People v. Velasco G.R. No. 127444
13 September 2000
There was a shooting in San Ildefonso, Bulacan. The shooting claimed the life of Alex Vinculado and seriously injured his twin brother Lei. Their uncle, !iguel Vinculado, "r. "r. was also shot. Three #$% criminal Informations & one #'% for homicide and two #(% for frustrated homicide were initially )led against *onorato +ale, !ayor of San Ildefonso, and +odofredo -iego, -iego, the alleged bodyguard bodyguard of the mayor. mayor. *oweer, the charges were withdrawn and a new set was )led against the same accused ugrading the crimes to murder and frustrated murder. !ayor +al +ale e was was char charge ged, d, in addi additi tion on,, with with iol iolat atio ion n of /- '0 '011 11 for for unauthoried carrying of )rearm )rearm outside his residence. The trial court found the accused +odofredo -iego guilty beyond reaso easonab nable le doub doubtt of the the crim crimes es of mur murder der and and doubl double e frus frustr trat ated ed murder murder.. *owee *oweer, r, it ac2uit ac2uitted ted !ayor !ayor *onora *onorato to +ale +ale of the same same charges due to insu3ciency of eidence. It also absoled him from the charge of illegal carrying of )rearm uon its )nding that the act was not a iolation of law. The ac2uittal of accused *onorato +ale was challenged by the +oernment before this 4ourt in a /etition for 4ertiorari under 5ule 16 of the 5ules of 4ourt. Allegedly, in holding in faor of +ale, the judge deliberately and wrongfully disregarded certain facts and eidence on record which, if judiciously considered, would hae led to a )nding of guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. /etitioner rooses that this this atent atently ly gross gross judici judicial al indisc indiscre retio tion n and arbitr arbitrari arines ness s should should be recti)ed by a re&examination of the eidence by the 4ourt uon a dete deterrmina minati tion on that that a reie eiew w of the the case case will will not not tran transg sgrress ess the the constitutional guarantee against double dou ble jeoardy. jeoardy. It is urged that this is necessary because the judgment of ac2uittal should be nulli)ed and substituted with a erdict of guilt. /etitioner ino7es the constitutional doctrine in the 8nited States that the -ouble "eoardy 4lause ermits a reiew of ac2uittals decreed by 8S trial magistrates where, as in this case, no retrial is re2uired should judgment be oerturned. Since /hiliine concets on double jeoardy hae been sourced from American constitutional rinciles, statutes and jurisrudence, articularly the case of Kepner v. United States and States and because similarly in this jurisdiction a retrial does not follow in the eent an ac2uittal on aeal is reersed, double jeoardy should also be allowed to ta7e the same directional course. ISSUES
& 9hether a reiew by the Sureme 4ourt of a judgment of ac2uittal in light of the constitutional interdict against double jeoardy is ermissible HEL!R"#I$ N$. It must be exlained that under existing American law and jurisrudence, aeals may be had not only from criminal conictions but also, in some limited instances, from dismissals of criminal charges, sometimes loosely termed :ac2uittals.: But this is so as long as the judgments of dismissals do not involve determination of evidence. It must inole 2uestions of law or matters unrelated to a factual resolution of the case which conse2uently, on aeal, will not inole a reiew of eidence. United States v. Scott ositiely selled out that if an ac2uittal was based on an areciation of the eidence adduced, no aeal would lie. In the case at bar, the records show that resondent trial judge based his )nding of ac2uittal, no matter how erroneous it might seem to etitioner, uon the eidence resented by both arties. The judgment here was no less than a factual resolution of the case. The doctrine that an aeal of a judgment after the defendant had been ac2uitted by the court in a bench trial is a new trial, is alicable in this case. 5e2uisites for ino7ing double jeoardy; #a% a alid comlaint or information< #b% before a cometent court before which the same is )led< #c% the defendant had leaded to the charge< and, #d% the defendant was acquitted, or conicted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his exress consent. It bears reeating that where ac2uittal is concerned, the rules do not distinguish whether it occurs at the leel of the trial court or on aeal from a judgment of coniction. This )rmly establishes the )nality&of& ac2uittal rule in our jurisdiction. Therefore, as mandated by our laws and jurisrudence, an ac2uittal is )nal and unaealable on the ground of double jeoardy, whether it haens at the trial court leel or before the 4ourt of Aeals. In general, the rule is that a remand to a trial court of a judgment of ac2uittal brought before the Sureme 4ourt on certiorari cannot be had unless there is a )nding of mistrial. The doctrine that :double jeoardy may not be ino7ed after trial: may aly only when the 4ourt )nds that the =criminal trial was a sham> because the rosecution reresenting the soereign eole in the criminal case was denied due
rocess. The :remand of the criminal case for further hearing and?or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the )rst jeoardy, and does not exose the accused to a second jeoardy. @Sir said; Ac2uittal must be alid an error of jurisdiction is the only alid ground for reiew. If aeal is based on error of judgment, it will amount to double jeoardy.