Antamoc Goldfields Mining Co. v. CIR (1940) Petitioners: Antamok Goldfields Mining Company (Antamok) Respondents: Court of Industrial Relations and National Labor Union, Inc. (Union) Ponente: Imperial Topic: Protection to Labor / Balancing of Power FACTS:
On December 12, 1938, the Union, representing Antamok’s workers and employees who were members of the labor union, addressed a letter to Antamok requesting 21 claims in favor of their members. Antamok’s officials informed the workers in a meeting on January 2, 1939 that some claims had been accepted and had already been put into practice, others would be considered, and the rest were rejected for being unreasonable. On the night of the same day, Antamok’s workers went on strike and abandoned their work. Antamok immediately informed the Department of Labor of this strike and requested its intervention in order to resolve it. Officials appointed by the Secretary of Labor convened a conference attended by Antamok’s officials, the strikers’ representative, and the head of the Baguio Federation of Labor, a workers' organization affiliated with the Union. As a result of the conference, the parties agreed on an amicable settlement to end the strike under the conditions that: o All laborers will be readmitted upon the execution of this agreement; o Provided, that all laborers whose services should be dispensed with due to lack of work in those tunnels where they are no longer needed will be given not less than 15 days employment from the date of this settlement or resumption of work, and o Provided, further, that as soon as the stopes in 1360 and 1460 levels are opened and the services of men are needed, [Antamok] will give preference to efficient laborers when reducing the personnel as above mentioned in those working places and may transfer them to other divisions to replace inefficient men. The agreement was signed by the parties on January 4, 1939, but the workers did not appear until 9:00 am on January 6. Antamok’s management did not, however, allow any worker to enter the underground section known as "830 level" because of the fact that the air had been vitiated by the strike and it was necessary to renew it with pure air to avoid personal misfortune. This precaution was taken by the workers as Antamok’s refusal to have them work again, so they went on strike again. The workers who worked in the mine called "680 division," a separate mine located 3 kilometers from the factory, joined the strikers sympathetically. Again the Department of Labor intervened and, through mediation, the workers returned to work on the night of January 6, 1939, when mine work resumed gradually. On January 9, 1939 the Department of Labor endorsed the dispute to the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) in accordance with Article 4 of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 103. On March 31, 1939, with most of the Union’s 21 claims still pending, the Union filed a motion before the CIR alleging that: o The foreman A. Haber and 9 other workers had been suspended indefinitely on March 29; o These workers had previously been transferred to outside work in order to provide Antamok with an excuse to separate them later from service;
Another group of about 30 workers were dismissed by [Antamok] without any reason and without authorization from the court; and o The suspensions and separations were acts of revenge and discriminatory for the workers. Thus, the Union requested that Antamok’s officials responsible for such acts be punished for contempt and that Antamok be forced to replace the workers in their primitive works within the mines and to pay their wages corresponding to the period in which they were separated from the service. Antamok contested the motion by denying the imputed facts and claimed that: o Haber and his nine companions were suspended for their continued laziness during working hours and for having consistently refused to work, and o The 45 workers headed by foreman Victoriano Madayag were dismissed for having refused to point out those responsible for the ill-treatment of foreman Juan Moldero on the morning of March 30, 1939. At the hearing of the Union’s motion on April 3, 1939, the parties presented their witnesses. The CIR designated one of its special agents to be sent in Antamok’s mine and to conduct an investigation to supplement the facts that were proven during the hearing. The CIR in its order of May 6, 1939, declared the following facts proven: o "1. The discharges and indefinite suspensions…were made by [Antamok] without first securing the consent of the [CIR] in violation of [its] order…of January 23, 1939." o "2. The discharges and indefinite suspensions were made by [Antamok] without just cause." The CIR observed: o "The charge that Haber and the group of nine laborers were indefinitely suspended because of continuous loafing and refusal to work was not established. The real motive behind the lay off was the completion of their work 'outside.' Under the circumstances, the provision of the order of March 21, to the effect that these men should be returned to their work underground after the completion of their work 'outside' should have been observed. [Antamok] instead of complying with the order laid off the men." o "The discharge of Victoriano Madayag and his 44 companions as a result of the Moldero incident also lacks justification. In the case of Madayag, although he was present with Haber when Moldero was attacked, neither one is accused of the aggression. The two of them were conversing with Moldero when the latter was stoned from behind without anybody apparently being able to point out the aggressor. o Less justification can be found for the discharge of the 44 men as a result of the incident. The investigation disclosed that at the time of the assault, they were at the Creek busy with their work. Both the distance and the topographical situation of the place where the men were working, which is far and well below the bank of the place of the incident, precluded their hearing or seeing clearly what transpired above them in the place where Moldero was assaulted. An ocular inspection of the premises made by the investigator confirmed this view. So far as is known, despite the investigations conducted by the officials of [Antamok] and the policemen of the camp and by the constabulary authorities in Baguio, the person or persons responsible for the stoning has not been determined. The precipitate and unwarranted dismissal of the 45 men after the incident seems to have been spurred by an over anxious desire on the part of [Antamok] to get rid of these men." o
"As previously found, in the order of [the CIR] of March 21, 1939, about 134 underground laborers of [Antamok] were transferred and made to work 'outside of the mines' or surface work. The majority of these men were muckers, miners, timbermen, trammers, and mine helpers and had to their favor from 6 months to 5 years service in the mines of [Antamok] and not a few of them have done underground work in several capacities and in different tunnels and divisions of the mine. Among them are found leaders of the movement of the laborers for higher pay and better working conditions which culminated in the strike called on January 3, 1939. These leaders have been prominent in the formation of the union and its activities and in connection with the strike. The temporary transfer of these men to 'outside' work was authorized by the Court in said order on the strength of the assurance of [Antamok] that no more work suited for them inside the mines existed. It was directed, however, in the aforesaid order that as soon as their work outside was completed the laborers should be immediately returned to their respective work inside the mines. Subsequent events and acts of the officials of [Antamok] in charge of the mines have convinced the [CIR] that work existed and exists for the men inside the tunnels and their transfers were made to provide an opportunity to [Antamok] to dispense with their services as soon as the work outside is completed. The unwarranted discharges of Haber and nine others and those of Victoriano Madayag and his 44 companions amply demonstrated this conclusion. Upon [Antamok]'s own admission, as shown in its reports in the records and upon the findings of the investigator of the [CIR], more than 400 workers of different classes…coming from different mines in the region have been employed by [Antamok] as fresh laborers. Almost all, if not all, of these men are not members of the [Union].” o "At the same time the work in different tunnels and divisions in the mines are allegedly being completed, the old workers are being laid off. Although a small number of the men found transfer to other divisions being operated, the majority are being left without work. Instead of laying hands on the old men laid off and making them work in the tunnels needing hands and reinstating in the tunnel work those laborers transferred to the 'outside' department, [Antamok] preferred to take in and hire other workers coming from different places because evidently they are not members of the union." xxx o From all what appears, it is inferred that [Antamok] desires to discourage membership in the union and to rout it if possible. The wholesale discharges were the expression of such desire. The acts in the mind of the [CIR] are calculated to have two effects. They will not only immediately affect the discharged laborers but would also discourage other laborers from joining or remaining members of the union." o "Under normal circumstances, the exercise of judgment of the employer in selecting men he is to employ should not be interfered with. But when such judgment is arbitrarily exercised to the prejudice of members of a labor union whose rights should be safeguarded in consonace with the policies of the law, the Court not only feels it justified but rightly its duty to interfere to afford protection to the laborers affected." The CIR ordered Antamok: o To reinstate in their previous work or in other substantially equivalent work the 45 workers (Madayag) and the 10 workers headed by A. Haber who were excluded indefinitely; and o
To pay to these 55 workers the wages they should have received from the date of their suspension or separation until their replacement The CIR denied Antamok’s motion for reconsideration. Thus, this appeal by certiorari. Antamok: Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 103, as amended by Acts Nos. 254 and 355, is unconstitutional because: o (1) it violates the principle of separation of powers; o (2) by it, the National Assembly abdicated its legislative power violating the doctrine on delegation of powers; o (3) the judicial powers conferred by the law on the CIR, considered separately, are arbitrary and unreasonable and allow the deprivation of freedom and property without due process of law; and o (4) assuming that the law is valid and constitutional in its entirety, at least part of Article 20, which requires the CIR to "adopt its procedural regulations", must be declared null and void because it infringes Section 13 of Article VIII of the [1935] Constitution, obliging the CIR to observe the general rules of procedure applicable to the courts of justice. Antamok alleges that as it had been subjected to an arbitrary procedure and different from that applied to other litigants in the Philippine courts, it had been denied due process of law and the principle of equal protection before the law. o
ISSUES:
WoN CA 103 violates the principle of separation of powers and the doctrine on delegation of powers o NO. CA 103 gives the CIR full discretion to resolve and decide agrarian and industrial disputes in the manner it believes to be fair and equitable, regardless of technicalities or legal forms (Article 20), and the power thus granted is judicial rather than legislative. So it does not violate the principle of separation of powers, the prohibition on delegation of legislative powers or equal protection before the law. As has been said in the Cincinnati case, W. & ZR Co. v. Comm., Of Clinton County, 1852), 1 Ohio St., 88, cited in Rubi et al. v. Provincial Board of Mindoro: "The true distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the later no valid objection can be made." o Antamok emphasizes the resolution of Schechter v. United States (1935), in which the United States Supreme Court declared the National Recovery Act to be unconstitutional. There is, however, a marked difference between that case and the one considered here because the National Recovery Act, rather than creating a court of law, I believe together With legislative powers (faulty translation) and authorized the President of the United States to promulgate codes that prescribe the rules of precedence in order to carry out the purposes of the law. o CA 103, which provides for the protection of the worker by creating a CIR empowered to: Fix a minimum wage for the workers and the maximum rent to be paid by the tenants; Enforce compulsory arbitration between employers or owners and employees or tenants, respectively,
And prescribes penalties for breach of its decrees, has been promulgated by the National Assembly pursuant to the precepts contained in the 1935 Constitution which provide: Art. II, SEC. 5. The promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people should be the concern of the State. Art. XIII, SEC. 6. The State shall afford protection to labor, especially to working women and minors, and shall regulate the relations between landowner and tenant, and between labor and capital in industry and in agriculture. The State may provide for compulsory arbitration. Art. VIII, SEC. 1. The Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law. Art. VIII, SEC. 2. The National Assembly shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts o In compliance with these precepts, the National Assembly promulgated CA103 creating the CIR which is a special court with judicial powers (Pambusco Employees Union v. Court of Industrial Relations et al, GR No. 46727, Ang Tibay et al. Vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., GR No. 46496, concurring opinion of Justice Jose P. Laurel). WoN the legal powers CA 103 grants to the CIR are so arbitrary and unreasonable that they allow deprivation of liberty and property without due process of law or that Article 20, CA 103 at least suffers from this fundamental defect because it confers on the CIR the power to issue its own rules of procedure, which contravenes Section 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution which prescribes that the Supreme Court shall issue rules concerning written pleadings, uniform practice and procedure for all courts of the same category. o NO. Section 20 reads: "The Court of Industrial Relations shall adopt its rules of procedure and shall have such other powers as generally pertain to a court of justice: Provided, however, That in the hearing, investigation and determination of any question or controversy and in exercising any duties and powers under this Act, the Court shall act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable." (Note: This provision is similar to Article 227 [221] of the Labor Code re: Labor Arbiters and the National Labor Relations Commission) o Article 20 has not empowered the CIR to investigate and resolve questions and disputes between workers and employers and tenants and owners in an arbitrary and capricious manner without being subject to a specific rule of conduct. Article 20 clearly stipulates that the rules of procedure which it adopts, to which the court must conform, must be based on justice and equity, and prescribes that the criterion which must be formed must be based on the substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms. CA 103 cannot be challenged on the ground that authorizes the deprivation of liberty and property without due process of law nor does it conflict with the precept of Section 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution because the CIR is not of the same category as the municipal courts, courts of justice and courts of first instance for which the regulations of the Courts by the Supreme Court [apply]. Citing the concurring opinion of Justice Laurel in Ang Tibay v. CA, to reassure the settled view that CA 103 and its amendments are valid and not unconstitutional: o “Our Constitution was adopted in the midst of surging unrest and dissatisfaction resulting from economic and social distress which was threatening the stability of governments the world over.” o
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Embodying the spirit of the present epoch, general provisions were inserted in the Constitution which are intended to bring about the needed social and economic equilibrium between component elements of society through the application of what may be termed as the justitia communis advocated by Grotius and Leibnits many years ago to be secured through the counterbalancing of economic and social forces and opportunities which should be regulated, if not controlled, by the State or placed, as it were, in custodia societatis. The promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people' was thus inserted as vital principle in our Constitution. (Sec. 5, Art. II, Constitution.) And in order that this declaration of principle may not just be an empty medley of words, the Constitution in various sections thereof has provided the means towards its realization. For instance, section 6 of Article XIII declares that the State 'shall afford protection to labor, especially to working women and minors, and shall regulate the relations between landowner and tenant, and between labor and capital in industry and in agriculture. The same section also states that 'the State may provide for compulsory arbitration. In extraordinary cases mentioned in section 16, Article VI, of the Constitution, the President of the Philippines may be authorized by law, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as the National Assembly may prescribe, to 'promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy.’ Albeit, almost at the same time the Congress of the United States approved the National Labor Regulations Act on July 5, 1935, commonly known as the Wagner Act, we were in the Philippines headway towards the adoption of our fundamental law, pursuant to congressional authority given in the Tydings-McDuffie Independence Act, approved March 24, 1934. In our Bill of Rights we now find the following provision 'The right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged (Par. 6, section 1, art. Ill, Constitution.) What was an agitation in the United States which brought about the recommendation by the Commission on Industrial Relations created by an Act of Congress in 1912 for the adoption of a Labor Bill of Rights as an amendment to the United States Constitution is, in our case, virtually an accepted principle, which may be expanded and vitalized by legislation to keep pace with the development of time and circumstances. "By and large, these [constitutional provisions] all evince and express the need of shifting emphasis to community interest with a view to affirmative enhancement of human values. In conformity with the constitutional objective and cognizant of the historical fact that industrial and agricultural disputes had given rise to disquietude, bloodshed and revolution in our country, the National Assembly enacted CA 103, entitled 'An Act to afford protection of labor by creating a Court of Industrial Relations empowered to fix minimum wages for laborers and maximum rental to be paid by tenants, and to enforce compulsory arbitration between employers or landlords, and employees or tenants, respectively; and by prescribing penalties for the violation of the orders' and, later, CA 213, entitled, 'An Act to define and regulate legitimate labor organizations.' Social and industrial disturbances which fifty years ago were feudal-like and of isolated importance may now well result in a serious strain upon the entire economic organism of the nation. In the United States, labor legislation has undergone a long process of development too long to narrate here, culminating in the enactments of what were commonly known as the Clayton Act, the Norris-La Guardia Act, and finally, the Wagner Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.
The Wagner Act created the National Labor Relations Board as an instrumentality of the Federal Government in the settlement of labor disputes, which device is aimed at the avoidance of unnecessary friction between labor and capital and the establishment of industrial peace. Scrutiny of legislation in that country and of pronouncements made by its Supreme Court reveals a continuous renovation and change made necessary by the impact of changing needs and economic pressure brought about by the irresistible momentum of new social and economic forces developed here. In the light of changes that have occurred, it is doubted if the pronouncements made by the said Supreme Court in 1905 (Lochner v. New York) or in 1908 (Adair v. U. S., and Coppage v. Kansas)—cases which are relied upon by [Ang Tibay] in its printed memorandum—still retain their virtuality at the present time. o In the Philippines, social legislation has had a similar development, although of course to a much smaller degree and of different adaptation giving rise to several attempts at meeting and solving our peculiar social and economic problems. (See Commonwealth Acts Nos. 37, 104, 139, 211; Presidential Message to the National Assembly, September 2, 1936; Executive Order No. 49, S. 1936). The system of voluntary arbitration devised by Act No. 4055 of the defunct Philippine Legislature has apparently been abandoned by the enactment of Commonwealth Acts Nos. 103 and 213. In the midst of changes that have taken place, it may likewise be doubted if the pronouncement made by this court in the case of People vs. Pomar—also relied upon by [Ang Tibay] in its printed memorandum—still retains its virtuality as a living principle. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the assumption by the government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations affected with public interests." o "In CA 103, and by it, our Government no longer performs the role of a mere mediator or intervenor but that of the supreme arbiter." WoN the conduct of the investigator, the investigation practiced and the manner in which the matter was heard by the CIR deprived it of an impartial and fair hearing and constitute deprivation of his property without due process of law. o NO. The commissioner was appointed by the CIR in the exercise of his authority conferred by article 10 of CA 103 and at the inspection and hearings held by the commissioner and court, respectively, the parties were duly represented, were heard and presented the evidence that they had available and thought it convenient to offer. Such inspection and hearings had the character of an impartial and fair judicial hearing and constitute the due process of law guaranteed by the Constitution. WoN the CIR order of May 6, 1939 is arbitrary because there is no substantial evidence to support it o NO. The order is sustained by the outcome of the commissioner's investigation and the evidence that the parties submitted directly to the CIR. In these conclusions all the evidence presented by the parties has been considered and analyzed by the CIR. WoN the CIR can order the payment of wages to the 55 retired workers that they ceased to receive during their separation from service o YES. Articles 1 and 4 of CA 103, as amended first by Article 1 of Act No. 254, confer power and jurisdiction on the CIR to hear, resolve and decide all questions, controversies and disputes between employers and workers and owners and landlords; and the wages of the retired workers during the time they were separated
from service were included in the disputes and disputes submitted to the Department of Labor and certified by it to the CIR. NOTES:
