Dee Chuan & Sons, Inc. vs CIR G.R. No. L-2216 January 31, 1950 DEE C. CHUAN & SONS, INC., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, CONGRESS OF LABOR ORGANIZATIONS (CLO), KAISAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA KAHOY SA PILIPINAS and JULIAN LUMANOG AND HIS WORKCONTRACT LABORERS, respondents.
Facts: Dee C. Chuan & Sons, Inc. assails the validity of an order of the Court of Industrial Relations. The order made upon petitioner's request for authority to hire" about twelve(12) more laborers from time to time and on a temporary basis," contains the proviso that "the majority of the laborers to be employed should be native." The petition was filed pending settlement by the court of a labor dispute (strike) between the petitioner and Kaisahan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa Kahoy sa Pilipinas. It is next said that "The Court of Industrial Relations cannot intervene in questions of selection of employees and workers so as to impose unconstitutional restrictions," and that "The restrictions of the number of aliens that may be employed in any business, occupation, trade or profession of any kind, is a denial of the equal protection of the laws." Although the brief does not name the persons who are supposed to be denied the equal protection of the laws, it is clearly to be inferred that aliens in general are in petitioner's mind. Certainly, the order does not, directly or indirectly, immediately or remotely, discriminate against the petitioner on account of race or citizenship. The order could have been issued in a case in which the employer was a Filipino. As a matter matter of fact the the petitioner petitioner insists that 75 % of its shares shares of stock stock are held held by Philippine Philippine citizens, a statement which is here assumed to be correct. Issue: W/N the order of CIR is valid and constitutional. Ruling: Yes. Costs against petitioners. Ratio: An alien may may question the constitutionali constitutionality ty of a statute statute (or court court order) order) only when when and so far as it is being, or is about to be, applied to his disadvantage. (16 C.J.S. 157 et seq.) The prospective employees whom the petitioner may contemplate employing have not come forward to seek redress; their identity has not even been revealed. Clearly the petitioner has no case in so far as it strives to protect the rights of others, much less others who are unknown and undetermined. We are of the opinion that the order under consideration meets the test of reasonableness and public interest. The passage of Commonwealth Act No. 103 was "in conformity with the constitutional objective and . . . the historical fact that industrial and agricultural disputes have given rise to disquietude, bloodshed and revolution in our country." (Antamok Goldfields Mining Co. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 40 Off. Gaz., 8th Supp., 173.)1 "Commonwealth Act No. 103 has precisely vested the Court of Industrial Relations with authority to intervene in all
disputes between employees or strikes arising from the difference as regards wages, compensation, and other labor conditions which it may take cognizance of." (Central Azucarera de Tarlac vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 40 Off. Gaz., 3rd Supp., 319, 324.)2 Thus it has jurisdiction to determine the number of men to be laid off during off-seasons. By the same token, the court may specify that a certain proportion of the additional laborers to be employed should be Filipinos, if such condition, in the court's opinion, "is necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling disputes or doing justice to the parties." We can not agree with the petitioner that the order constitutes an unlawful intrusion into the sphere of legislation, by attempting to lay down a public policy of the state or to settle a political question. In the first place, we believe, as we have already explained, that the court's action falls within the legitimate scope of its jurisdiction. In the second place, the order does not formulate a policy and is not political in character. It is not a permanent, all-embracing regulation. It is a compromise and emergency measure applicable only in this case and calculated to bridge a temporary gap and to adjust conflicting interests in an existing and menacing controversy. The hiring of Chinese laborers by the petitioner was rightly considered by the court likely to lead the parties away from the reconciliation which it was the function of the court to effectuate. We should not close without adverting to the fact that the petitioner does not so much as pretend that the hiring of additional laborers is its prerogative as a matter of right. It seems to be conceded that during the pendency of the dispute the petitioner could employ temporary laborers only with the permission of the Court of Industrial Relations. The granting of the application thus lies within the sound judgment of the court, and if the court could turn it down entirely, as we think it could, its authority to quality the permission should be undeniable, provided only that the qualification is not arbitrary, against law, morals, or established public policy, which it is not; it is an expedient and emergency step designed to relieve petitioner's own difficulties. Also important to remember is that it is not compulsory on petitioner's part to take advantage of the order. Being a permute petitioner is the sole judge of whether it should take the order as it is, or leave it if it does not suit its interest to hire new laborers other than Chinese.
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC DECISION January 28, 1950 G.R. No. L-2548 DEE C. CHUAN & SONS, INC., petitioner-appellant, vs. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, CONGRESS OF LABOR ORGANIZATIONS,
KAISAHAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA KAHOY SA PILIPINAS, and JULIAN LUMANOG AND HIS WORK-CONTRACT LABORERS, respondents-appellees. Quisumbing, Sycip and Quisumbing for petitioner. Lazatin and Caballero for respondents.
Paras (Edgardo),
J. :
This is an appeal by the petitioner from a decision of the Court of Industrial Relations ordering the petitioner (1) to grant an increase of P0.30 a day to all its employees and laborers except workers under the “pakiao system”; (2) to grant it s laborers, under certain conditions, 15 days vacation leave and 15 days sick leave both with full pay every year, and, upon the other hand, denying (a) petitioner’s prayer for the reduction of the salaries and wages of its employees and laborers, including the work-contract laborers of Julian Lumanog; (b) petitioner’s claim for damages resulting from its laborers’ strike; (c) petitioner’s prayers for the filing of a bond by Julian Lumanog under Act No. 3959 and for the reduction of wages of his work-contract laborers. The contention of the petitioner that the strike declared by its laborers on April 12, 1947, is illegal or unjustified because it originated from unfounded demands and was planned by t he Congress of Labor Organizations to create a general strike condition in Manila and embarrass the Roxas Administration, raises questions of fact decided adversely to the petitioner by the Court of Industrial Relations; and, it is now needless to state, we are not authorized to re-examine the same. It appears that there was a previous industrial dispute between the petitioner and its laborers resulting in a strike which was decided and settled by the Court of Industrial Relations in a final judgment promulgated on November 23, 1946. It is presently argued by the petitioner that the effective duration of this judgment is three years during which a strike may not be staged. Section 17 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, invoked by the petitioner, provides that “An award, order, or decision of the Court shall be valid and effective during the time therein specified. In the absence of such specification, any party or both parties to a controversy may terminate the effectiveness of an award, order or decision after three years have elapsed from the date of said award, order or decision by giving notice to that effect to the Court: Provided, however, That at any time during the effectiveness of an award , order or decision, the court may, on application of an interested party, and after due hearing, alter, modify in whole or in part, or set aside any such award, order or decision, or reopen any question involved therein.” The petitioner admits that this provision does not expressly prohibit the declaration of a strike during the effective duration of an award or decision, but contends that the prohibition may be inferred from the legislative intent of forestalling strikes. We cannot agree. A strike is not in itself inconsistent with or destructive of the efficacy of a n award or decision, since the Court of Industrial Relations in proper cases may enforce the same during the statutory period. In other words, an employer as soon as the laborers walk out, may resort to said court and defeat the aims of the strike by alleging the existence of a binding decision a previous similar industrial dispute, subject of course to the power of t he court to reopen any question involved therein (sec. 17, Commonwealth Act No. 103). As a matter of fact, a strike may not be staged only when, during the pendency of an industrial dispute, the Court of
Industrial Relations has issued the proper injunction against t he laborers (section 19, Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended). Capital need not, however, be apprehensive about the recurrence of strikes in view of the system of compulsory arbitration by the Court of Industrial Relations. This conclusion on the basic phase of the case, – that the strike in question is legal and justified, – is necessarily fatal (1) to petitioner’s claim for damages, even assuming that the Court of Industrial Relations has jurisdiction to pass thereon, and (2) t o petitioner’s claim that the striking laborers had ceased to be in it s employ as a consequence of their unjustified strike. The raise in wages and the 15-day vacation leave with full pay every year conceded to the workers by the Court of Industrial Relations were based on the financial ability of the petitioner as shown by the evidence adduced before and weighed by said court, and for us to review this feature of the case will involve a factual inquiry which we are not empowered to undertake. The Court of Industrial Relations has al so ordered the petitioner to grant its workers 15-day sick leave with full pay every year. In the case of Leyte Land Transportation Company, Inc. vs. Leyte Farmer’s and Laborers’ Union, L-1377, decided on May 12, 1948 (45 O.G. 4862)1 we already sustained the authority of the Court of I ndustrial Relations to grant vacation and sick leaves with pay, and observed that “when there is an assurance of holidays and vacations, workers take up their tasks with greater efficiency and tend to sustain their productiveness for longer periods.” The claims of the petitioner against Julian Lumanog must also be overruled, first, because it is admitted that the l atter is an independent contractor, and his l aborers (who joined the strike) are therefore not in the service of the petitioner, with the result that the Court of Industrial Relations has no jurisdiction over them; and, secondly, because we have ruled that the strike in question is legal and justified, and cannot consequently be a cause for discharge. The appealed decision of the Court of Industrial Relations is therefore affirmed, and it is so ordered with costs against the petitioner.
