Art. III, Sec. 2 & 3 Case Digest Compilation

Constitutional Law II, Art. III, Sec. 2 & 3, Case Digest Compilation|Page

Art. III, Sec. 2 Who can invoke?

1. People People vs. Chua Ho San, San, 307 307 SCRA SCRA 43 Facts: Accused Accused-app -appellan ellantt (Chua Ho San) prayed for his acquittal acquittal and the reversal reversal of the judgment judgment finding finding him guilty of transporti transporting, ng, without legal authority authority,, the regulated regulated substanc substance e methamp methampheta hetamine mine hydrochl hydrochloride oride,, in violation of Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as further amended by R.A. 7659. The trial court sentenced sentenced him to die by lethal injection. injection. In view thereof, thereof, the judgment was was brought to the the Supreme Court Court for automatic automatic review.

Chua was initially initially charged charged with illegal possessio possession n of methamph methamphetam etamine ine hydrochloride before the RTC. However, pursuant to the recommendation of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando, La Union, the charge was amended amended for illegal illegal transport transport of a regulated regulated drug, to which which he was convicted. The RTC found the prosecution successfully discharged its burden of proving the charge. It characterized the search as incidentals to a valid in flagr flagran ante te delic delicto to arre arrest st,, henc hence, e, it allo allowe wed d the the admi admiss ssio ion n of the the methamphetamine hydrochloride as corpus delicti. The RTC also noted the futili futility ty of inform informing ing Chua Chua of his const constitu itutio tional nal right right under under custo custodia diall investiga investigation tion considerin considering g the language language barrier, and such irregularity irregularity was rectified when the accused was duly arraigned and actually participated in the trial of the case. Issue: Can aliens invoke the right against unreasonable search and seizure? Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the search made was not incidental to an arrest. There was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not fall under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court. From all indications, the search was nothing like a fishing expedition. Indeed, the likelihood of Chua having actually transported the items cannot be quickly dispelled. But the constituti constitutional onal guarante guarantee e against against unreason unreasonable able searches searches and seizures seizures cannot cannot be so carelessly carelessly disregard disregarded. ed. The decision decision of the trial court court was reversed and set aside and the accused-appellant accused-appellant was acquitted of the crime charged.

NOTES TO PONDER AND HEADBANG ON: ON: POLITI POLITICA CAL L LAW; LAW; BILL BILL OF RIGHTS RIGHTS;; RIGHT RIGHT TO PRIVA PRIVACY; CY; SEARCH SEARCHES ES AND AND SEIZURES SEIZURES;; THE CONSTITUTION CONSTITUTION BARS STATE STATE INTRUSION INTRUSIONS S TO A PERSON’S PERSON’S BODY, PERSONAL EFFECTS OR RESIDENCE EXCEPT IF CONDUCTED BY VIRTUE OF A VALID SEARCH WARRANT; EXCEPTIONS. – Enshrined in the Constitution is the inviolable right to privacy of home and person. It explicitly ordains that

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people have the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. Inseparable, and not merely corollary or incidental to said right and equally hallowed in and by the Constitution, is the exclusionary principle which decrees that any evidence obtained in violation of said right i s inadmi inadmissi ssible ble for any purpos purpose e in any proce proceedi eding. ng. The Consti Constitut tution ional al proscription against unreasonable searches and seizure does not, of course, forestall reasonable searches and seizure. What constitutes a reasonable or even an unreason unreasonable able search in any particular particular case is purely purely a judicial judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved. Verily, the rule is, the Constitution bars State intrusions to a person’s body, personal effects or residence except if conducted by virtue of a valid search warrant issued in compliance with the procedure outlined in the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court; “otherwise such search and seizure becom become e ‘unrea ‘unreason sonabl able’ e’ within within the meani meaning ng of the aforem aforemen entio tioned ned constitutional provision.” This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, seizures, however, however, is not absolute absolute and such warrantless warrantless searches searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by jurisprudence in instances of (1) search of moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3) customs searches, (4) waiver or consent searches, (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search), and (6) search search incident incidental al to a lawful lawful arrest. arrest. The last includ includes es a valid valid warrantles warrantless s search search and seizure pursuant pursuant to an equally equally valid warrantless warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests, arrests, to wit: (1) arrest arrest in flagrante flagrante delicto, delicto, (2) arrests arrests effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrests of escaped prisoners. 2. FCC vs. vs. AT&T, AT&T, 562 US____ US____ March March 1, 2011 Facts: The Freedom of Information Act requires federal agencies to make records and documents publicly available upon request, subject to several statutory exemptions. One of those exemptions, Exemption 7(C), covers law enforcement records the disclosure of which “could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”

One of those exemptions, Exemption 7(C), covers law enforcement records the disclosure disclosure of which “could “could reasonab reasonably ly be expected expected to constitut constitute e an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”. CompTel, a trade association, submitted a FOIA request for documents AT&T had provided to the Federal Communications Communications Commission Enforcement Bureau during an investigation of that company. The Bureau found that Exemption 7(C) applied to individuals identified in AT&T’s submissions but not to the company itself, concluding that corporations do not have “personal privacy” interests as required by the exemption. The FCC agreed with the Bureau, but the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit did not. It held that Exemption 7(C) extends to the “personal


privacy” of corporations, reasoning that “personal” is the adjective form of the term “person,” “person,” which Congress Congress has defined, as applicab applicable le here, here, to include corporations. Issue: Do corporations have “personal privacy?” Ruling: No, the US Supreme Court rejected rejected the argument argument that because because “perso “person” n” is define defined d for purpos purposes es of FOIA FOIA to includ include e a corpo corporat ration ion,, the phrase“personal phrase“personal privacy” in Exemption 7(C) reaches corporations as well. The protection in FOIA against disclosure of law enforcement information on the ground that it would would constitut constitute e an unwarran unwarranted ted invasion invasion of personal personal privacy does not extend to corporations. DNA Testing & Suspicionless Drug Tests

3. Pimentel Pimentel vs Comelec, Comelec, GR GR 157870, 157870, 3 Nov. 2008, 2008, 570 SCRA 410 410

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picked; picked; neither are they beyond beyond suspicion suspicion.. When persons suspected suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their will. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons' right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Consti Constitut tution ion.. Worse Worse still, still, the accu accused sed person persons s are verit veritabl ably y force forced d to incriminate themselves.

4. Lucas vs Lucas, Lucas, GR 190710, 6 June 2011 Facts: Petitioner filed a Petition to Establish Illegitimate Filiation (with Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing) before RTC of Valenzuela City. Respon Responden dentt was was not serve served d with with a copy copy of the petitio petition. n. Noneth Nonethele eless, ss, respondent learned of the petition to establish filiation. His counsel therefore went to the trial court and obtained a copy of the petition. Petitioner filed with the RTC a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case. Hence, on September 3, 2007, the RTC, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, issued the Order setting the case for hearing and urging anyone who has any objection to the petition to file his opposition. After learning of the September 3, 2007 Order, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration reconsideration

Facts: In these these kindred kindred petitions, petitions, the constitutiona constitutionality lity of Section Section 36 of Republ Republic ic Act Act No. No. (RA) (RA) 9165, 9165, otherw otherwise ise known known as the Compre Comprehen hensiv sive e Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged befo before re the the pros prosec ecut utor or's 's offi office ce with with cert certai ain n offe offens nses es,, amon among g othe otherr Respondent averred that the petition was not in due form and substance personalities, is put in issue. As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads because petitioner could not have personally known the matters that were as follows: SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.—Authorized drug testing shall alleged therein. He argued that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a be done by any governme government nt forensic laboratorie laboratories s or by any of the drug mere allegation allegation pointing pointing to responde respondent nt as petitione petitioner’s r’s father. father. Moreover Moreover,, testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the jurisprudence is still still unsettled on the acceptability of of DNA evidence. evidence. quality of the test results. x x x The drug testing shall employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test which will determine the positive Issue: Should a court order for DNA testing be considered a “search” which result as well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test which will must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid? confirm a positive screening test. x x x The following shall be subjected to Ruling: Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional undergo drug testing: Students of secondary and tertiary schools, Officers and employees of public and private offices, All persons charged before the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable, and prosecuto prosecutor's r's office office with a criminal criminal offense having an imposable imposable penalty of a proper proper showing showing of sufficient sufficient justification justification under the particular particular factual factual imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a circum circumsta stance nces s of the case must be made made before before a court court may may order order a mandatory drug test, all candidates for public office whether appointed or compulsory blood test. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed regarding elected both in the national or local government shall undergo a mandatory the kind of procedur procedures es which which are required, required, but those jurisdictio jurisdictions ns have drug test. almost universally found that a preliminary showing must be made before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. Issue: Are the drugs tests required under RA 9165 suspicionless and valid? We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show that Ruling: No. A mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. The same condition precedent The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere being made defendants defendants in a criminal criminal complaint. complaint. They are not randomly randomly


harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity. Notwithstanding these, it should be stressed that the issuance of a DNA testing order remains discretionary upon the court. The court may, for example, consider whether there is absolute necessity for the DNA testing. If there there is already already preponder preponderance ance of evidence evidence to establish establish paternity and the DNA test result would only be corroborative, corroborative, the court may, in its discretion, disallow a DNA testing.

Anticipatory Warrants/Service of Warrant/”Media Ride-along”

5. United United States States vs Grubbs, Grubbs, 547 547 US 90 (2007) (2007)

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fugitive will be on the described premises (3) when the warrant is executed. It should should be noted, however, however, that where the anticipato anticipatory ry warrant warrant places a condition (other than the mere passage of time) upon its execution, the first of these determinations goes not merely to what will probably be found if the condition condition is met. Rather, the probability probability determinatio determination n for a conditione conditioned d anticipatory warrant looks also to the likelihood that the condition will occur, and thus that a proper object of seizure will be on the described premises. Two pre-requisites of probability must be satisfied (1) It must be true that if the triggering condition occurs “there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place” (2) there is probable cause to believe that the triggering condition will occur.

6. Wilson Wilson vs vs Layne, Layne, 526 US 603

magistra trate te judge judge issued issued an antici anticipat patory ory search search warra warrant nt for Facts: A magis respondent Grubbs’ house based on a federal officer’s affidavit. The affidavit explained that the warrant would not be executed until a parcel containing a videot videotape ape of child child pornog pornograp raphy hy which which Grubb Grubbs s had ordere ordered d from from an undercover postal inspector was received at, and physically taken into, the residence residence.. The affidavit also referred referred to two attachm attachments ents describin describing g the residence and the items to be seized. After the package was delivered and the search commenced, commenced, Grubbs was given a copy of the warrant, warrant, which which included the attachments but not the supporting affidavit. When he admitted ordering the videotape, he was arrested, and the videotape and other items were seized. Following his indictment for receiving child pornography, pornography, Grubbs moved to suppress the seized evidence, arguing, inter alia, that the warrant was invalid because it failed to list the triggering condition. The District Court denied the motion, and Grubbs pleaded guilty. The Ninth Circuit reversed, conc conclu ludi ding ng that that the the warr warran antt ran ran afou afoull of the the Four Fourth th Amen Amendm dmen ent’ t’s s particula particularity rity requireme requirement, nt, which, which, under under Circuit Circuit preceden precedent, t, applied applied to the conditions precedent to an anticipatory warrant.

Facts: While executing a warrant to arrest petitioners’ son in their home, Respondents invited a newspaper reporter and a photographer to accompany them. them. The warrant warrant made no mention of such a media media “ride-alo “ride-along.” ng.” The officers’ early morning entry into the home prompted a confrontation with petitioners, and a protective sweep revealed that the son was not in the house. The reporters observed and photographed the incident but were not involved in the execution of the warrant. Their newspaper never published the photographs they took of the incident. Petitioners sued the officers in their personal capacities for money damages contending that the officers’ actions in bringing the media to observe and record the attempted execution of the arrest warrant violated their Fourth Amendment rights. The District Court denied respondents respondents’’ motion motion for summary judgment judgment on the basis of qualified qualified immunity. immunity. In reversing reversing,, the Court of Appeals Appeals declined to decide decide whether the officers’ actions violated the Fourth Amendment, but concluded that because no court had held at the time of the search that media presence during a police entry into a residence constituted such a violation, the right allegedly violated was not “clearly established” and thus respondents were entitled to qualified immunity.

requirements/conditions Issue: What are anticipatory warrants? What are the requirements/conditions to make anticipatory warrants valid and constitutional?

Issue: Is the service of warrant through “media ride along,” valid?

Ruling: The court defined an anticipato anticipatory ry search search warrant warrant as “a warrant based upon an affidavit showing probable cause that at some future time (but not presently) certain evidence of crime will be located at a specified place. The court further held that the probable-cause requirement looks to whether evidence will be found when the search is conducted, all warrants are in a sense, anticipatory. Anticipatory warrants are, therefore, no different in principal from ordinary warrants. They require a magistrate to determine (1) that it is now probable that (2) contraband, evidence of a crime, or a

Ruling: NO, the service of warrant through “media ride along,” is not valid. A media media “ride-alon “ride-along” g” in a home violates violates the Fourth Fourth Amendmen Amendment. t. However, However, because the state of the law was not clearly established at the time the entry in the case case took took place place;; Respo Responde ndent nt office officers rs were were entitl entitled ed to qualifi qualified ed immunity.

Media ride alongs violate the Fourth Amendment rights of homeowners for police to bring members of the media or other third parties into their home


during the execution of a warrant when the presence of the third parties in the home home was was not in aid of the warra warrant’ nt’s s execu executio tion. n. The Amendm Amendment ent embodies centuries-old principles of respect for the privacy of the home, which apply where, as here, police enter a home under the authority of an arrest arrest warrant warrant in order order to take take into into custo custody dy the suspect suspect named named in the warrant. warrant. It does not necessarily necessarily follow from the fact that the officers officers were entitled to enter petitioners’ home that they were entitled to bring a reporter and a photographer with them. The Fourth Amendment requires that police actio actions ns in execu executio tion n of a warra warrant nt be relate related d to the objecti objectives ves of the authorized intrusion. It is certain that the presence of the reporters, who did not engage in the execution of the warrant or assist the police in their task, was not related to the objective of the authorized intrusion, the apprehension apprehension of petiti petitione oners’ rs’ son. son. Taken Taken in the entire entirety, ty, the reason reasons s advanc advanced ed by resp respon onde dent nts s to supp suppor ortt the the repo report rter ers’ s’ pres presen ence ce – publ public iciz izin ing g the the government’s efforts to combat crime, facilitating accurate reporting on law enforcement activities, minimizing police abuses, and protecting suspects and the officers officers – fall short of justifying justifying media ride-alongs ride-alongs.. Although Although the presence of third parties during the execution of a warrant may in some circumstances circumstances be constitutionally permissible, the presence of these third parties was not. 7. LA County County vs vs Retelle, Retelle, 550 550 US 609 609 (2007) (2007) Facts: Respondents filed a 42 U. S. C. § 1983 suit, alleging that their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures was violated when Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department deputies, who were executing executing a valid warrant warrant to search search a house house but were unaware unaware that the potentially armed suspects being sought had sold the house to respondents and moved out, ordered the unclothed respondents out of bed and required them to stand for a few minutes before allowing them to dress. The District Court granted the defendants summary judgment. In reversing, the Ninth Circuit found that the deputies violated the Fourth Amendment and were not entitled entitled to qualified qualified immunity immunity because because a reasonab reasonable le deputy deputy would would have stopped stopped the search upon discoverin discovering g that respondents respondents were of a different different race than the suspects and would not have ordered respondents from their bed. Issue: Did the deputies deputies violate the Fourth Fourth Amendme Amendment? nt? In executing executing a search warrant, what action may an officer take? Ruling: The deputi deputies es did not violat violate e the Fourth Fourth Amend Amendme ment. nt. Office Officers rs execut executing ing a search search warra warrant nt may take take reason reasonab able le actio action n to secure secure the premises and to ensure their own safety and the efficacy of the search. Upon encounter encountering ing responde respondents, nts, the deputies deputies acted acted reasonab reasonably ly to secure secure the premises. The presence of one race did not eliminate the possibility that

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suspec suspects ts of a differ different ent race were were in the residen residence ce as well. well. In orderi ordering ng respondents out of bed, the deputies acted reasonably to ensure their own safety, since blankets and bedding can conceal a weapon and since one of the suspects was known to own a firearm. There is no allegation that the detention was prolonged or that respondents were prevented from dressing any longer than necessary to protect the deputies’ safety. Personal Determination and Probable Cause

8. Republic Republic vs Eugen Eugenio, io, GR 174629, 174629, 14 14 Feb. 2008 2008 Facts: Follow Agan, a series Following ing the promul promulgat gation ion of Agan series of invest investiga igatio tions ns concerning the award of the NAIA 3 contracts to PIATCO were undertaken by the Ombud Ombudsm sman an and the Compli Complianc ance e and Invest Investiga igatio tion n Staff Staff (CIS) (CIS) of petitione petitionerr Anti-Mone Anti-Money y Launderin Laundering g Council Council (AMLC). (AMLC). The CIS conducte conducted d an intell intellige igenc nce e databa database se search search on the financ financial ial transa transacti ctions ons of certa certain in individua individuals ls involved involved in the award, award, including including responden respondentt Pantaleo Pantaleon n Alvarez Alvarez (Alvarez) (Alvarez) who had been the Chairman of the PBAC Technic Technical al Committe Committee, e, NAIA-IPT3 Project.5 Project. 5 By this time, Alvarez had already been charged by the Ombudsma Ombudsman n with violation violation of Section 3(j) of R.A. No. 3019. 6 The search search revea revealed led that that Alvare Alvarez z mainta maintaine ined d eight eight (8) bank bank acco account unts s with with six (6) different banks.7 banks.7

Lilia Cheng, wife of the accused, accused, argues argues that the AMLA, AMLA, being substanti substantive ve penal statute has no retroactive effect and the bank inquiry order could not apply to deposits or investments opened prior to the effectivity of Rep. Act No. 9164. Thus, she concludes, her subject bank accounts which she and her husband Pantaleon Alvarez jointly owns, could not be the subject of the bank inquiry order lest there be a violation of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. Issues: 1. Are AMLA bank inquiry orders valid and constitutional? 2. Must a bank inquiry order under Sec. 11 of the AMLA comply with the constitutional requirements on search warrant? Ruling: 1. Valid and constitutional, given that the statutory right to privacy will not prevent the courts from authorizing the inquiry anyway upon the fulfillment of the requirements set forth under Section 11 of the AMLA or Section Section 2 of the Bank Secrecy Secrecy Act; at the same time, time, the owner owner of the accounts have the right to challenge whether the requirements were indeed complied with.

2. No. Simply put, a bank inquiry order is not a search warrant or warrant of arrest as it contemplates a direct object but not the seizure of persons or property.


A bank inquiry inquiry order under under Section Section 11 does not necessitate necessitate any form of physical seizure of property of the account holder. What the bank inquiry order authorizes is the examination of the particular deposits or investments in banking banking institution institutions s or non-bank non-bank financial financial institution institutions. s. The monetary monetary instruments or property deposited with such banks or financial institutions are not seized in a physical sense, but are examined on particular details such as the account holder’s record of deposits and transactions.

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sufficient sufficient suspicion suspicion to warrant extending extending the search of Savanna Savanna to her underwear. On the liability of the of the school administrators, the Court, however, held that they were not personally liable because "clearly established law [did] not show that the search violated the Fourth Amendment." Amendment." It reasoned that lower court decisions were disparate enough to have warranted doubt about the scope of a student's Fourth Amendment right.

9. Safford United School School District District vs vs Redding, Redding, 557 US__ US__ (2009) (2009) Searching Questions Facts: Due to a declaration from another student that Savana Redding, an eighth grader at Safford Middle School, might have ibuprofen with her, which was a violation of the school’s policy, a strip-search was conducted by school officials on Savana. They searched Savana's backpack but found no evidence of drug use, drug possession, or any other illegal or improper conduct. They then took the girl to the nurse's office and ordered her to undress. Not finding any pills in Savana's pants or shirt, the officials ordered the girl to pull out her bra and panties and move them to the side. The observation of Savana's genital area and breasts also failed to reveal any contraband.

Savana’s mother then filed suit against the school district and the school officials officials responsible responsible for the search alleging alleging that her daughter daughter’s ’s Fourth Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure was violated. However, However, the district district court court granted granted the defendants' defendants' motion motion for summary summary judgment and dismissed the case. On the initial appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Circuit affirmed. affirmed. However, However, on rehearing rehearing before the entire court, the court of appeals held that Ms. Redding's Fourth Amendment right to be f ree of unreasonable search and seizure was violated. It reasoned that that the strip search search was not justified justified nor was was the scope scope of intrus intrusion ion reasonably related to the circumstances. circumstances. Now the defendants appealed to the Supreme Court, hence this petition. Issue: Can school officials strip-search a 13 year old girl student based on a declaration of a student claiming to have received drugs from the 13 year old girl? Ruling: This depends on the facts. But in this case, the Supreme Court held that Savanna's Fourth Amendment rights were violated when school officials searched her underwear for non-prescription painkillers. The Court reiterated that, based on a reasonab reasonable le suspicion suspicion,, search search measures measures used by school officials to root out contraband must be "reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction." Here, school officials did not have

10. Tabujara vs People, People, GR 175162, 29 Oct. 2008 Facts: The petitioner assails the February 24, 2004 decision of the CA in CA GR 6328 63280 0 deny denyin ing g its its petit petitio ion n for for revi review ew and and dire direct ctin ing g the the MTC MTC of Meycauayan, Bulacan, Br. II to proceed with the trial of criminal cases nos. 99-29031 and 99-29038 as well as the October 23, 2006 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration. Petitioner insist that the orders of the court should be annulled for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion because because the finding finding of probable probable cause was based solely on the unseen statement statement of Mauro Mauro de Lara who never never appeared appeared during the preliminar preliminary y investigation. Issue: Can the judge base his findings of probable cause on a statement of a witness whom he did not personally examine under oath? Ruling: No. It is constitutionally mandated that a warrant of arrest shall be issued only upon finding of probable cause personally determined by the judge after the examination examination under oath or affirmation of of the complainant and and the witnesses he/she may produce and particularly describing the person to be seized. In the case at bar, Judge Adriatico gravely abused his discretion in issuing the assailed May 2, 2000 and July 4, 2000 orders finding probable cause to hold petitioner liable for trial and to issue warrant of arrest because it was based solely in the statement of witness de Lara whom Judge Adriatico did not personally examine and under oath; neither did he asked propound questions questions.. He merely stated that in the assailed assailed May 2, 2000 Order, he overlooked that said statements of de Lara, nevertheless, without conducting a personal examination on said witness, Judge Adriatico still found de Lara’s allegations sufficient to establish probable cause. Plainly, this falls short of the requirement imposed by the Constitution. Particularity of Description

11. Yao et al vs People, GR 168306, 168306, 29 Oct. 2008


Facts: Petit Petitio ione ners rs are are inco incorp rpor orat ator ors s and and offic officer ers s of Masa Masaga gana na Gas Gas Corporation which is engaged in the refilling, sale, and distribution of LPG produc products. ts. Priva Private te respon responden dents ts Petron Petron Corpor Corporati ation on and Pilipin Pilipinas as Shell Shell Petroleum Corporation are two of the largest bulk suppliers and producers of LPG in the Philippines: “GASUL” and “SHELLANE,” respectively. Petron is the sole entity in the Philippines authorized to allow refillers and distributors to refill, refill, use, sell, and distribute distribute GASUL GASUL LPG containers, containers, products, products, and its trademarks while Pilipinas Shell is the only corporation authorized to allow refillers refillers and distributors distributors to refill, refill, use, sell, and distribute distribute SHELLANE SHELLANE LPG containers and products. On April 3, 2003, the NBI filed two applications for search search warra warrant nt agains againstt petiti petitione oners rs and other other occup occupant ants s of Masag Masagana ana compound for violation of sec. 155, in relation to sec. 170 of RA 8293 (“The Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines”) for alleged production, selling, and distributing LPG products using steel cylinders owned by, and bearing the tradename tradenames, s, trademark trademarks, s, and devices of Petron Petron and Pilipinas Shell without authority and in violation of the rights of the said entities. On April 22, 2003, petitioners filed with the RTC a Motion to Quash the two search warrants and on April 30, 2003, Masagana, as third party claimant, filed with the RTC a Motion Motion for the Return of Motor Motor Compresso Compressorr and LPG Refilling Machine. Both were denied, including their MRs. CA affirmed the decision of RTC.

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restricted restricted to a certain certain enumeration enumeration and the described described items are clearly clearly limited only to those which bear direct relation to the offense (violation of sec. 155 of RA 8293). Hence, the requirement of particularity of description is satisfied. The indication of the accurate sizes of the Gasul and Shellane LPG cylinders or tanks would be unnecessary. Chain of Custody Rule

12. Lopez vs People, GR 184037, 184037, 19 June 2007 Facts: On April 23, 2003, 2003, PO2 Atien Atienza, za, a membe memberr of Task Force of the Mandaluyong City Police Station, while conducting a routinary foot patrol saw petitioner at a distance of seven meters walking in his direction.

He saw petitioner, walking with head bowed, looking at his hand, which held a plastic sachet containing a crystalline substance. Thereafter, PO2 Atienza introduced himself to petitioner as a member of the Mandaluyong police, arrested him, and informed him of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel. counsel. He then brought brought petitione petitionerr to the Mandaluyong Mandaluyong Medical Medical Center for a check-up. He also confiscated the plastic sachet and brought it to the police station. He prepared a request and then placed the markings “APA”–his “APA”–his initials initials―on the the plastic plastic sach sachet. et.

Issue: Did the search search warran warrantt satisf satisfy y the partic particula ularit rity y of descr descript iption ion requirement?

Issues: 1) What is the chain of custody rule on search and seizure? 2) Does the presumption of regularity rule apply to chain of custody rule?

Ruling: Yes. The two search warrants satisfied the particularity of description requirement.

Ruling: 1) As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition condition in which which it was delivered delivered to the next link in the chain. These These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. Indeed, it is from the testimony testimony of every witness witness who handled handled the evidence evidence from which a reliable assurance can be derived that the evidence presented in court is one and the same as that seized from the accused.

A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow; or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact not of law by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure; or when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued. The l aw, however, does not require that the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute details as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities; otherwise, it would be virtually impossible for applicants to obtain a search warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of things they are looking for. Once described, the articles subject of the search and seizure need not be so invariant as to require absolute concordance concordance between those seized and those described described in the warrant. Substantial Substantial similarity similarity of those those articles articles described as a class or specie would suffice. The items to be seized under the search warrants in question were sufficiently described with particularity. The articles to be confiscated were

3) No. The presumption of regularity does not apply to the chain custody rule. In case at bar, the courts heavily relied on the testimony of PO2 Atienza and, in the same way, banked on the presumption of regularity. It bears stressing that this presumption only arises in the absence of contradicting details that


would raise doubts on the regularity in the performance of official duties. Where, as in this case, the police officers failed to comply with the standard procedure prescribed by law, there is no occasion to apply the presumption of regularity. 13. People vs Alejandro, Alejandro, GR 176350, 10 Aug. 2011 Facts: The RTC the appellant John-John Alejandro for violating RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. It was alleged that he sold shabu shabu to an underc undercov over er police police on Septem Septembe berr 1, 2002. 2002. The appell appellant ant appealed the case in the Court of Appeals but the appellate court affirmed the decision of the lower court stating that the defense already admitted the admissibility of certain evidences against the appellant and further stated that, in the absence of any motive to do otherwise, the police officers are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner. Thus, the appellant raised the matter to the Supreme Court claiming that the RTC erred in convicting him because the prosecution failed to prove that the integrity of the seized item, with police having failed to mark and photograph the seized item, therefore, his guilt was not proven to be beyond reasonable doubt. Issue: Is the evidentiary presumption that official duties have been regularly performed by the police officers applicable in the prosecution of RA 9165?

No. In convi convicti cting ng the appella appellant, nt, the RTC RTC and and CA relied relied on the Ruling: No. evidentiary presumption that the police officers have performed their duties in a regular manner. However, this presumption is not conclusive and cannot, by itself itself,, overco overcome me the const constitu itutio tiona nall presum presumpti ption on of innoc innocenc ence. e. The presumption of regularity is assumed only when there is no deviation from the regular performance of duty. If there i s any official act that is questioned, the presumption of regularity is no longer applied. In the case at bar, it was clear that the officers failed to follow the proper procedures stipulated in paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. Simply put, the Court said that since they were not able to properly mark the evidence, the integrity of the evidence has been compromised, therefore we can never be fully certain that it was still the same item seized on the day of the arrest. The failure to follow the procedure is the reason why the accused was acquitted by the Court because his guilt was not established to be beyond reasonable doubt. Warrantless Searches and Seizures

14. Valeroso vs People, GR 164815, 3 Sept. 2009 Facts: On July 10, 1996, the Central District Command served a duly issued warrant warrant of arrest arrest to Sr. Insp. Jerry Valeroso in a case of kidnapping kidnapping for ransom. Valeroso was found and arrested in INP Central Station in Culiat, Quezon City where he was about to board a tricycle. He was bodily searched

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and after which a firearm with live ammunition was found tucked in his waist. The subject firearm was later verified by the Firearms and Explosive Division at Camp Crame and was confirmed and revealed to have not been issued to the petitioner but to another person. The defense, on the other hand, insists that he was arrested inside the boarding house of his children. After serving the warrant of arrest (allegedly for kidnap kidnappin ping g with with ransom ransom), ), some some of the police police office officers rs search searched ed the boarding house and forcibly opened a locked cabinet where they discovered the subject firearm. Petitioner was charged with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition under P.D. 1866 and was found liable as charged before the RTC of Quezon City. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the same. Valeroso now appeals before the Supreme Court for acquittal alleging that his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure have been violated by the arresting police police officers; officers; and if granted granted would render render the confiscated confiscated firearm and ammunition inadmissible in evidence against him. Issue: Should the search search be considere considered d incident incident to a valid arrest? arrest? How should “within the area of his immediate control” be construed? Ruling: Searches and seizures incident to lawful arrests are governed by Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, which reads: SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. – A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.

The purpose of warrantless search as an incident to a lawful arrest is to protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who might be armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach. However there is an exception which is that the search should not be strained beyond what is needed to serve its purpose. Furthermo Furthermore, re, a valid arrest allows the seizure seizure of evidence evidence or dangerou dangerous s weapons either on the person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control. The phrase “within the area of his immediate control” means the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested. In the present case, the cabinet which, according to Valeroso, was locked, from where the officers found the weapon, could no longer be considered as


an “area “area within within his immedi immediate ate contr control” ol” becaus because e there there was was no way way for Valeroso to take any weapon or to destroy any evidence that could be used against him. Hence, the warrantless search in this case could not be justified as an incident to a lawful arrest.

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The forensic report admitted that only “the existence but not the sources” of the two sachets was admitted. warrantless arrest of the accused accused valid? 2) Was the Issues: 1) Was the warrantless prosecution able to establish the chain of custody?

15. Arizona vs Gant, 556 556 US 2009 Facts: The case involved involved Rodney Rodney J. Gant, Gant, who was arrested by Tucson, Tucson, Arizona, police and charged with driving on a suspended driver’s license. Police arrested Gant in a friend's yard after he had parked his vehicle and was walking away. away. Gant and all other other suspects suspects on the scene were then secured in police patrol cars. The officers then searched Gant's vehicle. After findin finding g a weapon weapon and a bag of cocain cocaine, e, they they also also charge charged d him with possession of a narcotic for sale and possession of drug paraphernalia. Issue: Up to what extent may a warrantless search on cars be allowed? Ruling: Police may search the passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to a recent recent occupant’s occupant’s arrest only if it is reasonable reasonable to believe that the arrestee arrestee might access access the vehicle vehicle at the time of the search search or that the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. Warrantless searches “are per se unreasonable,” subject only to a few specifically established and welldelineated exceptions. The exception for a search incident to a lawful arrest applie applies s only only to “the “the area area from from within within which which (an arrest arrestee) ee) might might gain gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.” Warrantless Arrests

16. People vs Gadiana, GR GR 184761, 8 Sept. 2010 Facts: Julius Gadiana was convicted by the lower court of possessing 0.09 grams of shabu in 2 heat-sealed transparent transparent plastic packets.

The prosecution’s version of events events says that about 3:40pm on 7 Feb., 2004, PO1 Busic Busico, o, PO3 Dinauana Dinauanao, o, and PO2 Ferre Ferrerr and three three others others were were conducting a saturation drive when they chanced upon Gadiana holding the two plasti plastic c bags. bags. Therea Thereafte fter, r, they they appro approac ached hed Gadian Gadiana a , identi identifie fied d themselves as policemen, and confiscated the sachets. According to Busico’s testimony, it was Ferrer who prepared and brought the request-letter for lab examination. Gadiana’s version: He denied ever holding two plastic bags. According to him, what happened was that three of the policemen only passed by him, after which, PO1 Busico uttered, "This is the one, this is the one. This is very obvious," held appellant’s arms and dipped i nto his pocket.

Ruling: 1) No. PO1 Busico only saw that Gadiana was placing two plastic sachets into his pocket. This, in itself, does not meet any of the requirements under the rules for warrantless arrests as provided in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court: A peace officer or a private person may, wi thout a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, presence, the person person to be arrested has committed, committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal personal knowledge knowledge of facts or circumstan circumstances ces that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. In cases cases falling falling under under paragrap paragraphs hs (a) and (b) above, the person person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 of Rule Rule 112.

2) The Court said, “Except for the charge sheet prepared against appellant which stated that evidence consisted of "two (2) heat-sealed clear plastic sachets containing shabu with markings ‘JGR-1’ and ‘JGR-2,’" …nowhere in the record record is a showin showing g that that the marking marking was done in the presen presence ce of appellant or his representatives or that a physical inventory and photograph of the seized items were taken as required under paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 reading:

1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accu accuse sed d or the the pers person on/s /s from from whom whom such such item items s were were confisca confiscated ted and/or and/or seized seized,, or his/he his/her r repres representa entativ tive e or coun counse sel, l, a rep represe resent nta ative tive from from the the medi media a and and the the Depa Depart rtme ment nt of Just Justic ice e (DOJ (DOJ), ), and and any any elec electe ted d publ public ic official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.” The police’s failure to comply with this requirement essentially makes it so that they failed in establishing the chain of custody. There are exceptions to


this requirement, but prosecution failed to establish justifiable grounds for such exceptions.

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Neverthele Nevertheless, ss, a search search substanti substantially ally contempo contemporane raneous ous with an arrest arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search.

Art. III, Sec. 3

17. People vs Racho, GR 186529, 186529, 3 Aug. 2010 Facts: On May 20, 2003, appellant was caught possessing a suspected drug during a police operation. He was charged for violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165, 9165, for transp transport orting ing or delive deliverin ring; g; and, and, of Sectio Section n 11 for posses possessin sing g dangerous drugs. During the arraignment, he denied liability and pleaded "Not Guilty" to both charges. On July 8, 2004, the RTC convicted him on the first charge but acquitted him of the second. Hence, he appealed and averred that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the confiscated drug because because of the team’s failure to mark the specimen specimen immediately immediately after seizur seizure. e. He assail assailed ed the legalit legality y of his arrest arrest and the validi validity ty of the subseque subsequent nt warrantle warrantless ss search. search. He questione questioned d the admissibil admissibility ity of the confiscated sachet on the ground that it was the f ruit of the poisonous tree. Issue: Should the confiscated items be considered “fruits of the poisonous tree” and, thus, admissible in evidence? Ruling: The case is an instance of seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous tree," hence, hence, the confiscated confiscated item is inadmissib inadmissible le in evidence evidence consonant consonant with Article III, Section 3(2) of the 1987 Constitution, "any evidence obtained in violat violation ion of this this or the prece precedin ding g sectio section n shall shall be inadm inadmiss issibl ible e for any purpose in any proceeding."

The 1987 Constitution states that a search and consequent seizure must be carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable and any evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceedi proceeding. ng. Said proscript proscription, ion, however, however, admits admits of exceptio exceptions, ns, namely: namely: (a)Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (b) Search of evidence in "plain "plain view;" view;" (c) Search Search of a moving moving vehicle; vehicle; (d) Consente Consented d warrantle warrantless ss search search;; (e) Custom Customs s search search;; (f) Stop Stop and Frisk; Frisk; and, and, (g) Exigen Exigentt and and emergency circumstances. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable warrantless search or seizure is purely purely a judici judicial al questi question, on, determ determina inable ble from from the unique uniquenes ness s of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure seizure was made, made, the place or thing searched, searched, and the characte characterr of the articles procured. Recent jurisprudence holds that in searches incident to a lawful arrest, the arrest must precede the search; generally, the process cannot be reversed.

The long standing standing rule in this jurisdiction jurisdiction is that "reliable "reliable information" alone alone is not sufficient sufficient to justify justify a warrantles warrantless s arrest. arrest. The rule requires, requires, in addition, addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. Appellant herein was not committing a crime in the presence of the police officers. Neither did the arresting officers have personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed, was committing, or about to commit an offense. He was not acting in any suspicious manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the police officers to suspect and conclude that he was committing or intending to commit a crime. Were it not for the information given by the informant, appellant would not have been apprehended and no search would have been made, and consequently, the sachet of shabu would not have been confiscated. Neither were the arresting officers impelled by any urgency that would allow them to do away with the requisite warrant. 18. People vs De la Cruz, GR 185717, 185717, 8 June 2011 Facts: This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated June 30, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02727, which affirmed in toto the February 8, 2007 Decision2 in Criminal Case No. Q-03-117814 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch Branch 82 in Quezon City. The RTC found found accused Garry de de la Cruz y dela Cruz (Garry) guilty beyond reasonable reasonable doubt of violating violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerou Dangerous s Drugs Act of 2002. 2002. The accused accused denied denied selling shabu to PO2 Ibasco. In short, the accused used the defense of denial and alleged a frameup by the arresting officers which was supported by some witnesses. Issue: Is the non-compliance with said Sec. 21, Art. II of RA 9165, fatal and renders and accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated seized/confiscated from him inadmissible? Was the prosecution able to establish the chain of custody? Ruling: Generally, non-compliance non-compliance with Secs. 21 and 86 of RA 9165 does not mean that no buy-bust operation operation against against appellant appellant ever took place. place. The prosecution’s failure to submit in evidence the required physical inventory and photograph of the evidence confiscated pursuant to Sec. 21, Art. II of RA 9165 will not discharge the accused from the crime. Non-compliance with said section is not fatal and will not render an accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. While While the law enfor enforce cers rs enjoy enjoy the presum presumpti ption on of regula regularit rity y in the


perfor performa manc nce e of their their duties duties,, this this presum presumpti ption on cannot cannot preva prevail il over over the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent and it cannot by itself constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

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extraordin extraordinary ary remedy remedy of habeas habeas data. data. Jurisdicti Jurisdiction on over over such concerns concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters. 20. Pollo vs David, GR 181881, 181881, 18 Oct. 2011

As the Suprem Supreme e Court Court stated stated;; “In sum, sum, consi conside derin ring g the multif multifari ariou ous s irregularities and non-compliance with the chain of custody, We cannot but acquit acquit accusedaccused-appe appellant llant on the ground ground of reasonab reasonable le doubt”. doubt”. The law demands demands that only proof of guilt beyond beyond reasonab reasonable le doubt can justify a verdict of guilt. In all criminal prosecutions, without regard to the nature of the defense which the accused may raise, the burden of proof remains at all times upon the prosecutio prosecution n to establish the guilt of the accused accused beyond beyond reasonable doubt. As the Court often reiterated, it would be better to set free ten men who might probably be guilty of the crime charged than to convict one innocent man for a crime he did not commit 19. Meralco vs Lim, GR GR 184769, 5 Oct. 2010 Facts: On June 4, 2008, an anonymous letter was posted at the door of the Metering Office of the Administration building of MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan Sector, at which respondent is assigned, denouncing respondent. Copies of the letter were also inserted in the lockers of MERALCO linesmen. Informed about about it, respondent respondent reported reported the matter matter on June 5, 2008 to the Plaridel Plaridel Station of the Philippine National Police. By Memorandum1[3]dated July 4, 2008, 2008, petitione petitionerr Alexande Alexanderr Deyto, Deyto, Head of MERALCO’ MERALCO’s s Human Human Resource Resource Staffing, directed the transfer of respondent to MERALCO’s Alabang Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa as “A/F OTMS Clerk,” effective July 18, 2008 in light of the receipt of “… reports that there were accusations and threats directed against [her] from unknown individuals and which could possibly compromise [her] safety and security.” Issue: May an employee invoke the remedies available under the writ of habeas data where an employer decides to transfer her workplace on the basis of copies copies of an anonymou anonymous s letter letter posted posted therein—im therein—imputin puting g to her disloyalty to the company and calling for her to leave, which imputation it investigated but fails to informs her of the details thereof? Ruling: Respo Responde ndent’ nt’s s plea plea that that she be spared spared from from compl complyin ying g with with MERALCO’s Memorandum directing her reassignment to the Alabang Sector, under the guise of a quest for information or data allegedly in possession of petitioners, does not fall within the province of a writ of habeas data. the petitions petitions therefor therefor are vague vague or doubtful. doubtful.2[16 2[16]] Employme Employment nt constitut constitutes es a prop proper erty ty righ rightt unde underr the the cont contex extt of the the due due proc proces ess s clau clause se of the the Constituti Constitution.3 on.3[17] [17] It is evident evident that respondent’s respondent’s reservations reservations on the real reasons for her transfer - a legitimate concern respecting the terms and condition conditions s of one’s employment employment - are what prompted prompted her to adopt adopt the

Facts: On January 3, 2007, 2007, an unsigned letter-comp letter-complaint laint addressed addressed to responden respondentt CSC Chairpers Chairperson on David David was marked “Confiden “Confidential” tial” and sent through through a courier courier service from a certain certain “Alan “Alan San Pascual”. Pascual”. The letterlettercomplaint indicated that a certain attorney of CSC is lawyering people with pending cases in the Commission. Furthermore, the letter-complaint said that the lawyer is from the “Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na” division.

Chairp Chairpers erson on David David immed immediat iately ely forme formed d a team team of four four person personnel nel with with backgroun background d in informatio information n technolog technology y (IT), and issued issued a memo memo directing directing them to conduct an investigation and specifically “to back up all the files in the computers found in the Public Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD) under under the Mamamayan Mamamayan Muna division. division.” ” Text Text messages messages were also sent informing the employees of the ongoing copying of computer files. The contents of the diskettes were examined by the CSC’s Office for Legal Affairs (OLA). It was found out that most of the files in the 17 diskettes containing files copied from the computer assigned to and being used by Briccio “Ricky” A. Pollo were draft pleadings or letters in connection with administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunals. Pollo, filed his Comment, denying that he is the person referred to in the letter-complaint which had no attachments to it, because he is not a lawyer and neither is he “lawyering” for people with cases in the CSC. He accused CSC officials of conducting a “fishing expedition” when they unlawfully copied and printed personal files in his computer. He asserted that the files in his computer were his personal files and those of his sister, relatives, friends and some some assoc associat iates es and that that he is not not autho authoriz rizing ing their their sealin sealing, g, copyi copying, ng, duplicati duplicating ng and printing as these would violate his constitu constitutiona tionall right to privacy and protection against self-incrimination and warrantless search and seizure. The CSC issued a Resolution finding prima facie case against Pollo and charged him with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and Violation of R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees). He then filed a motion for reconsideration in the Court of Appeals but it was denied. Issue: Was the search conducted on Pollo’s office computer and the copying of his person personal al files files withou withoutt his knowle knowledge dge and conse consent nt violat violate e his constitutional right to privacy?


Ruling: No. The right right to priva privacy cy has been accorde accorded d recogn recognitio ition n in this this jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee against unreason unreasonable able search and seizure seizure under under Section Section 2, Article Article III of the 1987 Constitution. However, the constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches and seizures but only of “unreasonable” searches and seizures.

First, First, if a person person has a reason reasonabl able e expec expectat tation ion of priva privacy cy,, he can can be protected of “search and seizure”. Justice Harlan of the US Supreme Court noted that the existence of privacy right under prior decisions involved a twofold requirement: requirement: first, that a person person has exhibited exhibited an actual actual (subjecti (subjective) ve) expectation of privacy; and second, that the expectation be one that society is prepar prepared ed to recog recogniz nize e as reason reasonabl able e (objec (objectiv tive). e). In the case case at bar, bar, petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy either in his office or government-issued computer which contained his personal files. Petitioner did not allege that he had a separate enclosed office which he did not share with anyone, or that his office was always locked and not open to other employees or visitors. He described his office as “full of people, his friends, unknown people” and that in the past 22 years he had been discharging his functions at the PALD, he is “personally assisting incoming clients, receiving documents, and drafting cases on appeals”. The CSC also had a policy regulating the use of office computers. Second, Second, a search search by a governm government ent employer employer of an employee employee’s ’s office office is justified at inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will will turn turn up eviden evidence ce that that the employee employee is guilty guilty of workwork-rel relate ated d misconduct. If, indeed, a CSC employee was found to be furtively engaged in the pract practice ice of “lawye “lawyerin ring” g” for partie parties s with with pendin pending g cases cases before before the Commission, then such scenario would undeniably cast clouds of doubt upon the institutional integrity of the Commission as a quasi-judicial agency, and in the process, render it less effective in fulfilling its mandate as an impartial and objectiv objective e dispenser dispenser of administra administrative tive justice.” The fact that these these documents were retrieved from the computer of Pollo raises the presumption that he was the author thereof. This is because he had a control of the said computer. The ephemeral nature of computer files, that is, they could easily be destroyed destroyed at a click of a button, button, necessitated necessitated drastic and immediate immediate action.

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Art. III, Sec. 2 & 3 Case Digest Compilation

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