Detailed most detailed marines intel: http://www.specialoperations.com/mout/humint.html Mission
The mission of Marine Counterintelligence (CI)/Human Intelligence (HUMINT) assets are to provide CI support and conduct CI and HUMINT operations in support of the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), other Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs), or other units as directed. (MOUT Homepage Note: The following tasks are based on the Commander’s Critical Intelligence Requirements (CCIRs), and are ultimately supervised and managed by the commander’s intelligence officer. HUMINT collection is but one of the information/intelligence information/intelligence assets available in an urban environment. In a Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT) environment HUMINT becomes one - if not the most - important collection assets. However, the tasks assigned and the operations authorized must be evaluated in terms of the units intelligence collection plan. The risk versus potential payoff payoff of utilizing human sources sources should always be weighed against the benefit of using other intelligence collection assets. That said, every member of a unit conducting urban operations is a HUMINT collector. The urban environment brings every member of a patrol, for example, into contact with the human/cultural elements of a complex area of operations. For this reason, every service member of a unit conducting MOUT must be fully aware of the information/intelligence information/intelligence collection requirements and be properly prebriefed and debriefed to ensure they have the highest possible level of "situational awareness" and are capable of providing useful information in support of the CCIRs). Tasks
1. Conduct tactical CI activities and operations, opera tions, including CI force protection source operations, in support of MAGTF or joint operations. 2. Conduct screening, debriefing and interrogation of personnel of intelligence/CI interest. 3. Direct and supervise intelligence activities conducted within the intoerrogation facility and material exploitation facility. 4. Perform CI and terrorism threat analysis and assist in the preparation of CI and intelligence studies, orders, estimates, and plans. 5. Conduct low-level-source HUMINT operations. 6. Collect and maintain information designed to identify, locate, and recover captured or missing personnel. 7. Debrief friendly personnel recovered from prisoner of war, hostage, or detainee
status. 8. Translate and exploit captured documents. do cuments. (MOUT Homepage Note: This includes hard copy, video and audio material) 9. Conduct limited CI investigations during combat or operations other than war. 10. Conduct CI surveys and evaluations. 11. Conduct Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM) operations. 12. Maintain foreign area specialists who can provide sociological, economic, cultural and geo-political information about the area of operations. 2RHPZ
11-24-2004, 06:46 PM CI and HUMINT operations in support of operation enduring freedom Oct-Dec, 2003 by Ron Stallings, Michael Foley Much has been learned in recent years about the value of active counterintelligence (CI) and human intelligence (HUMINT) as they relate to modern conflict. Some intelligence professionals proclaim that CI and HUMINT have accounted for more than 80 percent of the intelligence collection in places such as Bosnia, Kosovo, and now Afghanistan. The introduction of the integrated 2X concept has proven itself to be a major step in the right direction. This concept incorporates management, control, and coordination measures which synchronize and deconflict CI and HUMINT in all directions throughout the theater o f operations. The "Draft" 2X Handbook continues to serve as the guide f or 2X and CI and HUMINT operations in the deployed and tactical environment. Basic rules, roles, and responsibilities have proven to be "spot on." This document, coupled with experiences and lessons learned in Bosnia, Kosovo, and now Afghanistan, continue to produce a more refined concept. It outlines procedures and relationships involving national, strategic, and coalition CI and HUMINT assets. We clearly need to form and train tactical 2X officers and sections at various echelons throughout our military forces. Tactical CI and interrogation operations have vastly improved since the incorporation of the 2X concept. Vital to the success in the process are the 2X, CI Coordinating Authority (CICA), and the HUMINT Operations Cell (HOC) chief. Led ultimately by the 2X, who serves as the Director of CI and HUMINT activities, these three individuals are charged with coordinating, managing, deconflicting, and properly reporting-[] CI investigations. [] CI force protection (and HUMINT) source operations. [] Mobile and sporadic team-level operations. [] Interrogations and debriefing results. [] Certain other overt HUMINT operations, as required. [] All covert and/or special compartmented HUMINT operations. This harmonious relationship fully incorporates the primary HUMINT analysis and requirements management and totally complements intelligence centers, especially the Coalition Joint I ntelligence Support Element (CJISE) in Afghanistan. The XVIII Airborne Corps headquarters deployed to Afghanistan in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) in May 2002 to establish the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF-180) headquarters. Under the Director of Intelligence, initially COL Mike Flynn and later COL Ted Nicholas, the CJ2X section w as understaffed, but filled with experience and expertise. MAJ Ron Stallings, the CJ2X, with over 10 years' experience in CI and HUMINT, had commanded an interrogation company, served as a G2X in Bosnia, and as the S3 of a Tactical Exploitation Battalion. SFC Michael Foley, serving in a field grade officer position as the Task Force CICA (TFCICA), had served for over 16 years in every progressive CI role from agent, to CI
Operations non-commissioned officer (NCO) in Haiti, to S pecial Agent in-Charge of a forward deployed INSCOM Military Intelligence Detachment, and as First Sergeant of a CI and HUMINT Company. MAJ (Ret) and former XVIII Airborne Corps G2X, Don Gardner, who was responsible for training eight Balkans rotations on CI and HUMINT operations, also deployed as a part of the team. Additionally, the Defense I ntelligence Agency's Defense HUMINT Service provided two very seasoned and experienced HOC Chiefs. Prior to the arrival of CJTF-180, INSCOM's 202d Military Intelligence B attalion of the 513th Military Intelligence Brigade led the CI and HUMINT efforts. Their outstanding efforts established tactical CI and HUMINT collection and interrogation operations in Afghanistan. They had produced nearly fifteen hundred Intelligence Information Reports (IIRs) in just over seven months. Their reports database was absolutely superb and was instrumental during the hand-off to CJTF-180. Immediate CI and HUMINT challenges included improving reporting timeliness and procedures, developing and managing source administration and records, redesigning the CI and HUMINT force structure, and focusing and synchronizing all related operations throughout the theater. With a tremendous amount of support, CJTF-180's CJ2X team acquired authorization to publish and release IIRs locally, thus reducing reporting timelines significantly. It required an incredible work ethic and unbelievable numbers of work hours from the CJ2X and TFCICA; however, their commitment to "from collection to the community in less than 12 hours" was an internal slogan. Draft reporting and CI and HUMINT products were posted to Web pages (SECRET and TOP SECRET levels) within six hours of receipt, focusing primarily on units on the ground in Afghanistan. Final II Rs followed in less than six hours and were distributed to the intelligence community via standard intelligence reporting methods (A MHS-M3). Once the CJ2X became the release authority for the theater's tactical CI and HUMINT reporting, no longer did collected information have to leave the area of operations (AO) and return prior to being released to units and intelligence analysts throughout the intelligence community. This initiative made CI and HUMINT reporting a critical player in the targeting process and helped to synchronize all intelligence efforts in theater. Local records and source administration procedures were emplaced and controlled by the 2X section which set the stage for combined, joint, and multi-agency CI and HUMINT operations and deconfliction which followed. The TFCICA (SFC Michael Foley) created the first Theater Source Registry containing nearly three hundred active and inactive sources. He used this registry to deconflict active and inactive sources being used by all U.S. strategic and tactical CI and HUMINT collectors. Deconfliction and synchronization of operations were necessary to establish operational and technical control over theater CI and HUMINT operations and provide unity to the intelligence effort. The TFCICA put additional systems in place that led to the development of individual source files or dossiers and management. This gave the local command visibility and positive control of activities throughout the Combined Joint Operational Area (CJOA). By design, the TFCICA is the tool by w hich the command directs and coordinates tactical CI and source operations. With the advent of the TFCICA, the much needed structure, management, and control of CI and HUMINT source operations directly impacted the tactical commander's plans and intentions. Standing operating procedures (SOPs) and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) were written and instituted; routine coordination between units and agencies occurred; reporting was standardized and localized for review, approval, and publication; collectors were given constant target focus and guidance; and CI became synchronized with HUMINT. Reporting became more accurate and timely and, most importantly, targetable and mission enhancing. Positive relationships between all CI and HUMINT organizations in theater were fostered. The redesign of the CI and HUMI NT force structure provided both direct and general support to commanders on the ground at all levels and facilitated better area coverage, responsiveness, and a balanced approach to CI and HUMINT collection management. Prior to CJTF-180's arrival CI and HUMINT collection planning and management were not synchronized with the efforts of the local intelligence collection manager. The number of CI teams in theater increased from 4x (6-to-9-soldier) teams to 9x (4-soldier) teams. The largest increase in teams went to Kandahar and the southeastern portion of the AO. The number of interrogators working in the interrogation facility increased from 7 to 15 personnel. This restructure took place with the arrival of the 519th Military Intelligence Battalion and the TF Panther (3D Brigade 82D ABN DIV) from Fort Bragg, NC, but with little to no increase in the total numbers of CI and HUMINT personnel in theater. Probably the most apparent change and most significant contribution of the 2X concept arriving with CJTF180 was local command and control and synchronization to all CI and HUMINT operations. By design, the CJ2X coordinated and ensured CI and HUMINT support to both local commanders and national requirements.
Collection efforts were aligned with the intelligence requirements of commanders (at all levels) on the ground in Afghanistan, and CI and HUMINT collection became a key player in the targeting process. CI and HUMINT reporting became a source of timely, accurate (in most cases, immediately verified by multiple other intelligence platforms), and targetable data. We also created systems to dynamically re-task CI and HUMINT sources that worked for various agencies and organizations from one location (the CJ2X section). Source operations became synchronized with interrogation operations, and tactical and strategic CI and HUMINT merged in both locations (source operations outside the wire and interrogations inside the wire). CI and HUMINT lessons learned were numerous with CJTF-180's assumption of the OEF mission: [] Prior to Deployment. Coordinate manning (to include national augmentation), equipment, communications, and other unique requirements (such as Intelligence Contingency Funds , Incentives, analytical and reporting tools, Collector Reporter Codes, Field Reporter Numbers and methods, operational uniform/ clothing, and critical reach-back relationships). Prior planning cannot be emphasized enough on much of these tasks. CI and HUMINT operations must be in place and operational before the warfighter hits the ground. Protecting the force is a continuous process and must be command supported. [] Source Administration. Cut no corners when it comes to source administration and records keeping. There is no substitute for training and SOPs. Failing to maintain proper dossiers and registries is a costly mistake. Demand detailed and timely efforts in the development and maintenance of local dossiers and registries at all levels. SOPs may differ slightly between units, but regulations require these El items be maintained. They are absolutely mandatory when conducting hand-offs, deconfliction, and source validation. [] SOPs and TTPs. Ensure these are emplaced, rehearsed, tested, and improved with performance. These operating procedures can be easily tailored to fit the requirements of various AORs. [] CI and HUMINT Collection Management. Ensure the Collection Management Officer (CMO) in the intelligence center integrates and manages CI and HUMINT into the unit collection pl an. The CMO manages the collection plan, and CI and HUMINT represents one of many pieces to the puzzle. The CMO must work closely with the embedded CI and HUMINT technicians of the intelligence center. CI and HUMINT specialists constantly track all intelligence requirements to ensure that CI and HUMINT op erations are focused on the commander's priorities. The HUMINT Analysis and Requirements Cell (HARC) (requirements being the operative word) is a unique tool, o rganic to an intelligence center ... but guided by the 2X team and used to provide the necessary constant analysis of both CI and HUMINT information and sources. The HARC is additionally charged with ensuring that CI and HUMINT collectors are focusing on the HUMINT collection "Requirements" priorities of the commander and integrated into the overall unit colle ction plan. These requirements must be shared and tasked down to ev en passive HUMINT collectors (Civil Affairs, Military Police, Criminal Investigation Division, presence patrols, psychological operations, Medical units, information operations); this was underway in Afghanistan by late October 2002. [] Deconfliction. Consider both active and passive HUMINT collectors throughout deconfliction of CI and HUMINT operations. This is probably the most difficult task assigned to the TFCICA and the 2X team. The standard approach is to execute deconfliction from the lowest and most internal elements outward to ultimately national and coalition collectors. Deconfliction begins with proper source administration and ends with extensive coordination and good work relationships. Three areas must be addressed on the subject of deconfliction: * Registries and rosters. * Meeting sites and times. * Managing placement and access. Once deconfliction extends beyond the borders of the standard chain of command (that is, national collectors, special operations forces, sister services, and coalition forces), working relationships and mutual objectives become critical. The process begins with requiring and managing meticulous source rosters and constantly updated operational schedules. It requires cooperation between units, agencies, and coalitions. Command support and emphasis is a must in order for deconfliction to work. D econfliction of CI and HUMINT operations and sources is extremely difficult and frustrating to execute; therefore, it is one of the biggest challenges for the 2X and TFCICA. In Afghanistan, a tiered approach to deconfliction of sources was used. We obtained source registers from the (U.S.) tactical organizations (Army, Air Force, Marines, and the Special Operations community); deconflicted those, and created a (U.S.) theater source registry for
"tactical" collectors. We continued to deconflict with (U.S.) national agencies. At this point, we had a totally deconflicted (U.S.) theater source registry. Special emphasis was placed on the selection of sources based on placement and access and level of information; that is, tactical versus strategic information. By early October 2002, we were beginning to conduct deconfliction with Coalition CI and HUMINT collectors. Once completed, we could be certain that no source w as being seen, paid, or supported by multiple organizations. [Note: There is an order merit o r precedence (often first come, first serve) that aids in deciding the fate of sources when there is a conflict.] Finally, this process is strictly managed by the G2X and TFCICA. [] Screening Cell Operations. Immediately implement screening operations for local and civilian hires. For obvious force protection reasons, questioning local hires is required to determine placement or access and possible associations that would be of U.S. interest. Screening locals and civilians that operate within the wire is imperative. This requirement is often overlooked and therefore not built into our fo rce structure. The use of CI and HUMINT soldiers as screeners supported by linguist is the preferred method of establishing screening operations. With operations ongoing and SOPs in place, the screening cell should transition to a 90 percent (civilian contractor) 10 percent military mix, with 351E as the cell officer in charge. The mission of the screening cell is not as flamboyant as conducting CI and HUMI NT source operations; however, it is equally important. [] Interrogation Facility Operations. Manage and coordinate interrogation facility operations. Detention facility and interrogations add a whole new set of challenges to the 2X team. The HOC Chief is the point man for the 2X in the management and coordination of interrogation operations. As the Defense Intelligence Agency is also the lead proponent for the Joint Interrogation Debriefing Cell (JIDC), the HOC Chief has a direct interest in the operations of the interrogation facility. The JIDC, from within the interrogation facility, functions as the national and strategic interrogations cell (non-tactical and nonmilitary organizations). The facility should be directed by intelligence requ irements and should report like any other HUMINT resource. [] Screening Released Detainees. Exploit released detainees; they make excellent candidates for leads and/or continued intelligence sources. Part of the release process (after the determination has been made to release) should include a CI screening of po tential sources. [] Effective Use of Mobile Interrogation Teams (MITs). Implement screening and interrogation operations forward (on or near the battlefield or point of capture) to reduce the chance of detaining personnel with no intelligence or target value. This method helps to eliminate overcrowding facilities, associated costs, and administrative issues. Forward screening and tactical interrogations forward allow capturing units to sift through potential detainees and enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) o n or near the point of capture, reducing the population to only those of intelligence, criminal, tactical, or strategic value. When an MIT is used, it should consist of only the most experienced and senior interrogators (97Es/351Es) and best qualified linguist support available. Battlefield, on-the-spot tactical screening or interrogation is not the time to educate or train young questionable soldiers, nor is it the time to assume that 97Bs can perform the mission of 97Es without prior training. [i]MAJ Ron Stallings is currently the G2X (Director of CI/HUMINT Operations) for XVIII Airborne Corps. He recently served as the initial CJ2X for CJTF-180 in Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. MAJ Stallings also served as the G2X at Multinational Division North in Bosnia-Herzegovina in support of Operation Joint Forge. He commanded an interrogation company, served as the Executive Of ficer and Operations Officer of a CI Company, and the S3 of a CI/HUMINT Battalion. SFC Michael Foley is currently the NCOIC of the G2X for XVIII Airborne Corps. He recently served as the Task Force Counterintelligence Coordination Authority for CJTF-180 in Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. SFC Foley previously served as the Special Agent in Charge of the Uijongbu Military Intelligence Detachment, as well as the First Sergeant of a CI and HUMINT Company in the 501st MI Brigade, Seoul Korea. Prior to his assignment in K orea, SFC Foley served as the G2/CI Officer for the 82D Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, NC. 2RHPZ
11-24-2004, 07:17 PM CI and HUMINT or HUMINT and CI or CI/HUMINT Or TAC HUMINT: - Confusing, isn't it? The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, Department of Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
Now the reason the enlightened prince and the w ise general conquer the enemy whenever they move and their achievements surpass those of ordinary men is foreknowledge. What is called "foreknowledge" cannot be elicited from spirits, nor from gods, nor by analogy with past events, nor from calculations. It must be obtained from men who know the enemy situation. Now there are five sorts of secret agents...: native, inside, doubled, expendable and living. When these five types of agents are all working simultaneously and none knows their method of operation, they are the treasure of a sovereign.... He, who is not sage and wise, humane and just, cannot use secret agents. And he who is not delicate and subtle cannot get the truth out of them.... It is essential to seek out enemy agents who have come to conduct espionage against you and to bribe them to serve you.... And therefore only the enlightened sovereign and the worthy general who are able to use the most intelligent people as agents are certain to achieve great things. Secret agents are essential in war; upon them the army relies to make its every move. Sun Tzu, The Art of War We are relearning these lessons taught by Sun Tzu. Since Operations DESERT SHIELD and D ESERT STORM, the U.S. Army has been in transformation. The known Warsaw Pact foe is gone and the uncertain, asymmetric, and asynchronous foe now dominates much of our thinking. The Army's mission is to fight and win wars. Thus, while the Army trains for major theater wars (MTWs), it executes military operations other than war (MOOTVV) (see Figure 1). I n Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, East Timor, and other less advertised deployments, tactical commanders learned that "foreknowledge" and situational awareness that leads to situational understanding depend on people talking with people. W hile the technical sensors available provided valuable insight, it was the low-technology "analog" aperture that gave commanders the opportunity to "see" and act inside their adversaries' decision cycles. It was people talking to people. (2) Now the Army's Military Intelligence (Ml) community is engaged in its own decision-making. (3) In some ways, Army Ml is on the horns of a dilemma. Who is the right person in our tactical formations to execute Sun Tzu's treatises? What is the right set of skills? Do we require two specialties, or one, or three? What is the right answer for the future operations that we cannot predict? What can w e afford? Does anyone have the "right" answers to these questions? Many think they have the answer, but they only have opinions shaped by their experiences, and those require polishing. Requirements drive the Army Transformation. Thus, this article will begin with some ideas on where the Army needs certain specialists and why. It will also offer some thoughts on the human intelligence (HUMINT) discipline and the intelligence function of counterintelligence (Cl). The article will conclude with a proposal for restructuring the HUMINT and Cl military occupational specialties (MOSs). This article focuses more on tactical operations than operational and strategic efforts, but much of this discussion applies to and impacts on our theater, Service, and national capabilities. Requirements Determination In MTWs and small-scale contingencies (SSCs), the Army requires individuals who can interrogate enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) or detainees in a foreign language, and determine the most effective technique to obtain information from these EPWs. This requirement is not resident at all echelons. I n fact, it is required most at the Joint Interrogation Facility (JIF) or Joint Debriefing Center ( JDC) organic to a Joint Task Force. At tactical echelons we need soldiers who can quickly screen EPWs for information of immediate tactical value before moving them to a JIF or JDC. Individuals trained in tactical questioning can accomplish this requirement. They do, however, require language skills or an interpreter. In war and MOOTW, the Army will require-* Individuals trained to debrief U.S. persons w ho encounter adversaries. This requirement--which requires no language skills--exists at all echelons, but is most common at the theater and Service levels. * Individuals who can plan and execute contact and source operations. The purpose is to obtain information regarding an adversary's order of battle (OB), capabilities, plans, attitudes, and intentions. Effective operations using non-English-speaking persons require a linguist, either as the operator or interpreter. The focus is to ensure that commanders and other decision-makers under-stand the situation. * Soldiers with the ability to detect, identify, exploit, and neutralize an adversary's attempts to obtain information about U.S. capabilities, OB, plans, and intentions. The Army must detect, investigate, arrest, convict, and punish those who commit national security crimes, such as espionage. Espionage did not end with the Cold War. There are still soldiers like James Hall, Ill, and Albert Sombolay ( U.S. Army) and others like Harold Nicholson (CIA) and Earl Pills (FBI) (who were all charged with espionage). The Army requires
soldiers and civilians to bring such individuals to justice using its many investigative capabilities, including polygraphs, technical measures, and informants. This requirement exists at all echelons. While having a language capability enhances our ability to be successful, soldiers can accomplish this task using an interpreter. * Soldiers dedicated to the protection of sensitive Army programs. Force protection starts with the research and development cycle, at institutional training sites, and in major Army headquarters. If w e do not protect the information in our labs, concerning our special mission units, or our operational plans, then force protection suffers and combat soldiers will pay the price. * A technical control and support element to coordinate, deconflict, and synchronize all HUMI NT and CI activities in the area of intelligence responsibility while providing an analysis capability that provides predictive intelligence products for the AOI R, area of influence, and area of interest. This requirement exists from Brigade Combat Team (BCT) to Service level. The Discipline Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines HUMINT as "a category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources." However, that is not sufficient as it leads the reader to be lieve that anyone can execute HUMINT. This is not true. The following is my draft definition: Human Intelligence (HUMINT) is derived from the analysis of foreign positive information collected by a trained HUMINT Collector from people and multimedia to identify elements, intentions, composition, strength, dispositions, tactics, equipment, personnel, and capabilities. It uses human contacts and informants as a tool, and a variety of collection methods to gather information that satisfies the commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) and cues other collection resources. HUMINT is a foreign intelligence activity fo cused on the penetration of an adversary's decision-making architecture to obtain information regarding capabilities, vulnerabilities, dispositions, plans, and intentions. HUMINT entities employ human sources or contacts (controlled and not controlled), exploit documents, and execute reconnaissance and surveillance activities to satisfy requirements regarding the adversary (see Figure 2). As Sun Tzu's essays attest, HUMINT is the oldest of our intelligence disciplines. The Function FM 34-60, Counterintelligence, defines CI as-In formation gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons, or international terrorist activities, but not including personnel, physical, document or communications security programs. The CI and HUMINT Integrated Concept Team (ICT) chartered by the Commanding General, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH), will recommend a new definition. Currently, the draft definition reads-Counterintelligence counters or neutralizes intelligence collection efforts through collection, investigations, operations, analysis and production, and technical services CI includes all actions taken to detect, identify, track, exploit and neutralize the multidiscipline intelligence activities of f riends, competitors, opponents, adversaries and enemies, and is the key intelligence co mmunity contributor to protect U.S. interests and equities. In essence, CI entities have the mission of detecting, identifying, exploiting, and neutralizing our adversaries' intelligence activities. The function of countering an adversary intelligence service is also old. Archaeologists unearthed a clay tablet in Syria written in the 18th century B.C.E. with an inscription from one ruler of a city-state to another complaining that they had released spies for ransom but that payment had not come. Doctrinally, CI is a functional area that obtains and consumes information from all sources concerning an adversary's intelligence activities (see Figure 3). Some believe that CI is a subdiscipline of HUMINT. However, if that were true, CI would only focus on counter-HUMINT operations. To provide the commander
and senior decision-maker with the right intelligence, CI must look beyond HUMINT to determine the adversary threat. CI personnel detect and identify adversary intelligence activities by planning and conducting collection missions and analyzing information collected from all sources. The Army's departmental CI organization executes operations to exploit adversary intelligence activities and gather additional information, support theater and tactical objectives, and set the conditions for neutralizing the effects of adversary intelligence services. Army CI agents conduct investigations to gather the evidence required to neutralize a threat intelligence service and prosecute individuals for national secu rity crimes, such as espionage. As CI entities execute the functions of collection, operations, investigation, and analysis, commanders receive intelligence vital to their force protection programs. Interrelationship CI must either exploit, neutralize, or do both. Its activities span passive collection to active countermeasures. CI soldiers engage the adversary intelligence service' in a battle for data and information. According to Sir Winston Churchill, "The great thing is to get the true picture, whatever it is." Of course, commanders must not follow the model of Byzantine Emperor Justin II who, when given solid intelligence about the defenses of a besieged city, ignored it and fired his spies. Commanders and adversaries seek information to eliminate uncertainty in the conduct of operations or to gain an advantage. The BCT relies on "the true picture" to gain a positional advantage over an adversary. HUMINT and CI are shaping operations for the commander. While HUMINT contributes to information superiority by providing data and information about the adversary, CI contributes by affecting the data and information obtained by the adve rsary. HUMINT shapes the "Blue" forces' understanding of the "Red" forces while C I affects the Red forces' knowledge of Blue forces. There is confusion regarding who executes the discipline of HUMINT and the CI function. Army CI agents will use many of the same techniques and skills a HUMI NT operator employs. This is especially true at the tactical level where CI soldiers will e xecute tactical HUMINT (TAC HUMINT) operations teamed with linguists and HUMINT collectors. The confusion mounts when we use the Counterintelligence Force Protection Source Operations (CFSO) regulation (4) to justify HUMINT contact and source-collection activities. This fact is the root of confusion in some people's minds that CI and HUMINT are the same thing. While both employ the same types of sources and use many of the same techniques, the product is different. While both satisfy the CCIR, the intent is different. The HUMINT collector obtains data germane to the adversary's organization, disposition, capabilities, and decision-making. The Cl agent collects data relevant to the adversary's intelligence activities that will influence decision-making. While the HUM INT collector's task is complete with reporting the required data (including follow-up meetings with the source or contact), the CI special agent's tasks expand after detecting and identifying adversary intelligence activities. Future MOS Actions The Army is at a crossroads with regard to its CI and HUMINT force. The catalyst is TAC HUMINT. The term "TAC HUMINT" refers to those operations planned and executed by U.S. Army tactical intelligence formations to satisfy requirements levied by their maneuver commanders. In today's force structure, TAC HUMINT is not a single MOS or set of skills. TAC HUMINT is the task organization of skill sets for a tactical commander. * We should combine the HUMINT Co llector MOS (97E) and the Counterintelligence Agent MOS (97B) to create a soldier who can be all the Army needs. TAC HUMINT elements consist of CI agents, HUMINT operators, and linguists. These operations focus on developing contacts and informants who provide timely, relevant, and specific information to the combatant commanders. In most cases, the contacts and informants fill a void in the HUMINT continuum by providing excellent information relevant to the combatant commanders' CCIR that theater and national elements do not or cannot satisfy. (5) The debate is over w ho the TAC HUMINT soldier is. The suggestions include the ideas that* Both skill sets must be able to merge capabilities to satisfy tactical requirements while maintaining a separate ability to work theater-and national-level requirements. * We should merge the specialties at the -10 and -20 skill levels, b ut allow a split into tracks at the -30 level. * We should not resource a force above the tactical level.
* The only path to success is separate, but equal, MOSs. A Course of Action (COA) The following are my suggestions to enhance mission success and perhaps cut the confusion. If yo u agree, share your thoughts with the Directorate of Combat Developments (DCD ), USAIC&FH (please see the contact information below). If you disagree, tell DCD why. If you do neither, accept any future decision from the Ml Proponent at Fort Huachuca with a smile and the knowledge that you had a chance to influence the decision. In today's Army, the easy solution would be to merge 97E and 97B into a single MOS or to eliminate one and have the other assume all the critical skills. This is the easy solution because that is what we do in today's Army--eliminate and consolidate to achieve increased efficiency, sometimes at the risk of effectiveness. The Army needs soldiers who can execute contact and informant operations, perform interrogator and strategic debriefer functions, and execute Cl tasks from tactical to national levels. MOS 97L (Translator/Interpreter) exists only in the Reserve Components (RC). We should eliminate the 97L MOS. RC soldiers currently holding this MOS would migrate to either MOS 97E or 97B. New RC recruits would enlist for MOS 97E and receive language training as part of their initial entry training (IET). They would track in the same manner as Active Component (AC) soldiers. Editors Note: See the discussion of Military Linguists and the 97L MOS on page 65 of this issue of MI PB. The CI and HUMINT ICT will explore various COAs associated with MOS 97E, MOS 97B, Warrant Officer areas of concentration (AOC) 351 B and 351E (CI Technician and HUMINT Collection Technician), and the Officer AOC 35E (Counterintelligence Officer). The I CT's goal is to define CI and HUMINT requirements for the Objective Force. Results of the ICT w ill include a series of requirements documents to drive Objective Force organizations, material solutions, and soldier MOS recommendations. One COA combines 97E and 97B at skill level 10. The current "thinking" is to use MOS 97E as the combined initial entry MOS. Training soldiers in this initial entry MOS would focus on conducting contact and informant operations, recognizing information of CI value, executing tactical questioning of civilians, and screening EPWs and detainees with the assistance of an interpreter. We must differentiate between HUM NT contact operations and CESO to ensure both receive adequate training. Concurrently, the field units must ensure that they conduct both types of operations to satisfy the CCIR. The career model shown in Figure 4 w ill eliminate the language requirement for MOS 97E at skill level 10. It allows soldiers to select a track at skill leve l 20. Soldiers will have a choice of staying tactical with language training, moving to HUMINT operational assignments as Strategic Debriefers, or applying as Cl Agents. Soldiers would receive additional institutional training, such as the Basic Counterintelligence Agents Course, Strategic Debriefers Course, and language training. Beginning at skill level 30, assignments would be to either MOS 97E (HUMINT Collector) or MOS 97B (Cl Agent). Figure 4 reflects an official consideration. The author, however, looks at it somewhat differently. The COA depicted in Figure 4 combines two Warrant Officer AOCs as well. (6) This COA requires the Warrant Officer to be able to conduct and technically control TAC HUMINT operations, interrogations, strategic debriefings, investigations, counterespionage operations, CI analysis and production, CI surveillance activities, and computer-network protection operations, as well as to perform CI technical services (such as polygraph). This is "being all you can be" or using today's slogan, creating a real "army of one." Figure 4 reflects an official consideration. The author, however, looks at it somewhat differently. In my opinion, we must retain the separate Warrant Officer tracks to ensure the de velopment of technical experts. Warrant Officers are the technical leaders in our Ml organizations. They mentor and tutor junior enlisted personnel and NCOs on the proper planning and execution of operations. They provide the unvarnished, technically correct advice to commanders and senior intelligence officers (the "2s"). We need these technical experts to focus on specific critical skills and tasks. Combining these AOCs may be most efficient from the perspective of the number of available and qualified personnel but it will dilute the individuals' capabilities and adversely impact their effectiveness. The Officer AOC, 35E (Counterintelligence Officer), wil l expand to include skills focused on leading HUMINT soldiers. In addition to serving as a Cl officer, the 35E officer must be able to plan and lead Army HUMINT collection operations at all echelons.
Some Arguments Against This Proposal Force Developers will ask, "What does this do to the MOS pyramid?" I d o not have all the empirical data required to respond to this query. We are expanding the quantity of HUMINT and CI soldiers at the tactical level while not decreasing the quantity required at theater and national levels. The consolidated MOS at skill level 10 and the expected expansion will help create a better base for the MOS pyramid. Given a few exceptions, the 97B pyramid will start at E-5. Others may ask, "Can we recruit sufficient Warrant Officers to maintain two areas of concentration?" I believe the answer is "yes" if we concurrently scrub the requirement and authorization document with the intent of converting some Warrant Officer positions to Senior NCOs (E7). We must get the ratio between Warrant Officer and enlisted closer to 1:6 or 1:8 rather than the current 1:4 ratio. The expansion of the enlisted ranks will also help solve recruitment and ratio issues. There will be no wars w hen we have the earth digitized and soldiers trained to speak the language in all countries because we only go to war w here we have no maps and no linguists. Brigadier General John W. Smith (7) Some individuals may say, "Nethertheless, we must have linguists in our tactical units. "The Army will never have sufficient linguists for all HUMINT and Cl missions; therefore, why have a HUMINT language-dependent MOS? In the future, units must code those 97E (E-5 and above) positions that require a language. The question we must answer is, "Will the soldiers be required to maintain language proficiency to be MOS qualified?" That said, to receive language proficiency pay, the standard should be 3/3 rather than 2/2. The 97E-trained soldier will be skilled in working with an interpreter and using an automated translation device. There may be concern that the "dual tracks inside the 97E MOS will create an unfair situation for promotions. This issue requires additional study. However, we may resolve this issue with specific guidance to promotion broads and selection criteria documented in Department of the Army (DA) pamphlets. Some will raise the issue that current recruitment criteria for 97B and 97E are different. What will be the criteria for enlistment when all skill level 10 soldiers are in 97E? The easy answer is that the more stringent requirements of the two MOSs will apply in the future. For example, 97B requires that an individual be eligible for sensitive compartment information (SCI) access while the 97E does not. We would therefore apply the SCI requirement to all enlistees. Final Thoughts To reach decisions, a President needs more than data and information. A President needs real and current knowledge and analysis of the plans, intentions, and capabilities of our enemies. The last several months have shown that there is no substitute for good intelligence o fficers, people on the ground. These are the people who find the targets, follow our enemies, and help disrupt their evil plans. The United States must rebuild our network of human intelligence. --President George W. Bush, 11 December 2001 (*) While some will argue that the President's comments at the Citadel on 11 December targeted the national HUMINT organizations, some of us know that tactical formations in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo collected and reported information that found its way to the White House. Now and in the future, military operations exist in an interdependent environment where tactical formations initially depend on the information provided by national agencies to establish, update, and maintain situational awareness. On the flip side, as the operation develops and deployed personnel grow in experience, the strategic entities will grow increasingly dependent on the information tactical elements provide to develop the fine-grain resolution necessary to gain a more complete understanding of the situation. HUMINT and CI activities support shaping operations that, in turn, assist in establishing the conditions required to achieve the success of the decisive operation. HUMINT and CI are force multipliers that will make a difference to the commander's scheme of maneuver and force protection. HUMINT and CI will deliver timely, accurate, specific, and relevant information to the commander. The result is an enabled leader who now has the ability to accurately focus maneuver firepower, protection, and leadership at decisive points, which will decide the outcome of engagements and battles.
In the Objective Force, HUMINT and CI will embrace the "Quality of Firsts." HUMINT and CI will be among the "First to See" so that our leaders can be the "First to Understand." They will enable our maneuver units to be the "First to Act" and ultimately, our battles and campaigns to "Finish Decisively." End notes (1.) Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translated by Samuel B . Griffith (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1963). (2.) We must wait for the after-action reports to judge how critical HUMINT and CI are to the on-going operations in Afghanistan. We do know from media reports that HUMINT is play ing a significant role. (3.) The Commanding General, USAIC&FH, recently chartered a CI and HUMINT Integrated concept Team (ICT) to determine the requirements and write the necessary documents to transform CI and HUMINT for the Objective Force. (4.) This regulation is AR 381-172, counterintelligence Force Protection Source Operations and Low- Level Source Operations, which is classified. (5.) Lest someone misunderstand and accuse me of not giving credit to those that serve, be assured that theater and national organizations do respond to the tactical commander's CCIR and do provide timely, specific, and relevant information to the tactical formation. My point is that they are not everywhere and cannot do it all. (6.) The proposed single Warrant Officer AOC does not include 3510 (Area Intelligence Technician). It combines 351B (counterintelligence Technician) and 351E (Human Intelligence collection Technician). (7.) Brigadier General John W. Smith (U.S. Army, Retired) during one of many meetings regarding MOSs 97E and 97B when he was the Deputy Commanding General, USAIc&FH. (8.) Remarks made by President George W. Bush at The Citadel in December 2001. Colonel Jerry Jones completed 30 years with the Army on 1 June 2000. He began his career as an A rmor officer with the 1st Armored Division (lAD) at Fort Hood, Texas. After Vietnam, he served with the "Big Red One' at three Re forger exercises, 32d Army Air Defense Command (AADCOM), I AD in Germany; special mission units in the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM); U.S. Central Command J5 operations in DESERT SHIELD and STORM; and the Allied Military Intelligence Battalion in Bosnia. Colonel Jones finished his Army career at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, as the Commander, INSCOM Training and Doctrine Support (ITRADS) Detachment He was a 35F (Human Intelligence Officer) with significant 35E (Human Intelligence Officer) experience and a 6Z (Strategist). He served at all echelons from tactical to national. He is currently a DA Civilian at the USAIC&FH. Powered by vBulletin® Version 4.2.0 Copyright © 2012 vBulletin S olutions, Inc. All rights reserved.
Declination of CI and HUMINT The U.S. Army has always been a threat-based organization. Force structure, manning levels, weapons systems, doctrine, and war plans were based upon a specific threat. Since the end of World War II, that threat was the Soviet Union. During the Cold War era the roles, responsibilities, and functions were clearly defined for both CI and HUMINT. CI was focused on countering the intelligence collection efforts of the Soviet Bloc to deny them information for the development of countermeasures to plans and systems. HUMINT focused on collecting information on Soviet intentions, capabilities, disposition, etc., to support policy makers and military planners. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the focus of Arm y CI and HUMINT became confused due to a lack of identifiable threat. Compounding this confusion was the assumption of all separate military service Title 10 HUMINT missions under the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Defense HUMINT Service (DHS) in October 1995. This realignment caused a void in the Army's ability to conduct HUMINT operations under
the auspices of Title 50, War and National Defense, during any contingency operations to support the information requirements of combatant commanders. Throughout the 1990's, as operational deployments in stability operations and support operations environments increased, so dial the requirement to satisfy the information needs of combat commanders. With a lack of validated tactical HUMINT (TAC HUMINT) collection capability prescribed in policy and defined in doctrine, commander's developed a task organization of both CI and HUMINT soldiers to fulfill their information requirements. This task organization capitalized on skill sets of CI and HUMINT, the language capability of HUMINT, and the only validated collection program available, CI Force Protection Source Operations (CFSO). However, CFSO was not established to be an all-encompassing HUMINT collection mission, but rather a collection program focused primarily on identifying collection efforts targeting U.S. or allied interests, as well as hostile threats or force protection issues. The task organization of both CI and HUMINT to accomplish a HUMINT collection mission has significantly degraded the CI mission. Although done out of necessity, the emergence of TAC HUMINT elements, which has never been established in policy or doctrine, substituted one void for another. Throughout the 1990's, the Army's intelligence community lost focus on countering the adversarial intelligence threat, seeking instead to demonstrate their responsiveness to the warfighter by supporting predominantly HUMINT missions during contingency operations. This included CI elements at all echelons, echelons corps and below (ECB) to echelons above corps (EAC). The success of both CI and HUMINT to satisfy the combat commander's need for tactical HUMINT information has resulted in the perception throughout the Army, to include the MI community, that CI equals HUMINT collection, or CI and HUMINT are one and the same. This perception has also resulted in numerous Force Design Updates that have, or will, cause significant increases in CI authorizations to meet HUMINT collection requirements while HUMINT continues to stagnate. This blurring of missions, roles, responsibilities, and functions sets the stage for the CI and HUMINT ICT to develop the requirements to transform Army CI and HUMINT to help ensure complete information dominance in the OF.
The Army's Objective Force The purpose of the Army is to fight and win our nation's wars. To accomplish this, the Army must act in union with all the military services, other allied and coalition forces, and nongovemmental organizations to operate as a joint, multinational, combined, or coalition team. Based upon the current National Military Strategy (NMS), the Army will transform into an organization that will be able to deploy to increasingly complex operational environments to engage a wider range, and often, less identifiable adversary. The former Army Chief of Staff established seven characteristics that the Army's OF must embody to successfully execute future operations: [] Responsive. [] Deployable. [] Agile. [] Versatile. [] Lethal. [] Survivable. [] Sustainable.
As a network-centric forc e, the OF will increasingl y depend on high levels of information collection, fusion, and synthesis. Rapid, relevant, and accurate intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) will give combat commanders the situational awareness required to develop the situation out-of-contact and maneuver to a place and time on the battlefield to engage and destroy the enemy with minimal impact to friendly forces. ISR will be a key enabler to achieving the quality of "Firsts" emphasized by the Chief of Staff of the Army--See First, Understand First, Act First, and Finish Decisively! As part of the ISR comm unity, CI and HUMINT have becom e an increasingly valuable commodity to combatant commanders. As the eyes and ears of the combat commander, CI and HUMINT operators are one of the few all-weather, all-terrain, general support (GS) and direct support (DS) assets that can respond directly to a commander's information need with little warning, preparation, or asset bureaucracy. CI and HUMINT Operational Environment Analysis of recent operations and preparati on for future operations requires t he Army to rapidly deploy to any operational environment in the world in order to quickly accomplish its assigned mission. The NMS addresses Strategic Responsiveness as a key tenet of the OF. Future military operations require a reduced footprint and focused logistics to achieve surprise and rapid response to emerging crises. OF CI and HUMINT elements must be equipped and structured to provide a rapid deployment capability. Equipment will be small, lightweight, and interoperable with all intelligence information processing equipment in the Army and with other military services to ensure immediate reporting, dissemination, and database sharing. CI and HUMINT elements will be structured so that all operational, management, and analysis elements are modular and can be tailored to any military operation. CI and HUMINT elements located at echelons above their supported unit should be able to provide plug-in packages and quickly link-up, assimilate, and provide support to the unit commander. Threat CI and HUMINT elements will continue to deploy into complex environments when directed. The OF will encounter a multitude of asymmetric andasynchronous threats including-[] Attacks by insurgents, terrorists, and other organized criminal organizations. [] Information warfare attacks. [] Direct, armed conflict with conventional military forces. [] Proliferation and use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). These threats may be encountered at any time, in any place, across the spectrum of conflict. CI and HUMINT will play an increased role in developing information that supports predictive analysis to allow combat and response forces to neutralize conventional and unconventional threats before they can counter or execute offensive actions against U.S. or allied interests. Transforming CI and HUMINT While the focus of the CI and HUMINT ICT was to identify CI and HUMINT requirements in the OF, the ICT realized there were many problems and issues with today's (i.e., Current Force) CI and HUMINT that must be addressed to posture both CI and HUMINT for Transformation. The ICT identified seven Macro Requirements for both CI and HUMINT. (See Figure 1.) Figure 1. CI and HUMINT Macro Requirements. Balance MOS versus Mission Requirements. All major Army commands (MACOMs) represented in the ICT were charged with analyzing their individual tables of organization and equipment (TOE) of tables of
distribution and allowances (TDA) manning documents and restructuring the ratio of CI to HUMINT based upon their unique mission profiles. The best example is the CI to HUMINT ratio within ECB units in which there is parity in numbers between CI and HUMINT. However, the predominant mission in these units is HUMINT collection. Establish a HUMINT Collection Capability. A validated HUMINT collection mission will be prescribed in policy and defined in doctrine. This will be accomplished through the revision of AR 381-100 and address a specific HUMINT collection program to satisfy the Army's Title 50 requirements during contingency operations. These changes also require an increased HUMINT force structure, which will be achieved by re-coding a majority, not all, CI positions in ECB units to HUMINT positions. Refocus CI on Countering the Intelligence Threat and Activities of Our Adversaries. Once HUMINT fully reassumes the tactical HUMINT mission, CI will focus solely on countering the adversarial intelligence threats' ability to successfully target and collect on US or allied interests. Educate Leaders. Senior leader courses need to include formal programs of instruction on the distinct functions between CI and HUMINT and their proper employment. These courses include Advance Courses, Pre-Command Courses, and Senior Staff Courses.
Support Full Spectrum of Military Operations. Army CI and HUMINT elements must be trained, equipped, and organized to support the full range of military operations (peacetime military engagements [PMEs], small-scale contingencies [SSCs], and Major Theaters of War [MTWs]). The ability to support full spectrum operations in the OF construct will mean that Army CI and HUMINT elements must be composed of modular and standardized team formations. These standardized team formations will be force pooled at different echelons and can rapidly integrate into and support a designated combat force during contingency operations as described in the CI and HUMINT operational environment described above. Invest In Technologies To Enhance Capabilities. Emerging technologies will allow the formation of distributed, interdependent, and collaborative network environments. These network centric information grids will facilitate tipping and cueing of intelligence resources at all levels and will significantly increase the Army's advantage in intelligence collection, analysis, and security. Nanotechnology may result in miniature, mobile, autonomous sensors that can penetrate the secure and remote facilities of an adversary. Biometric technologies will allow rapid identification, coding, and tracking of adversaries, human sources; and cataloging of information concerning enemy prisoners of war (EPWs), detainees, and civilians of CI and HUMINT interest throughout the battlespace. Biometrics will also provide secure authentication of individuals seeking network or facility access.
Primary Feeder MOS (97E). 97E, HUMINT Collector, will be the primary feeder MOS for 97B. A number of the skill sets used by both MOSs are similar in their application. However, differences in mission focus, operational execution, and legal requirements make it necessary for the two MOSs to remain separate.
ORGANIZATION CI and HUMINT force structure will be a key tenet in supporting Army OF operations. CI and HUMINT assets have to be tailored to the mission focus at all echelons. To support the OF construct, CI and HUMINT organizations have to be standardized to support contingency operations planning and modular to provide scaleable plug-in packages to combat elements and combined joint task force (C/JTF) organizations. Mission focused CI and HUMINT force structure at the tactical level. In today's force, structure parity exists between the CI and HUMINT assets in ECB organizations. However, the predominant mission required by commanders in the tactical force is for HUMINT collection to support their information requirements on enemy activities. This situation has been a key factor in the TAC HUMINT phenomena, using CI assets to accomplish a HUMINT mission. This does not mean that there is no CI mission, only that it is smaller in scope than in operational or strategic environments. The Battle Command On-the Move and OF concepts developed by the Combined Arms Center dictate force pooling a majority of all combat support and combat service support at the Corps level. In keeping with this requirement, all tactical level CI and HUMINT elements will be force pooled at the Corps-like level or unit of employment (UE) and provided as plug-in packages down to division and brigade-like or unit of action (UA) elements. Providing modular and scaleable packages to Army Forces (ARFOR), joint and combined elements will require standardized team configurations. (See Figure 5.) Both CI and HUMINT will use two basic team formations: OMTs and OTs. [FIGURE 5 OMITTED] Operational Management Teams (OMTs). The OMT will be a four-person team. Generally the team will be led by a WO; however, in some cases, especially at the operational and strategic level, the team may be led by a civilian CI Special Agent (Military Intelligence Civilian Excepted Career Program [MICECP]). The other team members will be enlisted. The standards of grade for all OMT members are subject to the skill sets and experience required to accomplish the assigned mission. Example: An OMT at Corps would consist of a CW2, SSG, SGT, and a junior-enlisted soldier; whereas an OMT for a strategic element may be a CW4/GS-14, a SFC, SGT, and one junior-enlisted soldier, with three enlisted. OMTs will provide operational guidance for 1 to 4 OMTs, depending on mission focus and OPTEMPO. When two or more OTs are deployed in DS of a maneuver element, an OMT will also be deployed to provide technical control. The OMT will work closely with the supported S2, 2X, and Analysis and Control Team (ACT) to furnish current threat information and answer the supported commander's PIRs and information requirements (IRs). OMTs will coordinate with the supported * 2X and manage subordinate operational CI and HUMINT teams to-[] Provide guidance and technical control of operational activity. [] Provide collection and operational focus for all subordinate operational CI and HUMINT teams. [] Provide quality control and dissemination of reports for subordinate operational teams.
[] Conduct single-discipline analysis and assist in mission analysis for the supported commander. [] Act as a conduit between subordinate operational teams, the * 2X staff, and supported unit headquarters. [] Provide administrative support for subordinate operational teams to include reporting mission and equipment status to the * 2X staff and the supported unit headquarters. [] Educate the supported commander on the capabilities of the OMT and operational CI and HUMINT teams. [] Integrate the CI and HUMINT teams directly into the maneuver commander's reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) planning. Operational Team (OT). OTs will be a four-person team. CI OTs will consist of three NCOs and a juniorenlisted soldier. A HUMINT OT will consist of two NCOs and two junior-enlisted soldiers. At the operational and strategic level civilians may be inserted into this structure, as appropriate. The standards of grade (SOG) for all OMT members are subject to the skill sets and experience required to accomplish the assigned mission. OTs will be trained to execute the full range of functions for the discipline of the team. CI and HUMINT OTs will be discipline pure, but may be task-organized by the commander as required. Some specialized OTs may require additional advanced-level training prior to personnel being assigned to the team. For example: [] CI: Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM), Polygraph. [] HUMINT: Media Exploitation (document exploitation [DOCEX], strategic debriefing). DOCTRINE CI and HUMINT regulations and doctrinal manuals are out of date and are scheduled for revision to include the recommendations established in the ICT. AR 381-20 and AR 381-100 are currently under revision. Field Manuals 34-60 and 34-52 are scheduled to be revised; however, operational deployments have impacted the ability of the USAIC&FH Doctrine Division to resource this requirement. Updates of both discipline manuals will include doctrine on the roles, responsibilities, and functions of the * 2X staff. This will standardize the * 2X positions and provide personnel and organizations assigned to * 2X staffs the tools to successfully execute Army, joint, and combined CI and HUMINT operations. TRAINING Today's CI and HUMINT training has been modeled on the tactical merger of CI and HUMINT elements in ECB organizations with the focus of training on HUMINT-oriented source operations. This training model has reinforced the perception that CI and HUMINT are one and the same or interchangeable. This training has been beneficial for HUMINT soldiers whose previous training focused primarily on interrogation skills. However, this training model has overshadowed the investigative skills necessary for CI personnel. Changes in training have to be made to reorient the focus of both disciplines. Changes recommended by the ICT require the establishment of a new Critical Task Site Selection Board (CTSSB) to validate proposed Critical Task Lists (CTLs) developed during the course of the ICT. DCS G2 and CG, USAIC&FH, have forecasted the implementation for the new CI and HUMINT courses in fiscal year 2006.
This will coincide with projected implementation in personnel requirements initiated by the Military Occupation Classification and Structure (MOCS) package submitted to PERSCOM by OCMI. [] 97E/HUMINT. The new HUMINT course will provide training in HUMINT specific skills such as basic interrogation and debriefing skills. The course will also address common skills used by both the HUMINT and CI disciplines. These skills consist of interpersonal communications, interviewing, report writing, source operations, etc. Students will consist of all HUMINT IET soldiers. [] BCISAC. The BCISAC will be an all-ranks (military and civilian) course focused on CI investigative and operational skills. [] 2X Course. Another training goal is to establish a 2X course. The ICT concluded that the current J2X course sponsored by CI Field Activity (CIFA), while a good overview, does not adequately train and prepare officers, warrant officers, and NCOs for assignment to Army, joint, and combined 2X staff management positions. The ICT recommended the establishment of a proponent (USAIC&FH) course to teach students how to serve in a 2X staff position. The goal is to institutionalize the 2X staff and standardize the roles, responsibilities, and functions rather than to staff ad hoc and use the trial-by-fire training method. The Army provides the majority of all CI and HUMINT assets and 2X staff personnel supporting joint and combined operations. This fact, coupled with the adoption of the 2X concept throughout the Army, makes the 2X course a necessity. Although the target audience for the 2X course are Army NCOs, WOs, officers, and civilians serving in Army, joint, or combined 2X positions, a two- to three-week course would be beneficial to sister services as well as national agencies supporting contingency operations. (See Figure 6.) [FIGURE 6 OMITTED] LEADER DEVELOPMENT In today's NCO Education System (NCOES) and WO Education System (WOES), technical training does not keep pace with changes in emerging tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and technology. While leadership and staff managerial skills are important, more emphasis needs to be placed on the technical competence of NCOs and WOs. Currently the only technical training within NCOES and WOES occurs in basic-level courses such as Basic NCO Course (BNCOC) and WO Basic Course (WOBC). All other advance courses do not include MOS-related TTPs or technically focused training. With emerging technology, fielding of systems and especially the Army Transformation Campaign Plan, this is a critical shortfall, which must be addressed in courses like Advanced NCO Course (ANCOC) and WO Advanced Course (WOAC). This is especially true for WOs who are considered the technical experts in their fields, but receive significantly less professional development than NCOs or commissioned officers. MATERIEL Unlike the other intelligence disciplines (imagery intelligence, signals intelligence, measurements and signatures intelligence, and technical intelligence), CI and HUMINT obtain information through human interaction and not through the capture of data from the electromagnetic spectrum. All materiel and equipment requirements for CI and HUMINT are used to process and report information (e.g., CI and
HUMINT Automated Tool Set [CHATS] communications) or to support unique skills (e.g., polygraph, TSCM) and not the collection of information. However, emerging technologies will continue to enhance the basic capabilities of the individual CI and HUMINT soldier by creating faster information processing, data mining, information dissemination, and archival. As we move to a network-centric f orce, future CI and HUMINT support systems will have to kee p pace with joint interoperability requirements. This is especially true with the DOD mandated requirement to establish the Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS), which is not only multiservice interoperable but also must be interoperable within the joint, inter-agency, and multinational (JIM) environment. Conclusion In recent deployments, and especially with the Global War on Terrorism, CI and HUMINT have been the most deployed intelligence collection asset to support maneuver elements in contingency operations. Contingency operations in under-developed, third-world nations with limited infrastructure often diminish the effectiveness of other technically focused intelligence platforms. In these environments, combat commanders have recognized the value of CI and HUMINT as their eyes and ears on the battlefield. However, senior leaders and commanders are easily mesmerized by the visual (i.e., Light Emitting Diode [LED] displays, digitized maps, satellite and unmanned aerial vehicle [UAV] imagery, and PowerPoint presentations). They are often willing to expend a significant amount of resources to have a new system or gadget. At the same time, even while the OPTEMPO for CI and HUMINT continually increases, there has been no commensurate increase in dedicated resources for manning, training, and/or equipment. The length of CI and HUMINT training courses continues to be cut; our instructor and doctrine writer positions go unfilled; and mis-utilization of our CI and HUMINT soldiers force valuable and scarce assets from our ranks. CI and HUMINT must be properly trained, equipped, and organized in order to successfully transform and meet the challenges in the Army's OF.
CI COORDINATING AUTHORITY (CICA)
[] Coordinates and synchronizes all CI activities in the designated AOIR. [] Exercises technical control over all CI entities in the designated AOIR and deconflicts CI activities with higher, lower, and adjacent CI elements. [] Accomplishes all responsibilities through coordination with the operational units, the HOC, and the OSC.
HUMINT OPERATIONS CELL (OSC)
[] Coordinates and synchronizes all HUMINT activities in the AOIR. [] Exercises technical control over all HUMINT entities in the designated AOIR and deconflicts HUMINT activities with higher, lower, and adjacent HUMINT elements. [] Accomplishes all responsibilities through coordination with the operational units and the CICA and OSC.
CI ANALYSIS CELL (CIAC) AND HUMINT
[] Analyzes their respective discipline reporting and other intelligence discipline reporting and
ANALYSIS CELL (HAC)
analysis to provide a single-source analysis of the adversarial intelligence capability targeting friendly forces. [] Determines gaps in reporting and coordinating with other analysis elements and technical controllers to cross-cue other collection sensor systems. [] Produces and disseminates discipline-specific products and provides input to intelligence summaries (INTSUMs). [] Uses analytical tools to develop long-term collection plans and provide reporting feedback that will support all CI and HUMINT elements in the supported command's AOIR.
Concepts & Doctrine Defining CI and HUMINT Requirements by Chief Warrant Officer Four Patrick J. Foxen For the purpose of this article, we refer to human intelligence (HUMINT) specifically as the “collection of information for intelligence purposes from humans.” While there are obviously other human sources of information on the battlefield (e.g., scouts and long-range surveillance teams), they are beyond the scope of this article. During recent stability operations and support operations, the Army has placed a growing emphasis on collecting information for intelligence purposes from the local population. To keep in step with this growing emphasis, our division is assessing our current doctrine on human intelligence (HUMINT) and counterintelligence (CI) operations. Our first step is to develop the Combat Commander’s Handbook on HUMINT and CI Operations in Stability Operations and Support Operations this spring. We then plan to revise FM 3452,Intelligence Interrogation (possibly retitled HUMINT Collection), and FM
34-60, Counterintelligence, beginning this fall and winter. As we begin this challenge, we need your input. To start, we would like specific thoughts and comments on this article. CI Does Not Equal HUMINT Across DTLOMS (doctrine, training, leadership, materiel, and soldiers), there is a tendency to blur the distinction between two very distinct doctrinal requirements, HUMINT and CI.FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations, describes HUMINT as one of the four intelligence disciplines and CI as one of the two multidiscipline functions. There is a tendency to confuse the methodology on information collection and operational intention. This imprecise use and mixing of doctrinal terminology is bound to weaken both the HUMINT and CI efforts. While HUMINT and CI are highly complimentary efforts, even symbiotic, the basic mindsets of both are diametrically opposite by definition. CI is not a subset of HUMINT. HUMINT is the intelligence derived from information collected from people and related documents. HUMINT is a pure collection discipline and is an essential contributor to the all-source picture of the battlefield. By a “pure” collectio n discipline, we mean that the purpose of the discipline is to collect information from a specific type of source using a specific skill set. The purpose of and requirement for the collection of this information is irrelevant. That is not to suggest that no one evaluates and analyzes the information. The HUMINT collector responds to command and national collection requirements regardless of the intended use of that information. CI, on the other hand, is a multidiscipline function whose purpose is to detect, identify, assess, counter, neutralize, or exploit the intelligence collection efforts of competitors, opponents, adversaries, and enemies. It is the critical means the intelligence community uses to protect the force against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassination when the activity is conducted for, or on behalf of, foreign powers, organizations or persons, or international terrorist groups. The defining factor in CI operations is not how we collect the information but the purpose of collection. CI agents use HUMINT collection techniques in some aspects of their collection and investigative mission. It is this use of HUMINT skills, particularly in its investigative and source operation roles that has led to confusion. How Did We Get Here?
How then did this trend to associate CI solely with HUMINT collection and to define HUMINT entirely in CI or force protection terms develop? Two factors have contributed to this trend: insufficient resources and ill-defined mission requirements. Insufficient Resources. Many recent operations (e.g., Haiti, Somalia, and Bosnia) have been against a relatively unsophisticated foe technologically, but conducted in an environment that is rich in HUMINT collection potential. The forces that we deployed often have lacked the HUMINT capability to meet the collection opportunities. The lack of HUMINT collectors has led to the use of CI agents to perform a primary HUMINT collection job. This creates problems in two areas. First, because they are credentialed CI agents, there are restrictions that apply to CI agents but do not apply to HUMINT collectors (such as CI agents’ use in criminal investigations). Second, when using a CI agent as your HUMINT collector, you are not employing the best tool for the job. The tendency to define military occupational specialty 97E (Interrogator) and to a lesser degree 351E (Human Intelligence Collection Technician) as simply “interrogators” compounds this problem. This narrow focus coupled with a misunderstanding of the term “interrogator” (see the definitions below) has led to a hesitancy to use these personnel. Poorly Defined Mission Requirements. Our experiences in Bosnia and Somalia, coupled with our need to minimize causalities, have led us to define collection requirements solely in the terms of force protection and hence as CI. First, this is a misnomer, since CI does not equate to force protection and secondly, it ignores the “positive” collection capabilities of HUMINT. CI concerns itself with the threat’s collection capability not necessarily with an analysis of other threat capabilities and plans. The identification of the threat’s organizational structure, capabilities, and plans is a part of HUMINT collection. There is also a tendency to define CI strictly in the terms of HUMINT collection and ignore other “adversary” collection capabilities (e.g. computer penetration). Although some CI agents receive training in this area, most do not. So what is the solution to this problem? We must clearly define the sets of doctrinal requirements currently needed to meet the HUMINT collection mission and the CI mission. The rest of this article proposes some important doctrinal terms necessary to describe HUMINT collection, CI analysis, and CI investigations. HUMINT Collection
Activities
HUMINT collection includes “operations conducted using HUMINT collection techniques regardless of the ultimate use of that information.” HUMINT activities include a great variety of operations, analysis, and liaison duties. CI Force Protection Source Operations (CFSO). Tactically- oriented, overt collection program that uses human sources (informants) on the battlefield to identify potential and actual threats to deployed U.S. and coalition forces and to answer intelligence requirements. Sources can provide early warning of imminent danger to deployed U.S. and coalition forces and provide information that helps in the decision-making process. Liaison. Liaison is the gaining of rapport with and elicitation of information from host country and allied military and civilian agencies. Agents conduct liaison with host nation military and law enforcement U.S., coalition, and host nation law enforcement and security personnel. Liaison can answer collection requirements, coordinate activities, and foster cooperation. Document Exploitation (DOCEX). The systematic extraction of information from documents to aid in HUMINT collection operations and to obtain information in response to collection requirements. Surveillance. Observation of a facility, activity, or individuals to answer collection requirements, support the commander’s decision-making processes, or support a CI program. Screening Operations. Operations to identify sources that may be able to answer collection requirements, serve as CFSO sources, or be a part of a base or area security program. This operation is both a tactical HUMINT and CI operation. Screening operations include:
Mobile and static checkpoints (e.g., refugee or displaced persons). Part of a cordon and search operation. Locally employed personnel security. Enemy prisoner of war and detainee.
Interrogation and Detainee Operations. The systematic questioning of large numbers of enemy prisoners of war or detainees in response to collection requirements. This usually occurs at a military police- or other agencyoperated collection facility. Friendly Force Debriefing Operations. The systematic debriefing of U.S. Forces to answer collection requirements.
Refugee Debriefing Operations are the systematic debriefing of refugees and displaced persons to answer collection requirements. Single-Source HUMINT Analysis. The analysis of information obtained from HUMINT operations listed above. HUMINT Collection Procedures and Techniques Debriefing is the systematic effort to obtain information to answer specific collection requirements by direct and indirect questioning techniques of a person not in the custody of the forces conducting the questioning. The two primary categories of sources for debriefing are U.S. and foreign personnel. The U.S. personnel include patrols, military personnel who have been in contact with host nation personnel, and U.S. business- persons who may have worked in the areas of interest. Refugees, local inhabitants, and members of non-governmental organizations are examples of the foreign personnel who may be sources. Interrogation is the effort to acquire information to answer specific collection requirements by direct and indirect questioning techniques of a person in the custody of the forces conducting the questioning. Some examples of interrogation sources are enemy prisoners of war and detainees. Elicitation is the direct interaction with a human source to gain information where the source is not aware of the specific purpose for the conversation. Elicitation is the baseline method for initiating source operations. Screening encompasses the techniques used to identify an individual for further exploitation or investigation. Discriminators used in screening can range from general appearance and attitude to specific questions to assess areas of knowledge and degree of cooperation. You must remember that screening is not an intelligence collection technique (in itself). It is a timesaving measure that identifies those individuals most likely to answer an intelligence or CI requirement. CI Analysis and Support Operations Multidiscipline CI (MDCI) Analysis is the analysis of the threat’s signals intelligence (SIGINT), HUMINT, and imagery intelligence (IMINT) capabilities regarding intelligence collection, terrorism, and sabotage to develop countermeasures against them. It involves a reverse intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process in which the analyst looks at U.S. forces and
operations from the threat perspective to assist in friendly courses of action (COAs) development. This analytical tool supports the commander’s force protection program and facilitates the nomination of CI targets for neutralization or exploitation. CI Support to Threat Vulnerability Assessments provides an assessment of a command or facility’s susceptibility to foreign intelligence collection. Most assess- ments also evaluate threats from terrorist and insurgent groups, as well as susceptibility to sabotage. HUMINT and CI support to force protection. A commander’s force protection program encompasses many assets designed to help protect the force. HUMINT and CI can use their unique protective and collection capabilities to help a commander safeguard a deployed force. CI Investigation Operations are those operations requiring CI certification (i.e., counterintelligence agents with badge and credentials). CI Investigations. CI agents train to conduct investigations into breaches of national security. The average tactical HUMINT and CI team will not spend a great amount of time conducting CI investigations, and will require assistance from operational and strategic CI assets to perform more than basic CI investigations. The areas of CI investigation include espionage, terrorism, treason, subversion, sedition, and automated information systems intrusion. CI Technical Support. CI elements from the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) bring some valuable technical capabilities to a contin- gency area, to include Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM) capabilities and polygraph support. Conclusion HUMINT collection and CI are and will continue to become increasingly important as we enter the 21st century. Both efforts are vital to mission success across the entire spectrum of operations. The understanding of the doctrinal distinction between HUMINT collection and CI is fundamental. This distinction drives the doctrinal description of both efforts and our understanding of how they are mutually supportive and intertwined in stability operations and support operations. As we grapple with this issue, we need your input.
Editor’s Note: Look for the July -September 1999 issue of the Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, which will feature several ar ticles relating to HUMINT and CI. CW4 Patrick J. Foxen is a Human Intelligence Collection Technician (351E) with 24 years in the military. He is currently working in the Doctrine Division, Futures Directorate, USAIC&FH. Readers can contact him about this article via his E-mail at
[email protected] and by telephone at (520) 538-0971 and DSN 879-0971, or E-mail the doctrine staff at http: //138.27.35.36/Doctrine/dlb.htm.
