PCGG vs. Pena, 159 SCRA 556 FACTS: This is a case about the Presidential Commission on Good Government, created through E.O. 1, charging it with the task of assisting the President in regard to the recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by the Marcoses, including the power to issue freeze orders or sequestration of all business enterprises owned by them upon showing of a prima facie case. March 25, 1986 – PCGG issued an order freezing the assets, effects, documents and records of two export garment manufacturing firms: American Inter-fashion Corporation and De Soleil Apparel Manufacturing Corporation. June 27, 1986 – PCGG designated the OIC, Saludo, and Yeung Chun Ho as authorized signatories to effect deposits and withdrawals of the funds of the two corporations. Sept. 4, 1986 – PCGG designated Yim Kam Shing as co-signatory, in t he absence of Yeung Chun Ho and Marcelo de Guzman, in the absence of Saludo. Feb. 3, 1987 – Saludo, in a memorandum, revoked the authorizations previously issued upon finding that Mr. Yim Kam Shing was a Hong Kong Chinese national staying in the country on a mere tourist visa. The PCGG Commissioner approved the memorandum. Shortly, thereafter, Saludo withdrew funds from Metrobank against the accounts of the two corporations for payment of the salaries of t he stuff. Yeung Chung Kam, Yeung Chun Ho and Archie Chan instituted through Yim Kam Shing an action for damages with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against the said bank, PCGG, the Commissioner and OIC Saludo with the RTC, questiong the aforesaid revocation of the authorization as signatory previously granted to Yim Kam Shing. RTC i ssued TRO. PCGG filed a motion t o dismiss with opposition to Yim‟s prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction on the ground that the t rial court has no jurisdiction over the Commission or over the subject of the case. RTC judge denied PCGG‟s motion to dismiss and granted Yim‟s prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. Hence this petition. ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the PCGG
HELD: The Supreme Court held that RTC and the CA for that matter have no jurisdiction over the PCGG in the exercise of its powers under the applicable Executive Orders and Art. XVIII, sec. 26 of the Constitution and therefore may not interfere with and restrain or set aside the orders and actions of the Commission. Under section 2 of the President's Executive Order No. 14 issued on May 7, 198 6, all cases of the Commission regarding "the Funds, Moneys, Assets, and Properties Illegally Acquired or Misappropriated by Former President Ferdinand Marcos, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their Close Relatives, Subordinates, Business Associates, Dummies, Agents, or Nominees" 1 whether civil or criminal, are lodged within the "exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan" 2 and all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to, such cases necessarily fall li kewise under the Sandiganbayan's exclusive and original jurisdiction, subject t o review on certiorari exclusively by the Supreme Court. Powers of the PCGG E.O. 1 – created PCGG, charging it to assist the President in the recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by the Marcoses, including sequestration and provisional takeover of all business enterprises owned by them as well as conduct i nvestigations, require submission of evidence by subpoena, administer oaths, punish for contempt. Freedom Constitution (Proc. No. 3) – mandated the President to “…recover ill-gotten ill -gotten properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous
regime….” Quasi-Judicial Function As can be readily seen, PCGG exercises quasi-judicial functions. In the exercise of quasi-judicial functions, theCommission is a co-equal body with regional trial courts and “co-equal bodies have no power to control the other.” However, although under B.P. 129, the CA has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgment…of regional trial courts and quasi-judicial bodies, E.O. 14 specifically provides in section 2 that "The Presidential Commission on Good Government shall file all such cases, whether civil or criminal, with the Sandiganbayan which shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction thereof." Necessarily, those who wish to question or challenge the Commission's acts or orders in such cases must seek recourse in t he same court, the Sandiganbayan, which is vested with exclusive and original jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan's decisions and final orders are in turn subject to review on certiorari exclusively by this Court. Primary Administrative Jurisdiction and Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies The Court recently had occasion to stress once more, in G.R. No. 82218, Reyes vs. Caneba March 17, 1988, that "(T)he thrust of the related doctrines of primary administrative jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. Acts of an administrative agency must not casually be overturned by a court, and a court should as a rule not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency acting within the perimeters of its own competence." Applying these fundamental doctrines to the case at bar, the questions and disputes raised by respondents seeking to controvert the Commission's finding of prima facie basis for the issuance of its sequestration orders as well as the interjection of the claims of the predecessor of American Inter-fashion and De SoleilCorporations, viz. Glorious Sun Phil., headed by Nemesis Co are all questions that are within the primary administrative jurisdiction of the Commission that cannot be prematurely brought up to clog the court dockets without first resorting to the exhaustion of the prescribed administrative remedies. The administrative procedure and remedies for contesting orders of sequestration issued by the Commission are provided for in its rules and regulations. Thus, the person against whom a writ of sequestration is directed may request the lifting thereof, in writing; after due hearing or motu proprio for good cause shown, the Commission may lift the writ unconditionally or subject to such conditions as it may deem necessary, taking into consideration the evidence and the circumstances of the case. The resolution of the Commission is appealable to the President of the Philippines. The Commission conducts a hearing, after due notice to the parties concerned to ascertain whether any particular asset, property or enterprise constitutes ill-gotten wealth. TheCommission's order of sequestration is not final, at the proper time, the question of ownership of the sequestered properties shall be exclusively determined in the Sandiganbayan, whose own decisions in turn are subject to review exclusively by the Supreme Court. It should be emphasized here, as again stressed by the Court in the recent case of Republic, et al. vs. De los Angeles, et al., G.R. No. L-30240, March 25, 1988, that "it is well-recognized principle that purely administrative and discretionary function may not be interfered with by the courts. In general, courts have no supervising power over the proceedings and actions of the administrative departments of government. This is generally true with respect to acts involving the exercise of judgment or discretion, and findings of fact. There s hould be no thought of disregarding the traditional line separating judicial and administrative competence, the former being entrusted with the determination of legal questions and the latter being limited as a result of its expertise to the ascertainment of the decisive facts." This is specially true in sequestration cases affected by the Commission for the recovery of the nation' s plundered wealth that may affect the nation's very survival, in the light of the constitutional mandate that such sequestration or freeze orders "shall be issued only upon showing of a prima facie case" 17 and the settled principle that findings by administrative or quasi-judicial agencies like the Commission are entitled t o the greatest respect and are practically binding and conclusive, like the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts, save where they are patently arbitrary or capricious or are not supported by substantial evidence.
United Residents of Dominican Hills vs. Commission on Settlement of Land Problems, 353 SCRA 782 “Quasi- judicial function” is a term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc. of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. However, it does not depart from its basic nature as an administrative agency, albeit one that exercises quasi-judicial functions. Still, administrative agencies are not considered courts; they are neither part of t he judicial system nor are they deemed judicial t ribunals. FACTS: Some 800 public school teachers undertook “mass concerted actions” to protest the alleged failure of public authorities to act upon their grievances. The “mass actions” consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peacable assemblies, etc. The Secretary of Education served them with an order to return to work within 24 hours or face dismissal. For failure to heed t he return-to-work order, eight teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School were administratively charged, preventively suspended for 90 days pursuant to sec. 41, P.D. 807 and temporarily replaced. An investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the charges. When their motion for suspension was denied by the Investigating Committee, said teachers staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings. Eventually, Secretary Carino decreed dismissal from service of Esber and the suspension for 9 months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. In the meantime, a case was filed with RTC, raising the issue of violation of the right of the striking teachers‟ to due process of law. The case was eventually elevated to SC. Also in t he meantime, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements to Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacement as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to them. While the case was pending with CHR, SC promulgated its resolution over the cases filed with it earlier, upholding the Sec. Carino‟s act of issuing the return-to-work orders. Despite this, CHR continued hearing its case and held that the “striking teachers” “were denied due process of law;…they should not have been replaced without a chance to reply to the administrative charges;” there had been violation of their civil and political rights which the Commission is empowered to investigate.” ISSUE:
Whether or not CHR has jurisdiction t o try and hear the issues involved
HELD: The threshold question is whether or not t he Commission on Human Rights has the power under the Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice, 19 or even a quasi-judicial agency, it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights. The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter. The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those
factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be p rovided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have. Power to Investigate The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of an y person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt i n accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its fu nctions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its fi ndings. But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi -judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite disti nct meanings. “Investigate” vs. “Adjudicate” "Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an official inquiry." The purpose of investigation, of course, i s to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry. The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain mat ter or matters." "Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally ( the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy . . . ." In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits" t he question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the t eachers to discontinue those actions, and return to t heir classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained of by them; and (c)
what where the particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions. Who has Power to Adjudicate? These are matters within the original jurisdiction of the Sec. of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within t he appellate jurisdiction of the CSC. Manner of Appeal Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the Secretary of Education in disciplinary cases are correct and are adequately based on substantial evidence; whether or not the proceedings themselves are void or defective in not having accorded the respondents due process; and whether or not the Secretary of Education had in truth committed "human rights violations involving civil and political rights," are matters which may be passed upon and determined through a motion for reconsideration addressed to the Secretary Education himself, and in the event of an adverse verdict, may be reviewed by the Civil Service Commission and eventually the Supreme Court.
“Quasi- judicial power” distinguished from “judicial power” and “quasi -legislative power” Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. vs. Secretary of Education Culture and Sports, 153 SCRA 622 QUASI-LEGISLATIVE v. QUASI-JUDICIAL: When the rules and/or rates laid down by an administrative agency are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the country, they may partake of a legislative character. Where the rules and the rates imposed apply exclusively to a particular party, based upon a finding of fact, then its function is quasi-judicial in character.
Requirements for Valid Exercise (1) Jurisdiction Q: How is jurisdiction determined? A: Jurisdiction is conferred by law and by the Constitution. Thus, in order to determine who has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a case, one only needs to look at the law whether or not it confers jurisdiction on the body. Q: How do you resolve a conflict of jurisdiction between a quasi-judicial body and the court? A: First, determine what the controversy is all about. Is the plaintiff questioning whether an administrative body has a certain power? Or is he questioning how said power was exercised? In the first, the particular law creating the body must be considered in order to determine whether or not the administrative body has authority. If the law has been entrusted to that body for its implementation and such law vests authority in said body, then it has jurisdiction. Upon the other hand, if the case puts in issue, not whether the body has authority, but the questionable manner it is exercised, then the courts have jurisdiction to determine whether or not in the exercise of such powers rights and obligations have been impaired.
Globe Wireless Ltd vs. Public Service Commission, 147 SCRA 269 Too basic in administrative law to need citation of jurisprudence is the rule that the jurisdiction and powers of administrative agencies are limited to those expressly granted or necessarily implied from those granted in the l egislation creating such body; and any order without or beyond such jurisdiction
is void and ineffective.
Syquia vs. Board of Power and Water Works, 74 SCRA 212 FACTS: Ruiz, Enriquez and Moses filed 3 separate complaints with Board of Power and Waterworks charging Syquia as administrator of the South Syquia Apartments with t he offense of selling electricity without permit or franchise and alleging that Syquia billed them for their electricity consumption in excess of the Meralco rates. In her answer, Syquia questioned the jurisdiction of the Board, saying that she is not engaged in the sale of electric power but merely passes to the apartment tenants as the end-users their legitimate electric current bills in accordance with their l ease contracts. ISSUE:
Whether or not the Board has jurisdiction
HELD: Respondent board as a regulatory board manifestly exceeded its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and adjudicating the complaints filed by respondents against petitioner. Respondent board acquired no jurisdiction over petitioner's contractual relations with respondentscomplainants as her tenants, since petitioner is not engaged in a public service nor in the sale of electricity without permit or franchise. Respondents' complaints against being charged the additional cost of el ectricity for common facilities used by the tenants (in addition to those registered in their respective apartment meters) give rise to a question that is purely civil in character that is to be adjudged under the applicable provisions of the Civil Code (not the Public Service Act) and not by the respondent regulatory board which has no jurisdiction but by the regular courts of general jurisdiction. Respondent board in resolving the complaints against petitioner and requiring her to absorb the additional rising costs of electricity consumed for the common areas and el evator service even at a resultant loss of P15,000 .00 a year arrogated the judicial function. Its orders were beyond its jurisdiction and must be set aside as null and void.
Marino, Jr. vs. Gamilla, G.R. No. 132400, Jan. 31, 2 005 HOW JURISDICTION IS DETERMINED: Jurisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein. LIMITED JURISDICTION OF AGENCIES: Administrative agencies are tribunals of limited jurisdiction and as such, can exercise only those powers which are specifically granted to them by t heir enabling statutes. Consequently, matters over which they are not granted authority are beyond their competence. While the trend is towards vesting administrative bodies with the power to adjudicate matters coming under their particular specialization, to ensure a more knowledgeable solution of the problems submitted to them, this should not deprive the courts of justice t heir power to decide ordinary cases in accordance with the
general laws that do not require any particular expertise or training to interpret and apply.
(2) Due Process Q: What is meant by “opportunity to be heard?” A: It is the essence of due process. Due process in administrative proceedings includes the opportunity to be heard OR the opportunity to explain one’s side OR the opportunity to seek reconsideration UNLESS administrative rules on proceeding do not allow such motion for reconsideration. Thus, “an opportunity to be heard” does not require physical presence; for as long as the party is provided a remedy with which he can appeal his case or seek relief from an adverse judgment, then due process is complied with.
Utto vs. COMELEC, 375 SCRA 523 In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or an opportunity to explain one‟s side or opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
Rivera vs. Civil Service Commission, 240 SCRA 43 MUST NOT ONLY BE IMPARTIAL BUT MUST ALSO APPEAR IMPARTIAL: In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out to be a face, t hen reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose decision i s under review; otherwise, there could be no different view or t here would be no real review of the case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case.
Exceptions to requirements of notice and hearing 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
Summary abatement of nuisance per se Preventive suspension Padlocking of filthy restaurants, theaters, etc. Cancellation of passport of accused Summary distraint and levy Grant of provisional authority
Related Powers 1. 2. 3.
Power to promulgate own Rules of Procedures Subpoena Power Contempt Power
Q: Does an administrative agency have t he power to issue subpoena or hold a person in contempt for failure to comply with its order? A: It depends on whether or not the particular administrative agency has the authority to take testimony or evidence under the law it is entrusted to implement. Under the Revised Administrative Code, an agency that has been vested with the authority to take testimony or evidence likewise has the power to subpoena witnesses and require them to submit documents under a subpoena duces tecum. When a witness disregards its orders, the administrative body may also apply for a contempt of court with the court of first instance which has jurisdiction over the case, provided that such body
has the burden of proof in showing that it has authority t o take testimony or evidence. Q: Does an administrative agency authorized to investigate likewise have the power to issue subpoena and contempt? How do you reconcile this with the rule that administrative agencies can exercise powers expressly provided in the law as well as all those that are necessarily incidental in the exercise thereof? A: It depends. It is true that administrative agencies can exercise powers expressly provided in the law as well as all those necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. However, this rule admits of certain limitations, such as when the administrative agency is only a sub-delegate, in which case, the agency must never go beyond the limits of the function sub-delegated upon it by the authority vested by law. Another limitation is where the liberty and property of persons are sought to be brought within the operation of a power claimed to be impliedly granted by an act because it is necessary to its due execution, the case must be clearly seen to be within those intended to be reached. In other words, in order to determine whether the power to investigate includes the subpoena and contempt power, the law or rule vesting such authority must be examined in order to determine the nature and character of the delegation. If it is in the nature of subordinate delegation, then the general rule applies. But if it is merely a sub-delegation of a function by the authority directly vested by law, then it is necessary that the body must not exercise a power beyond that which has been sub-delegated. And finally, the circumstances of the case must be taken in consideration, for where it involves the liberty and property of persons there must be a clear showing that the case is within the scope of the authority vested.
Quantum of Proof Lameyra vs. Pangilinan, 322 SCRA 117 While it is settled doctrine that findings of fact of an administrative agency must be respected and this Court should not be tasked to weigh once more the evidence submitted before the administrative body, it is axiomatic that such findings of fact should be supported by substantial evidence.
PLDT vs. Tiamson, G.R. No. 164684-85, Nov. 11, 20 05 FACTUAL FINDINGS BINDING UPON COURTS: It is a settled rule that factual fi ndings of labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their respective jurisdictions, are generally accorded not only respect but even finality. Moreover, in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, the Supreme Court reviews only errors of law and not errors of facts. However, where there is divergence in the findings and conclusions of the NLRC, on the one hand, from those of the Labor Arbiter and the Court of Appeals, on the other, the Court is constrained to examine the evidence. BURDEN OF PROOF: In termination cases, the burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that t he dismissal is for just and valid cause; failure to do so would necessarily mean that the dismissal was illegal. The employer‟s case succeeds or fails on the strength of i ts evidence and not on the weakness of the employee‟s defense. If doubt exists between the evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of t he latter. Moreover, the quantum of proof required in determining the legality of an employee‟s dismissal is only substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintil la of evidence or relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise.
Enforcement and Execution
Lapid vs. CA, 174 SCRA 258 Appeal will not stay the award, judgment, final order or resolution unless the law directs otherwise.
Res judicata in administrative decisions Ocho vs. Calos, 345 SCRA 478 The doctrine of res judicata applies to both judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings. The doctrine actually embraces two concepts: the first is “bar by prior judgment” and the second is “conclusiveness of judgment.” The second concept is explained thus: The general rule precluding the relitigation of material facts or questions which were in issue and adjudicated in former action are commonly applied to all matters essentially connected with the subject matter of litigation. Thus it extends to questions „necessarily involved in an issue, and necessarily adjudicated, or necessarily implied in the final judgment, although no specific finding may have been made in reference thereto, and although such matters were directly referred to in the pleadings and were not actually or formally presented. Under this rule, if the record of t he former trial shows that the judgment could not have been rendered without deciding the particular matter, it will be considered as having settled that matter as to all future actions between the parties, and if a judgment necessarily presupposes certain premises, they are as conclusive as the judgment itself. Reasons for the rule are that a judgment is an adjudication on all the matters which are essential to support it, and that every proposition assumed or decided by the court leading up to t he final conclusion upon which such conclusion i s based is as effectually passed upon as the ultimate question which is solved.
