Makhan Singh Vs. State of Punjab (and connected appeals)
Facts of the case
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In the wake of the Chinese Chinese aggression aggression commencing commencing form form the 8th September September,, 1962, the President declared emergency in India nder article !"2 of the constittion on the 26 #ctober, 1962$
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%he &efence of India #rdinance1962 '(o$ ) of 1962* was also promlgated on that day$
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+n ordinance promlgtaed on (oember !, 1962 sspended the rights of citi-ens to moe to any Cort for the enforcement of the rights conferred by +rt$ 21 and 22 of the Constittion for the period dring which the proclamation of emergency issed on #ctober 26, 1962 wold be in force. nder article !"9'1* of the Indian Constittion$
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#n (oember 6, 1962, the rles framed by the Central /oernment were pblished$
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%he amendment of the Presidential order passed on 11 (oember, added +rticle 1) of the constition as well$
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#n &ecember, 6, 1962, 0le ! as originally f ramed was amended and 0le !+ added$
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#n &ecember 12, 1962 the +ct was made$ Section )8'1* of the +ct proided proided for the repeal of the #rdinances (os$ ) and 6 of 1962$ Section )8'2* proides that notwithstanding sch repea repeal, l, any any rle rless made, made, anyt anythi hing ng done done or any any actio action n take taken n nde nderr the the afor aforesa esaid id two two #rdinances #rdinances shall be deemed to hae been made, done or taken nder this +ct as if this +ct had commenced on #ctober 26, 1962$
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3ence, the 0les made made nder the #rdinance #rdinance contined contined to be the 0les 0les nder the +ct, +ct, and the appellants had been detained nder 0le !'1*'b*$
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In totality there were 26 criminal appeals, nine against the decision of the Pn4ab 3igh Cort, and 15 against the deecision of the ombay 3igh Cort$
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+ll the appellants were detenes who had been detained by the Pn4ab and the 7aharashtra State /oernments nder 0le !'1*'b* of the &efence of India 0les 'hereinafter called the 0les* made by the Central /oernment in eercise of the powers conferred on it by the &efence of India #rdinance$
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%hey had applied to the Pn4ab and the ombay 3igh Corts respectiely nder section )91 '1*'b* of the Code of Criminal Procedre and alleged that they had been improperly and illegally detained$
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%heir contention was that s$ !'2*'1"*'i* and s$ ) of the &efence of India +ct, 1962 '(o$ "1
of 1962* and 0le !'1*'b* nder which they hae been detained were constittionally inalid, becase they contraened their fndamental rights nder +rticles 1), 21 and 22')*, '"* '5* of the Constittion, and so, they claimed that an order shold be passed in their faor directing the respectie State /oernments to set them at liberty$ •
%hese petitions had been dismissed on the grond that the Presidential #rder which has been issed nder +rt$ !"9 of the Constittion creates a bar which precldes them from moing the 3igh Cort nder s$ )91'1*'b* Cr$ P$ C$
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%he allahabad 3igh Cort had in similar case faored the detenes, and it was this difference of opinion with the ombay and Pn4ab 3igh Corts which lead to the formlation of the Special ench for the appeal$
Relevant Laws
!"ticle #$%.:hile a Proclamation of ;mergency is in operation, nothing in article 19 shall restrict
the power of the State as defined in Part III to make any law or to take any eectie action which the State wold not for the proisions contained in that Part be competent to make or to take, bt any law so made shall, to the etent of the incompetency, cease to hae effect as soon as the Proclamation ceases, to operate, ecept as respects things done or omitted to be done before the law so ceases to hae effect$
#$&. '1* :here a Proclamation of ;mergency is in operation, the President may be order declare
that the right to moe any Cort for the enforcement of sch of the rights conferred by Part III as may be mentioned in the order and all proceedings pending in any cort for the enforcement of the rights so mentioned shall remain sspended for the period dring which the Proclamation is in force or for sch shorter period as may be specified in the order$ '2* +ny order made as aforesaid may etend to the whole or any part of the territory of India$<
Section )9l'l*'b* ofthe Code of Criminal Procedre '+ct " of l898* proided= +ny 3igh Cort may, wheneer it drinks fit, direct
'b* that a person illegally or improperly
detained in pblic or priate cstody within sch limits be set at liberty$ 1
!nal'sis
1%he proision has been omitted in the Code of Criminal Procedre, I95!$
&ring the operation of the ;mergency from 19621969, the Spreme Cort confined its role only to an eamination of the propriety of instances of preentie detention in terms of the applicable legislation$ %he Cort did not endeaor to rle on the scope and operation of the constittionally garanteed >ndamental 0ights dring an ;mergency$ (or did it assert its powers of 4dicial reiew in terms of the constittionally entrenched proisions on the Spreme Cort$ %hs in all these cases it has basically pheld the decisions of preentie detentions, and the case of 7akhan Singh is an eample of sch cases$
%he main isses considered by the Cort in the case were the following= 1$ :hat was the tre scope and effect of a Presidential #rder issed nder +rticle !"9'l*? 2$ &id the bar created by the Presidential #rder operate in respect of applications for habeas corps made by detainees, not nder +rticle 226 of the Constittion, bt nder section )91 ofthe Criminal Procedre Code?
%he Cort ths considered whether +rticle !"9 of the Constittion was to be so constred as to empower the President to sspend @all actions which a person may take nder a statte or common law, if he seeks thereby to protect his liberty against nlawfl encroachment by the state or its officersA :as the effect of the Presidential #rder confined to the constittional remedies garanteed by +rticles !2 and 226, or wold the #rder also bar remedies which are conferred by ordinary stattes, sch as by section )9l of the Code of Criminal Procedre?
%he Spreme Cort conceded that the right to claim relief nder the Code was a right which was distinct and separate from that conferred by +rticles !2 and 226 of the Constittion$ It was stressed that what was to be eamined was not the technical procedral form in which the action was initiated, not whether it was by writ petition nder +rticle !2 or +rticle 226 of the Constittion, or by proceedings sanctioned by ordinary state, bt rather that it was the @sbstance of the matter< which was decisie$ %herefore, proceedings taken nder section )91 of the Criminal Procedre Code wold be on the same footing as writ petitions nder the Constittion and wold, with respect to pleas based on rights conferred by the +rticles specified in that Presidential #rder, be eBally liable to attract the procedral bar$< %he tre test to determine whether a particlar proceeding is barred is to eamine the sbstance and not the form$ In the words of stice /a4endragadkar= @ In determining the Bestion as to whether a particlar proceeding falls within the mischief of the
Presidential #rder or not, what has to be eamined is not so mch the form which the proceeding has taken, or the words in which the relief is claimed, as the sbstance of the matter$$$before granting the relief claimed by the citi-en, it wold be necessary for the Cort to enBire into the Bestion whether any of his specified fndamental rights hae been contraened$ If any relief cannot be granted to the citi-en withot determining the Bestion of the alleged infringement of the said specified fndamental rights, that is a proceeding which falls nder +rt$ !"9'1* and wold, therefore, be hit by the Presidential #rder issed nder the said +rticle$ %he sweep of +rt$ !"9'1* and the Presidential #rder issed nder it is ths wide enogh to inclde all claims made by citi-ens in any cort of competent 4risdiction when it is shown that the said claims cannot be effectiely ad4dicated pon withot eamining the Bestion as to whether the citi-en is in sbstance, seeking to enforce any of the said specified fndamental rights$
stice Sbba 0ao dissented and arged that section )91 of the Code. thogh remedial in form, postlates the eistence of the sbstantie right$ 3e identified that sbstantie right as a common law principle that no person can be depried of his or her liberty ecept in the manner prescribed by law$ stice Sbba 0ao spported his conclsion as to the aailability of a remedy nder section )91 by classifying the 3igh CortDs power nder the Code as prely discretionary, and hence distinct from the ErightD to moe a cort as garanteed by +rticles !2 and 226$ Since he conceded to the Fegislatre the power to take away this sbstantie right, stice Sbba 0ao clearly did not derie the procedral right in Bestion from an implied constittional rle of law or principle of legality$ In the absence of a principle of legality which transcends the specific >ndamental 0ights conferred by Part III of the Constittion, the opinion epressed by stice Sbba 0ao is nconincing$ :hether the 4risdiction of the Cort is inoked by irte of a constittional proision, sch as +rticle !2 or +rticle 226, or inoked by reliance pon ordinary statte, does not, in itself affect the content of the sbstantie right soght to be asserted$ %he Bestion of an alternate 4risdictional basis is irreleant if the position regarding the legal procedre to enforce it is nclear$
:ith respect to the general scope and legal conseBence of a Presidential #rder nder +rticle !"9'l*, the Spreme Cort, in 7akhan Singh, obsered that its legal effect was to constitte @a sort of moratorim or blanket ban< against the initiation, or contination, of any legal action which Ein sbstance soght to enforce a >ndamental 0ight specified in the Presidential #rder$ #n this interpretation of +rticle !"9, the Spreme Cort nanimosly< conclded that a Presidential #rder cold neer operate as a bar to proceedings in which eectie action is attacked on gronds which are not relatable to the specified >ndamental 0ights$ Speaking on behalf of si of the seen
4dges of the ench, stice /a4endragadltar identified seeral pleas which were not barred by the Presidential #rder$ %hese concerned the enforceability of rights other than those specified in the Presidential #rder infringement by the detaining athority of mandatory proisions of the detention legislation. and mala fides$