Divine Space and the Space of the Divin

Divine Space and the Space of the Divine: On the Scholastic Rejection of Arab Cosmology Yossef Schwartz (Tel Aviv)

i. Two introductory remarks i.1 The interreligious dimension of medieval angelology

The ‘international’ character of medieval philosophy and science is a fact that today does not need much further clarification. Needless to say this intercultural global character does not apply homogeneously and cannot suppress strong local commitments. Yet, Yet, in spite of substantial efforts since the late 19th century to establish autonomous realms such as Christian, Moslem, or Jewish philosophy philosophy,, there there is no necessary necessary corollary between cultural identity and specific philosophic attitude. Time and again one confronts the reality in which rival philosophical parties ignore religious borders and arrange themselves according to purely philosophical considerations. Medieval thinkers themselves are the first to acknowledge this cultural interdependence and have no problem whatsoever admitting their great intellectual debt to their predecessors, be it pagans or adherents of rival monotheistic beliefs. While doing so they normally concentrate on the neutral scientific realms of astronomy astronomy,, medicine, logic etc. The antagonistic intercultural polemics were preserved for theological discourse, mostly for religious doctrines and scriptural interpretation. This general state of affairs is crucial for any analysis of my present subject matter,, one that presents us with an interesting hybrid case. Every medieval matter encounter with angels, be it of Christian, Moslem or Jewish origin, involves two different source-traditions, first of which derives its language directly from the particular mythical imagination of the culture involved while the second belongs to a common language of universal scientific knowledge. Indeed, every monotheistic scriptural cannon includes a mythical description of the spiritual creatures that inhabit the celestial and divine realm and that, being defined as mediating entities, move back and forth between it and the earthly human realm. At the same time, any rationalistic thinker would

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Yossef Yos sef Schwartz

assume that such spiritual creatures must be considered part of the reality analyzed in the Hellenistic sciences of physics, metaphysics and astronomy: or put differently, since spiritual creatures were conceived conceiv ed as a part of physical reality, any medieval description of them must have hav e been rooted in some of the principles of the Hellenistic scientific heritage.1 Such interdependence of the two realms works in both directions: not only must one consider scientific explanatory mechanisms when trying to explain biblical narrative but one cannot ignore that same biblical narrative when formulating his overall cosmological paradigm. It is precisely the case that a significant number of intellectuals in all three religions share an almost common mythology of divine heavenly entities, based on divine revelation and canonical writings, while at the same time sharing a basically similar scientific worldview, that makes medieval angelology into a transcultural phenomenon. Hence medieval angelology is extremely interreligious in its basic constitution, and it is on the basis of this primordial identity that each medieval thinker arrived at his own unique solution. Hence it is my conviction that the uniqueness of these solutions can be never fully exposed without paying attention to the rich cultural interchange that took place from the beginning.2 But the case study 1

2

Cf. Piron, Sylvain, Deplatonising Deplatonising the the Celestial Hierarchy: Peter John Olivi’s Interpretation of the Pseudo-Dionysius, in: Angels in Medieval Philosophical Inquiry: Their Function and Significance, Eds. Isabel Irribarren and Martin Lenz (Ashgate Studies in Medieval Philosophy), Aldershot 2008, pp. 29–44, here 29: “The encounter of biblical and Neoplatonist angels produced one of the most crucial questions that theologians had to face in the second half of the thirteenth century: could they, or indeed, should they be identified?” This particularistic assertion must be universalized in order to reconstruct the general multicultural context of medieval philosophy. This problematic can be seen in the clearest way in the above mentioned recently published collection of essays dedicated to this topic, and see Irribaren and Lenz (note 1). In the introduction to this volume the editors declare that they have confined their discussion “to the Western Latin world, being compelled by space and thematic coherence to exclude the very rich angelological contribution coming from the Arabic and the Jewish tradition.” Indeed, neither the editors in their introduction, nor any of the other contributors of this rich and illuminating volume mention any of the examples which I examine in the following. I leave it to the reader to judge to what extent the following western attitudes make sense, without giving any account of the polemical context toward the Moslem and Jewish doctrines to which they developed in parallel.















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of angelology in its cosmological aspects is not only an example of medieval transmission of knowledge. As I shall claim in this article, it provides us with one of the most striking examples of the development of an independent Latin European position, one that bears great significance for the further development of European thought. i.2 Theories of space in an Aristotelian Ptolemaic voidless universe

The problem of space, as a most general category that strives to include all physical entities, from the creator himself to the last element in the chain of being and from the void that exists or does not exist beyond the universe to the middle of the universe is one of the most central topics of medieval cosmology.3 The voidless Aristotelian Ptolemaic universe of Greek science (to exclude excl ude atomist theories) is a perfectly concentric system made, from its very center up to the outer sphere, of physical bodies that contain each other without distance and that move each other through direct contact. It is a closed and limited space, in which all parts, from the all-encompassing outer celestial sphere to the center of the earth are both contained and containers. None of these parts except its two extremes is motionless, and all motion, from the eternal constant movement of the celestial bodies to the contingent movement of physical bodies in the sublunar world of elements is both spatial and local. On the physical level it is a universe built of places, in which spatial language has only limited function, mostly as part of mathematical order (especially important for the development of optics and mathematical astronomy).4 Unlike the infinitude attributed to time in the ‘Physics’ (book 8, 250b–253a), the universe’s space is defined as finite (‘De caelo’ 271b18– 273a6). This definition would change only with early modern formulations

3

4

For some classic studies of the topic see Jammer, Max, Das Problem des Raumes. Die Entwicklung der Raumtheorien, Darmstadt 1960; Sorabji, Richard, Matter, Space and Motion: Theories in Antiquity and Their Sequel, Ithaca, New York 1988. See Zekl, Hans Günter Günter,, Raum, in: Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, Eds. Joachim Ritter and Karlfried Gründer, Vol. 8, Basel 1992, c. 75: “Der All-Körper ist gleichzeitig All-Ort”; Suarez-Nani, Tiziana, Les anges et la philosophie. Subjectivitè et function cosmologique des substances séparées à la fin du xiiie siècle (Étude de philosophie medieval 82), Paris 2002, p. 93.















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of the infinity of cosmic space, which is identified with God and t he divine attributes, hence Henry More, Spinoza and Newton.5 Aristotle’s discussion of place ( xor a , topos) in ‘Physics’, book iv (208a27–212a31), defines the framework for any philosophical discussion of these topics among medieval philosophers. ph ilosophers. In general medieval thinkers adopt the Aristotelian dichotomy of the sublunar/translunar parts of the universe. This dichotomy between earthly and heavenly realms raises the question as to the exact way in which the spatial relations between them, th em, the one contained within the other, can be transformed into causal relations.6 This discussion immediately involves the examination of the precise relation between space, motion and physical causality. But it is only with the Arabs, especially Alfarabi, Avicenna, Algazali in his influential scientific philosophical encyclopedia ‘The Intention of the Philosophers’ (Latin ‘Metaphysica’) and Maimonides’ ‘Guide of the Perplexed’ – I limit my discussion here to works that later on became widespread among European Scholastics – that this principle became part of a systematic cosmology, one that combines Aristotelian and Ptolemaic teaching within a strong Neoplatonic framework. The process of emanation as described in Avicenna’s Avicenna’s ‘Metaphysics’ creates a unified universe in which the cognitive, the mental and the physical are closely related, creating a cosmological picture which is completely parallel to the human triad of body – soul – intellect.7 In a voidless universe body is a defined extension and its local definition derives from the surface of the matter in which it is contained. Soul is an organic part of body, either unseparated in a completely hylemorphic definition or a separate substance from elsewhere which is mysteriously united with its body body..8 In both cases however this location differs from the material location of bodies in that the soul has no defined 5

6 7 8

Cf. Funkenstein, Amos, Theology and the Scientific Imagination from the Middle Ages to the Seventeenth Century, Princeton, New Jersey 1986, pp. 23–116; Grant, Edward, The Foundations of Modern Science in the Middle Ages: Their Religious, Institutional and Intellectual Contexts, Cambridge 1996, p. 125. Grant, Edward, Planets, Stars and Orbs: The Medieval Cosmos 1200–1687, Cambridge 1996, pp. 569–617. Avicenna Latinus, Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina, tract 1, cap. 5, tract 10, cap. 1, Ed. S. Van Riet, Louvain/Leiden 1977, i, 31–42, ii, 522–530. On the western reception of Avicennian psychological doctrines see Hasse, Dag Nikolaus, Avicenna’s Avicenna’s ‘De Anima’ in the Latin West: The Formation of a Peripatetic Philosophy of the Soul 1160–1300, London/Torino 2000.
















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and essential single place in the body. Human intellect adds a further element that does not exist in other sublunar species and that in all the Arab systems mentioned above is linked to the agent intellect as a natural place outside the particular human body and outside the sublunar realm. The description of angels in their holy scriptures provided Moslems and Jews with an impo importan rtantt part of thei theirr cosm cosmolog ologyy. In thei theirr myth mythical ical appe appearan arances ces in human shape they provide an example of an accidental relationship between spiritual substance and material body. In their essential form they could be integrated into the heavenly system, where they took their place as the manifestation of the spiritual forces active in the otherwise fully material Aristotelian universe that normally knows only material efficient causality. Their natural place is the place of their orbs to which whi ch they relate in a way similar to the way human intellect relates to human body and soul. This ‘divine space’ – rooted in late Neoplatonic interpretations of Aristotle9 – mediates between the theological concepts of divine omnipresence10 and the physical-cosmological reality. Early modern scientific deism would either further develop this 11 plerom romaa as the workplace of magical powers or give it up altogether mediated ple in favor of divine omnipotent omnipo tent and omnipresent power.12

ii. Arabic and Jewish-Arabic thought:

Mediated substances and divine power It is not the development of Arab A rab (Moslem and Jewish) theories that I would like to describe here in detail but its reception in Latin scholastic literature of the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. I shall therefore now Sambursky,, Shmuel, Die Raumvorstellungen der Antike, in: Eranos 44 (1975), Sambursky pp. 167–198; id., The Concept of Place in Late Neoplatonism, Jerusalem 1982. 10 Funkenstein (note 5), pp. 89–97. 11 Schmidt-Biggem Schmidt-Biggemann, ann, Wilhelm, Philosophia Philosophia perennis. Historische Historische Umrisse abendländischer Spiritualität Spiritualität in Antike, Mittelalter und früher Neuzeit, Frankfurt am Main 1998, pp. 428–520, esp. 503–507; Blanco, Arturo, The Influence of Faith in Angels on the Medieval Vision of Nature and Man, in: Mensch und Natur im Mittelalter, Eds. Albert Zimmermann and Andreas Speer (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 21/1), Berlin/New York 1991, pp. 456–467, here 461f. P., Jewish Theologies of Space in the Scientific Revolution: 12 Copenhaver, Brian P., Henry More, Joseph Raphson, Isaac Newton and their Predecessors, in: Annals of Science 37 (1980), pp. 489–548; Funkenstein (note 5), pp. 117–201. 9















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try and provide a few short remarks on the most essential and common elements of Arab cosmology as it is known in the West. Although I could easily bring the examples from Avicenna or Algazali I shall focus instead on Maimonides. In his philosophical work ‘The Guide of the Perplexed’ (arab. ‘Dalālat al-Hā’ir ī n’, n’, hebr. ‘Moreh Nevukhim’, lat. ‘Dux Neutrorum’), the general tendency of Arab falsafa toward rationalization and demythologization of angelic figures reached its most extreme form. Once it was translated into Latin during the 1230’s–1240’s it became one of the most representative pieces of Arab speculation on that matter, mostly because as a Jewish thinker Maimonides used biblical authorities that were familiar to his Christian reader, reader, different from Moslem philosophers who, if at all, use the mythical figures of Koranic tradition. In the opening chapter of ‘Guide’ ii Maimonides offers his well known summary of Aristotelian physics and metaphysics in 26 prepositions.13 Based on these premises he can move on in chapter 1 (chapter 2 in the Latin translation) to demonstrate God’s existence (ready to pay the price that such an apodictic knowledge knowled ge of God requires from him, i.e. to accept ad hoc proposition 26 concerning the eternal movement of the heavenly sphere). After doing all this, and before moving to his well known discussion of creation,14 Maimonides dedicates the next chapters, 2–12, to the translunar This introductory part of the second book has occasionally been perceived as an independent unit and as such was indeed copied separately sepa rately in different traditions and languages. The Moslem (Persian) philosopher Muhammad al-Tabrizi wrote a commentary on it, as did some European Jews, and see Schwartz, Yossef, Einleitung, in: Hillel von Verona, Über die Vollendung der Seele [Sefer tagmule ha-nefesh], übersetzt und eingeleitet von Yossef Schwartz (Herders Bibliothek der Philosophie des Mittelaters 17), Freiburg i.Br. 2009, pp. 11, 285, n. 21. It was translated separately into Latin and circulated among the scholastics under the title ‘De uno deo benedicto’ before the full translation became widespread, and see Kluxen, Wolfgang, Die Geschichte des Maimonides im lateinischen Abendland als Beispiel einer Christlich-Jüdischen Begegnung, in: Judentum im Mittelalter. Beiträge zum Christlich-Jüdischen Gespräch, Ed. Paul Wilpert (Miscellanea mediaevalia 4), Berlin 1966, pp. 146–182; For a critical edition of ‘De uno deo benedicto’ see Kluxen, op. cit. pp. 167–182; Hasselhoff, Görge K., Dicit Rabbi Moyses. Studien zum Bild von Moss Maimonides im lateinischen Westen vom 13. bis zum 15. Jahrhundert, Würzburg 2004, pp.88–122. 14 For the discussion and its reception among the scholastics scholastics see Rohner Rohner,, Anselm, Das Schöpfungsproblem bei Moses Maimonides, Albertus Magnus und Thomas von Aquin (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters 11/5), Münster 1913; Davidson, Herbert A., Proofs for Eternity, Eternity, Creation and 13


















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heavenly realm. Unlike in his discussion of God’s existence, where Maimonides was apparently willing to accept an heretical philosophical assertion (eternity of the world) in order to justify a central religious doctrine (existence of God), here in the following discussions Maimonides declares that he intends to do the opposite: he shall adopt some biblical and especially rabbinical assertions in order to justify the scientific discourse that loses its apodictic certainty in the move to discussing translunar physical reality reality.. The first cosmological claim, formulated in chapters 4–5, is that the heavenly spheres shall be understood as living creatures, animated and intelligent. It is only then that Maimonides makes the bold assertion (chapter 6) that “there is [only] a difference in the terms; for he [Aristotle] [Aristotle] speaks of separate intellects [arab: ; lat.: intellectus abstractos], and we speak of angels [arab: ; lat.: angelos].”15 In the following chapters Maimonides draws the consequences of this identi ty in the realm of Bible exegesis as well as in the realm of cosmology and metaphysics. The hermeneutic principle implemented by Maimonides in this discussion seems to be rather clear: wherever the biblical narrative provides us with a concrete (mostly human) shape of an angel this description must be explained (away) either as the result of a prophetic vision or else as the equivocal usage of the term ‘angel’ for any creature who functions function s as mediator of divine providence. The only accurate description of angels is in the form of natural powers.16 the Existence of God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy, New York 1987; Burrell, David B., Freedom and Creation in Three Traditions, Notre Dame, Indiana 1993. 15 Moses Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed Perplexed ii, 6, translated with Introduction and notes by Shlomo Pines, Chicago/London 1963, p. 262; Rabbi Mossei Aegyptii, Dux seu Director dubitantium aut perplexorum, ii, 7, Ed. Augustini Iustiniani, Paris 1520, Fol. 43r. 16 Maimonides’ demythologized enlightenment reaches its peak in the present context in the following claim (Guide [note 15], ii, 6; Pines, 263): “If you told a man who is one of those who deem themselves the sages of Israel that the deity sends an angel, who enters the womb of a woman and forms the fetus there, he would be pleased with this assertion and would accept it and would regard it as a manifestation of greatness and power on the part of the deity, and















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As I said, Maimonides draws out some important conclusions from this equivalence in the cosmological realm as well. This seems to be the case especially where he is unconvinced by the power of the scientific argumentation, and manipulates Rabbinic sources in order to justify his position in a discussion which is both philosophical and religious. One way to introduce Maimonides’ synthesis of scientific and biblical discourse is to follow his interpretation of Gen 28, 12 –13, i.e. his interi nterpretation of the appearance of the angels in Jacob’s dream. Maimonides comments on this biblical verse in several places, each time suggesting a different hermeneutic approach:17 the first is rather static and describes the seven stages architecture of the universe from the element of earth in its very middle point up until the Creator God who stands “on top of the ladder”.18 The second is dynamic and relates to sublunar physical reality, constructed according according to the theory of the four elements qua natural places. The two descending angels represent the two heavy elements, earth and water, while the two ascending angels are the two light elements, air and fire. All of them stand together on one step of the ladder, ladder, i.e. in the sublunar world of elements.19 The third description is dynamic and epistemological in nature. Here the descending and ascending angels are the intelligences of the prophets that ascend to the higher stages of cosmic hierarchy in order to meet there with the intelligences descending from above.20 The archetypal description of such an event of meeting can be seen in another exegetical metaphor of place: the Sinai revelation. Moses is described as the one who climbed the mountain while God is described as the one descending the mountain. The mountain itself is an abstract place that represents the highest stage in the hierarchy of knowledge. Hence – ecce est locus apud me, to be understood neither geographically nor cosmolog-

and that this force is the angel, or that all the forms derive from the act of the Active Intellect and that the latter is the angel and the prince of the world constantly mentioned by the sages, the man would shrink from this opinion.” 17 Cf. Klein-Braslavi, Sara, Maimonides’ Commentary on Jacob’s Dream of the Ladder,, in: Bar- Ilan: Annual of Bar-Ilan University Studies in Judaica and the Ladder
















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ically in the physical sense but epistemologically. epistemologically.21 W Wee shall see below what w hat role such allegoric interpretation plays within the cosmological discussion. In Chapter 9 Maimonides developed his well known hypothesis concerning the four orbs/globes orbs/globes..22 Against Ptolemy and with some ‘ancient astronomers’ and Andalusian contemporaries23 he suggest that Mercury and Venus shall be located with the three other planets above the sun.24 Therefore the number of elementary celestial primal movements might be reduced to four: the movement of the moon, sun, five planets, and the sphere

Cf. Schwartz, Yossef, Ecce est locus apud me. Eckharts’ und Maimonides’ Raumvorstellung als Begriff des Göttlichen, in: Raum und Raumvorstellungen im Mittelalter, Eds. Jan A. Aertsen and Andreas Speer (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 25), Berlin 1997, pp. 348–364. translate the Arabic Kura (instead of Pines’ 22 By using the term ‘globe’ to translate ‘sphere’) I accept the terminological suggestion of Gad Freudenthal; see Freudenthal, Gad, Maimonides on the Scope of Metaphysics alias Ma’aseh Merkavah: The Evolution of his Views, in: Maimónides y su época, Eds. Carlos del Valle, Santiago Garcia-Jalón and Juan Pedro Monferrer, Madrid 2007, pp. 221–230, here 225. 23 Among these Andalusians Maimonides refers mainly to Jabir ibn Aflah and his followers, see Guide (note 15) ii, 9, pp. 268f. 24 Guide (note 15), ii , 9, p. 268, Dux (note 15), ii , 10, fol. 44r: “Know that regarding the spheres of Venus and Mercury there exists a difference of opinion among the early mathematicians about whether they are above the sun or below the sun. For there is no demonstration proving to us what the position of these two spheres is. The doctrine of all the ancients was that the sphere of Venus and Mercury are above the sun. [… ] Then Ptolemy came and decided in favor of the opinion that they were both below the sun [… ]. Then came latterday groups of people in Andalusia who became very proficient in mathematics and explained, conforming to Ptolemy’s premises, that Venus and Mercury were above the sun.” The difficulty in reaching an agreement in this matter derives from the main method of argumentation used here. Ptolemy based his calculation of the order of the planets on their relative velocity in relation to the fixed stars. Venus and Mercury however are equal in that matter to the sun. All three complete their circle in one yea r. Therefore Ptolemy could only 21















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of the fixed stars.25 Hence the basic cosmological movements that Aristotle, according to medieval diverse traditions, estimated with 47 or 55 can be further reduced not only to ten but even to four. These four basic movements stand in direct relation to a series of fourfold cosmological structures in the trans and sublunar realms.26 As mentioned above, Maimonides does not believe that the debate concerning the exact location of Mercury and Venus can be definitely settled through scientific arguments, and therefore he is more than happy to call on in his support a series of rabbinic assertions that seems to support his opinion.27 Maimonides uses this cosmological hypothesis in order to formulate a strong metaphysical claim, one that establishes a firm continuity between the two separate realms of the sublunar and translunar universe, reducing every movement in the elemental world to a concrete heavenly remote cause.28

Guide (note 15), ii, 9, p. 269: “Accordingly, the number of informed spheres […] is four; namely the sphere of the fixed stars, that of the five planets, that of the sun, and that of the moon.” 26 Guide (note 15) ii, 10, p. 271, Dux (note 15), ii, 11, fol. 44v: “The spheres are four; the elements moved by the spheres are four; and the forces proceeding from the spheres into that which exists in general are four […]. Similarly the causes of every motion belonging to the sphere are four: namely, the shape of the sphere – I mean to say its sphericity; its soul; and its intellect through which it has conceptions […]; and the separate intellect, which is its beloved. […] There are thus four causes of the motion of spheres and four sorts of general forces proceeding from it toward us. These are, as we have explained, the force causing the generation of the minerals, the force of the vegetative soul, the force of the animal soul, and the force of the rational soul.” 27 Ibid., p. 272, Dux (note 15), fol. 45r: “They said in Midrash Rabbi Tanhuma: – which refers to the dictum: And How many steps were in the ladder? Four ladder? Four – behold a ladder set up on the earth.’ […] that the angels of God , whom [Jacob] saw ascending and descending were only four […] – two ascending and two descending – and that the four gathered together upon one step of the ladder , all four being in one row”. 28 Guide (note 15), ii, 10, pp. 270f.: “[I]t occurred to me that while the four spheres having stars have forces that overflow from them as a whole toward 25
















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In his thorough examination of this Maimonidean hypothesis Gad Freudenthal reconstructs an inner shift within Maimonides Maimonides’’ thought from an early metaphysical oriented interpretation to a later maturer cosmological speculation. The metaphysical element of the early speculation is connected by Freudenthal with the identification of angels with separate substances/ intellects, an identification that seems to be lost in the later cosmological theory that identifies Ezekiel’s figures with ‘material substances’ (the globes).29 No doubt there is an evolution in Maimonides’ understanding of this matter and Freudenthal’s assertions are certainly correct. Yet they do not necessarily correspond correspond to the simple way in which Maimonides himself understands and uses his terminology. Planets, spheres and orbs, none of them can be defined as an ‘angel’. Who then are the four fou r angels on Jacob’s ladder? They are neither the four celestial orbs nor the four fo ur earthly elements, but rather the forces that emanate from the orbs on the elements, who are called ‘angels’. And what is the relation of the intelligences to the orbs? Maimonides asserts very clearly “the equivocality of the term ‘angel’ and that it includes the intellects, the spheres and the elements, in as much as all of them carry out orders.”30 But more than that he directly relates all those subdivisions into a total understanding of the heavenly organism. As he himself puts it, the four causes of every spherical motion are the shape of the sphere, its soul, its intellect and the “separate intellect, which is its beloved”. Finally I would like to mention Freudenthal’s claim that the sole reason for Maimonides to develop his innovative cosmology in part two of the ‘Guide’ is in order to prepare his interpretation of Ezekiel’s vision in part three.31 I for my part would rather assume the opposite, i.e. that Maimonides manipulates the biblical verses, just as he has done with the Rabbinic midrash , in order to promote his philosophical agenda: metaphysics becomes cosmology as God’s transcendence merges into a Spinozistic understanding of the universe as divine attribute, an attitude developed mostly in the second part of the ‘Guide’ and most clearly stated in ‘Guide’ 32 ii, chapter 30.

rect progressions, and their stations – that the shape of the air, its differences, and its rapid contractions and expansions are multiple. The sphere of the fixed

















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iii. What exactly did the Latins reject

in Arabic celestial cosmology?

Whatever the final judgment relating to the role played by Arab thought in Western Western intellectual history since the 12th century might be, one surely cannot write such a history of Europe without understanding precisely the position taken by the Christian authors toward their Arab predecessors. predecessors. This is true for most realms of Scholastic thought but it is even more crucial here precisely because a large part of Arab speculation on these matters was rejected or avoided by the Christian theologians, and because these rejections seem to function as a strong emotive force toward new formulations and definitions. As Marcia Colish argues, angelology as part not only of devotional and exegetical literature but also of systematic cosmology and natural philosophy is developed among Latin theologians not before the first half of the 33 13th century. Once Aristotelian physics and metaphysics becomes an integral part of the theological imagination, then the existence of purely spiritual entities, such as angels, enables medieval thinkers to break through the limitations of classical Aristotelian discourse. Among the Latins, the breakthrough was neatly related to the th e encounter with Arab cosmology cosmology.. Following these general assertions assertio ns I would like to emphasize the fact that it is well nigh impossible to suggest any definitive description of the high scholastic attitude toward Arabic cosmology. cosmology. The vast corpus of Albertus
















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philosophorum’, so intensively discuss angelological matters. In this discussion they seem to present the hegemonic opinion op inion of scholastic theology, th eology, which is not strongly contradicted by any other scholastic author known to me. Before moving into the details of this critique I would lik e to generalize what seems to be its most basic features: 1. The division between the philosophical and theological discourse realms leads in some cases to a systematic division between the natural philosophical language concerning Aristotelian intelligences and the theological biblical language concerning angels. Here Albert and Thomas are usually taken to represent two different options.34 2.The bottom line is that the scholastic discussion represents a united front against Arabic theo-cosmology theo-cosmol ogy in its entirety. The difficulty of tracing a coherent and exact attitude of Latin philosophers toward the questions under discussion might be described through the notions suggested by Robert J. Henle, SJ in his monographon ‘Saint Thomas and Platonism’, differentiating between ratio, positio and via.35 None of the Latin philosophers totally reject all three elements. But all of them, each in his own way, rejects the via, i.e. the overall naturalistic framework, framework , with its possible determinist implications. Hence one cannot deduce or expect the logical/anal logical/analogogical ‘implicit’ assertion of a given theory. theory. Instead we must carefully follow the concrete line of argumentation and only afterwards try and understand the possible motivations lying underneath.36 In the following I shall provide such an analysis in relation to some major points of criticism. iii.1 The heavenly location of angels: between theology and cosmology















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cosmological hierarchy of intelligences, celestial spheres and orbs as an adequate description of the angelic realm. On different occasions angels would be defined as the ministers of these celestial bodies, hence identified with Aristotelian intelligences. Such a solution solves the local problem, in that each celestial sphere is directly connected with an angel, yet the Latins clearly reject two possible implications of such a hypothesis: first, the identity cannot be complete, as there are angels who do not minister to the orbs, as Bonaventure claims in Hexaemeron; second the total number of angels cannot be reduced to the number of the t he heavenly spheres.37 Recently,, Sylvain Piron argued, relating to the angelological doctrines of Recently Thomas Aquinas, that “(N)o other attempt at reconcilling both traditions [i.e. biblical and Hellenistic] was pursued as conscientiously and exhaustively in the thirteenth century.”38 As true as such a general assertion might be we shall see that Thomas does not radically differ from his contemporaries in his attitude toward the questions discussed here. Concerning the number of angels, Thomas mentions Maimonides’ name as one who (unsuccessfully) tried to accomplish precisely the achievement assigned assign ed to Thomas himself by Piron (Rabbi Moyses, Iudaeus, volens utrumque concordare).39 37

Bonaventura, In Hexaemeron, sermo v, Ed. Adolph C. Peltier, S. Bonaventurae Opera Omnia, 9, Paris 1867, p. 59: Alii posuerunt, quod Angeli essent numerate secundum numerum motuum, propter inclinationem naturalem ad motum. Alii posuerunt decem intelligentias, solum considerantes earum influentias, et fecerunt insanias et contentions. Angelus bene potest esse sine
















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In his commentary on the second book of the ‘Sentences’ Thomas expounds on the different attitudes toward these classifications in Greek, Jewish and Moslem Moslem traditions, related to the exegetical question concerning the identification of the nature of biblical angels with the cosmological discussion of their total numbering: Respondeo dicendum, quod ratio humana deficit a cognitione substantiarum separatarum, quae tamen sunt notissima naturae, ad quae intellectus noster se habet sicut oculus noctuae ad lumen solis, ut dicitur in 2 Metaphys. […] Et ideo philosophi de illis nihil quasi demonstrative, et pauca probabiliter dixerunt: et hoc ostendit eorum diversitas in ponendo numerum Angelorum. Quidam enim posuerunt numerum substantiarum separatarum secundum numerum motuum caeli, sicut Aristoteles in 12 Metaphys. Quidam secundum numerum sphaerarum, ut Avicenna in sua Metaphysic. […] [… ] Quidam vero posuit Angelos non in determinato numero nobis; sed tantum per Angelos significari dicit in Scripturis omnem virtutem vel corporalem vel spiritualem per quam Deus ordinem suae providentiae explet, quasi divinae voluntatis nuntium; adeo quod vim concupiscibilem nominat Angelum concupiscentiae: sed substantias separatas dicit esse secundum numerum quem philosophi posuerunt; et iste est Rabbi Moyses. Fides autem Catholica tenet numerum substantiarum separatarum, quas Angelos dicimus, esse numerum Deo finitum, sed nobis infinitum.40

The biblical angel cannot be completely identified with heavenly intelligences according to Aristotle in the ‘Metaphysics’ and ‘De caelo’ because there is an agreement among the commentators that Aristotelian intelligences are unmoved movers, immovable in themselves, while the biblical















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and suggest a crucial subdivision within the cosmic notion of place.41 It is mostly through such analytic precision that the scholastics try to resolve the paradox pointed out by Tiziana Suarez-Nani, i.e. that angels according to the Catholic truth as presented by Thomas Aquinas are deprived of any locality,, that they do not have locality h ave place.42 A most systematic integration of these different definitions of place in their cosmological context is to be found in the ‘Summa philosophiae’. Its English author, writing in the early 1270s’, first states the problematic of spiritual substances that cannot be located, neither in place nor in space, since they have no physical dimensional existence.43 Hence the author provides a series of definitions defini tions for locality localit y, such as locus circumscriptivus and definitivus, then implementing them on a series of entities, from the highest sphere, to the inferior orbs, spirits and souls. The first heaven, since it is not contained by any physical entity, has only a corporeal but not a circumscriptive definitive place, while the inferior spheres have both circumscriptive and corporeal. Spiritual substances have neither circumsc circumscriptive riptive nor corporeal spatial definition. Instead the author adopt the Thomistic solution: their place is defined by their operations. The soul finally is defined as having essentially solely a definitive place and only accidentally having a circumscriptive place, which is the body animated by it.44 The beginnings of 41

For Abelard as an early source for the description of angelic location as ‘circumscribable’ see Marenbon, John, Abelard on Angels, in: Angels in Medieval Philosophical Inquiry (note 1), pp. 63–72, esp. pp. 69–71. Abelard might be considered as a direct source for the Lombard who further develops this dif-


















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such a Dominican doctrine can be seen already in the writings of Guerric of Saint-Quentin in his ‘Quaestiones de quolibet’, composed during the 1230s. Guerric’ss unsystematic discussion of angels is found throughout the whole Guerric’ text. While rather undeveloped in his sources, heavily relying on Augustine, Lombard and other early scholastic authorities, Guerric does show interest in some of the acute questions of the second half of the century. His angels, located in the empyreum, have no power to move corporeal objects at a distance and have no connection whatsoever to heavenly bodies. I shall come back to this in the following, followin g, in discussing the question of physically distant causality causality.. iii.2 Angels and Intelligences

The identification, even on the strictly semiotic level, between Aristotelian intelligences and biblical angels creates one of the th e most misleading formu-















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Ordines autem intelligentiarum, quas nos determinavìmus, Quidam dicunt esse ordines angelorum et intelligentias vocant angelos. Et hoc quidem dicunt Isaac et Rabbi Moyses et ceteri philosophi Iudaeorum. Sed nos hoc verum esse non credimus. Ordines enim angelorum distinguuntur secundum differentias illuminationum et theophaniarum, quae revelatione accipiuntur et fide creduntur et ad perfectionem regni caelestis cae lestis ordinantur in gratia et beatitudine. De quibus philosophìa nihil potest per rationem philosophicam determinare.46

The individuation of angels and their hierarchy has nothing to do with their local position in space but with their spiritual grade of illumination and grace, which do not belong to the discursive realm of philosophy and science. Peripatetic intelligences are motionless, unlike the spheres and their souls. Every intelligence is an unmoved mover, mover, and therefore the hierarchy of the intelligences is deprived of the dynamic moment characteristic of the elemental realm.47 For Albert, the spheres mediate cosmic powers, angels mediate divine power. Identification of the two leads to radical naturaliza-
















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are approximately 60 out of 219 articles (without taking into consideration topics related to the possible and agent intellect which are also relevant to our discussion).50 Also a large part of ‘De errores philosophorum’ is dedicated to this topic. In the first chapter, dealing with the errors of Aristotle himself, the author mentions an identification of angels with intelligences and celestial orbs,51 reading anachronistically angelos into Aristotle’s Aristotle ’s terminology.. When it comes to Averroes our author again takes for granted the nology identity between angels and celestial intelligences, while blaming Averroes Averroes for defining angels as actio pura, hence eliminating the inner distinction in the celestial realm between God and the other spiritual substances.52 iii.3 Angels as mediators of divine creation and providence

According to the author of ‘De errores philosophorum’ Averroes is also mistaken in assuming that the angel physical entities immedi-















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as Algazali’s) ‘Metaphysics’ provided a full synthesis of Aristotelian and Neoplatonic cosmologies. This cosmology was accepted by early scholastic authors such as Dominicus Gundissalinus, the author of the ‘Liber de causis primis et secundis’ and partially also by Alan of Lille and William of Auvergne in his ‘De universo’. From the mid 13th century however it would be systematically rejected by theologians, who did not accept the existence of secondary causes as mediated forces between God and the creatures. According to Caterina Rigo’s analysis of Albertus Magnus’ encounter with Maimonides54 one can trace a turning point within Albert’s early early intellectual development around the writing of the th e second part of his commentary on the Sentences and the second redaction of his ‘De iv coaequaevis’ around 1246. From now on Albert the theologian, in contrast to the former scholar of artes, is not willing to accept the identification between angels and intelligences, rejects the concept of animated spheres and rejects the concept of secondary causes.55
















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of a series of Arab texts t exts translated in Toledo, mostly by him, such as ‘Liber de causis’58 and Avicenna’s ‘Metaphysics’.59 Albert discuss Gundissalinus in ‘De homine’ [second part of ‘Summa de creaturis’] i,3 (Utrum animae 60 rationales immediate creentur a deo an ab intelligentiis int elligentiis angelicis) quoting, beside Gundissalinus, also the third proposition of the ‘Liber de causis’ (quia cusa prima creavit esse animae mediante intelligentia), and a passage from Isaac Israeli’s Israeli’s ‘Liber de definitionibus’, another text translated by Gundissalinus. Against these claims Albert asserts that one has to maintain that the angels were not involved in the creation of the human soul at all and do not even create as God’ God’ss ministers.61 Later on, in Albert’s commentary on Dionysius’ ‘Celestial hierarchy’, written in 1248, Albert clearly connected the problem of mediated causation to the cosmic order of angels.62 The philosophers cannot accept that the intelligences can act upon the sublunar world in any way other than through thro ugh the mediation of the spheres, “but we do not assume that angels act through

















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These are precisely the two facets of Arab cosmology where the celestial entities mediate between the divine and the created universe and the orbs mediate between the separate intellects (angels) and the sublunar elements. A most detailed description of the different attitudes toward the problem
















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uses the notion of place in a spiritual sense to designate a degree of divine illumination.65 Many articles in the condemnation of 1277 are dedicated to the issue of mediatory causes. The different articles refer to great variety of mistaken















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Yossef Yos sef Schwartz iii.4 Heaven inanimate

In its most extreme formulation this rejection would not be limited anymore to the pure theological discourse of angels but would be formulated as a
















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cated to the false conception of the celestial spheres as animated living entities, being analogous to the human body – mind system. Against such an assumption the author quotes as Catholic authority Damascenus, claiming that the heavens are inanimate and insensible.76 The same mistake is attrib-















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that Maimonides himself claims originality.78 The four orbs/globes theory – according to Gad Freudenthal, at least in its precise p recise formulation truly an 79 independent theory of Maimonides – creates a multifaceted system that connects all ontological realms and cosmological levels. One can find some























































































Divine Space and the Space of the Divin

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