ADMIN-2E-CASE-DIGESTS-ELEC-LAWS-3.pdf

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ELECTION LAWS 1. AKBAYAN YOUTH vs. COMELEC GR 147066 March 26, 2001 DOCTRINES: a. No registration shall, however, be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a special election. b. The State, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voters registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election. c. COMELEC performed its constitutional task to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election , inter alia, questions relating to the registration of voters FACTS: I Petitioners - representing the youth sector - seek to direct the Comelec to conduct a special registration before the May 14, 2001 General Elections, of new voters ages 18 to 21. According to petitioners, around 4 million youth failed to register on or before the December 27, 2000 deadline set by the respondent COMELEC under R.A. No. 8189.

On January 29, 2001, Commissioners Tancangco and Lantion submitted Memorandum No. 2001-027 on the Report on the Request for a Two-day Additional Registration of New Voters Only. The rationale for the additional two-day registration is the renewed political awareness and interest to participate in the political process generated by the recent political events in the country among our youth. Comm. Borra called a consultation meeting among regional heads and representatives and a number of senior staff headed by Exec. Dir. Mamasapunod Aguam. It was the consensus of the group, with the exception of Director Jose Tolentino, Jr. of the ASD, to disapprove the request for additional registration of voters on the ground that Sec. 8 of R.A. 8189 explicitly provides that no registration shall be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and that the Commission has no more time left to accomplish all preelection activities. The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 3584, the decretal portion of which reads: Deliberating on the foregoing memoranda, the Commission RESOLVED to deny the request to conduct a twoday additional registration of new voters on February 17 and 18, 2001. Commissioners Rufino Javier and Mehol Sadain voted to deny the request while Commissioners Luzviminda Tancangco and Ralph Lantion voted to accommodate the students’ request. With this impasse, the Commission construed its Resolution as having taken effect. AKBAYAN-Youth, SCAP, UCSC, U CSC, MASP, KOMPIL II (YOUTH) et al. filed before this Court the instant Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus which seeks to set aside and nullify respondent COMELECs Resolution and/or to declare Section 8 of R. A. 8189 unconstitutional since it causes the disenfranchisement of petitioners and others similarly situated.

ATTY. NACHURA 2E AY 2015-2016 ∙

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Likewise, petitioners pray for the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing respondent COMELEC to conduct a special registration of new voters and to admit for registration petitioners and other similarly situated young Filipinos to qualify them to vote in the May 14, 2001 General Elections. ISSUE: WON Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing resolution HELD: No. Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 8189 provides “No registration shall, however, be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a special election.”

The act of registration is an indispensable precondition to the right of suffrage. For registration is part and parcel of the right to vote and an indispensable element in the election process. Thus, contrary to petitioners’ argument, argument, registration cannot and should not be denigrated to the lowly stature of a mere statutory requirement. The State, in the exercise exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voters registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election that even pre-election activities could be performed by the duly constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner one which is not indifferent and so far removed from the pressing order of the day and the prevalent circumstances of the times. In issuing the assailed Resolution, respondent COMELEC simply performed its constitutional task to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election , inter alia, questions relating to the registration of voters; evidently, respondent COMELEC merely exercised a prerogative that chiefly pertains to it and one which squarely falls within the proper sphere of its constitutionally-mandated powers. Accordingly, in the absence of clear showing of grave abuse of power of discretion on the part of respondent COMELEC, this Court may not validly conduct an incursion and meddle with affairs exclusively within the province of respondent COMELEC a body accorded by no less than the fundamental law with independence. 2. ASISTIO vs. TRINIDAD-PE AGUIRRE GR 191124 April 27, 2010 DOCTRINE: The residency requirement of a voter is at least one (1) year residence in the Philippines and at least six (6) months in the place where the person proposes or intends to vote. (Sec 117, Omnibus Election Code; Sec. 9, The Voters Registration Act) FACTS: Enrico R. Echiverri filed against Luis A. Asistio (both mayoralty candidates in Caloocan) a Petition for Exclusion of Voter from the Permanent List of Voters of Caloocan City before the MeTC alleging that Asistio is not a resident of Caloocan City, specifically not in the address stated in his Certificat e of Candidacy (COC) for Mayor in the 2010 Elections. Upon verification by private respondent, petitioner was listed as a registered voter of Baranggay 15 but his declared address, in truth, falls under Baranggay 17 where he is not listed in the CVL. Trial on the

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW merits ensued and Judge Malabaguio rendered a decision directing removal of the name of LUIS AQUINO ASISTIO from the list of permanent voters of Caloocan City. An appeal to the MeTC decision was made as it would deprive Asistio of his right to vote. Echiverri, however, filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal, arguing that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the Appeal on the ground of failure to file the required appeal fees; petitioner having paid his docket fee only on February 11, 2010 which was not simultaneous with the filing of his notice of appeal on February 10, 2010. RTC granted the motion of Echiverri to dismiss Asistio’s appeal of the MeTC decision on the ground of non-payment of the required docket fees. ISSUE: WON Asistio should be excluded from the permanent list of voters of [Precinct 1811A, Barangay 15] of Caloocan City for failure to comply with the residency required by law evidenced by the declaration of a false or non- existent address HELD: Section 117 of The Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Bilang 881) echoed in Section 9 of The Voters Registration Act of 1996 (Republic Act No. 8189) states the qualifications of a voter.

From these provisions, the residency requirement of a voter is at least one (1) year residence in the Philippines and at least six (6) months in the place where the person proposes or intends to vote. "Residence," as used in the law is doctrinally settled to mean "domicile," importing not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative indicative of such intention inferable from a person’s acts, activities, and utterances Asistio has always been a resident of Caloocan City since his birth or for more than 72 years and his family is known to be among the prominent political families in Caloocan City. In fact, Asistio served in public office as representative, having been elected as such in the 1992, 1995, 1998, and 2004 elections. In 2007, he also sought election as City Mayor. In all of these occasions, Asistio cast his vote in the same city. Taking these circumstances into consideration, it cannot be denied that Asistio has qualified, and continues to qualify, as a voter of Caloocan City. There is no showing that he has established domicile elsewhere, or that he had consciously and voluntarily abandoned his residence in Caloocan City. He should, therefore, remain in the list of permanent registered voters of Precinct No. 1811A, Barangay 15, Caloocan City. As to the payment of docket fees, the Court observes, that while Judge Aguirre declares in her Order that the appellate docket fees were paid only on February 11, 2010 , she conveniently omits to mention that the postal money orders obtained by Asistio for the purpose were purchased on February 10, 2010. To the court, Asistio, by purchasing the postal money orders for the purpose of paying the appellate docket fees on February 10, 2010, although they were tendered to the MeTC only on February 11, 2010 already meant substantial compliance with the procedural requirements in filing his appeal. Blind adherence to a technicality, with the inevitable result of frustrating and nullifying the constitutionality guaranteed right of suffrage, cannot be countenanced.


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ADDITIONAL NOTES: "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence where, when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. Three rules that must be borne in mind (re: domicile): (1) that a person must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) once established, it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) that a person can have but one residence or domicile at a time .35

Requisites for lost of domicile: (1) an actual removal or change of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and (3) acts which correspond with that purpose . 3. FRIVALDO vs. COMELEC 174 SCRA 245 DOCTRINE: Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged.The fact that he was elected by the people does not excuse the patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. FACTS: The petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed the governorelect of the province of Sorsogon on January 22, 1988 and assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988, the League of Municipalities, represented by its President, Salvador Estuye, filed with the Commission on Elections a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen since he had already been naturalized in the United States.

In his answer, the petitioner admitted that he was naturalized in the United States, but justified his actions only insofar as he sought American citizenship to protect himself against President Marcos’ influence. As an additional point, the petitioner argued that the challenge to his title should be dismissed, it being a quo warranto petition that should have been filed within ten days from his proclamation, in accordance with Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. He further added that the League, moreover, was not a proper party because it was not a voter and so could not sue under the said section. In their comment, the private respondents reiterated their assertion that Frivaldo was a naturalized American citizen and had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of the election on 18 January 1988. Moreover, they clarified that their petition in the Commission on Elections was not really for quo warrantosince they only wantedto prevent Frivaldo from continuing as governor since his candidacy and election being null and void ab initio because of his alienage. Finally, even if assuming that the League itself was not a proper party, Estuye himself, who was suing not only for the League but also in his personal capacity, could nevertheless institute the suit by himself alone as a private person.

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ISSUE: WON Frivaldo is qualified to assume the position as governor of Sorsogon HELD: No, he is not, because he was not a Filipino citizen at the time of the elections. While the Court saw no reason not to believe that the petitioner was one of the enemies of the Marcos dictatorship,it cannot agree to the argument that that as a consequence thereof, he was forced to abandon his Filipino citizenship.There were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo and some of them subject to greater risk than he, who did not find it necessary to resort to his solution.

Frivaldo likewise contended that he had already been repatriated as a Filipino by reason of his participation in the elections of the Philippine government, thereby automatically renouncing his American citizenship under the laws of the United States. However, such laws do have an effect on the petitioner’s citizenship under Philippine laws for it is clear that the reacquisition of citizenship can only be done by three ways: (1)direct act of Congress; (2) naturalization;and (3) repatriation.The alleged forfeiture is between the petitioner and United States as his adopted country; such forfeiture did not and could not have the effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he had earlier renounced. Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged.The fact that he was elected by the people does not excuse the patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. 4. LABO vs. COMELEC 176 SCRA 245 DOCTRINE: Qualifications are continuing requirements; once any of them is lost during incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. In the case at bar, the citizenship and voting requirements were not subsequently lost but were not possessed at all in the first place on the day of the election. The petitioner was disqualified from running as mayor and, although elected, is not now qualified to serve as such. FACTS: Petitioner Ramon L. Labo, Jr proclaimed mayor-elect of Baguio City on January 20, 1988. In this petition, he asks this Court to restrain the Commission on Elections from looking into the question of his citizenship as a qualification saying it is not the issue. The issue is whether or not the public respondent, has jurisdiction to conduct any inquiry into this matter, considering that the petition for quo warranto against him was not filed on time. However, after the court decided favorably for the petitioner regarding the technicality of filing a quo warranto, still the Court proceeded and settled the issue on his citizenship as a qualification for the assumption of Public Office


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Labowas married to an Australian national in 1976but was later on annulled after it was found that his marriage to the Australian citizen was bigamous. Independent of the marriage, he was also formally naturalized as a citizen of Australia, formally took the Oath of Allegiance, made the Affirmation of Allegiance, obtained an Australian passport, and registered as an alien with the Commission on Immigration and Deportation upon his return to the Philippines country in 1980. Coming back to the Philippines in 1980, He later asked for the change of his status from immigrant to a returning former Philippine citizen and was granted Immigrant Certificate of Residence. ISSUE: WON petitioner was divested of his Philippine citizenship and cannot assume office. HELD: Yes. Under CA No. 63, which enumerates the modes by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. Among these are: (1) naturalization in a foreign country; (2) express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country, all of which are applicable to the petitioner. Also, contrary to the petitoner’s assertion that at worst he can only be considered a dual national, it is also worth mentioning in this connection that under Article IV, Section 5, of the present Constitution, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."

His divesture of his Australian citizenship also does not concern the court. That is a matter between him and his adopted country. What must be considered is the fact that he voluntarily and freely rejected Philippine citizenship and willingly and knowingly embraced the citizenship of a foreign country. The possibility that he may have been subsequently rejected by Australia, as he claims, does not mean that he has been automatically reinstated as a citizen of the Philippines. Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. It does not appear in the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of these methods. He does not point to any judicial decree of naturalization as to any statute directly conferring Philippine citizenship upon him. Neither has he shown that he has complied with PD No. 725, providing that: ... (2) natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship may reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation by applying with the Special Committee on Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction No. 270, and, if their applications are approved, taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after which they shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. The Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their certificate of registration. The petitioner is not now, nor was he on the day of the local elections on January 18, 1988, a citizen of the Philippines. In fact, he was not even a qualified voter under the Constitution itself because of his alienage.

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW Lastly, even if the petitioner won by 2100 votes over private respondent, the electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of Australia, or at least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to preside over them as mayor of their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege over their countrymen. These qualifications are continuing requirements; once any of them is lost during incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. In the case at bar, the citizenship and voting requirements were not subsequently lost but were not possessed at all in the first place on the day of the election. The petitioner was disqualified from running as mayor and, although elected, is not now qualified to serve as such. However, private respondent, who was 2 nd highest in vote for the mayoralty position, cannot replace the petitioner for that position. In Geronimo v. Ramosthe Court ruled that “The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid to vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless.” 5. ROMMEL APOLINARIO JALOSJOS vs. COMELEC GR 191970 April 24, 2012 DOCTRINE : There is no hard and fast rule to determine a candidates compliance with residency requirement since the question of residence is a question of intention.Still, jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where once established, that domicile remains until he acquires a new one; and (c) a person can have but one domicile at a time. FACTS: Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City. He Migrated to Australia and acquired Australian citizenship. On November 22, 2008, at age 35, he returned to the Philippines and lived with his brother in Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Upon his return, he took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and was issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship. He then renounced his Australian citizenship in September 2009.He acquired residential property where he lived and applied for registration as voter in the Municipality of Ipil. His application was opposed by the Barangay Captain of Veterans Village, Dan Erasmo, sr. but was eventually granted by the ERB.

A petition for the exclusion of Jalosjos' name in the voter's list was then filed by Erasmo before the MCTC. Said petition was denied. It was then appealed to the RTC who also affirmed the lower court's decision.On November 8, 2009, Jalosjos filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay Province. Erasmo filed a petition to deny or cancel said COC on the ground of failure to comply with R.A. 9225 and the one year residency requirement of the local government code.COMELEC ruled that Jalosjos failed to comply with the residency requirement of a gubernatorial candidate and failed to show ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil. COMELEC en banc affirmed the decision.


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ISSUE: WON the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. HELD: Yes. The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the position of provincial governor to be a resident of the province for at least one year before the election. For purposes of the election laws, the requirement of residence is synonymous with domicile, meaning that a person must not only intend to reside in a particular place but must also have personal presence in such place coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.

The question of residence is a question of intention. Jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where once established, that domicile remains until he acquires a new one; and (c) a person can have but one domicile at a time. Quezon City was Jalosjos’ domicile of origin, the place of his birth. It may be taken for granted that he effectively changed his domicile from Quezon City to Australia when he migrated there at the age of eight, acquired Australian citizenship, and lived in that country for 26 years. Australia became his domicile by operation of law and by choice. When he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change his domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and renounced his allegiance to that country. In addition, he reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his domicile there. And he has since lived nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. To hold that Jalosjos has not establish a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay despite the loss of his domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his domicile of choice and by operation of law (Australia) would violate the settled maxim that a man must have a domicile or residence somewhere. The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his domicile in Ipil since he has merely been staying at his brother’s house. But this circumstance alone cannot support such conclusion. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly held that a candidate is not required to have a house in a community to establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. It is sufficient that he should live there even if it be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or relative. To insist that the candidate own the house where he lives would make property a qualification for public office. What matters is that Jalosjos has proved two things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an intention of making it his domicile. Further, it is not disputed that Jalosjos bought a residential lot in the same village where he lived and a fish pond in San Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay. He showed correspondences with political leaders, including local and national party-mates, from where he lived. Moreover, Jalosjos is a registered voter of Ipil by final judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga Sibugay.

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 6. SVETLANA JALOSJOS vs. COMELEC GR 193314 FEBRUARY 26, 2013 DOCTRINE: A change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time. Where there is no such proof of abandonment, the residence of origin should be deemed to continue. FACTS: On November 20, 2009, Petitioner Svetlana filed her Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for mayor of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental for the May 10, 2010 elections. She indicated therein her place of birth and residence as Barangay Tugas, Municipality of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental.

Asserting otherwise, private respondents, Tumpag and Estrellada filed against petitioner a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy, in which they argued that she had falsely represented her place of birth and residence, because she was in fact born in San Juan, Metro Manila, and had not totally abandoned her previous domicile, Dapitan City. They presented some documents to support this claim. Petitioner averred that she had established her residence in the said barangay since December 2008 when she purchased two parcels of land there, and that she had been staying in the house of a certain Mrs. Lourdes Yap while she (petitioner) was overseeing the construction of her house. Furthermore, she asserted that the error in her place of birth was committed by her secretary. She also presented a number of documents supporting her claim. The case remained pending as of the day of the elections, in which petitioner garnered the highest number of votes. She was then proclaimed as the duly elected municipal mayor. On June 4, 2010, COMELEC Second Division disqualified petitioner from running for the position of mayor. On August 19, 2010, COMELEC En Banc denied her Motion for Reconsideration, holding, among others, that she did not meet the residency requirement, and that the affiants of the Sworn Statements (some of the documents petitioner submitted) were all partial, because they either worked for her or were members of organizations that received financial assistance from her. ISSUE: WON Petitioner Svetlana failed to prove compliance with the oneyear residency requirement for local elective officials HELD: Yes. Svetlana was disqualified. When it comes to the qualifications for running for public office, residence is synonymous with domicile. There are three requisites for a person to acquire a new domicile by choice which must be established by clear and positive proof: (a) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (b) an intention to remain there; and (c) an intention to abandon the old domicile.

Where there is no such proof of abandonment, the residence of origin should be deemed to continue.


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Moreover, even if these requisites are established by clear and positive proof, the date of acquisition of the domicile of choice, or the critical date, must also be established to be within at least one year prior to the elections using the same standard of evidence. (emphasis in the original) Petitioner failed to establish by clear and positive proof that she had resided in Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, one year prior to the 10 May 2010 elections. In fact, there were discrepancies in the Affidavits and documents she submitted. In one instance, the affiants (construction workers) asserted that in December 2009, construction was still ongoing. By their assertion, they were implying that six months before the 10 May 2010 elections, petitioner had not yet moved into her house at Brgy. Tugas. Accordingly, in the CoC of petitioner, her statement of her eligibility to run for office constitutes a material misrepresentation that warrants its cancellation. With this final determination of her ineligibility to run for office, there is now a permanent vacancy in the office of the mayor of Baliangao. Hence, the vice-mayor of Baliangao shall become its mayor in accordance with Section 44 of the Local Government Code. 7. VIDAL vs. COMELEC GR 206666 January 21, 2015 CASE: Before the Court are (1) a Petition for Certiorari filed by Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal (Risos-Vidal), which essentially prays for the issuance of the writ of certiorari annulling and setting aside the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in SPA No. 13-211 for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (2) a Petition-in-Intervention filed by Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), wherein he prays to be declared the 2013 winning candidate for Mayor of the City of Manila in view of private respondent former President Estrada’s (former President Estrada) Joseph Ejercito disqualification to run for and hold public office. FACTS: On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada, a former President of the Republic of the Philippines, for the crime of plunder and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification. On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former President Estrada where it was explicitly stated that “he is hereby restored to his civil and political rights”. On November 30, 2009, former President Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacyfor the position of President but was opposed by three petitions seeking for his disqualification. None of the cases prospered and Motions for Reconsideration were denied by Comelec En Banc. Estrada only managed to garner the second highest number of votes last May 10, 2010 synchronized national elections. On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed a Certificate of Candidacy, this time vying for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of Manila.

Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against former President Estrada before the COMELEC because of Estrada’s conviction for Plunder by the Sandiganbayan

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW sentencing him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with Perpetual Absolute Disqualification. Petitioner relied on Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC). Petitioner-intervenor Alfredo Lim who garnered the second highest votes intervened and sought to disqualify Estrada for the same ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal and praying that he be proclaimed as Mayor of Manila. SECTION 40. Disqualifications.- The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position: (a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence; (b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case; (c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic; (d) Those with dual citizenship; (e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad; (f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and (g) The insane or feeble minded. (Emphasis supplied.) Sec. 12, Omnibus Election Code: Section 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgmentfor subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any public office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty. In a Resolution dated April 1, 2013, the COMELEC, Second Division, dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that [former President Est rada’s] right to seek public office has been effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo. Since this Commission has already spoken, it will no longer engage in disquisitions of a settled matter lest indulged in wastage of government resources." Hence, the petitions. ISSUES: WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in public office as a result of the pardon granted to him by former President Arroyo HELD: No. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Resolutions. The arguments forwarded by Risos-Vidal fail to adequately demonstrate any factual or legal bases to prove that the assailed COMELEC Resolutions were issued in a “whimsical, arbitrary or capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law” or were so “patent and gross” as to constitute grave abuse of discretion. Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political


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rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The sentence which states that “(h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights,” expressly remitted the accessory penalties that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly remitted together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is worded in absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal escape from the prohibition – a plenary pardon or amnesty. In other words, the latter provision allows any person who has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty after conviction by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any public office, whether local or national position. Therefore, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Resolutions. 8. CAASI vs. COMELEC 191 SCRA 229 DOCTRINE: To qualify to run for elective office in the Philippines, the law requires that the candidate who is a green card holder must have "waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country." Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in the Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States. The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this country. Without such prior waiver, he was "disqualified to run for any elective office." FACTS: The case is about the disqualification of Merito Miguel under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code for the position of municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan, to which he was elected in the local elections of January 18, 1988, on the ground that he is a green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the United States (US), not of Bolinao.

Miguel admitted that he holds a green card issued to him by the US Immigration Service, but he denied that he is a permanent resident of the US. He allegedly obtained the green card for convenience in order that he may freely enter the US for his periodic medical examination and to visit his children there. He alleged that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan, that he voted in all previous elections, including the plebiscite on February 2, 1987 for the ratification.of the 1987 Constitution, and the congressional elections on May 18,1987.

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW The green card that was subsequently issued by the United States Department of Justice and Immigration and Registration Service to the respondent Merito C. Miguel identifies him in clear bold letters as a RESIDENT ALIEN. In the “Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration”, Miguel’s answer in one of the questions regarding his length of intended stay was “permanently.” Consequently, the COMELEC, except for one Commissioner, dismissed the petitions on the ground that “the possession of a green card by Miguel does not sufficiently establish that he has abandoned his residence in the Philippines.” ISSUE: WON Miguel is qualified to run for mayor in the local elections on January 18, 1988 HELD: No. Miguel's immigration to the US in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines because he did not go to the US merely to visit his children or his doctor there; he entered the US with the intention to have there permanently as evidenced by his application for an immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa. Based on that application of his, he was issued by the U.S. Government the requisite green card or authority to reside there permanently.

Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law" is not applicable to Merito Miguel for he acquired the status of an immigrant of the United States before he was elected to public office, not "during his tenure" as mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan. The law applicable to him is Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), which provides that “any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless such person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.” To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law requires that the candidate who is a green card holder must have "waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country." Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in the Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States. The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this country. Without such prior waiver, he was "disqualified to run for any elective office" (Sec. 68, Omnibus Election Code).

Respondent Merito Miguel admits that he holds a green card, which proves that he is a permanent resident or immigrant it of the United States, but the records of this case are starkly bare of proof that he had waived his status as such before he ran for election as municipal mayor of Bolinao on January 18, 1988. We, therefore, hold that he was disqualified to become a candidate for that office.


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The reason for Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is not hard to find. Residence in the municipality where he intends to run for elective office for at least one (1) year at the time of filing his certificate of candidacy, is one of the qualifications that a candidate for elective public office must possess (Sec. 42, Chap. 1, Title 2, Local Government Code). Miguel did not possess that qualification because he was a permanent resident of the United States and he resided in Bolinao for a period of only three (3) months (not one year) after his return to the Philippines in November 1987 and before he ran for mayor of that municipality on January 18, 1988. Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered his green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local elections on January 18, 1988, our conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for said public office, hence, his election thereto was null and void. 9. MORENO vs. COMELEC GR 201796, June 15, 2013 DOCTRINE: Those who have not served their sentence by r eason of the grant of probation which, we reiterate, should not be equated with service of sentence, should not likewise be disqualified from running for a local elective office because the two (2)-year period of ineligibility under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code does not even begin to run. FACTS: Urbano M. Moreno (Moreno) assails the Resolution that disqualified him from running for the elective office of Punong Barangay of Barangay Cabugao, Daram, Samar in the July 15, 2002 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections.

Norma L. Mejes (Mejes) filed a petition to disqualify Moreno from running for Punong Barangay on the ground that the latter was convicted by final judgment of the crime of Arbitrary Detention and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of Four (4) Months and One (1) Day to Two (2) Years and Four (4) Months. Moreno filed an answer aver that he was already granted probation. Allegedly, following the case of Baclayon v. Mutia, the imposition of the sentence of imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties, was thereby suspended. Moreno also argued that the final discharge of the probation shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed including the right to vote and be voted for in the July 15, 2002 elections. After due proceedings, the Investigating Officer recommended that Moreno be disqualified from running for Punong Barangay. According to the Comelec en banc, the Local Government Code provides that those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence, are disqualified from running for any elective local position. The grant of probation to Moreno merely suspended the execution of his sentence but did not affect his disqualification from running for an elective local office. Moreno argues that the disqualification under the Local Government Code applies only to those who have served their sentence and not to probationers because the latter do not serve the adjudged sentence. The Probation Law should allegedly be read as an exception to the

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW Local Government Code because it is a special law which applies only to probationers. Further, even assuming that he is disqualified, his subsequent election as Punong Barangay allegedly constitutes an implied pardon of his previous misconduct. ISSUE: WON Moreno should be disqualified HELD: The resolution of the present controversy being whether Morenos sentence was in fact served. The accessory penalties of suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, attendant to the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period imposed upon Moreno were suspended upon the grant of probation. It appears then that during the period of probation, the probationer is not even disqualified from running for a public office because the accessory penalty of suspension from public office is put on hold for the duration of the probation.

Clearly, the period within which a person is under probation cannot be equated with service of the sentence adjudged. During the period of probation, the probationer does not serve the penalty imposed upon him by the court but is merely required to comply with all the conditions prescribed in the probation order. The fact that the trial court already issued an order finally discharging Moreno fortifies his position. Sec. 16 of the Probation Law provides that [t]he final discharge of the probationer shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed as to the offense for which probation was granted. Thus, when Moreno was finally discharged upon the courts finding that he has fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation, his case was deemed terminated and all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction were restored to him, including the right to run for public office. Probation is not a right of an accused but a mere privilege, an act of grace and clemency or immunity conferred by the state, which is granted to a deserving defendant who thereby escapes the extreme rigors of the penalty imposed by law for the offense of which he was convicted.Thus, the Probation Law lays out rather stringent standards regarding who are qualified for probation. It is important to note that the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code covers offenses punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, a penalty which also covers probationable offenses. In spite of this, the provision does not specifically disqualify probationers from running for a local elective office. This omission is significant because it offers a glimpse into the legislative intent to treat probationers as a distinct class of offenders not covered by the disqualification. On this score, we agree with Moreno that the Probation Law should be construed as an exception to the Local Government Code. While the Local Government Code is a later law which sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of local elective officials, the Probation Law is a special legislation which applies only to probationers.


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We rule that Moreno was not disqualified to run for Punong Barangay of Barangay Cabugao, Daram, Samar in the July 15, 2002 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections. 10. SOBEJANA-CONDON vs. COMELEC GR 198742 August 10, 2012 DOCTRINE: Foreign citizenship must be formally rejected through an affidavit duly sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath. FACTS: Petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino parents on August 8, 1944. On December 13, 1984, she became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon. On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship before the Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003."The application was approved and the petitioner took her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005. On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued the Order dated September 27, 2006 certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian citizen.The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Union in the 2007 elections. She lost in her bid. She again sought elective office during the May 10, 2010 elections this time for the position of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the highest numbers of votes and was proclaimed as the winning candidate. She took her oath of office on May 13, 2010. Private respondents Robelito V. Picar, Wilma P. Pagaduan and Luis M. Bautista filed separate petitions for quo warranto questioning the petitioner’s eligibility before the RTC. he petitions similarly sought the petitioner’s disqualification from holding her elective post on the ground that she is a dual citizen and that she failed to execute a "personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath" as imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225. ISSUE: WON "sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship" in Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 is a mere pro-forma requirement HELD: R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship for natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenshipby taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic. The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores one’s Filipino citizenship and all civil and political rights and obligations concomitant therewith, subject to certain conditions imposed in Section 5. Under the provisions of the aforementioned law, the petitioner has validly re-acquired her Filipino citizenship when she took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005. At that point, she held dual citizenship, i.e., Australian and Philippine. On September 18, 2006, or a year before she initially sought elective public office, she filed a renunciation of Australian citizenship in Canberra, Australia. Admittedly, however, the same was not under oath contrary to the exact mandate of Section 5(2) that the renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath. The language of Section 5(2) is free from any

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ambiguity. In Lopez v. COMELEC, we declared its categorical and single meaning: a Filipino American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public position in the Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign citizenship at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy. We also expounded on the form of the renunciation and held that to be valid, the renunciation must be contained in an affidavit duly executed before an officer of the law who is authorized to administer an oath stating in clear and unequivocal terms that affiant is renouncing all foreign citizenship. In fine, R.A. No. 9225 categorically demands natural-born Filipinos who re-acquire their citizenship and seek elective office, to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before an authorized public officer prior to or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections. The rule applies to all those who have reacquired their Filipino citizenship, like petitioner, without regard as to whether they are still dual citizens or not. It is a prerequisite imposed for the exercise of the right to run for public office. 11. MAQUILING vs. COMELEC GR 195649 July 2, 2013 DOCTRINE: By using his US passport after renouncing his American citizenship, Arnado has recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he took. The logic is that by nullifying his Oath of Renunciation, Arnado was still beholden to his American citizenship, which under the Local Government Code was a ground for disqualification as the law expressly disqualifies those who have dual citizenship from running for local office. FACTS: Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008. On the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor.

On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship. On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national elections. Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA American." To further bolster his claim of Arna do’s US citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum a computer-generated travel record dated 03 December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been


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using his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and departing the Philippines. ISSUE: WON Arnado qualified to run for public office HELD: NO. Arnado cites Section 349 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of the United States as having the effect of expatriation when he executed his Affidavit of Renunciation of American Citizenship on April 3, 2009 and thus claims that he was divested of his American citizenship. However, the fact that he was still able to use his US passport after executing his Affidavit of Renunciation repudiates this claim.

If there is any remaining doubt, it is regarding the efficacy of Arnado’s renunciation of his American citizenship when he subsequently used his U.S. passport. The renunciation of foreign citizenship must be complete and unequivocal. The requirement that the renunciation must be made through an oath emphasizes the solemn duty of the one making the oath of renunciation to remain true to what he has sworn to. Allowing the subsequent use of a foreign passport because it is convenient for the person to do so is rendering the oath a hollow act. It devalues the act of taking of an oath, reducing it to a mere ceremonial formality. The dissent states that the Court has effectively left Arnado "a man without a country". On the contrary, this Court has, in fact, found Arnado to have more than one. Nowhere in the decision does it say that Arnado is not a Filipino citizen. What the decision merely points out is that he also possessed another citizenship at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy. It must be stressed that what is at stake here is the principle that only those who are exclusively Filipinos are qualified to run for public office. If we allow dual citizens who wish to run for public office to renounce their foreign citizenship and afterwards continue using their foreign passports, we are creating a special privilege for these dual citizens, thereby effectively junking the prohibition in Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code. 12. EJERCITO vs. COMELEC GR 212398 November 25, 2014 FACTS: Contested in this petition for certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Rules), is the May 21, 2014 Resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in SPA No. 13-306 (DC), which affirmed the September 26, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division granting the petition for disqualification filed by private respondent Edgar "Egay" S. San Luis (San Luis) against petitioner Emilio Ramon "E.R." P. Ejercito (Ejercito). Three days prior to the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections, a petition for disqualification was filed by San Luis before the Office of the COMELEC Clerk in Manila against Ejercito, who was a fellow gubernatorial candidate and, at the time, the incumbent Governor of the Province of Laguna. He alleged in his Petition that: ▪

Based on the records of the Provincial COMELEC, the Province of Laguna has a total of 1,525,522 registered electorate. A certification issued by the Provincial Election Supervisor is hereto attached and marked as Annex "E" as an integral part hereof;

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ▪

In this regard, par. (a), Section 5 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, otherwise known as the Rules and Regulations Implementing FAIR ELECTION ACT provides and I quote:

"Authorized Expenses of Candidates and Parties. –The aggregate amount that a candidate or party may spent for election campaign shall be as follows: a)For candidates – Three pesos (P3.00) for every voter currently registered in the constituency where the candidate filed his certificate of candidacy. b)For other candidates without any political party and without any support from any political party – Five pesos (P5.00) for every voter currently registered in the constituency where the candidate filed his certificate of candidacy. c) For Political Parties and party-list groups – Five pesos (P5.00) for every voter currently registered in the constituency or constituencies where it has official candidates. (underscoring mine for emphasis) ▪

▪

▪

▪

Accordingly, a candidate for the position o f Provincial Governor of Laguna is only authorized to incur an election expense amounting to FOUR MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY-SIX THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED SIXTY-SIX (P4,576,566.00) PESOS. However, in total disregard and violation of the afore-quoted provision of law, [Ejercito] exceeded his expenditures in relation to his campaign for the 2013 election. For television campaign commercials alone, [Ejercito] already spent the sum of PhP23,730.784 based on our party’s official monitoring on the following dates: April 28, May 4 & May 5, 2013. Even assuming that [Ejercito] was given 30% discount as prescribed under the Fair Election Act, he still exceeded in the total allowable expenditures for which he paid the sum of P16,611,549; In view of the foregoing disquisitions, it is evident that [Ejercito] committed an election offense as provided for under Section 35 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, which provides and I quote:

"Election Offense. – Any violation of R.A. No. 9006 and these Rules shall constitute an election offense punishable under the first and second paragraph of Section 264 of the Omnibus Election Code in addition to administrative liability, whenever applicable. x x x" Moreover, it is crystal clear that [Ejercito] violated Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides and I quote: "Sec. 68. Disqualifications. – Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision by a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86, and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing asa candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be ▪


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qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws." (emphasis ours) Subsequently, on May 16, 2013, San Luis filed a Very Urgent ExParte Motion to Issue Suspension of Possible Proclamation of Respondent and Supplemental to the Very Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Issue Suspension of Possible Proclamation of Respondent. However, these were not acted upon by the COMELEC. The next day, Ejercito and Ramil L. Hernandez were proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers as the dulyelected Governor and Vice-Governor, respectively, of Laguna. Based on the Provincial/District Certificate of Canvass, Ejercito obtained 549,310 votes compared with San Luis’ 471,209 votes. The COMELEC First Division issued a Summons with Notice of Conference on June 4, 2013. The scheduled case conference between the parties on June 13, 2013 was reset to June 27, 2013. In the latter date, all the documentary exhibits were marked in evidence and the parties agreed to file their respective memorandum within ten (10) days. On September 26, 2013, the COMELEC First Division promulgated a Resolution disqualifying Ejercito from holding the office of the Provincial Governor of Laguna and to cease and desist from performing the functions of the office of the Provincial Governor of Laguna. The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the findings of its First Division that San Luis’ petition is an action to disqualify Ejercito. ISSUE: WON the Petitioner should be disqualified for spending in his election campaign an amount in excess of what is allowed by the OEC. HELD: Yes. Ejercito claims that the advertising contracts between ABSCBN Corporation and Scenema Concept International, Inc. were executed by an identified supporter without his knowledge and consent as, in fact, his signature thereon was obviously forged. Even assuming that such contract benefited him, Ejercito alleges that he should not be penalized for the conduct of third parties who acted on their own without his consent. Citing Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission decided by the US Supreme Court, he argues that every voter has the right to support a particular candidate in accordance with the free exercise of his or her rights of speech and of expression, which is guaranteed in Section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. He believes that an advertising contract paid for by a third party without the candidate’s knowledge and consent must be considered a form of political speech that must prevail against the laws suppressing it, whether by design or inadvertence. Further, Ejercito advances the view that COMELEC Resolution No. 9476 distinguishes between "contribution" and "expenditure" and makes no proscription on the medium or amount of contribution. He also stresses that it is clear from COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 that the limit set by law applies only to election expenditures of candidates and not to contributions made by third parties. For Ejercito, the fact that the legislature imposes no legal limitation on campaign donations is presumably because discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the government.

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We refuse to believe that the advertising contracts between ABSCBN Corporation and Scenema Concept International, Inc. were executed without Ejercito’s knowledge and consent. As found by the COMELEC First Division, the advertising contracts submitted in evidence by San Luis as well as those in legal custody of the COMELEC belie his hollow assertion. His express conformity to the advertising contracts is actually a must because noncompliance is consideredas an election offense. Notably, R.A. No. 9006 explicitly directs that broadcast advertisements donated to the candidate shall not be broadcasted without the written acceptance of the candidate, which shall be attached to the advertising contract and shall be submitted to the COMELEC, and that, in every case, advertising contracts shall be signed by the donor, the candidate concerned or by the duly-authorized representative of the political party. Conformably with the mandate of the law, COMELEC Resolution No. 9476 requires that election propaganda materials donated toa candidate shall not be broadcasted unless it is accompanied by the written acceptance of said candidate, which shall be in the form of an official receipt in the name of the candidate and must specify the description of the items donated, their quantity and value, and that, in every case, the advertising contracts, media purchase orders or booking orders shall be signed by the candidate concerned or by the duly authorized representative of the party and, in case of a donation, should be accompanied by a written acceptance of the candidate, party or their authorized representatives. COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 also unambiguously states thatit shall be unlawful to broadcast any election propaganda donated or given free of charge by any person or broadcast entity to a candidate without the written acceptance of the said candidate and unless they bear and be identified by the words "airtime for this broadcast was provided free of charge by" followed by the true and correct name and address of the donor. This Court cannot give weight to Ejercito’s representation that his signature on the advertising contracts was a forgery. The issue is a belated claim, raised only for the first time in this petition for certiorari. It is a rudimentary principle of law that matters neither alleged in the pleadings nor raised during the proceedings below cannot be ventilated for the first time on appeal before the Supreme Court. It would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play and justice to allow Ejercito to raise an issue that was not brought up before the COMELEC. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally truethat elementary considerations of due process require that a party be duly apprised of a claim against him before judgment may be rendered. Likewise, whether the advertising contracts were executed without Ejercito’s knowledge and consent, and whether his signatures thereto were fraudulent, are issues of fact. Any factual challenge has no place in a Rule 65 petition. This Court is not a trier of facts and is not equipped to receive evidence and determine the truth of factual allegations. Section 13 of R.A. No. 7166 sets the current allowable limit on expenses of candidates and political parties for election campaign, thus: SEC. 13. Authorized Expenses of Candidates and Political Parties. – The aggregate amount that a candidate or registered


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politicalparty may spend for election campaign shall be as follows: (a) For candidates – Ten pesos (P10.00) for President and Vice President; and for other candidates, Three pesos (P3.00) for every voter currently registered in the constituency where he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, a candidate without any political party and without support from any political party may be allowed to spend Five pesos (P5.00) for every such voter; and (b) For political parties - Five pesos (P5.00) for every voter currently registered in the constituency or constituencies where it has official candidates. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, any contribution in cash or in kind to any candidate or political party or coalition of parties for campaign purposes, duly reported to the Commission, shall not be subject to the payment of any gift tax. The inclusion of the amount contributed by a donor to the candidate’s allowable limit of election expenses does not trample upon the free exercise of the voters’ rights of speech and of expression under Section 4, Article III of the Constitution. As a content-neutral regulation, the law’s concern is not to curtail the message or content of the advertisement promoting a particular candidate but to ensure equality between and among aspirants with "deep pockets" and those with less financial resources. Any restriction on speech or expression is only incidental and is no more than necessary to achieve the substantial governmental interest of promoting equality of opportunity in political advertising. It bears a clear and reasonable connection with the constitutional objectives set out in Section 26, Article II, Section 4, Article IX-C, and Section 1, Art. XIII of the Constitution. Indeed, to rule otherwise would practically result in an unlimited expenditure for political advertising, which skews the political process and subverts the essence of a truly democratic form of government. 13. PENERA vs. COMELEC GR 181613 November 25, 2009 DOCTRINE: The effective date when partisan political acts become unlawful as to a candidate is when the campaign period starts. Before the start of the campaign period, the same partisan political acts are lawful. Accordingly, a candidate is liable for an election offense only for acts done during the campaign period, not before.

FACTS: On 11 September 2009, the Supreme Court affirmed the COMELEC’s decision to disqualify petitioner Rosalinda Penera (Penera) as mayoralty candidate in Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte, for engaging in election campaign outside the campaign period, in violation of Section 80 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (the Omnibus Election Code).

Penera moved for reconsideration, arguing that she was not yet a candidate at the time of the supposed premature campaigning, since under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436 (the law authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated election system



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for the process of voting, counting of votes, and canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local elections), as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, one is not officially a candidate until the start of the campaign period.

unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period.” The only inescapable and logical result is that the same acts, if done before the start of the campaign period, are lawful.

ISSUE: WON Penera’s disqualification for engaging in premature campaigning should be reconsidered

(D) The Court’s 11 September 2009 Decision also reversed Lanot vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 164858; 16 November 2006). Lanot was decided on the ground that one who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period. This ground was based on the deliberations of the legislators who explained that the early deadline for filing certificates of candidacy under R.A. 8436 was set only to afford time to prepare the machine-readable ballots, and they intended to preserve the existing election periods, such that one who files his certificate of candidacy to meet the early deadline will still not be considered as a candidate.

HELD: Yes. Granting Penera’s motion for reconsideration, the Supreme Court En Banc held that Penera did not engage in premature campaigning and should, thus, not be disqualified as a mayoralty candidate. The Court said –

(A) The Court’s 11 September 2009 Decision (or “the assailed Decision”) considered a person who files a certificate of candidacy already a “candidate” even before the start of the campaign period. This is contrary to the clear intent and letter of Section 15 of Republic Act 8436, as amended, which states that a person who files his certificate of candidacy will only be considered a candidate at the start of the campaign period, and unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of such campaign period. Thus, applying said law: (1) The effective date when partisan political acts become unlawful as to a candidate is when the campaign period starts. Before the start of the campaign period, the same partisan political acts are lawful. (2) Accordingly, a candidate is liable for an election offense only for acts done during the campaign period, not before. In other words, election offenses can be committed by a candidate only upon the start of the campaign period. Before the start of the campaign period, such election offenses cannot be so committed. Since the law is clear, the Court has no recourse but to apply it. The forum for examining the wisdom of the law, and enacting remedial measures, is not the Court but the Legislature. (B) Contrary to the assailed Decision, Section 15 of R.A. 8436, as amended, does not provide that partisan political acts done by a candidate before the campaign period are unlawful, but may be prosecuted only upon the start of the campaign period. Neither does the law state that partisan political acts done by a candidate before the campaign period are temporarily lawful, but becomes unlawful upon the start of the campaign period. Besides, such a law as envisioned in the Decision, which defines a criminal act and curtails freedom of expression and speech, would be void for vagueness. (C) That Section 15 of R.A. 8436 does not expressly state that campaigning before the start of the campaign period is lawful, as the assailed Decision asserted, is of no moment. It is a basic principle of law that any act is lawful unless expressly declared unlawful by law. The mere fact that the law does not declare an act unlawful ipso facto means that the act is lawful. Thus, there is no need for Congress to declare in Section 15 of R.A. 8436 that partisan political activities before the start of the campaign period are lawful. It is sufficient for Congress to state that “any

When Congress amended R.A. 8436, Congress decided to expressly incorporate the Lanot doctrine into law, thus, the provision in Section 15 of R.A. 8436 that a person who files his certificate of candidacy shall be considered a candidate only at the start of the campaign period. Congress wanted to insure that no person filing a certificate of candidacy under the early deadline required by the automated election system would be disqualified or penalized for any partisan political act done before the start of the campaign period. This provision cannot be annulled by the Court except on the sole ground of its unconstitutionality. The assailed Decision, however, did not claim that this provision is unconstitutional. In fact, the assailed Decision considered the entire Section 15 good law. Thus, the Decision was selfcontradictory — reversing Lanot but maintaining the constitutionality of the said provision. 14. QUINTO vs. COMELEC GR 189698 February 22, 2010 DOCTRINE: Any elective or appointive municipal, city, provincial or national official or employee, or those in the civil or military service, including those in government-owned or-controlled corporations, shall be considered automatically resigned upon the filing of certificate of candidacy for a barangay office. FACTS: Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8678, the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No. 8678 provide:

SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy. —a) Any person holding a public appointive office or position including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elective office or position. Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment they file their CoCs, petitioners Eleazar P.

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions in the government and who intend to run in the coming elections, filed the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the declaration of the afore-quoted Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null and void. Petitioners also contend that Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the assailed COMELEC resolution, contains two conflicting provisions. These must be harmonized or reconciled to give effect to both and to arrive at a declaration that they are not ipso facto resigned from their positions upon the filing of their CoCs. ISSUE: WON the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal protection clause HELD: Yes. The second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are declared as unconstitutional.

In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential treatment. In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely: (1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions; (2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It must apply equally to all members of the class. Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law. The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to promote one’s candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence on the electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electoral arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to their office work. If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then the assailed provision cannot be constitutionally rescued on the ground of valid classification. Glaringly absent is the requisite that the classification must be germane to the purposes of the law. Indeed, whether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain. For example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet for that matter, could wield the same influence as


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the Vice-President who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet post. With the fact that they both head executive offices, there is no valid justification to treat them differently when both file their CoCs for the elections. Under the present state of our law, the Vice-President, in the example, running this time, let us say, for President, retains his position during the entire election period and can still use the resources of his office to support his campaign. As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in the discharge of the functions of his appointive office, the inverse could be just as true and compelling. The public officer who files his certificate of candidacy would be driven by a greater impetus for excellent performance to show his fitness for the position aspired for. There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the elective ones. The classification simply fails to meet the test that it should be germane to the purposes of the law. The measure encapsulated in the second proviso of the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in Section 66 of the OEC violates the equal protection clause. 15. AMORA vs. COMELEC GR 192280 Jamuary 25, 2011 FACTS: Petitioner Amora filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Candijay, Bohol. At that time, Amora was the incumbent Mayor of Candijay and had been twice elected to the post in 2007 and in 2007. Olandria, one of the candidates for councilor in the same municipality, filed before the COMELEC a Petition for Disqualification against Amora. Olandria alleged that Amoras COC was not properly sworn contrary to the requirements of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Olandria pointed out that, in executing his COC, Amora merely presented his Community Tax Certificate (CTC) to the notary public, Atty. Oriculo Granada (Atty. Granada), instead of presenting competent evidence of his identity. Consequently, Amoras COC had no force and effect and should be considered as not filed.

Amora countered that: 1. The Petition for Disqualification is actually a Petition to Deny Due Course or cancel a certificate of candidacy. Effectively, the petition of Olandria is filed out of time; 2. Olandrias claim does not constitute a proper ground for the cancellation of the COC; 3. The COC is valid and effective because he (Amora) is personally known to the notary public, Atty. Granada, before whom he took his oath in filing the document; 4. Atty. Granada is, in fact, a close acquaintance since they have been members of the League of Muncipal Mayors, Bohol Chapter, for several years; and 5. Ultimately, he (Amora) sufficiently complied with the requirement that the COC be under oath. The Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition and disqualified Amora from running for Mayor of Candijay, Bohol.



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ISSUE: WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding Olandria's claim that an improperly sworn COC is equivalent to possession of a ground for disqualification

a candidate. Yet, the COMELEC would uphold that petition upon the outlandish claim that it is a petition to disqualify a candidate "for lack of qualifications or possessing some grounds for disqualification."

HELD: The petition is meritorious.

The proper characterization of a petition as one for disqualification under the pertinent provisions of laws cannot be made dependent on the designation, correctly or incorrectly, of a petitioner. The absurd interpretation of Olandria, respondent herein, is not controlling; the COMELEC should have dismissed his petition outright.

In this case, it was grave abuse of discretion to uphold Olandrias claim that an improperly sworn COC is equivalent to possession of a ground for disqualification. Not by any stretch of the imagination can we infer this as an additional ground for disqualification from the specific wording of the Omnibus Eleciton Code in Section 68, which reads: SEC. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having: (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86, and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the elections laws and of Section 40 of the LGC, which provides: SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:

A petition for disqualification relates to the declaration of a candidate as ineligible or lacking in quality or accomplishment fit for the position of mayor. The distinction between a petition for disqualification and the formal requirement in Section 73 of the OEC that a COC be under oath is not simply a question of semantics as the statutes list the grounds for the disqualification of a candidate. To emphasize, a petition for disqualification on the one hand, can be premised on Section 12 or 68 of the OEC, or Section 40 of the LGC. On the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only be grounded on a statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is false. The petitions also have different effects. While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC Another red flag for the COMELEC to dismiss Olandrias petition is the fact that Amora claims to personally know the notary public, Atty. Granada, before whom his COC was sworn. In this regard, the dissenting opinion of Commissioner Larrazabal aptly disposes of the core issue. He said that accordind to the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;

Section 2. Affirmation or Oath. The term "Affirmation" or "Oath" refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion:

(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;

(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and

(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;

(a) appears in person before the notary public;

(c) avows under penalty of law to the whole truth of the contents of the instrument or document.

(d) Those with dual citizenship; (e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad; (f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and (g) The insane or feeble-minded. It is quite obvious that the Olandria petition is not based on any of the grounds for disqualification as enumerated in the foregoing statutory provisions. Nowhere therein does it specify that a defective notarization is a ground for the disqualification of

Therefore, competent evidence of identity is not required in cases where the affiant is personally known to the Notary Public, which is the case herein. In this case, contrary to the declarations of the COMELEC, Amora complied with the requirement of a sworn COC. He readily explained that he and Atty. Granada personally knew each other; they were not just colleagues at the League of Municipal Mayors, Bohol Chapter, but they consider each other as distant relatives. Thus, the alleged defect in the oath was not proven by Olandria since the presentation of a CTC turned out to be sufficient in this instance.

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW The ruling herein does not do away with the formal requirement that a COC be sworn. In fact, we emphasize that the filing of a COC is mandatory and must comply with the requirements set forth by law. 16. TAGOLINO vs. HRET GR 202202 March 19, 2013 FACTS: On November 30, 2009, Richard Gomez (Richard) filed his certificate of candidacy (CoC) with COMELEC, seeking congressional office as Representative for the 4th Legislative District of Leyte. Subsequently, one of the opposing candidates, Buenaventura Juntilla (Juntilla), filed a Verified Petition, alleging that Richard, misrepresented in his CoC that he resided in Canadieng, Ormoc City. In this regard, Juntilla asserted that Richard failed to meet the one (1) year residency requirement and thus should be declared disqualified/ineligible to run for the said office. In addition, Juntilla prayed that Richard's CoC be denied due course and/or cancelled.


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course to and/or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78. The distinctions between the two are wellperceived.Primarily, a disqualification case under Section 68 of the OEC is hinged on either: (a) a candidate's possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country; or (b) his or her commission of certain acts of disqualification. It must be stressed that one who is disqualified under Section 68 is still technically considered to have been a candidate, albeit proscribed to continue as such only because of supervening infractions which do not, however, deny his or her statutory eligibility. In other words, while the candidate's compliance with the eligibility requirements as prescribed by law, such as age, residency, and citizenship, is not in question, he or she is, however, ordered to discontinue such candidacy as a form of penal sanction brought about by the commission of the abovementioned election offenses.

The COMELEC First Division rendered a Resolution 6 granting Juntilla's petition without any qualification.Aggrieved, Richard moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by theCOMELEC En Banc through a Resolution.

On the other hand, a denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC proceeding under Section 78 of the OEC 36 is premised on a person's misrepresentation of any of the material qualifications required for the elective office aspired for. It is not enough that a person lacks the relevant qualification; he or she must have also made a false representation of the same in the CoC.

Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez (private respondent) filed her CoC together with a Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance from the Liberal Party endorsing her as the party's official substitute candidate vice her husband, Richard, for the same congressional post. The COMELEC En Banc, in the exercise of its administrative functions, issued Resolution allowing the substitution of private respondent.

Pertinently, while a disqualified candidate under Section 68 is still considered to have been a candidate for all intents and purposes, on the other hand, a person whose CoC had been denied due course to and/or cancelled under Section 78 is deemed to have not been a candidate at all. The reason being is that a cancelled CoC is considered void ab initio and thus, cannot give rise to a valid candidacy and necessarily, to valid votes.

Pending resolution of Juntilla's motion, the national and local elections were conducted as scheduled on May 10, 2010. During the elections, Richard, whose name remained on the ballots, garnered 101,250 votes while his opponents, namely, Eufrocino Codilla, Jr. and herein petitioner Silverio Tagolino, obtained 76,549 and 493 votes, respectively. In view of the aforementioned substitution, Richard's votes were credited in favor of private respondent and as a result, she was proclaimed the duly-elected Representative of the Fourth District of Leyte.

Section 77 of the OEC provides that if an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, a person belonging to and certified by the same political party may file a CoC to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. — If after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. Evidently, Section 77 requires that there be an "official candidate" before candidate substitution proceeds. Thus, whether the ground for substitution is death, withdraw al or disqualification of a candidate, the said section unequivocally states that only an official candidate of a registered or accredited party may be substituted.

On May 24, 2010, petitioner filed a Petition 15 for quo warranto before the HRET in order to oust private respondent from her congressional seat, claiming thatshe did not validly substitute Richard as his CoC was void ab initio. After due proceedings, the HRET issued the assailed decision which dismissed the quo warranto petition and upheld the validity of private respondent's CoC due to petitioner's failure to controvert her claim that she was personally known to the notary public who notarized her CoC. ISSUES: WON the substitution of respondent is valid HELD: The petition is meritorious. The Omnibus Election Code (OEC) provides for certain remedies to assail a candidate's bid for public office. Among these which obtain particular significance to this case are: (1) a petition for disqualification under Section 68; and (2) apetition to deny due

Considering that Section 77 requires that there be a candidate in order for substitution to take place, as well as the precept that a person without a valid CoC is not considered as a candidate at all, it necessarily follows that if a person's CoC had been denied due course to and/or cancelled, he or she cannot be validly substituted in the electoral process. The existence of a valid CoC is therefore a condition sine qua non for a disqualified candidate to be validly substituted. Accordingly, given Richard's non-compliance with the one year residency requirement, it cannot be mistaken that the COMELEC First Division's unqualified grant of Juntilla's "Verified Petition to



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Disqualify Candidate for Lack of Qualification" — which prayed that the COMELEC declare Richard "DISQUALIFIED and INELIGIBLE from seeking the office of Member of the House of Representatives and that thus Certificate of Candidacybe DENIED DUE COURSE and/or CANCELLED" — carried with it the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of Richard's CoC pursuant to Section 78.

precisely why she withdrew her COC upon learning she was not qualified.

In view of the foregoing rulings, the COMELEC En Banc direly misconstrued the COMELEC First Division's February 17, 2010 Resolution when it adopted the Law Department's finding that Richard was only "disqualified" and that his CoC was not denied due course to and/or cancelled, paving the way for the approval of private respondent's substitution. It overlooked the fact that the COMELEC First Division's ruling encompassed the cancellation of Richard's CoC and in consequence, disallowed the substitution of private respondent. It was therefore grave and serious error on the part of the COMELEC En Banc to have approved private respondent's substitution.

HELD: Yes. Under Sec 78, BP 881 Comelec has the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of COCs. It has no discretion to give or not give due course to COCs. While it may look into patent defects in the COCs, it may not go into matters not appearing on their face. The question of eligibility of a candidate is beyond the usual and proper cognizance of Comelec.

17. CERAFICA vs. COMELEC GR 206136 December 2, 2014 DOCTRINE : Substitution should be upheld. Olivia complied with all the requirements. First, there was withdrawal of Kimberly’s COC after the deadline of filing COCs. Second, Olivia belongs to, and is certified by, the same political party as Kimberly’s. Third, Olivia filed her COC not later than mid-day of the day of the election. FACTS: October 1, 2012 Kimberly Da Silva Cerafica filed her COC for Councilor, City of Taguig for the 2013 Elections. Her COC stated that she was born October 29, 1992 or that she was 20 years of age on the day of the elections in contravention of the requirement that one must be at least 23 years of age on the day of elections as stated in in Sec 9, RA 8487 (Charter of the City of Taguig). Kimberly was summoned to a clarificatory hearing due to the age qualification, but instead, Kimberly filed a sworn Statement of Withdrawal of COC. Simultaneously, December 18, 2012 Olivia filed her COC as a substitute of Kimberly.

Director Esmeralda Amora-Ladra of Comelec Law Department recommended the cancellation of Kimberly’s COC, and consequently, the denial of the substitution of Kimberly by Olivia. Under Comelec Resolution 9551, it was as if no COC was filed by Kimberly, thus, she cannot be substituted. In a Special En Banc Meeting of Comelec, Kimberly’s COC was cancelled and substitution by Olivia was denied as recommended by Dir. Amora-Ladra. Olivia the filed a Petition for Certiorari Comelec contended that Olivia cannot substitute Kimberly as the latter was never an official candidate because she was not eligible because of her age and that the COC Kimberly filed was invalid on ground of material representation relating to her eligibility. On the other hand, Olivia contend that although Kimberly may not be qualified to run because of her age, it cannot be denied that she still filed a valid COC and was an official candidate who may be substituted. There was no ground to cancel and deny Kimberly’s COC on ground of lack of qualification and material representation because she did not misrepresent her birth date to qualify as councillor and there was no deliberate attempt to mislead the electorate, which was

ISSUE: Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in the cancellation of Kimberly’s COC and denial of substitution by Olivia

Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) provides for the procedure of substitution of candidates, to wit: Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. – If after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned may file his certificate of candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the preceding sections not later than mid-day of election day of the election. Olivia complied with all the requirements. First, there was withdrawal of Kimberly’s COC, after the deadline of filing COCs. Second, Olivia belongs to, and is certified by, the same political party as Kimberly’s. Third, Olivia filed her COC not later than mid-day of the day of the election. In the case at bar, Kimberly was an official nominee of the Liberal Party, thus, she can be validly substituted. Moreover, in simply relying on the Memorandum of Dir AmoraLadra and absent any petition to deny due course to cancel the COC, the Court finds Comelec once more gravely abused its discreyion. The Court reminds Comelec that, in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers, the Constitution mandates it to hear and decide cases first by Division and, upon motion for reconsideration, by En Banc. 18. ARATEA v COMELEC GR 195229 October 9, 2012 DOCTRINE: An ineligible candidate is not considered a candidate at all. A void Certificate of Candidacy (COC) cannot produce any legal effect. All the votes for the ineligible candidate are stray votes. The candidate who obtained the highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates is not a second placer. He is technically a first-placer since the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determining the winner of an election. FACTS: Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida) and Estela D. Antipolo (Antipolo) were candidates for Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010 National and Local Elections. Dra. Sigrid S. Rodolfo (Rodolfo) filed apetition under Section 78 of the Omnibus

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW Election Code to disqualify Lonzanida and to deny due course or to cancel Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that Lonzanida was elected, and had served, as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for four (4) consecutive terms immediately prior to the term for the May 2010 elections. Rodolfo asserted that Lonzanida made a false material representation in his certificate of candidacy when Lonzanida certified under oath that he was eligible for the office he sought election. Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code both prohibit a local elective official from being elected and serving for more than three consecutive terms for the same position. The COMELEC Second Division rendered a Resolution on 18 February 2010 cancelling Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy. Lonzanida’s motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc remained pending during the May 2010 elections. Lonzanida and Efren Racel Aratea (Aratea) garnered the highest number of votes and were respectively proclaimed Mayor and Vice-Mayor. Aratea took his oath of office as Acting Mayor. On 11 August 2010, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution disqualifying Lonzanida from running for Mayor in the May 2010 elections. The COMELEC En Banc’s resolution was based on two grounds: first, Lonzanida had been elected and had served as Mayor for more than three consecutive terms without interruption; and second, Lonzanida had been convicted by final judgment of 10 counts of falsification under the Revised Penal Code. The judgment of conviction became final on 23 October 2009 in the Decision of this Court in Lonzanida v. People, before Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009. The manner of filling up the permanent vacancy in the Office of the Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales is dependent upon the determination of Lonzanida’s removal. Whether Lonzanida was disqualified under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, or made a false material representation under Section 78 of the same Code that resulted in his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio, is determinative of whether Aratea or Antipolo is the rightful occupant to the Office of the Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. ISSUE: WON Lozanida’s removal is based on Section 78 HELD: YES. Antipolo, the alleged "second placer," should be proclaimed Mayor because Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy was void ab initio. In short, Lonzanida was never a candidate at all. All votes for Lonzanida were stray votes. Thus, Antipolo, the only qualified candidate, actually garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Mayor.

A petition for disqualification under Section 68 clearly refers to "the commission of prohibited acts and possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country." All the offenses mentioned in Section 68 refer to election offenses under the Omnibus Election Code, not to violations of other penal laws. There is absolutely nothing in the language of Section 68 that would justify, including violation of the threeterm limit rule, or conviction by final judgment of the crime of falsification under the Revised Penal Code, as one of the grounds or offenses covered under Section 68.


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On the other hand, Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code states that a certificate of candidacy may be denied or cancelled when there is false material representation of the contents of the certificate of candidacy. The conviction of Lonzanida by final judgment, with the penalty of prisión mayor, disqualifies him perpetually from holding any public office, or from being elected to any public office. This perpetual disqualification took effect upon the finality of the judgment of conviction, before Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy. A cancelled certificate of candidacy is void ab initio and cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes. As the Comelec stated in their February 2011 Resolution: Since Lonzanida was never a candidate for the position of Mayor [of] San Antonio, Zambales, the votes cast for him should be considered stray votes. Consequently, Intervenor Antipolo, who remains as the sole qualified candidate for the mayoralty post and obtained the highest number of votes, should now be proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. Whether his certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial because the cancellation on such ground means he was never a candidate from the very beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. 19. ABCEDE vs. IMPERIAL 103 Phil 136 FACTS: Alfredo Abcede was a candidate for senator in 1953, again in 1955, in both of which his votes were nil. Prior to September 7, 1957, petitioner Alfredo Abcede filed his certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC for the Office of the President of the Philippines, in connection with the elections to be held on November 12 of the same year, with the redemption of the Japanese war notes as his main program of government.

On or about said date, Abcede and other candidates were summoned by the Commission on Elections to appear before them on September 23, 1957, "to show cause why their certificates of candidacy should be considered as filed in good faith and to be given due course," with the admonition that their failure to so appear would be sufficient ground for the Commission to consider said certificates of candidacy as not filed in good faith and not to give due course thereto. It is of record that the Bureau of Posts banned from the use of the Philippine mail matter of whatever class mailed by, or addressed to, the Japanese War Notes Claims Association of the Philippines, Inc., and its agent and representatives, including Alfredo Abcede and Marciana Mesina-Abcede. Such order was based on the findings of the Securities and Exchange Commission, confirmed by the Secretary of Justice that said entity aid its agents and representatives, including Alfredo Abcede. They are engaged in a scheme to obtain money from the public by means of false or fraudulent pretenses. The Commission is convinced that the certificate of candidacy of Alfredo Abcede was filed for motives other than a bona fide desire to obtain a substantial number of votes of the electorate.

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW COMELEC issued a resolution dated October 4, 1957, ordering that the certificates of candidacy "shall not be given due course" due to the following reasons: a. The Commission believes that while Section 37 of the Revised Election Code imposes upon the commission the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge certificates of candidacy, the law leaves to the Commission a measure of discretion on whether to give due course to a particular certificate of candidacy should it find said certificate of candidacy to have been filed not bona fide. We also believe that a certificate of candidacy is not bona fide when it is filed, as a matter of caprice or fancy, by a person who is incapable of understanding the full meaning of his acts and the true significance of election and without any political organization or visible supporters behind him so that he, has not even the tiniest chance to obtain the favorable indorsement of a substantial portion of the electorate, or when the one who files the same exerts no tangible effort, shown by overt acts, to pursue to a semblance of success his candidacy. b. The law requires the certificate of candidacy to be under oath in acknowledgment of its serious character as an indispensable segment in the process of election, the first step that a citizen has to take in seeking public trust and in avoiding service to the common weal. It is a solemn matter, not to be taken lightly. c. The giving due course to a certificate of candidacy is a process of no mean proportion, particularly for the offices of President and Vice President of the Philippines and Senator which involve the printing at public expense of around 136,000 copies of each certificate of candidacy; the printing of the names of the candidates in several election forms; the mailing, sorting, and distribution of the copies of said certificates of candidacy and forms among the 34,000 polling places throughout the country; the entering of the names of the candidates by the board of inspectors in still other forms; etc. Considering all these, the Commission is satisfied with the view that Congress could not have meant to make as a ministerial duty of the Commission to give due course to every certificate of candidacy, no matter how senseless said certificate of candidacy may be, thus in effect authorizing a meaningless expenditure of a considerable amount of public funds, and in the process put added routinary burden on the already heavily burdened election machinery, as well as shear off the election much of its dignity as a solemn process of democracy.


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qualifications are, therefore, deemed legally fit, at least, to aspire to such office and to run therefor, provided that they file their respective certificates of candidacy within the time, at the place and in the manner provided by law, and petitioner herein has done so. Lastly, as the branch of the executive department — although independent of the President — to which the Constitution has given the "exclusive charge" of the "enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections," the power of decision of the Commission is limited to purely "administrative questions."(Article X, sec. 2, Constitution of the Philippines.) It has no authority to decide matters "involving the right to vote". It may not even pass upon the legality of a given vote. The question whether a candidate must be capable of "understanding the full meaning of his acts and the true significance of election," and must have — is a matter of policy, not of administration and enforcement of the law, which policy must be determined by Congress in the exercise of its legislative functions. Section 36 of the Revised Election Code provides that 96 certificates of candidacy of candidates for President . . . shall be filed with the Commission on Elections which shall order the preparation and distribution of copies for the same to all the election precincts of the Philippines. . . . Moreover, pursuant to section 37 of said Code: “The Commission on Election, the secretary of the provincial board, and the municipal secretary, in their respective cases, shall have the ministerial duty to receive the certificates of candidacy referred to in the preceding section and to immediately acknowledge receipt thereof.” The foregoing provisions give the Commission no discretion to give or not to give due course to petitioner's certificate of candidacy. On the contrary, the Commission has, admittedly, the "ministerial" duty to receive said certificate of candidacy. Moreover, in the words of section 37, the Commission "shall immediately send copies" of said certificates to the secretaries of the provincial boards. The compulsory nature of this requirement, evinced by the imperative character generally attached to the term "shall", is stressed by the peremptory connotation of the adverb "immediately."

A reconsideration of such resolution was also denied. Abcede filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and mandamus, praying that the resolution be annulled and that his certificate of candidacy be given due course. ISSUE: WON the COMELEC erred in declaring that the certificates of candidacy of petitioner was not made in good faith HELD: YES. The action of the Commission as regards petitioner's certificate of candidacy is beyond the bounds of its jurisdiction and hence, void.

The Constitution fixes the qualifications for the office of the highest magistrate of the land. All possessors of such

In this particular case, however, the action of the Commission as regards petitioner's certificate of candidacy is beyond the bounds of its jurisdiction, and, hence, void. 20. LORETO-GO vs. COMELEC GR 147741 May 10, 2001 Doctrine: There is nothing in Section 73, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, which mandates that the affidavit of withdrawal must be filed with the same office where the certificate of candidacy to be withdrawn was filed. FACTS: Petitioner Catalina Go, who was then incumbent 5 th District Representative of Leyte, seeks to nullify the COMELEC Resolution

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW declaring her disqualified to run for governor of Leyte and mayor of Baybay, Leyte because she filed certificates of candidacy for both positions and when she withdrew her certificate of candidacy for mayor, she was late by twenty eight minutes from the deadline. Petitioner was late because when she first filed her affidavit of withdrawal before the provincial election supervisor of Leyte, the latter refused to accept the same because, as he claimed, the affidavit must be filed with the office of the municipal election officer of Baybay, Leyte, where petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for mayor. ISSUE: WON affidavit of withdrawal must be filed with the election officer of the place where the certificate of candidacy was filed HELD: No. The Court GRANTED the petition and annulled respondent Comelec’s Resolution since there is nothing in Section 73, Batas PambansaBlg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, which mandates that the affidavit of withdrawal must be filed with the same office where the certificate of candidacy to be withdrawn was filed. Thus, it can be filed directly with the main office of the COMELEC, the office of the regional election director concerned, the office of the provincial election supervisor of the province to which the municipality involved belongs, or the office of the municipal election officer of the said municipality. While it may be true that Section 12 of COMELEC Resolution No. 3253-A, adopted on 20 November 2000, requires that the withdrawal be filed before the election officer of the place where the certificate of candidacy was filed, such requirement is merely directory, and is intended for convenience. It is not mandatory or jurisdictional. An administrative resolution cannot contradict, much less amend or repeal a law, or supply a deficiency in the law. Hence, the filing of petitioner's affidavit of withdrawal of candidacy for mayor of Baybay with the provincial election supervisor of Leyte is deemed substantial compliance to effectively withdraw such candidacy. The COMELEC thus acted with grave abuse of discretion when it declared petitioner ineligible for both positions for which she filed certificates of candidacy. 21. ROMEO JALOSJOS vs. COMELEC GR 205033 September 10, 2013 DOCTRINE: It is the COMELEC's duty to cancel motu proprio the candidate's CoC, notwithstanding the absence of any petition initiating a quasi-judicial proceeding for the resolution of the same. Even without a petition, the COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final judgment of convicti on. FACTS: Petitioner was convicted by final judgement of two (2) counts of statutory rape and six (6) counts of acts of lasciviousness and was consequently sentenced to suffer the principal penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal. Then President Gloria Arroyo issued an order commut ing his prison term to 16 years, 3 months, and 3 days and was eventually released from prison.

Petitioner applied to register as a voter in Zamboanga City. However, because of his previous conviction, his application was denied by the Acting City Election Officer of the Election Registration Board (ERB), prompting him to file a Petition for Inclusion in the Permanent List of Voters (Petition for Inclusion)


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before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Zamboanga City. Pending resolution, he filed a CoC seeking to run as mayor for Zamboanga City. In his CoC, petitioner stated, inter alia, that he is eligible for the said office and that he is a registered voter of Barangay Tetuan, Zamboanga City. MTCC denied his Petition for Inclusion on account of his perpetual absolute disqualification which in effect, deprived him of the right to vote in any election. Such denial was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Branch 14 (RTC)Five (5) petitions were lodged before the COMELEC's First and Second Divisions (COMELEC Divisions), praying for the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of petitioner's CoC. COMELEC En Banc issued motu proprio Resolution to CANCEL and DENY due course the Certificate of Candidacy filed by Romeo G. Jalosjos as Mayor of Zamboanga City in the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections" due to his perpetual absolute disqualification as well as his failure to comply with the voter registration requirement. Petitioner claims that the COMELEC En Banc usurped the COMELEC Divisions' jurisdiction by cancelling motu proprio petitioner's CoC through Resolution No. 9613, contrary to Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution): “All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.” ISSUES: WON the COMELEC En Banc acted beyond its jurisdiction when it issued motuproprioResolutionin so doing, violated petitioner's right to due process; HELD: SC is not persuaded. The constitutional provision requiring a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc may take action is confined only to cases where the COMELEC exercises its quasi-judicial power. It finds no application, however, in matters concerning the COMELEC's exercise of administrative functions.

The distinction is well defined in the case of Villarosa vs. COMELEC: “[T]he term 'administrative' connotes, or pertains, to 'administration, especially management, as by managing or conducting, directing or superintending, the execution, application, or conduct of persons or things. It does not entail an opportunity to be heard, the production and weighing of evidence, and a decision or resolution thereon. While a 'quasi judicial function' is a term which applies to the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.” Accordingly, in such a situation, it is the COMELEC's duty to cancel motu proprio the candidate's CoC, notwithstanding the absence of any petition initiating a quasi-judicial proceeding for the resolution of the same. Even without a petition, the COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction. COMELEC En Banc did not exercise its quasi-judicial functions when it issued Resolution No. 9613 asit did not assume

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW jurisdiction over any pending petition or resolve any election case before it or any of its divisions. Rather, it merely performed its duty to enforce and administer election laws in cancelling petitioner's CoC on the basis of his perpetual absolute disqualification, the fact of which had already been established by his final conviction. In this regard, the COMELEC En Banc was exercising its administrative functions, dispensing with the need for a motion for reconsideration of a division ruling under Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the same being required only in quasi-judicial proceedings. 22. TIMBOL vs. COMELEC GR 206004 February 24, 2015 DOCTRINE: The power of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to restrict a citizen's right of suffrage should not be arbitrarily exercised. The COMELEC cannot motuproprio deny due course to or cancel an alleged nuisance candidate's certificate of candidacy without providing the candidate his opportunity to be heard. FACTS: Petitioner filed a CoC for the position of Member of the SangguniangPanglungsod of the 2 nd District of Caloocan City. He was subsequently sent a subpoena to attend a clarificatory hearing in connection with his CoC. During the hearing, he contended that he was not a nuisance candidate and that he had sufficient resources to sustain his campaign. He pointed out that his name already appeared in the list of nuisance candidates posted in the COMELEC website pursuant to Resolution No. 9610 dated January 11, 2013. The hearing panel allegedly assured him that his name would be deleted from the list and that his Certificate of Candidacy would be given due course.

However, his name was not deleted from the list. With the printing of ballots for the automated elections set, Timbol filed a Petition praying that his name be included in the certified list of candidates for the May 13, 2013 elections. The COMELEC denied his petition for being moot. According to Timbol, the COMELEC deprived him of due process of law when he was declared a nuisance candidate even before Election Officer Valencia conducted the clarificatory hearing.He prayed for a preliminary mandatory injunction ordering the COMELEC to include his name in the certified list of candidates. The COMELEC argued that the Petition was already moot and academic, considering that the May 13, 2013 elections had already been conducted. Even assuming that the Petition was not moot and academic, the COMELEC maintained that it did not gravely abuse its discretion. Contrary to Timbol's argument, he was given an opportunity to be heard when Election Officer Valencia heard him during the clarificatory hearing. He even admitted that he attended the clarificatory hearing with his counsel.


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declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.” We may no longer act on petitioner's prayer that his name be included in the certified list of candidates and be printed on the ballots as a candidate for Member of the SangguniangPanlungsod. Petitioner filed with this court his Petition for Certiorari on March 15, 2013, 39 days after respondent began printing the ballots on February 4, 2013. Also, the May 13, 2013 elections had been concluded, with the winners already proclaimed. 2. Yes; Respondent declared petitioner a nuisance candidate without giving him a chance to explain his bona fide intention to run for office. Respondent had already issued Resolution No. 9610 on January 11, 2013 when petitioner appeared before Election Officer Valencia in a clarificatory hearing on January 17, 2013. This was an ineffective opportunity to be heard. To minimize the logistical confusion caused by nuisance candidates, their certificates of candidacy may be denied due course or cancelled by respondent. This denial or cancellation may be "motuproprio or upon a verified petition of an interested party,subject to an opportunity to be heard.The opportunity to be heard is a chance to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. In election cases, due process requirements are satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. 23. MARTINEZ vs. HRET GR189034 January 12, 2010 DOCTRINE: The prohibition against nuisance candidates is aimed at precisely at preventing uncertainty and confusion is ascertaining the true will of the electorate. Thus, in certain situations, final judgments declaring a nuisance candidate should effectively cancel the certificate of candidacy filed by such candidate as of election day. Otherwise, potential nuisance candidates will continue to put the electoral process into mockery by filing certificates of candidacy at the last minute and delaying resolution of any petition to declare them as nuisance candidates, until elections are held and the votes counted and canvassed. FACTS: In the May 14, 2007 elections, petitioner Celestino Martinez and private respondent Salimbangon were among the candidates for Representative in the 4 th Legislative District of Cebu. On Mar. 29, 2007, Edilito Martinez, a resident of Cebu, filed his COC for the same position.

Celestino filed a petition to declare Edilito a nuisance candidate. However, the Comelec Second Division issued its Resolution declaring Edilito a nuisance candidate only on June 12, 2007 or almost 1 month after the elections.

ISSUES: 1. WON this case is moot and academic 2. WON respondent COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner Timbol's Petition for inclusion in the certified list of candidates.

Salimbangon was proclaimed winner in the congressional elections on the basis of official results showing that he garned 67,277 votes as against Celestino who garnered 67,173 votes, or a difference of 104 votes.

HELD: 1. Yes; a case is moot and academic if it "ceases to present a justiciable controversy because of supervening events so that a

Celestino filed an election protest Ad Cautelam and the HRET granted his motion to convert the same into a regular protest of all 1,129 precincts of 4 th legislative district of Cebu. The election

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW protest is based on 300 ballots more or less with only “Martinez” or “C. Martinez” written on the line for representative which the BEI did not count for Celestino on the ground Edilito, another congressional candidate, had the same surname.Celestino further alleged that fake and unofficial ballots were counted in favor of Salimbangon. During the revision, ballots with only “Martinez” or “C. Martinez” written were not counted which comprised majority of the 9,831 stray ballots. HRET sustained the BEI in considering the ballots as stray. ISSUE: What is the legal effect of declaring a nuisance candidate as such in a final judgment after the elections? HELD: In controversies pertaining to nuisance candidates, the law contemplates the likelihood of confusion which the similarity of surnames of 2 candidates may generate. A nuisance candidate is thus defined as one who, based on the attendant circumstances, has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed, his sole purpose being the reduction of the votes of a strong candidate, upon the expectation that ballots with only the surname of such candidate will be considered stray and not counted for either of them.

The pendency of proceedings against a nuisance candidate on election day inevitably exposes the bona fide candidate to the confusion over the similarity of names that affects the voter's will and frustrates the same. Undeniably, the adverse effect on the voter’s will was present in this case considering the substantial number of ballots with only “Martinez” or “C. Martinez” which have been declared as stray votes, the invalidated ballots being more than sufficient to overcome Salimbangon’s lead of only 453 votes after the recount. The inclusion of nuisance candidates turns the electoral exercise into an uneven playing field where the bona fide candidate is faced with the prospect of having a significant number of votes cast for him invalidated as stray votes by the mere presence of another candidate with a similar surname. Any delay on the part of the COMELEC increases the probability of votes lost in this manner. Edilito clearly indicated lack of serious intent to run for the position for which he filed his certificate of candidacy, foremost of which is his sudden absence after such filing. He did not even campaign nor formally launch his candidacy. Celestino should not be prejudiced by COMELEC's inefficiency. The similarity of Edilito’s surname with that of Celestino was meant to cause confusion among the voters and spoil petitioner's chances of winning the congressional race. Had the Commission timely resolved the petition to declare Edilito C. Martinez a nuisance candidate, all such ballots with "MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" would have been counted in favor of petitioner and not considered stray. Respondent HRET gravely abused its discretion in affirming the proclamation of respondent Salimbangon as the duly elected Representative despite the nal outcome of revision showing 5,401 ballots with only "MARTINEZ" or "C. "MARTINEZ" written on the line for Representative, votes which should have been


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properly counted in favor of petitioner and not nullified as stray votes. The prohibition against nuisance candidates is aimed precisely at preventing uncertainty and confusion in ascertaining the true will of the electorate. Thus, in certain situations, as in the case at bar, final judgments declaring a nuisance candidate should effectively cancel the certificate of candidacy filed by such candidate as of election day. Otherwise, potential nuisance candidates will continue to put the electoral process into mockery by filing certificate of candidacy at the last minute and delaying resolution of any petition to declare them as nuisance candidates until elections are held and the votes counted and canvassed. Wherefore, the ballots indicating only the similar surname of two (2) candidates for the same position may, in appropriate cases, be counted in favor of the bona fide candidate and not considered stray, even if the other candidate was declared a nuisance candidate by final judgment after the elections. 24. VILLAFUERTE vs. COMELEC GR 206698 February 25, 2014 DOCTRINE: Section 78 states that the false representation in the contents of the COC required under Section 74 must refer to material matters in order to justify the cancellation of the COC. Material representation under the Omnibus Election Code refers to “qualifications for the elective office”, e.g., residency, age, citizenship or any other legal qualification necessary to run for local elective office as provided in the Local Government Code, coupled with a showing that there was an intent to deceive the electorate. The candidate’s nickname does not pertain to his eligibility or qualification for office, and cannot be considered a material misrepresentation. FACTS: Luis Villafuerte and Miguel Villafuertewere both candidates for the Gubernatorial position of the Province of Camarines Sur in the May 13, 2013 local and nati onal elections.

On October 25, 2012, petitioner filed with the COMELEC a Verified Petition to deny due course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy (COC) of respondent, alleging that respondent intentionally and materially misrepresented a false and deceptive name/nickname that would mislead the voters when he declared under oath in his COC that "L-RAY JR.-MIGZ" was his nickname and that the name he intended to appear on the official ballot was VILLAFUERTE, L-RAY JR.-MIGZ NP; that respondent deliberately omitted his first name "MIGUEL" and inserted, instead "LRAY JR.," which is the nickname of his father, the incumbent Governor of Camarines Sur, "LRay Villafuerte, Jr." Respondent denied the commission of any material misrepresentation and asserted, among others, that he had been using the nickname "LRAY JR. MIGZ" and not only "MIGZ"; that the choice of name/word to appear on the ballot was solely his choice or preference; and that the presumption that the voters would be confused on the simple fact that his name would be placed first in the ballot was misplaced. COMELEC's First Division denied the petition for lack of merit. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc, which denied the same.

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ISSUE: WON respondent committed a material misrepresentation under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code so as to justify the cancellation of his COC. HELD: Section 74 thereof enumerates the contents of the COC: Contents of certificate of candidacy. – The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.

Unless a candidate has officially changed his name through a court approved proceeding, a certificate shall use in a certificate of candidacy the name by which he has been baptized, or if has not been baptized in any church or religion, the name registered in the office of the local civil registrar or any other name allowed under the provisions of existing law or, in the case of a Muslim, his Hadji name after performing the prescribed religious pilgrimage: Provided, He may also include one nickname or stage name by which he is generally or popularly known in the locality. Clearly, Section 78 states that the false representation in the contents of the COC required under Section 74 must refer to material matters in order to justify the cancellation of the COC. The material misrepresentation contemplated by Section 78 of the Code refers to qualifications for elective office. Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation must consist of a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." In other words, it must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one’s qualifications for public office. Clearly, for the petition to deny due course or cancel the COC of one candidate to prosper, the candidate must have made a material misrepresentation involving his eligibility or qualification for the office to which he seeks election, such as the requisite residency, age, citizenship or any other legal qualification necessary to run for local elective office as provided in the Local Government Code. Hence, petitioner’s allegation that respondent’s nickname "LRAY JR. MIGZ" written in his COC is a material misrepresentation is devoid of merit. Respondent's nickname written in the COC cannot be considered a material fact which pertains to his eligibility and thus qualification to run for public office, and there is no substantial evidence showing that in writing the nickname "LRAY JR. MIGZ" in his COC, respondent had the intention to deceive the voters as to his identity which has an effect on his eligibility or qualification for the office he seeks to assume.


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Notably, respondent is known to the voters of the Province of Camarines Sur as the son of the then incumbent Governor of the province, popularly known as "LRay." Their relationship is shown by the posters, streamers and billboards displayed in the province with the faces of both the father and son on them. 25. HAYUDINI vs. COMELEC GR 207900 April 22, 2014 DOCTRINE: One of the requirements for a mayoralty candidate is that he must be a resident of the city or municipality where he intends to be elected. FACTS: Hayudini filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Municipal Mayor of South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi. Ten days after, Omar filed a Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel the certificate of Hayudini, asserting that Hayudini should be disqualified for making false representation regarding his residence. He claimed that Hayudini declared that he is a resident of the Municipality of South Ubian when, in fact, he resides in Zamboanga City. Hayudini won the mayoralty race in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi. He was proclaimed and, consequently, took his oath of office.However, the COMELEC issued a Resolution granting Omar’s second petition to cancel Hayudini's Certificate of Candidacy. Thus, Hayudini filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition. ISSUE: WON Hayudini was a candidate for the position of mayor HELD: No. It bears stressing that one of the requirements for a mayoralty candidate is that he must be a resident of the city or municipality where he intends to be elected. Thus, under Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code, it is required that a candidate must certify under oath that he is eligible for the public office he seeks election. In this case, when petitioner stated in his Certificate of Candidacy that he is a resident of Barangay Bintawlan, South Ubian, Tawi Tawi and eligible for a public office, but it turned out that he was declared to be a non-resident thereof in a petition for his inclusion in the list of registered voters, he therefore committed a false representation in his Certificate of Candidacy which pertained to a material fact which is a ground for the cancellation of his Certificate of Candidacy under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Whether a certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial, because the cancellation on such ground means he was never a candidate from the very beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. We then found that since the winning mayoralty candidate's certificate of candidacy was void ab initio, he was never a candidate at all and all his votes were considered stray votes, and thus, proclaimed the second placer, the only qualified candidate, who actually garnered the highest number of votes, for the position of Mayor. 26. JALOVER vs. OSMENA GR 209286 September 23, 2014 DOCTRINE: To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with conduct indicative of this intention. It

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW requires not only such bodily presence in that placebut also a declared and probable intent to make it one’s fixed and permanent place of abode. In a choice between provisions on material qualifications of elected officials, on the one hand, and the will of the electorate in any given locality, on the other, the Court believes and so hold that it cannot choose the electorate’s will. FACTS: On October 3, 2012, Osmeña filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of mayor, Toledo City, Cebu. In his COC, Osmeña indicated that he had been a resident of Toledo City for 15 years prior to the May 2013 elections.

Soon thereafter, the petitioners filed before the COMELEC a "Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and to Disqualify a Candidate for Possessing Some Grounds for Disqualification." The petitioners alleged before the COMELEC that Osmeña made material misrepresentations of fact in the latter’s COC and likewise failed to comply with the residency requirement under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code. In particular, the petitioners claimed that Osmeña falsely declared under oath in his COC that he had already been a resident of Toledo City 15 years prior to the scheduled May 13, 2013 local elections. In his defense, Osmeña argued that even prior to his actual transfer of residence to Ibo, Toledo City, in 2004, he had been able to establish ties with Toledo City in view of his family’s business interests and his political linkages. According to Osmeña, in 1995, he bought a piece of land in Ibo, Toledo City, where he built two (2) houses from 1998 to 2002 and became a permanent resident thereof in 2004. Osmeña further averred that he became a registered voter of Toledo City in 2006 and that he leased at least 2 properties in Toledo City for his headquarters. In addition, he claimed that in December 2011, he bought a 5 hectare parcel of land in Das, Toledo City. The COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petition on the ground that Osmeña did not commit any material misrepresentation in his COC. The COMELEC en banc subsequently denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration and stated that it is not required that a candidate should have his own house in order to establish his residence or domicile in a place. ISSUE: WON Osmeña committed misrepresentation in his certificate HELD: NO. To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with conduct indicative of this intention. It requires not only such bodily presence in that place but also a declared and probable intent to make it one’s fixed and permanent place of abode.

Osmeña’s actual physical presence in Toledo City is established not only by the presence of a place (Ibo, Toledo City, house and lot) he can actually live in, but also the affidavits of various persons in Toledo City. Osmeña’s substantial and real interest in


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establishing his domicile of choice in Toledo City is also sufficiently shown not only by the acquisition of additional property in the area and the transfer of his voter registration and headquarters, but also his participation in the community’s sociocivic and political activities. To successfully challenge a winning candidate’s qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote. Where a material COC misrepresentation under oat his made, thereby violating both our election and criminal laws, we are faced as well with an assault on the will of the people of the Philippines as expressed in our laws. In a choice between provisions on material qualifications of elected officials, on the one hand, and the will of the electorate in any given locality, on the other, we believe and so hold that we cannot choose the electorate’s will. With the conclusion that Osmeña did not commit any material misrepresentation in his COC, the Court sees no reason in this case to appeal to the primacy of the electorate’s will. 27. CODILLA vs. COMELEC GR 150605 December 10, 2002 DOCTRINE: The jurisdiction of the Comelec to disqualify candidates is limited to the grounds enumerated in Sec 68, BP 881. All other election offenses are beyond the ambit of the Comelec jurisdiction. They are criminal and not administrative in nature, and the power of Comelec over such cases in confined to the conduct of preliminary investigation on the alleged election offense for the purpose of prosecuting the alleged offenders before the courts of justice. FACTS: Petitioner Codilla and Respondent Ma. Victoria Locsin were candidates for the position of Representatives of the 4 th legislative district of Leyte on the May 14, 2001 elections. At that time, Codilla was Mayor of Ormoc City while Locsin was sitting Representative of the 4 th legislative district of Leyte. May 8, 2001, Josephine de la Cruz filed with Comelec a Petition for Disqualification against Codilla for indirectly soliciting votes from the registered voters of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte in violation of Sec 678, Omnibus Election Code. Codilla allegedly used equipments and vehicles owned by the Ormoc City Government to extract, haul and distribute gravel and sand to the 2 towns to induce, them to vote for him. The case was assigned to Comele’s 2nd Division, who remanded the case to the Regional Election Director for investigation.

At the time of the elections on May 14, the Regional Election Director has yet to hear the disqualification case. Consequently, Codilla was included in the list of candidates, was voted for, and won in the initial results. Locsin filed a “Most Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation” of Codilla with Comelec 2 nd Division, alleging the evidence on record is very strong and unless rebutted remains. Codilla’s proclamation was suspened by ExParte Order of Comelec 2 nd Division. As a result, Codilla was not proclaimed as winner even though the final election results

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW showed that he garnered more votes as against Locsin. Codilla filed an Answer alleging that he has not received the summons together with the copy of the petition and that the maintenance, repair and rehabilitation of Brgy. roads of the Matag-ob and Kananga were undertaken without his authority as City Mayor. Later, Codilla filed a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension of his proclamation and requested the setting of a hearing on his motion. He submitted his Memorandum in support of his Motion assailing the suspension of his proclamation on the grounds that: a) he was not afforded due process, b) the order has no legal and factual basis, c) evidence of his guilt is patently inexistent for the purpose of suspending proclamation. But the motion was not resolved. Comelec 2 nd Division promulgated a Resolution which found him guilty of indirect solicitation of votes and order his disqualification. It directed the immediate proclamation of the candidate who garnered the highest number of votes. By virtue of the Resolution, the votes cast for Codilla, totalling 71, 350 were declared stray even before said Resolution could gain finality. As a result, Locsin was proclaimed as the duly elected Representative of the 4 th legislative district of Leyte and took her oath of office. Codilla seasonable filed with Comelec En Banc a Motion for Reconsideration and a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Proclamation of Locsin who garnered the 2d highest number of votes. Respondent Locsin filed her Answer alleging that: (1) the Commission lost jurisdiction to hear and decide the case because of the proclamation of Locsin and that any question on the "election, returns, and qualification" of Locsin can only be taken cognizance of by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); (2) the case should be filed and heard in the first instance by a Division of the Commission and not directly by the Commission en banc; and (3) the proclamation of Locsin was valid because she received the highest number of valid votes cast, the votes of Codilla being stray. Comelec reversed the Resolution of the 2 nd Division and declared the proclamation of Locsin as null and void. Locsin questioned the procedure and manner by which the decision was issued, and relied on the opinion that Comelec has no jurisdiction to nullify the proclamation of Locsin after she has taken oath and assumed office since HRET is the sole judge of election, returns and qualifications of Members of the House. She further declared that she will openly defy and disobey Comelec En Banc resolution ordering her to vacate the position. Despite this, Codilla was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers as the dulyelected Representative and took his oath of office. ISSUES: 1. WON the proclamation of Respondent Locsin by Comelec Second Division is valid - No 2. WON said proclamation divested Comelec En Banc of jurisdiction to review its validity - No HELD: 1. No. First, Petitioner Codilla was denied due process during the entire proceeding leading to the proclamation of Respondent Locsin. Petitioner was not notified of the petition for his disqualification through the service of summons nor of the Motions to suspend his proclamation. Under section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, the COMELEC can suspend proclamation only when evidence of the winning candidate's guilt is strong. In the case at


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bar, the COMELEC Second Division did not make any specific finding that evidence of petitioner's guilt is strong. Its only basis in suspending the proclamation of the petitioner is the "seriousness of the allegations" in the petition for disqualification. We hold that absent any finding that the evidence on the guilt of the petitioner is strong, the COMELEC Second Division gravely abused its power when it suspended his proclamation. Second, Comelec 2nd Division did not give ample opportunity to Petitioner to adduce evidence in support of his defense in the petition for his disqualification. No hearing was conducted in gross violation of Sec 6, RA 6646 which specifically enjoins Comelec to “continue with the trial or hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest. Third, the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division disqualifying the petitioner is not based on substantial evidence. It merely relied of the affidavits of witnesses attached to the petition for disqualification. Worse, the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division, even without the evidence coming from the petitioner, failed to prove the gravamen of the offense for which he was charged. Petitioner allegedly violated section 68 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code which reads:

"Section 68. Disqualifications.- Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing official functions, xxx shall be disqualified from continuing as candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding office" The affidavits relied upon by the COMELEC Second Division failed to prove these allegations. To be sure, the petition for disqualification also ascribed other election offenses against the petitioner, particularly section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz: "Section 261. Prohibited Acts - The following shall be guilty of an election offense: a) Vote-buying and vote-selling.- (1) Any person who gives, offers or promises money or anything of value, gives or promises any office or employment, franchise or grant, public or private, or make or offers to make an expenditure, directly or indirectly, or cause an expenditure to be made to any person, association, corporation, entity or community in order to induce anyone or the public in general, to vote for or against any candidate or withhold his vote in the election, or to vote for or against any aspirant for the nomination or choice of a candidate in a convention or similar selection process of a political party. (o) Use of public funds, money deposited in trust, equipment, facilities owned or controlled by the government for an election campaign.- Any person who uses under any guise whatsoever directly or indirectly, xxx (3) any equipment, vehicle, facility, apparatus, or paraphernalia owned by the government or by its political subdivisions, agencies including government-owned or controlled corporations, or by the Armed Forces of the Phili ppines for any election campaign or for any partisan political activity x x x." However, the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those enumerated in section 68 of the

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW Omnibus Election Code. All other election offenses are beyond the ambit of COMELEC jurisdiction. 97 They are criminal and not administrative in nature. Pursuant to sections 265 and 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, the power of the COMELEC is confined to the conduct of preliminary investigation on the alleged election offenses for the purpose of prosecuting the alleged offenders before the regular courts of justice, viz: "Section 265. Prosecution.- The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same. The Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government: Provided, however, That in the event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within four months from his filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the office of the fiscal or with the Ministry of Justice for proper investigation and prosecution, if warranted. Section 268. Jurisdiction.- The RTC shall have the exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceeding for violation of this Code, except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote which shall be under the jurisdictions of metropolitan or municipal trial courts. From the decision of the courts, appeal will lie as in other criminal cases." The COMELEC Second Division grievously erred when it decided the disqualification case based on section 261 (a) and (o), and not on section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. Fourth, exclusion of the votes in favor of the petitioner and the proclamation of respondent Locsin was done with undue haste. The COMELEC Second Division ordered the exclusion of the votes cast in favor of the petitioner, and the proclamation of the respondent Locsin, without affording the petitioner the opportunity to challenge the same Fifth, the votes cast in favor of the petitioner cannot be considered "stray" and respondent cannot be validly proclaimed on that basis. As previously stated, the disqualification of the petitioner is null and void for being violative of due process and for want of substantial factual basis. Even assuming, however, that the petitioner was validly disqualified, it is still improper for the COMELEC Second Division to order the immediate exclusion of votes cast for the petitioner as stray, and on this basis, proclaim the respondent as having garnered the next highest number of votes. Respondent Locsin, as a mere second placer, cannot be proclaimed. More brazen is the proclamation of respondent Locsin which violates the settled doctrine that the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified.102 In every election, the people's choice is the paramount consideration and their expressed will must at all times be given effect. When the majority speaks and elects into office a candidate by giving him the highest number of votes cast in the election for the office, no one can be declared elected in his place

2. No. First, the validity of the respondent's proclamation was a core issue in the Motion for Reconsideration seasonably filed by the petitioner. Since the petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the Second Division suspending his proclamation and disqualifying him, the COMELEC en banc was not divested of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the said Order of the Second Division. The said Order of the Second


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Division was yet unenforceable as it has not attained finality; the timely filing of the motion for reconsideration suspends its execution. It cannot, thus, be used as the basis for the assumption in office of the respondent as the duly elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. Second, tt is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which has no jurisdiction in the instant case. The issue on the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division has not yet been resolved by the COMELEC en banc. To stress again, at the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division was seasonably challenged by the petitioner in his Motion for Reconsideration. The issue was still within the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to resolve. Hence, the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over the matter. 28. ALFAIS MUNDER vs. COMELEC GR 194076 October 19, 2011 DOCTRINE: The filing of a petition to deny or cancel a Certificate of Candidacy has a prescriptive period which must be strictly followed. Under the rules, a verified petition to deny due course or to cancel a COC may be filed by any person within five (5) days from the last day for the filing of a COC but not later than twenty-five (25) days from the filing of COC under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. FACTS: Petitioner Munder ran as mayor of Bubong, Lanao del Sur, and filed his Certificate of Candidacy on 26 November 2009, four days before the last day for filing on 30 November 2009. Under Sec. 4(a)[1] of COMELEC Resolution 8696, a petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy must be filed within five days from the last day of the filing of the certificate of candidacy but not later than twenty-five days from the filing thereof. Respondent Atty. Tago Sarip likewise filed a certificate of candidacy and vied for the same position in the same municipality.

On 13 April 2010, Sarip filed a Petition for Disqualification with the COMELEC on the ground that Munder was not a registered voter of Bubongand that the latter’s application for candidacy was not accomplished in full. Sarip corroborated his allegation that Munder was not a registered voter of the area. He further argued that the candidate Munder was different from the registered voter Munder in the area, since they had different birth years; and even went so far as to implicate Munder as having committed dishonesty and falsity in stating that the latter was a registered voter of Bubong, Lanao del Sur. For his part, Munder, on the other hand, countered that he was a registered voter of Precinct No. 0033, Barangay Rogero, Municipality of Bubong, Lanao del Sur. Moreover, Munder denied committing any misrepresentation in his CoC. He also argued that false representations, dishonesty and mockery of justice were not grounds for disqualification of a candidate under COMELEC Resolution No. 8696. In the 10 May 2010 elections, Munder won overwhelmingly, garnering 4,793 votes over Sarip who came in second with 2,356 votes. The Municipal Board of Canvassers of Bubong, Lanao del Sur, thus proclaimed Munder as mayor on 15 May 2010.

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW On 29 June 2010, the COMELEC Second Division sustained Munder’s arguments and dismissed Sarip’s Petition. It agreed with Munder that the grounds invoked by Sarip were not proper for a petition for disqualification, and that the latter’s petition was actually seeking the purging of Munder’s CoC. The outcome was, however, different when the COMELEC en banc, upon Sarip’s Motion for Reconsideration, which reversed the ruling of the Second Division and disqualified Munder based on the question of the continuing possession by Munder of one of the qualifications of the office of the Mayor – being a registered voter of the municipality where he runs as a candidate.


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29. TALAGA vs. COMELEC GR 196804 October 9, 2012 DOCTRINE: Only an official candidate of a registered or accredited party may be substituted. FACTS: Ramon Talaga (Ramon) and Philip M. Castillo (Castillo) were running for the position of Mayor of Lucena City in the May 10, 2010 elections.

Ramon declared in his CoC that he was eligible for the office he was seeking to be elected to. ISSUE: WON the COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion in concluding that the Alfais Munder in the voters’ list is not the same as Alfais Munder the candidate HELD: Yes, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in concluding that Munder the voter was not Munder the mayoralty candidate. We observe that the COMELEC en banc relied on the Voter's Certification indicating one Alfaiz Tocalo Munder registering for the first time in 2003, with 7 May 1984 as birth date, and stating therein that he was 18 years old at the time of the registration. We find this evidence insufficient to impeach the fact that the petitioner was a registered voter of Bubong, Lanao del Sur for one simple reason: the registration was in 2003, while the election was in 2010.

It may be true that in 2003, Munder, who was still a minor, registered himself as a voter and misrepresented that he was already of legal age. Even if it was deliberate, we cannot review his past political acts in this petition. Neither can the COMELEC review those acts in an inappropriate remedy. In so doing, it committed grave abuse of discretion, and the act resulting therefrom must be nullified. Regardless of the present evidence, it would not negate the fact that in 2010, Munder had already attained eligibility to run for mayor. In fact, in such a small municipality like Bubong, the likelihood of not being able to know whether one has a namesakeis very slim. Sarip should have proved that another Alfais Tocalo Munder is in existence, and that the latter is the registered voter and not herein petitioner. In such a case, Sarip's remedy is not a Petition for Disqualification, but a Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy which must comply with the prescriptive period. In the case at bar, however, Sarip miserably failed to comply with the filing period since he filed it one hundred and seven days after the filing of the COC – obviously later than the twenty five day prescriptive period for such. A petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy filed beyond the required period is filed out of time and may be not entertained; as such, Sarip’s remaining remedy is now left to file a quo warranto action with the Regional Trial Court to prove that Munder lacks the eligibility required by law. With this conclusion, Sarip's petition has become moot. There is no longer any issue of whether to apply the rule on succession to an elective office, since Munder is necessarily established in the position for which the people have elected him.

Castillo filed with the COMELEC a petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. as Mayor for Having Already Served Three (3) Consecutive Terms as a City Mayor of Lucena. Under the Constitution and existing Election Laws, New Local Government Code of the Philippines, and jurisprudence, Ramon is no longer entitled and is already disqualified to be a city mayor for the fourth consecutive term. COMELEC First Division declared Ramon DISQUALIFIED to run for Mayor of Lucena City for the 10 May 2010 Elections. COMELEC En Banc affirmed. On May 4, 2010, Barbara Ruby filed her own CoC for Mayor of Lucena City in substitution of Ramon. On election day on May 10, 2010, the name of Ramon remained printed on the ballots but the votes cast in his favor were counted in favor of Barbara Ruby as his substitute candidate. Barbara Ruby won and was proclaimed Mayor of Lucena City. Castillo filed a Petition for Annulment of Proclamation with the COMELEC. He alleged that Barbara Ruby could not substitute Ramon because his CoC had been cancelled and denied due course. Barbara Ruby maintained the validity of her substitution. She countered that the COMELEC En Banc did not deny due course to or cancel Ramon’s COC, despite a declaration of his disqualification, because there was no finding that he had committed misrepresentation, the ground for the denial of due course to or cancellation of his COC under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. On the other hand, Roderick Alcala (Alcala), the duly-elected Vice Mayor of Lucena City, sought to intervene,positing that he should assume the post of Mayor because Barbara Ruby’s substitution had been invalid and Castillo had clearly lost the elections. On January 11, 2011, the COMELEC Second Division dismissed Castillo’s petition and Alcala’s petition-in-intervention. However, COMELEC En Banc concluded that Barbara Ruby could not have properly substituted Ramon but had simply become an additional candidate who had filed her COC out of time; and held that Vice Mayor Alcala should succeed to the position. ISSUE: WON the substitution by Barbara Ruby as candidate for the position of Mayor of Lucena City in lieu of Ramon is valid HELD: NO. Existence of a valid CoC is a condition sine qua non for a valid substitution.


A person’s declaration of his intention to run for public office and his affirmation that he possesses the eligibility for the position he seeks to assume, followed by the timely filing of such declaration, constitute a valid CoC that render the person making the declaration a valid or official candidate. There are two remedies available to prevent a candidate from running in an electoral race. One is through a petition for disqualification and the other through a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. A petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised on Section 12 or 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, or Section 40 of the Local Government Code. On the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only be grounded on a statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is false. The petitions also have different effects. While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC. In the event that a candidate is disqualified to run for a public office, or dies, or withdraws his CoC before the elections, Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code provides the option of substitution. Only an official candidate of a registered or accredited party may be substituted. Considering that a cancelled CoC does not give rise to a valid candidacy, there can be no valid substitution of the candidate under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code. It should be clear, too, that a candidate who does not file a valid CoC may not be validly substituted, because a person without a valid CoC is not considered a candidate in much the same way as any person who has not filed a CoC is not at all a candidate. Likewise, a candidate who has not withdrawn his CoC in accordance with Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code may not be substituted. A withdrawal of candidacy can only give effect to a substitution if the substitute candidate submits prior to the election a sworn CoC as required by Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code. Declaration of Ramon’s disqualification rendered his CoC invalid; hence, he was not a valid candidate to be properly substituted. 30. DELA CRUZ vs. COMELEC GR 192221 November 13, 2012 DOCTRINE : A petition to cancel or deny a COC under Section 69 of the OEC should be distinguished from a petition to disqualify under Section 68. Hence, the legal effect of such cancellation of a COC of a nuisance candidate cannot be equated with a candidate disqualified on grounds provided in the OEC and Local Government Code. FACTS: On November 2009, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy (COC) for the position of Vice Mayor of Bugasong, Antique. Subsequently, Aurelio De La Cruz also filed his COC for the same petition. Petitioner filed a petition to declare Aurelio as a


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nuisance candidate because he filed his COC to put the elections in mockery and to cause confusion due to the similarity in their names. She contended that the latter has no prior political experience or affiliation, that he has no sufficient source of income, and that he did poorly in previous local elections, all of which shows his lack of bona fide intention to run. The COMELEC First Division granted the petition; however his name was not deleted from the Certified List of Candidates and the Official Sample Ballot. This prompted petitioner to file a motion to delete the respondent’ s name and in the event that such can no longer be deleted, that all votes made in favor of Aurelio be credited to her in accordance with COMELEC Resolution 4116. COMELEC granted the motion and released a list of disqualified candidates through COMELEC Resolution No. 8844, including that of Aurelio’s. During the May 2010 elections however, Aurelio’s name appeared in the ballots. During the canvassing of votes, petitioner insisted that Aurelio’s votes be credited to her but the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC) refused and John Lloyd Pacete, another candidate, was proclaimed Vice-Mayor, winning by only 39 votes over the petitioner. Petitioner Casimira De La Cruz filed a petition to assail COMELEC Resolution No. 8844 considering as stray the votes cast for Aurelio and other candidates declared disqualified or denied due course. She contends that the Resolution violates her right to equal protection as there is no substantial difference between the Manual Elections and the present Automated Elections to justify the non-observance Resolution 4116, which authorizes the crediting of the votes for a disqualified candidate to that of a candidate with the same name. ISSUE: WON the votes should be credited to the petitioner HELD: Yes. a petition to cancel or deny due course to a COC under Section 69 as in Section 78 cannot be treated in the same manner as a petition to disqualify under Section 68 as what COMELEC did when it applied the rule provided in Section 72 that the votes cast for a disqualified candidate be considered stray, to those registered candidates whose COC’s had been cancelled or denied due course. We hold that the rule in Resolution No. 4116 considering the votes cast for a nuisance candidate declared as such in a final judgment, particularly where such nuisance candidate has the same surname as that of the legitimate candidate, not stray but counted in favor of the latter, remains a good law. The voters’ constructive knowledge of such cancelled candidacy made their will more determinable, as it is then more logical to conclude that the votes cast for Aurelio could have been intended only for the legitimate candidate, petitioner. The possibility of confusion in names of candidates if the names of nuisance candidates remained on the ballots on election day, cannot be discounted or eliminated, even under the automated voting system especially considering that voters who mistakenly shaded the oval beside the name of the nuisance candidate instead of the bona fide candidate they intended to vote for could no longer ask for replacement ballots to correct the same.

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