R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 1 RUPERTA CANO VDA. DE VIRAY and JESUS CARLO GERARD VIRAY vs.SPOUSES JOSE USI and AMELITA USI VELASCO, JR., J.: JR., J.: The Facts On April 28, 1986, Geodetic Engineer Abdon G. Fajardo prepared a
subdivision plan (Fajardo Plan) for Lot 733,registered in the name of Ellen P. Mendoza (Mendoza) under Transfer Certificate of Title No. (TCT) 141-RP of the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga, in which Lot 733 was divided into six (6) smaller parcels of differing size dimensions, designated as: Lot 733-A, Lot 733-B, Lot 733-C, Lot 733-D, Lot 733-E, and Lot 733-F. The following day, Mendoza executed two separate deeds of
absolute sale, the first, transferring Lot 733-F to Jesus Carlo Gerard Viray (Jesus Viray), and the second deed conveying Lot 733-A to spouses AvelinoViray and Margarita Masangcay (Sps. Viray). As of that time, the Fajardo Plan has not been officially approved by the Land Management Bureau (LMB), formerly the Bureau of Lands. And at no time in the course of the controversy did the spouses Viray and Jesus Viray, as purchasers of Lots 733-A and 733-F, respectively, cause the annotations of the conveying deeds of sale on TCT 141-RP. The aforementioned conveyances notwithstanding, Mendoza,
Emerenciana M. Vda. de Mallari (Vda. de Mallari) and respondent spouses Jose Usi and Amelita T. Usi (Sps. Usi or the Usis), as purported co-owners of Lot 733, executed on August 20, 1990 a Subdivision Agreement,or the1st subdivision agreement (1st SA). Pursuant to this agreement which adopted, as base of reference, the LMB-approved subdivision plan prepared by Geodetic Engineer Alfeo S. Galang (Galang Plan), Lot 733 was subdivided into three lots, i.e., Lots A to C.TCT 141-RP would eventually be canceled and, in lieu thereof, three derivative titles were issued to the following, as indicated: TCT 1584-RP for Lot 733-A to Emerencia M. Vda. Mallari; TCT 1585-RP for Lot 733-B to Sps. Jose B. Usi and Amelita B.Usi; and TCT 1586-RP for Lot 733-C to Ellen P. Mendoza. On April 5, 1991, another Subdivision Agreement (2nd SA) was
executed, covering and under which the 8,148-sq. m. Lot 733-C was further subdivided into 13 smaller lots (Lot 733-C-1 to Lot 733-C-13 inclusive). The subdivision plan for Lot 733-C, as likewise prepared by Engr. Galang on October 13, 1990, was officially approved by the LMB on March 1, 1991. Based on the ocular inspection and survey conducted on Lot 733,
as an undivided whole, by Geodetic Engr. AngelitoNicdao of the LMB, Lot 733-A of the Fajardo Plan that Sps. Viray bought is within Lot 733-B (Galang Plan) allotted under 1st SA to Sps. Jose and AmelitaUsi; andLot 733-F of the Fajardo Plan is almost identical to the combined area of Lots 733-C-8 to 733-C-12 awarded to Ellen Mendoza and her children—McDwight, Bismark, Beverly and Georgenia, and a portion (1,000 square meters) of Lot 733-C-10 of the Galang Plan awarded to Sps. Jose and AmelitaUsi. The Usis and Mendoza filed a suit for Annulment of Deed of
Absolute Sale filed before the RTC, Pampanga assailing t he validity and seeking the annulment of the deed of absolute sale executed by Mendoza conveying Lot 733-A (Fajardo Plan) to defendants Sps. Viray.A similar suit for Annulment of Deed of Absolute Sale commenced by Mendoza against Jesus Viray, also seeking to nullify the Deed of Absolute Sale conveying Lot 733-F (Fajardo Plan) to Jesus Viray and to declare the plaintiff as entitled to its possession.
The two cases were jointly tried by RTC-Br. 55, which, rendered a
Joint Decision finding for the Sps. Viray and Jesus Viray, as defendants, and accordingly dismissing the separate complaints to annul the deeds of sale subject of the joint cases. On appeal, the CA, in effect affirmed in toto the RTC dismissal
decision. A forcible entry case filed o n November 19, 1991 by the late Jesus
Viray against the Sps. Usi before the Municipal Ci rcuit Trial Court (MCTC), Pampanga, to eject the Usis from Lot 733-F (Fajardo Plan). The MCTC rendered a Decision in favor of Jesus Viray, which
decision eventually became final and executory, the Usis having opted not to appeal it. The spouses Usi, instead of appealing from theMCTC Decision,
sought, after its finality, its annulment before the RTC, whichboth RTC and CA, upon appeal, dismissed. A Petition for AccionPubliciana/ Reivindicatoriawas instituted on
December 12, 2001 by Sps. Usi against the late Jesus Viray, as substituted by Vda. de Viray, et al., before the RTC, Pampanga, involving Lots 733-B, 733-C-1 and 733-C-10 (Galang Plan), asserting that the execution of the MCTC Decision would oust them from their own lots even though the dispositive portion of said forcible entry Decision mentioned Lots 733-A and 733-F (Fajardo Plan) and not Lots 733-B, 733-C-1 and 733-C-10 (Galang Plan) which are registered in their names. Vda. de Viray moved for the dismissal of these publiciana/
reivindicatoria actions on grounds, litispendentia and res judicata.
among
others,
of
An action for Cancellation of Titles or Surrender of Original Titles
with Damages was commenced by Vda. de Viray, et al., against the Sps. Usi, Mendoza and eight others before the RTC, Pampanga, seeking the cancellation of TCT Nos. 3614-R.P., 2099R.P., 2101-R.P., 7502-R.P. and 2103-R.P. covering Lots 733-C-8 to 733-C-12 as subdivided under the 2nd SA of April 5, 1991 which taken together is basically identical to Lot 733-F (Fajardo Plan) sold to Jesus Viray. In sum, of the six (6) cases referred to above, the first four (4)
have been terminated and the main issue/s therein peremptorily resolved. Only two cases of the original six revolving around Lot 733 remained unresolved. The first refers to the petition for review of the decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 90344 which, in turn, is an appeal from the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 01-1118(M), a Petition for AccionPubliciana/ Reivindicatoria and Damages, and the second is Civil Case No. (02)-1164(M) for Cancellation of Titles or Surrender of Original Titles with Damages. The first case is subject of the present recourse, while the second is, per records, still pending before the RTC, Pampanga, its resolution doubtless on hold in light of the instant petition. The Ruling of the RTC in Civil Case No. 01-1118(M) In Civil Case No. 01-1118(M), the Macabebe, Pampanga RTC
rendered judgment dismissing the petition of the Sps. Usi for AccionPubliciana/Reivindicatoria, where it held that the Sps. Usi failed to establish by preponderance of evidence to support their claim of title, possession and ownership over the lots subject of their petition. The Ruling of the CA The CA rendered the assailed decision, reversing and setting aside
the appealed RTC decision, and declaring as legal and valid, the
R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 2 right of ownership of petitioner-appellant respondents spouses Jose Usi and Amelita T. Usi over Lot Nos. 733-B, 733-C-1 and 733C-10 covered by TCT Nos. 1585-R.P., 2092-R.P, and 2101-R.P., respectively. The Issue
WON the two (2) subdivision agreements dated August 20, 1990 and April 5, 1991, respectively, partake of a bona fide and legally binding partition contracts or arrangements among co-owners that validly effectuated the transfer of the subject lots to respondent spouses Usi, which the validity of deeds of absolute sale upon which the petitioners hinged their claim of ownership and right of possession over said lots depended. The Court’s Ruling
The Court rules in favor of petitioners. The subdivision agreements not partition of co -owners
Partition, in general, is the separation, division, and assignment of a thing held in common by those to whom it may belong. Contrary to the finding of the CA, the subdivision agreements forged by Mendoza and her alleged co-owners were not for the partition of pro-indiviso shares of co-owners of Lot 733 but were actually conveyances, disguised as partitions, of portions of L ot 733 specifically Lots 733-A and 733-B, and portions of the subsequent subdivision of Lot 733-C. It is fairly clear that Lot 733, even from the fact alone of its being registered under the name of the late Moses Mendoza and Ellen Mendoza, formed part of the couple’s conjugal property at the time Moses’ demise on April 5, 1986. Equally clear, too, is that Vda. de Mallari became a co-owner of Lot 733 by virtue of the purchase of its 416-square meter portion on February 14, 1984, during the lifetime of Moses. Be that as it may and given that the Sps. Usi have not been shown to be co-owners of Mendoza and Vda. de Mallari prior to the sale by Mendoza on April 29, 1986 of Lots 733-A and 733-F (Fajardo Plan) to the Sps. Viray and Jesus Viray, respectively, then the execution of the 1st SA on August 20, 1990 could not have been a partition by co-owners of Lot 733. The same could be said of the 2nd SA of April 5, 1991 vis-à-vis Lot 733-C, for the records are similarly completely bereft of any evidence to show on how the purported participating co-owners, namely Sps. Usi, the Sps. Lacap, the Sps. Balingit and the Sps. Jordan became co-owners with Mendoza and her children, i.e., McDwight, Bismark, Beverly and Georgenia. The April 29, 1986 Deeds of Absolute Saleof Lot 733-A and Lot 733F are Valid
It must be noted that the RTC, in its decision in Civil Case Nos. 880265-M and 88-0283-M, upheld the validity of the separate April 29, 1986 deeds of absolute sale of Lots 733-A and 733-F (Fajardo Plan). The combined area of Lot 733-A (366 sq. m.) and Lot 733-F (3,501) is less than one half of the total area coverage of Lot 733 (9,137). The sale of one-half portion of the conjugal property is valid as a sale. It cannot be gainsaid then that the deeds, executed as they were by the property owner, were sufficient to transfer title and ownership over the portions covered thereby. And the aforesaid RTC decision had become final and executory as far back as December 11, 1995 when the Court, in G.R. No. 122287, in effect, affirmed the RTC decision. Likewise, the MCTC’s decision in Civil Case No. 91 (13) for forcible entry, declaring Vda. de Viray, as successor-in-interest of Jesus Viray, as entitled to the physical possession, or possession de facto, of Lot 733-F (Fajardo Plan), and the RTC’s decision in Civil Case
No. 99-0914M, disposing of the belated appeal of the MCTC decision in the forcible entry case, have become final and executory on February 12, 2003 under G.R. No. 154538. From the facts, there is no valid sale from Mendoza to respondents Usi. The parties did not execute a valid deed of sale conveying and transferring the lots in question to respondents. What they rely on are two subdivision agreements which do not explicitly chronicle the transfer of said lots to them. Given the above perspective, the Sps. Viray and Vda. de Viray (vice Jesus Viray) have, as against the Sps. Usi, superior rights over Lot 733-A and Lot 733-F (Fajardo Plan) or portions thereof. Res Judicata Applies
Notably, the Sps. Viray and Vda. de Viray, after peremptorily prevailing in their cases supportive of their claim of ownership and possession of Lots 733-A and 733-F (Fajardo Plan), cannot now be deprived of their rights by the expediency of the Sps. Usi maintaining, as here, an accionpubliciana and/or accionreivindicatoria, two of the three kinds of actions to recover possession of real property. The third, accioninterdictal, comprises two distinct causes of action, namely forcible entry and unlawful detainer, the issue in both cases being limited to the right to physical possession or possession de facto, independently of any claim of ownership that either party may set forth in his or her pleadings, albeit the court has the competence to delve into and resolve the issue of ownership but only to address the issue of priority of possession. Both actions must be brought within one year from the date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand to vacate following the expiration of the right to possess, in case of unlawful detainer. When the dispossession or unlawful deprivation has lasted more than one year, one may avail himself of accionpubliciana to determine the better right of possession, or possession de jure, of realty independently of title. On the other hand, accionreivindicatoria is an action to recover ownership which necessarily includes recovery of possession. Now then, it is a hornbook rule that once a judgment becomes final and executory, it may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land, as what remains to be done is the purely ministerial enforcement or execution of the judgment. Any attempt to reopen a close case would offend the principle of res judicata. The better right to possess and the right of ownership of Vda. de Viray (vice Jose Viray) and the Sps. Viray over the disputed parcels of land cannot, by force of the res judicata doctrine, be re-litigated thru actions to recover possession and vindicate ownership filed by the Sps. Usi. The Court, in G.R. No. 122287 (Ellen P. Mendoza and Jose and AmelitaUsi v. Spouses AvelinoViray and Margarita Masangcay and Jesus Carlo Gerard Viray), has in effect determined that the conveyances and necessarily the transfers of ownership made to the Sps. Viray and Vda. de Viray (vice Jose Viray) on April 29, 1986 were valid. This determination operates as a bar to the Usi’sreivindicatory action to assail the April 29, 1986 conveyances and precludes the relitigation between the same parties of the settled issue of ownership and possession arising from ownership. It may be that the spouses Usi did not directly seek the recovery of title or possession of the property in question in their action for annulment of the deed sale of sale. But it cannot be gainsaid that said action is closely intertwined with the issue of ownership, and affects the title, of the lot covered by the deed. The prevalent doctrine, to borrow
R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 2 right of ownership of petitioner-appellant respondents spouses Jose Usi and Amelita T. Usi over Lot Nos. 733-B, 733-C-1 and 733C-10 covered by TCT Nos. 1585-R.P., 2092-R.P, and 2101-R.P., respectively. The Issue
WON the two (2) subdivision agreements dated August 20, 1990 and April 5, 1991, respectively, partake of a bona fide and legally binding partition contracts or arrangements among co-owners that validly effectuated the transfer of the subject lots to respondent spouses Usi, which the validity of deeds of absolute sale upon which the petitioners hinged their claim of ownership and right of possession over said lots depended. The Court’s Ruling
The Court rules in favor of petitioners. The subdivision agreements not partition of co -owners
Partition, in general, is the separation, division, and assignment of a thing held in common by those to whom it may belong. Contrary to the finding of the CA, the subdivision agreements forged by Mendoza and her alleged co-owners were not for the partition of pro-indiviso shares of co-owners of Lot 733 but were actually conveyances, disguised as partitions, of portions of L ot 733 specifically Lots 733-A and 733-B, and portions of the subsequent subdivision of Lot 733-C. It is fairly clear that Lot 733, even from the fact alone of its being registered under the name of the late Moses Mendoza and Ellen Mendoza, formed part of the couple’s conjugal property at the time Moses’ demise on April 5, 1986. Equally clear, too, is that Vda. de Mallari became a co-owner of Lot 733 by virtue of the purchase of its 416-square meter portion on February 14, 1984, during the lifetime of Moses. Be that as it may and given that the Sps. Usi have not been shown to be co-owners of Mendoza and Vda. de Mallari prior to the sale by Mendoza on April 29, 1986 of Lots 733-A and 733-F (Fajardo Plan) to the Sps. Viray and Jesus Viray, respectively, then the execution of the 1st SA on August 20, 1990 could not have been a partition by co-owners of Lot 733. The same could be said of the 2nd SA of April 5, 1991 vis-à-vis Lot 733-C, for the records are similarly completely bereft of any evidence to show on how the purported participating co-owners, namely Sps. Usi, the Sps. Lacap, the Sps. Balingit and the Sps. Jordan became co-owners with Mendoza and her children, i.e., McDwight, Bismark, Beverly and Georgenia. The April 29, 1986 Deeds of Absolute Saleof Lot 733-A and Lot 733F are Valid
It must be noted that the RTC, in its decision in Civil Case Nos. 880265-M and 88-0283-M, upheld the validity of the separate April 29, 1986 deeds of absolute sale of Lots 733-A and 733-F (Fajardo Plan). The combined area of Lot 733-A (366 sq. m.) and Lot 733-F (3,501) is less than one half of the total area coverage of Lot 733 (9,137). The sale of one-half portion of the conjugal property is valid as a sale. It cannot be gainsaid then that the deeds, executed as they were by the property owner, were sufficient to transfer title and ownership over the portions covered thereby. And the aforesaid RTC decision had become final and executory as far back as December 11, 1995 when the Court, in G.R. No. 122287, in effect, affirmed the RTC decision. Likewise, the MCTC’s decision in Civil Case No. 91 (13) for forcible entry, declaring Vda. de Viray, as successor-in-interest of Jesus Viray, as entitled to the physical possession, or possession de facto, of Lot 733-F (Fajardo Plan), and the RTC’s decision in Civil Case
No. 99-0914M, disposing of the belated appeal of the MCTC decision in the forcible entry case, have become final and executory on February 12, 2003 under G.R. No. 154538. From the facts, there is no valid sale from Mendoza to respondents Usi. The parties did not execute a valid deed of sale conveying and transferring the lots in question to respondents. What they rely on are two subdivision agreements which do not explicitly chronicle the transfer of said lots to them. Given the above perspective, the Sps. Viray and Vda. de Viray (vice Jesus Viray) have, as against the Sps. Usi, superior rights over Lot 733-A and Lot 733-F (Fajardo Plan) or portions thereof. Res Judicata Applies
Notably, the Sps. Viray and Vda. de Viray, after peremptorily prevailing in their cases supportive of their claim of ownership and possession of Lots 733-A and 733-F (Fajardo Plan), cannot now be deprived of their rights by the expediency of the Sps. Usi maintaining, as here, an accionpubliciana and/or accionreivindicatoria, two of the three kinds of actions to recover possession of real property. The third, accioninterdictal, comprises two distinct causes of action, namely forcible entry and unlawful detainer, the issue in both cases being limited to the right to physical possession or possession de facto, independently of any claim of ownership that either party may set forth in his or her pleadings, albeit the court has the competence to delve into and resolve the issue of ownership but only to address the issue of priority of possession. Both actions must be brought within one year from the date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand to vacate following the expiration of the right to possess, in case of unlawful detainer. When the dispossession or unlawful deprivation has lasted more than one year, one may avail himself of accionpubliciana to determine the better right of possession, or possession de jure, of realty independently of title. On the other hand, accionreivindicatoria is an action to recover ownership which necessarily includes recovery of possession. Now then, it is a hornbook rule that once a judgment becomes final and executory, it may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land, as what remains to be done is the purely ministerial enforcement or execution of the judgment. Any attempt to reopen a close case would offend the principle of res judicata. The better right to possess and the right of ownership of Vda. de Viray (vice Jose Viray) and the Sps. Viray over the disputed parcels of land cannot, by force of the res judicata doctrine, be re-litigated thru actions to recover possession and vindicate ownership filed by the Sps. Usi. The Court, in G.R. No. 122287 (Ellen P. Mendoza and Jose and AmelitaUsi v. Spouses AvelinoViray and Margarita Masangcay and Jesus Carlo Gerard Viray), has in effect determined that the conveyances and necessarily the transfers of ownership made to the Sps. Viray and Vda. de Viray (vice Jose Viray) on April 29, 1986 were valid. This determination operates as a bar to the Usi’sreivindicatory action to assail the April 29, 1986 conveyances and precludes the relitigation between the same parties of the settled issue of ownership and possession arising from ownership. It may be that the spouses Usi did not directly seek the recovery of title or possession of the property in question in their action for annulment of the deed sale of sale. But it cannot be gainsaid that said action is closely intertwined with the issue of ownership, and affects the title, of the lot covered by the deed. The prevalent doctrine, to borrow
R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 3 from Fortune Motors, (Phils.), Inc. v. Court of Appeals,"is that an action for the annulment or rescission of a sale of real property does not operate to efface the fundamental and prime objective and nature of the case, which is to re cover said real property."
lot, as well as the affidavits of witnesses who are pioneer residents of the area, attesting that Sps. Gurieza’s claim over such lot is preposterous. MTC also found that Sps. Gurieza’s continuous stay on the subject lot was by Bonifacio’s mere tolerance and such stay became illegal when they refused to vacate the said lot despite the latter’s demand. RTC affirmed the MTC ruling in toto. CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling, and consequently, ordered t he dismissal of Bonifacio’s Complaint for Unlawful Detainer and Damages.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated July 24, 2009 and Resolution dated June 2, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 90344 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated June 21, 2007 in Civil Case No. 01-1118(M) of the RTC, Branch 55 in Macabebe, Pampanga is accordingly REINSTATED. CASE DIGEST 3: RULE 70 – 70 – FORCIBLE FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER
ISSUE: Whether or not Bonifacio’s Complaint for Unlawful Detainer and Damages against Sps. Gurieza is proper. YES
BONIFACIO PIEDAD, MARIA PIEDAD represented by INSPIRACION DANAO vs. SPOUSES VICTORIO GURIEZA and EMETERIA M. GURIEZA, G.R. No. 207525, June 18, 2014, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
RULING:
FACTS:
A COMPLAINT FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER AND DAMAGES was filed by Bonifacio against Sps.Gurieza before the Municipal Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya. BONIFACIO alleged that he is the absolute owner of the 1/3 middle portion of a parcel of residential land designated as Lot 1227, located at La Torre, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, withan area of 4,640.98 square meters which he acquired through intestate succession from his late fat her who inherited the same from the latter’s parents, Alejandro Piedad and Tomasa Villaray. He also claimed that his ownership of the subject lot took place even before his father’s death and was validated through a Deed of Confirmation of an Adjudication and Partition executed by Alejandro and Tomasa’s legal heirs. Further, BONIFACIO a lleged that before migrating to Hawaii, he built a bungalow on the subject lot and assigned numerous caretakers to look after it, the last of which were Sps. Gurieza.
However, SPS. GURIEZA allegedly took interest of the bungalow and the subject lot after learning from an employee of DENR that Lot 1227 is public land. Using such information, SPS. GURIEZA had the subject lot declared under their name fo r tax purposes, caused a subdivision survey of Lot 1227, and filed an application fo r survey authority and titling with the Bureau o f Land Management, CENRO – DENR Nueva Vizcaya. When BONIFACIO learned of Sps. Gurieza’s acts, he authorized Ofelia Bay-ag to file a protest before the DENR which deferred further action on their (Sps. Gurieza’s) application before it. Thereafter, Bonifacio sent his daughter, Maria Inspiracion Piedad-Danao, to the country to personally demand that Sps. Gurieza vacate the subject lot unconditionally; and for this purpose, Danao initiated a complaint before the barangay court. However, during the mediation proceedings, SPS. GURIEZA refused to heed Danao’s demand and even challenged her to go to higher courts. Thus, BONIFACIO was constrained to file the instant case as his last resort. SPS. GURIEZA denied Bonifacio’s claim and maintained that in 1974, the subject lot was a vacant and virginal public land and that the DENR allowed them to possess and occupy the same in t he concept of an owner. As such, they acquired the same through acquisitive prescription. They likewise assailed the authenticity and validity of the Deed of Confirmation, contending that it was only signed by a few heirs of Alejandro and Tomasa. MTC ruled in Bonifacio’s favor, and ordered Sps. Gurieza to vacate the subject lot. It found that Bonifacio had a better right of possession over the subject lot as evidenced by t he house he built thereon as early as the 1950s when he took possession of the said
UNLAWFUL DETAINER is an action to recover possession of real property from one who unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The POSSESSION OF THE DEFENDANT IN UNLAWFUL DETAINER is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess. The ONLY ISSUE TO BE RESOLVED IN AN U NLAWFUL DETAINER CASE is the physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties. An EJECTMENT CASE, based on the allegation of possession by tolerance, falls under the category of unlawful detainer. Where the PLAINTIFF allows the defendant to use his/her property by tolerance without any contract, the DEFENDANT is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he/she will vacate on demand, failing which, an action for unlawful detainer will lie. Thus, under SECTION 1, RULE 70 OF THE RULES OF COURT, the COMPLAINT MUST BE FILED "within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession" and must allege that: (a) the DEFENDANT originally had lawful possession of the property, EITHER by virtue of a contract or by tolerance o f the plaintiff; (b) eventually, the DEFENDANT’S POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY became illegal or unlawful upon notice by the plaintiff to defendant of the expiration or the termination of the defendant’s right of possession; (c) thereafter, the DEFENDANT remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff the enjoyment thereof; and (d) WITHIN ONE (1) YEAR from the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment. After a judicious perusal of the rec ords, the COURT holds that Bonifacio had clearly established his cause of action for unlawful detainer. The following established facts impel this conclusion: FIRST, the evidence shows that as early as the 1950s, Bonifacio already had possession of the subject lot and even built a bungalowtype house thereon. Moreover, when HE MIGRATED TO HAWAII, Bonifacio appointed numerous caretakers to the said house and lot, the last being Sps. Gurieza. SECOND, when Bonifacio learned that Sps. Gurieza declared the subject lot under their name for tax purposes, caused a subdivision survey of Lot 1227, and filed an application for survey authority and titling with the CENRO –DENR Nueva Vizcaya, he immediately took steps to terminate their tolerated stay on the subject lot and house and demanded that they leave immediately, rendering the Sps.Gurieza’s stay on the s ubject lot illegal. THIRD, instead of vacating the subject lot, Sps. Gurieza defied Bonifacio’s demand and asserted their ownership over the same. LASTLY, BONIFACIO, THROUGH DANAO, made his final demand to Sps. Gurieza on January 14, 2008, as evidenced by a Certificate to File Action issued by the Barangay Captain of the area where the subject lot was located, stating that the Sangguniang
R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 4 Barangay had tried to settle the dispute between the parties but failed to do so, and filed his complaint on June 24, 2008, or within the one (1) year period from his last demand.
CASE DIGEST 4: RULE 70 – FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER SPOUSES ALEJANDRO MANZANILLA AND REMEDIOS VELASCO vs.WATERFIELDS INDUSTRIES CORPORATION, represented by its President, ALIZA MA, G.R. No.177484, July 18, 2014, DEL CASTILLO, J.:
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s action for Unlawful Detainer against Waterfields is proper. YES
FACTS:
The SPOUSES MANZANILLA are the owners of a 25,000-square meter parcel of land in BarangaySan Miguel, Sto. Tomas, Batangas. On May 24, 1994, they leased a 6,000-square meter portion of the abovementioned property to Waterfields, as represented by its President Aliza R. Ma (Ma). The PARTIES executed on June 6, 1994 an Amendment to the Contract of Lease. Save for the COMMENCEMENT OF THE LEASE WHICH THEY RECKONED on the date of the execution of the amendment and the undertaking of the spouses Manzanilla to register the agreements, the PARTIES agreed therein that all other terms and conditions in the original Contract of Lease shall remain in full force and effect. Beginning April 1997, however, WATERFIELDS failed to pay the monthly rental. On July 30, 1998, the SPOUSES MANZANILLA filed before the MTC a COMPLAINT FOR EJECTMENT AGAINST WATERFIELDS. They alleged in PARAGRAPH 4 thereof that they entered into a Contract of Lease with Waterfields on May 24, 1994, and in PARAGRAPH 5, that the same was amended on June 6, 1994 and July 9, 1997. However, WATERFIELDS had committed violations of the lease agreement by not paying the rentals on time. And in y et another violation, it failed to pay the ₱18,000.00 monthly rental for the past six mo nths prior to the filing of the Complaint, that is, from December 1997 to May 1998 or in the total amount of ₱108,000.00. Demands upon Waterfields to pay the accrued rentals and vacate the property were unheeded so the SPOUSES MANZANILLA considered the contract terminated and/or rescinded. Hence, SPOUSES filed the Complaint and prayed therein that the former be ordered to (1) vacate the subject property and, (2) pay the accrued rentals of ₱108,000.00 as of May 1998, the succeeding rentals of ₱18,000.00 a month until t he property is vacated, the interest due thereon, attorney’s fees, and cost of suit. WATERFIELDS admitted paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Complaint and alleged that: (1) when the lease agreement was executed, the property subject thereof was just bare land; (2) it spent substantial amounts of money in developing the land, i.e., building of water dikes, putting up of a drainage system, land filling and levelling; (3) it built thereon a processing plant for fruit juices, preserved vegetables and other frozen goods for which it spent around ₱7,000,000.00; and (4) it caused the installation in t he said premises of an electrical system for ₱80,000.00 and water system for ₱150,000.00. WATERFIELDS further alleged that although the first two years of its operation were fruitful, it later suffered from business reverses due to the economic crisis that hit Asia. Be that as it may, WATERFIELDS claimed that it did not fail or refuse to pay the monthly rentals but was just utilizing the rental deposit in the amount of ₱216,000.00 (equivalent to one year rentals) as rental payment in accordance with Section 4 of the original Contract of Lease. Hence, it argued that the SPOUSES MANZANILLA have no cause of action against it. WATERFIELDS also asserted that the precipitate filing of the Complaint against it is tainted with bad faith and intended to cause it grave injustice considering that it already spent an enormous amount of almost ₱10,000,000.00 in developing the property.
MTC found no merit in Waterfield’s claim that it did not fail or refuse to pay the monthly rentals as it was applying the rental deposit to its payment of the same. Consequently, the MTC declared that Waterfields violated the lease agreement due to non-payment of rental. RTC affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC. The CA concluded that the spouses Manzanilla have no cause of action against Waterfields.
RULING:
For the purpose of bringing an unlawful detainer suit, TWO REQUISITES MUST CONCUR: (1) there must be failure to pay rent or comply with the conditions of the lease, and (2) there must be demand both to pay or to comply and vacate. The FIRST REQUISITE refers to the existence of the cause of action for unlawful detainer, while the SECOND refers to the jurisdictional requirement of demand in order that said cause of action may be pursued. IMPLIED IN THE FIRST REQUISITE, which is needed to establish the cause of action of the plaintiff in an unlawful detainer suit, is the presentation of the contract of lease entered into by the plaintiff and the defendant, the same being needed to establish the lease conditions alleged to have been violated. Thus, in Bachrach Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that the EVIDENCE NEEDED TO ESTABLISH THE CAUSE OF ACTION IN AN UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE is (1) a lease contract and (2) the violation of that lease by the defendant. It must be stressed that in t his case, the VIOLATION OF THE LEASE THROUGH NON-PAYMENT OF RENT is what constitutes the cause of action. Hence, ONCE THE FAILURE TO PAY RENT IS ESTABLISHED, a cause of action for unlawful detainer aris es. The problem, however, is that the CA acted on its mistaken notion as to when a cause of action arises. It did not base its determination of the existence of the cause of action from the fact that Waterfields failed to pay rents from December 1997 to May 1998. To it, the CAUSE OF ACTION in this case only arose after the contract was terminated and the rental deposit was found sufficient to co ver the unpaid rentals. This is erroneous since as already discussed, it is the FAILURE TO PAY RENT which gives rise to the cause of action. Prescinding from this, the CA’s acknowledgement that Waterfields failed to pay rent, as shown by its declaration that the latter is the debtor of the spouses Manzanilla with respect to the unpaid rentals, is clearly inconsistent with the conclusion that no cause of action for ejectment exists against Waterfields. FAILURE TO PAY THE RENT must precede termination of the contract due to nonpayment of rent. It therefore follows that the CAUSE OF ACTION FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER IN THIS CASE must necessarily arise before the termination of the contract and not the other way around as what the CA supposed. Indeed, in going beyond the termination of the contract, the CA went a bit too far in its resolution of this case.
All told, the COURT sustains the RTC in affirming the MTC's grant of the spouses Manzanilla's Complaint for ejectment against Waterfields. Case Digest No 4: DELA CRUZ vs SPOUSES HERMANO
Facts:
Respondents Anotonio and Remedios Hermano are the registered owners of a house and lot situated in Tagaytay City covered by TCT No. T-24503. On June 13, 2002,
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Antonio sued petitioner, Dela Cruz, before MTCC of Tagaytay City for ejectment and damges. In his complaint, he averred that they (spouses Hermano) are the registered and lawful owners of the said house and lot, which they use as their rest house or vacation place. They further alleged that petitioner occupied and possessed the aforesaid house and lot sometime on September 1, 2001 pursuant to the alleged Memorandum of Agreement between her and certain Don Mario Enciso Benitez without respondents’ authority and consent. Petitioner admitted to the existence of TCT No. T-24503 but contended that the tue and actual owner thereof was Don Benitez. Allegedly, Antonio and his wife, respondent Remedios Hermano, had already sold the property to Benitez; the latter, in turn, sold it to petitioner by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale, which they executed on 1 March 2001. Petitioner claimed that Antonio knew about the sale and her immediate occupation of the premises. She also claimed that the place was actually uninhabited when she occupied it and that it was Benitez who had provided the keys thereto. Moreover, Antonio allegedly knew that her caretakers had been managing the property since March 2001, and that he never questioned their presence there. Thus, petitioner contended that estoppel had set in, as he had made her believe that she had the right to occupy and possess the property. The MTCC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint. According to MTCC, Antonio’s proper remedy was an action for recovery, instead of the summary proceeding of ejectment, because there was no showing of forcible entry or unlawful detainer. RTC affirmed MTCC’s decision. CA reversed based on its finding that the case was an ejectment complaint for forcible entry, and that Antonio had sufficiently alleged and proved prior physical possession, as well as petitioner’s entry and possession by stealth. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether Antonio has adequately pleaded and proved a case of forcible entry.
Ruling:
NO. After an exhaustive review of the case record, the
Court finds that the Complaint was sufficient in form and substance, but that there was no proof o f prior physical possession by respondents.
The Complaint’s allegations sufficiently established the
jurisdictional facts required in forcible entry cases.
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, requires that in actions for forcible entry, it must be alleged that the complainant was deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, and that the action was filed anytime within one year from the time the unlawful deprivation of possession took place. This requirement implies that in those cases, possession of the land by the defendant has been unlawful from the beginning, as the possession was obtained by unlawful means. Further, the complainant must allege and prove prior physical possession of the property in litigation until he or she was deprived thereof by the defendant. The one-year period within which to bring an action for forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry into the land, except when entry was made through
stealth; if so, the one-year period would be counted from the time the plaintiff learned about it. The allegations in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Complaint adequately aver prior physical possession by respondents and their dispossession thereof by stealth, because the intrusion by petitioner was without their knowledge and consent. The Court thus agrees with the findings of the CA that contrary to those of the RTC that the case was an action for ejectment in the nature of accion reivindicatoria, the case was actually for forcible entry and sufficient in form. Likewise, the Court agrees with the CA’s findings that the Complaint was timely filed. It is settled that where forcible entry occurred clandestinely, the one-year prescriptive period should be counted from the time the person who was deprived of possession demanded that the deforciant desist from dispossession when the former learned about it. xxx And to deprive lawful possessors of the benefit of the summary action under Rule 70 of the Revised Rules, simply because the stealthy intruder managed to conceal the trespass for more than a year, would be to reward clandestine usurpations even if they are unlawful. However, the title to the property of respondents and their Tax Declaration proved possession de jure, but not their actual possession of the property prior to petitioner’s entry. Ownership certainly carries the right of possession, but the possession contemplated is not exactly the same as that which is in issue in a forcible entry case. Possession in a forcible entry suit refers only to possession de facto, or actual or material possession, and not one flowing out of ownership. These are different legal concepts under which the law provides different remedies for recovery of possession. Thus, in a forcible entry case, a party who can prove prior possession can recover the possession even against the owner. Whatever may be the character of the possession, the present occupant of the property has the security to remain on that property if the occupant has the advantage of precedence in time and until a person with a better right lawfully causes eviction. Similarly, tax declarations and realty tax payments are not conclusive proofs of possession. They are merely good indicia of possession in the concept of owner based on the presumption that no one in one’s right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in one’s actual or constructive possession. Respondents, in this case, failed to discharge their burden of proving the element of prior physical possession.
Case Digest No 5: ZACARIAS vs ANACAY
Facts:
On December 24, 2008, petitioner Amada Zacarias thru her son and attorney-in-fact, Cesar C. Zacarias filed a complaint for Ejectment with Damages/Unlawful Detainer against respondents, Victoria Anacay and members of her household. Said respondents are the occupants of a parcel of land with an area of 769 square meters in Silang, Cavite covered by Tax Declaration No. 18-026-01182 in the name of petitioner and issued by Municipal Assessor Reynaldo L. Bayot on August 31, 2007. As mediation between the parties was unsuccessful, the case was referred to MTCC, which rendered a decision dismissing the complaint, It held that the allegations of the complaint failed to state the essential elements of an
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action for unlawful detainer as the claim that petitioner had permitted or tolerated respondents’ occupation of the subject property was unsubstantiated. Since petitioner was deprived of the physical possession of her property through illegal means and the complaint was filed after the lapse of one year from her discovery thereof, the MCTC ruled that it has no jurisdiction over the case. The RTC reversed MCTC pointing out that petitioner did not state that respondents entered her property through stealth and strategy but that petitioner was in lawful possession and acceded to the request of respondents to stay in the premises until May 2008 but respondents’ reneged on their promise to vacate the property by that time. It held that the suit is one for unlawful detainer because the respondents unlawfully withheld the property from petitioner after she allowed them to stay there for one year. The CA reversed RTCs decision granting respondent’s petition. For RTC, the MCTC clearly had no jurisdiction over the case as the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer. Since the prescriptive period for filing an action for forcible entry has lapsed, petitioner could not convert her action into one for unlawful detainer, reckoning the one-year period to file her action from the time of her demand for respondents to vacate the property. For petitioner, unlawful detainer was the proper remedy considering that she merely tolerated respondents’ stay in the premises after demand to vacate was made upon them, and they had in fact entered into an agreement and she was only forced to take legal action when respondents reneged on their promise to vacate the property after the lapse of the period agreed upon.
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.
unlawful detainer as it does not describe possession by the respondents being initially legal or tolerated by the petitioner and which became illegal upon termination by the petitioner of such lawful possession. Petitioner’s insistence
she
actually
tolerated
respondents’
into the subject premises is incorrect. As she had averred, she discovered respondents’ occupation in May 2007.
Such possession could not have been legal from the start as it was without her knowledge or consent, much less was it based on any contract, express or implied. We stress that the possession of the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.
In Valdez v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that where the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the case. Thus:
To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must have
been present right from the start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered. Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy.
In Sarona vs Villegas: The word "tolerance" confirms our view heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be present right from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of
Ruling:
that
continued occupation after her discovery of their entry
Issue: W/N the present case partakes that of an unlawful detaine r.
Petitioner’s complaint failed to allege a cause of action for
NO. The invariable rule is that what determines the nature of the action, as well as the court which has jurisdiction over the case, are the allegations in the complaint. In ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which Section 1 of Rule 70 provides a summary remedy, and must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence. Such remedy is either forcible entry or unlawful detainer. In forcible entry, the plaintiff is deprived of physical possession of his land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In illegal detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right thereto under any contract, express or implied. In Cabrera vs Getaruela, the Court held that a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following:
unlawful detainer - not of forcible entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine. And for two reasons: First. Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge to the right of the possessor. Violation of that right authorizes the speedy redress – in the inferior court provided for in the rules. If one year from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the remedy ceases to be speedy; and the possessor is deemed to have waived his right to seek relief in the inferior court. Second, if a forcible entry action in the inferior court is allowed after the lapse of a number of years, then the result may well be that no action of forcible entry can really prescribe.
In Go, Jr. vs CA: It is settled that one whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a deforciant illegally occupying the land the moment he is required to leave. It is essential in unlawful detainer cases of this kind, that plaintiff’s
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon
supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered. This is where petitioners’ cause of ac tion fails.
notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of
The evidence revealed that the possession of defendant
the latter’s right of possession;
was illegal at the inception and not merely tolerated as
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of
alleged in the complaint, considering that defendant
the property and deprived the plaintiff of the
started to occupy the subject lot and then built a house
enjoyment thereof; and
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Respondents’ Claim:
and before them, their mother. xxx Clearly, defendant’s
entry into the land was effected clandestinely, without the knowledge of the owners, consequently, it is categorized as possession by stealth which is forcible entry. As explained in Sarona vs. Villegas, cited in Muñoz vs. Court of Appeals[224 SCRA 216 (1992)] tolerance must be present right from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of
In the Complaint, respondents stated that they were the coowners of the land. They alleged that Tagalog occupied a portion of the land as lessee and paid rent on a month to month basis by virtue of a verbal contract. Tagalog built a house with light materials on the land and when a strong typhoon hit Cebu, Tagalog’s house was damaged. Thereafter, respondents alleged that Tagalog discontinued payingthe rent and stopped inhabiting the house.
unlawful detainer not of forcible entry x x x.
The complaint in this case is similarly defective as it failed to allege how and when entry was effected. The bare allegation of petitioner that "sometime in May, 2007, she discovered that the defendants have enterep the subject property and occupied the same", as correctly found by the MCTC and CA, would show that respondents entered the land and built their houses thereon clandestinely and
Sometime before December 2002, respondents demanded that Tagalog remove the scattered debris on the land, notified her of their intention to use the land, and subdivide and develop it for their personal use. Respondents informed Tagalog to vacate the premises asserting that the verbal contract of lease was deemed terminated upon the expiration of the monthly contract. However, Tagalog refused to vacate claiming that she was still a lessee.
without petitioner's consent, which facts are constitutive of forcible entry, not unlawful detainer. Consequently, the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the case and the RTC clearly erred in reversing the lower court's ruling and granting reliefs prayed for by the petitioner. SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 201286
July 18, 2014
INOCENCIA TAGALOG, Petitioner, vs. MARIA LIM VDA. DE GONZALEZ, GAUDENCIA L. BUAGAS, RANULFO Y. LIM, DON L. CALVO, SUSAN C. SANTIAGO, DINA C. ARANAS, and RUFINA C. RAMIREZ, Respondents.
DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Resolutions dated 12 May 20112 and 9 March 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 02784. The Facts
The subject of the litigation involves a parcel of land known as Lot No. 1595-A containing an area of 27,551 square meters situated in Buanoy, Balamban, Cebu and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-57604. On 5 February 2003, respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 29, a Complaint for Recovery of Possession, Preliminary Mandatory Injunction with a Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order with Damages and Attorney’s Fees against petitioner Inocencia Tagalog (Tagalog). At the time of the complaint, the land was declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 01-08-05410 with an assessed value of ₱57,960 and a market value of ₱ 264,930.
Sometime in January 2003, respondents alleged that Tagalog constructed a two-storey residential house made of cement, large steel bars, hollow blocks, sand and gravel on the land. Respondents informed the Office of the Municipal Engineer ofBalamban, Cebu of Tagalog’s act of constructing a house on the land without their consent and without the required building permit. Respondents alleged that despite the warning given by the Office of the Municipal Engineer to stop the construction, Tagalog still continued withthe construction. Respondents then referred the matter to the Barangay Captain of Buanoy, Balamban, Cebu but again, as respondents alleged, Tagalog only ignored the advice given by the Barangay Captain. Petitioner’s Claim:
In her Answer, Tagalog alleged that the lease contract was still valid and subsisting and had never been terminated by the parties. She added that she had not abandoned her possession over the land and has continuously paid the rent on a month to month basis. Tagalog denied having been notified of the respondents’ intention to use and subdivide the land and further alleged that she sought and was granted permission to repair her dwelling structure and undertook the repair without enlarging the area of her occupation. Tagalog admitted being summoned by the Office of the Municipal Engineer and Barangay Captain and she alleged that both offices found that she had long ceased the repair work. As a defense, Tagalog prayed for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the action was for ejectment and unlawful detainer which was beyond the jurisdiction of the RTC. RTC’s Ruling:
In a Decision dated 5 May 2008, the RTC decided the case in favor of respondents. The RTC ruled that, in the complaint, respondents prayed for the recovery of possession of the leased property as owners. Thus, the issue of ownership, which was within the original jurisdiction of the court was primordial and the prayer for eviction was merely incidental there being no written contract of lease between the parties. Tagalog filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC in an Order dated 30 May 2008. Tagalog then filed
R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 8 an appeal8 with the Court of Appeals. In a Resolution dated 12 May 2011, the CA dismissed the case for failure of Tagalog to file the required brief within the extended period requested. Tagalog filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the appellate court in a Resolution dated 9 March 2012. Hence, the instant petition. The Issue
The main issue for our resolution iswhether the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. The Court’s Ruling
of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the land. In such case, the RTC has jurisdiction. However, in this case, the unlawful withholding of possession of the land before the filing of the complaint with the RTC lasted only for more or less three months. Also, neither of the parties brought forth the issue of ownership which was the reason given by the RTC for taking cognizance of the action. Jurisdiction is conferred by law and any judgment, order or resolution issued without it is void and cannot be given any effect. This rule applies even if the issue on jurisdiction was raised for the first time on appeal or even after final judgment. In this case, Tagalog raised the issue of jurisdiction in her Answer.
The petition is meritorious. Petitioner contends that the subject of the action is for unlawful detainer, thus cognizable by a first level court or the Municipal Trial Court (MTC). Since the case was filed with the RTC, a second level court, the RTC’s decision should be rendered void for lack of jurisdiction over the case. The jurisdiction of a particular court is determined by the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. In order to determine whether the lower court had jurisdiction, it is necessary to first ascertain the nature of the complaint filed before it. In the present case, the complaint was for recovery of possession, preliminary mandatory injunction with a prayer for temporary restraining order with damages and attorney’s fees.
Based on the allegations in respondents’ complaint, it is clear that the case involves only the issue of physical possession or unlawful detainer as defined in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. In De Leon v. CA, we held that unlawful detainer is the withholding by a person from another of the possession of a land or building to which the latter is entitled after the expiration or termination of the former’s right to hold possession by virtue of a contract, express or implied. An ejectment suit is brought before the MTC to recover not possession de jure but physical possession only or possession de facto, where dispossession has lasted for not more than one year. The right to recover possession of the land based on the expiration of the verbal monthly contract of lease is governed by Article 1687 of the Civil Code. Since the lease is paid monthly under a verbal contract of lease without a fixed period, the lease period is from month to month. Respondents demanded that Tagalog vacate the land sometime before December 2002, after the termination ofthe monthly verbal lease contract. They filed the complaint with the RTC in February 2003. Since the complaint was filed within one year from the expiration of the right to hold possession, this case is clearly an unlawful detainer suit within the jurisdiction of the MTC. The conclusion would be different if the action is for the recovery of the right to possess and dispossession lasted for more than one year which would justify resort to the remedy of accion publiciana. Accion publiciana is the plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of the land independently of the title and is filed after the expiration
Clearly, the RTC erred in not dismissing the case before it. Under the Rules of Court, it is the duty of the court to dismiss an action whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter. In sum, since respondents' complaint should have been filed with the MTC, the RTC seriously erred in proceeding with the case. The proceedings before a court without jurisdiction, including its decision, are null and void. It then follows that the appeal brought before the appellate court, as well as the decisions or resolutions promulgated in accordance with said appeal, is without force and effect. WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolutions dated 12 May 2011 and 9 March 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 02784. We DISMISS Civil Case No. T-1059 without prejudice to the parties seeking relief in the proper forum. SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION CORAZON D. SARMIENTA, JOSE DERAMA, CATES RAMA, JOSIE MIWA, TOTO NOLASCO, JESUS OLIQUINO, NORBERTO LOPEZ, RUBEN ESPOSO, BERNARDO FLORESCA, MARINA DIMATALO, ROBLE DIMANDAKO, RICARDO PEA, EDUARDO ESPINO, ANTONIO GALLEGOS, VICTOR SANDOVAL, FELICITAS ABRANTES, MERCY CRUZ, ROSENDO ORGANO, RICKY BARENO, ANITA TAKSAGON, JOSIE RAMA and PABLO DIMANDAKO, Petitioners,
versus -
G.R. No. 182953
Present: CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson, BRION, BERSAMIN, VILLARAMA, JR., and SERENO, JJ.
Promulgated: October 11, 2010
R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 9 MANALITE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. (MAHA), Respondent.
court acting as an ejectment court, and that the complaint was irregular and defective because its caption states that it was for Forcible Entry/Unlawful Detainer . MAHA, additionally, had no legal capacity to sue and was guilty of forum shopping. Its officers were likewise fictitious. MTC’s Decision:
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x DECISION
On May 19, 2005, the MTCC of Antipolo City rendered a decision dismissing the case for lack of cause of action. The MTCC held that the complaint filed was one of forcible entry, but MAHA failed to establish the jurisdictional requirement of prior physical possession in its complaint. Also, the trial court held that MAHAs failure to initiate immediate legal action after petitioners unlawfully entered its property and its subsequent declaration of benevolence upon the petitioners cannot be construed as tolerance in accordance with law as to justify the treatment of the case as one for unlawful detainer.
VILLARAMA, JR., J .: RTC’s Decision: The Case:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to nullify the Decision dated October 19, 2007 and Resolution dated May 21, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 93050. The case stemmed from a complaint for Forcible Entry/Unlawful Detainer filed by respondent Manalite Homeowners Association, Inc. (MAHA) against AMARA W CIGELSALO Association (AMARA) and its members. Facts:
MAHA alleged that it is the registered owner of a certain parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 222603. Through force, intimidation, threat, strategy and stealth, petitioners entered the premises and constructed their temporary houses and an office building. Petitioners likewise even filed a civil case to annul MAHAs title on September 2, 1992, but said case was dismissed by the trial court. After said dismissal, MAHA demanded that petitioners vacate the land. Petitioners pleaded that t hey be given one year within which to look for a place to transfer, to which request MAHA acceded. The said one-year period, however, was repeatedly extended due to the benevolence of MAHAs members. Later on, petitioners came up with a proposal that they become members of MAHA so they can be qualified to acquire portions of the property by sale pursuant to the Community Mortgage Program (CMP). MAHA again agreed and tolerated petitioners possession, giving them until December 1999 to comply with the requirements to avail of the CMP benefits. Petitioners nonetheless failed to comply with said requirements. Thus, on August 9, 2000, MAHA sent formal demand letters to petitioners to vacate the property. Upon the latters refusal to heed the demand, MAHA filed the complaint for Forcible Entry/Unlawful Detainer . In their Answer with Counterclaims, petitioners denied the said allegations and averred that they are the owners of the subject lot, having been in actual physical possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years before MAHA intruded into the land. They claimed that as the years went by, they established the AMARA and bought the subject property from Julian Tallano. The property later became known as the Tallano Estate and registered under TCT No. 498. They likewise argued that the allegations in the complaint do not confer jurisdiction upon the
The RTC rendered a Decision dated January 10, 2006, reversing the decision of the MTCC. The RTC held that the lower court erred in dismissing the case by considering the complaint as one of forcible entry which required prior physical possession. The RTC found that MAHA was able to allege and prove by preponderance of evidence that petitioners occupation of the property was by mere tolerance. MAHA tolerated the occupation until all those who wanted to acquire MAHAs rights of ownership could comply with membership obligations and dues. Petitioners, however, failed to comply with said obligations within the given period; thus, their occupation became illegal after MAHA demanded that they vacate the property. CA’s Decision:
In a Decision dated October 19, 2007, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA held that while the complaint in the beginning alleged facts which make out a case for forcible entry, the rest of the averments therein show that the cause of action was actually for unlawful detainer. The CA noted that the complaint alleged supervening events that would show that what was initially forcible entry was later tolerated by MAHA thereby converting its cause of action into one for unlawful detainer. Accordingly, t he complaint was fi led within the required one-year period counted from the date of last demand. The CA further held that the fact that the complaint was captioned as both for forcible entry and unlawful detainer does not render it defective as the nature of the complaint is determined by the allegations of the complaint. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads, Petitoner’s Claim:
Petitioners assert that the jurisdictional requirement of prior physical possession in actions for forcible entry was not alleged with particularity in the complaint, as it merely alleged that respondent had been deprived of its possession over the property.They also maintained that they were not withholding possession of the property upon the expiration or termination of their right to possess because they never executed any contract, express or implied, in favor of the respondent. Hence, there was also no unlawful detainer.
R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 10 Issues:
(1) whether or not the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to make up a case of forcible entry or unlawful detainer; and (2) whether or not the CA was correct in affirming the RTCs decision finding a case of unlawful detainer. Ruling:
We deny the petition. Well settled is the rule that what determines the nature of the action as well as the court which has jurisdiction over the case are the allegations in the complaint. In ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases under Section 1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Section 1 thereof. There are two entirely distinct and different causes of action under the aforequoted rule, to wit: (1) a case for forcible entry, which is an action to recover possession of a property from the defendant whose occupation thereof is illegal from the beginning as he acquired possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and (2) a case for unlawful detainer, which is an action for recovery of possession from the defendant whose possession of the property was inceptively lawful by virtue of a contract (express or implied) with the plaintiff, but became illegal when he continued his possession despite the termination of his right thereunder.
obligations, MAHA had the right to demand for them to vacate the property as their right of possession had already expired or had been terminated. The moment MAHA required petitioners to leave, petitioners became deforciants illegally occupying the land. Well settled is the rule that a person who occupies the land of another at the latters tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. Thus, the RTC and the CA correctly ruled in favor of MAHA. As to petitioners argument that MAHA’s title is void fo r having been secured fraudulently, we find that such issue was improperly raised. In an unlawful detainer case, the sole issue for resolution is physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties. Since the only issue involved is the physical or material possession of the premises, that is possession de facto and not possession de jure, the question of ownership must be threshed out in a separate action. WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated October 19, 2007 and Resolution dated May 21, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 93050 are hereby AFFIRMED. With costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED. [G.R. No. 178635, April 11 : 2011] SERVILLANO E. ABAD, PETITIONER, VS. OSCAR C. FARRALES AND DAISY C. FARRALES-VILLAMAYOR, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION In forcible entry, the plaintiff must allege in the complaint, and prove, that he was in prior physical possession of the property in dispute until he was deprived thereof by the defendant by any of the means provided in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In unlawful detainer, there must be an allegation in the complaint of how the possession of defendant started or continued, that is, by virtue of lease or any contract, and that defendant holds possession of the land or building after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied. In the present case, a thorough perusal of the complaint would reveal that the allegations clearly constitute a case of unlawful detainer.
A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following: (1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latters right of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment. Likewise, the evidence proves that after MAHA acquired the property, MAHA tolerated petitioners stay and gave them the option to acquire portions of the property by becoming members of MAHA. Petitioners continued stay on the premises was subject to the condition that they shall comply with the requirements of the CMP. Thus, when they failed to fulfill their
The Facts and the Case Petitioner Servillano Abad claims that on August 6, 2002 he and his wife, Dr. Estrella E. Gavilan-Abad, bought a 428-square meter registered property on 7 Administration St., GSIS Village, Project 8, Quezon City,[1] from Teresita, Rommel, and Dennis Farrales.] Teresita operated a boarding house on the property. Because the Abads did not consider running the boarding house themselves, they agreed to lease the property back to Teresita for P30,000.00 a month so she could continue with her business.[4] But, although the lease had a good start, Teresita suddenly abandoned the boarding house,[5] forcing the Abads to take over by engaging the services of Bencio Duran, Teresita's helper, to oversee the boarding house business.[6] On December 8, 2002 Oscar and Daisy came, accompanied by two men, and forcibly took possession of the boarding house. Two days later or on December 10, 2002, the day the Abads left for abroad, Oscar and Daisy forcibly entered and took possession of the property once again. Because of this, on March 10, 2003 petitioner Servillano Abad (Abad) filed a complaint[8] for forcible entry against the two before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City.[9] Oscar and Daisy vehemently denied that they forcibly seized the place. They claimed ownership of it by inheritance. They also claimed that they had been in possession of the same from the time of their birth.[10]That Oscar had been residing on the property since 1967 as attested to by a March 31, 2003 certification issued by Barangay Bahay Toro.[11]
R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 11 The MeTC rendered a decision[16] in favor of Abad, stating that Oscar and Daisy could not acquire ownership of the property since it was registered. And, as owner, Abad was entitled to possession.
SPS. VICENTE DIONISIO AND ANITA DIONISIO, Petitioners, v. WILFREDO LINSANGAN, Respondent.
ABAD, J.:
Questions Presented The case presents the following questions:
FACTS:
1. Whether or not Abad sufficiently allegedin his complaint the jurisdictional fact of prior physical possession of the disputed property to vest the MeTC with jurisdiction over his action; and
Gorgonio M. Cruz (Cruz) owned agricultural lands inSan Rafael, Bulacan, that his tenant, Romualdo San Mateo (Romualdo) cultivated.Upon Romualdos death, his widow, Emiliana, got Cruzs permission to stay on the property provided she would vacate it upon demand.In September 1989, spouses Vicente and Anita Dionisio (the Dionisios) bought the property fro m Cruz. In April 2002, the Dionisios found out that Emiliana had left the property and that it was already Wilfredo Linsangan (Wilfredo) who occupied it under the strength of a "Kasunduan ng Bilihan ng Karapatan" dated April 7, 1977.
2. In the affirmative, whether or not Abad sufficiently proved that he enjoyed prior physical possession of the property in question. The Court's Rulings Two allegations are indispensable in actions for forcible entry to enable first level courts to acquire jurisdiction over them: first, that the plaintiff had prior physical possession of the property; and, second, that the defendant deprived him of such possession by means of force, intimidation, threats, strategy, or stealth.[29] There is no question that Abad made an allegation in his complaint that Oscar and Daisy forcibly entered the subject property. The only issue is with respect to his allegation, citing such property as one "of which they have complete physical and material possession of the same until deprived thereof." Abad argues that this substantially alleges plaintiffs prior physical possession of the property before the dispossession, sufficient to confer on the MeTC jurisdiction over the action. The Court agrees. The plaintiff in a forcible entry suit is not required to use in his allegations the exact terminology employed by the rules. It is enough that the facts set up in the complaint show that dispossession took place under the required conditions.[30] It is of course not enough that the allegations of the complaint make out a case for forcible entry. The plaintiff must also be able to prove his allegations. He has to prove that he had prior physical possession[31] for this gives him the security that entitles him to remain in the property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects him.[32] Here, evidently, the Abads did not take physical possession of the property after buying the same since they immediately rented it to Teresita who had already been using the property as a boarding house. Abad claims that their renting it to Teresita was an act of ownership that amounted to their acquiring full physical possession of the same.[33] But the Abad's lease agreement with Teresita began only in September 2002.[34] Oscar and Daisy, on the other hand, have proved that they had been renting spaces in the property as early as 2001 as evidenced by receipts that they issued to their lessees. This was long before they supposedly entered the property, using force, in 2002. Possession in forcible entry cases means nothing more than physical possession or possession de facto, not legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil law. Only prior physical possession, not title, is the issue.[9] The absence of prior physical possession by the plaintiff in a forcible entry warrants the dismissal of the complaint.[40] G.R. No. 178159 : March 2, 2011.
The Dionisios, on April 22, 2002, demanded that Wilfredo vacate the land but the latter declined, prompting the Dionisios to file an eviction suit against him before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Rafael, Bulacan.Wilfredo filed an answer with counterclaims in which he declared that he had been a tenant of the land as early as 1977. At the pre-trial, the Dionisios orally asked leave to amend their complaint.The Dionisios filed their amended complaint on August 5, 2003; Wilfredo maintained his original answer. The MTC ruled for the Dionisios and asked Wilfredo to vacate the property and pay rent and costs. The RTC affirmed, adding that the action was one for forcible e ntry. The CA, however, reversed. The CA held that, by amending their complaint, the Dionisios effectively changed their cause of action from unlawful detainer to recovery of possession which fell outside the jurisdiction of the MTC.Further, since the amendment introduced a new cause of action, its filing on August 5, 2003 marked the passage of the one year limit from demand required in ejectment suits. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the amended complaint changed the cause of action 2. Whether or not the action is within the jurisdiction of the MTC HELD: The petition is granted. REMEDIAL LAW: Effect of amendment of the complaint; nature of the action. First issue: To determine if an amendment introduces a different cause of action, the test is whether such amendment now requires the defendant to answer for a liability or obligation which is completely different from that stated in the original complaint. Here, both the original and the amended complaint have identical allegations, and required Wilfredo to defend his possession based on the allegation that he had stayed on the land after Emiliana left out of the owners mere tolerance and that the latter had demanded that he leave.It did not introduce a new cause of action. Second issue: Wilfredo points out that the MTC has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the case since it involved tenancy relation under the DARABs jurisdiction. But jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 12 action is determined by the allegations o f the complaint. The records show that Wilfredo failed to substantiate his claim that he was a tenant of the land. Second, the Court ruled that this is not an action for forcible entry, since the complaint contained no allegation that the Dionisios were in possession of the property before Wilfredo occupied it either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, an element of that kind of eviction suit. The Court ruled that this is an action for unlawful detainer: (1) the defendant has possession of property by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) such possession became illegal upon plaintiffs notice to defendant, terminating the latter's right of possession; (3) the defendant remains in possession, depriving the plaintiff of the enjoyment of his property; and (4) within a year from plaintiff's last demand that defendant vacate the property, the plaintiff files a complaint for ejectment. If the defendant had possession of the land upon mere tolerance of the owner, such tolerance must be present at the beginning of defendants possession. Here, while there was no specific allegation of "tolerance" in the complaint, the Court concedes that the rules do not require the plaintiff in an eviction suit to use the exact language of such rules.The Dionisios alleged that Romualdo used to be the lands tenant and that when he died, the Dionisios allowed his widow, Emiliana, to stay under a promise that she would leave upon demand.These allegations clearly imply the Dionisios "tolerance" of her (or any of her assignees).
in the Registry of Deeds nor provided Tormil the necessary documents to have the titles over the properties transferred in its name. Later, Manuel unilaterally r evoked the transaction.
Subsequently, Manuel, together with two other persons, one of whom is Edgardo Pabalan (Edgardo), established Torres Pabalan Realty, Incorporated (TorresPabalan).
As part of his capital contribution, Manuel assigned the same aforesaid parcels of land to TorresPabalan.
Construction of the Torres Building on the subject real properties was completed in 1985 and its units rented out.
Edgardo, who was also then the General Manager and Administrator of Tormil, acted as the building administrator and occupied the 2nd floor.
In March 1987, Tormil filed a case before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) docketed as SEC Case No. 31535 (SEC case) to compel Manuel to fulfill his obligation by turning over the documents necessary to effect the registration and transfer of titles in its name of the properties assigned to it by Manuel.
RULE 70: CASE #10 Edgardo also then set up in October 1989 a l aw office (law office) with Atty. Augustus Cesar Azura (Augustus) in the 2nd floor of the building. Torres Building was thereafter declared by Torres-Pabalan for tax purposes
G.R. No. 176341, July 07, 2014 PRO-GUARD SECURITY SERVICES CORPORATION, Petitioner, versus TORMIL REALTY AND DEV ELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
DEL CASTILLO, J.: Contending that it is obliged to pay back rentals only from the time the demand to vacate was served upon it and not from the time it began occupying the disputed premises, petitioner Pro-Guard Security Services Corporation (ProGuard) seeks recourse to this Court. This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 of the September 6, 2006 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
On March 6, 1991, the SEC rendered judgment in favor of Tormil,7 and this was later affirmed by the SEC en banc.8
Manuel appealed to the CA. During the pendency thereof, Pro-Guard entered into an agreement with Edgardo in March 1994 for the rent of a unit in the 3rd floor of Torres Building. As payment, Pro- Guard was to provide security services to Torres-Pabalan.
in CA-G.R. SP No. 58867 which denied the Petition for Review filed therewith by Pro-Guard as one of the petitioners. Likewise assailed is the CA’s January 23, 2007
Resolution3 denying the motion for reconsideration thereto. Factual Antecedents
On July 24, 1984, Manuel A. Torres, Jr., (Manuel) assigned to respondent Tormil Realty and Development Corporation (Tormil) three parcels of land located in Pasay City and all the improvements thereon in exchange for shares of stock in the said corporation.4 Despite the assignment, however, title to the real properties remained in Manuel’s name as he neither registered the t ransaction
Subsequently, the CA,9 and later this Court,10 upheld the ruling in the SEC case such that it became final and executory on December 12, 1997.11
By October 1998, not only were the titles to the subject parcels of land registered in Tormil’s name,12 but also the tax declaration over the Tor res Building.13
On November 5, 1998, Tormil sent letters14 to Edgardo and Augustus (for the law office) and Pro-Guard asking them to validate their possession/enter into a lease contract with Tormil and at the same time settle their past and current rentals.
Since these letters were ignored, Tormil, on November 16, 1998 sent them separate demands to
R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 13 vacate the premises and pay the monthly rental of P20,000.00 from the time of their occupation thereof until the same are actually turned over to Tormil.15 As these were unheeded, Tormil asserting right of possession based on its ownership of the Pasay properties, filed before the Pasay City Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) separate ejectment suits against Edgardo and Augustus, and Pro-Guard16 which were raffled to Branch 44.
Edgardo and Augustus disputed Tormil’s ownership of the parcels of land where the building stands and asserted that Torres-Pabalan was the owner of the same.
Unfortunately, its tax declarations over the building were surreptitiously and unlawfully cancelled on the sole basis of the SEC Case.
Pro-Guard, for its part, claimed that it was paying rentals to the owner, Torres-Pabalan, in the form of security services provided to the latter. It likewise called attention to the fact that it was no longer in the premises as Tormil forcibly ousted it therefrom.
Ruling of the Metropolitan Trial Court
The MeTC adjudged that Tormil has proven its right to possess the property. Said court brushed aside the claim that Torres-Pabalan owns the building since its SEC Certificate of Registration was already cancelled, and that the construction of the building was completed in July 1985 or prior to the time said corporation was incorporated in September 1986. Finding the defendants’ occupancy of the units as only upon Tormil’s tolerance, the MeTC concluded that their possession became unlawful when Tormil decided to assert its right of ownership over the building after the ruling in the SEC case was upheld with finality by this Court. Thus, in its June 28, 1999 Decision,17 the MeTC ordered Edgardo and Augustus to vacate the unit they possessed, as well as to pay attorney’s fees and costs. With respect to Pro-Guard, it adjudged:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary 2. ordering defendant Pro-Guard Security Services Corporation and all persons claiming rights under [it] to vacate and surrender possession of Unit M, 3rd Floor, Torres Building, 157 Buendia Ext., Sen. Gil Puyat Avenue, Pasay City;
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its Decision20 dated December 15, 1999, the RTC did not find merit in the appeal, viz:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary In view of the foregoing and pursuant to several decision[s] of the Supreme Court and the provision of Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court to the effect [that] the occupancy and possession of the subject premises by the defendants-appellants became ill egal when they failed and refused to heed the demand letters of herein plaintiff-appellee to vacate the same and surrender possession peacefully, the Court fi nds no cogent reason to reverse the decision of the trial court and hereby affirms the same IN TOTO. SO ORDERED.21 On appeal to the CA, Edgardo, Augustus and Pro-Guard reiterated their arguments on Torres-Pabalan’s ownership of the building and on its right to possess it. Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA adjudged Tormil to have sufficiently proven its case for unlawful detainer. It held t hat based on its Torrens titles over the subject parcels of land and the tax declarations over the building thereon, Tormil has the r ight to possess the disputed properties. It debunked the claim of Edgardo, Augustus and Pro-Guard that the tax declarations in Tormil’s name are invalid, ratiocinating that their issuance by the City Assessor are presumed to have been regularly performed. Ultimately, the CA denied t he petition and affirmed the RTC Decision,22viz:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, THE Petition is DENIED DUE COURSE and ordered DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Decision dated 15 December 1999 and Order dated 02 May 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109 in Civil Case Nos. 99-0618 & 99[0619] are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.23 In asking for a reconsideration, one aspect which Edgardo, Augustus and Pro-Guard objected to was the order for them to pay P20,000.00 monthly rental and the reckoning point of payment. Pro-Guard, in its Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration,24 argued that the CA should have modified the RTC judgment by r eckoning the payment from the date o f Tormil’s notice to vacate.
4. ordering defendant Pro-Guard Security Services Corp. to pay [Tormil] the fair and reasonable rental of the premises [in] the amount of P20,000.00 per month with legal interest from June, 1995 until the premises is fully vacated;18
The CA found no reason to reverse its judgment,25 impelling ProGuard to elevate the case to this Court. Issue:
Contending that Tormil has no right to possess t he building, the defendants appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City and the same was raffled to Branch 109 thereof. In the meantime, Pro-Guard informed the MeTC that it had already vacated the premises as early as March 20, 1999.19
WHETHER THE [CA] ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE [METC] AND THE [RTC] ON THE AWARD OF THE [METC] IN RECKONING THE DATE OF PAYMENT OF RENTALS IN THE AMOUNT OF P20,000.00 PER MONTH WITH LEGAL INTEREST FROM JUNE 1995 UNTIL THE PREMISES IS FULLY VACATED CONTRARY TO PREVAILING LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.26
R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 14 Ruling While indeed Tormil, as the victor in the unlawful detainer suit, is entitled to the fair rental value for the use and occupation of the unit in the building, such compensation should not be reckoned from the time Pro-Guard began to occupy the same, but from the time of the demand to vacate. “In unlawful detainer cases, the defendant is necessarily in prior
lawful possession of the property but his possession eventually becomes unlawful upon termination or expiration of his right to possess.”27 In other words, the entry is legal but the possession thereafter became illegal. Additionally, the Rules of Court requires the filing of such action within a year after the withholding of possession,28 meaning that “if the dispossession has not lasted for more than one year, [then] an ejectment proceeding (in thi s case unlawful detainer) is proper Here, from the moment Pro-Guard started to occupy the unit in March 1994 up to November 15, 1998, the right of Pro-Guard to possess the premises was not challenged. It was only after Tormil prevailed over Manuel in its ownership of the same that it terminated Pro-Guard’s right to p ossess the unit it was occupying through a letter to vacate dated November 16, 1998. Hence, i t is only from that point t hat Tormil is considered to have withdrawn its tolerance of Pro-Guard’s occupation. Conversely, Pro-Guard’s possession became unlawful at that same moment. This is supported by the allegation in the complaint for ejectment that Tormil initiated the same not because of non-payment of rentals, but because of withdrawal of tolerance. Tolerance or “[t]oleration is defined as ‘the act or practice of permitting or enduring something not wholly approved of,”30 while tolerated acts are “those which by reason of neighborliness or familiarity, the owner of the property allows his neighbor or another person to do on the property; they are generally those particular services or benefits which one’s property can give to another without material injury o r prejudice to the o wner, who permits them out of friendship or courtesy.”31 With regard to the effects of withdrawal of tolerance, it is settled that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary x x x A person who occupies the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without any contract between t hem, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. His status is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy continued by tolerance of the o wner. In such a case, the date of unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession is to be counted from the date of the demand to vacate.32 Thus, in Sps. Jimenez v. Patricia, Inc.,33 the lessor ended its tolerance of the sublessees’ occupation of the property and demanded that they vacate the premises on March 29, 1995. We upheld the ejectment of the sublessees and ordered them to pay monthly rentals beginning April 1995 until they vacate the premises. Indeed, it is inconsistent to demand payment of rentals during the period of tolerance. Incidentally, Tormil mentioned that Pro-Guard is obliged to consign the payment of rentals. One legal cause for consignation is when two or more persons claim the same right to collect.34 Various claimants to a debtor’s payment must have the appearance of a
right to collect such that the debtor would have a reasonable doubt, not based on negligence, as to who is entitled to the payment.35 Whether Pro-Guard was indeed aware of the legal dispute then pending before the SEC and subsequently before the courts is of no moment. When the dispute regarding the validity of Manuel’s assignment to Tormil of the realties was pending before the SEC, Tormil did not claim to Pro-Guard that it is the true owner of the premises. It neither sought payment of rentals which it now claims Pro-Guard should have consigned during the pendency of its suit against Manuel. As such, from the viewpoint of Pro-Guard, the lease contract remained to be then between it and Torres-Pabalan. The latter was occupying and running the building, as evidenced by several tax declarations in its name which, while not conclusive proofs of ownership, nevertheless, are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner.36 Moreover, Edgardo, who claimed to act on behalf of Torres-Pabalan, administered the premises. Pro-Guard is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant betwee n them.37 WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA -G.R. No. SP 58867 are MODIFIED in that Pro-Guard is to pay for the fair and reasonable rental of the premises in the amount of P20,000.00 per month with legal interest beginning November 16, 1998 up to the time that the premises are fully vacated.
RULE 70 #11 G.R. No. 127850 January 26, 1998 MARIA ARCAL, JOSEFINA ARCAL, MARCIANA ARCAL, and VIRGILIO ARCAL, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, DANILO BUCAL, COSTAN & LETTY RICAFRENTE, RENIE & CENY RICAFRENTE, SANCHO and LANIE RICAFRENTE, CORA GONEZ, SOLLY GONEZ, ENIE and FLORIDA RICAFRENTE, C ARMEN TAMBOC, BOY AGUILAR, NORMING ARCAL, NORA and ALEX BOCITA, ELVIE TAHIMIC, ANCHANG ARGUSON, IDRENG and JULIA ARGUSON, LIZA ARGUSON, ACION ARGUSON, BALENG and FELY ARGUSON, FIDENG and CILENG MURANIA, ROSIE and ALDO CALAGO, ENGAY and SHIRLEY RICAFRENTE, NENITA and NARSING AGUILAR, ODIE DOZA, NENENG and RAMON LUNGCAY, TISAY and ABET DONES, YOLLY and ED PAULINO, ERIC and JENNIFER PAULINO, CHARLIE PANGANIBAN, DELIA and PATRICIO BUEZA, ELLE N DUEZA, BERTING and NORMA BUEZA, ALICE and PILO RICAFRENTE, DELLY and FREDO NUNEZ, ANDRO and ELLEN JIMENEZ, CRISELDA and GORIO CLARETE, NENA VELASCO, DANNY CLARETE, ERLIN and NONONG IBONG, CHITA and RESTIE REYES, SONNY and DONG REYES, and WALLY and DAISY REYES, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.: FACTS
This petition seeks the review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40824 dated November 15, 1996 and its Resolution dated January 13, 1997.
Petitioners as plaintiffs filed on August 31, 1995 a complaint for unlawful detainer before the Municipal Trial Court of Tanza, Cavite against private respondents as
R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 15 defendants. Subject of the complaint was a 21,435 square meter parcel of land designated as Lot No. 780 of the Santa Cruz de Malabon Estate Subdivision, Cavite and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 26277 in the names of Maria, Josefina, Marciana and Marcelina 1 Arcal. 2
The complaint alleged, among others, that:
Defendants herein occupied the subject parcel of land described above thru plaintiffs' implied tolerance, or permission but without contract with herein plaintiffs. From the dates of their occupancy, plaintiffs did not collect any single centavo from defendants, nor the latter pay to plaintiffs any rental for their occupancy therein;
lack of jurisdiction, the complaint being one for recovery of right of possession." 7 The appellate court, ruling in favor of private respondents, granted the petition, reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court and dismissed Civil Case No. 370. 8
In considering that the complaint was not one for unlawful detainer, adverting that private respondents had previously filed complaints questioning petitioners' ownership of the land, the appellate court made the following disquisitions:
In commencing this suit for unlawful detainer, private respondents are banking on their allegation that they merely tolerated petitioners to stay on the premises in question, but which tolerance they already withdrew on July 23, 1995. However, the other allegations and admissions of private respondents in their complaint would show that the case is not one of unlawful detainer as petitioners did not actually occupy the subject property upon the tolerance of private respondents.
On June 18, 1984, plaintiffs herein, except Virgilio Arcal, filed an ejectment suit against substantially all of defendants herein with the Municipal Trial Court of Tanza, Cavite, docketed as Civil Case No. 285 covering the subject parcel of land in dispute: Meanwhile, on September 18, [1984], 3 Lucio Arvisu the alleged son of Gaudencio Arvisu and Natalia Ricafrente Arvisu, and substantially all defendants herein filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Trece Martires, Cavite, a civil case for "Annulment of Title, with Reconveyance and Damages" against Salud Arcal Arbolante, Marcelina Arcal (deceased), Maria Arcal, Josefina Arcal and Marciana Arcal. On May 28, [1985], 4 the said complaint was ordered to be dismissed by the trial court for failure to prosecute. An appeal was made to the Court of Appeals but in the resolution of the latter Court promulgated on November 28, 1986, said appeal was considered abandoned and dismissed for failure of appellants to file their brief.
Thus, the written demand to vacate of July 3, 1995 made by private respondents on petitioners did not terminate any right of the latter to stay on the subject premises supposedly founded on tolerance.
As further alleged and admitted by private respondents in their complaint, a certain Lucio R. Arvisu and substantially all of petitioners filed against them on September 18, 1984 an action for "Annulment of Title, with Reconveyance and Damages" before the RTC of Trece Martires, Branch 23, docketed therein as Civil Case No. TM-59. Although that case was later dismissed for failure to prosecute, there is no question that its institution constituted an open challenge to the title of private respondents over the premises in dispute.
With regard to the ejectment suit filed by plaintiffs herein, except Virgilio Arcal, with the Municipal Trial Court of Tanza, Cavite, the said court rendered a favorable judgment in favor of plaintiffs ordering defendants therein, among others, to vacate the property in question and remove residential houses and improvements introduced therein and return the possession thereof to plaintiffs. Unfortunately, on appeal with the RTC, the foregoing decision was reversed and set aside, and the said complaint for ejectment was dismissed without prejudice to the filing of the proper action after the prejudicial question in Civil Case No. TM-146 is resolved in a fair and adversary proceeding. Said decision attained finality for failure of plaintiffs' former counsel to interpose an appeal. Several demands were made by plaintiffs for defendants to vacate the premises in question, the last written demand was made by plaintiffs' lawyer on July 23, 1995, but they proved futile as they refused and failed, and still refuse and fail to vacate the premises, to the damage and prejudice of plaintiffs . In a Decision dated October 26, 1995, the municipal trial court held that petitioners are registered owners of the property and as such they have the right to enjoy possession thereof.
We are therefore convinced that the allegations of private respondents in their own complaint do not sufficiently support an action for unlawful detainer.
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED FINDING THAT THE COMPLAINT FILED BEFORE THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF TANZA, CAVITE, DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNLAWFUL DETAINER SUIT, AND IN DISMISSING THE SAME FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION. 10
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 23, affirmed in toto the municipal trial court's decision.6
Private respondents filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, arguing inter alia that "the respondent trial court erred in not dismissing the case for
ISSUE
RULING
We grant the petition. The CA erred in its
decision. From a reading of the allegations of the complaint quoted above, we find that the action is one for unlawful detainer.
R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 16 Petitioners alleged in their complaint that they are the registered owners of the subject property. The cases filed by a certain Lucio Arvisu and several of the private respondents casting doubt on petitioners' ownership of the property, namely Civil Case No. TM-59 for 'Annulment of Title, with Reconveyance and Damages' and Civil Case No. TM-146 for 'Registration of Claim Under Section 8, R.A. No. 26,' were resolved with finality adverse to private respondents. 13
An unlawful detainer suit involves solely the issue of physical or material possession over the property or possession de facto, that is, who between the plaintiff and the defendant has a better right to possess the property in question. 27 Where, however, the issue is who has the better and legal right to possess or to whom possession de jure pertains, accion publiciana is proper. 28 In the case at bar, petitioners' complaint for unlawful detainer was confined to recovery of de facto or physical possession of the property and was resorted to after private respondents had indubitably failed in their suits assailing petitioners' right of ownership.
Petitioners also alleged in the complaint that the possession of the property by private respondents was with petitioners' tolerance, 14 and that they (petitioners) had served written demands upon private respondents, the latest demand being on July 23, 1995, but that private respondents refused to vacate the property. 15
The rule is that possession by tolerance is lawful, but such possession becomes unlawful upon demand to vacate made by the owner and the possessor by tolerance refuses to comply with such demand. 17 A person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. The status of the possessor is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy continued by tolerance of the owner. In such case, the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession is to be counted from the date of the demand to vacate. 18
Notably, inferior courts retain jurisdiction over ejectment cases even if the defendant raises the question of ownership and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding provisionally the issue of ownership.
Because of the pendency of the cases involving ownership, the proceedings in the first ejectment case were suspended. Petitioners could not but await the outcome of these cases and preserve the status quo in the meantime these were pending. As the Court has stated:
In giving recognition to the action of forcible entry and detainer the purpose of the law is to protect the person who in fact has actual possession; and in case of controverted right, it requires the parties to preserve the status quo until one or the other of them sees fit to invoke the decision of a court of competent jurisdiction upon the question of ownership. It is obviously just that the person who has first acquired possession should remain in possession pending this decision; and the parties cannot be permitted meanwhile to engage in a petty warfare over the possession of the property which is the subject of the dispute. To permit this would be highly dangerous to individual security and disturbing to social order. Therefore, where a person supposes himself to be the owner of a piece of property and desires to vindicate his ownership against the party actually in possession, it is incumbent upon him to institute an action to this end in a court of competent jurisdiction; and he cannot be permitted, by invading the property and excluding the actual possessor, to place upon the latter the burden of instituting an action to try the property right. 23
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 15, 1996 and Resolution dated January 13, 1997 of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The judgment of the Municipal Trial Court in Civil Case No. 370 and the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 23 affirming said disposition of the inferior court are hereby REINSTATED.
G.R. No. 164277
October 8, 2014
FE U. QUIJANO, Petitioner, vs. ATTY. DARYLL A. AMANTE, Respondent. BERSAMIN, J.:
Facts: The petitioner and her siblings, namely: Eliseo, Jose and Gloria, inherited from their father, the late BibianoQuijano, the parcel of land in Cebu City. Eliseo sold a portion of his shareto respondent Atty. Daryll A. Amante and describing the portion subject of the sale. Eliseo, sickly and in need of money, sold an additional 1/3 portion of his share to the respondent, with their deed of absolute sale stating that the sale was with the approval of Eliseo’s siblings, and describing the portion subject of the sale.’ Fe, Eliseo, Jose and Gloria executed a deed of extrajudicial partition to divide their father’s estate, resulting in the portions earlier sold by Eliseo to the respondent being adjudicated to the petitioner instead of to Eliseo. Petitioner demanded to vacate, but respondent refused. Hence, complaint for ejectment before MTCC-Cebu, alleging among others the portion possessed by Respondent was thru the mer e tolerance of Eliseo when the property she and her siblings had inherited from their father had not yet been subdivided. MTCC: favored Petitioner. -
Eliseo effectively conveyed to the respondent only the portion that would ultimately be allotted t o him once the
R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 17 property would be subdivided; that because the disputed property was adjudicated to the petitioner under the deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition, she was i ts owner with the consequent right of possession; and t hat, as such, she had the right to demand that the respondent vacate the land. RTC: reversed. -
the summary proceeding for ejectment was not proper because the serious question of ownership of th e disputed property was involved. CA: affirmed. -
the rule that inferior courts could pass upon the issue of ownership to determine the question of possession was well settled. Issue 1: WON the issue on owenership can be raised in an ejectment suit. Ruling 1: Yes. (Book based) -
An ejectment case can be eitherfor forcible entry or unlawful detainer. It is a summary proceeding desig ned to provide expeditious means to protect the actual possession or the right to possession o f the property involved.19The sole question for resolution in the case is the physical or material possession (possession de facto)of the property in question, and neither a claim of juridical possession (possession de jure)nor an averment of ownership by the defendant can outrightly deprive t he trial court from taking due cognizance of the case. Hence,even if the question of ownership is raised in the pleadings, like here, the court may pass upon the issue but only to determine the question of possession especially if the question of ownership is inseparably linked with the question of possession.20 The adjudication of ownership in that instance is merely provisio nal, and will not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving the title to the property. Issue 2: WON unlawful detainer is proper, considering Petitioner alleged possession by mere tolerance Ruling 2: No. -
-
To show that the possession was initially lawful, the basis of such lawful possession must then be established. With the averment here that the respondent’s possession was by mere tolerance of the petitioner, the acts of tolerance must be proved, for bare allegation of tolerance did not suffice. At least, the petitioner should show the overt acts indicative of her or her predecessor’s tolerance, or her coheirs’ permission for him to occupy t he disputed property.31 But she did not adduce such evidence. Instead, she appeared to be herself not clear and definite as to his possession of the disputed property being merely tolerated by Eliseo. Considering that the allegation ofthe petitioner’s tolerance of the respondent’s posse ssion of the disputed property was not established, the possession could very well be deemed illegal from the beginning. In that case, her action for unlawful detainer has to fail.34 Even so, the Court would not be justified to treat this ejectment suit as one
for forcible entry because the complaint co ntained no allegation thathis entry in the property had been by force, intimidation, threats, strategy or stealth.
R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 18 G.R. No. 204926
December 3, 2014
ANACLETO C. MANGASER, represented by his Attorney-in-fact EUSTAQUIO DUGENIA, Petitioner, vs. DIONISIO UGAY, Respondent.
-
MENDOZA, J.:
Facts: Petitioner Mangaserrepresented by his attorney-in-factDugeniafiled a complaint for Forcible Entryagainst respondent Ugaybefore MTCCaba, La Union, alleging that he was the registered owner a nd possessor of a parcel of land situated in Santiago Sur, Caba, La Union, portion of which is unlawfully occupied by respondent without his knowledge and consent. Respondent answered that petitioner was never in actual possessi on of the property occupied by him when he occupied the same. That, he assured petitioner that he would voluntarily vacate the premises if he would only be shown to have intruded into petitioner's titled lot after the boundaries were pointed out to him.
-
MTC: favored Respondent. -
petitioner failed to adduce any evidence to prove that the lot occupied by respondent was within his lot titled RTC: reversed -
petitioner had clearly shown his possession of t he property as evidenced by his OCT and tax declarations. CA: reversed when the law would speak of possession in forcible entry cases, it is prior physical possession or possession de facto, as distinguished from possession de Jure. What petitioner proved was legal possession, not his prior physical possession. Issue: WON Petitioner proved prior physical possession
this exceptional rule is that possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession. It is sufficient that petitioner was able to subject the property to the action of his will. If the Court were to follow the ruling of the CA and disregard juridical acts to obtain prior possession, then it would create an absurd situation. It would be putting premium in favor of land intruders against Torrens title holders, who spent months, or even years, in order to register their land, and who religiously paid real property taxes thereon. They cannot immediately repossess their properties simply because they have to prove their literal and physical possession of their property prior to the controversy. The Torrens title holders would have to resort to ordinary civil procedure by filing either an accionpubliciana or accionreinvidicatoria and undergo arduous and protracted litigation while the intruders continuously enjoy and rip the benefits of another man's land. It will defeat the very purpose of the summary procedure of an action for forcible entry. Against the Torrens title and tax declarations of petitioner, the bare allegations of respondent that he had prior, actual, continuous, public, notorious, exclusive and peaceful possession in the concept of an owner, has no leg to stand on. Thus, by provisionally resolving the i ssue of ownership, the Court is satisfied that petitioner had prio r possession of the subject property.
-
G.R. No. 203760
-
HOMER C. JAVIER, represented by his mother and natural guardian, SUSAN G. CANENCIA vs.
-
SUSAN LUMONTAD
-
December 3, 2014
-
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
-
Ruling: Yes.
-
FACTS:
-
-
Petitioner alleged that he is one of the sons of the late
-
-
As a rule, the word "possession" in forcible entry suits indeed refers to nothing more than prior physical possession or possession de facto, not possession de Jure or legal possession in the sense c ontemplated in civil law. Title is not the issue, and the absence of it "is not a ground for the courts to withhold relief from the parties in an ejectment case." The Court, however, has consistently ruled in a number of cases that while prior physical possession is an indispensable requirement in forcible entry cases, the dearth of merit in respondent's position is evident from the principle that possession can be acquired not only by material occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of one's will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right. Possession can be acquired by juridical acts. These are acts to which the law gives the force of acts of possession. Examples of these are donations, succession, execution and registration of public instruments, inscription of possessory information titles and the like.The reason for
Vicente T. Javier (Vicente), who was the owner of a 360square meter (sq. m.) parcel of land. Since his birth, petitioner’s family has lived in the residential house
erected thereon.9 Upon Vicente’s death, petiti oner, together with his mother, continued their possession over the same. On March 26, 2007, respondent gained entry into the subject land and started to build a two (2)-storey building (subject building) on a 150 sq. m. portion thereof, despite petitioner’s vigorous objections and protests. -
Respondent admitted that during Vicente’s lifetime, he
indeed was the owner and in physical possession of the subject land. Nevertheless, she claimed to be the owner of the portion where the subject building was being constructed, as evidenced by TD No. 00-TY-002-13031 in her name. Hence, she took possession of the said portion not as an illegal entrant but as its owner.
R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 19 -
The MTC found that Vicente actually subdivided the
possession of the property. This requirement is
subject land into two (2) lots: the first lot, with an area of
jurisdictional, and as long as the allegations demonstrate
187.20 sq. m., was given to petitioner, while the second
a cause of action for forcible entry, the court acquires
lot, with an area of 172.80 sq. m. and where the subject
jurisdiction over the subject matter."
building was erected, was given to one Anthony de la Paz Javier (Anthony), son of Vicente by a previous fai led
-
required jurisdictional averments, so as to demonstrate a
marriage, but was eventually acquired by respondent from
cause of action for forcible entry, have all been complied
the latter through sale. Based on this finding, the MTC
with. Said pleading alleges that petitioner, as the original
concluded that petitioner had no cause of action against
owner’s, i.e., Vicente’s, successor -in-interest, was in prior
respondent since she was merely exercising her r ights as
physical possession of the subject land but was eventually
the owner of the 172.80 sq. m. subdivided lot. -
A plain reading of petitioner’s complaint shows that the
dispossessed of a 150 sq. m. portion thereof on March 26,
Also, the MTC observed that petitioner’s complaint failed
2007 by respondent who, through force and intimidation,
to aver the required jurisdictional facts as it merely
gained entry intothe same and, thereafter, erected a
contained a general allegation that respondent’s entry into
building thereon.
the disputed portion was made by means of force and
-
The "how" (through unlawful entry and the construction of
intimidation, without specifically stating how, when, and
the subject building), "when" (March 26, 2007), and
where were such means employed. With such failure, the
"where" (a 150 sq. m. portion of the subject land) o f the
MTC intimated that petitioner’s remedy should either be
dispossession all appear on the face of the complaint. In
an accionpubliciana or an accionreivindicatoria instituted
Arbizo v. Sps. Santillan, the Court held that the ac ts of
before the proper forum.
unlawfully entering the disputed premises, erecting a
-
The RTC reversed and set aside the MTC ruling.
structure thereon, and excluding therefrom the prior
-
The CA set aside the RTC ruling and remanded the case to
possessor, would necessarily imply the use of force, as
the latter court for trial on the merits.
what had, in fact, been alleged in the instant complaint.
-
-
Verily, ejectment cases fall within the original and
-
ISSUE:
exclusive jurisdiction of the first level courts by express
-
Whether the CA correctly set aside the RTC Ruling an d
provision of Section 33 (2) of Batas PambansaBlg. 129, in
ordered the remand of the case to the latter court for trial
relation to Section 1, Rule 70, of the Rules of Court. Even
on the merits in an action for recovery of ownership and
in cases where the issue of possession is closely
possession.
intertwined with the issue of ownership, the first level
-
courts maintain exclusive and original jurisdiction over
-
RULING:
ejectment cases, as they are given the authority to make
-
The Court disagrees with the findings of both the MTC and
an initial determination of ownership for the purpose of
the CA that the allegations in the petitioner’s complaint do
settling the issue of possession. It must be clarified,
not make a case for forcible entry but another action
however, that such adjudication is merely provisional
cognizable by the RTC.
and would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the property. It is,
-
As explicated in the case of Pagadora v. Ilao, "[t]he invariable rule is that what determines the nature of the action, as well as the court which has jurisdiction over the case, are the allegations in the complaint. In ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which [Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court] provides a summary remedy, and must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence. Hence, in forcible entry, the complaint must necessarily allege that one in physical possession of a land or building has been deprived of that possession by another through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. It is not essential, however, that the complaint should expressly employ the language of the law, but it would suffice that facts are set up showing that dispossession took place under said conditions. In other words, the plaintiff must allege that he, prior to the defendant’s act of dispossession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, had been in prior physical
therefore, not conclusive as to the issue of ownership.
-
G.R. No. 158231
-
BABY ARLENE LARANOvsSPS. ALFREDO CALENDACIONand RAFAELA T. CALENDACION
-
June 19, 2007
-
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
-
FACTS:
-
Petitioner
owns
a
parcel
of riceland situated
in Barangay Daniw, Municipality of Victoria,
Laguna
covered by TCT No. 175241 of the Register of Deeds of Laguna. On
September
14,
1998,
petitioner
and
respondents executed a Contract to Sell whereby the latter agreed to buy a 50,000-square meter portion of petitioner's riceland for P5Million,
with P500,000.00
as
down payment and the balance payable in nine installments of P500,000.00 each, until September 2001.
R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 20 -
-
-
Pending full payment of the purchase price, possession of
Municipal Trial Court against the person or
the riceland was transferred to respondents under the
persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of
condition that they shall account for and deliver the
possession, or any person or persons claiming
harvest from
under
said riceland to
petitioner. Respondents,
them,
for
the
however, failed to pay the installments and to account for
possession,
and deliver the harvest from said riceland.
costs. (Emphasis supplied)
On March 7, 2000, petitioner sent respondents a demand
-
together
restitution with
of
such
damages
and
In unlawful detainer, the possession was originally lawful
letter to vacate the riceland within 10 days from receipt
but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of
thereof, but as her demand went unheeded, she filed on
the right to possess; hence, the issue of rightful possession
April 5, 2000 a Complaint against respondents for
is decisive for, in such action, the defendant is in actual
unlawful detainer before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC.
possession and the plaintiffs cause of action is the
Respondents admit the execution of the Contract to Sell
termination of the defendants right to continue in
but deny that it contains all the agreements of the
possession.
parties. They allege that petitioner has no c ause of action
-
Applied to the present case, petitioner, as vendor, must
against them because the three-year period within which
comply with two requisites for the purpose of bringing
to pay the purchase price has not yet lapsed; that the MTC
an ejectment suit: (a) there must be failure to pay the
has no jurisdiction over the case because t he complaint
installment due or comply with the conditions of the
failed to allege that a demand to pay and to vacate
Contract to Sell; and (b) there must be demand both to
the riceland was made upon them.
pay or to comply and vacate within the periods specified
-
The MTC rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner.
in Section 2 of Rule 70, namely: 15 days in case of land
-
Respondents filed an appeal with the Regional Trial Court
and 5 days in case of buildings. The first requisite refers
(RTC, the dispositive portion of which reads:
to
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is
unlawful detainer, while the second re fers to the
hereby affirmed subject to the modification that
jurisdiction requirement of demand in order that said
-
defendants are ordered to pay plaintiff the amount
of
(P400,000.00),
-
FOUR as
HUNDRED
THOUSAND
yearly
reasonable
the
existence
of
the
cause
of
action
for
cause of action may be pursued.
-
Both demands to pay installment due or adhere to the terms of the Contract to Sell and to vacate are necessary
compensation for the use and occupation of
to
said riceland computed from 1999 until such
an ejectment suit may be filed. It is the vendor's demand
time that defendants have actually vacated the
for the vendee to vacate the premises and the vendee's
same.
refusal to do so which makes unlawful the withholding of
Undaunted, respondents filed a Petition for Review with
the possession. Such refusal violates the vendor's right of
the CA.
possession
CA rendered a Decision, setting aside the Decision of the
unlawful detainer. However, prior to the institution of
RTC and dismissing the complaint for unlawful detainer.
such action, a demand from the vendor to pay the
-
make
the
giving
vendee deforciant in
rise
to
an
order
that
action
for
installment due or comply with the conditions of the
-
ISSUE:
Contract to Sell and to vacate the premises is required
-
Whether the complaint is one for unlawful detainer.
under the aforequoted rule.
-
-
Thus, mere failure to pay the installment due or violation
-
RULING:
of the terms of the Contract to Sell does not automatically
-
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
render a person's possession unlawful. Furthermore, the
provides:
giving of such demand must be alleged in the complaint;
Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and
otherwise, the MTC cannot acquire jurisdiction over the
when. Subject to the provisio ns of the next
case.
-
succeeding section, a person deprived of the
-
It is clear from the foregoing that the allegations in the
possession of any land or building by force,
Complaint failed to constitute a case of
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or
unlawful detainer. What is clear is that in the Complaint,
a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against
petitioner alleged that respondents had violated t he terms
whom the possession of any land or building is
of the Contract to Sell. However, the Complaint failed to
unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
state that petitioner made demands upon respondents to
termination of the right to hold possession, by
comply with the conditions of the contract the payment of
virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the
the installments and the accounting and delivery of the
legal
harvests from the subject riceland. The 10-day period
representatives
or
assigns
of
any
such lessor, vendor, vendee or other person
granted respondents to vacate even fell short of the 15-
may, at any time within one (1) year after such
day period mandated by law. When the complaint does
unlawful
not satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of a valid cause
deprivation
or
withholding
of
possession, bring an action in the proper
R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 21 for unlawful detainer, the MTC does not have jurisdiction
The fact that respondent Judge took cognizance of the forcible
to hear the case.
entry case did not taint her action with grave abuse of authority,
[A.M. MTJ-96-1085. October 8, 1998]
even if defendant had alleged that the land in question was under agricultural tenancy, and that there was an issue of jurisdiction .
SALVACION P. ONQUIT vs. JUDGE AURORA BINAMIRA-PARCIA, and SHERIFF IV DANILO O. MATIAS, QUISUMBING, J.: Facts: Respondent Judge was assigned a forcible entry case which the complainant and her two brothers were co-defendants. Complainant raised the issue of jurisdiction stating that said case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) because it involves tenancy over an agricultural land. Respondent Judge denied all motions raised by defendants ruling that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint and not those raised by defendants. Moreover, according to respondent Judge, the claim regarding the nature of the case at bar would not automatically divest the court its jurisdiction. Subsequently, plaintiff in the lower court filed an injunction bond which was approved by respondent Judge and a writ of preliminary injunction was issued against the defendants, including herein complainant. A seizure order followed which directed respondent Sheriff to seize the palay from the land in question. Complainant details several allegations as follows: (1) That the land subject of the forcible entry case is an agricultural riceland, thus, it is the Department of Agrarian Reform which has original and exclusive jurisdiction, and not the respondent Judge's court; (2) That the plaintiff’s injunction bond was approved by res pondent Judge without first serving a copy to the complainant resulting in a violation of due process. Complainant avers that it left her no opportunity to object to the sufficiency of the bond. Further, a copy of the writ of injunction was notserved on complainant’s counsel; (3) That a notice regarding the Motion for Issuance of Seizure Order was not served on the complainant thereby depriving her of a chance to oppose it; (4) That respondent Judge has been heard saying that complainant and his co-defendants ought to leave the land because it is certain that they will lose their case; (5) And that, with regard to respondent Sheriff, upon the issuance of the seizure order, he seized all the palay harvested without issuing a receipt, despite demand therefor, and delivered the palay to the plaintiff
Well-settled is the principle that the courts shall not be divested of jurisdiction over a case merely by what is raised in the answer. What determines the nature of an action and a court's jurisdiction over it are the allegations set up by the plaintiff .Basic is the rule that the material averments in the complaint, which in this case is for ejectment, determine the jurisdiction of the court . And, jurisprudence dictates that the court does not lose its jurisdiction over an ejectment case by the simple expedient of a party raising as a defense therein the alleged existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties. It is the duty of the court to receive evidence to determine the veracity of allegations of tenancy. In an Order of respondent Judge dated 09 February 1996, it was ruled that, considering the evidence presented, the land in question is an irrigatedriceland, but not tenanted. This matter was even brought up on a petition for certiorari with prohibition to the Regional Trial Court of Ligao, Albay, but said petition was denied.[20] These antecedents are sufficient to convince us that the respondent Judge did not act with grave abuse of authority in assuming jurisdiction over the case filed in her sala. With regard to the allegation of having failed to furnish to the defendants a copy of the bond and the writ of preliminary injunction, we give credence to the findings made by the Office of the Court Administrator, as follows: However, Section 8, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court in conjunction with Section 3, Rule 70 thereof provides that the party filing the bond shall forthwith served a copy of such bond on the other party, who may except to the sufficiency of the bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon. This means that the plaintiff and not the Court or the respondent Judge for that matter, who is duty bound to serve a copy of the injunction bond to the defendants. x xx Nevertheless, the failure of the plaintiff to serve a copy of the injunction bond to the defendant is merely a formal defect and not a reversible error. For in this case the defendant may ask the court to order the plaintiff to serve upon him the copy of the bond. On the other hand, the records belie the claim of complainant that the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was not served to (sic) the defendants. Records show that said writ was served to (sic) the defendants on February 16, 1996 at their residence but all refused to acknowledge receipt therefor, nevertheless the executing Sheriff left each a copy to (sic) the defendants.
Issue: Whether or not respondent Judge committed grave abuse of authority, bias and grave misconduct in assuming jurisdiction.
[G.R. No. 107741. October 18, 1996] FRANCISCO BERNARTE, et al., vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ROMERO, J.:
Ruling:
FACTS:
Considering the Complaint, the Comments, and the Reply as well as the pleadings and exhibits submitted, we find no grave abuse of authority, grave misconduct and bias on the part of respondent Judge.
Estrella Arastia, in her own behalf and as attorney-in-fact of the heirs of Teodorica Reinares Arastia, Letecia Arastia-Montenegro and Juanita Arastia (Arastia Siblings), filed a complaint for violation of Section 73 (b) of Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988) before the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 48 in its capacity as a Special Agrarian
R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 22 Court. In their answer, petitioners averred that they had been in continuous and peaceful possession of their respective tillages since 1950 when the late Teodorica Arastia was still the administratix of the landholding in question and moved for the dismissal of the case and that RTC has no jurisdiction over the said case. RTC denied said motion and issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering petitioners and/or any other person acting in their command and/or their behalf to desist and refrain from occupying their respective portions they are allegedly cultivating pending the termination of this litigation, and/or unless a contrary order is issued by this Court. Subsequently, petitioners filed before SC a petition for certiorari assailing the jurisdiction of the lower court over the agrarian case which SC dismissed for failure to comply with Circular No. 1-88, specifically No. 4 thereof. Meanwhile, petitioners filed before Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) a complaint against Estrella Arastia, alleging that through the use and employ of armed men, Estrella Arastia forcibly evicted and drove them out of their landholdings, harvested and appropriated their standing rice crops, destroyed their vegetable crops, took their deep well and set fire on their houses. As a consequence thereof, they suffered damages in the total amount of P3,300,000.00 for which Estrella Arastia should be held liable. They prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order to enjoin defendant therein from preventing their re-entry and reoccupation of the landholdings pending the resolution of the case. The case was referred to the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) of barangays San Isidro, Santiago, San Rafael and Lourdes in Lubao, Pampanga for fact-finding and exploration of the possibility of an amicable settlement. After conducting the necessary proceedings, the BARCs found that petitioners had been in possession and cultivation of their respective farm holdings. However, despite receipt of summons and the DARAB orders, Estrella Arastia did not file an answer nor comply with said orders. DARAB construed this as her waiver and affirmation of what had been submitted by petitioners, and that she had no evidence to submit for its consideration. Based on the findings of the BARCs, the DARAB issued an order declaring the 300-hectare land as within the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988; maintaining petitioners possession and cultivation of their respective landholdings from where they were forcibly ejected on September 29, 1989 and restraining the respondent or any other persons acting in her behalf from entering, intruding, and disturbing the farming activities of the said petitioners in their respective farmholdings. On the strength of the said writ of preliminary injunction from DARAB, petitioners resumed occupation and cultivation of the subject land. Such actions resulted in the dispatch of several policemen to the area. They reminded petitioners of the writ of preliminary injunction issued earlier in Agrarian Case No. 2000 and ordered them to leave the land in dispute. Upon their refusal to leave, the policemen arrested them and subsequently charged them with resistance and/or disobedience to the lawful order of persons in authority before the MTC. On the same day, however, they were released from police custody. Insisting on their right to work on the land, petitioners again entered the land. Without a warrant of arrest, herein respondent police officers arrested petitioners for having entered the landholding and for resisting and intimidating said police officers. Petitioners were detained at the municipal jail of Lubao, Pampanga on and they were
charged with direct assault upon agents of a person in authority. Thereafter, the municipal court ordered the transfer of petitioners to the provincial jail in San Fernando, Pampanga on the ground that the case fell within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and the fact that petitioners, having refused to receive copy of the complaint and the affidavits of the complainants, did not "intend to file counter-affidavit. On October 21, 1992, the Provincial Prosecutor filed an information for direct assault upon an agent of a person in authority which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 3171 before the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga. On December 22 and 29, 1992 and January 21, 1993, thirty (30) of the forty-five (45) petitioners posted bail in the criminal case for direct assault. In their Memorandum which was received by the Court on May 17, 1995, petitioners furnished the information that most if not all of the petitioners were already released on bail and therefore cannot avail of the writ of habeas corpus for being moot and academic. And yet, invoking Soriano v. Heirs of Domingo Magali, Malabanan v. Hon. Ramentoand Salonga v. Pano where the Court considered the issues raised notwithstanding that certain events had supervened to render the case moot and academic, petitioners insist that dismissal of the case on such ground should not bar the resolution of this case on the merits. Issue: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case. Ruling: As regards the issue of jurisdiction over the dispute between them and the Arastias, petitioners should be reminded that the allegations in a compliant are determinative factors of said issue. On this matter, the Court declared: Jurisdiction over the subject-matter is determined upon the allegations made in the complaint, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled or not entitled to recover upon the claim asserted therein — a matter resolved only after and as a result of the trial. Neither can the jurisdiction of the court be made to depend upon the defenses made by the defendant in his answer or motion to dismiss. If such were the rule, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely upon the defendant. In her complaint in Agrarian Case No. 2000, Estrella Arastia alleged that she and the rest of the plaintiffs therein were the registered owners of the parcels of land in question which herein petitioners illegally intruded into, damaged and cultivated under the status of holding "actual title over the properties;" that the definite findings and rulings of the DAR showed that "no tenancy relationship" existed between the parties and that petitioners were definitely not qualified beneficiaries of the rights and benefits under Republic Act No. 6657 as they were not in any way tenants and/or legitimate tillers of the subject land, and that the acts of petitioners violated Section 73 (b) of said law. Petitioner's raising the issue of jurisdiction in their answer to the complaint did not automatically divest the lower court of jurisdiction over Agrarian Case No. 2000. The court had to continue exercising authority to hear the evidence for the purpose of determining whether or not it had jurisdiction over the case. In a plethora of cases, this Court has made the pronouncement that once jurisdiction is vested, the same is retained up to the end of the
R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 23 litigation. After such hearing, if tenancy had in fact been shown to be the real issue, then the court should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. It should be pointed out, moreover, that in filing Agrarian Case No. 2000, Estrella Arastia was merely ejecting petitioners from the land on the ground that no tenancy relationship existed between them. However, her invocation of Sec. 73 (b) of Republic Act No. 6657 which considers as a prohibited act "forcible entry or illegal detainer by persons who are not qualified beneficiaries under this Act to avail themselves of the rights and benefits of the Agrarian Reform Program," obviously led the court to docket the case as Agrarian Case No. 2000 and assume jurisdiction over it as a special agrarian court. Such actions were in consonance with Section 56 and 57 of said law which vest upon the Regional Trial Court, acting as a Special Agrarian Court, with jurisdiction over two classes of agrarian-related cases: (1) "petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners" and (2) "prosecution of all criminal offenses" under the same law. A criminal offender under Republic Act No. 6657 is, pursuant to Section 74 of the law, "(a)ny persons who knowingly and willfully violates the provisions of this Act." Thus, the lower court correctly assumed jurisdiction over Agrarian Case No. 2000. It was within petitioners' rights to question the issuance of the writ before this Court through G.R. No. 100663. However, in filing the petition, they failed to comply with Circular No. 1-88. The consequent dismissal of the case for noncompliance with said circular deprived this Court with authority to look into the validity of the writ once again. To repeat, such dismissal constituted res judicata on the issue of validity of the writ of preliminary injunction. Consequently, petitioners are treading on shaky ground in questioning the legality of their arrest in this petition for habeas corpus for the reason that the police officers were enforcing a writ of preliminary injunction illegally issued in Agrarian Case No. 2000 and, in the same breath, allege that they could use force or "legally resist and even intimidate another, be he a private individual or an agent of a person in authority, who interferes with the legitimate exercise of (his) rights" as possessors and cultivators of the Arastia property. If indeed petitioners are tenants of the Arastias under the law,they are not without other legal recourses. Certainly, through their counsel, who appear to be zealous in protecting whatever rights petitioners believe they may have, they should pursue DARAB Case No. 161-P'89 and whatever actions are available for them under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. Although it is well-accepted that a court should always strive to settle the controversy in a single proceeding, leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation, this rule cannot apply if the result would negate the rational application of the Rules of Court. Petitioners may not engage in procedural shortcuts to revive the settled issue of the validity of the writ of preliminary injunction issued in Agrarian Case No. 2000 allegedly on the ground of the existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties in the instant petition for habeas corpus arising from their arrest for having assaulted persons in authority. [G.R. No. 142503 . June 20, 2003] ROMUALDO C. PEREZ, petitioner , vs. APOLONIO CRUZ, respondent .
QUISUMBING, J .: FACTS: Cruz is the owner of a lot he inherited from his mother, whoacquired the same from petitioner Romualdo Perez. Cruz claimed that Perez requested his permission to build his house on a small portion of said property, as Perez had nowhere to erect his dwelling on.This request was granted, as they are close relatives.
Unknown to Cruz, however, Perez filed an application for issuance of title covering the subject land with the DENR. When Cruz learned of Perez’s design, he immediately opposed the application. Accordingly, Cruz demanded that Perez remove his house from the land and vacate the same. When petitioner failed to heed the demand, respondent filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against him. Perez denied Cruz’s ownership of the property by claiming to be owner of the lot in question, having inherited the same from his grandmother. He asserted that he had been in continuous possession for many years. To support his claim, Perez presented Tax Declaration No. 26682 and official receipts of tax payments. Perez submitted that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the case as the issue involved was one of ownership, not mere possession.
On February 12, 1992, the MTC dismissed the case on the ground of want of jurisdiction, holding that the main issue is one of ownership, not mere possession de facto.Cruz appealed said decision to the RTC. Meanwhile, on March 31, 1992, the Regional Executive Director of the DENR, Region III, disapproved the survey of the lot submitted by Perez. Cruz was then directed to file the appropriate public land application for the land subject of the controversy. On June 29, 1992, the RTC Branch 13, rendered its decisionreversing the MTC ruling, and ordering the remand of the records for trial on the merits.On remand, the MTC decided for the plaintiff and against the defendant. Perez appealed. The RTC of Malolos Branch 10 REVERSED the appealed decision. The question of ownership was inextricably intertwined with the issue of possession. Since the issue of possession could not be resolved without first addressing the question of ownership, the case should have been dismissed, following case law. Cruz then elevated the matter to the CA by way of petition for review.The Court of Appeals held that the decision of the Regional Director of Lands disapproving the survey application of petitioner Perez and affirming the right of respondent Cruz to file the application for titling of the subject land rendered moot and academic the possessory action in the RTC. Said decision awarding the land to Cruz gave him a better right of possession over the disputed lot as against Perez, a non-awardee.[15] It likewise held that the RTC of Malolos, Branch 10, erred in reversing the decision of the RTC of Malolos, Branch 13, because said decision already acquired finality. Perez then moved for reconsideration, but the appellate court denied it. ISSUE: WON MTC has jurisdiction to hear and decide cases for ejectment.
R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 24 RULING:It is hornbook law that jurisdiction is determined by the averments in the complaint. In civil cases, if a complaint is filed involving a subject matter within the jurisdiction of an inferior court, but if after the trial, it appears that the subject matter falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of a superior court, the inferior court cannot render judgment but must dismiss the case.
In the complaint for ejectment filed before the Hagonoy MTC, it was alleged by Cruz that Perez pleaded that he be allowed to construct his house as he had no other parcel of land on which to build a house. The complaint further alleged that it was by mere tolerance that Cruz, now respondent herein, allowed Perez to occupy a small portion of the lot. Taking the allegations in the complaint as basis, in our view, there is no doubt that the case is one for unlawful detainer. The Hagonoy MTC had the jurisdiction to hear and decideCivil Case No. 979. It was held that a person who occupies the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by the implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. Anent petitioners claim that the issue is not one of mere possession but rather of ownership, we held that in ejectment cases, the defendant cannot deprive the court of jurisdiction by simply claiming ownership of the property involved. Precisely with the aim of preventing a possible anomaly, the provisions of the Rules of Court governing unlawful detainer and forcible entry were revised. When the defendant raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of physical possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.[26] Should the inferior court make any determination on the issue of ownership, the same shall not be conclusive and shall be without prejudice to the right of the parties to ventilate before the proper court their claims of ownership over the same land. The question of ownership is yet to be resolved with finality and conclusiveness. Although the DENR has disapproved the cadastral survey submitted by petitioner Perez, he could contest respondent Cruz’s application for said lot, which yet remains to be titled. That administrative agency should be the arena where the parties could tackle the issue of ownership.
G.R. No. 152423 December 15, 2010 SPOUSES MARCOS R. ESMAQUEL and VICTORIA SORDEVILLA, petitiomers vs. MARIA COPRADA, respondent PERALTA, J.:
Respondent alleged that sometime in the early 1960’s, petitioner Victoria offered the said lot for sale for P2,000.00 to the respondent, who readily agreed. The price was paid in installments and was fully paid in 1962. The agreement was never reduced to writing.
The MCTC dismissed the complaint. It held that laches had already set in which prevented petitioners from questioning the validity of the purported sale between Victoria and Maria. On appeal, the RTC reversed the MCTCs judgment. The RTC ruled that respondent’s occupation was by virtue of petitioner’s tolerance. Hence, respondent is bound by an implied promise that she will vacate property upon demand. Her possession over the subject property became unlawful after the petitioners demanded her to vacate. Respondent filed an MR, which was denied. Dissatisfied, respondent filed with the CA a petition for review. The CA granted the petition and reversed the decision of the RTC, and affirmed in toto the decision o f the MCTC.
ISSUE: WON the petitioners have a valid ground to evict respondent from the subject property
RULING: Yes.In unlawful detainer cases, the possession of the defendant was originally legal, as his possession was permitted by the plaintiff on account of an express or implied contract between them. However, defendant's possession became illegal when the plaintiff demandedthat defendant vacate the subject property due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess under their contract, and defendant refused to heed such demand.
The sole issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties. Where the issue of ownership is raised by any of the parties, the courts may pass upon the same in order to determine who has the right to possess the property. The adjudication is, however, merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the property. Since the issue of ownership was raised in the unlawful detainer case, its resolution boils down to which of the parties' respective evidence deserves more weight. x x x As a registered owner, petitioner has a right to eject any person illegally occupying his property. This right is imprescriptible and can never be barred by laches.
Bugarin vs Palisoc Sunflower Neigborhood vs CA G.R. No. 157985
FACTS: In 1997, petitioners filed an ejectment case against Coprada before the MCTC of Magdalena, Laguna. Petitioners claimed that they are the registered owners of a parcel of land in Laguna. In 1945, respondent was able to persuade the petitioners to allow her and her family to use and occupy the land for their residence. When respondent’s circumstances have improved, petitioners verbally demanded that respondent vacate the subject land but the latter refused. Petitioners were therefore constrained to lodge an ejectment case.
FIRST DIVISION ZENAIDA BUGARIN, VIOLETA ABANO, LIZA ABAYATA, ANTONIO ALEGRE, REMEDIOS ALEGRE, CHRIS ANASCO, JEFFREY ARQUILLOS, LOURDES BAGARESE, EUGENIA BARAQUIL, PRECIOS BASOY, RANNY BASOY, FELY BERMEJO, CARLOS BO, JUN BO, ALEX BORRES, ANNA MARIE CORDOVA, ESPERANZE CORDOVA, EDWIN DEPETILLO, ROMULO FERRY, LEONISA GABRIEL, MA. FE GABRIEL, SALOME CORDOVA, ELEN JACOB, JEREMIAS JACOB, OLIVIA LERIN, CRISELDA MADEJA, JOMARI MANONG, NESTOR MANONG, VALENTIN MANONG, EDMUNDO/FELY MINA, TEDDY PARUAN, SALVACION
R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 25 PASCUA, ROMMEL POLISTICO, DANIEL/NANCY PRADO, ARMANDO ROMERO, SANCHO VILLAFUERTE, and FERNANDO YAMID, Petitioners, - versus CECILIA B. PALISOC, MARINA B. MATA and REYNALDO T. NEPOMUCENO, Respondents. Promulgated: December 2, 2005 x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x RESOLUTION QUISUMBING, J.: . The facts in this case, culled from the record, are as follows. The present controversy arose from a complaint for ejectment, \ filed before the MeTC by private respondents Cecilia B. Palisoc and Marina B. Mata. In a decision[4] dated February 27, 2002, the court declared respondents as the rightful possessors of the properties in dispute. It also ordered the petitioners to vacate the premises and pay to private respondents the rentals. Petitioners appealed while private respondents moved for execution pending appeal.MeTC decision with the modification that petitioners must start paying rentals from the date of the appealed decision. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Opposition to the Issuance of a Writ of Execution. RTC denied the motion and granted private respondents motion for execution for failure of petitioners to post a supersedeas bond or to pay the back rentals. Thus, a writ of execution pending appeal was issued and petitioners were served with the writ and notice to vacate. Petitioners filed a Supplement to the Motion t o Defer Implementation of Writ of Execution and Opposition to Motion to Issue Special Order of Demolition, contending that Section 28 o f Republic Act No. 7279[5] was not complied with. Private respondents filed a Motion Reiterating the Motion for Issuance of Special Order of Demolition. The RTC declared the decision denying petitioners appeal final and executory, and remanded the records of the case to the MeTC. However, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction before the Court of Appeals. They also filed an Urgent Vigorous Opposition and Motion to Suspend Proceedings on respondents Motion Reiterating the Motion for Issuance of Special Order of Demolition before the MeTC. MeTC Branch Sheriff Reynaldo T. Nepomuceno reported that petitioners refused to vacate the premises. Petitioners instead filed a Motion to Quash and Recall the Order dated April 30, 2003 and/or Special Order of Demolition. The MeTC denied the motion and issued the Special Order of Demolition, Hence, this petition. ISSUE: are the Orders of the MeTC proper? RULING: Petitioners contend that the Orders of the MeTC violated the mandatory requirements of Section 28[7] of Rep. Act No. 7279 since there was no 30-day notice prior to the date of eviction or demolition and there had been no consultation on the matter of resettlement. They also claim that there was neither relocation nor financial assistance given. They insist that the MeTC orders are patently unreasonable, impossible and in violation of the law.[8] Private respondents for their part argue that R ep. Act No. 7279 is not applicable. They aver that there was no proof that petitioners are registered as eligible socialized housing program beneficiaries in
accordance with procedure set forth in the Implementing Rules and Regulations Governing the Registration of Socialized Housing Beneficiaries issued by the Department of Interior and Local Government and the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council. They aver that even if Rep. Act No. 7279 was applicable, the required notices under the law had already been complied with. According to them, petitioners were already notified when the writ of execution was served.[9] We find for respondents. Under Section 19,[10] Rule 70 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, a judgment on a forcible entry and detainer action is immediately executory to avoid further injustice to a lawful possessor, and the courts duty to order the execution is practically ministerial.[11] The defendant may stay it only by (a) perfecti ng an appeal; (b) filing a supersedeas bond; and (c) making a periodic deposit of the rental or reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the property during the pendency of the appeal.[12] Once the Regional Trial Court decides on the appeal, s uch decision is immediately executory under Section 21,[13] Rule 70, without prejudice to an appeal, via a petition fo r review, before the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court.[14] However, petitioners failed to file a petition for review. Records show that petitioners received on March 12, 2003 the RTC decision denying their motion for reconsideration. They had until Marc h 27, 2003 to file a petition for review before the Court of Appeals. Instead, they filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition. Clearly, petitioners petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals was filed as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. Certiorari is not and cannot be made a su bstitute for an appeal where the latter remedy is available but was lost through fault or negligence.[16] Thus, the filing of the petition for certiorari did not prevent the RTC decision from becoming final and executory.[17] The RTC acted correctly when it remanded the case to the court of origin. Thus, we find that the MeTC cannot be faulted for issuing the assailed orders to enforce the RTC judgment. It also appears that the order of demolition had already been executed. Petitioners had already vacated the area and private respondents now possess the properties free from all occupants, as evidenced by the sheriffs turn-over of possession dated May 19, 2003. Thus, the instant case before us has indeed become moot and academic. WHEREFORE, the petition for review assailing the Order dated April 30, 2003 and the Special Order of Demolition dated May 9, 2003 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Paraaque City, Branch 77, is DENIED for mootness and lack of merit. SO ORDERED. THIRD DIVISION [G.R. No. 136274. September 3, 2003] SUNFLOWER NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, represented by FLORO ARAGAN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE LORIFEL LACAP PHIMNA, MeTC, Branch 77, Paraaque City and ELISA MAGLAQUI-CAPARAS, respondents. DECISION CORONA, J.: The antecedent facts follow. Private respondent Elisa Maglaqui-Caparas, in her capacity as executrix of the testate estate of Macaria Maglaqui, filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Alfredo Mogar and 46 other persons[4] who were occupying several parcels of land (Lots 1-A, B, C, E, F and G) in Yellow Ville, United Paraaque Subdivision IV, Metro Manila. These parcels of land are covered by individual transfer
R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 26 certificates of title[5] registered in the name of Macaria Maglaqui, private respondents mother. The MeTC of Paraaque City, eventually decided in favor of private respondent. On appeal, the decision of the MeTC was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. Mogar et al. elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but their petition was dismissed. After the dismissal became final, a writ o f demolition was issued by the MeTC of Paraaque City. The writ, however, was not immediately implemented because the case was transferred to Branch 77 of the same court. Mogar et al. filed a petition with the RTC of Paraaque City, Branch 257, presided over by Judge Rolando G. How, to enjoin the implementation of the writ of demolition. However, this petition was denied and subsequently, an alias writ of demolition was issued by Judge Vivencio G. Lirio of MeTC Branch 77, the court of origin. The alias writ of demolition was, again, not executed, this t ime due to the ex parte issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction by Judge Amelita Tolentino, in connection with the expropriation case filed by the Municipality of Paraaque against the Testate Estate of Macaria Maglaqui. Meanwhile, another group of persons occupying portions of the parcels of land (Lots I-F and I-G) s ubject of the unlawful detainer case, organized themselves into the Sunflower Neighborhood Association (Sunflower), the petitioner herein. Sunflower, represented by one Floro Aragan, filed a complaint for prohibition/injunction with preliminary injunction against private respondent also with the RTC of Paranaque City, Branch 257. Sunflower argued that its members should be excluded fro m the demolition order as they were not parties to the original unlawful detainer case. To include their houses in the demolition would be to deprive them of due process. This time, Judge How granted the injunction and ordered the exclusion of the houses belonging to petitioner from demolition. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of private respondent holding that, as the judgment in the unlawful detainer case had already become final, the execution could not be enjoined. Consequently, the MeTC of Paraaque City, Branch 77 issued another alias writ of demolition on September 14, 1998. In order to stay the execution of the writ of demolition, Sunflower filed an urgent motion for the issuance of a status quo order. The court granted it. Prior to the issuance of our resolution, however, the writ of demolition was implemented on Petitioner thus filed a motion to allow its members to return to the premises, which was granted. Thereafter, the court required both parties to submit their memoranda. ISSUE: whether petitioners members, who were not parties to the unlawful detainer case, may be ejected from the land subject of this case. RULING: Before we proceed, it should be pointed out that any issue relating to the expropriation case filed by the Municipality of ParaNaque has been rendered moot by the dismissal of that case. We rule in the affirmative. It is well-settled that, although an ejectment suit is an action in personam wherein the judgment is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded and giv en an opportunity to be heard, the judgment becomes binding on anyone who has not been impleaded if he or she is: (a) a trespasser, squatter or agent of the defendant fraudulently occupying the property to frustrate the judgment; (b) a guest or occupant of the premises with the permission of the defendant; (c) a transferee pendente lite; (d) a sublessee; (e) a co-lessee or (f) a member of the family, relative or privy of the defendant.[9]
In the case at bar, the records show that petitioners members are trespassers or squatters who do not have any right to occupy the property of respondent. Petitioner does not dispute the ownership of the parcels of land in question. In fact, it even admitted that the subject property is owned by Macaria Maglaqui, mother of private respondent.[10] Petitioner failed to establish any right which would entitle its members to occupy the land in any capacity, whether as lessees, tenants and the like. Petitioners only defense against the eviction and demolition orders is their supposed non-inclusion in the original detainer case. This defense, however, has no legal support since its members are trespassers or squatters who are bound by the judgment. Petitioners argument that the parcels of land occupied by its members (Lots I-F and I-G) were not included i n the original ejectment complaint has no basis. The complaint private respondent filed with the MeTC of Paraaque City, Branch 78, clearly included Lots I-F and I-G as part of the subject matter under litigation in the unlawful detainer case.[11] Thus, petitioners members, together with all the parties in the unlawful deta iner case, must vacate the disputed land. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 46861 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 173616 June 25, 2014 AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE (ATO), Petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS (NINETEENTH DIVISION) and BERNIE G. MIAQUE, Respondents. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: This petition for certiorari and prohibition of the Air Transportation Office (ATO) seeks the nullification of the Court of Appeals' Resolution1 dated March 29, 2006 and Resolution2 dated May 30, 2006 in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01603. The Resolution dated March 29, 2006 granted the application for temporary restraining order (TRO) of Bernie G. Miaque, while the Resolution dated May 30, 2006 issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation of the writ of execution issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo despite Miaque's alleged continued failure and refusal to make current the supersedeas bond and to pay to the A TO the rental and concession privilege fees. Facts:
Main case of ejectment:
In May 2001, the ATO filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Miaque in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Iloilo City, Branch 3. The ATO sought the following, among others: (1) That Miaque be ordered to permanently vacate and peacefully return to the ATO possession of: (a) the 800-square meter Refreshment Parlor fronting the New Terminal Building-Iloilo Airport; (b) the 310-square meter Restaurant/Gift Shop inside the Iloilo Airport Terminal; and (c) all areas occupied or otherwise utilized by Miaque incident to his operation of the Porterage Service within the Iloilo Airport; and (2) That Miaque be ordered to immediately pay the ATO the amount of not less than ₱1,296,103.10, representing unpaid space rental and concessionaire privilege fees as of October 15, 2000 plus interest and additional rental and fees which may be proven during the trial.
R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 27 MTCC: judgment is rendered finding [Miaque] to be unlawfully detaining the following premises and was ordered to vacate the premises RTC: affirmed the MTCC Decision in its entirety. Miaque’s motion for reconsideration was denied. CA:dismissed Miaque’sthe petition and affirmed the RTC Decision
In a new case in the Court of Appeals, Miaque filed a petition for certiorari (with prayer for issuance of TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction) in CA docketed as CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01603, where he assailed the RTC’s Order dated March 20, 2006which caused the issuance of the writ. The ATO claims that the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the TRO and the subsequent writ of preliminary injunction through the Order dated March 29, 2006 and the Resolution dated May 30,2006, respectively. According to the ATO, the Court of Appeals ignored the government’s right under the law, Rules of Court, jurisprudence and equity to the possession as well as to the payment of rental and concession privilege fees which, at the time of the filing of this petition, already amounted to ₱2 Million. Such right had already been decided with finality by this Court, which affirmed the Decision dated April 29, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79439, but the Court of Appeals has repeatedly thwarted it.
Issue: WON CA acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the TRO and the subsequent WPI
Held: YES
Preliminarily, the Court notes that the challenge to the Order dated March 29, 2006 granting a TRO, effective for 60 days, is moot as its effectivity had already lapsed. Section 21, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides the key to that question: Sec. 21. Immediate execution on appeal to Court of Appeals or Supreme Court. – The judgment of the Regional Trial Court against the defendant shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom.
This reflects Section 21 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure: Sec. 21. Appeal. - The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate Regional Trial Court which shall decide the same in accordance with Section 22 of Batas PambansaBlg. 129. The decision of the Regional Trial Court in civil cases governed by this Rule, including forcible entry and unlawful detainer, shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom. Section 10 of Rule 70 shall be deemed repealed. The above provisions are supplemented and reinforced by Section 4, Rule 39 and Section 8(b), Rule 42 of the Rules of Court which respectively provide: Sec. 4. Judgments not stayed by appeal. – Judgments in actions for injunction, receivership, accounting and support, and such other judgments as are now or may hereafter be declared to be immediately executory, shall be enforceable after their rendition and shall not be stayed by an appeal taken therefrom, unless otherwise ordered by the trial court. On appeal therefrom, the appellate court in its discretion may make an order suspending,
modifying, restoring or granting the injunction, receivership, accounting, or award of support. The stay of execution shall be upon such terms as to bond or otherwise as may be considered proper for the security or protection of the rights of the adverse party. The totality of all the provisions above shows the following significant characteristics of the RTC judgment in an ejectment case appealed to it: (1) The judgment of the RTC against the defendant-appellant is immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom; and The first characteristic -- the judgment of the RTC is immediately executory -- is emphasized by the fact that no resolutory condition has been imposed that will prevent or stay the execution of the RTC’s judgment. The RTC’s duty to issue a writ of execution under Section 21 of Rule 70 is ministerial and may be compelled by mandamus.Section 21 of Rule 70 presupposes that the defendant in a forcible entry or unlawful detainer case is unsatisfied with the RTC’s judgment and appeals to a higher court. It authorizes the RTC to immediately issue a writ of execution without prejudice to the appeal taking its due course.5 The rationale of immediate execution of judgment in an ejectment case is to avoid injustice to a lawful possessor.5 Nevertheless, it should be s tressed that the appellate court may stay the writ of execution should circumstances so require. (2) Such judgment of the RTC is not stayed by an appeal taken therefrom, unless otherwise ordered by the RTC or, in the appellate court’s discretion, suspended or modified. The second characteristic -- the judgment of the RTC is not stayed by an appeal taken therefrom – reinforces the first.1The judgment of the RTC in an ejectment case is enforceable upon its rendition and, upon motion, immediately executory notwithstanding an appeal taken therefrom. The execution of the RTC’s judgment is not discretionary execution under Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. On the other hand, execution of the RTC’s judgment under Section 21, Rule 70 is not discretionary execution but a ministerial duty of the RTC. In connection with the second characteristic of the RTC judgment in an ejectment case appealed to it, the consequence of the above distinctions between discretionary execution and the execution of the RTC’s judgment in an ejectment case on appeal to the Court of Appeals is that the former may be availed of in the RTC only before the Court of Appeals gives due course to the appeal while the latter may be availed of in the RTC at any stage of the appeal to the Court of Appeals. But then again, in the latter case, the Court of Appeals may stay the writ of execution issued by the RTC should circumstances so require To reiterate, despite the immediately executory nature of the judgment of the RTC in ejectment cases, which judgment is not stayed by an appeal taken therefrom, the Court of Appeals may issue a writ of preliminary injunction that will restrain or enjoin the execution of the RTC’s judgment. In the exercise of such authority, the Court of Appeals should constantly be aware that the grant of a preliminary injunction in a case rests on the sound discretion of the court with the caveat that it should be made with great caution. In this case, the decisions of the MTCC in Civil Case No. 01 (38), of the RTC in Civil Case No. 02-27292, and of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 79439 unanimously recognized the right of the ATO to possession of the property and the corresponding obligation of
R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 28
Miaque to immediately vacate the subject premises. This means that the MTCC, the RTC, and the Court of Appeals all ruled that Miaque does not have any right to continue in possession of the said premises. It is therefore puzzling how the Court of Appeals justified its issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction with t he sweeping statement that Miaque "appears to have a clear legal right to hold on to the premises leased by him from ATO at least until such time when he shall have been duly ejected therefrom by a writ of execution of judgment caused to be issued by the MTCC in Iloilo City, which is the court of origin of the decision promulgated by this Court in CA-G.R. SP No. 79439." Unfortunately, in its Resolution dated May 30, 2006 granting a writ of preliminary injunction in Miaque’sfavor, the Court of Appeals did not state the source or basis of Miaque’ s "clear legal right to hold on to the [said] premises." This is fatal. The sole basis of the Court of Appeals in issuing its Resolution dated May 30, 2006 is its view that the RTC "has no jurisdiction to order the issuance of [the] writ of execution" because, when it gave due course to the petition for review in CA-G.R. SP No. 79439, the RTC was already divested of jurisdiction over the case pursuant to the third paragraph of Section 8(a), Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. The Court of Appeals is mistaken. It disregards both (1) the immediately executory nature of the judgment of the RTC in ejectment cases, and (2) the rule that such judgment of the RTC is not stayed by an appeal taken there from. It ignores the nature of the RTC’s function to issue a writ of execution of its judgment in an ejectment case as ministerial and not discretionary.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolution dated May 30, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01603 is ANNULLED for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion. The Court of Appeals is directed to conduct its proceedings in CAG.R. CEB-SP No. 01603 expeditiously and without delay.
SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 196219 July 30, 2014 SPOUSES MAURICIO M. TABINO and LEONILA DELA CRUZTABINO, Petitioners, vs. LAZARO M. TABINO, Respondent. DEL CASTILLO, J.: FACTS: Proclamation No. 518 (Proc. 518) excluded from the operation of Proc. 423 – which established the military reservation known as Fort Bonifacio situated in the then municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, Pateros and Parañaque, Province of Rizal and Pasay City – certain portions in said reservation known and identified as BarangaysCembo, South Cembo, West Rembo, East Rembo, Comembo, Pembo, and Pitogo, situated in Makati, and declared the sameopen for disposition in accordance with Republic Act (RA) No. 274, and RA 730 in relation to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141. Among others, Proc. 518 allowed a maximum area of 300 square meters for disposition to any bona fideoccupants/residents of said BarangaysCembo, South Cembo, West Rembo, East Rembo, Comembo, Pembo, and Pitogo who have resided in or occupied such areas on or before January 7, 1986. In 1985, petitioner Mauricio M. Tabino (Mauricio) – a technical sergeant in the military – and his brother, respondent Lazaro M. Tabino – a colonel in the military – occupied a 353-square meter lot in Pembo, Makati City. Mauricio established residence within
the lot, while respondent continued to reside in Novaliches, Quezon City.9 The lot was later subdivided into two portions, denominated as Lots 2 and 3. Lot 2 – containing an area of 184 squaremeters – was applied for coverage under Proc. 518 by Mauricio, while Lot 3 – containing an area of 169 square meters – was applied for by respondent. Respondent was later on issued by the Fort Bonifacio Post Commander a Revocable Permit to occupy his lot, but the permit authorized him to occupy an area of only 150 square meters. In 1988, Lot 3 was awarded to respondent, and a Certificate to such effect was issued by the Bureau of Lands (now Land Management Bureau). On May 11, 2004, respondent filed an ejectment case against Mauricio and the latter’s wife, Leoniladela Cruz (petitioners) with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati (MeTC). The ejectment case is based on the theory that respondent is the true and sole owner of the 353-square meter lot; that he used Mauricio only for the purpose of circumventing the 300-square meter limit set by Proc. 518 by asking the latter to apply for the purchase of a portion of the lot after subdividing the same into two smaller lots; that Mauricio’s stay in the premises is merelyby tolerance of respondent; that petitioners introduced permanent structures on the land; and that petitioners refused to vacate the premises upon respondent’s formal demand. Respondent thus prayed that petitioners be ordered to vacate Lots2 and 3 and to pay the former rentals, attorney’s fees, and costs of suit. Petitioners countered n their Answer1 that respondent had no right to eject them; that the parties’ trueagreement was that petitioners would act as caretakers of respondent’s Lot 3, and for this, respondent would pay petitioners a monthly salary of ₱800.00; that respondent failed to honor the agreement; and that relative to Lot 2, there was a pending Protest filed with the Regional Executive Director of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)National Capital Region. It appears that petitioners and respondent both filed Protests with the DENR relative to Lots 2 and 3. DENR granted the petitioners and denied the respondent.
MeTC: ruled in favour of the petitioners The only issue to be resolved in this action to recover possession of the subject property is the question on who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the premises. In ejectment cases, the word "possession" means nothing more than physical possession, not legal possession, in the sense contemplated in civil law. RTC: affirmed MeTC’s decision in toto. CA: Assailed RTC’s decision
In reversing the trial court, the CA held that the 1994 affidavit – which petitioners do not dispute – should be taken as an admission by Mauricio that he was merely appointed by respondent as the caretaker of Lot 2, and that respondent is the true possessor and owner thereof. This being the case, petitioners occupy the premises by mere tolerance of respondent, and are bound to the implied promise that they shall vacate the sameupon demand. The CAadded that while respondent was authorized to occupy only 150 square meters, this was irrelevant since the only issue that must be resolved n an unlawful detainer case is actual physical or material possession, independent of any claim of ownership; since respondent has satisfactorily shown by preponderant evidence that he was in actual possession of Lots 2 and 3, he is entitled to recover the same from petitioners. The CA also held that while respondent’s application for Lot 2 was denied by the DENR in its June 13, 2006 Decision – since he was
R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 29 already an awardee of another lot within Fort Bonifacio, the issue of possession was not touched upon. For this reason, the DENR Decision has no bearing on the unlawful detainer case. Additionally, the DENR rulings are still the subject of appeals, and thus could not have conclusive effect. ISSUE: WON THE FINDINGS OF FACTS BY THE DENR IN RESOLVING CONFLICTING CLAIMS AS TO WHO HAS A BETTER RIGHT OF POSSESSION BETWEEN PETITIONERS AND RESPONDENT OVER SUBJECT PARCELS OF LOT BE NULLIFIED BY THE COURT UNDER AN EJECTMENT CASE. HELD:
Respondent is correct in arguing that petitioners may not raise the issues of exhaustion of administrative remedies and forumshopping, after having voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the MeTC and the RTC trying the ejectment case. Nonetheless, the Court finds that the appellate court erred in ordering petitioners to vacate the premises. With the pendency of the DENR Protests – Case Nos. 2004-821 and 2005-939 – respondent’s claim of possession and his right to recover the premises is seriously placed in issue. If the ejectment case – Civil Case No. 85043 – is allowed to proceed without awaiting the result of the DENR Protests, then a situation might arise where the existing structures thereon would have to be demolished. If petitioners’ position, as affirmed by the DENR, is further upheld with finality by the courts, then it would mean that respondent had no right to occupy or take possession of the subject lots, which thus negates his right to institute and maintain the ejectment case; and an injustice would have occurred as a consequence of the demolition of petitioners’ residence and other permanent improvements on the disputed lots. On this point, it is worth stressing that the courts generally accord great respect, if not finality, to factual findings of administrative agencies because of their special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction. Moreover, notwithstanding the issue of physical possession having been ruled upon by the Court in CA-G.R. SP No. 107957, it is well to note that in the case of Estrella vs. Robles, it was explained that the Bureau of Lands determines the respective rights of rival claimants to public lands, but it does not have the wherewithal to police public lands. Neither does it have the means to prevent disorders or breaches of the peace among the occupants. Its power is clearly limited to disposition and alienation and any power to decide disputes over possession is but in aid of making the proper awards.
x xxWhere the action, therefore, [is] one of illegal detainer, as distinguished from one of forcible entry, and the right ofthe plaintiff to recover the premises is seriously placed in issue in a proper judicial proceeding, it is more equitable and just and less productive of confusion and disturbance of physical possession, with all its concomitant inconvenience and expenses. For the Court in which the issue of legal possession, whether involving ownership or not, is brought to restrain, should a petition for preliminary injunction be filed with it, the effects of any order or decision in the unlawful detainer case in order to await the final judgment in the more substantive case involving legal possession or ownership. It is only where there has been forcible entry that as a matter of public policy the right to physical possession should be immediately set at rest in favor of the prior possession regardless of the fact that the other party might ultimately be found to have superior claim to the premises involved, thereby to discourage any attempt to recover possession thru force, strategy or stealth and without resorting to the courts .34 More significantly, Amagan v. Marayag dictates, thus – As a general rule, an ejectment suit cannot be abated or suspended by the mere filing before the regional trial court (R TC) of another action raising ownership of the property as an issue. As an exception, however, unlawful detainer actions may be suspended even on appeal, on considerations of equity, such as when the demolition of petitioners' house would result from the enforcement of the municipal circuit trial court (MCTC) judgrnent. WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed August 25, 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 107957 is MODIFIED, in that the directive for petitioners to vacate the subject premises is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. G.R. No. 203075, March 16, 2016 MILAGROS DIAZ, EDUARDO Q. CATACUTAN, DANTE Q. CATACUTAN, REPRESENTED BY THEIR COMMON ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, FERNANDO Q. CATACUTAN, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES GAUDENCIO PUNZALAN AND TERESITA PUNZALAN, Respondents. PERALTA, J.: Facts: Petitioners alleged that their motherhad acquired a parcel of land in Mapanique, Candaba, Pampanga. They contend that respondents (Spouses Punzalan) constructed their house on a portion of said lot
(CITED JURISPRUDENCE) In Samonte v. Century Savings Bank , this Court made the following pronouncement: Only in rare instances is suspension allowed to await the outcome of a pending civil action. In Vda. de Legaspi v. Avendaño, and Amagan v. Marayag, we ordered the suspension of the ejectment proceedings on considerations of equity. We explained that the ejectment of petitioners therein would mean a demolition of their house and would create confusion, disturbance, inconvenience, and expense. Needlessly, the court would be wasting much time and effort by proceeding to a stage wherein the outcome would at best be temporary but the result of enforcement would be permanent, unjust and probably irreparable.32
without their consent and knowledge. But petitioners allowed them
On the other hand, Vda. de Legaspi v. Hon. Avendaño ,which Samonte refers to, states:
Fernando RTC, which affriemd the decision of MTC.
to stay, thinking that they would vacate once their need for the property arises. However, when they made a demand, the Spouses Punzalan refused to vacate. Thus,petitioners wrote the spouses a formal demand letter to vacate. Still, they refused to leave the property. Petitioners filed a Complaint for unlawful detainer with the MCTC of Sta. Ana-Candaba, Pampanga. The MCTC then rendered a Decision in favor of the petitioner; The Spouses Punzalan, thus, brought the case before the San
R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 30 Aggrieved, the Spouses Punzalan elevated the case to the CA. CA
The Court finds that the allegations actually make up a case of
Reversed the ruling of RTC and ruled in favor of the Spouses
forcible entry. The Spouses Punzalan constructed their dwelling
Punzalan for lack of jurisdiction.
house on a portion of petitioners' lot, without the latter's prior consent and knowledge. This clearly falls under stealth, which is
Petitioners insist that their complaint states a cause of action for
defined as any secret, sly or clandestine act to avoid discovery and
unlawful detainer and thus, the MCTC duly acquired jurisdiction.
to gain entrance into, or to remain within residence of another
Issue: WON complaint states a cause of action for unlawful detainer and thus, the MCTC duly acquired jurisdiction. Ruling: The petition lacks merit.
without permission.Here, the evidence clearly reveal that the spouses' possession was illegal at the inception and not merely tolerated, considering that they started to occupy the subject lot and thereafter built a house on the same without the permission and consent of petitioners. The spouses' entry into the land was, therefore, effected clandestinely, without the knowledge of the owners. Consequently, it is categorized as possession by stealt h
Well settled is the rule that jurisdiction of the court in ejectment
which is forcible entry.
cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought.The complaint should embody such
PETITIONER’S TOLERANCE CAME LATER, NOT FROM INCEPTION AS
statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of
REQUIRED BY THE RULES.
cases under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. States:
The allegations of the complaint failed to state the essential elements of an action for unlawful detainer. The allegation that the
SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. - Subject to
Spouses Punzalan entered the subject property and constructed
the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of
their house on a portion of the same without petitioners' knowledge
the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat,
and consent is more consistent with an action for forcible entry,
strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person
which should have been filed within a year from the discovery of
against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully
said illegal entry.
withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the p erson or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs. Under the aforequoted rule, there are two (2) entirely distinct and different causes of action, to wit: (1) a case for forcible entry, which is an action to recover possession of a property from the defendant whose occupation thereof is illegal from the beginning as he acquired possession by fierce, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and (2) a case for unlawful detainer, which is an action for recovery of possession from the defendant whose possession of the property was lawful at the inception by virtue of a contract with the plaintiff, be it express or implied, but subsequently became illegal when he continued his possession despite the termination of his
To vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant, it is necessary that the complaint should embody such a statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature. In the instant case, the allegations in t he complaint do not contain any averment of fact that would substantiate petitioners' claim that they permitted or tolerated the occupation of the property by the Spouses Punzalan right from the start. This failure of petitioners to allege the key jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful detainer is fatal. Since the complaint did not satisfy th e jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the MCTC corollarily failed to acquire jurisdiction over the case. Petitioners may be the lawful possessors of the subject property, but they unfortunately availed of the wrong remedy to recover possession. Nevertheless, they may still opt to file an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria with the proper RTC.
right or authority.
Petition is DENIED.
A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful
[ GR No. 191527, Aug 22, 2016 ]
detainer if it recites the following: (1) the defendant's initial possession of the property was lawful, either by c ontract with or by
BALIBAGO FAITH BAPTIST CHURCH v. FAITH IN CHRIST JESUS
tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became
BAPTIST CHURCH +
illegal upon the plaintiffs notice to the defendant of the termination of the latter's right of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession and deprived the plaintiff o f the enjoyment of the property; and (4) the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment within one (1) year from the last demand to vacate the property.
PERALTA, J.: FACTS: Balibago Faith Baptist Church, Inc. (BFBC) and Philippine Baptist S.B.C., Inc. (PBSBC) filed a case for ulawful detainer against Faith in
R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 31 Christ Jesus Baptist Church, Inc. (FCJBC) and Reynaldo Galvan
possession and the plaintiffs cause of action is the termination of the
(Galvan) before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), , Angeles City. The
defendant's right to continue in possession.[14]
complaint sought the ejectment of FCJBC from the subject parcel of land with improvements, located at 35-3 Sarita St., Diamond
From the foregoing, it is then clear that unlawful detainer and
Subdivision, Balibago, Angeles City, and owned by PBSBC.
forcible entry are entirely distinct causes of action, to wit: (a) action to recover possession founded on illegal occupation from the
On March 7, 1990, a contract of loan was entered into between
beginning - forcible entry; and (b) action founded on unlawful
PBSBC and BFBC where the latter borrowed money from the former
detention by a person who originally acquired possession lawfully -
to enable it to purchase the subject property. Thereafter,
unlawful detainer.
respondent BFBC took possession of the subject property and held therein their religious activities.
The rule is that the allegations in the complaint determine both the nature of the action and the jurisdiction of the court. The cause of
While BFBC was still in possession of the subject property, Galvan
action in a complaint is not what t he designation of the complaint
and his companions began attending BFBC's religious activities at the
states, but what the allegations in the body o f the complaint define
subject property. BFBC alleged that Galvan apparently was
and describe. The designation or caption is not co ntrolling, more
interested on the property because after some tim e Galvan formed
than the allegations in the complaint themselves are, for it is not
and incorporated FCJBC and took control of the subject property.
even an indispensable part of the complaint. The complaint must specifically allege the facts constituting unlawful detainer or forcible
BFBC demanded that FCJBC vacate the property within five (5) days
entry if the complaint filed was for unlawful detainer, or forcible
from notice and to pay the amount of P10,000.00 per month
entry, respectively.
beginning October 2001 as reasonable compensation for its use. If entry is illegal, then the cause of action which may be filed against Due to non-compliance with its demand, BFBC and PBSBC filed a
the intruder within one year therefrom is forcible entry. If, on the
Complaint[6] for unlawful detainer and damages against FCJBC and
other hand, entry is legal but thereafter possession became illegal,
Galvan.
the case is one of illegal detainer which must be filed within o ne
The MTC rendered its Decision in favor of BFBC . The MTC ruled that
year from the date of the last demand
the case was one of forcible entry and not unlawful detainer.It
Court held that a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for
ordered the FCJBC to vacate and surrender possession o f the
unlawful detainer if it recites the following:
subject property to plaintiff within three (3) months from receipt of this Decision;
(1)
initially, possession of property by the defendant was by
contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; Both parties filed their respective appeal memoranda with the RTC. RTC affirmed the Decision of the MTC. FCJBC moved for
(2)
reconsideration, but was denied on November 24, 2006. Thus, FCJBC
plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter's right of
eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by
filed a petition for review on certiorari before the appellate court.
possession;
The appellate court granted the petition, It REVERSED and SET ASIDE
(3)
the decision of the RTC. The complaint for unlawful detainer is
property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the
DISMISSED. (4)
within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate
ISSUE: Whether the instant case is one of unlawful detainer or
the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for
forcible entry.
ejectment.[21]
It is a Forcible Entry.
FCJBC's occupancy was unlawful from the start and was bereft of contractual or legal basis. There was, likewise, no allegation that
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer are two distinct causes of ;.
BFBC and PBSBC tolerated FCJBC's possession of the subject
action defined in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. In forcible
property. Neither was there any averment in the complai nt which
entry, one is deprived of physical possession of any land or building
shows any overt act on the part of BFBC and PBSBC indicative of
by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In
permission to occupy the land.
unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under
This case would have to fall under the concept of forcible entry as it
any contract, express or implied. In forcible entry, the possession is
has been long settled that in forci ble entry cases, no force is r eally
illegal from the beginning and th e only issue is who has the prior
necessary. The act of going on the property a nd excluding the lawful
possession de facto. In unlawful detainer, possession was originally
possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of force over
lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the
the property, and this is all that is necessary. Unfortunately, BFBC
right to possess and the issue of rightful possession is the one
and PB SBC's failure to allege when the dispossession took place and
decisive, for in such action, the defendant is t he party in actual
how it was effected leaves the complaint wanting in jurisdictional ground.
