Criminal Procedure
Constitutional Rights of the Accused
Harriz F. Dela Cruz 09-18-001
Paralegal - 41 Judge Tita B. Alisuag Professor
Article III Bill of Rights of the Constitution Section 1. Right to due process Section 1. Right to equal protection of the laws Section 3. Right to inadmissibility of evidences obtained under Setion 2 Section 11. Right to a free access to the courts Section 11. Right to an adequate legal assistance Section 12(1). Right to be informed to remain silent Section12(1). Right to counsel Section12(1). Right to be informed of such rights Section 12(2). Right against torture Section 12(2). Right against secret detention Section 12(3). Right to inadmissibility of evidence against him obtained from any confession Section 13. Right to bail Section 14(1). Right to due process for a criminal offense Section 14(2). Right to be presumed innocent until presumed guilty Section 14(2). Right to be heard by himself and to be heard his counsel Section 14(2). Right to be informed of the cause and nature of the accusations against him
Section 14(2). Right to a speedy, impartial, and public trial Section 14(2). Right to confront the witnesses Section 14(2). Right to present evidence Section 16. Right to a speedy disposition of his case Section 17. Right against self-incrimination Section 19(1). Right against excessive fines Section 19(1). Right against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment Section 21. Right against double jeopardy Section 22. Right against ex-post facto laws
Under the doctrine of supremacy of the constitution, the constitution is the supreme law of the land, it is above all laws, and all laws must conform to it, otherwise it is inoperative, creates no right, no obligation, in short, no void. Righ Rightt is so some meth thin ing g that that is due due to a pers person on by just just clai claim, m, lega legall guarantee, or moral principle. 1 It gives protection the accused and serves as a barrier. The The Cons Consti titu tuti tion onal al Righ Rights ts of the the Ac Accu cuse sed d are are thos those e right rights s of the the accused which were provided by the Constitution, specifically provided under Article III Bill of Rights of 1987 Philippine Constitution. These rights are of paramount consideration, and are designed to protect the accused from any possible abusive acts of the government. It is intended against the State and in favor of the accused. ____________
1
Black’s Law Dictionary, page 4120, (8th edition 2004) Since the Constitution is the highest law of the land, as it provides the
rights of the accused, it fully guarantees them other than any statutes. It constrains the government to be negligent in promulgating judgments to avoid injustice and mistrial, and more importantly to prevent mistakes of judgment convicting innocent people, so that administration of justice will wi ll be more efficient. Constitutional Rights of the accused Article III, Bill of Rights, of the 1987 Constitution provides for the following rights: 1. All All pers person ons s shall shall have the righ rightt to a speed speedy y disp dispos osit itio ion n of their their cases cas es before before all judicial judicial,, quasi-j quasi-judi udicia cial, l, or admini administr strati ative ve bodies bodies.. (Sec. 16) 2. No person person shall be held held to answer answer for a criminal criminal offense offense withou withoutt due process of law. (Sec. 14[1]) 3. All All pers person ons, s, exce except pt thos those e charg charged ed with with offe offens nses es puni punish shab able le by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conv co nvict ictio ion n be bail bailabl able e by suff suffic icie ient nt suret suretie ies, s, or be rele release ased d on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. 4. In all all crim crimin inal al pro prose secu cuti tion ons s, the the ac accu cuse sed d shal shalll be pre presume sumed d innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be hear heard d by himse himself lf and and co coun unse sel, l, to be info inform rmed ed of the the natu nature re ad cause of the accusation against him, to have speedy, impartial, and
publ public ic tria trial, l, to meet meet the the witn witnes esse ses s face face to face face,, and and to have have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, tria triall may proc procee eed d no notw twit iths hsta tandi nding ng the the abse absenc nce e of the the ac accu cuse sed d provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. (Sec. 14 [2]) 5. No person person shall be compelled compelled to be a witness witness against himself. himself. (Sec. (Sec. 17) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain sile silen nt
and and
to
have have
comp co mpe etent tent
and and
indep ndepe enden ndentt
cou co unse nsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person person cannot cannot afford afford the service services s of counse counsel, l, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (Sec. 12[1]) No tortur torture, e, force, force, violen violence, ce, threat threat,, intimi intimidat dation ion,, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secr Se cret et dete detent ntio ion n place places, s, so soli lita tary ry,, inco incommu mmuni nica cado do,, or othe otherr similar forms of detention are prohibited. (Sec. 12[2]) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible inadmissible in evidence evidence against him. (Sec. 12[3]) 6. Exce Excess ssiv ive e fine fines s shal shalll no nott be impo impose sed, d, no norr crue cruel, l, degr degrad adin ing g or inhuman punishment inflicted. (Sec. 19[1])
7. No person person shall shall be twice twice put in jeop jeopar ardy dy of puni punish shme ment nt for the the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. (Sec. 21) 8. Free Free acc access ess to the courts courts and quasi-ju quasi-judic dicial ial bodies bodies and adequat adequate e legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty. (Sec. 11) Rights of the accused which may be waived and rights which may not be waived. A right which may be waived is the right ght of the accus cused to confrontation and cross-examination. A right which may not be waived is the right ight of the the ac accu cuse sed d to be info inform rmed ed of the natur ature e and and ca caus use e of the accusation against him. The reason or principle underlying the difference between rights which may be waived and rights which may not be waived is that those rights which may be waived are personal, while those rights which may not be waived involve public interest which may be affected. (2 Moran, Rules of Court, 1952 Edition, 748)
Procedural Procedural right. It is a right that derives from legal or administrative administrative proc proced edur ure; e; a righ rightt that that help helps s in the the prot protec ecti tion on or enfo enforc rcem emen entt of a substantive right. Cf. substantive right. Black’s Law Dictionary 8 th Edition, 2004 Substantial right. It is an essential right that potentially affects the outcome of a lawsuit and is capable of legal enforcement and protection, as dist distin ingu guis ishe hed d from from a mere mere tech techni nica call or proc proced edur ural al righ right. t. Blac Black’ k’s s La Law w Dictionary 8th Edition, 2004
Substantive right. It is a right that can be protected or enforced by law; a right of substance rather than form. Cf. procedural right. Black’s Law Dictionary 8th Edition, 2004 1987
Constitution
is
the
story
of
governmental
power
and
constitutional limits on it found in the Bill of Rights. The totality of governmental power is contained in three great powers: police power, power of eminent domain, and the power of taxation. These belo belong ng to the the ver very
exist xiste ence nce of gove goverrnmen nmentt and and wit witho hout ut the them no
government can exist. Therefore, inherent powers of the government which the constitu constitutio tion n does does not grant to the governme government, nt, but only only define define and deli delimi mitt them them and and allo alloca cate te thei theirr exer exerci cise se amon among g vari variou ous s gove govern rnme ment nt agencie agencies. s. The sto story ry of consti constitut tution ional al jurisp jurisprud rudenc ence e is the sto story ry of great great minds striving to strike a balance between governmental power and personal freedom. Chief Justice Shaw stated that police power is “the power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of whol wholes esom ome e and and reaso reasona nable ble laws, laws, stat statue ues, s, and and ordi ordina nanc nces es,, eith either er with with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.” The police power has been used to justify public health, justify public safety, public morals. The almost awesome character of police power shown by the vastness of its reach comes out in greater relief when seen together with with the presum presumpti ption on of consti constitut tution ionali ality ty which which its exerci exercise se enjoys enjoys.. The judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is no clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation.
This vast power is, however, must be exercised within the limits set by the constitution. In the words of the leading case of U.S. v. Toribio, Toribio, the legislative “determination of what is a proper exercise of its police power is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the courts.” “The exercise of such police power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property of any person is subject to the judicial inquiry.” And exercising such powe powerr must must be meas measur ured ed with with “due “due proc proces ess” s” clau clause se and and the the “equ “equal al protection clause.” Finally, it should be noted that the restrictions found in the Bill of Rights, as constitutional law, are directed against the state. They do not govern the relations between private persons. The The word word “per “perso son” n” incl includ udes es no nott on only ly the the citi citize zens ns but but also also alie aliens ns,, privat private e corpor corporati ations ons withou withoutt regard regard to any differ differenc ences es of race, race, col color, or, or nationality. Article III, Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. Bill of Rights: Protection against abuse of power. Justice Malcolm elaborated: The right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution includes that right to exis existt and and the the righ rightt to be free free from from arbi arbitr trar ary y pers person onal al rest restra rain intt or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace embrace the right of man to enjoy the faculties to which he has endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraints as are necessary for the common welfare. w elfare.
Malc Ma lcol olm m likew likewis ise e borr borrow owed ed from from Apol Apolin inar ario io Ma Mabi bini ni calli calling ng libe libert rty y “freedom to do right and never wrong. . . ever guided by reason and the upright and honorable conscience of the individual.” Protected property has been deemed to include vested rights, or a perfected homestead, or a final judgment. It includes the right to work and the right to earn a living. One’s employment, profession, trade, or calling is protected property. The constitutional protection of the right to life is not just a protection of the right to be alive or to the security of one’s limb against physical harm. The right to life is also the right to a good life. The poor are the oppressed precisely because they are poor. In their regard therefore, property is as important as life and their liberty. Shylock was right: “You take my life, when you do take the means whereby I live.” Unde Underr the the pres presen entt prov provis isio ion, n, unde unders rsto tood od in the the ligh lightt of es esta tabl blis ishe hed d jurisprudence on the position of property in the hierarchy of constitutional values, property stands a good chance of serving and enhancing the life and liberty of all. Due process as procedural fairness The legislature must provide “due process in the enforcement of law.” Thus, due process was understood to relate chiefly to the mode of procedure which government agencies must follow; it was understood as a guarantee of procedural fairness. Its essence was expressed by Daniel Webster as a “law which hears before it condemns.” Due process, however, is not always judicial process. This has always been recognized. Due process does not always include “actor, reus, judex, regula regularr allegat allegation ions, s, opport opportuni unity ty to answer answer and a trial trial acc accord ording ing to some some settled course of judicial proceedings.”
Substantial evidence means such reasonable evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. What is required is not actual hearing but a real opportunity to be heard. Thus, one who refuses to appear at a hearing is not thereby denied due process if a decision is reached without waiting for him. Substantive due process If all that the due process clause requires is proper procedure, then life, life, libert liberty, y, and proper property ty can be destro destroyed yed,, provid provided, ed, proper proper forms forms are observed. Hence, the clause must be understood to guarantee not just forms of procedure but also the very substance of life, liberty and property. The due due proc proces ess s clau clause se must must be inte interp rpre rete ted d both both as a proc proced edur ural al and and as a subst substan anti tive ve guar guaran ante tee. e. It must must be a guar guaran ante tee e agai agains nstt the the exer exercis cise e of arbitrary power even when the power is exercised according to proper forms and procedure. “Shall the judiciary permit a government of men instead of a government of laws to be set up in the Philippine Islands?” “the courts will assist in retaining it as a government of laws, and not of men,’ and that “no official, however high, is above the law,” and that “the courts are the forum which which func functi tion on is to sa safe fegu guar ard d indi indivi vidua duall libe libert rty y and and to puni punish sh offi offici cial al transgressors.” Equal protection The equal protection clause is a specific constitutional guarantee of the Equality of the Person. The equality it guarantees is “legal equality or, as it usua usuall lly y put, put, the the equa equali lity ty of all pers person ons s befo before re the the law. law. Unde Underr it, it, ea each ch individual is dealt with as an equal person in the law, which does not treat the the pers person on diff differ eren entl tly y beca becaus use e of who who he is or what what he is or what what he possesses. The goddess of Justice is portrayed with a blindfold, not because
she must be hindered in seeing where the right lies, but that she may not discriminate against suitors before her, dispensing instead an even handed justice to all.” Equality in the criminal process One clear consequence of economic inequality is inequality in the field of criminal justice. In a criminal crimi nal prosecution the accused finds himself face to face with the State and all its resources of wealth and power. Even the rich can feel intimidated by the resources that are at the disposal of the State. How much more helpless will a poor man feel when he finds himself ranged against the power of the State? It is for this reason that the law takes a special interest in the poor when brought before the bar of justice to answer for a crime. Article III, Section 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodi bodies es and and adeq adequa uate te lega legall assist assistan ance ce shal shalll no nott be deni denied ed to any any person by reason of poverty. This constitutional provision is the basis for the provision of Rule 3, Section 22, of the New Rules of Court allowing litigation in forma pauperis. Thos Those e
prot protec ecte ted d
inclu include de lowlow-pa paid id empl employ oyee ees, s,
dome domest stic ic
serv se rvan ants ts and and
laborers. They need not be persons so poor that they must be supported at public public expens expense. e. “It suffic suffices es that that plaint plaintiff iff is indige indigent… nt… and the differ differenc ence e between ‘paupers’ and ‘indigent’ persons is that the latter are ‘persons who have no property or sources of income sufficient for their support aside from their heir own labo laborr
tho houg ugh h
self se lf-s -sup uppo port rtin ing g
when when able able to
work work and and
in
employment’.” Article III, Section. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his righ rightt to rema remain in silen silentt and and to have have comp compete etent nt and and inde indepe pend nden entt
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the serv servic ices es of coun counsel sel,, he must must be prov provid ided ed with with on one. e. Thes These e right rights s cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No tortur torture, e, force, force, violen violence, ce, threat threat,, intimi intimidat dation ion or any other other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. (3) (3) Any Any conf confes essio sion n or admi admissi ssion on obta obtain ined ed in viol violati ation on of this this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. (4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this this secti section on as well well as comp compen ensat satio ion n to and and reha rehabi bili litat tatio ion n of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families. The provision is of American provenance coming as it does principally from from two Americ American an Suprem Supreme e Court Court decisi decisions ons:: Escobe Escobedo do v. Illinoi Illinois s and Miranda v. Arizona. Escobedo spoke of the rights of person in “custodial investigations’ and specified custodial investigation as the time when “the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect,” the suspect has been taken into police custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting eliciting incriminatin incriminating g statements statements.” .” Miranda Miranda for its part enumerated enumerated the rights that were available: (1) the person in custody must be informed at the outset in clear and unequivocal terms that he has a right to remain silent. (2) After being so informed, he must be told that anything he says can and will be used against him in court. (3) He must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during the interrogation. He does not have to ask for a lawyer. The investigators should tell him that he has the right to counsel at that point. (4) He should be warned that not only has he the right to consult with a
lawyer but also that if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. him. (5) (5) Even Even if the the pers person on co cons nsen ents ts to answ answer er ques questi tion ons s with withou outt the the assistance of counsel, the moment he asks for a lawyer at any point in the investigation, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. (6) If the foregoing protections and warnings are not demonstrated during the trial to have been observed by the prosecution, no evidence obtained as a result of the interrogation can be used against him . People v. Duero said: “Inasmuch as the prosecution in this case failed to prove that before Duerro made his alleged oral confession he was informed of his rights to remain silent and to have counsel and because there is no proof that he knowingly and and inte intelli llige gent ntly ly waive waived d thos those e righ rights ts,, his his co conf nfes essi sion on is inad inadmi miss ssibl ible e in evidence.” Meanwhile, however, the process of clarifying the rights that are made available available continue. continue. Discussion of this provision will answer answer three questions: questions: (1) When do the rights begin to be available? (2) What rights are made available? (3) When do the rights cease to be available? The The righ rights ts unde underr this this se sect ctio ion n are are avail availabl able e to “any “any pers person on unde underr investigation for the commission of an offense.” Investigation in this section was was defi define ned d by the the 1971 1971 Cons Consti titu tuti tion onal al Conv Conven enti tion on as “inve “invest stig igat atio ion n cond co nduc ucte ted d by the the
poli police ce auth author orit itie ies s whic which h will will incl includ ude e inve invest stig igat atio ions ns
conducted by the municipal police, the PC and the NBI and such other police agencies in our government.” This includes conversation with a barangay captai captain n that that is part part of an ongoin ongoing g custod custodial ial invest investiga igatio tion, n, Sectio Section n 12(1) 12(1) applies. Clearl Clearly, y, theref therefore ore,, the right rights s enumer enumerate ated d are not availab available le before before govern governmen mentt invest investigat igators ors become become involv involved. ed. Thus Thus admiss admission ions s made made in an administrative investigation conducted by officials of the Philippine Airlines do not come under Section 12. It does not apply when the confession or
admission is made to a private individual. Neither does it apply to a person unde underg rgoi oing ng audi auditt beca becaus use e an audi auditt exami examine nerr is no nott a law law enfo enforc rcem emen entt officer. Nor does it apply to a verbal admission made to a radio announcer who was not part of the investigation. Even an admission made to a mayor who is approached not as a mayor but as confidante is not covered. Similarly an inter intervie view w reco record rded ed on vide video o and and in the the pres presen ence ce of newsm newsmen en is no nott covered. However, because of the inherent danger in the use of television as a medium for admitting one’s guilt, and the recurrence of this phenomenon in several cases, the Court has warned that it is prudent that trial courts are reminded that extreme caution must be taken in further admitting similar confes confessio sions. ns. The Court Court recogn recognize ized d the possib possibili ility ty of conniva connivance nce with the police. Not for that matter does Section 12(1) apply to a situation where a pers person on pres presen ents ts hims himsel elff to the the poli police ce and and in the the proc proces ess s make makes s his his admissions. As the court said in People v. Taylaran: Taylaran : The The appl applic icab abil ilit ity y of the the fore forego goin ing g pro provisi visio on does does no nott se see em to contemplate cases like the present where no written confession is sought to be presented in evidence as a result of the formal custodial investigation. What was testified to was only what appellant told the police why he is (sic) surrendering to them. It is but natural for one who surrenders to the police to give reason or explanation for his act of surrendering. It can hardly be said sa id that that unde underr such such circ circum umst stan ance ce,, the the surr surren ende dere ree e is alre already ady ‘unde ‘underr invest investiga igatio tion,’ n,’ within within the meanin meaning g of the constit constituti utiona onall provisi provision. on. As the Solicitor General correctly observes on the circumstances of this case: ‘If however, he voluntarily admits the killing and it was precisely because he surrendered to admit the killing (sic), the constitutional safeguards (sic) to be informed of the rights to silence and to counsel may not be invoked.
It is no now w es esta tabli blish shed ed that that co cons nsti titu tuti tion onal al proc proced edur ures es on cust custod odia iall investigatio investigation n do not apply to a spontaneou spontaneous s statement, statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused orally admits having committed the crime. The accepted accepted constitutio constitutional nal rule, moreover, moreover, following following Escobedo Escobedo and Miranda, is that the rule covers only situations when the person is already in custody, for which reason Escobedo ad referred to them as rights “under custod custodial ial invest investigat igation ion.” .” Signif Significan icantly tly,, howeve however, r, the Court Court,, in Galman Galman v. Pamaran, departed from this rule. The Court sustained the contention of General General Ver that the provision covered covered even persons not yet in custody but already under investigation. The Court said: The fact that the framers of our (1973) Constitution did not choose to use the term “custodial” by having it inserted between the words “under” and “inves “investig tigati ation, on,”” as in fact fact the sentence sentence opens with the phrase phrase “any “any person” goes to prove that they did not adopt in toto the entire fabric of the Miranda doctrine. The Text of the 1987 Constitution has preserved the phrase “person under investigation” without the word “custodial.” Moreover, the discussions on the floor of the 1986 Constitutional Commission manifest an intent, in the light of experiences during martial law, to expand he coverage of the right to situat situation ions s when when a person person under invest investigat igation ion is not yet in custod custody. y. The discussion was triggered by the question of Commissioner Aquino whether the
guar guaran ante tee e
inve invest stig igat atio ion. n.””
cove co vere red d
bot both
Resp Respon ondi ding ng to
custo ustodi dial al the the
inve invest stig igat atio ion n
and and
“tact tactic ical al
ques questi tion on of Comm Commis issi sion oner er Aqui Aquino no,,
Commissioner Colayco explained that, indeed, the intention was to extend the guarantee beyond mere strict custodial investigation of the Escobedo vari variet ety y to “the “the time time imme immedi diat atel ely y afte afterr the the co comm mmis issi sion on of any any offe offens nse, e, whethe whetherr the policeman policeman or the person person making making the investig investigati ation on had any
suspect under custody.” Or, as Commissioner Aquino summed it up, the right right should should extend extend to the period period of “custo “custodial dial interr interroga ogatio tion, n, tempor temporary ary detention and preliminary technical custody.” Thus, if one puts the Galman case together together with the 1986 deliberations, deliberations, the conclusion conclusion that comes out is that the rights are available if a person is already in custody as a suspect, or if the person is the suspect, even if he is not yet deprived in any significant way of his liberty. Jurisprudence under the 1987 Constitution, however, has consistently held held,, foll follow owin ing g Esco Escobe bedo do,, the the stri strict cter er view, view, that that the the righ rights ts begin begin to be available only when the person is already in custody. As Justice Regalado emphasized in People v. Marra: Marra : Cust Custod odia iall inve invest stiga igati tion on invo involv lves es any any ques questi tion onin ing g init initia iate ted d by law law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. It is only after the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins to operate. In an obiter dictum and writing for a division in People v. Maqueda, Just Justic ice e Davi Davide de,, who, who, like like Just Justic ice e Rega Regala lado do,, was was a memb member er of the the 1986 1986 Cons Consti titu tuti tion onal al Commi Commissi ssion on adve advert rted ed to the the view view in the the Cons Consti titu tuti tion onal al Commission that the rights are available even to one who is not yet in custody. There There are, are, moreov moreover, er, other other investi investigat gatory ory situat situation ions s where where Sectio Section n 12(1) does not apply. Subjection to paraffin test is one because it is not communicative action or testimonial compulsion. Similarly, one placed in a police line-up does not enjoy Section 12(1) rights, unless there is a move on the part of the investigators to elicit admissions or confessions. But a person
already under custodial investigation who is placed in a police line-up is entitled to Section 12 rights. Finally, however, it is important for the defense to remember that rights under Section 12 can be lost by neglect. Where the defense fails to raise objections to the admissibility of evidence immediately, as required by Rule 132, Section 36, the accused is deemed to have waived his right to obje object ct to admi admissi ssibi bilit lity. y. This This is an indi indicat catio ion n that that the the fate fate of a pers person on sometimes depends on the quality of counsel he or she can afford. Right of a person under investigation. Three rights are made available by Section 12(1): (1) the right to remain silent; (2) the right to counsel; (3) the right to be informed of such rights. Unde Underr the the righ rightt again against st se self lf-in -incr crim imin inat atio ion n in Se Sect ctio ion n 17, 17, on only ly an accused has the absolute right to remain silent. A person who is not an accused may assume the stance of silence only when asked an incrimination question. Under Section 12, however, a person under investigation has the right to refuse to answer any question. His silence, moreover, may not be used against him. The 1987 Constitution now specifies that the counsel made available to the person under investigation must be “competent and independent” and “preferably of the accused’s own choice.” Under the present provision, where a former judge showed up and said to the detainee: “I am here because I have been summoned to assist you and I am going to assist you,” the offer of assistance was found inadequate to meet the constitutional requirement. But if the accused never raises an objection to counsel given to him, he is deemed to have been properly counseled.
More Mo reov over er,, the the Cour Courtt has has eloq eloque uent ntly ly sa said id that that even even in time times s of emergency, and especially in times of emergency, the right to counsel must be resp respe ected cted.. Thi This was was in the ca case se of Diok Diokno no v. Enri Enrile le where, where, after after repe repeat ated edly ly bein being g refu refuse sed d perm permis issi sion on to se see e Diok Diokno no,,
coun co unse sell file filed d a
mandam mandamus us petiti petition. on. Diokno Diokno was releas released ed on Septem September ber,, 1974, 1974, but the Supreme Court decision affirming his right to counsel was made only on December 19, 1981. The right to be informed of his rights which are guaranteed here is more more than than what what is shown shown in televi televisio sion n shows shows where where the police routine routinely ly reads out the rights from a note card. As People v. Rojas put it: When the Constitution requires a person under investigation ‘to be informed’ of his right to remain silent and to counsel, it must be presumed to contemplate the transmission of a meaningful information rather than just the ceremo ceremonia niall and perfun perfuncto ctory ry recita recitatio tion n of an abstrac abstractt consti constitut tution ional al principle. As a rule, therefore, it would not be sufficient for a police officer just to repeat the person under investigation the provisions of the Constitution. He is not only duty-bound to tell the person the rights to which the latter is entitled; he must also explain their effects in practical terms. In othe otherr word words, s, the the righ rightt of a pers person on unde underr inve invest stig igat atio ion n ‘to ‘to be info inforrmed’ med’ impl implie ies s a co corrrela relattive ive oblig bligat atio ion n on the the part part of the the poli police ce investigator to explain, and contemplates an effective communication that results in understanding what is conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial of the right, as it cannot then truly be said that the person has been ‘informed’ of his rights. The criminal process includes the investigation prior to the filing of charge charges, s, the prelimi preliminar nary y examin examinati ation on and invest investigat igation ion after after charge charges s are filed, and the period of trial. The Miranda rights or the Section 12(1) rights were conceived for the first of these three phases, that is, when the inquiry
is unde underr the the co cont ntro roll of poli police ce offi office cers rs.. It is in this this situ situat atio ion n that that the the psychological if not physical atmosphere of custodial investigations, in the abse absenc nce e of prop proper er sa safe fegu guar ards, ds, is inhe inhere rent ntly ly co coer erciv cive. e. Outs Outside ide of this this situation, Section 12(1) no longer applies. But Sections 14 and 17 come into play instead. This This was alread already y adverte adverted d to during during the deliberat deliberation ions s of the 1971 Consti Constitut tution ional al Conven Conventio tion n when, when, upon upon inquir inquiry y by Delega Delegate te Sambola Sambolawan wan,, Delegate
R.
Ortiz,
who
was
spo sponsoring ing
the
pro provisi ision,
said
t h at
“investigation” here did not include judicial and quasi-judicial investigation such as those conducted by the fiscal of by the judge. Justice Narvasa was referring to the same matter when he said that Section 12(1) does not apply to persons under preliminary investigation or already charged in court for a crime and therefore already under the protection of the court: It seems quite evident that a defendant on trial or under preliminary investigation is not under custodial interrogation. His interrogation by the police, if any there had been would already have been ended at the time for the filing of the criminal case in court (or in the public prosecutor’s office). Hence, with respect to the defendant in a criminal case already pending in court (or the prosecutor’ office) there is no occasion to speak of his right whil while e
unde underr
“cu “custod stodia iall
inte interr rrog ogat atio ion” n” laid laid down down by the the
seco se cond nd and and
subsequent sentences of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution [now Section 12(1)], for the obvious reason that he is no longer under “custodial interrogation.” But unquestionably, the accused in court (or undergoing preliminary invest investiga igatio tion n before before the public public prosec prosecuto utor), r), in common common with with all person persons, s, possesses the right against self-incrimination set out in the first sentence of Section 20, Article IV of he 1973 Constitution [now Section 17, Article III],
i.e., the right to refuse to answer a specific incriminatory question at the time it is put to him. Concei Conceivab vably, ly, howeve however, r, even even after after the charge charges s are filed, filed, the police police might still attempt to extract confessions or admissions from the accused outside of judicial supervision. In such situation, Section 12(1) would still apply. But outside of such situation, the applicable provisions are Section 14 and Section 17. It is for this reason that an extrajudicial confessions sworn to before a judge enjoys the mark of voluntariness. The The 1987 1987 Cons Consti titu tuti tion on no now w sa says ys:: “The “These se righ rights ts ca cann nnot ot be waive waived d except in writing and in the presence of counsel.” The implication of this rule is that, in localities where there are no lawyers, the state must bring the individual to a place where there is one or bring counsel to the place where the person is held. And needless to say, the waiver must be in language which clearly manifests the desire to wave the right. The consti constitut tution ional al privile privilege ge agains againstt self-i self-incr ncrimi iminat nation ion,, also also treate treated d separately as Section 17, has developed and has been interpreted so as to cove co verr a wide wide rang range e of form forms s of se self lf-a -acc ccus usat atio ion. n. To proh prohib ibit it co coer erce ced d confessions, the 1987 Constitution added: “secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention detention are prohibited.” prohibited.” “Secret “Secret detention places” has special reference to “safe-houses” and, like “solitary” and incommunicado detention, detention, were phenomena phenomena during the authoritari authoritarian an regime of Mr. Marcos. Under the 1987 Bill of Rights, where self-incrimination is treated in Section 17 and custodial investigation and forced confessions in Section 12, the rule is reiterated in Section 12(3) thus: “Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.”
It covers every form of evidence obtained in violation of Section 12 and Section 17, every form of confession tainted with involuntariness. It is a mani manife fest stat atio ion n of the ca care re with with whic which h the the law law wish wishes es to insu insure re the the voluntariness of confessions. This care was already evident even under the 1935 Constitution. This care also appears in a number of recent cases where the Supreme Court has insisted that a plea of guilty should be accepted only after the trial court has taken pains to assure itself that the accused was well aware of the consequences and full import of his plea. Or, as one decision eloquently put it, “Even if the confession of an accused is gospel truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given. The same would apply to a waiver of the rights to counsel not made in the presence of counsel.” More Mo reov over er,, alth althou ough gh the the word word “con “confe fess ssio ion” n” was was used used in the the last last sentence of Section 20 of the 1973 Bill of Rights, the protection covered not only “confessions” but also “admissions.” This is now explicit in the 1987 text. The difference difference between confession confession and admission admission is found in Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Admission is the “act, declaration or omission of party as to a rele releva vant nt fact fact”” (Rul (Rule e 130, 130, Se Sect ctio ion n 26) 26) wher wherea eas s co conf nfes essi sion on is the the “declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein,” (Rule 130, Section 33). Where the signature of an accused on a receipt for seized property or marijuana cigarettes where the accused wrote his name is not admissible. It should also be noted that the exclusionary rule found in Section 12 is not couched in the same language as the exclusionary rule in Section 3. Section 3 makes evidence illegally obtained “inadmissible ofr any purpose in any proceeding.” Section 12 says that confessions made in violation of the section and Section 17 “shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.” It
migh mightt be as aske ked d whet whethe herr the the text text of Se Sect ctio ion n 12 co coul uld d be open open to the the narrow narrowing ing proces process s which which the Mirand Miranda a rule rule seems seems to have undergon undergone e in American jurisprudence. The text of Section 12 is general enough to allow a stri strict ct
cons co nstr truc ucti tion on
agai agains nstt
gove govern rnme ment nt..
More Mo reov over er,,
cons co nsid ider erin ing g
that that
involuntary involuntary testimonial testimonial evidence is a more serious affront to human dignity than illegally obtained real evidence, the absolute inadmissibility inadmissi bility provided for in Section 3 should also be read into Section 12, and with greater reason, since involuntary confessions also affront the right of privacy protected by Section 2. The The ques questi tion on of retr retroa oact ctiv ivit ity y of the the appl applica icati tion on of this this prot protec ecti tion on granted by the Constitution was settled in the first important Supreme Court decision on the new 1973 provision on custodial investigation, Magtoto v. Manguera. It established the rule that the new provision should only operate prospectively from the date of effectivity of the new Constitution January 17, 1973. The dissents of Justices Castro, Teehankee, and Fernando arguing for retroactivity of the rule are persuasive; but the issue is now regarded as closed and the Court now applies Magtoto where necessary as a matter of course. Section 12(4) says: “The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.” Civil sanction in the form of damages is, strictly speaking, already covered by the Civil Code provision on actionable violations of constitutional rights. Penal sanctions are mean meantt to be a dete deterr rren entt agai agains nstt viol violat atio ions ns.. An And d the the co comp mpen ensa sati tion on and and reha rehabi bili lita tati tion on prov provid ided ed for for are are so soci cial al welf welfar are e meas measur ures es.. The The way way the the provis provision ion is worded worded,, howeve however, r, it will need need impleme implementi nting ng legisla legislatio tion. n. And against the argument that the provision has no place in a Constitution, it was pointed out that these matters are intimately connected with the rights
guaran guarantee teed d by the Consti Constitut tution ion and should should see articulat articulation ion in the Bill of Rights itself which guarantees the inviolability of the rights. Arti Article cle III, III, Secti Section on 13. 13. All All pers person ons, s, excep exceptt thos those e char charge ged d with with offenses offenses punishable by reclusion reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. Right to bail The right to bail, which is a corollary to the right to be presumed innocent is, like the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, another means of immediately obtaining liberty. It also enables the accused to prepare his defense. Bail is a “mode short of confinement which would, with reasonable cert ce rtai aint nty, y, insur insure e the the atte attend ndan ance ce of the the ac accu cuse sed. d.”” If capit capital al offe offense nses s or offe offens nses es puni punisha shabl ble e by reclu reclusio sion n perp perpet etua ua are are no nott made made bail bailab able le,, it is because frequently nothing short of confinement can insure the attendance of one who expects to receive such sentence. “Where, however, the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is excessive. So the Constitution commands.” Because of the importance of the right to bail both for the accused and for the prosecution, certain duties are imposed upon the judge. Basco v. Rapatalo reiterates them thus: (1)
Noti Notify fy the the prose prosecu cuto torr of the the hear hearin ing g of the the appli applica cati tion on for for bail bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended);
(2) (2)
Conduct a hearing ing of the appli plicati ation for bail regard ardles less of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to
show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion (sections 7 and 8, supra); (3) (3)
Deci Decide de whet whethe herr the the evide evidenc nce e of guil guiltt of the the accus accused ed is stron strong g based on the summary evidence of the prosecution;
(4)
If the the guilt guilt of the the accu accuse sed d is not not stro strong, ng, dis disch char arge ge the the accu accuse sed d upon upon the the
appr appro oval val
of the bail bailbo bond nd..
(Se (Sectio ction n
19, 19,
supr supra) a)..
Otherwise, petition should be denied. Part Pa rticu icula larl rly y in ca case ses s wher where e the the ac accu cuse sed d is char charge ged d with with a ca capi pita tall offense, a hearing, mandatory in nature and which should be summary or othe otherw rwis ise e in the the disc discre reti tion on of the the co cour urt, t, is requ requir ired ed with with the the participatio participation n of both the defense and a duly notified representat representative ive of the prosecution for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. The burden of proof is on the prosecution to show that the evidence meets the required quantum. The prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it want to introduce before the court. Likewise, the petitioner has the right to cross-examine the witnesses w itnesses and present his own evidence in rebuttal. When, eventually, the court issues an order either granting or refusing bail, the same should contain a summary of the the evid eviden ence ce for for the the pros prosec ecut utio ion, n, foll follow owed ed by its its co conc nclu lusi sion on as to whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. The quantum of evidence needed in order to deny an accused the right to bail is described by the text simply as “strong evidence.” This This has been been constr construed ued to mean mean “proof “proof eviden evident” t” or “presu “presumpt mption ion great. great.”” “Proof “Proof eviden evident” t” or “evide “evident nt proof” proof” in this this connec connectio tion n means means clear clear,, stro strong ng evide evidenc nce e whic which h lead leads s a wellwell-gu guar arde ded d dispa dispass ssio iona nate te judgment to the conclusion that the offense has been committed as
charged, that accused is the guilty agent, and that he will probably be punish punished ed capita capitally lly if the law is admini administe stered red.. “Presu “Presumpt mption ion great” great” exist xists s
when when the cir circums cumsta tanc nce es
test testif ifie ied d
to are are
suc such
that that the the
interference of guilt naturally to be drawn therefrom is strong, clear, and convincing to an unbiased judgment and excludes all reasonable doubt as to the guilt of accused, if on an examination of the entire record the presumption is great that accused is guilty of a capital offense, bail should be refused. If the prosecution does not present evidence, the court may ask the prosecution such questions as would ascertain the strength of the state’s evidence or judge the adequacy of the amount of bail. The factors which must be considered in determining bail are: ability to post bail, the nature of the offense, penalty imposed by law, char charac acte terr and and repu reputa tati tion on of the the ac accu cuse sed, d, healt health h of the the ac accus cused ed,, stre streng ngth th of the the evid eviden ence ce,, prob probabi abilit lity y of appe appear arin ing g for for tria trial, l, prio priorr forfeiture of bonds, whether the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested, authority to change the characterization of the offense but there is no power to reduce or change the crime charged in order to justify the grant of bail to the accused. It has been held that a court cannot require a strictly cash bond. It was established that since bail is constitutionally available to “all persons,” it must be available to one who is detained even before formal charges are filed. But of course, the person claiming the right must be under actual detention or custody of the law. One is under the custody of the law law either when he has been arreste sted or has surrendered himself to the jurisdiction of the court. If granted bail, the accused does not necessarily have the right to leave the country. As a necessary consequence of the bail bond, which is intended to make a
person available any time he is needed by the court, a court may prevent a person admitted to bail from leaving the country. It has also been held that the right to bail may be waived even implicitly in an irrecoverable manner. Thus, it was held by the court that an accused waived his right when he agreed “to remain in legal custody during the pendency of the trial of his criminal case.” After conv co nvic icti tion on
by the the
tria triall
cour co urtt,
when when
pre presump sumpttion ion
of
inno innoce cenc nce e
terminates, the constitutional right to bail should also terminate. Article III, Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. (2) (2) In all all crim crimin inal al pros prosecu ecutio tions ns,, the accu accuse sed d shal shalll be presu presume med d innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be hear heard d by hims himsel elff and and coun counse sel, l, to be info inform rmed ed of the the natu nature re and and cause of the accusations against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial trial may may proc procee eed d no notw twith ithsta stand ndin ing g the the absen absence ce of the the accu accuse sed d provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. Due process in criminal cases The criminal due process clause of the Bill of Rights presupposes that the penal law being applied satisfies the substantive requirements of due process. As to procedural due process, it may be noted that, while the right to appeal is statutory, once it is granted by law, its suppression is a violation of due process. Public trial
The Court said, “To warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity.” The Court added: Be that as it may, we recognize that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain circumstances can deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial. Moreover, the effect of publicity on judges cannot be presumed especially since, unlike jurors, judges are trained professionals. Another Another aspect of due process, so frequently frequently emphasized, emphasized, is the right to be tried by an impartial judge. “All suitors, we must say, are entitled to noth no thin ing g shor shortt of the the co cold ld neut neutra rali lity ty of an inde indepe pend nden ent, t, whol wholly ly-f -fre ree, e, disinterested and impartial tribunal.” The principle is applicable to all types of cases. The rights rights under under Sectio Section n 14(2) 14(2) guaran guarantee teed d by the consti constitut tution ion are righ rights ts in all all “cri “crimi mina nall pros prosec ecut utio ions ns”” and and pros prosec ecut utio ion n star starts ts on only ly upon upon arraign arraignmen ment. t. The implica implicatio tion, n, theref therefore ore,, is that that the rights rights enumer enumerate ated d in Section 14(2), including the right to impartiality, are protected only during the trial. Finally, it may be asked whether a judge who inherits a case from anot anothe herr judg judge e may may deci decide de a ca case se fair fairly ly sinc since e he did did no nott hear hear all all the the witnesses presented. The practical answer to the question must be in the affi affirm rmat ativ ive e. As the Cour Courtt has sa saiid: “The “The rule ule is roo ootted in prac practi tica call considerations. Sometimes it is an impossibility for the judge who tried the case to be the same judicial officer to decide it. The judge who tired the case may die, resign or retire from the bench, before he could render judgment
thereon. We find no legal impediment to his successor’s continuing with the trial or rendering judgment on the basis of the evidence submitted if the trial has been terminated. It is sufficient that in such circumstances the judge, in deciding the case, must base it completely on the cold record before him, in the same manner as appellate appellate courts when they review the evidence evidence of the case raised to them on appeal.” Presumption of innocence This principle has always been a part of criminal procedural law as guaranteed first by statutory law (General Orders No. 58) and now by the Constitution. Right to be heard The concept of the “right to be heard,” applied to criminal procedure, embodies in shorthand form a very fundamental and multifaceted right of the accused. In a very broad sense, it can be understood to mean the totality of the rights embodied in an adequate criminal procedural system. More precisely, however, it can be viewed as expressing both the qualities of the “hearer” and the manner of the hearing. The qualities demanded of the hearer are fairness and impartiality. Thhu Thhus, s, it is dema demand nded ed that that the the judg judge e may may no nott play play the the ou oubl ble e role role of pros prosec ecut utor or and and judge judge in on one e and and the the sa same me ca case se.. He must must main mainta tain in an attitude of neutrality in regard to the prosecution and the accused. Influence on the judge, even if unconscious, which prevents a calm and careful review of the evidence can nullify his decision. The more active role of the accused in expressing the right to be herd includes three specific rights: (1) the right to present evidence and to be present at the trial, (2) the right to be assisted by counsel, and (3) the right to compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf.
The right to present evidence includes the right to testify in one’s favor and the right to be given time to call witnesses. If accused of two offenses, he is entitled to a trial of each case, and it is error for the court to consider in one case the evidence adduced against him in another. It also includes the right to present evidence even after a motion to dismiss, made before presentation of evidence for the defense, has been denied. “The substantial righ rights ts of the the ac accu cuse sed d shou should ld no nott be impai impaire red d beca becaus use e of his his co coun unse sel’ l’s s anxiousness to have him promptly acquitted.” Right to counsel The right to be heard can be a meaningless farce if it does not include the right to counsel. Justice Sutherland’s well-known observations in Powell v. Alabama deserve to be quoted: “Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skil skilll in the the scie scienc nce e of law. law. If char charge ged d with with crim crime, e, he is inca incapa pabl ble, e, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may may be put on trial rial wit witho hout ut a prop prope er char charge ge,, and and co conv nvic icte ted d upon pon incomp incompete etent nt eviden evidence, ce, or eviden evidence ce irrele irrelevant vant to the iss issue ue or otherw otherwise ise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he has a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence.” Thus, the familiarity of the ordinary layman with court procedures was compounded by the fact that he was made to face “a government official whose specific function was to prosecute, and who was incomparably more familiar than the accused with the problems of procedure, the idiosyncrasies of juries, and last but not least, the personnel of the Court,: The guarantee
of the right to counsel serves to minimize that imbalance in the adversary system. In the words of Justice Black: It embo embodie dies s a reali realist stic ic reco recogn gnit itio ion n of the the obvi obviou ous s trut truth h that that the the average defendant does not have the professional skill to protect himself when when brou brough ghtt befo before re a trib tribun unal al with with powe powerr to take take his his life life,, or libe libert rty, y, wher wherei ein n the the pros prosec ecut utio ion n is pres presen ente ted d by an expe experi rien ence ced d and and lear learne ned d counsel. In sum, the basic elements of the right to counsel as it i t is enforced now are the following: (1) The court is duty bound to inform the defendant that he has a right to an attorney before he is arraigned; (2) The court must ask him if he desires the service of counsel; (3) If he does, and is unable to get one, the court must assign counsel de oficio; oficio; (4) Or, if the accused wishes to procure private counsel, the court must give him time to obtain one. Where the appointed counsel could have acted “in a double capacity,” that is, if his actual interests were divided between the prosecution and the defense, his appo appoin intm tmen entt
cons co nsti titu tute tes s
reve revers rsibl ible e
erro error; r;
(5) (5)
Wher Where e
duly duly
auth author orize ized d
“members of the bar are not available, the court may appoint resident of the province and of good repute for probity and ability.” As Section 6 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court puts it, the judge has four pre-arraignment duties: “(1) to inform the accused that he has the right to have his own counsel before being arraigned; (2) after giving such information, to ask accused whether he desires the aid of counsel; (3) if he so desires to procure the services of counsel, the court must grant him reasonable time to do so; and (4) if he so desires to have counsel but is unable to employ one, the court must assign counsel “de “de oficio to defend him.” It should be noted that under present jurisprudence the counsel de oficio must be a qualified lawyer. However, there are limits to the court’s duty to furnish counsel de oficio. oficio. “The duty of the court to appoint a counsel
de oficio when the accused has no counsel of choice and desires to employ the services of one is mandatory only at the time of arraignment ( Rule 116, Section 6, Revised Rules of Court). This is no longer so where the accused has proceeded with the arraignment and the trial with a counsel of his choice but when the time for the presentation of evidence for the defense has arrived, he appears by himself alone and the absence of his counsel was inexcusable.” Moreov Moreover, er, unlike unlike the right right to counse counsell under under Sectio Section n 12(1), 12(1), counse counsell need not be one who is the choice of the accused “An examination of related provisions in the Constitution concerning the right to counsel, will show that the ‘preference in the choice of counsel’ pertains more aptly and specifically to a person under investigation [Art. III, Section 14(2)],” But, an accused who wishes to withdraw his appeal to the Supreme Court on the ground that he could not afford counsel should be given counsel de oficio instead. Like other personal rights, the right to counsel may be waived. In one case, where defendant, on being asked whether he could afford to employ a lawyer, replied in the affirmative but said that he had been unable to come to an agreement with any one as to the amount he should pay for the services and thereupon entered into trial conducting his own defense, he was deemed to have waived his right. This waiver of right is exemplified in People v. Sim Ben. The accused in this case was informed by the judge of his right to counsel and he was asked if he desired one. He answered that he did not. He was then asked if he agreed to have the information read to him even without counsel. He agreed. Thereupon, the information was read and tran transla slate ted d for for him. him. He plea pleade ded d guilt guilty. y. He was was then then as aske ked d whet whethe herr he realized that because of his plea of guilt the punishment provided by law would be imposed on him. He answered that he did. He was deemed to have validly waived his right.
Howev oweve er,
in
anot anoth her
case ca se,,
Peop Pe ople le
v.
Holgad lgado o,
The The
foll follow owin ing g
interchange transpired in court: Court: “Do you have an attorney or are you going to plead guilty?” Accused: “I have no lawyer and I will plead guilty.” Whereupon he was arraigned. The Supreme Court ruled that the accused was denied the right to counsel. Waiver was not effective. As the Court said in another case, “Whenever a protection given by the Constitution is waived by the person entitled entitled to that protection, protection, the presumption presumption is always against the the waiv waiver er.. Cons Conseq eque uent ntly ly,, the the pros prosec ecut utio ion n must must prov prove e with with stro strong ngly ly convincing evidence to the satisfaction of this Court that indeed the accused willi willing ngly ly and and vo volu lunt ntar arily ily subm submit itte ted d his his co conf nfes essi sion on and and know knowing ingly ly and and deliberatel deliberately y manifested manifested that he was not intereste interested d in having a lawyer assist him during the taking of that confession.” Fina Finally lly,, the the righ rights ts enum enumer erat ated ed in Se Sect ctio ion n 14(2) 14(2) are are righ rights ts “in “in all all criminal criminal prosecutions prosecutions”” and “criminal “criminal prosecution prosecutions” s” according according to the 1971 case of People v. Jose covers the period from arraignment to rendition of judgment. Hence, according to the same case, the right to counsel exists only on ly duri during ng that that peri period od.. It has has been been show shown, n, ho howe weve ver, r, that that unde underr the the circ circum umst stan ance ces s of Se Sect ctio ion n 12(1 12(1)) a righ rightt to co coun unse sell also also exis exists ts befo before re arraignment. Right to be informed The The hear heartt of the the co cons nsti titu tuti tion onal al guar guaran ante tee e – its its purp purpos ose e and and its its requirements – was explained in U.S. v. Karelsen: Karelsen: The The obje object ct of this this writ writte ten n ac accu cusa sati tion ons s was was – Firs First. t. To furn furnis ish h the the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make make his his defe defens nse; e; and and se seco cond nd,, to avail avail hims himsel elff of his his co conv nvict ictio ion n or acquittal for prosecution against a further prosecution for the same cause; and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be
had. In order that this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent; these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances. In short, the compl omplai aint nt must must co cont ntai ain n a spe specifi cific c
alle allega gattion ion of eve every fact fact and and
circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged. Thus, the cardinal requisite is that the accused be informed of facts that that are impute imputed d to him. him. To satisf satisfy y this this requisi requisite, te, the inform informati ation on must must descri describe be the act with with suffici sufficient ent particu particular larity. ity. If person personal al proper property ty is the subject of the offense, the descriptive terms used must be “sufficient in their common and ordinary acceptation to show with certainty to the common understanding of intelligent men what the property was and to fully identify it.” If the value of the property is material, it must be stated. If an offense has a qualifying circumstance, such as relationship in statutory rape, the rela relati tion onsh ship ip must must be alle allege ged. d. The The righ rightt to as assa sail il the the suff suffici icien ency cy of the the information or the admission of evidence may be waived by the accused if he fails to object to its sufficiency during the trial and the deficiency is cured by competent evidence presented therein. What is essential therefore is that the accused be informed of the facts alleged against him; he need not be informed of the characterization of the crime, which is a conclusion of law. Hence, provided the facts are found in the the body body of the the info inform rmat atio ion, n, an inco incorr rrec ectt ca capt ptio ion n is no nott a fata fatall defe defect ct.. However, of the accused is charged with two informations containing two sets of facts, while the trial of the two cases may be joint, there should be two two se sepa para rate te verd verdic ictts for for the the two two info inform rmat atio ions ns.. The The fact facts s in the the two two informations cannot be combined to allow a conviction for a complex crime consisting consisting of the allegations allegations in the two informatio informations. ns. To do so would violate his right to be informed of the accusation against him.
Speedy, impartial, and public trial As already seen, the right to impartial treatment is already an aspect of the guarantee of due process. It should be noted, however, that the right to an impa impart rtia iall tria triall is no nott a bar bar to a judg judge e’s int interve ervent ntio ion n in cro crossssexamination. As the Court said: “We have had occasion to hold that it is not only the right but oft-times the duty of a trial judge to examine witnesses when when it appe appear ars s nece necessa ssary ry for for the the eluc elucida idati tion on of the the reco record rd.. Unde Underr the the system system of legal procedure procedure in vogue in this jurisdiction jurisdiction,, where the trial court is judge of both the law and the facts, it is oft-times expedient or necessary in the due and faithful administration of justice for the presiding judge . . . to re-examine a witness in order that his judgment when rendered may rest upon a full and clear understanding of the facts. Speedy trial, for its part, is a two-edged sword. It can work against or to the advantage of the accused. Since the prosecution has the burden of proof, proof, delay delay in the trial trial occ occasi asioni oning ng disapp disappear earanc ance e of witnes witnesses ses and the dimm dimmin ing g of memo memori ries es ca can n ac actu tual ally ly less lessen en the the chan chance ces s of co conv nvic icti tion on.. Similar Similarly, ly, the acc accuse used’s d’s own witnes witnesses ses can disappe disappear ar or suffer suffer a similar similar dimming of memory. Speedy trial, as already stated, like fair trial, is necessarily relative. “It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to the defendant. It does not preclude the rights of public justice.” What the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable delays. While it is the duty of the prosecution “to see to it that criminal cases are tried without unfounded delays,” the accused himself “cannot sleep on said right but must see to it that his case be tried at any early date . . . He cannot agree to the repeated postponement of the trial of his case and then, when he finds the government absent or unable to go to trial on any of the dates of hearing, take advantage of said absence and ask for the dismissal
of his ca case se.” .” Much Much less less may he be allo allowe wed d to conniv connive e in the the hidi hiding ng of witnes witnesses ses in order order to delay delay trial. trial. “The “The consti constitut tution ional al privil privilege ege was never never intended as furnishing a technical means for escaping trial.” The right, moreover, may be waived. But waiver is not to be inferred from mere failure of the accused to urge the trial of the case. Such waiver or abandonment may be presumed only when the postponement of the trial has been sought and obtained by the accused himself or by his attorney. The pres presum umpt ptio ion, n, in fact fact,, is alwa always ys agai agains nstt the the waive waiverr of co cons nsti titu tuti tion onall ally y protected rights. In People v. Oplado, Oplado, it was said that where one of two co-accused can be tried separately, the absence of the other does not justify delay of the trial of the accused who is present. The remedy an accused has for violation of his right to speedy trial is dismissal of the case and, if he is under detention, release by habeas corpus. Moreover, dismissal for violation of the right to speedy trial is equivalent to acquittal and is therefore a bar to subsequent prosecution for the same offense. Right of confrontation Closely connected with and equally essential as the right to be heard is the right “to meet the witnesses face to face,” or, as Rule 115, Section 1(f) of the (New) Rules of Court expresses it, “to confront and cross-examine the witness against him at the trial.” The right has a two-fold purpose: (1) primarily, to afford the accused an opportunity to test the testimony of the witness by cross-examination, and (2) secondarily, to allow the judge to observe the deportment of the witness. Agreements between prosecution and the defense to the effect that certain witnesses, if presented, would testify to certain facts can deprive the
defendant of the right to confrontation (besides preventing review of the evidence by the appellate court). The practice, however, of admitting such agreements has not been completely disallowed. A corollary of the right of confrontation is that testimony not subjected to cross-e cross-exami xaminat nation ion must must be exclude excluded d from from conside considerat ration ion.. Howeve However, r, if cross-examination actually commenced, but, for lack of material time, was nott co no comp mple lete ted, d, and and the the witn witnes ess s in the the mean meanti time me died died befo before re cros crosssexamination could be resumed, so much of the testimony as had already been covered by cross-examination is admissible. The Court said in Marinas v. Siochi : From Section 5 of Rule 112 it is clear that, unlike in the preliminary investigation proper, an accused is not entitled as a matter of right to be pres presen entt duri during ng the the prel prelim imin inar ary y exam examin inat atio ion n no norr to cros cross-e s-exa xamin mine e the the witn witnes esse ses s pres presen ente ted d agai against nst him him befo before re his his arre arrest st,, the the purp purpos ose e of sa said id examination being merely to determine whether or not there is sufficient reas reason on to issu issue e a warr warran antt of arre arrest st.. The The prov provis isio ion n co comm mman andi ding ng the the determination of probable cause prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest, requires no notice to an accused. A preliminary examination is generally a proceeding ex parte in which the person charged has no right to participate or be present. Compulsory process Equally important as the right to counsel is the right to compulsory process for the attendance of witnesses. The accused, however, may not invoke this right on appeal if he made no effort during the trial to avail himself of it. Moreover, to establish the right to continuance by reason of the absence of witnesses the accused must show: (a) that the witnesses is really mate materi rial al;; (b) (b) that that he is guil guilty ty of no negl neglec ectt in prev previo ious usly ly obta obtain inin ing g
attendance of said witness; (c) that the witness will be available at the time desired; (d) that no similar evidence could be obtained.
Trial in absentia The 1987 Constitution, as also the 1973 Constitution, now provides for allowa allowable ble trial trial in absent absentia ia.. Arti Articl cle e III, III, Se Sect ctio ion n 14(2 14(2), ), has has this this adde added d sentence: “However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of he accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.” The evident purpose of this change is to prevent unnecessary delays of the trial. The rights of the accused are amply protected protected because because trial in absent absentia ia ca can n be had had on only ly if thre three e co cond ndit itio ions ns concur: (1) accused has been arraigned; (2) notice of the trial was duly served to him and properly returned; (3) his failure to appear is unjustified. The Court has ruled that the presence of the accused at arraignment is an absolute requisite for any trial to proceed, the reason being that it is at arraignment that the accused is informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him and it is then that the trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person. It has also been ruled that the new provision allowing allowing trial in absentia does not “lend itself to a latitudinarian construction” that would prec preclu lude de forf forfei eitu ture re of bail bail for for on one e who jump jumps s bail. bail. Mo More reov over er,, ther there e is a statutory rule which requires the presence of the accused at promulgation of judgment. Trial in absentia absentia can also also take take place place when when the accused accused volunt voluntari arily ly waives his right to be present. There are, however, restrictive conditions for allowing waiver. The right may be waived “provided that after arraignment he may be compelled to appear for the purpose of identification by the witnesses of the prosecution, or provided he unqualifiedly admits in open court after his arraignment that he is the person named as the defendant in
the case on trial. Reason for requiring the presence of the accused despite his waiver, is, if allowed to be absent in all the stages of the proceeding withou withoutt giving giving the Peo People ple’s ’s witness witnesses es the opport opportuni unity ty to identi identify fy him in court, he may in his defense and, therefore, is entitled to acquittal.” Thus, for an accused to be excused from attending trial, it is not enough that he vaguely agrees to be excused from attending trial, it is not enough that he vagu vaguel ely y agre agrees es to be iden identi tifi fied ed by witne witness sses es in his his abse absenc nce. e. He must must unqualifiedl unqualifiedly y admit that every time a witness witness mentions a name by which he is known, the witness is to be understood as referring to him. Article III, Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disp dispos osit itio ion n of thei their r case cases s befo before re all all ju judi dici cial al,, quas quasii-ju judi dici cial al,, or administrative bodies. Speedy disposition of cases It is a truism that justice delayed can mean justice denied. It should be noted noted that that the provision provision guaranti guaranties es the right genera generally lly to “a speedy speedy disposition of their cases.” It covers therefore the periods before, during, and after trial. In this respect it gives broader protection than Section 14(2) which guarantees merely the right to a speedy trial. It is also broader than the protection given by Article VIII, Section 15, which covers merely the peri period od afte afterr the the subm submis issi sion on of a ca case se.. Mo More reov over er,, the the pres presen entt prov provis isio ion n applies to civil, criminal, and administrative cases. As the Court has put it, “the constitutional right to a ‘speedy disposition of cases’ is not limited to to the accu ac cuse sed d in crim crimin inal al proc procee eedin dings gs but but exte extend nds s to all all part partie ies s in all all ca case ses, s, including civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings.” The concept of “speedy disposition of cases,” like “speedy trial,” is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept. It is consistent with reasonable delay.
Lastly, as in the case of violation of the right to a speedy trial, the remedy for violation of the right to a speedy disposition d isposition of a case is dismissal obtained through mandamus. Article III, Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Self-incrimination The The 1987 1987 Cons Consti titu tuti tion on se sepa para rate ted d the the prov provis isio ion n from from the the rule rules s on cust custod odial ial inve invest stiga igati tion on.. Bu Butt Se Sect ctio ion n 12(3 12(3)) place places s viol violat atio ions ns of the the se self lf-incrimination clause under the “exclusionary rule”. The justification for the guarantee was stated by the Court thus: “It was established on the grounds of public policy and humanity: Of policy, because, if the party were required to testify, it would place the witness unde underr the the stro strong nges estt tempt temptat atio ion n to co comm mmit it perj perjur ury; y; and and of huma humanit nity, y, because it would prevent the extorting of confessions by duress.” Another deci decisi sion on sa said id:: “The “The main main purp purpos ose e of the the prov provis isio ion n . . . is to proh prohib ibit it compulsory oral examination of prisoners before the trial, or upon trial, for the purpose purpose of extorting extorting unwilling unwilling confessions confessions or declaration declarations s implicating implicating them in the commission of a crime.” Altho Althoug ugh h the the guar guaran ante tee e has has pros proscr crib ibed ed an inqu inquis isit itor orial ial syst system em of investigation, it does not prohibit every form of preliminary investigation. Preliminary investigation “is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime so as to enable the fiscal his complaint or information.” To violate the right, it is not necessary that a categorical admission of a specific offense be sought. “Chief Justice Marshall explained that usually a crim crime e or a crimi crimina nall ac actt may may co cont ntain ain two or more more elem elemen ents ts and and that that a question would have a tendency to incriminate, even if it tends to elicit only
one of said elements.” The right thus includes a “right to refuse to testify to a fact which would be a necessary link in a chain of evidence to prove the commission of a crime by a witness.” It was held early in Philippine Philippine jurisprudence jurisprudence that what is prohibited prohibited by the constitutional guarantee is the use of physical or moral compulsion to exto extort rt co comm mmun unica icati tion on from from the the witn witnes ess, s, no nott an inclu inclusi sion on of his his body body in evidence, when it may be material. Thus, substance emitting from the body of the the defe defend ndan antt was rece receiv ived ed as evid eviden ence ce in a pros prosec ecut utio ion n for for ac acts ts of lasc lascivi iviou ousn snes ess. s. Su Subje bject ctio ion n to ultr ultraa-vio viole lett exami examina nati tion on is allow allowed ed.. So is paraffin test. Morphine forced out of the mouth of the accused was received. An order by the judge for the witness to put on a pair of pants for size was allowed. The taking of an accused person’s picture does not incriminate him. And since, according to the Court, the “kernel of the privilege” was the prohibition of “testimonial compulsion.” This harsh rule, so contrary to the huma humane ne purp purpos ose e of the the law, law, was was just justif ifie ied d by just justic ice e Ma Malc lcol olm m by the the stat statem emen entt that that “No “No rule rule is inte intend nded ed to be so rigi rigid d as to emba embarr rras ass s the the administration of justice in its endeavour to ascertain the truth.” The Court added: “Fully conscious that we are resolving a most extreme case . . . whic which h on firs firstt impr impres essi sion on is a shoc shock k to on one’ e’s s se sens nsib ibil ilit itie ies, s, we must must nevertheless enforce the constitutional provision . . . undeterred by merely sentimental influences.” The only proviso imposed was that “torture or force should be avoided.” The rule on the permissibility of requiring a witness to write in order to furnish a sample of his handwriting was settled in Beltran v. Samson. Samson. It was held that, since witnesses in a preliminary investigation are protected by the proh prohibi ibiti tion on,, they they may may no nott be co comp mpel elle led d to take take a dict dictat atio ion n in orde orderr to comp co mpar are e thei theirr hand handwr writ itin ing g with with that that foun found d in a supp suppos osed edly ly fals falsif ifie ied d document. In support of this ruling, the Court said:
. . . writing is something more than moving the body, or the hand, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the application of the intelligence and attention . . . We say that, for the purpose of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document. And one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is require to furnish evidence against himself. And we say that the present case is more serious . . . because here the witness is compelled to write and create, by means of the act of writing, evidence which does not exist. Beltran, however, was distinguished from Marcelo v. Sandiganbayan where the accused where asked to affix their signatures on the envelopes of the letters which constitute constituted d the corpus delicti in a mail pilferage case. The Cour Courtt said: said: “To “To be sure sure,, the the use use of spec specime imen n hand handwr writ itin ing g in Beltran is different form and the use of petitioner’s signature in this case. In that case, the the purp purpos ose e was was to show show that that the the spec specim imen en handw handwri riti ting ng matche matched d the the handwriting in the document alleged to have been falsified and thereby show that the accused was the author of the crime (falsification) while in this case the purpose for securing the signature of petitioner on the envelopes was merely to authenticate the envelops as the one seized from him and his coaccused.” When When a
pers person on,,
howe ho weve ver, r, vo volu lunt ntar aril ily y
answ answer ers s
an incr incrim imin inat atin ing g
ques questi tion on,, he is deem deemed ed to have have waive waived d his his righ right. t. Mo More reov over er,, afte afterr the the accused pleaded guilty, for the purpose of ascertaining the proper penalty to be imposed or for any other legal purposes, the court may properly ask such questions as are necessary to that end. By this plea of guilty, he is deemed to have have waiv waived ed his his righ rightt “to “to the the exte extend nd,, at leas leastt of no nott allo allowi wing ng him him subsequently to claim error by reason of such questions or answers thereto.
Besides, it is the courts which determine whether or not a question is in fact incriminating. But an invariable answer of “I do not remember” is equivalent to refusal to answer and does not constitute waiver. The privilege against self-incrimination can be rendered meaningless if the silence of a witness witness may be used against him. Hence, the rule has been established that refusal of an accused to be a witness or of a witness to answer should in no manner be used against them. This rule, however, does nott proh no prohib ibit it an unfa unfavo vour urabl able e inte interf rfer eren ence ce from from fail failur ure e of on one e part party y to produce evidence that is in his control. Documents and records It will be recalled that Philippine jurisprudence prior to Stonehill v. Diokno had linked the inadmissibility of illegally obtained evidence with the self-incrimination clause. Jurisprudence on the subject was founded on Boyd v. United States which had declared “that a compulsory production of the private books and papers of the owner . . . is compelling him to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.” Both Stonehill and Article III, Section 3(1), have since divorced the exclusionary rule in the search search and seizur seizure e clause clause from from self-i self-incr ncrimi iminat nation ion.. Nevert Neverthele heless, ss, the rule rule established in Boyd still remains that the self-incrimination clause covers documentary evidence. It should also be noted that, unlike the search and seizure clause, which protects both natural persons and corporations, the privilege against self-incrimination “is a personal one, applying only to natural individuals.” Moreover, a corporate officer may not prevent the production of corporate papers on the ground that they may incriminate him personally, for in such situation it would not be a case of the officer incriminating himself but the corporation incriminating him.
Article Article III, Section Section 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor crue cruel, l, degr degrad adin ing g or inhu inhuma man n puni punish shme ment nt infli inflict cted ed.. Neith Neither er shal shalll death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua . (2) (2)
The The
empl employ oyme ment nt
of
puni punish shme ment nt agai again nst any any subs substa tand ndar ard d
or
phys physic ical al,,
psyc psycho holo logi gica cal, l,
pris prison oner er or
inad inadeq equa uate te
penal enal
deta detain inee ee,,
faci facili liti ties es
or
degr degrad adin ing g
or the the
und under
use of
sub subhum human
conditions shall be dealt with by law. Cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment; excessive fines In Legarda v. Valdez , it was clearly established that the phrase “cruel and and unus unusua ual” l” embo embodie died d an inse insepa para rable ble pair pair:: “To “To be proh prohib ibit ited ed by this this provision the punishment must not only be unusual but it must also be cruel. There is no reason why unusual punishments which were not cruel should have been prohibited.” “Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a ling linger erin ing g deat death; h; but but the the puni punish shme ment nt of deat death h is no nott crue cruel, l, with within in the the meaning of that word as used in the Constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life.” Thus to be “cruel and unusual” or “excessive” within the meaning of the Consti Constitut tution ion,, the penalt penalty y must must be flagra flagrantl ntly y dispro dispropor portio tionat nate e to the offense no matter under what circumstances the offense may be committed; but to be “clearly excessive” under Article 5 of the Penal Code, it need only be disproportionate to the circumstances of the offense and of the offender. In the former, the punishment imposed by the Legislature has exceeded the limi limits ts of its its disc discre reti tion onar ary y powe power, r, and and the the Cour Courtt step steps s in to appl apply y the the constitutional brake; in the Latter, the Legislature has acted within the limits of its power, but an unforeseen situation occurs which calls for clemency and
the court court can merely merely recomm recommend end clemen clemency cy because because in the consti constitut tution ional al scheme it has power only to apply the law. Abolition of death penalty It was made clear that there was no intention to pass judgment on capit ca pital al puni punish shme ment nt as crue cruell and and unus unusua ual. l. The The matt matter er shou should ld be left left to legislative discretion. Thus, when lethal injection was challenged as a cruel and unusua unusuall punish punishmen mentt disall disallowe owed d by the Consti Constitut tution ion,, the Court Court easily easily dismissed dismissed the contention contention appealing appealing to well-settled well-settled jurisprudence jurisprudence that the death penalty penalty per se is not a cruel, cruel, degrading degrading or inhuma inhuman n punish punishmen ment. t. Puni Pu nish shme ment nt is so if it invo involv lves es tort tortur ure e or a ling linger erin ing g deat death; h; but but the the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the Constitutio Constitution. n. Unconstitut Unconstitutional ional punishment punishment implies implies something something inhuman inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life. Article III, Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. Double jeopardy Just Justic ice e Mo Mora ran, n, writ writin ing g in 1941 1941,, co coul uld d sa said id:: “Bei “Being ng thus thus a mere mere reco recogn gnit itio ion n of the the maxi maxim m of the the co comm mmon on law, law, and and adop adoptm tmen entt from from the the Constitution of the United States, the principle of double jeopardy followed in this jurisdiction the same – no narrower or wider – line of development as in Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence.” It will also be seen that the role which the Rules of Court has played in the the deve develo lopm pmen entt of the the doct doctri rine ne on doub double le jeop jeopar ardy dy has has made made it very very diff diffic icul ultt
to
det determi ermin ne
what what
aspe as pect ct
of
the
deve develo lopm pme ent
belo belong ngs s
“constitutional double jeopardy” and what to “statutory “statutory double jeopardy.”
to
When jeopardy attaches Under present law, to raise the defense of double or second jeopardy three requisites must be shown: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have terminated; (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first. These three three requis requisite ites s provide provide a conven convenien ientt divisio division n for the discus discussio sion n of the subject. The Court enumerated the requisites for the attachment of jeopardy: (a) (a) upon upon a good good indi indict ctme ment nt,, (b) (b) befo before re a co comp mpet eten entt co cour urt, t, (c) (c) afte afterr arraignment, and (d) after plea. Rule 117, Section 7 of the New Rules of Court, says that there must be a “valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and and subs substa tanc nce e to sust sustai ain n a co conv nvic icti tion on.” .” Unde Underr such such rule rule,, it has has been been uniformly held that if the charge is fatally defective in form, jeopardy does not attach. Thus, too, when the substance of the information does not allege sufficient facts to constitute an offense, jeopardy does not attach. Under thes these e and and simil similar arly ly defe defect ctiv ive e infor informa mati tion ons, s, the the ac accu cuse sed d ca can n neve neverr be conv co nvict icted ed and, and, henc hence, e, he ca cann nnot ot be said said to have have been been in jeop jeopar ardy dy of conviction. When the court that court that takes cognizance of the case without jurisdiction, either because the crime charged is outside the ambit of the court’s powers or because the crime was committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of t he court, all proceedings in such court are void and the accused cannot be convicted. Hence, again, jeopardy does not attach. Conviction by a court that is without jurisdiction is a nullity and, at most most,, has has the the effe effect ct of a prel prelim imin inar ary y inve invest stig igat atio ion. n. In a prel prelim imin inar ary y
investigation, however, the accused is not placed in jeopardy because it “has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe the accused guilty thereof.” However, the Supreme Court ruled that in the case of People v. Balisacan, Balisacan, where the accused pleaded guilty and was allowed to present evidence in mitigation, mitigation, his evidence amounted amounted to a withdrawal withdrawal of his plea of guilty and, since no new plea was entered, there was no jeopardy which the “acquittal” could terminate. Termination of jeopardy Once Once jeop jeopar ardy dy has has atta attach ched ed,, may may doub double le jeop jeopar ardy dy be raise raised d as a defense even before the termination of the first jeopardy? Justice Roberto Concepcion, in Yap v. Lutero, Lutero, wrote: Our bill of Rights deals with two kinds of double jeopardy. The first sent se nten ence ce of claus clause e 20, 20, Se Sect ctio ion n 1, Arti Articl cle e III III of the the [193 [1935] 5] Cons Consti titu tuti tion on ordains that “no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.” The second sentence of said clause provides that “if an act is punishable by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.” Thus, the first sentence prohibits double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, whereas the second contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the same act. Under the first sentence, one may be twice put in jeopardy of punish punishmen mentt of the same act. act. Provide Provided d that that he is charge charged d with differen differentt offenses, or the offense charged in one case is not included in, or does not include, the crime charged in the other case. The second sentence applies, even if the offenses charged are not the same, owing to the fact that one constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the other violation of a statute. If the two charges are based on one and the same act, conviction or acquittal
under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other. Article III, Section 22. No ex-post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted. “Ex post facto” laws An ex post facto law has been defined as one: (a) (a)
Whic Which h makes makes an acti action on done done befo before re the the passi passing ng of the the law law and which which was was inno innoce cent nt when when done done crimi crimina nal, l, and and puni punish shes es such such action; or
(b) (b)
Whic Which h aggr aggrav avat ates es a crim crime e or mak makes es it it grea greate terr than than when when it it was committed; or
(c) (c)
Whic Which h chang changes es the the puni punish shme ment nt and and infli inflict cts s a great greater er puni punish shme ment nt than the law annexed to the crime when w hen it was committed;
(d) (d)
Whic Which h alt alters ers the the lega legall rules ules of evide videnc nce e and and rece receiv ive es less less or diffe differe rent nt test testimo imony ny than than the the law law requ requir ired ed at the the time time of the the commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant;
(e) (e)
Assum Ass umes es to to regul regulat ate e civil civil righ rights ts and and reme remedie dies s only only but in in effe effect ct imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful;
(f) (f)
Depr Depriv ives es a pers person on accu accuse sed d of a crime crime of som some e lawfu lawfull prote protect ctio ion n to which he has become entitled, entitled, such as protection protection of a former former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.
Bill of attainder
“A bill of attainder, according to Cummings v. Missouri, “is Missouri, “is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial. If the punishment be less than death, the act is termed a bill of pains and penalties.” It is thus a “general safeguard against legislative exercise of the judicial function, or more simply – trial by legislature.”
BIBLIOGRAPHY The 1987 Philippine Constitution: Commentary, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, 2003 Edition Remedial Law Volume I, Justice Herrera, 2001 Edition Revised Penal Code Annotated, J.B.L. Reyes, 2008 Edition
