH-66s) adds three-dimensional mobility and aerial firepower to complement ground TO misforces. Th combination sile-equipped H M M W V s and high velocity 105-mm armored gun systems (AGS) provides the light fighter increased protection against enemy mored forces in mid-to high-intensity conflicts. The rapid mobility and smaller vehicle size permit the LCR opera te in low- to mid-intensity to operate conflicts as well. The scout platoon includes enough personnel for dismounting and for manning vehicles during dismounted operations. Mortars and howitzer batteries organic th light regiment provide essential indirect fires. fir es. The LCR LCR would clearly increase the light fighter's reconnaissance and security securit y capabilities in most conflicts.
Armored Gu System n armored ar mored gun system is the key to make this light force work. work. All other weapon systems ar available. stm-
Fig. ~~
ARMOR
~
~
November-December 1991
31
Light Cavalry Platoons Scout Platoon
Armored Gun System Platoon
tegically deployable, lightweight tank killer with with a rapid firing cycle (quicker (quicker than the th e TOW TOW missile missile)) would would give the LCR LCR the abilit ab ility y to fight th covering force battle. The Sheridan’s marginal performance performan ce in in JUST CAUSE, and now DESERT STORM, proved its inability to fight on today’s battlefield. battlefield. We need need a new, easily deployed armored tank killer for light forces. We know that future constrained budgets do not allow for a new acquisition program, but we must replace the Sheridan. Industry has made sigin prototypes that nificant investments in e cannot cannot afford to let slip away. If everyone every one understands understands that the AGS AGS i not a replacement for the main battle tank, then we might get the funding.
32
Conclusion L.D. Holder, former 2d ACR
commander, commented: “One of the points drawn from the wa Persian Gulf) is the Army needs its cavalry regiments. It used all three to good effect. In contingency operations, the requirements for reconnaissance, security, and economy of force he very very things cavalry units ar made for rise immediately after the initial task of securing securing a base.” he Army needs to to give g ive its light corps a regimental cavalry outfit like it does for the heavy corps. corps . If force reductions in Europe reduce the need for a second ACR ther there, e, then the might Army convert the other into a light fighter structure. Also, we must
ARMOR-
pursue a strategically deployabl deployabl AGS for our contingency contingency forces. forces. We cannot afford to continue deploying light forces without vital cavalry cava lry forces and obsolete tank killer. with
Major Robert J. Wottlin graduated from the the University of Houston in 1979. He holds a bachelor‘s degree in history and a Master’s in public administration. He sewed with the 2d ACR as platoon leader, XO, and troop commander. graduate of AOBC, AOAC, CAS3, CGSC, and Ranger and Airborne Courses, he is currently an inspector general on the USAREUR staff. wember-December 79
TH
ARMORED FORCES
MONUMENT
Army Chief of Staff General Gordon R. Sullivan and Mrs. Creighton Abrams admire the centerpiece of the Armored Armored Forces Monument they they unveiled moments before.
Remarks
the Dedication
November 11,1991 General Gordon R. Sullivan, Army Chief of Staff Ambassador, Comrades, General Streeter, S treeter, and fellow soldiers sold iers.. I’m I’m glad that you are with us today. It’s an honor for me to be here with you today, to share in this moment mo ment with with you. We pause paus e on on this th is important day n important da for America, significant da for us o dedicate in this very simple ceremony, monument lovingly brought to reality by people standing here, to recognize soldiers and Marines who went into battle armored vehicles against
ARMOR
November-December 7991
PHOTO S G T R A N D Y D Y K S T R A
the enemies of th United States of America, and against the enemies of
tiful granite tells th story of countless thousands who call themselves armored warriors. You can see th symbolism: symbolism: our service s ervice seals nited States Army, United States Marine Corps; the maps of of our campaigns World War I, World Europe, the Mediterranean, North Africa, the Pacific, Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf. The emblems and numbers our units are proudly etched in the granite. Our heritage is displayed on th vertical wall, reaching back into time, commemorating the ideas of a visionary, v isionary, General Chaffee, who so perceptively and eloquently stated th essence and the power of of armored forces: team of combat comb at arms and services o “A balanced team equal importance and equal prestige.”
Above, Above, the th e color guard for the dedication ceremony was from the 3rd U.S. Infantry, “The Old Guard.” Guard.” Right, General Sullivan presents a memento of the occasion to the Kuwaiti Ambassador to the United States, Shaikh Saud Nasir AISabah. PHOTOS: SOT RANDY DYKSTRA
However, this great monument on on this hallowed hallowed ground is not a monument to numbers or things. This seis a monument monument which symbolizes symbo lizes the the courage co urage o lect few soldiers sold iers who who climbed into vehicles of of stee s teel, l, giving life to the ideas of of the Chaffees, the Devers, an th Pattons. This monument monument memorializes me morializes the self-sacr self- sacrifice ifice of thousands of nameless, faceles people who risked all to serve armored warriors. We unmay not remember remembe r their names, but they are known to us. These Thes e men and wome es, women erved in units not for f or personal gain, but because their nation called. This monument recognizes them and you, for your sacrifices for democracy, the dignity of your fellow man, and the principles princ iples for which which this t his nation stands: “We hold hold these truths be self evident ev ident,, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by by their their Creator with certain certa in inalienable rights: that th at among among these are life, liberty, an the pursuit pursu it of of happiness.” United under our colors, red, white and blue he national colors e answered answer ed the call as a balanced team of mounted warriors war riors,, forging forging a concept of of war
34
that delivers decisive decisi ve victory. We banded banded together, as this circle cir cle binds us no nto crews, platoons, and units famous for their courage, their daring, and their selfless service. Reflect on on this bond, with these words from wanior to his soldiers before battle beenry fore Agincourt A gincourt this da to the ending the world, we in it shall sha ll be be remembered e few, few, we happy few, few , w band band of brothers, bro thers, for fo r he today that sheds his bloo bloo with me shall shal l be brother.” ‘From
Our Our flag, fla g, our triangular patch, these units, our circle of brotherhood represent repre sent ou fight for freedom in this century. In the 18th Century, we secured our ow freedom. In the 20th Century, Cent ury, we served serve d others. We served around the world. This monument chronicles those terrible, but necessary battles: St. S t. Mihiel, Normandy, mandy, the Rhine, Italy, Ita ly, Casabla Ca sablanca, nca, Okinawa, Ta rawa, Pusan, the Naktong River Line, Cambodia, Bac, Thon Son Nhut, Bien Bien Hua, Khafji, Kha fji, Safwan, Saf wan, Wad Wad al Batin, Basrah.
ARMOR
November-December 1991
General Sullivan delivers the dedication address. address. Seated, left to right, ri ght, are MG Thomas C. Foley, Chief of Armor; Shaikh Saud Nasir AI-Sabah, Kuwaiti Ambassador; Mrs. Creighton Abrams; Abrams; MG William Streeter, commander, Military District of Washington; and Chaplain (BG) Donal D onald d W. Shea, deputy dep uty chief of chaplain cha plains, s, U.S. U.S.A. A.
Victory in th Cold War, th seminal event of our lifetimes, was also a result res ult of people who were willing to serve as armored soldiers sold iers and persevere in a lonely war of nerves for th last years. This stone memorializes Grafenwoehr, Hohenfels, Butzbach, the Fulda Gap, the National Training Center and the crumbling th Berlin Wall. This circle cir cle symbolizes that we have done battle duties, sacrificed ourselves, and return to this hallowed ground. Today we consecrate cons ecrate this small plot of earth to the soldiers soldi ers and Marines who had had the th e courage to mount those steeds ste eds of of steel, to protect an idea democracy nd to free others from oppression. oppression. Each of us recalls names from the past atton, Eisenhower, Abrams, Leach, Knowlton, Otis, Starry, Palmer, Tait, Funk, Griffith, Franks, and countless others. You ca name them. They’re in ou memories. We know them, loved them, we fought with them, we
ARMOR
November-December 7997
laughed with with them, and we shared vice to this great republic. republic.
SGT R A N D Y DYKSTRA
th joys
ser-
monum ent. She repreMrs. Abrams will unveil this monument. sents a great link with with the past, but she also represents our wives and children who served wth us, loved us, and supported us. This monument is to all of them, and to you who follow.
o those who serve today, and to those
We will will add to this monumen someday. Th additions unknown to me. can’t predict them. cannot draw the battle maps. But know clearly that those who follow will serve serv e with with distinctio disti nction n and courage and honor -just as you served with courage cour age and honor. bless them, God bless this monument, and God bless you. you. God bless all who call themselves them selves armored soldiers and Marines. Thank you.
IASMNSlW D.C.
The Monument The monument to the Armored Forces the United States Army and United States Marine Corps past, present, future was dedicated on November 11, 1991, near th entrance Arlington National Cemetery on Memorial Drive (“The Avenue of Heroes”). H eroes”).
Th monument a memorial to Army and Marine tankers, cavalrymen, an tank destroyers destro yers who fought in th mechanized th 20th Century wars rom to Operation DESERT STORM.
The 99th Congress approved Public La 99-620 on November 1986, authorizing the establishment a memorial to honor the American Armored Forces. Forc es. “The memorial shall commemorate the exceptional professionalism the members the American Armored Force and their their efSort efSortss to maintain peace worldwide.”
Designed by by distinguished military memorial architect Harold Schaller, the oval30 shaped monument is 40 feet wide feep deep, encompassed by by a three-f t hree-foot oot wall of fme-grained Vermont granite. On th w a l l is engraved historical text, campaign maps and the units that fought in each of th five wars depicted. The highlight of th monument is a magnificently cawed centerpiece of Nubian black granite eight feet tall and feet wide on which which is i s depicted the evolution the U.S. Armored Forces. (Some of of the th e original wa executed by artists, SFC Robert ontributing ARMOR’S Torsrud and SPC Jody Harmon.)
Sponsoring Associations U.S. Armor Association U.S. U.S. Field Fie ld Artillery Associa tion U.S. Marine Corps Association Vete rans of of Foreign Fore ign Wars The Military Order of the W orld orld Wars Association of the United States States Army Armo red Cavalry Regiment Armo red Division Associations Cou ncil of Armored D ivisions ivisions he American Legion
NoncommissionedOfficers NoncommissionedOfficers Association American Historical Foundation Foundation National Association Association of Uniformed Uniformed S ervices The Rakkasans Separate Tank Battalion Associations Separate Cava lry Squadron Associations Veterans of the Battle of the Bulge World Wars Tank Corps Military Order of the Purple Heart Tank Destroye De stroyerr Associations Associations
ARMOR
November-December 1991
Can’t Can’t Get There Th ere From F rom ere: Moving the Heavy Force by Captaln Harry Schute, Jr In days of old, when all infantry moved foot and all cavalry on
th “march to the sound of th guns.” Today, with with conflic co nflictt frequently frequentl y thousands of of miles from one’s shores, sho res, that expression expression easily could cou ld be, “deploy to the sound of of the t he guns.” When Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi Army invaded Kuwait and threatened Saudi Arabia in Au gust 1990, th modem version of the tested axiom almost became a mission impossible impossibl e for the th e U.S U.S.. Army’s heavy forces. Iraq committed Kuwait large conventional force, forc e, consisting of vast quantities of tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery. Iraq’s forces dictated that the Allied Coalition deploy similar mechanized force to meet the heavy threat. threat. Our O ur Army’s Army’s heavy focu for the last 40 years, however, has been on reinforcing Central Europe, not Southwest Asia (SWA). This meant that ou deployment and buildup in SWA in a completely immature theater, with with no Pre-positioned Pre-po sitioned Materiel Configured to Unit Sets (POMCUS), or suppor supportt inh structu re.
ARMOR
The initial Allied deployment was a major undertaking, and although well executed, could have been been a disaste di saste if Saddam had had decided to invade Saud Arabia in September October 1990. That, however, is completely completely differ ent story. An operation after th deployment ust as difficult and vitally important as the movement of the combat divisions from from their Sea Ports of Debarkation (SPOD) to their Rear Assembly Areas (RAA) and Tactical Assembly Areas (TAA). It is this operation nd some of the t he “what if‘s” if‘s” and “what should we learn” pon which I will focus. Army Army Transportation’ Trans portation’ss focus on Eu rope is readily apparent in its published doctrine: “The most most challenging situation situatio n is that posed posed by the So viet-led Warsaw Pact forces in Europe. It is for this challenge that the bulk of the U.S. U.S. Army force are organized, equipped, and trained.”’ trained.”’ The focus on on Europe is further evident in the following planning assumptions: that units will be in deployed deploy ed positions before hostilities, dependents will be present, host nation (HN) and
November-December 7997
Allied transport will be readily able, heavy transport will only be needed for high priority units in moving POMCUS POMCUS materiel, m ateriel, and rail will be heavily relied upon to move mo ve heavy equipment to the corps rear or division support area? With the demise of of Operation DESERT STORM, it should be obvious that we need to plan better for intratheater transportation of of heavy forces forc es in other contingency areas. M a n y potential areas of conflict, such as the Middle East or Central America, do not have well established rail networks, or even extensive road networks. Consequently, transport of heavy equipment in in these areas of operation would have to rely on Heavy Equipment Transporters (HET). This was the case in Sau Saudi di Arabia. Arabia. When When faced f aced with the prospect pro spect of moving hundreds of miles from SPODs to RAAs and TAAs, with no rail and limited roads, the Army’s Abrams tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, howitzers, etc., etc., had to move by HET. The wear an tear of move
over long distances in the harsh harsh desert des ert environment eally in any environment ithout HETs would have caused much much higher rates rate s of of vehicle mechanical failure. failure. In SWA, we were able to marshal enough HETs to meet the minimum minimum requirements, requi rements, but the simple fact remains that our Army is not readily configured to provide large scale HET support to heavy forces. Currently, Currently , you you can find HETs at three levels in a theater of operations. At division level, the Divisi Division on S port Command’s (DISCOM) Transportation Motor Transport Company (TMT) has two HET platoons with total of 24 tractors and trailers. primary purpose of these HETs is to move heavy equipment back to maintenance collection points? At corps level, the organization is bit more more complex. The Corps Support Command (COSCOM) has a Transportation Brigade with with a flexible flex ible number of of direct di rect support (DS) venge of three nd general support (GS) verage vera ge of four attalions. The battalions include a number number of light and medium truck companies. The GS battalions ar similar, but also have a heavy truck company of 24 of these HETS is HETS? The purpose of for unprogrammed movements and supporting corps rear area operations! Finally, at theater level, the Transportation Command has a flexible number of motor groups or brigades that have have a flexible flex ible number number of of motor battalions. Each of the motor battalions has a HET company of 24 vehicles. The Th e primary primary purpose p urpose of of these HET companies is for administrative movements. Based upon the assets that may reasonably be availabl avai lable e from from corps and theater, a division commander can expect to have a tank-to-HET ratio of between 7:l and 15:l. 15 :l. Two assumptions used in developing this ratio that only tanks will be moved by the HETs, and the HETs will have an operational readiness (OR) ate of of 100 percent. Of Of course, neither of of those th ose assumptions is valid, because the dividi vi-
sion will have to move least as many other armored vehicles as tanks, and the planning OR rate for HETs is 75 percent.8 Some additional additiona l planning guidance for IETs includes having each of the HET company’s trucks pable pabl e of of making either four local haul round hips, or line haul round trips? trip s? Each Each line haul is expected expected to have a 90-mile one-way distance.” So the bottom bottom line is that a division commander commande r could have significant trouble trou ble movin moving g a tank battalion batta lion ad ministratively across a distance of more than 90 miles. As DESERT STORM drew near, forces in SWA were at averArmy forces age tank-to-U.S. tank -to-U.S. HET ratio rati o of of approxappro ximately 7:l. Once again, that figure only provides for tanks, nd counts HETs on hand, hand, without without regard regard to o erationa erat ionall readiness. It was was only wit considerable host nation and Allied HET support that units were able to move from the port to the RAAs n matter of seven se ven1 1 days instead o weeks. Likewise, the same ru as forces forc es moved moved forward fro RAAs TAAs. As the result of four f our problems problems
eceiving ceiv ing HET HET support from from a collectiv colle ctiv grab bag of sources, source s, movin moving g over ov er distances that exceeded the 90-mile planplanning ning factor, fact or, moving moving the the divisions’ divisio ns’ other armored systems, and and dealing with a HET fleet that was regularly near its doctrinal planning OR rate, meant that ou force was very wlnerable during the entire deployment. Units Unit s were fragmented fragmente d because because of ex treme transportation schedules, command mand and an d control contr ol were strained, and an desire desi re to achieve achiev e rapid mass mass remained a dream. Ironically, our adversary, Iraq,had a tank-to-HET ratio rati o of of nearly 3:l 3 :l It fa vorable HET ratio, and intemal supply lines, made it relatively easy for Iraq to realign forces. And if the Iraqis had been been wise wise to the th e brillian bril liantt Allied flanking maneuver, they might have preempted our initia in itiative tive by moving moving some of of their th eir armored force into a better bett er positio position n to react.
ARMOR
When the time came in February 1991, to Allied if the HETs and U.S. ad done their thei r job, the tanks, answer was apparent. Bradleys and howitzers entered the ground war with all fleets above 90 percent rates. “his figure would have been far worse if those vehicles had road marched to their RAAs and TAAs. In future contingencies conting encies that require force s, we may may not be as fortuheavy forces, nate to enter a scenario in which the host nation and Allies can provide large larg e numbers of of HETs to ease our transportation burden. In fact, fa ct, our own doctrine acknowledges that infratheater transportation ma be one of the most most restrictiv restr ictive e operational operational ele’ And more mor e spec sp ecif ific ical ally ly,, tha “HETS ar scarce, vital assets in th delive del ivery ry of heavy equipment. equipment...”’* ..”’* In such a future scenar sce nario, io, we would would be in the midst mid st of a situati situ ation on in which which the HET ratio would be far below the minimum minimum requirem requirement ent to move move a heavy force for ce from from one point to another in a matter matter of days day s instead instead of of weeks. The simple si mplest st way way to plan properly properly for this contingency is to increase the number of HET units available to the division and corps commanders. sure many readers will wonder where we would ge the spaces to ma my proposed HET units, but that is beyond the scope of this article article Suffice it to say that in this age ag e of reduction, the “easiest” place to make the HET units would probably be in the Reserve Re serve Component Componen t (at (at the expense of othe o therr units). The HE orgapropose would become nizations roundout organiza orga nization tionss to their parent parent support commands. commands. And, let’s face fa ce it, it is sure easier to synchronize the batbattlefield tlefi eld employment emplo yment of of a HET HET company than it is a combined arms neuver brigade. of the HET Putti Putting ng aside aside the s assets ass ets,, what I will do now is outline what I think is a good short-term solution to conting con tingency ency HET HET support. support. At division level, I would replace the DISCOM’s TMT company with a TMT battalion battal ion composed of of a November-December 7997
DISCOM
Figure light/medium truck company and four HET companies (see Fig. The battalion’s HET companies TM would have minimum of trucks each. The HET companies in this th is new battalion would operate much like the other division-level units, units, that they would be sliced to the maneuver brigades in direct support role. The fourth company would either remain under division control or become to the brigade or division that most critical transportation needs. The light/medium truck company would continue to fulfill its present role except it would have expanded capabilities. The addition of th TMT battalion to the DISCOM would change the scenario from one in which the division tank-to-HET ratio under can expect optimum optimum conditions condit ions and augmentation augmentation to scenario scena rio in which which the th e division can expect an everyday, unsupported tank-to-HET ratio of 4:l. Remember, that is tanks only, no other combat systems are included in these calculations. At corps level, would add to the COSCOMs COSCO Ms transportation brigade DS battalions configured configured exactly like that of the division’s divisi on’s new TM battalion
ARMOR
(see Fig. The number of of battalions would be dependent upon the number of divisions division s normally assigned to the corps, with planning average of three. These battalions would be assigned to the division in relationship to augment its transportation needs. Much Much like the situation situati on at divi-
sion level, th corps battalions could have their habitual support relationship changed to meet unforeseen critical transportation transport ation needs of another division. division’s division’ s augmentation by a battalion from the COSCOM would further improve th division commander’s tank-to-HET ratio to approximately Of course, th COSCOM’s GS battalions, with with their one HE company each, would still be available to perform their intended mission to provide unscheduled support. Emergency use of the GS assets would would place pla ce the tank-to-HET tank-to-H ET ratio solidly at 2:l. This is obviously vast improvement over he current best case ratio. As with any organization that relies upon upon support relationships, and works tactically with units other othe r than than those its in garrison, garrison , this new organization tion would need periodic period ic training. The armored vehicle crews would need to gain gain experien exp erience ce loading their equip ment on HETs rather than trains, and the HET operators and units would need to get used to working for a brigade or division commander on regular basis.
COSCOM
3-4
x3-4
x3-4
Figure
November-December 7991
39
This plan to increase the support available to the heavy force is certainly not the total s$ution to th myriad problems in an administrative move. This Thi s plan coul c ould, d, however, however, be a step in the th e right direction, dire ction, making making a heavy force movement less of a challenge. The image im age o hundreds tanks, Bradleys, an howitzers stuck at Ad Damman, waiting for HETs to move forward, the Iraqis roll across th Saudi border is not an attractive thought. Just as unattractive is the thought of of that th at armored force being told to road march forward several hundred hundred miles m iles before going into combat. Oh, by the way, your OR rate probably will have dipped below 70 percent during that road march. Fortunately, time and Allies were cards that we held in our deck during buildup in SWA. Those cards allowed us to get our armored force in position a reasonable amount time, ready
Lett
to fight. Do we want to bank on having that same hand for the next contingency? would it be better to the planning and force f orce structure stru cture now now that we support the next contingency? do know know tha don't want to be the guy that tells that future division commander, "We can't get there from here."
Captain Harry Schute, Jr was commissioned in Armor in 1985 from the USMA. USMA. A graduaie grad uaie o AOBC AOBC,, AOAC, AOAC, C , and Airborne School, he has served in 3AD in FRG as an M1 tank platoon leader, subcommunity operations officer, and company XO. He served as a training battalion adjutant, company commander, and at Directorate Total Armor Force Readiness Fort Knox. Knox. He is currently current ly in the USAR.
Notes 'F
55-2, Division
n O 2-1. Jan 85, 2FM 55-1. Army Transportation Services in Theuter Oprutions, Washington D.C., 30 NOV4, pp. 1-1.16. tiom, Washington D.C..
3FM 55-2. pp. 3-5.64. 4FM55-1, p. 2-5. ' l b i d , p. 6-3. 61bid, p. 2-6. 'Ibid. p. 2-3. *FM 55-15. Transportation Reference Doh. Washington D.C.. Jun p. 3-8. tit,p. 6-3. 55-10. Movement Control in Theater Jul Operations. Washington D.C., w K 1 , p. 5-2.
63-31,Combat tions
Service
Corps, Washington
Suprt O ~ M -
D.C.. 12 Aug 85, p.
14-1 1. 12FM 100-10, Combat Service S q p o r t , Wwh4. ington D.C., 18 Feb 88.
continued from Page
was there or Tet, which raged for a bit more than 10 hours itself. Our Alpha Troop received a unit citation for saving Bien Hoa Air Base by tanks effecting firepower, shock action, and an d by running over several hundred VC VC bent on capturing capturing the airfield. They didn't. And recall reading about few tankers being in Korea, although on my last visit to the Patton Museum in 1989, you would have thought that armored warfare ended in 1945. It didn't. Then of course there was The Big War itself, in which tanks played playe d certainly a key role in the European Theater and a vital supporting role in other theaters. Let's not forget those whose actions brought The Combat Arm of Decision to where it is today.
Lers join to support both combat tanker badge and a combat cavalryman badge however we can. But let's make the awards retroactive to recognize all treadheads wh actions deserved them. them. Let's re p-
award since the combat infantryman badge has been around. Fair's fair. JOHN REICHLEY Leavenworth. Kan.
Dlstlnctlon Is Justlfied Dear Sir:
Alter reading read ing 1LT Ronald . Bashista' letter. 'War Revives Armor Badge Issue,' feel he's only concerned with those men who actually saw combat, and not those who make up the armor community. true that M 1 crew crew me memb mber er It's true jealous of their Infantry brothers, and feel they are worthy of distinction. Fo Infantryman tryman to receive an 'EIB' 'EIB' (Exper Infantryman's Badge), he must go through a rigorous test of of individual skills and physiendurance, the same is true of the 'EFMB' 'EFMB' (Expert (Expe rt Field Fie ld Medical Badge) worn ar medics.
Why not develop a TAB" (Expert Armor Badge) program for the whole Armor community and award math for those ho Armor crewman. served in combat as The fact is there are expert tankers; there are expert scouts. This was proven when we sent expert tankers to transition M1 crews to M1 just weeks before DESERT STORM. It was those tho se "expert' crews wh brought victory home to the armor community. So who dewbps this program? feel that a collective effort by the commanders, staff officers, and master gunners of Armor Branch could develop such program, one the entire Armor community would be proud to see. see.
The men of 'Armor are proud and gallant gallant hey need a challenge; they need distinction. Let's give them something to strive for. BARRY G. TANKERSLEY SSG, SSG, Master Maste r Gunner 1/11 ACR. FRG
ovember-December 1991
The Cadre Ca dre Ar or Joseph by Colonel Joseph
Kopacz
Introduction Th direct result of AirLand Battl Doctrine at tactical, operational, and strategic stra tegic level of conventional warfare as been shift emphasis along the continuum of of war from general war to regional conflict. The effective fectiv e and and efficient efficie nt execution of this doctrine doctrin e by the United States Army has to be considered one of the th e key reasons for the major political and y chan change gess tak takin ing g place place in Central and Eastern Europe. At the strategic level, this doctrine has been th prime reason for he implementation deployment/utilization strategy that has caused potential enemies to reevaluate their strategic military options. Operationally, both friend and possible fo have deemed this strategy viable option to ensure our capability to secure national survival and vital interests. However, it is at tactical level that both have been most effective. Not only potential enemies, but our soldiers realize that plan is in place to win armed conflict, based.on th AirLand Battle tenets of initiative, initiat ive, deep battle, synchronization, and adaptability. Moreover, in combination with an operational level deployment/utilization strategy of forward deployed, contingency, and reinforcing forces, the doctrine can be executed successfully. Additionally, the effects of of technological advances in he 1970s and '80s regarding weapon effectiveness, mobility, and communications have been phenomenal. An An addition add itional al benefit of this advancement has been the development of now well established training system, under TRADOC, that produces soldiers much much more qualified, quali fied, in in less l ess time.
ARMOR
vision vision Concept
These measures have greatly shortened the time required to respond to conventional conflict. Additionally, th Soviets' massive withdrawal fro Warsaw Pact countries as increased th amount of time to more than one year to respond to large-scale general War. Based Based on these realizations, plus fis constraints, it is the appropriate time to consider shifting part of ou combat power from from the Active Component (AC) to the Reserve Component (RC) United States Army Reserve ser ve (USAR), in the form of cadrelevel combat divisions. A number of of units are in place plac e to accomplish this transition. Currently, there are 12 training divisions and two training traini ng brigades within within the USAR RC structure. Al of these units are Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) organizations. (However, they have command command and control struct structure ure from company/troop through battaliodsquadron to division, organized along the lines of of Table of Organiza tion and Equipment (TO&E) (TO&E) combat units.) these 12, three divisions and one brigade ar armor training organizations with th mission of Armor Center Center displa displacem cement ent,, at Fort b Ky 100th Division (Training), Louisville Louis ville,, Ky.; Ky.; formation format ion additional armor training centers at Fort Hood, Texas 4th Division (Training), Milwaukee, Wis. th Cavalry Brigade Brigad e (Training), (Trainin g), Omaha, Neb. Neb.;; and at Fort Bliss, Texas 5th Division (Training), Chicago, Ill. Due to the geographic proximity of the 100th Division to the Armor Center, combat support, and combat service support USAR-type unit support capabilities capabil ities with within in that proximity, and empirical manning, training, readiness first USAR USAR divisional divi sional unit to data, be redesignated as a cadre division
November-December 7997
should be the 100th Division (Training). In addition, for past four years, the 100th enhanced its already outstanding performance b conducting field training exercises to Army Training and Evaluation Evalua tion Program Mission Training Plan (ARTEP-MTP) 71-2 tasks and standards, to th extent conditions would would allow. This additional training further enhanced the abilities of drill sergeants to train Initial Entry Training also become (IET) soldiers. It base institutional knowledge that will allow the division to grow and mature into combat combat cadre c adre divisional divisional unit.
Concept Historically, before World War I, Army combat divisions were maintained at cadre level, to be augmented by by state National Guard militias at times time s of of national nati onal emergency. After World War I, based on on the orgaorg anization of Army divisions divis ions by General Pershing during World War I, number of active divisions divis ions were maintained at combat-ready levels in both personnel and equipment. During an expansion of th Army, Army, core c ore elements from these combat-ready divisions would form form the th e base of new division divis ion in time of national crisis. This was th method employed 1942 and 1943 to meet the requirements of combat divisions for World War After World War the Army employed combination of of methods to both minimize total Army force manpower requirements and provide training for soldiers. Here are three historic examples of this method: .The 3d Armored Division was deactivated activa ted late in 1945 and reactivated as th 3d Armored Division Replace-
41
ment Training Center, Fort Knox, Ky. reconstituted, 3d maintained its combat division TO&E with subordinate commands at various levels of both personnel and equipment fill. Additionally, other elements remained remained at “cadre” officer and noncommissioned officer personnel levels and be came the base for training more than 25 percent of all enlisted men joining the Army. In addition to he 14-week cycle, the division conducted si additional training missions: reenlisted refresher refres her training: 16-week band training; leader course training (officer candidate preparatory/acting noncomnoncommissioned officer); specialist schools (mess stewards, cooks, clerks, and mechanics); “methods instruction” cadre school; and reserve officer/enlisted training methods update courses. Upon completion of training, soldiers were reassigned to all branches branche s of the Army. In 1955, the 3d Armored Division Replacement Center was reorganized into tactical armored division, and 1956 deployed to the Federal Fe deral Republic of of Germany as TO&E combat armored division. *The 2d Armored Division, which was th division that th 3d replaced in Germany, was redesignated as 2d Armored Training Division, Fort Hood, Texas Tex as in in 1958. 1958. While it maintained its armored division TO&E, TO&E, th division was manned at a cadre level throughout. IET soldiers were attached to the assigned cadre-level units in order to complete both Basic Combat Training (BCT) and Advanced Individual Training (AIT) in the combat comba t branches of Armor, Artillery, and Infantry. with the 3d AD, after afte r completion of of BCT and AIT, attached personnel went to units throughout throughou t the Army. Army. In 1962, afte training more than 89,000 89, 000 soldiers, the 2d Armored Training Division was redesignated a line armored division with a combination combin ation of soldier sol dierss who had just completed training and those 42
assigned from appropriate branch-specific schools. *In mid-1946, after serving with distinction in World War the 100th Infantry Division was deactivated.
in
as th
100th Airborne Division, U.S. U.S. Army Reserve (USAR). 1952, it was again redesignated as th 100th InfanDivision. In 1955, the 100th was redesignated, this time as a replacement division for the Replacement Training Center, Cen ter, Fort Knox, Ky. It was during this period that 3d mored Division was itself being reorganized from th Replacement Training Center, Fort Knox, to a line combat armored division. In fact, the 100th Division’s mission was to assist the Replacement Training Center during the transition of the 3d Armored Division and the planned of 2d Armored Division as an AC training division divi sion in in 1958. In 1959, th division redesignated as a “training” division. During he Berlin Crisis, the 100th Division (Training) was recalled to active duty and trained more than 32,000 soldiem in BCT and skills at Fort Chaffee, Ark. Ark. Late in 1962, the division returned to reserve Reorgan ization of the division divisi on status. Reorganization into three-line-brigade organization took place in 1973; this provided command and control structure along ROAD guidelines, facilitating the ability of the division to function as either TDA or TO&E organization. The missi mission on of the h Division Division expanded from strictly BCT and to One Station Unit Training (OSUT) Armor/Armored Cwalry in 1977. This historical data, plus plus Department of th Army, “Army Ground Forces” studies 11 and 12, and the evolution of the Army of Excellence Tables of Organization and Equipment (AOETO&E) will serve as the basis for this concept. Assumptions made in order to develop this concept further are:
ARMOR
*Cadre divisions will be combat ready read y within one year o off mobilization. *Both and RC units will be lo cated a t Fort Knox, Ky. Ky. or geographically supportable suppo rtable from from a division headquarters headqua rters located in Louisville, *Major subordinate subordina te commands of the cadre division will be located as close as possible to the cadre division headquarters. Figure shows the basic organizational structure of the cadre division. ten-maneuver-battalion, ten-maneuver-battalio n, serie It is 87004L200 AOE-TO&E. While “pure” cadre organization is possible, as shown in the TO&E, both its effectiveness as a Reserve Component major command and post-mobilization utilization would be extremely limited. Therefore, to bridge the gap between RC-National Guard combat di vision reinforcing forces, the training base requireme re quirements nts of RC-USAR RC-USAR training divisions and the formation completely new combat divisions, propose a modified “cadre” division (see Figure 2) Conceptually, it is augmented with fifth brigade consisting of four armor battalions and armored cavalry squadrons organized under current TDA authorization. This fifth brigade, with with an approp ap propriat riate e command command and control slice from the division headquarters, is designed either to displace the 1st Armored Armored Training Brigade, Brigade, or augment United States Army Armor Training Center upon mobilization. Both these missions ar currently compatible with missions assigned to the 2d Brigade, 100th Division (Training) and th division headquarters. In fact, the 2d Brigade, 100th Division (Training) conducted Mobilization Armor Training Center training missions. This OSUT mission consisted of training IET soldiers, based based on 12-hour day, 6day week Mobilization Program of Instruction.
November-December 7997
Armor Division L-Series TO&E Cadre Cadre Armor Division Divis ion Study Ar Div
Ar Bde
Sig Bn
Mech
nf Bde
Div Arty
Mech Inf Bn
Mech
Div Avn
FA
Ar Bn
Aslt Co
MSE (en)
Atk Bn
Fwd Spt Bn
Mech Inf Bn
ADA Bn CEWl Bn
(155 SP) 3x
CM Co
Figure
Armor Division L-Series TO&E Cadre Cadre Armor Armor Division Divis ion Study Ar Div
Div HQs HQs
Ar Bde
HHC
ArBn
Sig Bn
Mech Bn
ADA Bn
I
Med lhf Bd ec Inf Bn
HHB
HHT
Mech Inf
Mech Inf
HHC
ArBn
MSE (Bn) Bn
(155 sp)
3x
tk Bn
Fwd Spt Bn
Ar Bn
Figure ARMOR
November-December 1991
43
Armor Division L-Series TO&E Cadre Armor Division Division Study
MedlhfBde
ech Inf
Ar Bn
FA
Aslt Co
MSE (Bn)
Ar Bn
Mech In
Figure ?he division consists of one armorheavy brigade (1st Brigade), one balanced brigade (2d Brigade), and another armor-heavy brigade (3d Brigade). The 1st Brigade could consist of three Army National Guard battalions maintained at an Authorized Level of of Organization Organiza tion (ALO) t or near combat readiness. In fact, it would be the division combat ready ready brigade with appropria appropriate te CS CS and CSS units also manned and equipped at that level (see Figure 3). The 2d Brigade would consist consist o USAR units at personnel and equipment levels prescribed by by their applicable L-series cadre level organization. The 3d Brigade could consist of an AC brigade headquarters (194th S A B , Knox, Ky.), an armor battalion (1-10 Cav, Ft. Knox, Ky.), Ky.), and a Nationa Guard Guard armor battalion, battal ion, again, at or near ALO 1, plus a USAR mechanized battalion at cadre level. 44
With exceptions exceptions noted noted above, ll other CS and CSS units would be organized per their applicable L-series AOE-TO&E AOE-TO&E and maintained mainta ined at cadre level ALOs. Personnel reorganized in existing TO&E units would would require require formal Area of ConcentrationFIO Concen trationFIOS S education. AC unit personn pers onnel el who ar part th division would provide a good additional additiona l source of soldiers s oldiers for the if they change their status. maximum maximum of one grade above TO&E authorization authoriza tion woul woul be permitted for NCOs in 11 and 19-series MOS duty positions. Active Guard and Reserve, and civilian civ ilian personnel positions woul be cross-leveled and consolidated wherever possible. Key personnel strength comparisons are:
complete cadre RC armor division represents a 45 percent officer, a 77 percent enlisted, or a 74 percent
ARMOR
total personnel reduction compared AC organization. (Figure an armor divicomplete cadre sion with an armor training center DA brigade represents a 41 percent officer, 76 percent enlisted, or 71 percent total personnel reduction compared to an ALO AC organization.
(Figure 5. cadre RC armor armor divisi division on wit wit an armor training center brigade and its fmt brigade, as a division combat ready brigade brig ade with appropriate C 1) represent a and CSS units (all LO 1)represent 34 percent officer, 59 percent percent enlisted, enlist ed, or a 57 percent total personnel reduction compared to an ALO 1 AC AC organization. (Figure 6. Training plans of units already conducting L-series TO&E and armor training center cent er training will will not be fected. Focus of training will will be those units requiring reorganization
overnber-December 1991
Cadre Armor Division Major Subordinate Cmd Cmd Roll-Up ALO-Cedre
LO-2
ALO-1
MS
!!WE (both existing TO&E and TDA units, Le., cadrelevel maneuver battalions). Training will be conducted in in three three phases: .First (1-3 years): Emphasis will be on in-house basic TO&E maneuver unit organization and tactical operations. Training will be conducted, much as possible, with readiness groups and mobile training teams and maneuver maneuver training training commands for command post exercises (CPXFirst Battle: Battalion-Corps-type training. (4-6 years): .Second Small unit (platoon or company/troop) tactical training conducted during both Inactive Duty Training and Annual Training. All training will be executed to applicable ARTEP/MTP tasks, standards, and conditio conditions. ns. Ad ditionally, as skills increase, gunnery oth live fire! and Unit Conduct of Fire Trainer Trainer (UCOFI‘) ill be integrated integra ted into training plans. .Third (7-9 years): CPX and tactical training at the battalion/squadron and brigade level, plus tank gunnery, to be conducted during Annual Training Inactive Duty Training focus will be on simulation exercises, i.e., FB:BC and Simulation Simulation Network (SIIvI (SIIvINET NET). ). At this this phase pha se the units may conduct their Annual Training at one of the national train-
ARMOR
Di HQ 1st Ar Bd 2d Mech &i 3d Mech de DIVARTY 4th DA Bd Spt Cmd (DISCOM)
Tota To tall
3,025 1,595 2,619 2,111 2,581 1,558 2,611
239 41 140 6 190 8 150 6 212 12 15 258 159 76
3.305 1.741 2,817 2,267 2,805 1,969 2.846
1,243 1,24 3 407 16,100 16,100 17.750 17.750
41 237 139 8 187 6 147 12 209 153 254 73 159
2,793 1.528 2,454 1,968 2,471 1,399 2.198
w 3,071 1,673 2,649 2,121 2,692 1,806 2,430
1,231 1,2 31 400 14,811 14,811 16,442 16,442
o
140
22
97 72 95 95 142
80 50
723
E
I 73 492 587 434 79 603 88
572 404 482 356 69 428 696
181 18 1 3,628 4,53
Figure
Cadre Armor Division WlATC TDA Brigade nit
ALO-Cedr ALO-Cedre e
Total
TbA-ATC O
Cadre Armor Div 723 181
3,628
4,532
100th AT
723 66
3
486
555
66
W
O
E
I
181 3,628 4,532 3
486
555
(5th Tota To tall
789 184 4,114 5,087 5,087
Figure Cadre Armor Division WlATC TDA B rigade rigade Division Combat Ready Brigade nit
ALO-CadrdTDA ATC
Total
LO-1
w Cadre Di w/ATC Div Cbt Ready 1stAr Bd 1 ea FA Bn ea FSB
78
184
4,114
5,087
-
ea EN Plt ea ADA Co ea MP Co
-
58 33 3 4 1
6 3 1 1
1,191 539 307 256 182 39
Total ‘Differential sum, 10
cadre versus ALO
1,255 572 313 261 184 40
o
E
I
789
184 4,114 5,087
58 33 3 4 1
1,191 1,255 539 572 3 307 313 1 256 261 1 182 184 39 40
889
195 19 5 6,628 7,712
or each dement.
Figure
ovember-December 7997
45
100th Div
I
MTC
I
Figure ing centers Fort h i n , Fort Chaffee, or even Hohenfels) or as part of a REFO RGE R-like operation. In all of the phases of training, both sustainment of of basic so ldier individual individual skills and inwinter-phase refresher training will conducted. This will be done to ensu re the m aximization of knowledge and operational utilization of both the soldiers and the division. Post-mobilization training for armor training center units will not change. However, they will develop a contingency plan in case they are needed to round out existing divisional battalions or squadrons or assume th 1st Brigade mission if it is used independently. Remaining division training will be based on personnel and equipment fi ll schedules rather than than training training time required and deployment date. A unique training asset available to th 100th Division (Training) is the 100th Division Maneuver Training Command (100th Div. MTC). This Second Army asset, currently colocated with the lOOth Division (Training) headquarters and OPCON to it for personnel, financial, and limited logistical support, consists 19 46
teams in all three Army disciplines, CBT, CS, and CSS. Figure shows the org anizational composition of th 100th Div. MTC. This organization, for the past 16 years, has conducted th planning, development, execution, and evaluation of all types of training exercises up to brigade level for military organizations within both th Second and Fourth U.S. U.S. Army areas. Therefore, further propose that, while the ov erall mission mission of the 100th Div. MTC not be changed, its focus through emphasis from FORSCOM and TRADOC be placed on the 100th while it develops as a combat division. As assisted by Readiness Group Knox, the MTC will develop exercises emphasizing technical, tactical, and leadership skills required to successfully execute combat missions, if not exclusively, primarily for the 100th Division. Logistical support for this organization will be guided by the following principles: .Organizati .Organizational onal Clothing Clot hing and Individual Equipm ent, i.e. i.e.,, CTA 50-901, is already issued or hand in uni
.Installation property, again, is on hand hand but may require redistribution. installations will be consolidated based on final TO&E unit utilization or location. .Existing .Existing obilization obiliz ation and Training Equipment Sites use will be maximized for the storage and training availability of m ajor end items. .Existing .Existing tactical tactica l equip ment me nt will be cross-leveled, and equipment will be requisitioned based on the difference between on-hand status and authorized level per that unit's ALO. Equipment to round out th cadre vision after mobilization will come from from the following sources .F'repositioned Organization Materiel Configured Unit Sets (POMCUS) Unit Residual Equipment (PURE).
.New manufacture. Th r f ar ti Division Sets. .Combination of of the above. The cost of im plemen ting this concept, based on Headquarters, DA, Manpower and Force hogram Analysis Division, Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate data is approximately nine to 24 percent of the total cost for an AC heavy division. (See Figure The cost a "pure" RC cadre heavy division is the least expensive: however, as stated earlier, its effectiveness is also minimal. It woul take it he longest to become combat ready and would not have th capability to displace augment trainers in the training base. An RC heavy division would be he most exp ensive and would still not be the best prepared to go to war, nor possess the capability to support the training base. The us of an an RC cadr cadree /A K is approximately $2.5 million more expensive than th RC cadre, but it can support the training base. However, it still cannot meet combat readiness criteria on
AC Heavy Division Versus Versus RC C adre Heavy Heavy (A rmor) Division Annual Costs' (in millions) C,
RC, Cadre WlATC
RC, Cadre W/ATC Div Cb Bd
Personnel AC RC2 civilians3 ATC Bde4 Div Cbt Bde5
435.1
OPTEMPO
108.79
5.23
.07
.07
5.S6
Total
543.90
150.13
48.70
51.75
86.47
134.9
38.38 5.25
38.38 5.25 3.05
38.38 5.25 3.05
14.44
Notes:
'Data from Cadre Division Concept Study (Draft) Department of the Amy, DAW-SSW. dated 15 Jul90. 21ncludes TPU, AGR. and AC personnel. 31ncludes GS and FTS avilians. Num Number ber requiredwas requiredwas based on Division (Tng) manpower level (73) plus 72 since data is currently unavailable unavailable for other concept units. units. Calculation is as follows: 73+72x35K divided by k 5 . 2 5 . 4Based on current 100th Div (Tng) 2d Bde TDA aumOrlzation. Calculation is as follows: 555x5.5K divided by M-3.05. Calwlatlon Is 5Additional 2.6 2.625 25 personnel required for 1st Cadre Bde make it AL fdlom: 2,625x5.M divided by 1 bL14.44. 'Calculation 'Calculation based on 25% cadre fill (personnel and equipment), Le. 5.07 5.07 d lv iied ii ed by 25-20.2 25-20.28+5. 8+5.07 07 (cadre)-25.35.
ployed
Army contingency, contingen cy, no division would be organized either in personnel or equipment at less than fully combat ready here will be no skeleton combat AC AC divisions. divis ions. In fact, even the "cadre" divisions, as this concept shows, could be organized either pure or with with elements having having varying degree combat readiness. The degree which this this would be done would obviously be dependent on both threat analysis and other constraints, like personnel, equipment, or fiscal. The risks involved in this concept ar not minimal. However, if if reaction reaction lead times are accurate, and cadre di visions can become combat-ready within within those lead times, this concept should be considered seriously serio usly as an acceptablerisk.
Figure
with division combat ready and ATC brigade, ATC bri gade, is i s approximately $3 million more expens expensive ive than than the RC million less cadre division, but than than the RC heavy division. divis ion. These differentials are significant and justify the expense for unit that would be capable to meet bot both h its pre- and postmobilization armor training center trainer mission, plus provide an additional tional on-lin o n-line e combat unit source. cadre
Conclusion AirLand AirLand Battle Batt le Future Doctrine, current utilization/deployment strategy, plus the evolution of new world order dictate the reevaluation of tactioperation al, and and strategic str ategic employcal, operational, ment of United States Stat es Armed Forces. The rapid technological growth and the effectivene effecti veness ss of weapons system and training methodology for soldiers, soldie rs, coupled with fiscal constraints, makes realigning costly combat-heavy forces
ARMOR
inevitable. This realignment could take place and minimize the overall loss of combat effectivene effecti veness ss by placing specific specific heavy heavy combat divisions divisi ons at a cadre cadre level of organization organiza tion in in the United States Army Reserve. By using selected USAR training divisions as "core" "core" elements elem ents,, the training base would would not be adversely affected. affect ed. In fact, fact, they they would continu con tinue e to contribute to the training base because their their mission would no be both the training of initial enhy en hy trainees trainee s and combat preparedness. An additional benefit of of this concept is that it will provide connection between the use of National Guard reinforcing combat forces forces and the next next level leve l of of current cur rent mobilization, mobiliza tion, which which is creating creatin g completely new combat divisions. Moreover, this method will provide a way to bring force levels down without compromising the combat power of of exist existing ing AC AC divisions. divisions. Regardless of of mission, either forward de-
November-December 1991
Colo nel Josep h C. Kopacz was commissioned from Armor Officer Candidate School, and has attended Armor Officer Advanced School and CGSC. He attended John Carroll University and holds a B.S. degree in m arketing from the University f Louisville. Louisville. He se we as a platoon leader and SUPBO with 2-68 Armor, 8th ID (Mech); Asst 100th Div (Tng); S2/3, 00th Div Support Bn: Armor/Cavalry team leader, 100th Div Maneuver Training Command: squadron commander, 1 397th, 3d Bde, 100th Di (Tng); and as chief, Plans, Operations, Training, RM, and MOB Division, 100th Div Manuever Command. As a ivilian, vilian, he is a m arketing man agem envfinancial planner. 47
Army Begins SD
in January Army's new W-Development Test (SDT) is here. Testing of noncommissioned noncommissioned officers in the grades of sergeant through sergeant first class was scheduled scheduled to begin in place of Skill Qualificati Qualification on Test on Oc 91. Delays in publications shipments, however, however, have po stponed that start date to Jan 92 he SDT is designed to evaluate leadership, training, and MO skills. To sustain doctrinal proficiency in these areas, NCOs are required to know the material in their MO S- sp ati c soldie soldier' r'ss manual and and any any jobrelated technical references. To strengthen proficiency in the leadership and training areas, NCOs taldng the SDT are required to know material in four additional manuals: FM 22-100, Military Leadership; FM 22-101, Leadership Counseling; FM 22-102, Solder Team Development; and FM 25-101, Battle Focused Training. These publications were distributed as a set to each insta llation and major command, worldwide. worldwide. T he m anuals were distributed in sufficient quantities to allow a personal set for evwy sergeant through sergeant first class, with a 20 percent excess to allow for new promotions, etc. Only NCOs in grade s sergeant sergeant through sergeant first dass should receive packaged set. soldier's pe rsonal Th manuals become the soldier's set and should be accounted for on the permanent clothing record. record. Mass shipment he manuals, by sets, ended 19 Se 91 you or your NCOs have not rece ived your set of manuals, check with your local publication officials to see if they have been distributed. If your manuals were distributed that al sergeants through sergeants sergeants first das s did not receive a set, new m anuals will have to be requisitioned individually through normal channels. POC fo more information information is the Directorate of To tal Armor Force Re adiness, DSN 464-TANK, or commercial (502) 624-TANK.
Slmulatlon Slmulatlon Proponen cy Offlce For Armor Tralnlng Devlces The Simulation
Proponency Office (SPO)
within the Directorate of Training Develop-
48
ment is open for business. The mission of SPO is to be the Armor Center's point of contact for information and analysis of Armor training aids, devices, simulators and simulations simulations (TADSS) and integration of TADSS into training. As the Armor Center's simulation proponent, SPO provides: oproponency for TC 17-12-7. Battle Focused Combined Arms Training Strathe centerpiece document egy: Armor for integration of TADSS into training strategies for the Total Armor Force (TAF) (institution, Active and Resetve Component). application, oexpwtise on training d evice application, capability capability and limitation. limitation. Preparation and presentation information and update briefings on Armor TADSS and the Combined Arms Training Strategy: Armor. .adv .advce ce and inform ation on TADSS to director, deputy assistant commandant, assistant commandant, an commanding general. oUSAARMS' position actions affecting Armor non-systems and systems TADSS.
.simulation proponency in the development of Fort Knox as a regional training center. analytical capability to monitor, ad vise, and participate in training related studies studies an d tests. Further, conduct training development studies, abbreviated analysis, trade off analysis, analysis, an d training imp act analysis in support of TADSS and proponent system acquisition.
ocoordination with other schools, integrating centers and MACOMs concerning TADSS development, acquisiti acquisition, on, and inte gration for combined arms raining. oidentification of secondary application of TADSS that enhance warfighting capability during actua l combat operations. This brief introduction to the Simulation Proponency Office is intended to raise the reader's awareness of the office an its missions. The staff welcomes your questions or comments. mailing address is: USAARMS, AlTN: ATSB-TDN-0 (Simulation Proponency Office), Fort Knox, Ky.
ARMOR
40121-5200. or phone DS 464-3982/ 3881, commercial (502) 624-398W3881.
Ho
of We Fight
71-123
The U.S. Armor School printed final draft of FM 71-123, Tactics an Techniques for Combined Arms Heavy Forces: Armored Brigade, Battalionflask Force, and Companymeam, in June 1991. Th present plan for FM 71-123 is to incorporate its contents into FM 71-1, FM 71-2, and FM 71-3 and not to go to 'DAW print with this version. All future field manuals will contain three parts, doctrine, tactics and techniques, and standing operating procedures. Due to funding, only a limited number of FM 71-123s were printed. The Armor School mailed a copy of this manual to every armor and mechanized battalion and above, Active, Reserve, and National Guard. The remainder of the manuals are for instructional purposes. Because there are a limited number of manuals, local reproduction production is permitted and encouraged. encouraged. FM 71-123 reflects the the way we tight The manual encompasses three echelons: brigade, battalion, and company. This approach allows the reade r to understand the relationships of he echelons to each other. Troop-leading Troop-leading procedures provide a thread of continuity, leading a reader chronologically through through each mission. Planning, preparation, and execution are addressed in tum, to reinforce the staff planning process bethe tween commanders and staff. Accordingly, planning, preparation, and execution of each mission are further described in terms of the seven battlefield operating systems. This structure gives the manual a unique combined arms perspective, which encapsulates the activities of each of the arms, as well as its relationship to the overall operation. FM 17-123 designed as a thought-prothought-provoking professional resource. resource. It m ay as a point of departure for professional development dasses or as a basis for training. Above all, it is a living document to be read and improved as soldiers in the field
ovember-December 1991
develop new and innovative techniques. Comments and suggestions are encouraged. Send them to Commandant, USAARMS, ATSB-CSC (AlTN : CPT True) call DSN Fo t K x , y 40121-5200 464-2319/6651, commercial (502) 624-
Senior Offlcer Logist Management Course (SOLMC SOLMC is spedfically designed to update commanders and their r i q s ta ta ffff a t battalion and brigade level in th logistics arena. For more information, contact the SOLMC staff, DSN 464-71331341 or commercial (502)624-713313411.The principal point of contact for administrative information and enrollment procedures is Maintenance Department Support Section, Section, DSN 464-1755 or commercial (502) 624-1755.
SOLMC Schedule (Course Number 8A-FZ3)
231916651.
History of of Unit Coin
lam Number
Th Armor School's Professional Development Division (PDD) is interested in developing a history of the unit coin, sometimes called a challenge coin. PDD is especially interested in the origin of he unit coin; its introduc tion nt o the U.S. U.S. A rmy; its uses, either as an immediate reward for a job well done or as a means of justification of membership; and the various rules of "challenge" that have developed around it. The various designs of such coins are also of great interest. If you have any information regarding th unit coin and its traditions, please notify SFC Broom or MAJ Norfolk at Command and Staff Department, U.S. Army Armor School, AlTN: ATSB-CSP-L, Fort Knox, Ky. 40121-5211, or phone DSN 464commercial 3420/5450, (502) 624-
10
Brandy Station Battlefleid in Danger On June 9, 1863, as prelude to he Gettysburg Gettysburg Campaign, Union cavalry und er MG Alfred Pleasonton, managed to surprise the scattered brigades of MG J.E.B. Stuart's cavalry near Brandy Station, Va. Th desperate battle that ensued was a classic cavalry fight abre-wielding cavalrymen charging and countercharging amidst clouds of dust, dust, a nd the largest cavalry battle of the Civil War. Today, the historic fields on which the battle was fought am threatened with the prospects of commercial development. development. If you want to find out how you can help preserve this part of cavalry history, contact the Brand y Sta tion Foundation at P.O. P.O. Box 165, Brandy Station, Va. 22714, or call d. (703) 825-9433.
Jan 92 26 Jan 92 Mar92 29 Mar 92 92 92 26 10 Ma 92 14 Jun 92 20 Se 92 4Oct92 3Jan93
Feb 93
10
342015450.
Any documents, photographs, or actual examples of the coin would be greatly appreciated. All such documents, photographs, and coins will be deposited at the Patton Museum, at Fort Knox, Ky. They will be credited to the donating party unit.
Report Date
21 Mar93 11 93 25 Apr 93 Ma 93 23 Ma 93 27 Juri 93 12 Sep 93
Start Date Jan 92
Jan 92 2 Mar 92 30 Mar 92 92 27 92 11 Ma 92 15 Jun 92 21 Sep 92 50~392 4Jan93
8Feb93
22 Mar 93 12 Apr 93
26Apr93 10 May 93 24 May 93 28 Jun
93
13 Sep 93
En Date 10 Jan 92 31 Jan 92 Mar 92 92 10 Acr 92
May92
15 Ma 92 19 Jun 92 25 SeD 92 9Oct92
8Jan93 12 Fe 93 26Mar93
16Apr93
30 Apr 93 14 Ma
28 May
93
2 Jul93 17 Sep 93
Battallon Motor O fflcer Cou rse The Battarin Motor officer Cours Course e (BMOC) (BMOC) is designed designed to p officers fo ssignment to positions which have directly related maintenance responsibilities at he unit level (battalionkquadron and below) with emphasis on management and supeMsory operations. Th course encompasses maintenance management, repair pa supply, troubleshooting, recovery operations, and scheduled maintenance services. Army an Reserve Component captains, first lieutenants, Th course is open to Active Army and second lieutenants who have completed the Basic Course and have been in the field more than six months, warrant officers, and officers of Allied nations. The fourweek course is conducted 19 times each fiscal year at Fort Knox. Ky. Class quotas can be obtained through through normal Army Training and Doctrine Command channels. channels. F or more information, contact Delaquis, DSN 464-8119/8510 or commercial (502) 624-81 1918510.
BMOC Schedule (Course (Course Num ber 8 G F 2 l ) Clam
Armor O fficer Writing Hlsto ry of the Armored Force, 1940-1945 Major Kevin McKedy seeks information
Number
00 00 005
00 007 00 009
Report Date Jan 92 30 Jan 92 13 Feb 92 28 Feb 92 Ma 92 27 Ma 92
10Apr92
23
01 1 13 01 01 01 50 503
92
Ma 92 20 Ma 92 Jun 92 18 Jun 92 17 Jul92 92 20 92 10 Se 92
Start Date
End Date
10 Ja 92 Feb 92 18 Fe 92 3 Mar 92 17 Ma 92 31 Mar92 14 92 27 92 11 Ma 92 22 Ma 92 Jun 92 22 Ju 92 21 Jul92 10 92 24 92 14 Sep 92
Fe 92 3 Mar 92 17 Mar 92 31 Mar92 14 92 28 92 12 Ma 92 Ma 92 9 Jun 92 19 Jun 92 7 Jul92 21 Jul9 18 92 Se 92 Se 92 Oc 92
and materials from from A rmored Force veterans
ARMOR
November-December
1991
49
Armor Branch Notes by LTC Fred
Treyz 11
of Workl War II. Major McKedy, an assistant professor of military history at West Point, who served with 4-66 Arm or in Operation DESERT STORM, is currently conducting research on Armored Force units in preparation of his doctoral dissertation, "The Evolution of American Armored Doc1940 -1945. bine, 1940His dissertation will analyze American armor docbine during WWll by examining the organization, tactics, training, equipment, and combat actions of armored divisions and separate tank battalions in North Africa, Europe, and the Pacific. Major McKedy is interested in interviewing Armored Force veterans about their experiences in training and combat. Any veteran intereste d in assisting Major McKedy in preparation preparation of this im portant hisshould contact him at th e Detorical project should partment of History, United States Military Academy, W est Point, N.Y. N.Y. 10996. His daytime phone is (914)938-5084/3561; DSN 688-5084.
In the few months since assumption of duty as your Armor Branch Chief at PERreport that the Armor Force is ou in front! We have a force of dedicated tankers and cavalrymen cavalrymen with unm atched quality leaders who demonstrate care and compassion by their actions, not just words. This makes our branch special tightknit community of WARFIGHTERSI feel would be remiss in my d uties if would not share with you feelings feelings in my challenging times he veil is starting to heart concerning our officer corps. These lift on the specifii issues resulting from the Army's drawdown via a Selective Early Retireme nt Board (SERB) and a Reduction In Force (RIF). These times will require a tremendous sense of care and compassio for our officers, soldiers, and their families. Th other part of the drawdown plan is the ea rly release of officers through the Voluntary Early ReleaselRetirement Program (VERRP). Armor leaders in the field need now take particular heed! Now is the time to strongly encourage and recruit officers who possess the talents and potential distinctive to Armor Branch to stay in the Army. the other hand, now is the time to be sober and truthful in dealing with officers who do no possess the same potential and talents. These officers should be encouraged to take advantage the incentives of ava ilable release programs. programs. This way our branch will keep intact the high quality quality force that we've come to expect. In the months ahead, no one afford to be too busy to take 10-15 minutes at their Personn el Services Services Company or on the phone with Armor Branch to ensure that their files are presented presented in the best light to board m embers. Brigade, battalion and squadron adjutants need to work extra hard to assist their officers, officers, an d we at Armor Branch will help. help. Leaders everywhere everywhere need need to weigh in as mentors, and officers who who are in doubt should call upon them for advice in these challenging times. times.
4th AD Dedicates Wood Hail
Annor Branch personnel 9696):
Some 55 4th A rmored Division veterans veterans and their family members made the trip to Fort Knox on August 23 to dedicate Wood Hall in honor of their WWll commander, MG John Shirle y P' Wood. Comprising Comprising the ceremony wa unveiling of a portrait of General Wood, a bronze in his honor. Th pottrait pottrait and other memorabilia are to be display ed in the building' building' conference room. through which every soldier training as a tanker or scout will pass. In his remarks, BG (Ret.) Albin F. Inyk, wartime commander of the division's 8th Tank Battalion, said, 'I you want to to answer the question, what is leadership, throw away the books and study General Wood. Wood. No division comm ander ever loved his men as did General Wood and was loved in turn by his m en." Later, at a luncheon, Armor School Assistant Commandant BG James Noles told the group, want you to know that you are our heroes. We in today's Army are indebted to yo for the legacy built by he Fourth Division and its first great wartime commander, John P" Wood. You defined the role of he Armwed Force in terms of firepower. shock effect, and movement, movement, movement." Wood Hall is part of Holder training facility at Fort Knox. The event was part of the AD Association's 50th anniversary reunion.
SCOM, ca
Armor Branch
he f
MAJ Assignments: CPT Assignments Assignments::
follows (DSN: 221-9696 LTC Fred . Tr ey Larry
Future Readiness Readiness::
commercial (703) 25
111
MA Tom Piskel CPT Steve Stalvey Ms. Robin Harper CPT Chuck Honore Mary Fowler CPT Schuy Deca mp
LT Assignment Assignments: s:
or
Ms. Maly Mooney CPT John Kallerson Ms. Ruby Bourne Ms. Margo Bertagnolli
Upcamlng Boards COL SERB LTC, MAJ, CPT SERB LTC FY93 Cmd
14-31 14-31 Jan Jan 9 14Ja n-7 Feb 92 3-30 Feb 92
Because the RIF Board could come at any time, it is imperativ for each officer to review his file and correct any deficiencies. We at Armor Branch need your help to keep your file REDCON 1.
Development 1992 Pmfess lonal Development Program Deadlines
considered for professional development programs outside th normal realm of lo get considered Armor, we must submit your file for consideration within th e following following deadlines: congrecrsional Fellow Training With Industry Harvard HarvardlDCSOPS lDCSOPS Fellow Fellow Olmstead Scholarship USUHS Applications FLEP Applications White House Fellow
92 10 25 Jan 92 1 Se p9 Oct 92 Nov92 Nov92 Dec92
(Summer 92) (Summer 92)
Continued on Page ~~
50
ARMOR
ovember-December 1991
Armor Branch
Notes (Continued from page 50)
Selective Early Retirements Boards (SERB) Th 1823002 182300 2 Nov 91, will select officers with 18 years Active Federal Service Service (AFS) for early retirement We encourage each of you to obtain a copy of the message fro your Personnel Services Company for details, as well as ensure your file is REDCON 1. 1. By law, the selection selec tion rate for early retirement cannot exceed percent. Officers selected will retire on the first day of the month following the month the officer completes 20 years Active Federal Service, and will retire in their current grade.
Army Acqulsltion Corps (AAC) The AAC AAC is designed design ed to develop a pool of highly qualified specialists to fill designated critical acquisition positions, positions, while ensuring ensuring that the development of systems reflects ref lects a balance between keen regard for operational realities re alities and technical knowledge. A key goal of the AAC is to develop develo p officers officers by assigning them to positions allowing work on branch developmental programs, eventually becoming a project manager or commander of a Defense Logistics Logis tics Agency Procurement Command (defense plant or defense contract management area). Acquisition Corps officers are not eligible for consideration for Armor battalion command. Each development developmental al project pr oject is aligned to a basic branch and is determined by an annual General Officer Steering Committee. or example, the AGS development is cumntly aligned with Armor, so Armor officers accessed into the AAC are developed to become the AGS Progect Manager. Armor currently is aligned with seven sev en LT PM positions and five COL PM positions, and officers officer s can compete for 21 LTC commands and 23 COL commands. commands. To get into i nto the AAC, AAC, a an n officer must be branch branc h qualified, be competitive for promotion to the next higher rank, possess functional area of 51, or 97, 97, have a scientific, engineering, business, or administration tratio n degree background, a GPA of 2. or higher, higher, and have GRUGMAT GRUG MAT scores whic will allow Advanced Civil Schooling (ACS). Of these requirements, only competitiveness for promotion cannot be waived, officers with other functional areas may also redesignate their functional functional area and enter the AAC. As with normal n ormal ACS, ACS, a good GRUGMAT score can offset a poor GPA.
ARMOR
Armor is currently short in all year groups, and we intend to make up these shortages by the next PERSCOM Acquisition Accession Board (PAAB) in Fall 92. Hopefully, we can fill all the vacancies through voluntary accessions. If interested, write your assignment officer to get your file seen by the PAAB. For more information on the AAC, call MAJ Mark Brown, the 97 AAC AAC Assignment As signment Officer, at A AV V 22122 12758. He is an Armor officer in the Acquisition Corps and can answer your questions.
Mlcrof che
Your performance microfiche is the final item in your board boar d file (other than loose papers such as last minute OERs). Each officer should order a fiche if you have not done so in the last year. Check to ensure only your OERs and AERs are on the fiche. Alert us if you note problems. To order your fiche, write w rite to: Commander, Commander, PERSC PERSCOM OM,, Al : TAPC-M TAPC-MSRSR-S, S, 200 Stoval Sto valll St., Alexandria, Va. 22332. sure to include inc lude your SSN and return retu rn address on the letter.
Photograph
Although official photographs are required every five years, it is advisable to retake a photo upon promotion. We continually stress the importance of a good photo, and comments from DA Board Boa rd members also emphasize its importance. Black and white photos will be used exclusively for DA Boards until Feb 92. After this date, color photographs will be used for all DA Selection Selecti on Boards, Boards, but each board will be cautioned that not all officers will have a color photo and that a black and white photo will be sufficient. DA will advise the field when boards will only review color photos. A word of caution pay more attention attenti on to detail deta il when taking color photo. Flaws in the uniform, such as different shades in coat and trousers, award placement placement and wrinkles wrinkles in the uniform, tend to show up more in color than in black and a nd white
OR
A correct, easy-to-read ORB is also lmportant for a board. Check your ORB now, even if you just went through birth-month auditit Ensure corrections you submitted aud present, and if not, again. Captains, majors and lieutenant colonels tend to have problems in the assignment history section, and lieutenants tend to have problems in the assignment history, service data and awards sections. All ranks have problems with updated home addresses. If you cannot resolve a problem with your ORB, send s end us corrections needed with any necessary necessary supporting documents.
November-December 1991
Bustle Rack
(Continued from Page 50) Patton Museum Adds Abrams Auditorium Auditorium
On July 12, the Cavalry Armor Foundation signed a contract for the Abrams Auditorium wing of the Patton Museum. Construction of the fifth major addition to the museum is underway and should be well out of the ground as this goes to press. Designed as a multifunction area for dasses, temporary temporary exhibits, and meetings, meetings, the auditorium will be completed compl eted by spring of 1992. It will be dedicated to to General General Creighton W. Abrams, the first Chief of Staff to have Armor as his basic branch.
Reunions The Society of the First Division (Big Red One), will hold its 74th Annual Reunion from August 26-30, 1992. in Chicago, Chicago, 111. For information, please contact Arthur Chaitt, Executive Exe cutive Director, Director, Montgomery Avenue, Philadelphia, Pa. 19118, 19118, phone (215) 836-4841.
SmokelObscurants Symposlum Th SmokdObswrants Symposium WI will be held h eld 14-16 April 1992 19 92 at the Kossiakoff Conference and Education Center, Th Johns Hopkins University, Laurel, Md. The theme of the Symposium is "Smoke, the Margin of Victory." Topics to be presented are Smoke Systems and Materiels, Modelling, Operational Operat ional Uses, Health or Environmental Effects, DESERT STORM Lessons, Countermeasures, Nonmilit No nmilitary ary Applications, Data Analysis, Data Assessment and Evaluation, Camouflage, Concealment, Deception, Natural Obscurants, and Electromagnetic Systems Performance. he symposium is sponsored by the Army Chemical Research, Development and Engineering gineer ing Center, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md. Members of the t he Department of Defense, Defense, industry, academia acade mia and allied alli ed na tions are invited to submit papers up to and including the the SECRET level on the aforementioned topics. topics. The abstract deadline is 15 January 1992. For further information contact Judy Cole, Cole, Symposium Coordinator (804) 865-7604 and telefax (804) 865-8721; or Walter Klimek, Symposium Chairman (301) 6712494, DSN 584-2494, or telefax (301) (301 ) 6713471.
51
Ne Book Gulf War Combines Combines Wealt Detail the Big Picture With Clear View Desert Vlctoty: Th War for Kuwait, by Norman Friedman. Naual Institute Press, Annapolis, 1991,435 $24.95 It is difticuk enough to put a war and a major nationa l experience experience in perspective at all, so it is surprising that defense analyst Norman Friedman does it here so quickly an so well. Beyo nd that, the bro ad strokes are filled in with with a wealth of d etail that help even specialized readers understand how complex weapons work and how they m ust be orchestrated orchestrated if a nation is to succeed in modem war. This This book is a remarkably mature look at the Gulf War big picture, arriving very soon after the en d of the conflict. conflict. It successfully explains why so many experts were wrong about this war, and to a great extent why we shouldn't have been as surprised as we were by its outcome. he book follows a chrondog'cal path, beginning with a detailed, compact chapter on Saddam Hussein's Iraq, followed by of his soulhother chapters on his inva sion of em neighbor, the forging of the coalition, the embargo, embargo, th build-ups in Saudi A rabi and in Kuwait, and the military considerations that commanders on both sides had to fac face. e. S g chapters chapters deal with the the air war, war, the na val contribution, the land campaign, and a final chapter on "lessons teamed and mis-learned."
The 260 pages of text ar followed by 103-page appendix section that analyzes land, sea, and air weapons systems on both sides, lists air and naval losses an how they occurred, and documents each SCUD launching and its outcome. Friedman's clear explanations of weapons and how they work make the appendices major strength of the book. But equally interesting are his conclusions, including some I'd never heard from the many experts who quarterba cked he war from TV's sidelines. Why the Iraqi Force didn't
52
fight, fo example. Friedman argues that force; Saddam was actua lly afraid of his air force; it was on of the few power centers that could actually challenge his control of his country, he denied it resources. and its morale was never good. He also argues that we overestimated his forces because we were counting counting weapons, weapons, rather than assessing willof the men behind them. He argues further that when we looked at Saddam's lavish weapons purchases, we
didn't realty buy failed to notice that redundancy redundancy and spare parts that make systems robust; these glitzy weapons were purchased purchased more to intimidate than to fight. And once the coalition shattered the Iraqi command and control system, it should have been no surprise that Saddam's hollow legions completely lost whatever shreds of cohesion they mig ht have had.
CLEMENS, ARMOR
Cogent Quotes from "Desert Victory" managed to buy great deal of the outward appearance of military power he guns and tanks and missiles. He was unable to buy, or to maintain, a modem command and co ntrol system system to back up that outward power power.'.' "Saddam
'Inexperienced armies, or, more likely, inexpen'enced dictators will choose th maximum apparent military power pe dollar. Most of time, after all, they expect to win more by b luffing than by actually fighting. It is tempting fo the United States to follow much the same path as he military budget declines. declines. The ar demo nstrates clearly clearly just haw bad a m istake that would be borne extent, it could be argued that Saddam Hussein's tactical, training, an logistical failures were a result of the limited cadre of educated men in Iraq; that is, they were a consequence of Iraq's Third World character To the extent that such generalizations are correct, the war carries a fascinating lesson: Third W orld countries countries are unlikely to defeat reasonably competently competently h andled First World forces unless they modernize their societies hat is unless they they em erge out of the Third World. Mere purchases of sophisticated weaponry will not do ..."
'It is quite possible that, fo all its mobilization, Iraq lacked sufficient numbers of educated men outside its officer class. The next best method is to decentralize, relying heavily on officers in forward positions, whose knowledge of the current situation ca for fear of political instability."
headquarters. Saddam
sort
iesson IS mar an soaery wisning IU smnd up to modern Western forces will have to moderniz modernize. e. It cannot merely b y equipment equipment;; the society itself itself has to change. Th change need not m imic the West (probably it will not), but it must produce a larger leadership and technically adept class
..:
ARMOR
ovember-December 7997
Streets, Battle for Fire in 1968, by Eric Eric Hammel. ConHue,
temporary Books, Inc., Chicago, 1991. 370 pages. $24.95.
Hundreds of books, articles, and studs have bee n written written ab out th e events events TET of 968, o explain, condemn, cond emn, an justify justify what wha t took too k p lace la ce.. s book. refreshingly. spends most of it efforts on the battles waged by the units involved. It primarily covers -ourw side of the th e hill, as It was obviously impossible impossible to obtain the d etaile d inter interview views s and do cumentation ument ation from 'their' 'their' slde of the th e hili. The real re al heroes of the t he story story of Hu during TET 1968 have to be the three U.S. Marine 11. 1/5. and Marine batta lions 21 whose bat b attl tle e prowess s dissplaye d in deta il in this this book. T e condico nditions under which they were forced to fight were d aunting, to y th e least. e Intell I ntelligen igence ce of th e enemy. they gained largely combat action; much of the time artillery and air support was was denied them them by policy or ba weather; their logistic support was somewhat shaky; shaky; a nd their superior superior headquarters did not understandor understand or apprecia pre ciate te their their situation. situation. T e Marine M arine battalion commander who was told by his superlor that he had no interest in how he deployed his companies must have puzzled over that even more than the reader will. ut that battalion commander dep loyed loy ed his his companies and got the job done. e author has performed perform ed an outstanding job in reconstructing the details of the battle actions of US. units through extensive extensive interview interviews s of the peo ple who fought the battle. Well portrayed is the superb superb traini training ng of the Marines, who quickly adapted to the tactics of fighting in an urban environment rather than tha n the bush. l O l s t AirActions of units of the borne and 1st Cavalry Cava lry Divisions sions in sealing off Hue from outside reinforcement and support are Included n the book, as well wel l as as those thos e of th e 1st ARVN Division Divis ion and th e VNMC Battle Group Alpha, both of which fought valiantly valiantly with the Marines in retaking Hue. However, the US. US. Marine ba ttalions provid ed the combat combat s , blood blood,, and guts guts to accomplish the task of clearing clea ring Hue of of th enemy. It has has long bee n an axiom axiom that battalions battalions fight the battles, battles, and this this old concept is no better illustrated than in
the descriptions in this book of the Marines fighting in Hue. If ther th ere e is something someth ing missin missing g from th book, it is the lack of more detail in the actions actio ns of o f the th e t A VN Division in and a nd around Hue during TE 1968. Ths Ths divisi div ision on held most its positions In Hue from start to finish of TET 1968. It performe d well in clearing Hue, and was reinforced other GVN GVN units, Including the th e VNMC. VNMC. during the fighting. More details of its actions would have added to the book. Numerous Numerous examples of juniors juniors step ping forward to assume the place of leaders who had fallen are contained in the book, particularly In the Marine units. units. s once onc e again aga in served to emphaemp hae the th e excellent Marine training. Ther was was one example of a com pany in which which corpora corporals ls comm anded ande d ail three platoons. This is a good book for junior leaders to read o see some of the unexpected situations that may arise in comb co mbat, at, as well as the th e examples of what determined individual leadership can achieve under almost any condition. JOHNS COL, USA, Ret. Midlothian, Va.
Spartans
Jerry Pournelle and a nd S.M. S.M. Sterling. Baen Books Riverdal Rive rdale, e, N.Y., N.Y., 1991. 34 pages (paperback). back ). $4.95. $4.95. Tell
Need a book to take to Graf? Take this this one. Need a book for an officer professional development seminar on low-intensity conflic conf lict? t? Use this this one. o ne. Readers Readers of science fictio n are familiar familiar with Mess Messrs. rs. Pournelle Pourne lle and an d Sterling. Sterlin g. this work, they both entertain and educate ca te.. T e book s a fast read. re ad. The The charch aracters an d situations situations are lively. T e bat b at tie scenes will set set your teet te eth h on ed ge s book boo k is fun to read rea d and an d tuc k in your cargo poc ket while while you wait for the fo to lift on Range 117. s book boo k will also give you y ou a gre g reat at start poin po intt for a class class or serie series s of classes classes on low-intensity conflict (LiC). Pournelle and Sterl Sterling ing set set one battali bat tali on against the dual challenge of training a native army while simuttaneoudy fighting a growing insurgency. he training program covers weapons training and exercises ses,, to com bined bin ed arm small unit exerci
exerci exercises ses and leader lead er training. Th insurgency grows from Mao's phase one guerrilla and political terrorism stage to phase three three convention al unit battles. Starting with this book, a unit OPD session can cover the gamut of LIC problems. looms large many ma ny units un its'' SOF. This book convent con ventiona ionall s well offers offers a r eadable eada ble yet challen ging expoexposure to the problems and challenges facing counterinsurgent units. The intelligence preparation preparation of the battlefield i different, different, inclu ding urban and rural rural ter raln as as well as as the polit p olit ical ica l landscap land scape. e. The law of land warfare comes into play pla y as as the savagery of th e terrori terrorist st demands a response.Yet Yet forces representre presenting the established government must obey the law as the terrorist upsets the law while hiding behind it, setting up the 'what do yo do now, lieutenant?' lieutenant?' question ques tion sessi session. on. The vehicles vehic les the th e book b ook provides also allows a user friendly framework for for exploration into th e world of guerrila. guerrila. Pournelle and Sterling used classic Chairman Mao to set up the th e guerrilla force and campaign. Mao did y that guerrilla war in China was different than warfare in other settings, but most guerrilla forces use use Mao as as the b ible ib le for ac tion, adapting him to their area of operations. T e phases of guerrilla ope o perarations follow Mao's guidelines and give graphic examples of their products. Phase one guerrilla operations include hit and run operations on police forces and terror. Phase two, mobile warfare, blends small Conventional units with continued guerrilla and terror operations. The The final battl ba ttle e is classically phase three with large conventional forces clashing. T e easily identif iden tifiab iable le phases phases allow for reflection refle ction and an d discus discussio sion n when used for for OPD. OPD. e pr oblem obl em of th e guerrilla will not go away, especially the afte af term rmat ath h of D M a d our decisive decisive conven co nventiona tiona lmilitary victory. s book boo k is fun to read r ead,, but after a fter the t he fun it will make you think. Our enemies may not challenge us with large conventlonal ventlon al force fo rce next n ext time. The The respons to supe superi rior or conve ntional force m ay b unconventional. Are Are you yo u getting gett ing ready for the next war? Read this book and reflect refle ct on your your answer. answer. KEVIN C. . BENSO MAJ, Armor Ft. Ft. Leavenworth. Leaven worth. Kan.
~~
ARMOR
November-December 7997
53
Proposal Proposal for two Armor Armor badge goes to Department of the Army General Frederick M. Franks Jr. Jr.,, TRADOC commander, commander, has h as recommended that the Chief C hief of Staff of the Army approve a plan by the Chief of Armor to award Combat Armor and Expert Armor badges similar to the long-established long-estab lished Combat Infantryman's Infantryman's Badge and Expert Infantryman's Infantryman's Badge. Badge. If approved approve d by the t he Chief of Staff, the badges will provide pro vide a way to recognize outstand ing Armor soldiers, soldiers, increasing increa sing the morale and esprit of the Armor Force.
The Combat Armor Badge The Combat Armor Badge would be an exact replica in size and color to the insignia insign ia approved in 1918 for what was then called the Tank Corps. The insignia was was the second design authorized for wear and was in use between 1918 and 1920. George S. Patton Jr. Jr. and other ot her officers of the Tank Corps wore it during dur ing the Battle Batt le of St. Mihiel. 12 September 1918, the initiation by fire for what is now called the Armor Force.
Expert Armor Badge The Expert Armor Badge Badge is an exact copy of the Armor Branch insignia worn during World War II and until 1951, when the current branch insignia wa was s authorized. The Mark tank was one of the first tanks successfully employed, at the Battle of Cambrai in 1917. The battalion of heavy tanks employed it at a t the Battle of Epehy Epehy during the Meuse-Argonne Meuse-Argon ne Campaign Campaign of WWI.
PIN: 069105-000 Government Printin Office 1991 U.S. Government 748-050/91-6