BOOK 1

Prepare For Your Emirates Upgrade

“BOOK 1” THE PROCESS GUIDE

(AIRBUS - A330) “ October October – 2008 ” ”

First Edition

☺

Prepare for Success Publications 2008

©

This book has been written and published as a reference book to assist all Emirates pilots who are going or being in their Upgrade command process. All materials herein are gathered and collected from pilots with emirates airlines during their upgrade process, recurrent or line training. Every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy of the information contained within this book, however it’s the responsibility of all pilots to make sure that the information in this book is up-to-date acco rding to Emirates’s latest updates as per the Company CD, FCI’s or any sort of updating venues.

All pilots are highly appreciated to submit their feedback, suggestions, comments or anything that might be helpful to our colleagues now or in future. Please send all your correspondences to the following e-mail: [email protected]

FOREWAORD

I would like to say a big thank you for all the people who provided me with this amount of useful information that led to the publishing of this book, I hope their time, effort and study will be reflected on all of us during our upgrade process, I wish you a very successful upgrade.

A.B

October 2008 2008

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Preparing For Your Emirates Upgrade

Congratulations

CONGRATULATIONS!

Congratulations! as you have been selected for a new role as a Commander of an Emirates aircraft, this new role requires a lot of study and preparation, I’m sure that all of Emirates Pilots are having the skills and the experience required for the this new responsibility, during service with Emirates all of us were waiting for this moment which is a mile stone in our career. During your service with Emirates you should have heard good stories, bad stories about the upgrade process, so just put faith in your self and be confident you can do it, just do your home work and make some effort to achieve your goal which you have always dreamed off. This book is intend to give you a hand during your preparation for your upgrade on the A330 Aircraft, I gathered all available information that made sense to me that it might be needed and combined them in TWO different books, (BOOK 1 and BOOK 2), Book one is “THE PROCESS GUIDE “, which includes most of the official material provided by the company, and Book 2 “SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION”, which include some good information collected from Emirates Pilots and a trusted internet sites. I have tried my best to gather as much information as I can from all my friends, colleagues, instructors and experienced, knowledged, trusted pilots, and combined them in this document for the benefit of all of us. Although this document is updated to the best of my knowledge and up to date, it is required by all pilots to update this document according to the new revisions/updates from the company. I wish all the best for all of us, and hope this document will give some help for all my colleagues approaching their upgrade time, GOOD LUCK.

A.B

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Congratulations

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Section 1 Introduction

1. INTRODUCTION

How you will be selected selected for your u pgrade As stipulated in in the FOM the minimum minimum experience for normal command are as follows: 1) A minimum of 6,000 6,000 hours Total Time. 2) A minimum of 4,000 4,000 hours HardTime. 3) Possessio Possessio n of a valid UAE ATPL. 4) A minimum of 3 years years of service in Emirates Emirates prior to promoti on to Captain. Captain. 5) A mini mum of fo ur PPCs PPCs successfu lly comp leted on any aircraft type in Emirates fleet. 6) A minimum of 12 months on type, from date of completion of initial line training. 7) Must maintain full Route and Aerodrome qualification recency, including CAT B & C airports.

If you are fulfilling the above requirements, then once your time comes the process is as follows: 1- Each month there is a Fleet Review Meeting which will review your file for an INITIAL SUITABILITY SUITABILITY ASSESMENT (details in Section 1 of this document). 2- Once you have been successfully selected by the Fleet Review Board, you will be notified in Writing to conduct a DETAILED SUITABILTY ASSESMENT ASSESMENT as follows: -

At ten d a p sy ch om etr ic tes t. At ten d a test t est on A330 t ech ni cal , proc pr oc edu res and FOM know kn ow ledge. led ge. To fly a series of command assessment sectors.

3- Upon the successful completion of the above requirements, candidate will be invited for INTERVIEW with INTERVIEW with Fleet Management (details are listed in Section 2 of this document). 4- Successful candidates will be receive offers for their upgrade course dates.

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Section 1 Introduction

Upgrade Course Layout The following is your upgrade footnotes, it will be detailed in the following sections of this document.

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Upgrade requirements and process (Extracts from FOM, OM-D, TM 334-Part 1)


Section 2 Company Manuals Extracts

2. Company Manuals Extracts

This section will highlight the minimum requirement for upgrade in Emirates Airlines as well as the different upgrade steps and process which lai d down in our official documents (FOM, TM 334 Part 1, OM-D and any FCI’s or FCN’s). The following documents will be extracted to cover all the requirements and di fferent upgrade process steps: -FOM (OM-A) -TM 334 Part 1 -OM-D -FCI’s and FCN’s (If available)

The following are exact extracts from the FOM’s latest version up to date as of October 2008. Note: Please make sure to u pdate any changes that migh t happen as per u pdates on company CD, FCI’s, FCN’s.

Chapter 3: Training, Checking, Qualifications & Recency 3.5 Upgrade Training 3.5.3.1 Minimum experience for normal command ◊ The experience requirements for upgrade to command are: 1) A minimum of 6,000 hours Total Time. 2) A minimum of 4,000 hours Hard Time. 3) Possession of a valid UAE ATPL. 4) A minimum of 3 years of service in Emirates prior to promotion to Captain. 5) A minimum of four PPCs successfully completed on any aircraft type in Emirates fleet. 6) A minimum of 12 months on type, from date of completion of initial line training. 7) Must maintain full Route and Aerodrome qualification recency, including CAT B & C airports. 3.5.4 Initial Suitability Assessment ◊ Suitability means having the necessary licence and experience requirements as defined above and also meeting the technical and performance standards expected for the new role. ◊ The monthly Fleet Review Meeting will assess the initial suitability of pilot candidates for type transfer or upgrade to command. ◊ The findings of this review process will be considered the Initial Suitability Assessment. ◊ The Fleet Review Meeting will be chaired by the Chief Pilot or Fleet Manager of the Fleet type. Minimum attendees shall consist of the Chief Pilot or Fleet Manager, Fleet Standard Captain or his representative, Manager Flight Training or his representative, Human Resource representative and Recruitment representative. ◊ The review meeting will perform the initial assessment of both the technical competence and all aspects of personal performance of the pilot in relation to the required standard expected for the new role. ◊ In determining the suitability of a First Officer, the review meeting will pay particular attention to Training and Standard performance. The candidate will be expected to have a high level of competency demonstrated through PPCs and ALCs. Unofficial Document

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◊

The Fleet management shall advise unsuccessful candidates in writing and shall provide details of the assessment on which the recommendations are based. This written notification will also specify the conditions and/or performance criteria necessary for future upgrade consideration. ◊ The outcome of the Review Meeting will be deemed to be the Flight Operations management’s final decision in this respect. ◊ An upgrade candidate who is successful in the Initial Suitability Assessment will be put forward for Detailed Suitability Assessment. 3.5.5 Detailed Suitability Assessment ◊ Subject to a satisfactory recommendation from the Initial Suitability Assessment, First officers will undertake a Detailed Suitability Assessment. Upon completion of the Detailed Suitability Assessment, the First Officer will be given a written notification of the outcome. ◊ The Detailed Suitability Assessment will consist of the following: 1) Candidates will attend the Psychology Department for psychometric testing. 2) Candidates will be tested on their current technical, procedural and FOM knowledge. 3) Candidates may be required to fly a series of Command Assessment Sectors with a Pilot Standards Captain where further demonstrations of technical, procedural, handling and FOM knowledge will be assessed. 4) Upon completion of the above requirements, candidates will be invited for an interview with Fleet Management where the results of the Assessment Process will be discussed and a decision will be made as to the candidate’s suitability to commence the upgrade training program. ◊ Successful candidates will receive offers of command training. Unsuccessful candidates will be notified by Fleet Management in writing outlining areas of concern that require development Any future consideration for command upgrade will be determined by Fleet Management upon the candidate meeting the suitability requirements as outlined in this policy. 3.5.6 Upgrade Command Training 1) On the same type:  Pilots undergoing upgrade on the same aircraft type will undertake a suitable upgrade course as described in OM-D.

Upgrade PPC with a grading of 3 must be reviewed by VPFT and CFI Airbus/Boeing to decide on the continuation or termination of Upgrade Training. 2) On a different type (Transition Upgrade): It is the policy of Emirates not to permit transition upgrades. 

3.5.7 Course Failure 3) Upgrade Command Training Failures: At the discretion of the Fleet Management, after a period of 12 months from an upgrade failure, a First Officer may be considered for a second upgrade attempt subsequent to satisfactory completion of 2 recurrent PPCs. In determining the suitability of a First Officer for a second attempt, the Fleet Review Meeting will pay particular attention to Training and Standard performance. The meeting expects to see a high level of competency demonstrated through PPCs and ALCs.

Before being offered a second upgrade course, the First Officer will undergo an assessment process that will include a technical quiz and Command Assessment Sectors as determined by the Fleet Standards Dept. If any developmental training is required this will be identified and the First Officer sent to the Training Dept to undergo the required training. If the First Officer is determined suitable for his second attempt at upgrade then he will conduct a final assessment flight with either the Chief Pilot or his nominated deputy.

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3.5.8 Freeze Periods 1) General: ◊ For the purposes of this policy, the A330, A340 and A380 will be considered to be the same aircraft type. ◊ The freeze period is the period of time a pilot is not permitted to change aircraft type. Freeze periods are not cumulative. Freeze periods commence from the date of FLC. Upgrade on the current type may take place during the freeze period. Freeze periods may be varied to meet company requirements. Any such variation must be authorised by SVPFO or EVP-E & O. 

2) Captains: After completion of initial training (Upgrade/DEC), Captains will be frozen on type from FLC for a minimum of six years. 

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The following are exact extracts from the TM 334 Part 1 latest version up to date as of October 2008. Note: Please make sure to u pdate any changes that migh t happen as per u pdates on company CD, FCI’s, FCN’s.

CH 2: Training Syllabi and Checking 2.1.3 Upgrade Command Training General Foreword The A330 Upgrade course has been designed to cater for the needs of a rapidly expanding fleet. This requirement has led to a course that will provide suitably qualified First Officers with the adequate training required, to qualify them as competent Aircraft Commanders in Emirates. Refer to OM-D for crew complement during upgrade training. Objectives The Command Upgrade Training is provided in order to achieve the following goals. 1. To ensure that the newly upgraded Captains have: • Acquired the flying skills and competency required to operate from the Left Hand Seat (LHS); • Acquired the leadership qualities and the technical and procedural knowledge required to command the operation of the aircraft; • Meet the standards established in the FOM. 2. To ensure that newly qualified Captains will comply with Line Operation Standards through the implementation of standardized training programmes.

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2.1.3.1 Course Footprint

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2.1.3.2 Ground School Foreword The Upgrade Ground School forms the initial part of the Upgrade training programme. During the course a variety of topics will be addressed in the form of lectures, presentations, discussions and practical application thereof. Thorough preparation is required by the upgrade candidate. Candidates are required to log on to the Crew Portal, Training / Generic / Upgrade, as required pre-reading and questionnaires must be downloaded from the crew portal Topics, summarized below will be presented in a modular format. Please refer to the downloadable course footprint and timetable sent by Flight Training Administration for the exact dates and times. Objective At the end of the modular ground school candidates should: 1. Show enhanced knowledge of the duties and responsibilities of a Captain, 2. Understand company policy and procedures to be app lied in normal and emergency situations and 3. Demonstrate sound management skills, decision-making abilities and leadership traits expected of a newly-upgraded Captain. Course Modules and Subjects Module 1 - Management Model (CRM) Trainees will, through an extensive review of relevant CRM topics and case studies, decide how effective management, decision making, leadership and communication can be achieved in a flight deck environment. Topics will be covered with the emphasis place from a human factors perspective. Module 2 – Perfor mance A review is conducted on certification, ICAO, JAR-OPS and LIDO performance requirements. Demonstration of practical application of procedures is required during and as part of pre-course study. Module 3 – Responsibilities, Expectations, Standards and LOS Scenario 1 A major component of upgrade training is being fully conversant with a Captains’ duties and responsibilities. A pre-course questionnaire on policy and procedures and pre-reading on the subject of aviation law will assist a candidate to gain extensive knowledge and awareness of international, local (GCAA) and company legal requirements. A thorough understanding of when and how to apply the procedures provided in company documentation is required to ensure that both individual and company integrities are maintained.

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Module 4 – LOS Scenario 2-5 In-flight normal and abnormal scenarios will be proposed at various stages of flight, requiring, through role play, practice of all the topics briefed and trained in Module 1 – 3. Candidates will be required to provide input through review and discussion on various aspects of flight operations. The topics will include: • •

• •

•

•

•

Flight Planning – LIDO requirements and practicalities. Aircraft Systems Management - Normal and Emergency procedures and awareness of effective management of various major emergencies, i.e. fuel leek, bomb on board, flight control failure. All Weather Operations (AWOPS) - company and international legal requirements. Extended Twin Operations (ETOPS) - normal and abnormal operations when a failure may effect the safe operation. Diversion and Suitable Airport planning - Selection of diversion airports using resources and guidance provided in aircraft manuals, Discussion on procedures when diverting to EK and non-EK airports whether continuing or terminating a flight. Fuel Management - The current fuel policy is reviewed and its practical application discussed. Aviation Law - The FOM will be reviewed with emphasis on an Emirates Captains’ duties and responsibilities. Legal responsibilities, the boundaries and authority bestowed upon an Aircraft Commander as derived from International and National Law will also be reviewed.

Module 5 - LOS Scenario 6 and 7 Module 4 dealt with small scenarios based on various stages of flight. In this module two full flights are given as examples requiring the candidates, through group exercise, to plan and complete a safe and efficient flight in the given circumstances. Through this classroom practice of LOS training, all aspects of the airli nes operation should be fully understood. Module 6 – Fleet To enable better understanding of the airli nes’ operation, briefings are conducted by representatives from the flowing departments in Flight Operations, Fleet Planning, Network Control and Flight Safety representatives. 2.1.3.3 Pre PPC Training Foreword This phase will provide a training forum to prepare the candidate for successful completion of the PPC and AWOPS/ZFT phases, whilst operating from the LHS. Objectives 1. To become proficient with operating the aircraft from the LHS. 2. To develop a sound decision-making process whilst re-familiarising the candidate with certain abnormal and emergency failures. 3. To prepare the candidate for the successful completion of the Upgrade PPC and 4. AWOPS/ZFT Simulator sessions. 5. To prepare the candidate for the successful completion of the LOS/LOE phase.

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Upgrade Full Flight Simulator (FFS) Training The FFS Training for type-rated First Officers is divided into two phases, i.e. RHS to LHS conversion and preparation for the LOS/LOE phase. The first 3 sessions encompass the pre-PPC training. The candi date must display a good understanding of failure items and the handling of the aircraft during normal a nd abnormal operations, before recommendation for the PPC can be made. F1U: provides a familiarization from the LHS, a review of flight characteristics, and a review of some Emergency and Abnormal Procedures. F2U & F3U: provides a review of some additional Emergency and Abnormal procedures. PPCI: is the Initial Pilot Proficiency Check as per OM-D - Training Manual Vol A33/4 Part 2. On successful completion of the PPCI the student will proceed to F5U. F5U: All Weather Operations and Zero Flight Time. Refer to relevant chapters. Note: FIU / F2U / F3U may be conducted with 2 Upgrade Trainees swapping seat’s or with a Line F/O in the R.H.S. In the case of a Li ne F/O in the RHS, Item’s that have been covered in the 1st half of the session need not be repeated.

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2.1.3.4 CAT C Airport Familiarization Foreword All Upgrade candidates are required to complete a simulator exercise at SANAA and SEYCHELLES airport. The simulator exercise is designed to familiarise the candidate with that particular Cat C aerodrome, with a large emphasis placed on training. During the session the Instructor will highlight important aspects and considerations for safe operations into that airport. Each familiarisation takes approximately 1 hour. The Sanaa familiarisation is conducted after LOS1 and the Seychelles familiarisation is conducted after LOS2. As the training takes place immediately after a LOS there is little time avail for a formal briefing. Therefore the student must have complete a thorough review of the OM-C RAIG beforehand Refer to TM 5.23 Category C Airfield training for details.

2.1.3.5 LOS – See section 5.19 of TM 334 Part1 (Below). 5.19 Line Orientated Simulation Foreword This phase consists of 4 FFS sessions, with the emphasis being again on training. The first 3 sessions will be Line Orientated Simulation (LOS), with the last one being the Line Orientated Evaluation (LOE). The 4 simulator sessions will be interspersed with normal upgrade line training sectors, during which time the line training syllabus will be completed to a satisfactory standard. These sectors have been inserted between the 3 LOS and the 1 LOE session to further enhance the overall training value, and to generally assist in building the confidence and ability of the upgrade candidate. The allotted amount of sectors, as per FTPM, will be completed before the LOE, followed by the Final Li ne Check (FLC). Training rostering will endeavor to produce a roster, whereby the candidate will fly between 4 to 8 line sectors from the LHS, between each simulator session.

Objectives To observe and develop the ability of the candidate to handle various emergencies and abnormalities in “real time”, and realistic operational conditions. To observe and develop the candidates knowledge in technical and procedural matters. To observe CRM behaviours and task management when subjected to potentially demanding scenarios. To develop the skills, knowledge and the application of knowledge so that upgrade candidates will have the tools to: • Successfully complete the upgrade training, and • Use sound judgment and make sensible decisions in accordance with Company Policies upon promotion to Captain. Unofficial Document

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Training Guidelines During the LOS phase, the emphasis is on training. The scenarios will be run as realistically as possible, however the TC is e ncouraged to intervene and discuss pertinent issues as required to assist in developing the candidate. If necessary the use of the simulator “freeze” facility is acceptable for the TC to stress an important point of instruction. During this phase the candidate must demonstrate a good standard, or show signs of improving towards this, before being recommended for the LOE. Should the standard not be achieved within the allocated sessions, then extra training may be scheduled at the discretion of VPFT and/or CFI/CFE. During the LOS and LOE sessions, the TC will act as engineer, purser, ATC and any other character as may be required. The emphasis on training must be maintained during the LOS phase. The final LOS is conducted as a Progress Review without any instructor intervention. On successful completion of this exercise, the candidate wil l be recommended for the LOE. The LOE will be run as a normal flight in all aspects. All LOS and LOE forms consist of 2 pages, filling in and signing of these forms is as per standard Emirates practice. Use Of Video It is recommended that the video equipment be used to record the entire Loft as this gives increased value to the debriefing. It clearly highlights CRM aspects and in many cases will greatly assist in getting across an important teaching point. The student should provide a blank 180 minute video tape for each session, i f he wishes he can use the same tape and record over it. The tape must be erased after each session and the student must not be allowed to take it home. A video eraser is available in briefing room 4 for this purpose. During the simulator session the instructor should note the times at which items of i nterest occur and use this as a guide during replay. Debriefing in this manner may increase the debriefing time however this method has been well received by the crews that have undergone upgrade training. LOS Rules LOS sessions are designed with the following rules: • Only 1 MEL prior to pushback. Thi s may or may not be combined with further failures to affect the outcome of the flight. • Only 1 failure allowed during taxi. This can be in addition to the MEL above. • After takeoff, only 1 x recoverable failure, and 1 x unrecoverable failure may be given. These failures may be the secondary result of a primary failure, eg. Hydraulic system failure due to engine shutdown. • Weather conditions are to be realistic with changes as indicated on the forecast The content and failure scenarios of each LOS will be at the discretion of the TC in accordance with the prescribed guidelines in OM-D.

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LOS/LOE Guidelin es Furthermore, one prescribed scenario will be included in each LOS: LS1U: the first LOS will include a Monsoon Weather scenario. LS2U: will include a Cold weather Operation scenario. LS3U: will include an ETOPS flight. LOEU: is the Line Orientated Evaluation. The content will be at the discretion of the TRE in keeping with the above rules. If a particular LOFT does not take up the entire simulator session, then a second mini-loft may be introduced and conducted by the TC.

2.1.3.6 Initial Pilot Proficiency and ZFT – See Training Manual Volume A33/4 Part 2, Section 5.17 of TM 334 Part 1(Below). 5.17 Zero Flight Time Training General: The Zero Flight Time module is a training event. As a general rule, all the items in the syllabus should be completed and repeated, if necessary, unti l proficiency is achieved. At the end of the session the instructor shall certify the trainees proficiency by ticking the ZFTT box on the Synthetic Training Report Form.

2.1.3.7 All Weather Ops Initial – See Training Manual Volume A33/4 Part 2, Section 5.5 of TM 334 Part 1 (Below). 5.5 Low Visibility Operations – LVO Training 5.5.1 General: The Low Visibility Operations module is a combination training / checking event. There is significant preparation required for this module. The trainee should prepare by reviewing the document references listed below. Refer to Training Manual A33/4 Part 2 for the latest syllabus.

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5.5.2 Document References:

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2.1.3.8 LIFUS – See section 5.21 of TM 334 Part 1 (Below).

5.21 Line Flying Under Supervision General The Line Training Syllabus presented has been developed from the Airbus recommended listing of Line Training subjects. Line Training is intended to familiarise new entry, upgraded pilots, and pilots who are transferring fleets, with the operation of their new aircraft type, their respective crew duties, and the characteristics of our route network environment. It must highlight the duties, and the characteristics of our route network environment. It must highlight the difficulties and traps that could affect the safety and the efficiency of the flight, and provide comprehensive guidance regarding the use of all the resources that are available to support the Company’s flying operations. Line Training will also include the technical items on the syllabus, which can not be taught in the simulator. These may include: weather radar, ETOPS and comprehensive use of the FMS. The main objective of Line Training is to consolidate the training received on the ground in order to deliver to the Fleet hi ghly competent, safe and standardised pilots. At the completion of their Line Training, these pilots must have demonstrated that they have reached a high level of technical and operational knowledge, as well as good flying skills, and that they are capable and efficient cockpit resource managers. The Briefings are listed in flight phase order until parking. The topics are then listed in procedural order.

Line Training Preparation This guide is to help prepare you for the transition from Simulator Training (Aircraft Type Rating) to Line Training (operating on the line according to Emirates procedures.) Preparation is key: Before each flight thorough route study is essential. OM-C RAIG (Route and Aerodrome Information Guide) is a good starting point. You can obtain old LIDO en-route charts and Aerodrome charts from Nav Services, located in the Emirates Operations Centre (EOC). These charts will be out d ated but are still useful for route study. We recommend you buy an ATLAS. You are bound to be flying over unfamiliar territory and a ‘geographical awareness’ is essential. When you get transferred to “LVIV Control” it would be nice to know which country you are over, not to mention the pronunciation. A day or two before your flight you can ask the operations clerks at the CBC to print off a CFP and NOTAMS for that particular sector. It will not be exactly as per the flight you will be doing but it will be a great aid in preparation, especially when covering NOTAMS. It will also help with time management, as you will know which items are need-to-know and which can be covered later, in flight. A good time to get these is immediately following a duty when signing off, obtain the CFP/NOTAMS for your next flight, so you can study at home.

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Study: Line Training will require an in-depth knowledge of the FOM and the FCOM’s. Thorough knowledge of all chapters is expected and required. For study purposes we recommend you give particular emphasis to FOM chapters 11-15 and chapter 20. Your Training File contains a Line Training Syllabus. Each subject will be covered by your various Training Captains you must arrive for you flig ht well prepared. The Line T raining Study Guide and Completion standard is designed to help you study, please use this document to your advantage. Time Management: Your pick-up will be approximately 2hrs15mins prior to flight (depending on location – check FOM). Arrival time at CBC will vary, however, cabin crew are instructed to depart CBC for the aircraft at STD -75 mins. The bus ride from CBC to the aircraft can take 15- 20mins depending on the parking bay. Time Management at the briefing stage is critical. Prioritisation is essential, make sure you know the minimum requirements FOM 12.2.

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The following are exact extracts from the OM-D latest version up to date as of October 2008. Note: Please make sure to u pdate any changes that migh t happen as per u pdates on company CD, FCI’s, FCN’s.

CHAPTER 2: TRAINING SYLLABI AND CHECKING 2.1.3 Upgrade Comm and Trainin g 2.1.3.1 General The Company may upgrade First Officers to command on their existing fleet or select first officers for an upgrade on a different type. Direct Entry Captains (DEC) may also be employed. DECs and Upgrade First Officers complete a course of training and checking, detailed in the applicable type specific training manual, which incorporates the required elements of Initial, Conversion and Upgrade Command training courses. 2.1.3.2 Auth orit y The CFE and CFI-A/B shall ensure that upgrade command training and checking programmes are established in the Operations Manual and approved by the Authority. 2.1.3.3 Asso ciated Trainin g • Initial Training Course • Conversion Training Course 2.1.3.4 Minimum Qualif icatio ns / Experience Levels Refer to OM-A. (FOM). The candidate shall complete the training detailed and successfully complete the associated proficiency and other tests to the standard detailed in Chapter One – Specification of Training and Checking – Assessment. 2.1.3.5 Syllabus and Cont ent The command course shall include at least the following: • training in an approved flight simulator to include LOFT and/or flying training • a PPC operating as commander • commander's responsibilities • line training in command under supervision • completion of a commander's line check and route and aerodrome competence qualifications (see Line Flying Under Supervision and Line Checking Appendix) • CRM training (see CRM Training Appendix) The Upgrade Command course is conducted in accordance with a detailed course syllabus, included in the applicable type specific training manual.

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2.1.3.5.1 Ground School - Pilots progressing from First Officer to Captain will undertake ground school training emphasizing the duties and responsibilities of a Commander. - Human factors topics in relation to Crew Resource Management (CRM) will be trained and practiced. At the end of the course, candi dates should have an understanding of how to maintain safe and efficient operations. - During this ground school, exercises will be undertaken to enhance sound and effective management, decision making, leadership and communication skills. The followin g topics are conducted in a modular format: • Aircraft Performance • Crew Recourse Management (CRM) • Airline Management and Flight Safety • Command Responsibilities, expectations and achievement standards. • Line Orientated Simulation exercises covering the following topics: • Aircraft Systems Management - Normal and Emergency procedures • All Weather Operations (LVO) • Extended Twin Operations (ETOPS) • Diversion and Suitable Airport planning • Flight Planning • Fuel Management • Aviation Law for Aircraft Commanders 2.1.3.5.2 Simulator Training Details of the upgrade simulator training modules can be found in the applicable type specific Training Manual. The Upgrade FFS Modules are summarised as foll ows: • Module 1: 2 simulator sessions Provides a familiarisation from the Left Seat, and a review of the flight characteristics of the aircraft. • Module 2: 1 simulator session Provides a review of the principal Emergency and Abnormal Procedures, in preparation for the Pilot Proficiency Check (PPC). • Module 3:

1 simulator session Initial Pilot Proficiency Check

• Module 4: 1 simulator session o LVOPS o ZFT o Cat C (if required). • Module 5: 3 LOS simu lator and 1 LOE simu lator sessi on. o LOS: a series of line oriented flight training simulator exercises. o LOE: is a final line oriented simulator check. o Simulator LOS and LOE sessions will be embedded throughout the Li ne Training flights. LOS session 1 must be completed satisfactorily before commencing Line Training and LOE must be completed before the FLC. Note: For guidelines on the conduct of LOS/E, refer to the LOS and LOE Appendix. 2.1.3.5.3 Line Training Refer to the Line Flying Under Supervision and Line Checking Appendix. Unofficial Document

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Section 3 Interview Process

3. INTERVIEW PROCESS Upon completion of the requirements stipulated in the FOM and previously stated in Section 1 of this document, candidates will be invited for an interview with Fleet Management where the results of the Assessment Process will be discussed and a decision will be made as to the candidate’s suitability to commence the upgrade training program. Successful candidates will receive offers of command training. The interview panel may consist of: -Fleet Management. -Human Resources representative. -Recruitment representative. The interview will take about 15 min to 1 hour depending on the panel and your answers ☺. Questions will vary between personal, technical, operational or daily operation including a real scenario for a flight with different problems on ground and before departure. Problems will be time critical and sometimes to judge your awareness of the FOM, decision making process and company operational policies. In the following pages you will find a very good summary of some points you need to focus and it really covers some of the interview questions as well as the experience of many pilots who have gone through their interview process and would like to share their experience with their colleagues, I tried to gather as much interview sessions as I can from both Airbus and Boeing pilots respectively so please if you come across an interview with a Boeing pilot, please disregard the specific type technical info and procedures.

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GOOD POINTS TO PREPARE FOR YOUR COMMAND INTERVIEW

- - - -

Limitations Tech Log, Daily Validity, What must be signed MEL, Concessions, verbal, Captain performed items Company Ops Spec, Where, what does it contain? Aircraft Documentation Folder Fuel Policy, extra, when Reduced Reserve Fuel, conditions, actions Continue without Alternate, conditions Fuel uplift check Tankering, how to maximize calculation Fuel emergency AWO Minima, Take-off / Landing Take-Off Alternate requirements, when, distance ETOPS, Suitable Alternate, weather deteriorates? Alternate Airport weather requirements, 2 Alts when? Circling Minima Visual requirements Stable approach criteria Flight parameter callouts by PNF Orbit Autoland Approach ban point Company speed limits Derated Take-off, when must you use TOGA FO takeoff / landing restrictions, taxi Minimum cabin crew Captain Responsibilities, whose authority, when, where (ie)hotel? ZFW LMC, 300, 700, +700, LMC Fuel? LMC bag weights New CFP when? Need to reduce TO weight, priorities New Captain limits ASRs, when, GCAA Fire fighting / Rescue Capt is PF mandatory when? Departure / Arrival delays, time, Pax PA, Ops call info Arming of doors Autobrakes recommended Land ASAP (RED) when Mayday vs PAN Flight Duty period, local night, max duty with positioning Flight Duty Period extensions Latest publication amendments numbers

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Command Interview 1 (Airbus ) Quiz: • • • • • • • • • • • • •

•

•

330 Severe Turbulence Penetration Minimum battery voltages Engine Master Fault light Destination Alternate minima Time limit on taking Viagara before a flight Max number of INADS and DEPOS Is Captain required to be informed if a wheel chair pax is on board Can the Captain sign transit checks Meaning of ‘Check EWD’ on upper display What is the minimum contingency fuel Whose permission id is required for a crew member to stay away from hotel on layover Maximum number of bags allowed for a crew member Interpret the engine bleed page to determine what power setting the engine is at when both the High and Low pressure bleeds are supplying air ETOPS weather requirements when TEMPO condition exists on the ETOPS alternate TAF What happens when the thrust levers are moved forward of the climb detent below 100’

Interview •

• • • • •

Scenario involved a flight to BAH with considerations for fuel planning, F/O landing restrictions, dispatch with no engineer, all with a difficult F/O and how I would handle him. What would you do if the FO was ‘running down’ the company while you were on duty. Relate a complex situation you have been involved in. Non-adherence to SOP's, when/why? Relate a time you have had to assert yourself. What do you think of EK command criteria?

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Command Interview 2 (Airbu s)

30 Nov. 02

3 Panel members Duration : 20 – 25 min 1.

If there has been a failed check ride in the past it will come up and be discussed. This may include any abnormal write up you may have had, not necessarily a failed check ride. 2. What do you think a good Captain is (should be) ? a. Include Leadership roles. b. How to motivate crew. c. Etc. 3. Have you had any difficult situations in the past (could be as Captain or F/O) ? Explain if full detail. 4. Have you had any conflicting experiences ? 5. What is enroute reserve fuel ? This will lead into the next question. 6. You are in LHR after pushing off the gate and find out you must off load a bag. What are the considerations ? You notice that you no longer have CFP fuel, what will you do ? Refueling is not an option. After exhausting your great knowledge on flying at a more economical speed, closer alternate, blah, blah, you are stuck with what you got and it’s not enough. a. LMC b. RRP i. New CFP ii. DP, etc 7. Following through with the above scenerio….you now end up with a medical emergency. What are your considerations ? How are you going to handle it ? What is your role in this case ? 8. You are approaching the Lamborne VOR for LHR. Weather is fluctuating above and below Cat III limits. First of all what are the limits ? And second of all what are you going to do ? 9. Are both autopilots engaged in a autoland ? 10. What considerations must you take into effect for a NPA ? This questions is referring to the QRH checklist. There is also a question regarding the EK policy that you must fly a NPA at least once a month and then annotate in the VR. 11. Know EGT limits.

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Command Interview 3 (Airbus) -Panel of 2 to 4 people -They expect to see at least a tie and shirt worn, possibly a jacket depending on time of year. -Approx 15-20 mins in duration -Relatively informal format -Possible discussion on anything Pysch may have de-briefed you on Past Question s (A330) : FOM Chap 18 : FOM Chap 3 : AFM section 6 : FCOM VOL 2 Special Flig ht -What is contained in the Ops Specs & Where are they located : (Docs Folder on b oard) -When can the Captain utilise Fl t and Duty discretion : FOM Chap 27 -Outline the Company Circling minima : FOM Chap 21 -Who can issue a CRS? : FOM Chap 17 -What is a concession, how many sectors can y ou operate under one and who can authorize its use? : FOM Chap 17 & MEL Section 0 -What is the recommended technique if an overspeed occurs in the descent? : SOP’s & FCOM 3 Supplementary Procedures -What would you do if you realize you will be arriving at dest with < CMR fuel : FOM Chap 11 -Incapacitation scenario : FOM Chap 25 & FCOM 3 -Why do you want to be a Captain? -What are the qualities you think a Captain should have? -Tell us about a time you experienced conflict in the fli ght deck/at work/at home….how was it resolved -What are the duties and responsibilites of a Captain? : FOM Chap 1 -Tell us about the worst experience you have had in your aviation career -Tell us what you were doing prior to joining EK -What do you think of the EK fuel policy…If ZFW drops prior to departure what would you do re-fuel…., When would you take extra fuel? -ATC ask you to maintain 210 kts until 8nm final…what would you do…? -On the CFP, how is block time calculated? -How do you view EK as a company? -What do you think EK could be doing better? -Destination Alternate is equipped with a CAT 2 Approach only, what are the weather limits required at the planning stage : FOM Chap 12 -Briefly summarise the changes in the latest FOM amendment -Briefly summarise the changes in the latest SOP amendment -First officer limitations -New Captain limitations -List reasons you cant continue on an ETOPS flight

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Command Interview 4 (Airbus) Stabilization Criteria Capt Limitations What is CPDLC What is ADS RVSM- 1000’ FPM Climb-where do you find this criteria? G/A calls Duties & Responsibilities of Captain Who can you call inflight for help? Concessions ETOPS-Currency requirements Reason for ASR Actions for Bomb onboard Fuel Policy Special ops (ETOPS,RVSM) Circling minima VFR Wx Req 180 min Etops-Ops specs (Doc Folder) A330 -420 m -Not approved NAT MNPS -RNP 4 Approved -RVSM approved -CPDLC/ADS approved Scenarios: -Cabin Crew Pregnant – Can she fly (No…License) -Fat Lady thinks she is preg-can u off load her -Fight with F/O-now to get talking-SOP’s Go Around calls and actions MNPS/RNP/RVSM

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Command Interview 5 (Airbus) Hi guys, Just a few points about the interview this week

-

-

-

interview takes about 45 minutes st 1 10 minutes about how you and family are adapting to Dubai ? o Any problems? How is school for the kids etc, o Have you had any conflicts at work? If yes, how did you handle it? If no, discussion about CRM at Emirates, read RM CRM section. AAM, stay under the radar, conflict resolution, etc How would you handle conflict with FO that refuses to follow your request/direction while airborne? What is your honest opinion about the new SOPs If you could change any part, what would it be? What do you think about the Gross Error procedure for performance Give an example of a recent Category 1 change to the SOP Why do we enter the CFP FINAL fuel into the FMGS? (ISA versus Actual temp) What must you watch for if you order 40.0kg of fuel, pre-load, trim tank numbers, trim sheet, etc What do you do for a TCAS RA event? What is the reject procedure? What is meant by a single suitable ETOPS alternate? Is there a critical fuel point? What is a DEPA? (Deportee accompanied) What form do you need? Scenario 30 minutes from TOD and you have insufficient fuel, options? o After you have given the solution (Alt Fuel at cruise) you then commence o descent, now there is holding at destination, what to do? Scenario o LHR, LVP, Slot times with LMC o Offload bags, check total LMC, new load sheet? o Start aircraft and released by engineer, you’ve dispatched During taxi, ground tells you to call ops, one LMC bag still on board o Pull off to the side to off load the bag, shut down engine, bag removed by the o redcap and he gives you the thumbs up. o Can you dispatch and continue Yes you can, still dispatched o Fuel is now below minimum amount on the CFP, can you go? o o Yes use the enroute reserve, call SMNC, get Reduced reserve CFP figures via ACARS, etc.

That’s about it Good luck

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Command Interview 6 (Airbus) 1. CRM: Tell us a story of when you had to use it: 2. How do you handle a stressful situation or when you are stressed (RM: CRM section) 3. What do the latest FCI's contain 4. What is the Best ANGLE/RATE speed/mach 5. What is your max taxi speed and when would you configure for take off with snow covered ramps and taxiways 6. While flying at V2, follo wing an engine failure after rotate, what bank angle will the AFS limit you to during a turn and when will the bank angle increase 7. What is the minimum altitude at which you may commence a turn after take off to comply with an ATC assigned heading 8. RVSM: What is the recommended maximum rate of climb in RVSM airspace to avoid TCAS Alerts. 9. What are the F/O Wx limits for T.O. And landing 10. If ATC or you require an " orbit" wile on approach, what is the minimum altitude and what are the requirements that need to be met 11. How long before the STD are the FA's required to leave the CBC. 12. How long is the daily check valid 13. When and what does the Captain "sign for" in the Tech Log 14. If your duty period started at 15:10, what is your max duty period(before Captain's discretion) 15. How will an FA alert you to a hijacking 16. What are your actions in the event of a hi jacking 17. What are and where can the "Ops Specs" be found 18. When is a new load sheet required and what is the maximum LMC. 19. What is the minimum number of Cabin Crew required on the A 330 to b e able to dispatch 20. What can be done if you are one short from the requirements of Q.19 21. ETOPS: What are the currency requirements 22. Where can you find the alternate Wx limits on the OFP, and where else 23. When do the slides have to be armed 24. How do you know all the passengers are seated 25. What is an MEL concession 26. You arrive late at the CBC, what is the minimum to brief in your flight pl an briefing 27. What are the normal A 330 RFF requirements for Dest./Alt./ETOPS Alt and can they be Reduced? 28. What is the range the glide path angle can be within to be suitable for an autoland 29. What are the published wind l imits for the AFS to conduct a successful autoland 30. How do we conduct a circling approach on the A 330 31. What are the EK Company Wx minima for a circling approach 32. What are the criteria for a "stabili zed approach"

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Command Interview 7 (Airbus) Do you need a ceiling for T/O alternate at planning stage? When can you use factoring to arrive at an RVR equivalent? What are the factoring figures to be used....they give you different options so just know the numbers. You have no engineer and no defect so do you need a CRS? How much can you extend an FDP by? What is min fuel for landing with commitment to destination, destination and alternate.....they gave me two of these options, can't remember which. They gave me 3 different questions with pi ctures of a PFD and asked me what law we were operating under.....didn't like those at all, just couldn't remember that stuff. Picture of ECAM fuel page with jettison showing on left wing and in Amber....what is happening here? What initial actions for unreliable airspeed? What is initial attitude for double engine flameout and is it weight dependant? ECAM fuel page with aft transfer occurring and upper ECAM showing "trim tank transfer"....why? How do you check if battery voltage is acceptable? At what temp do you correct DH/DA (cold weather)? When can you dispatch without contingency fuel, never or when using decision point procedure? What's true about dest alternate, need one navai d if weather is CAVOK, weather below CAVOK you need 2 navaids or both of the above? For taxi you have toe brake pressure applied and you release the park brake. The triple indicator drops to zero...is this normal? Do tempo or prob30/40 of a transient nature have influence on destination alternate weather when assign at planning stage?

Max alts for gear and flap operation?

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Command Intervi ew 8 (Boeing) Here is the rundown from what’s left of my memory (I’m trying really hard to wipe it out in Malta). HR QUESTIONS 1. Tell us about your career up to joining EK 2. Tell us a time when you were really pushed time wise during a flight 3. Tell us about a time when you had a conflict with cabin crew, Captain, F/O- how did you resolve it? 4. Tell us a time when you were put into a difficult situation after all planning failed 5. How are you finding life in Dubai? 6. How has your experience at EK been? Alon g tho se li nes FLT OPS QUESTIONS KUL DAC DXB WX KUL 10kt crosswind/ 3500 BKN CB/ 2000m VIS tempo TS RA+ Same basically for DAC 200ER emi OFP's for both legs Tankering sector KUL-DAC, reason (p) price fuel out of KUL 62.2 Alternate leg 1 VTBD (15.1) second alternate VTCC (10ish) Nothing special Enroute Wx wise What are your thoug hts? I just did the normal flight planning routine and looked at EVERYTHING including the Wx timings on the OFP (new Wx was coming out for our departure time and with temp it seemed to like that) and reason for tinkering (price not supply or volume) Consider -Contaminated RTOW for KUL and DAC (DAC has a Max ZFW) remembering max payload for min cost. -F/O limits. -Alternate limits(met VIS for cat 1 not RVR). -Fuel in center tank (below all limits for RTOW and fuel limitations but use the penalty of carrying 1.2 - .9 t in the center tank min cost). Then a purser handling ops question (PREGGO..."WASNT ME" or maybe a dg or weapons or Inad/Depo scenario) Pushback status before or after start or MEL and engineer is a bit lax about procedures "just jiggle the switch" what to do.. be firm about getting fixed and signed. Nothing unusual about the flight to DAC. DAC on ground, he drew a map of the taxi way and said the a/c is halfway to the RWY and an ACARS load sheet rev2 pops out what would you do. F/O is taxing (I just said keep taxiing to hold short of RWY, set brakes you have control, advise ATC and review what the load final 2 is about) Mine was ZFW - 270 and 3 PAX less. Had to call company and enquire about what type of people and if bags offloaded etc. 30 min delay due wx, push hold scenario Fuel policy question - say landing assured as much as possible ... a/c failures, airport failures traffic and WX (Wx specifically if you have CAT 1 Wx and a CAT 2 approach then its ok but if the Wx drops to cat 2 and that’s the lowest landing not assured. Stuff like that) maybe RWY lighting issues, anything that would prevent any easy landing. Remember fuel to land at Dest, fuel at alternate and fuel to commit. Alternate Wx limits, planning and enroute (jepps mins enroute only apply) Basically he was very easy going and ligh t toned, even jokin g a bit. He really wants to see your gu t reaction and legal reaction to all the scenarios. No surprises really, just know the basics and he was glad to see if you had the key points b ut wanted to check the FOM just t o be sur e. Take your time, don’t rush and just do what you have been doing all the time, everything we yapped about is there. Unofficial Document

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Command Intervi ew 9 (Boeing) th

Upgrade interview ( 20 of June 2007 ) 1.

Psychometric assessment • •

2.

Technical quiz •

3.

It takes from 2 to 3 hours to answer the 560 questions Debriefing occurs on the same day or the next day.( Take notes of the results as it can come back during the final interview.

30 questions in 30 minutes These questions are mainly from the multiple choice B 777 questions o 2 to 4 Dangerous Goods questions o

Final interview • •

•

Interview was conducted by S.P and H.W ( HR) The interview was done in a nice casual atmosphere. It was more a discussion than an interrogation. S.P was helping in case of any doubts. My feeling about the interview is that they already knows whether you will pass it or not. It is just a matter of being 100 % sure, so, if you studied enough and had no problems before, it should be a piece of cake. So, my advise would be: don’t put unnecessary pressure on your shoulder. i. Interview with the H.W ( HR) In 2 to 3 minutes, talk about your career before EK What was the hardest thing when you joined EK? Do you have any ambitions in EK ? Have you had any problem with a captain ? Did you have to take any Important decisions ( in aviation, of course) ? ii. Interview with S.P The interview is a small scenario to see if you are able to react in the grey areas of the FOM and FCOM. During the discussion, S.P fills the white board, helps you if you need it and adds questions to the initial scenario. Again, he is not there to kill you. The scenario: I have to operate a flight from DXB to IST and return DXB 10:40 – IST 14:30 IST 16:00 – DXB 20:00 DXB: 5000 m BLSA 100/06 SKC – ILS IST : 2000 m RA 140/08 OVC 040 – ILS ALTN : 1800 m RA 160/10 OVC 040 – VOR DME( 1600m) no circling ANC : CAVOK • • • • •

•

•

1) What are your considerations when you reach the CBC ? In blowing sand, visibility might decrease and the fall below the  F/O’s minimas . What are the F/O’s minimas ? The alternate weather is below the planning minimas  (1600m+1000m=2600 m) then ANC fuel. →

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2) You reach the airplane and you see that the techlog hasn’t been signed. Only missing the signature. What do you do ? Call SMNC to know if the captain is still ther ? ( gone)  At the same time, the red cap asks if he can start the boarding  o I ask him to wait 5 minutes, the time to solve my problem, he says he is going to put my responsibility for the delay and I accept it . Obviously, only the signature is missing as all the other boxes  were filled and we decide to go and raise a CSR. 3) APU auto shutdown due to APU controller. You are in the black. What are your actions? Check list  Stop boarding + PA  Engineer + MEL  Ground power  S P for engine start  Check if dest has the appropriate equipment  4) NOTOC 5 or 6 containers are loaded with radioactive products( TI = 12.4)  at last minute. What do you do ? You accept after you checked the TI or  You refuse it because you don’t know if it is loaded  on the bottom of the container th

5) You have a MEL cat C dated of 10 of june at 17:40. What do you do? th th Dated on the 10 means active from the 11 at 00:00 until the  th 20 of june 23:59. Then, we can go. 6) And what if you have a split duty in IST and land in Dubai at 01:00 LT ? As we takeoff before midnight, MEL is a pre dispatch document,  we can go. 7) During taxi, you have a comm message and a new load sheet, final 2… Stop and coordinate with ATC  Contact load control and discover that LMC, - 3 pax and – 270  kg ( check that bags are not on board ) No perfo change… We continue  8) You arrive at IST, gate 223 and it is really not your day, the ground kart doesn’t connect… Neither the second one … The right engine is turning, so, I coordinate with everybody(  Engineer, ground staff, ATC…) and connect the bridge on the left( disembark PAX) Then, I start the left and shutdown the right. Proceed for bags(  offload and load), cargo and fuel( + 2hrs of fuel( 2.5 tons) to cover the rest of the ground ops Start left and shutdown right to allow pax. Arm a second door.  9) The end

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Command Interview 10 (Boeing) The interview started with question from the HR lady as: What I have done to get prepared for the interview What are the characteristic of a good captain Story where you needed to use persuasion to reach a goal A time you needed to act quickly for flight safety What do you do to prepare for a flight Then S.P stepped in asking the maximum duty period and what if you are now i nto the position for the last leg or a single leg (2 hrs max) Scenario: MNL to DXB Rain, wind 120/15-22 (Crosswind) Dubai weather fine Alternate OMAA with tempo 2000 meter Who will fly the sector? Although the weather is border limit I would fly Then he added that RWY is contaminate with 3 mm rain. In this case CA must takeoff OMAA has a tempo wit 2000 meters , ILS is out, consideration? Alternate weather is not adequate for a NPA need to get a new alternate (considering both ends of RWY if ILS is available opposite end) RAK is elected and since is within 100 nm is not required to have the extra fuel. The new alternate need to be filed with ATC tough!! During pushback ,prior to engine start FO push status page and you get a "Hydr Dem right", what you do? Ask to be pulled in and get the engineer to fix it. REFUELING WITH PAX ON BOARD AND PURSER IS NOT HAPPY L5 GETTING PADDLE OF WATER . Want it closed but ask for another one to be armed> Close and manned and since there is no other door she needs to accept it. During taxi TWR advice full length is not available and OPT doesn't have the intersection takeoff point, considerations? Ask for backtrack, Push into position for full length Set for a different RWY if wind gets within limits OR Decrease RWY length by distance unusable entering the data in the Notams. • • • •

After takeoff bomb threat red, Step by Step: STOP CLIMBING WITH ALT HOLD MAYDAY to ATC PURSER TO FLIGHT DECK (NITS) GET IN THE HOLD ABOVE MSA PLAN TO LOWER GEAR AND FLAPS IN CASE IT GOES OFF LAND ON RWY, STAY THERE AND GET A PRECAUTIONARY DISEMBARKATION (BOMB FOUND: FULL EMERGENCY EVACUATION) •

• • • •

•

Well this is all I can remember…..I hope it can help. Unofficial Document

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Command Interview 11 (Boeing) I was scheduled for this interview on a day when S.P’s roster was showing a cross day off. I was a bit concerned and asked P.D. She confirmed that interview is still ON and I was impressed to know that S.P works on his off days as well. Good management. I reached there a bit early and after waiting for a while was received by S.P. In his office he was accompanied by R.M from HR. They both introduced themselves. S.P briefed me about how the interview will be conducted. During that he asked me what was my understanding about the interview and how had I prepared for it. Off course I told him that I had ruined my one month leave in Dubai studying for this interview. Then R.M asked me about my past experience in aviation and all the typical questions about occasions of: Deviation from SOPs Helping others Team work Any decision that I regret or that I could have done better Questions regarding feed back from my psychometric analysis Since I went through my log book thoroughly and recalled quite a lot of occasions regarding these questions so I had answers to all most all the questions that she asked. Than it was S.P’s turn. Scenario was from DXB-LGW. Low visibility ops in Dubai and LGW. Alternate was LHR AND BHX. LHR also low vis and BHX was fine. I have reached late in the CBC with my F/O and our cabin crew had already left. Basically he was looking at the Min briefing requirements, Who will do the take off and landing, T/O alternate requirements, 2 alternate requirements for destination What kind of weather do we need for alternate Additional fuel and how much Above discussion was in detail and took about 25 mins. Then we go to the a/c and red cap wants to get boarding clearance. I told him we need to see the techlog first and also I want to talk to the purser and than will be able to give the boarding clearance. Then we had a CAT C MEL and expiry was the same day midnight UTC so I accepted that. Then purser came to me with a pregnant woman case whose medical certificate was one month st old. She was having twins and was in her 31 week. Not a problem. Than we completed our boarding and push back. Eng start was normal and we taxi out. He wanted to know my considerations during taxi and what taxi speed will I maintain.

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During taxi we got an EICAS “TCAS” message. We checked the MEL and it says A/C SHOULD not depart Dubai with a TCAS U/S. We talked to maintenance and there point of view was that we have been dispatched and it is a SHOULD case and not a MUST case. I checked the requirement for MNPS airspace and off course it was not required, but I still decided to get i t rectified considering busy airspace in Europe and expected holdings and stacking at LGW. So we decided to return and that was it. Stefan said I have no further questions. They told me to wait outside and than after a short while called me and gave me the good news. Over all it was a very comfortable environment. Stefan’s perspective is to see that you know your stuff very well. The earlier you can make it happen the easier the interview is. So my advice is to thoroughly understand and remember your books particularly FOM along with all the FC’Is plus all the supplementary procedures. Best wishes.

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Command Interview 12 (Boeing) I reached EOC an hour early ( just in case there was an accident) and then waited till I got called in by May B.K. She introduced me to S.P and P.D that were waiting in the room. At that point S.P started a mini brief on what to expect and made it clear that i f at any stage I wasn’t sure or didn’t feel comfortable about a question or a situation, to speak up and say so. I found it very very professional and felt that they really wanted to put you in a situation you can feel free to answer the questions with no pressure. P.D started asking questions regarding a brief history on my career, what made me move to Emirates and an example on when I had to make a difficult decision thinking outside the procedures. Then was S.P’s turn. What would you do to prepare for the flight the day before? Well, basically he wants to hear that you don’t go clubbing’ the night before… You are picked up late and your F/O is in the car and you can see fog everywhere on the way to CBC. SCENARIO DXB to FCO Weather in DXB Fog and Vis 200 m. B777-300ER EBA What are your consideration? (F/O LVO qualified, T/O Alternate) You get to CBC and spot your crew going thru security. What do you tell them? You get to the briefing area now, what are your considerations? Min time brief (as per FOM) and check the rest on the bus ride. You’re ready to go but SMNC wants you now to Operate Moscow. Weather in Moscow is CAOK. Basically do the same as above (Min Time brief and go to the Aircraft since the crew already left). You Arrive on Board and the Purser wants to start boarding. What do you tell her? (Chk the Techlog ,Slot Check with the Dispatcher, refueling) MEL: APU GEN U/S. CAT C, When does it expire? 10 days following the day of discovery…well you know all that stuff don’t you? The purser asks again to board, refueling still going ,so OK but 2 bridges required. th

A pregnant pax having twins with a letter issued the 10 of OCT stating no complications and in th th st the 26 week. Today is NOV 12 so we are in the 31 . Therefore no problem we can accept her. Ready to go now and we start the Engine at the gate and ask for the Pushback. During the push and BEFORE the other engine start the F/O pushes the Status Key and there is HYD DEM PUMP L displayed. Considerations? Unofficial Document

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I said to my self: 1 engine has started already so I would disregard that and go. He said he would do the same. During taxi we Received Load sheet edition 2. What are your actions? Stop, ATC evaluate the changes (3 PAX no bags minus 275 KG) Call SMNC to see if they’re part of a group and continue. Clear for T/O RVR 150/125/150 I said it’s below minima ‘cause we need 150 for all the positions. He said ok now RVR is within minima and you takeoff but you lose visibility at 75 Knots. I said it’s below 80 so we Stop. He said ok, now you are airborne and around 2000 ft they tell you to contact the company ASAP. I said I would wait till above MSA then handover the control to the F/O and call the Company. We Have a confirmed bomb on board so what are your actions? Tell the F/O to stop the climb and reduce the speed, declare a Mayday etc.. etc.. He wanted to know step by step the FOM actions for a RED ALERT in FLIGHT Also having elected to return to DXB I decided to land below the minima (Remember ? The weather is still cat 3 but we only have CAT 2 avail in DXB) And also to use the Autoland that is not certified for overweight landing. After landing A/C stopped on the RWY, Precautionary Disembarkation. I was then asked to wait outside for few minutes. S.P called me back 5 minutes later and gave me the good news. During the debrief He pointed out a few suggestions. Instead of asking for radar vectors after declaring an Emergency with the ATC, it would have been better to ask for a holding on the PPOS so you always know where you are. Another point was that I assumed that the ATC would have provided the steps for the precautionary disembarkation and I should have i nstead asked the Company. Other than that I found the whole process very professional and relaxed. They really want you to p ass and I’m sure they already know i f you gonna have problems. So my advise is, study hard before the Interview and when is your turn, relax, be yourself and it’s going to be very easy!........Best Luck! Unofficial Document

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Command Interview 13 (Boeing) I wasn’t prepared for this part of the i nterview, I was asked all the usual questions: How did you prepare for the interview? What manuals had I read? Did I know what to expect, Who had I spoken to regarding the interview? Give me an example of when you had to be assertive with a Capt. Give an example of when I had to reprimand a cabin crew member. Give an example of a confrontation you have had with a cabin crew member, how did I resolve the situation? ( she wouldn’t let it go!!) Then about 40 mins with Stephan Weather : MNL

Wind 160/22 3mm standing water on rwy RA, vis 3500m TEMPO 1218 2500m RA+

DXB

NSC, 200/4,3000m TEMPO 9999

OOMA

NSC, 280/4, 3500m, TEMPO 2000m HZ BR

Flight time 9hrs 30mins Departure time 1600gmt Arrival time 1.30 gmt You arrive at the aircraft and you no tice the left cowling open…….what are your considerations? I then went through everything like a normal line flight, went through the weather, I was asked who would fly? What are the new F/O’s restrictions? Do I need a take off alternate? When do you need a t/off alternate? Engineer comes in and says it will take 2 hours to fix problem……your considerations? Unofficial Document

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Flight duty time, MEL? ETOPS sensitive item? Etc Purser comes in to ask if they can board?.....No because of engine prob. He then put some times up on the board, and worked out that we would be out of duty time. How can we extend our duty time? How much discretion can you go in to? How would you brief the cabin crew? Two of the Philipino cabincrew then decide that they don’t want to operate because of going into discretion……how would you handle them? Finally engineer says plane is ready. He has fixed it and there are no MELs relating to this problem, however, there is one already in the book. It is a category “C,” due to expire at mid night tonight, before you land, can you go? How long is cat “C” MEL valid for? Purser again wants to board…….ok this time Pushing back and F/O pushes STATUS button. “ HYD PRESS DEM R”….what do you do? Stop push back / ATC/ tell engineer. He says cycle the switch, he has had this problem before. I asked to be towed back to the gate and have him come and do it. This would add a further 20 min delay. I stuck to my guns and asked to be pulled back in. Engineer comes in and sorts out prob. ( In the debrief he told me I should have just done what the engineer asked and saved the 20min delay) As we are taxiing out for dept, ATC says full length is not available…..my considerations? Stop/ new figures from laptop etc… Depart, Abeam BKK, unable to get level requested, and FMC reserves are bel ow what is required ( needed 6.1 tonnes and FMC showing 5.7 tonnes) Considerations? When can you commit to destination? What are the criteria? ( he wanted to know e xact wording from the FOM) That was it. Hope this is of some use.

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Command Interview 14 (Boeing) Command interview - Aug 2007 Present were S.P and a lady from HR. HR began the proceedings with the usual touchy-feely questions like: "Tell me when you had to be assertive; Tell me when you had a disagreement with a captain or cabin crew; Tell me about a time in the airplane when you were pressed for time and how you handled it." After about a half hour of that, S.P took over with a flight scenario: DXB-CMB-SIN Due to traffic I'm arriving late at CBC so I was asked about the minimum requirement for PreFlight Briefing. As opposed to other candidates, I was not given any "real" paperwork. Instead Stefan wrote out all the details on a whiteboard in his office. Weather in DXB and SIN was good but rain and 4000 m forecast for CMB. Our destination alternate was TRV with TEMPO indicating only 2500 m with ILS U/S. Applying the required minima I requested a new alternate since TRV would be tight and in coordination with dispa tch we nominated GOA as the new alternate. He asked who would fly the sector and after looking at the wx and crosswind I stated that I'd let the F/O choose. During the cockpit preparations and while passengers a re boarding the APU suddenly quits. "What are your actions?" Call engineering for power and A/C cart, summon purser to stop boarding e.t.c. The APU can't be fixed so we will dispatch without it. "Your concerns?" ETOPS restrictions, ground/pwr cart availability in CMB and SIN. We also had another MEL (Category C) which would exceed 10 days in a couple of hours before landing in CMB so he asked it we could go with that, and the answer was YES since the MEL is a Pre-Dispatch document and unlike the daily check, a MEL validity can expire during flight. But, of course in this case, repair would have to be done in CMB or a concession would be required. Stefan put me as PF and during taxi-out i n DXB we receive a new loadsheet, Final 2, with a ZFW drop of 275 kg and minus 3 pax. "Your actions." Hand controls and ATC to FO, while I call load control on the other radio to ascertain that the passengers' bags were not on the plane. He seemed to be happy with that and I didn't have to elaborate any further. Then shortly before taking the runway for departure we get a TCAS EICAS. "Actions?" Call MCC, explain the situation, ask for suggestions, switch transponders, and consult the MEL. Stefan says the MEL says (in this case) do not depart DXB. I express my desire to MCC to have it fixed, due to dodgy ATC on both upcoming sectors but with an estimated time of repair (according to MCC) of 2:45 hrs and considering implications of FDP, I el ect to depart without TCAS. I was then asked about when you could use max d iscretion of 3 hrs versus 2 hrs. Then we find ourselves on the ramp in CMB and after parking none of the power- or air-carts are working and I'm asked for step-by-step actions. Advise ATC, Purser, and the Station that we will need to keep one engine running for the whole ground stop. First the right engine for deplaning and expedited boarding then cross-bleed-starting the left before shutting down the right so baggage and cargo can be offloaded and loaded and fueling take place. I elect to take some extra fuel to allow for this procedure. That was the end of the e xercise as far as I can remember. Good Luck when your time comes!!! Unofficial Document

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Command Interview 15 (Boeing) The good news: I managed to convince him to give me the upgrade letter. The bad news : The rumors about the interview being cancelled is ,well, still a rumor! I prepared the way most guys did all the usual manuals, with particular emphasis on things like fuel policy, flight planning, handling, safety and security, AWOPS, cold weather ops, Etops (sounds like the entire FOM !). Memorise it if u can because if you can quote verbatim from there in the first 5 mins, half the battle is won. FCOM Vol 1 ,the AFM, and the Document folder on board are also good reading, especially the Supplementary procedures and limitations. From my own experience, and from a few others who have gone before me, my 2 cents worth…. The day itself; He was extremely pleasant and professional. He knows that it’s a big day for you and tries to put you at ease. Establish a rapport with him early. He can be quite witty...end of the day he’s not there to kill you. He needs to see that you are confident with ease and able to laugh and relax during what is a really stressful point in your career. However, do not get lulled into a state of being too relaxed as well, he is very good at that. He knows that you have read the books backwards so the earlier you can show him this in the interview, the easier it will be. But the most important thing that he seems to look for is a logical management model/style. Anybody can repeat the numbers, but how you apply it in out of the box ,grey situations is the clincher. My Scenario : DME- DXB,777-300ER, DEP:1400utc ARR:1900utc DME : 170/16 G22 ,3500m,BLSN,OVC5000,-4/-11,1024,tempo 1200-1600 1500m +SHSN, Nil Notams DXB :280/8 5000m,HZ,NSC,28/16 1019 ,nil notams Alternate OMAL : 260/4, 4000m, HZ,NSC, 28/16, 1019, tempo 3000m HZ, BR, VOR DME approach only I went through the weather thoroughly e.g, DME : crosswind not a problem and weight more than 250 tons so no li mitations on Xwind limits, vis 3500m with tempo 1500m so no problem for takeoff and for immediate return with a Cat 1 ILS, well above FO limits, BLSN is the runway contaminated? No, only blowing snow, Ok so no RTOW issues, BLSN visually deceptive so possible threat(include in threat briefing later), cloud, Temp, QNH ok, tempo is applicable, vis already discussed, +SHSN confirm its dry snow because heavy wet snow is no go. Similar weather analysis for Dest and Alt. Volunteer information even if he does not specifically ask you, he wants to see your thought process.I told him that during the actual preflight brief, I will pull out the adverse weather supp procedure and the Boeing deice/anti ice worksheet from the blank forms folder and brief from there. I also spoke about Cold Wx Ops ( kind of precipitation, kind of fluid,1 or 2 trucks, EK spray pattern or otherwise, comms via headset, if lose comms, exchange mobile numbers etc..)

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As you can see, DXB weather is not a factor, but OMAL is because we need circling or NPA+200ft/1000m.I asked whether there is a circling approach and there was ,so need 1000(round up to nearest 100ft)+5km.Having gone through the Wx, I let the F/O fly if he wants to. Was asked the criteria for takeoff alternate and FO minimums. If MEL restricts us to 120 Min ,are we still ETOPs? Yes we are. some questions on EETOPS, since I brought it up! Q : there is a MEL Cat B Item reported on 4 days ago /1620Z. A : applicable from 0000Z 3 days ago till today 2359Z,so no prob. Q : what if we are delayed and land in DXB after 2359Z? A : No problem, MEL is pre dispatch so can go, but defect needs to be addressed in DXB,I will send MCC an ACARS Msg to remind them. Q : How to apply for Concession to operate with expiring MEL? A : Ans in the MEL. Q : Tech log is all filled in with a defect from the last sector, but not signed. A ; I said will contact SMNC first to try to contact the Captain or FO,then call MCC to inquire about any significant downlinks from the airc raft over the past 5 days or so. Eng has done a transit check, and I will ask him to have a look in the onboard maint(CMC) computer have any active leg faults that might i mpact the flight. SMNC calls back that unable to contact the flight crew .I said I am happy to accept the aircraft as I have verified that the aircraft is fit for service and will release and accept the aircraft in the tech log.I will also make a note in the voyage record about what I have done. Q: Purser comes in to ask to board the pax A : verify one door with steps and one aerobridge, ok to board Q: snow blowing into door L5 A: I said close the door and have somebody man the door Q: do you remove the steps A: I said No, on the contrary, I will call the Eng and confirm with him that the steps be left in place until refueling complete. Q while boarding , APU quits..what are your actions? A: 1) verify Apu has failed 2) call for checklist from the QRH(no ECL, dark cockpit) 3) hand the F/O my torch(if he doesn’t have one) 4) while he looking for chklist, call Purser to stop boarding 5) make a quick PA to calm the pax 6) do the chklist,no joy,so call eng to connect me to grnd elecs and gnd air cond and then come upstairs 7) Ask for Grnd Air Cond supp procedure before connecting to air con cart 8) Eng in the cockpit to clear the pages in the Status, cannot fix the APU 9) OK ,implication on my operation…No Apu on during the remote deicing, flight non Etops so no problem, need grnd support at Dest. Can it be deferred, yes. I said I will call ATC to ask for dispensation to deice at the gate. Not allowed. So I said I will need to keep one Engine running on the side of the aircraft that is not being deiced, ATC doesn’t understand because of English problems : ( , I was on the verge of calling for our stunning Russian cabin crew to translate : ), But I ask for the deicing chap to come upstairs and explain my plan, he says no problem. (Ok, saved the stunning Russian for language lessons later in the cruise!) So push to remote deice spot after 1 eng started at the gate with normal de/anti ice one side at a time. Unofficial Document

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During taxi ,due congestion HOT time expired. I explained HOT protocol and said that as long as a PCI is done before takeoff and the fluid is still effective with the wings clean, we can takeoff. was asked how I was gonna conduct the PCI as well as the engine runups ( FO does the PCI ,make sure he knows what he is looking for and eng runup one at a time to 50%N1/60 min) Finally ,we takeoff and during cruise, of course a passenger falls sick! Medlink contact and page for doctor, nurse…started looking for possible diversion spots. Purser comes back and informs us that pax is worsening fast. Medlink prefers we go to Tiblisi. for the purposes of the scenario, Tiblisi is an approved 777 alternate, wx was ok with Cat 1 ILS. Ran through my diversion considerations quickly and decided to go to Tiblisi with the intent of dispatching myself out of there considering FTL, dump if required to get myself no overweight, refueling ,tech support, parking position if no B777 tow bar etc….went through all the actions step by step with me taking control for the landing. after landing, considerations for qui ck getaway e.g: FTL, Captain’s authority for refueling, Transit check, new OFP, ATC FLT PLN.

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Command Interview 16 (Boeing) With Capt S.P. At the beginning he explained the interview, how it will be conducted and that he will be asking me some HR questions and later some operational ones, giving me a sort of scenario.> HR: 1. My aviation career 2. A time where I had to take a quick decision 3. A time where I had to go outside the FOM SCENARIO: DME-DXB ETD 2200Z On the bus to the airport snow starts to fall with temp of -1 C: what are your thoughts ... cold Wx ops, Rwy, RTOW, de-icing, FO, engineer, purser, pax, planning: alternate AUH FCST with tempo 2000 BR: need to change it with RAK, same fuel on the OFP because 100nm, but new on ATC flight plan. RWY condition in DME: patches of ice 50% rwy: rwy is SSW because the contamination is more than 25%. MEL: CAT C expiring al 2359Z: we can go, in DXB the MEL needs to be fix. In cruise I will remind DXB MC via acars. De-icing is needed. In DME it is be done with Engs OFF and at a remote stand, not at the gate, the OM and the engineer says. While the last pax are boarding the APU ... quits, what are your actions: 1. EICAS + checklist 2. Talk to engineer to get an ext pwr 3. Talk to pax and advice them to be patient for a few minutes Ext power arrives and APU in the MEL ... Now ... we still need to de-ice at a remote stand .... first I ask ground to de-ice at the stand but they reply that for environmental reasons it's not possible. I ask the F/O and the engi neer if they have any suggestions ... we could start left engine, push back to the de-icing remote stand, de-ice right side of the a/c. Then stop the de-icing, x-bleed start right engine, shut down left one and de-ice left side of a/c. Then x-bleed start left engine. We need to get extra fuel, 1 ton. Fuel truck gone, 2hrs wait. We can continue using the contingency fuel.

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HOT 2310-2330z. Time now is 2340z. what do you do? PCI and if the A/C is clean we can go. At the hold short load sheet edition No.2: minus 270kgs and 3 pax missing. I advice ground 3 minutes delay. I call ops and I find out that 2 of thei r bags are inside the A/C .... I said that this is a security breach and that I need to off load them. I request Ops to organize for refueling, deicing again and MC for a concession for the MEL expiring at 2359z. S.P. asked me: " Are you sure?" I said YES again. He then suggested that I could get in contact with FCDM and security in DXB. They could have more info about these pax and their bags, like that they were in transit and the bags travelled already on another flight ... or other details ... He said that sometimes we need to go outside the FOM lines and be "creative" in order to bring back an A/C. He then congratulate me and he gave me a course date. Good luck.

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Command Interview 17 (Boeing) The interview started with question from the HR lady as: What I have done to get prepared for the interview What are the characteristic of a good captain Story where you needed to use persuasion to reach a goal A time you needed to act quickly for flight safety What do you do to prepare for a flight Then S.P stepped in asking the maximum duty period and what if you are no into the position for the last leg or a single leg (2 hrs max)

Scenario: MNL to DXB Rain/ wind 120/15-22 (Crosswind) Dubai weather fine/ Alternate OMAA/with tempo 2000 meter Who will fly the sector? Although the weather is border limit I would fly Then he added that Rwy is contaminate with 3 mm rain. In this case CA must takeoff OMAA has a tempo wit 2000 meters , ILS is out, consideration? Alternate weather is not adequate for a NPA need to get a new alternate (considering both ends of rwy if ILS is available opposite end) RAK is elected and since is within 100 nm is not required to have the extra fuel. The new alternate need to be filed with ATC tough!! During pushback ,prior to engine start /O push status page and you get a "H ydr Dem right", what you do? Ask to be pulled in and get the engineer to fix it. REFUELING WITH PAX ON BOARD AND PURSER IS NOT HAPPY L5 GETTING PADDLE OF WATER . Want it closed but ask for another one to be armed> Close and manned and since there is no other door she needs to accept it. During taxi TWR advice full length is not available and OPT doesn't;t have the intersection takeoff point, considerations? • • • •

Ask for backtrack, Push into position for full length Set for a different RWY if wind gets within limits OR Decrease RWY length by distance unusable entering the data in the Notams.

After takeoff bomb threat red, Step by Step:

• • • • • •

STOP CLIMBING WITH ALT HOLD MAYDAY to ATC PURSER TO FLIGHT DECK (NITS) GET IN THE HOLD ABOVE MSA PLAN TO LOWER GEAR AND FLAPS IN CASE IT GOES OFF LAND ON RWY, STAY THERE AND GET A PRECAUTIONARY DISEMBARKATION (BOMB FOUND: FULL EMERGENCY EVACUATION)

Well this is all I can remember, I hope it can help. Unofficial Document

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Command Interview 18 (Boeing) Hi guys, here is the summary of my i nterview on Sep 09th 1) Aprrox 30 min questions by HR representative: - What have you done to prepare the interview? - How is your family in Dubai? - What was the biggest change when you have arrived in Dubai? - Has EK been a good experience so far? - Have you got any conflicting situation with a Cpt/FO during your career? And with EK? - How do you deal with? - Have you ever used your authority to solve crew or handling problems? - Have you ever take over controls from your F/O or Cpt? Explain in details - Etc... 2) Approx 45 min with S.Prugner Scenario DXB - LGW - alternate LHR B772 A6-EMI WX: DXB: 160/04 Rwy 12L RVR 200-200-200 ( CAT II app ) LGW: Calm RWY 26L RVR 250-250-250 BCMG 1113 2KM ( CAT II app ) LHR: Calm RWY 27 RVR 300-300-300 BCMG 1114 2800M ( CAT III app ) ETA LGW 1100Z ETA LHR 1130Z You arrive late at the CBC due to the poor wx: What are your considerations? What do you do? What do you say to your F/O, purser... Min flt prep then quick brief to CC to leave CBC asap, brief in bus if necessary Check F/O LVO qualify, LVO in OPS, check 10 AWO for T /O mins Special brief for LVO ( slow taxi, ca t II holding points, mel, t/o alternate, lights,...) Extra fuel for ground ops in DXB (he asked me how much and I said 1 extra ton) Calculate req fuel asap to determine max payload with load control What are the min items to cover? OFP, WX+ notams dep, dest, alt, 1st hour enroute, relevant FCIs What fuel do you want? Dest is below minima so you need 2 alt with fuel for the furthest ( I said EGBB, EGCC) LHR is CAT III arpt so you need CAT I WX at planning stage ( cons ider end of TAF period for WX improvement ) Extra fuel for LGW (he asked me why bcs I already have fuel to go to EGCC and I aswered that my intention is to land in LGW so I need fuel till 1300Z. Believe me, hard to say that you look for an extra 12 tons... T/O Alternate is at 620Nm, is it Ok? Yes, ETOPS A/C can go up to 840 Nm ( 2H at 1 eng inop speed ISA ) What if MEL APU GEN U/S limiting ETOPS to 180 min? I said 420 Nm 1 H at 1 eng inop speed ISA and I was wrong! He told me that if I can go up to 180 min, I'm still ETOPS... keep that in mind You arrive at the aircraft and you have a MEL CAT C item expiring today. Are you legal? MEL is pre-dispatch doc so as long as you T/O before 2359 Z, you are ok What about if you land after the expiry time? Just don't care Unofficial Document

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During taxi, new load sheet edition 2 from printer ZFW drop 285KG. What do you do? Contact load control and ask what are the changes. He said 3 pax so you have to make sure that they have no bags on board and if they are not part of a group Red bomb warning just after T/O. What do you do in the correct sequence? Push alt hold verify for obstacles (above MSA) transfer controls to F/O go to PINGO Declare mayday std-by for intentions, NN check-list, purser to flight deck with NITS Declare that you go back to DXB in emergency, ask for stairs at designated area and fire brigade. Disregard overweight landing autoland and wx restrictions, you just want to land asap. Update info with purser prior landing (precautionary/emergency evac). That's all I can remember... Good luck for the interview.

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Section 4 Pre-Course Notes

4. Pre-Course Notes

1. Introduction Congratulations on your award of a command assignment! As you await the commencement of your training in excited anticipation you may well be feeling somewhat daunted at the amount of work you will have to do in a relatively short time. These notes are designed to help you focus on the key aspects of your new role and help make your upgrade training as beneficial as possible. We certainly do not underestimate the strong base of knowledge, expertise and experience that you have gained as a First Officer. In many ways, Command Training will not teach you anything new. It will, however, give you opportunities to develop and improve your leadership and management skills. This process of improvement does not stop at your check to line. There will always be room for improvement throughout your career as an Airline Captain. You will find that your command training is consistent with the type of CRM training you have had in recent years and it is consistent with the A.A.M. model, (discussed below). It is also useful to consider how this training fits in with the flight operations mission statement “to operate Emirates’ aircraft in the safest and most efficient way,” and in accordance with our strategic goals:     

Safety record among the best in the industry Respond to the business needs in a flexible and cost effective way Provide superlative training and flight technical support Encourage initiative, teamwork and business awareness Demonstrate concern for the needs of the customers

The safety message is one that we are very well aware of but it is worth emphasising that the pilots are often the last line of defense. All parts of the Company should be working towards this goal, but there may be times when you feel that this is not the case. As a Captain you may well have a wider understanding of, and exposure to, safety issues than others in the organisation. You also have the authority, supported by company policy and legislative force, to say ‘No!’. As pilots we are often sceptical about cost-saving measures, but the simple fact is that we have to run an airline cost efficiently, over time, if we are to stay in business. There are a number of ways that you, as a Captain, will be able to contribute to this efficiency. Our industry has always been a competitive one and this fact is unlikely to change. As a company we need Captains who are up to the challenge of making their contribution towards improvements in efficiency. How we attract and look after customers is also an important part of the profit equation. Whilst we do not have a great deal of face-to-face contact with customers we should not underestimate the effects (positive and negative) of our communications with them in building customer value. In any company, especially large ones, maintaining staff motivation is a challenge. You may well recognise periods in your career when personal motivation has slumped but as you are about to take the most significant step in an Airline Pilot’s career your motivation level is probably high. As a Captain it is worth reflecting on how you motivate those around you. The way you go about your job has the potential to significantly enhance the people you work alongside. It affects not only your First Officer and Cabin Crew, but also Engineers, Ground Staff and others. Unofficial Document

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2. Human Factors You bring a unique combination of knowledge, skills and attitude with you as you embark upon your training. These are all equally important, but it is fair to say that with the correct attitude, the other factors will, in all likelihood, fall into place. It is therefore appropriate to spend some time focussing on some of the human factor aspects of Captaincy.

2.1. Leadership Leadership is a concept that is easier to recognise than it is to define. ‘Leadership’ is not a quality that you either have or don’t have. It is a complex set of skills that can be learnt and continually improved, upon with reflection and application. The whole of your command training is about leadership but here are a few preliminary points to think about: Command leadership is much more than occupying the left-hand seat. • Leaders plan, organise and evaluate the work that is done. • A good leader needs to be competent at a task to inspire confidence. • Leaders help keep others motivated. • Leaders create the conditions in which others can excel at their job. • Leadership requires patience. • Leaders facilitate interpersonal interaction and positive working relations. •

As a Captain you will hold an important leadership role by virtue of the authority vested upon you in that position. It is important that you develop your own leadership style and have the confidence to back your own judgement. You will have seen a variety of leadership styles and techniques throughout your career. It is worthwhile thinking over some of the challenging situations that you have been involved in as a crewmember. Were there particular techniques that the Captain used that were effective or ineffective? Think of ways to incorporate the useful techniques in your own operation. It is also important to recognise that different leadership styles are needed in different situations. Normal operations may allow for a participative style that would not be appropriate in an emergency. As a Captain you must be able to quickly adapt to the situation. A ‘laissez-faire’ style in an emergency will only exacerbate the problem, whilst an ‘autocratic’ style in normal operations will cause resentment and frustration. One particular challenge that some of you will face is to be a newly qualified Captain flying with First Officers that have thousands of hours more than you on type. It is important that you do not abdicate your leadership. You have the authority that goes with your position. Remember also that the First Officer is a very useful resource available to you.

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2.2. Team Building Research and practical experience consistently point to team building as an important factor in team performance. The key activity to facilitate team building is the pre- flight briefing. You have a lot to do at Operations, but remember there will always be time constraints that make your job as a Captain more difficult. When faced with these challenges it is often simply a matter of doing the best job in the time available. A good briefing need not take up much time. It is not necessary to labour the point regarding normal operations, but you should provide specific information and guidance with respect to unusual or non-standard situations. The same applies to your flight crew briefings, if necessary. Team building is ongoing. It is not something that is restricted to the pre- flight stage. You can take advantage of quieter periods in flight to communicate with your Purser and crew regarding any operational needs. Team building with your First Officer is also something you should think about. This may be a matter of discussing who flies which sector taking into account the weather, recency, alertness, practice requirements, preferences and, of course, the destination. Also a good team player does not shirk his or her share of the work.

2.3. Communication The importance of effective communication will not be new to you but there are some points that are worth emphasising as you focus on your new role. In Emirates we have a disciplined approach to using standard terminology. This is vital as it is driven by the number of differing nationalities on the flight deck. Miscommunication will occur, but being standard in your speech will keep these instances to a minimum. The benefit of standard phraseology is that it defines a common vocabulary and provides specific direction to deal with many operational situations. It is important, however, not to let our communication be limited in situations where standard phraseology does not provide guidance. It is also important to recognise that there is a wide variety of communications that occur on the flight deck. Here are some examples: Commands Crew obligatory statement Crew suggestions Queries Preferences Hints Self-directives Permission-seeking questions

Turn 30 degrees right. We need to deviate right/sink rate/speed etc. Let’s go around this one. Which way do you want to turn? I think a left turn is best. That doesn’t look good. I’ll get us a clearance to divert. Do you want a clearance to divert?

Communication is not simply about passing information. There is also a social / relational aspect. You are probably aware that as a First Officer you frequently used indirect communications to good effect. As a Captain you need to be aware that much of the communication that you receive from subordinates and other airline staff will be indirect. There may be times that you have to ask people to be more specific with the information they provide if you think they are being too ‘socially sensitive’. You, as the Captain, must establish a very open style of communication. You should ‘share the plan’ with your crew. This does not in any way undermine your authority. If fact it enhances it and promotes the flow of information that will contribute to sound decision making. Unofficial Document

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2.4. Decision-making As a Captain, you make the decisions, but the process of decision making involves other crewmembers and resources. The aim is to minimise risk whilst maximising the effectiveness and efficiency of the operation. The decisions you will have to make will vary greatly in complexity and importance. Sometimes your decision will be the first acceptable option (e.g. land ASAP in an emergency). At other times it may be to find the optimal decision after taking into account many variables (e.g. A diversion due to weather or maintenance requirements). In your decision-making, keep in mind the operating priorities of Safety, Economy, Comfort, and Schedule. It is always important to approach decisions in a thorough and constructive manner. A useful mnemonic may help. The one that is provided in Emirates is A.A.M. Firstly, when a problem occurs concentrate on flying the aircraft, then ensure a safe trajectory/phase of flight and finally communicate. Aviate - Navigate - Communicate are the golden rules.

A -Assess the problem. ( ANC, “Stay below the line,” time management) A -Action the problem. (ECAM / EICAS / Recalls / Checklist / Plan) M -Manage the needs. (Prioritise - Individual / Task / Group-Communicate) Further essential reading is contained in your CRM course notes and in the Route Manual chapter one. Remember that you are now the leader / manager of the situation, something you may have not practised for some time. As the situation develops do not forget to evaluate your actions at each significant point, or decision, in the ongoing situation. You may also find it helpful to think about decision- making in the following terms: Risk Information Time Perspective

- Consider potential as well as actual risk as you approach a problem. - Do I have all the information I need? If not where do I get it? - Can I create time for myself by holding or parking the brakes? But how before another problem occurs from waiting too long to take action? - Involve others in the process. They may have a different perspective on the problem, which may be of assistance.

Remember that it is your job to analyse the situation and find the critical limiting factor. It may one of many things such as; time, fuel, runway length or even the weather. Stay below the line, ask questions and ensure that you have all the relevant information, prior to embarking on a course of action. Some seconds spent gathering information; planning and directing the instigation of that plan will save many minutes later in the operation. An important point to emphasise with regard to evaluation is what happens after the situation has been dealt with. Some events require you to de-brief the crew at an appropriate time and place. You may also have reporting requirements. For you own benefit, you should also evaluate your decisions that do not require a formal report. Ask yourself what you did well and what you could do have done better to handle a similar situation in the future.

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Indeed as pert of your preparation you should study other Commanders decisions. You should analyse their situations, with the benefit of hindsight, and without the stressor of time, to see if you agree with the decisions made, and if not, decide what you would have done in similar circumstances. Indeed, if you did not agree with their decisions you should also analyse why you did not agree and decide, perhaps at a later date after further consideration, why you did not agree.

2.5. Error Management Early CRM programmes endeavoured to improve air safety by eliminating error. The focus was on interpersonal issues and promoting a team concept. More recently it has been recognized that we operate in an environment where systemic threats contribute to errors. From the mid 1990s it became apparent that eliminating error completely was an unrealistic goal. Researchers changed tack somewhat and attempted to record and classify threats and errors as they actually occurred on the Flight Deck. This differed from much of the previous research, which reconstructed and analysed accidents and incidents after the event. The findings from observing crews on normal scheduled flights indicate an average of two errors per flight. (It could well be higher but the observers probably do not pick up every error that crews make.) Fortunately most of the errors we make do not end in disaster, because of effective ‘error management’. This is the process of correcting an error before it becomes consequential. Most errors occur in the Taxi/Take Off/Climb/Descent/Approach/Landing phase, which probably is no surprise. Another point worth highlighting is that crews that make intentional violations are also more likely to make unintentional errors. This underlines the importance of adherence to SOP's and of knowing the Company requirements as laid down in the OM-A (FOM). Workload management and contingency planning also reduce errors and help crews deal with the errors they make.

2.6. Cognition Our brain is exceptionally powerful but typically limited to dealing consciously with one issue at a time. It is easily overloaded and can also produce biased results. Restrictions in attention and filtering may reduce the processing of sensory inputs therefore thought awareness and training we can implement ways of overcoming these shortfalls. Some examples are: avoiding information overload, task sharing, avoiding mindsets and practising psychomotor skills (‘motor-actions’).

2.7. Stress Recognising the effects of stress in yourself and others is important if you are to understand that the effect stress has on team performance. Stress is caused by a combination of external factors, workplace factors and personality. Some level of stress is inevitable and, in fact, desirable in our workplace. However, beyond a certain point, the cumulative effects of stress will cause performance to decline possibly in a very rapid manner. There are many symptoms of acute and chronic stress and individuals will vary in how they react.

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The following list of symptoms may be helpful but is by no means comprehensive:       

Tunnel vision/fixation Increased error rate Perspiration/high heart rate Sleeplessness/fatigue/inability to relax Irritability Depression/loss of interest in work Long term health effects.

As well as coping with stressful tasks as a Captain, the Command Training process itself can be a stressful time. On the whole, pilots are not particularly good at recognising stress and seeking assistance. Hopefully an organised approach to your training and maintaining a healthy lifestyle will help avoid and alleviate stress. If you do feel that stress is having a negative effect on your ability to do your job, don’t ignore the assistance you can get. Often family and friends can be of great support and, perhaps, help you keep things in perspective. Do not hesitate to discuss issues of concern with your Training Captains and Fleet Training Manager. If it is necessary to take some time out or get expert assistance it is far better to do this sooner rather than later. Command training is hard work. There is a lot to cover and a high standard to achieve. It should not, however, be an ordeal. Remember that the training system is designed to help you reach the standard, it is not a hurdle designed to trip you up.

2.8. Conflict Resolution Hopefully conflict will not feature regularly in your everyday work. Effective team building and communication will reduce the likelihood of conflict but it will inevitably occur from time to time. There is no point being too prescriptive about how to deal with such occurrences as personalities and situations will vary greatly, but here are a few points that may be worth considering. 







Focus on the facts: Often conflict arises because not everyone has the same information and remember, you may be the one that is missing the critical piece. Clarifying exactly what the problem is, and why it is a problem will make it easier to resolve. Focus on the task: Sometimes conflicts have little to do with the task at hand and can be a dangerous distraction. As a Captain, it is important that you control the situation. In some cases, discussion should be deferred until the appropriate time and place. Refer to the appropriate documents and people: Sometimes conflict can be resolved by referring the other party to the appropriate company documentation or by seeking the opinion of another suitably qualified person. There is no point making a discussion of policy or procedure a matter for personal argument. Do it better next time: We all have situations that we know could have been handled more effectively. As an effective Captain it is important that you reflect on your handling of difficult situations and think of ways that you could improve your handling of them.

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2.9. Learning Styles We are all different and have different ways that we prefer to take on new information and learn new skills. Some learn well by observation, others prefer a hands-on approach. Some are quick at applying general principles whilst others may prefer to see concrete examples. You are probably aware of what learning styles and techniques work best for you. If you haven’t thought about it much, now is a good time to start. Your instructors and Training Captains will give you a clear idea of what is required, but it is up to you to work out how to go about it. It is important to set out a disciplined timetable to make sure you cover all areas. Remember that prior planning prevents a poor performance. It is also important that you discipline yourself to take regular breaks whilst studying, and don’t attempt to work seven days a week throughout your training and preparation.

2.10. Continuous Improvement As all pilots recognise, there is no such thing as a perfect flight. This is something you should become even more aware of as a Captain, because your role has the added dimension of leadership. There will always be areas that need improvement and, as we are all different, we each have different strengths and weaknesses. It is also important that Emirates is a ‘learning organisation’, thus to continue to improve there must be effective and constructive feedback. The feedback that Captains provide is vital. This can be done through formal channels such as Captains Special Reports and the Voyage Report and informally through direct contact with the appropriate management. You also have the opportunity as a Captain to help other people improve by sharing knowledge and experience. It is often easy to become discouraged in seeking to help improve the organisation. Results tend not to be immediately visible and, due to organisational constraints, feedback mechanisms to Captains are sometimes imperfect. However it is important that we maintain a positive approach in this matter. In a rapidly changing environment, if you are not striving to improve as an organisation, you are probably in decline.

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3. Commercial Environment We are working in an industry that has become increasingly volatile. Companies come and go. Fleet structure and schedules change very rapidly here at Emirates. Whether we like it or not, we are business managers in a very challenging economic environment. It is important that we understand the commercial environment to ensure that we can make decisions that are appropriate. It is also important to understand the public relations/customer satisfaction impact of our decisions. We may not need to know a great deal about the balance sheet or profit and loss statement, but we should all have a clear understanding of how our decisions can affect Emirates profitability.

3.1. Cost side On the cost side of the equation, fuel is the major variable expense for most airlines. You do not have to justify the fuel uplift you decide on but the company would like to know, if just for statistical records, why extra fuel was required. Take the amount that you think is needed to do the job safely. However, where safety permits, we can help reduce cost by carrying the flight planned amount. There are also a number of other ways we can minimise our fuel burn, which you should consider. On a day-to-day basis, it is good to be aware of actual fuel burn and sector time compared with planned figures. Also having an awareness of the seasonal variations in delays in approach due to weather or traffic, i.e. WX in Male’ during the monsoon and Traffic in Nice during the film awards or car race periods. Minimising delays within your power is the other major cost contribution you can make. The cost of rolling delays is difficult to estimate but it is certain to be quite significant when you consider the inefficiencies caused, not to mention the effect on our customer’s satisfaction. Also the cost of an unnecessary diversion has to be judged in comparison to carrying holding fuel.

3.2. Revenue Side On the revenue side, your main contribution is in terms of customer satisfaction. Obviously the primary concern of your passengers is that you do your job safely. You can also contribute to high levels of customer satisfaction through the way you interact with your passengers.

3.2.1. Passenger Announcements The main form of interaction you will have with customers is by way of the PA. Timely supply of information is consistently reported as a key factor in customer satisfaction and this is something that you can have a direct effect on. Guidance is given in the OM-A (FOM) on the use of the Public Address System. Here are some further comments for you consideration: 

  

  

Many pilots speak too fast. You will need to speak slower than normal conversation. About 100-125 words per minute is a reasonable guide. It is useful to have a standard ‘spiel’ but try to vary it to make sure it does not come across as clichéd. Try to sound (and be) sincere. Be honest, but you may have to be selective in the information you provide. If you are trying to explain something complex or awkward, make notes before your PA to make sure you communicate clearly. Avoid using jargon or technical terminology. Ask for feedback regarding clarity and volume from Pursers. This may not be offered unsolicited. When travelling as a passenger, listen to PA's that are particularly effective or ineffective and continue to improve your own technique.

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4. Resource Base As a Captain you have many resources available to you. These may be in the form of crewmembers; ATC and manuals carried on the aircraft. There is also the resource of the Integrated Operations Centre (IOC) available to you, SMNC , MCC and conference call facilities, and DNATA Movement Control (MOCON). It is important that you have a good understanding of how the IOC and MOCON work and what they can offer you. It is anticipated that you will be given the opportunity to visit the IOC, MOCON and Engineering at some stage in your training, (non-official personal visits are also allowed). In the meantime make sure you are familiar with the various ways that you can contact them.

5. Knowledge Base As an experienced airline pilot you already have a very solid knowledge base. A good understanding of regulations, procedures and policies will help you to make consistently sound decisions. There are some things that you should know from memory. Other areas require a ‘working knowledge’. There are also things that you should not attempt to memorise, but should be able to be referenced efficiently when the need arises. If it is not clear what sort of information fits into each category, your Training Captains will help clear up any ambiguity. Depending on your background and previous experience, your knowledge requirements will vary slightly. You should however have a working knowledge of the OM-A (FOM), the LIDO and the FCOM’s. You should concentrate on revising the areas that will affect you specifically as a Captain. The sections below provide some general guidance.

5.1. Civil Aviation Regulations. On a day-to-day basis most of the requirements that affect our operation are covered comprehensively in the OM-A (FOM). However it is important to have a good understanding of from where the requirements are derived. It may also be necessary from time to time to refer to the primary document for a greater understanding. The full CAR’s of the UAE and AIP’s of the countries we operate to are kept at Flight Operations.

5.2. LIDO. A good knowledge with particular emphasis on these areas: - Chart Legends, Definitions (especially MORA, MOCA, and MSA) - Notam and Weather decodes - Country Specific Normal and Emergency Procedures - Aircraft Speeds - Flight Planning - Meteorology - Rules of the Air

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5.3. Flight Operations Manual. As mentioned above, it is best to work through the whole manual to revise all areas. Particular attention should be made to your duties and responsibilities as an Emirates Captain.

5.4. Flight Crew Operating Manuals. You must be thoroughly conversant with Emirates SOP’s, as previously discussed. You should also have a working knowledge of the Supplementary Techniques, FCOM bulletins and the OEB’s. You should also revise Limitations and Abnormal and Emergency Procedures. A general knowledge of all the FCOM’s is a decided advantage, during your Command Training. Also the management of various emergency situations, i.e. who should be the PF / PNF, knowing what the ECAM/EICAS or Checklist procedure is trying to achieve and what will be available to Aviate, Navigate, and Communicate.

5.5. Route Manual. A working knowledge of the route manual is essential for you to properly prepare for your flight and simulator training. You must be able to quickly extract information about diversion airports, DARD and other less time critical information. Being familiar with the information in this manual will enable you to prepare quickly and efficiently for both simulator and line training.

6. Skills Manipulative skill is generally not a major point of difficulty in command training. You will have plenty of opportunity for practice and, of course, a very good standard is expected. You may find however, that as you settle in on the line your manipulative standard drops slightly as you are concentrating on the ‘big picture’ aspects of the operation. It is important that you maintain your standards for a number of reasons. One of which is to inspire confidence from your First Officer and the rest of the crew. You may have to pick which sectors you fly to make sure you keep in practice. You should also bear in mind recency requirements when planning your flying for the day.

7. Conclusion These notes do not provide you with a recipe for success in your command training. Rather they are designed to get you thinking about the general principles involved, so that you can prepare these principles prior to putting them into place during your training and after your check to line. You will find flying as a Captain very satisfying and enjoyable, but command is not without its challenges and frustrations. You will have to be thoroughly conversant with a Captain's duties and responsibilities, and be developing a high level of knowledge and understanding of many topics. Through training you will be able to develop you skills and show an attitude that meets the company’s expectations. We are all different and some people will pick up some aspects of the job quicker than others. The important thing as a Captain is to ‘put it all together.’ Do not hesitate to seek extra assistance if you need it. Your Training Captains and your Fleet Training Manager are in a position to help, should you call upon them. We also recognise that the Captain’s position is not an easy one. Not every decision that you make will be perfect, but it is important not to let fear of making a mistake inhibit you from exercising confident command leadership. All the very best with your command training and enjoy the view from the left-hand seat! Unofficial Document

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Command Upgrade Official Memorandums (Crew Portal Extracts)

M E M O RA N D UM Flight Operations Training

ATTN: FLIGHT DECK CREW SUB: AIRBUS A330 NOMINATION AS COMMANDER COURSE

Please refer to the Ground school roster that has been issued to you via My Mint for the details of your course on a daily basis. You may refer to the Crew Portal while on Sim Training. Crew Portal > Main Menu > Sim Roster Please arrange to collect your training file from Flight Training Content Management team, Emirates Training College (ETC), 2nd Floor. Please note that you are required to complete and submit a GCAA application form for your Licence to the Flight Training Admin Assistants. This form will be available in your training file. Please complete Part 1; Part 2 (section 5) – circle “P2 deletion”; Part 3; Part 8; signature and date. This is a mandatory requirement. nd

Kindly submit a clear paper copy of the following to Flight Training Admin, ETC, 2 Floor, as it is a mandatory requirement to process your Licence with GCAA:• • • •

•

1 copy - valid Passport copy - with passport holder's picture & details page. 1 copy - valid UAE visa page - The UAE visa endorsed page, please check if visa is not expired. 1 copy - valid & current UAE licence copy (ATPL) - showing both sides of the card on same page. 1 copy - valid & current UAE medical certificate or Temporary medical cert - showing both sides of the card on same page. 1 colour passport size colour photograph on white b ackground

On arrival at the College, please collect the visitor’s swipe card from the Security Desk in exchange of your ID or any oth er identification card to gain access to Flight Operations Training. Please ensure you collect your ID card and return the swipe card prior to leaving the College. Required Documentation and Pre-reading

1.

A paper copy of the FOM will be available for use during the ground school. The FOM can be collected from the Flight Training Content Management on day 1 of your ground school. Please ensure you return the FOM on the last day of your ground school.

2.

Your FCOM 3 and QRH.

3.

The Crew Portal > Home Page > Training - Generic > Nomination as Commander , containing pre-reading information on Command Preparation, Aviation Law and Rights of a Commander is to be reviewed before the ground school.

4.

Please familiarise yourself with A330 Nomination as Commander Training Manual which may be viewed on Crew Portal > Home Page > Training Manuals > A330 Training

The transportation arrangements can be viewed from: Crew Portal > Main Menu > Training - Generic > Transport Arrangements. Note: In the event that a Flight Crew has to leave the Ground School Training session for any urgent reason/s, he/she must inform either the FTSM or the relevant Training Chief before leaving the Training College.

As per the Company’s regulations you are required to attend in your Uniform. Flight Training Department Office Hours: 07:00 to 15:30 – Sunday to Wednesday 07:00 to 15:00 – Thursday


ATTN: FLIGHT DECK CREW SUB: CRM UPGRADE COURSE Please refer to the Ground school roster that has been issued to you for the date and time of your course. You may view the Classroom details mentioned on the roster that has been issued to you. The Classroom Utilisation sheet is also posted on the CBT Area Entrance Door and in the FCTI’s Area at st the Emirates Training College (aircraft shaped building), Flight Training Department, 1 Floor. The Classroom Utilization sheet can also be accessed from: Crew Portal > Main Menu > Training – Generic > Class room Utilization Sheet Most of the training courses are held at the Emirates Training College. However, if any of your sessions are held at the Emirates Aviation College (EAC) Sim Building, the location can be viewed from Crew Portal > Main Menu > Training – Generic > EAC SIM Building Class room Location On arrival at the College, please collect the visitor’s swipe card from the Security Desk in exchange of your ID or any other identification card to gain access to Flight Operations Training. Please ensure you collect your ID card and return the swipe card prior to leaving the College. Please find attached the Pre-reading material for your CRM Upgrade Course . Kindly read it thoroughly as it forms an integral part of the course. Your attention is drawn specifically to the following:• •

American Airlines Swissair 111 Investigation Report – Exec Summary

CRMPre-reading 2005.pdf(333...

The transportation arrangements can be viewed from: Crew Portal > Main Menu > Training Generic> Transport Arrangements As per the Company’s regulations you are required to come in your Uniform.

Flight Training Department

Office Hours: 07:00 to 15:30 – Sunday to Wednesday 07:00 to 15:00 - Thursday


ATTN: FLIGHT DECK CREW SUB: IOC (NCC) / ENGINEERING VISIT Please refer to your Ground School roster for the date and time of your IOC (NCC)/Engineering Visit. You are required to carry your ID card for security verification purposes. The details of the visit are as follows (timings are approximate). You may refer to the location map from: Crew Portal > Main Menu > Training Airbus > Upgrade > New EK II Engg gate Location Map Training Boeing > Upgrade> New EK II Engg gate Location Map

IOC(NCC)/Engineering Visits: •

•

•

Pick up from Training College at 1200hrs to arrive at the new EK Engineering Gate-EK II near Hangar D for IOC (NCC)/Engg. visits at 1230hrs. 

Contact: IOC (NCC) - SMNC on Tel: 04-2182201 or 04-2991011/6061 at the security gate for prior notification.



Contact: Engineering – Base Shift Manager on 050-6458762 or 04-208 5259 for prior notification and approximate finishing time at NCC.



Contact: Mr. Francis T/ Mr. Sajith Thayath on Tel: 04-2181216/8, if you face any problems at the Security. Mr. Ayman Murad El Hag (for gate passes) on Tel: 04-2181221.

Return from IOC (NCC) / Engineering visit to Training College at 1515 hrs (approximately, coordinate with bus driver).

Return to residence from Training College at 1530 hrs (approx).

If you foresee any delay or if you finish prior to the scheduled time, you can call Central Services on 2184538/2184539/2184540. As per the Company’s regulations you are required to come in your Uniform. Note to Flight Crew:•

• •

Visits should be strictly followed in the order as given below(timings are approximate):st nd 1 Visit - To IOC (NCC): 1230 - 1345 2 Visit - To Engg. area: 1345 - 1500 Please call the contact numbers mentioned above of the respective areas for tour co-ordination. Please contact the new Police EK II Gate Tel: 04-2151563 for the Gate passes, if delayed or if not yet available at the Gate.

Flight Training Department Office Hours:



Five day upgrade course details (OLD COURSE)

Upgrade Ground School Syllabus

Flight Operations Training

FIVE DAY UPGRADE COURSE

DAY ONE

INTRODUCTION

Guidance will be given on how to be prepared and what expectations are to be anticipated, however the Upgraders are to show that they are developing proficiency toward their new position. A full description of the upgrade programme from Day 1 until the final line assessment is to be provided by the Instructor.

COMPANY PROCEDURE

A FOM review; emphasis is placed on an Emirates Captains’ responsibilities and duties. Also discussed are specific areas of the FOM where guidance is specified in how to conduct routine and non-routine flight operations; the policies and procedures to be followed and circumstances where the Captain, in the interest of safety, may take whatever course of action he deems necessary.

DOCUMENTATION AND REPORTS

The aim is to have a thorough knowledge of what manuals and documentation are required to be onboard, those that are stored onboard and those that the crew should take on a flight. Other documentation and reports for example, Captains special reports, Captains discretion report, ASIR’s etc, are to be thoroughly understood in relation to when and what should be recorded and how the various reports are to be filed.

AIRCRAFT TECHNICAL LOG

The aim is to increase the trainees’ knowledge of the Aircraft Technical logbook, and the practical aspects during line operations whereby the trainee should be able to state: 2. The Tech. Log’s contents 3. The required pre-flight check of the log book 4. How to record deficiencies 5. Who is able to sign the CRS



Procedures to be followed if diverting to a non-EK airport.

MOVEMENT CONTROL BRIEFING

A tour of the Airport Operations and Movement Control (MOCON), and a briefing conducted by the Duty Controller outlining the facilities and procedures used for scheduled and delayed departures from Dubai Airport.

ENGINEERING

A visit to Network Control (IOC) and Engineering is conducted so that a wider understanding of the whole operation is achieved and also provides the opportunity to ask operational and maintenance related questions.

DAY TWO

FLIGHT SAFETY

The General Manager Flight Safety presents a summary of the departments’ functions. Procedures in the case of an incident or accident, the requirements for reporting of air safety incidents are discussed and a visual presentation of the FOQA programme. Specific areas and recent trends of ASIR are highlighted; further discussion is invited from the participants. LIDO FLIGHT PLANNING

The Flight Dispatch Manager provides the Flight Dispatch Department gives an informative briefing on LIDO flight planning and EK dispatch principals with elaboration on the methods of application. In-flight assistance, i.e. flight with landing gear down, re-routings, significant profile changes and the principals of ETOPS planning are discussed to update overall LIDO understanding.

DANGEROUS GOODS

This is a review of dangerous goods procedures and an update of new information in the new IATA Dangerous Goods Manual. A Captain’s responsibilities in relation to the carriage of these goods and applicable operational considerations are to be unders tood.



AIR LAW

Legal responsibilities, the boundaries and authority bestowed upon an Aircraft Commander derived from International and Local Law are clarified with a review of the Chicago, Warsaw and Tokyo conventions. The outcomes of recent legal cases in relation to notification of seatbelt usage are discussed along with proposed changes to the UAE law, specifically in the handling of disruptive passengers.

DAY THREE

CREW RESOURCE MAMAGEMENT (CRM)

This CRM day provides a review of Emirates CRM principals and “ tools” which aid towards maintaining a high level of safety and efficiency. Emphasis is also given towards the development of leadership skills and the use of authority dynamics. Demonstration is made in the application of the company’s Threat Management Model (AAM). Finally “ Live” application of CRM techniques is practised during roll play in the F3D trainer, which is videoed to provide effective feedback.

DAY FOUR

PERFORMANCE

This is a review of FAR/JAR, ICAO, and Jeppesen requirements together with FCOM and EK performance criteria and its practical application. The review is assisted through the aid of a questionnaire to be completed as part of home study before the course. The questions refer to various performance sections within the FCOM’s, which aren’t usually employed in normal operations, however a detailed knowledge would be required in abnormal situations. Operational knowledge and the correct use of the laptop (BLT / LPC) in normal and abnormal configurations is heightened through realistic examples.



SUITABLE AIRPORTS

Instruction is given on guiding principals in the selection of adequate and suitable alternate airports in cases of technical and non-technical related in-flight abnormal/emergency situations, i.e. where to go, how to proceed, continue, return or divert.

DIVERSIONS

Once the decision has been made divert, the procedures for operations to EK and non-EK station airports are considered, i.e. re-plan a continued flight or preparing for an unscheduled night stop. Guidance is provided on how and what expected tasks must be completed by the crew in an unscheduled night stop at a non – EK airport.

FUEL MANAGEMENT

Details of fuel planning, normal and RRSV planning, plus in-flight considerations and procedures when the flight is forecast to land with less than the Company Minimum Reserve (CMR) requirement. Examples of various situations are given so that unnecessary diversions are avoided.

DAY FIVE

ABNORMAL PROCEDURES

Major emergency and abnormal procedures/checklists are clarified. For example: 1. Emergency Electrical configuration 2. Dual engine flame out 3. Smoke / Toxic fumes 4. Fuel leak 5. Volcanic ash 6. Unreliable airspeed Current Operational Engineering and FCOM Bulletins are reviewed.



MEL

A revision of the various sections in the MEL, specifically guidance is given in the practical operational use of the MEL. 

WHEN and HOW to use this reference tool.



If there isn’t a reference in the MEL then how next do you proceed?

ALL WEATHER OPS

This is a review of Airbus and Emirates All Weather Operations Procedures, also aircraft equipment, ground facilities requirements, and procedures to be followed in the cas e of malfunctions.

COLD WEATHER OPS

Overall considerations and the procedures to be applied during cold weather operations are discussed in detail. The emphasis is on being organised and having an aw areness of the procedures in the FCOM, FOM, and RM


An introduction to International Aviation Law

A330 Training Department International Aviation Law


International Aviation Law: An Introduction It is great importance that Aircraft Commanders have a basic understanding of the major instruments of "Public International Law", and "Private International Law" that apply to International Airline Operations, and how these instruments relate to State Law. For their own protection, and in the Company's interests, Aircraft Commanders are expected to have: •

•

•

•

•

•

•

an understanding of the international applicability of "The Rules Of The Air", individual State variations, and the responsibility of the Aircraft Commander in observing same. an understanding of possible civil action that could be directed at an Aircraft Commander in the event of an accident, incident or occurrence, and the requirement to observe all published company procedures to minimise personal liability. an understanding of the rights of the Aircraft Commander in relation to containing disturbances on board, and any resulting civil liability in relation to acts taken against individuals. an understanding of the implications of civil and or criminal action that may be taken against an Aircraft Commander in the event of a ground collision whilst taxying. an understanding of the implications of disallowing a passenger to disembark after a request has been made to disembark. an understanding of the obligations of the Aircraft Commander to State Immigration Authorities in the event of being required to carry deportees. an understanding of actions to be taken in the event of an accident or incident.



U.A.E. Aviation Law 1. The Civil Aviation Law (Federal Act No. 20 [1991])

This is the primary source of all UAE Aviation Law. This document contains the basic provisions of UAE Aviation Law, and also specifically identifies acts which will lead to punitive measures being taken against offenders. Examples of Punitive Provisions Include: •

•

•

A term of imprisonment not exceeding one year and a fine not exceeding fifty thousand dirhams for piloting an aircraft when drunk to such an extent as to impair his capacity to pilot the aircraft. Also the same penalties are legislated against a pilot-incommand who has failed to enter the required information in the documents or record of the aircraft, or who has altered such information (Article 69) A term of imprisonment not exceeding three years and a fine not exceeding one hundred thousand dirhams, or either penalty, for carrying munitions or weapons of war, or committing smuggling (or the intent to smuggle), (Article 70) A term of life imprisonment, or a lesser term of imprisonment, for an act of violence committed on board an aircraft against a crewmember, (Article 72)

2. The UAE Civil Aviation Regulations (July 2003)

This document contains the detailed administrative provisions required to implement the Civil Aviation Law. This document is amended biannually. Copies of this document are kept in the Emirates Operations Centre (E.O.C.)

International Air Law The foundations of international and state aviation law are International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) Conventions, but how do these Conventions become State Law? The Conventions are prepared by the ICAO Legal Committee, and are then agreed to and signed by a number of States. After a pre-determined number of States become "signatories" to the Convention, it is said to be in force. After a State becomes a "signatory" to the Convention, it is expected that the State will enact "enabling legislation" to enact the Convention under local law. Be aware that it is not uncommon for a State to be a signatory to a Convention, but has failed to pass enabling legislation.



The Chicago Convention (1944) The Chicago Convention was agreed to in 1944 by 50 States. It's objectives were to establish the framework, and standards for the establishment of civil aviation after the termination of hostilities post World War II. The Chicago Convention established the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), which formally came into being on May 13, 1947. Quoting from the Chicago Convention, the objectives of ICAO are: The aims and objectives of the Organization are to develop the principles and techniques of international air navigation and to foste r the planning and development of international air transport so as to: (a) Insure the safe and orderly growth of international civil aviation throughout the world; (b) Encourage the arts of aircraft design and operation for peaceful purposes; (c) Encourage the development of airways, airports, and air navigation facilities for international civil aviation; (d) Meet the needs of the peoples of the world for safe, regular, efficient and economical air transport; (e) Prevent economic waste caused by unreasonable competition; (f) Insure that the rights of contracting States are fully respected and that every contracting State has a fair opportunity to operate international airlines; (g) Avoid discrimination between contracting States; (h) Promote safety of flight in international air navigation; (i) Promote generally the development of all aspects of international civil aeronautics. (The Chicago Convention, Article 44)

Annexed to the Chicago Convention are the following annexes that constitute the basis of air law as the pilot knows it: Annex 1 - Aircrew Licensing Annex 2 - Rules of the Air Annex 3 - Met. Services for International Aviation Annex 4 - Aeronautical Charts Annex 5 - Units of Measurement Annex 6 - Operation of Aircraft Annex 7 - Aircraft Nationality and Registration Marks Annex 8 - Airworthiness of Aircraft Annex 9 - Facilitation Annex 10 - Aeronautical Telecommunications Annex 11 - Air Traffic Services Annex 12 - Search and Rescue



Annex 14 - Aerodromes Annex 15 - Aeronautical Information Services Annex 16 - Environmental Protection Annex 17 - Security - Safeguarding International Civil Aviation against Acts of Unlawful Interference Annex 18 - Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air Of particular relevance to the Airline Commander are Annex 2 Rules of The Air, and Annex 11 Air Traffic Services. Extracts from both of these Annexes are found in the Jeppesen Manual, Air Traffic Control Section.

Jeppesen Manual - AirTraffic Control Section J EP P . A TC F ) L IGHT P R OCEDURES (200 S E RIES

Extracted from ICAO Document 8168 (Procedures for Air Navigation Services - Aircraft Ops. [PANS-OPS].) Outlines the parameters that instrument procedures are based on, to emphasise the necessity of compliance with charted procedures. J EP P . A TC ICAO R U LES O F T ) HE A IR - A NNEX 2 (300 S E RIES

Extracted from the Chicago Convention - Annex 2 Basic Rules of the Air Responsibility for Compliance With The Rules of The Air Chapter 2.3 : Responsibility of PIC/ 2.4: Authority of PIC



J EP P . A TC ICAO R U LES O F T ) HE A IR - PANSRAC (400 S E RIES

Extracted from Procedures for Air Navigation Services, Rules of the Air and Air Traffic Services (PANSRAC - Doc. 4444) Mainly directed at Air Traffic Services Personnel. J EP P . A TC JAR-OPS (600 S E RIES )

Contains excerpts from Joint Airworthiness Operations (JAR-OPS) legislation. The Joint Airworthiness Authority (JAA) comprises a number of European States that have agreed to harmonise aviation legislation across their jurisdictions. A State is said to be “JAR Compliant” if it’s aviation legislation is in accordance with JAR-OPS requirements. S T ATES P A GES R U LES

AND

P R OCEDURES - L ISTED A LPHABETICALLY

State variations to ICAO Standards. It is necessary to review this section to verify if a State has enacted non-ICAO procedures (e.g., holding speeds, communication procedures, emergency procedures, classification of airspace, etc.). For example, Saudi Arabia “SCATANA” procedures and TIBA procedures, China and C.I.S. states Emergency Descent requirements, U.K. TMA Holding speeds and required call on initial contact with Radar Departure.



Rules of The Air Over the High Seas Signatory States to the Chicago Convention agree that over the High Seas, the Rules of The Air (with no State differences) shall apply to all aircraft.

In Summary The Aircraft Commander is legally responsible for the disposition and safe operation of the aircraft (Annex 2 and Annex 6). It is his responsibility to ensure that all legal requirements have been met before accepting flight plans and accepting the aircraft from maintenance. The Company has a legal obligation to the local regulatory authority to ensure that appropriate protocols are in place to meet all legal requirements, however, the Aircraft Commander must remember that in most areas, he bears final legal responsibility. Failure to take all reasonable actions to ensure all legal requirements are met could be considered as negligence, or breach of "duty of care". Deliberate failure to observe any rule could be considered as reckless conduct or wilful misconduct .

The Montreal Convention (1999) The Montreal Convention of 1999 lays out the liability of the carrier for damage caused to passengers, goods and cargo, and also the liability of carriers from damages caused by delays. This convention came into force on November 4 2003. This convention totally replaces the Warsaw Convention of 1929 (and amending protocols). The Montreal Convention primarily focuses on the rights of passengers and consignors to claim for damages for death, injury, damage or loss of baggage or goods. The Convention applies a principle of “strict liability” up to a nominal sum, (e.g., for the death of a passenger, the carrier is strictly liable for a sum of 100,000 Special Drawing Rights [SDRs, approximately US$135,000]). For a plaintiff to be awarded sums in excess of the limit of strict liability, it is incumbent upon the carrier to prove that: (a) such damage was not due to the negligence or other wrongful act or omission of the carrier, or its servants and agents; or (b) such damage was solely due to the negligence or other wrongful act or omission of a third party. (Article 21)

The implications for the aircraft commander are that plantiffs will attempt to prove that the actions of the Captain were a causal factor in the damages claimed against, and that these actions were negligent, wrongful, or constituted an omission that the normal pilot should not make. If the court accepts that this was the case, the carrier’s liability is unlimited. Under the now defunct Warsaw Convention, it was necessary to prove that the Carrier or its agents acted recklessly , or with wilful misconduct . It is probable that it is now easier to prove that the



carrier or its agents acted negligently or did not perform an act that was contributory to the damages claimed against. The Warsaw Convention primarily provided protection for carriers, and specified l imitations of liability for carriers. The Montreal Convention however primarily protects the rights of passengers and consignors. The carrier is burdened with the requirement to prove that it or its agents did not act in a negligent manner to preserve limits of liability. For the Montreal Convention to apply, the following tests must be satisfied: •

•

the carriage is international, the plaintiffs injury or damages are directly related to the flight in question (for passenger injury or death, the event must occur on the aircraft, or in the process of embarkation or disembarkation [Article 17]).

Under the Warsaw Convention, plaintiffs had to prove that the Carrier or its agents acted recklessly. Historically Courts have found Aircraft Commanders to have acted recklessly under the following circumstances •

•

For failing to utilise INS during a long overwater crossing, amongst other acts , (KAL 007 shootdown, September [1983]) For failure to switch on the seat belt sign when entering an area of forecast turbulence (Goldman v. Thai Airways International, [1983]) The Judge's finding in this case was predicated on the fact that the Airline's Flight Operations Manual (which was presented as evidence in Court) stated explicitly that the seat belt sign was to be switched on before entering an area of forecast turbulence.

•

For failure to properly observe documented anti-icing procedures (Air Florida crash, Potomac River, Washington, January 1982)

In all these cases, having proved wilful misconduct or reckless conduct (depending on whether the Warsaw Convention or the amending Hague Protocol applied), the plaintiff was then able to claim damages in excess of the Warsaw Convention limits of liability. In the U.S., particularly, the pecuniary damages awarded may be extraordinarily high, as the U.S. law system allows the award of punitive damages to express societal disapproval. The implications to the Aircraft Commander are obvious, be aware of the fact that your best defence in the event of an accident or incident is to prove that you followed manufacturers, and company procedures to the letter! Any procedural shortcut could be considered grounds for negligence in a Court of Law.

The Tokyo Convention (1963) Contains protocols relating to crimes on board aircraft. Provides that the State of Registration of the aircraft has competence to exercise jurisdiction over acts committed on board. The



protocol's intent is to ensure that such acts do not go unpunished. States party to this Convention are obligated to take all measures to restore control of the aircraft to its commander, or to preserve his control of it. The Tokyo Convention defines the acts to which its provisions apply: 1. This Convention shall apply in respect of: (a) offences against penal law; (b) acts which, whether or not they are offences, may or do jeopardize the safety of the aircraft or of persons or property therein or which jeopardize good order and discipline on board. 2. Except as provided in Chapter III, this Convention shall apply in respect of offences committed or acts done by a person on board any aircraft registered in a Contracting State, while that aircraft is in flight or on the surface of the high seas or of any other area outside the territory of any State (The Tokyo Convention, Article 1)

The Tokyo Convention makes specific reference to the powers of the Aircr aft Commander. 1. The aircraft commander may, when he has reasonable grounds to believe that a person has committed, or is about to commit, on board the aircraft, an offence or act contemplated in Article 1, paragraph 1, impose upon such person reasonable measures including restraint which are necessary: (a) to protect the safety of the aircraft, or of persons or property therein; or (b) to maintain good order and discipline on board; or (c) to enable him to deliver such person to competent authorities or to disembark him in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter. 2. The aircraft commander may require or authorize the assistance of other crew members and may request or authorize, but not require, the assistance of passengers to restrain any person whom he is entitled to restrain. Any crew member or passenger may also take reasonable preventive measures without such authorization when he has reasonable grounds to believe that such action is immediately necessary to protect the safety of the aircraft, or of persons or property therein. (The Tokyo Convention, Article 6)

Additionally specific licence is granted to the Aircraft Commander to disembark any person, suspected of committing any act as specified in Article 1: 1. The aircraft commander may, in so far as it is necessary for the purpose of subparagraph (a) or (b) or paragraph 1 of Article 6, disembark in the territory of any State in which the aircraft lands any person who he has reasonable grounds to believe has committed, or is about to commit, on board the aircraft an act contemplated in Article 1, paragraph 1(b).



2. The aircraft commander shall report to the authorities of the State in which he disembarks any person pursuant to this Article, the fact of ,and the reasons for, such disembarkation. (The Tokyo Convent ion, Article 8)

The powers of the Aircraft Commander take effect when the aircraft is in-flight, the exact definition of when the aircraft is in-flight is found in Article 5: 2. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1, paragraph 3, an aircraft shall for the purposes of this Chapter, be considered to be in flight at any time from the moment when all its external doors are closed (The Tokyo Convention, Article 5)

For any action taken in accordance with this Convention, complete exemption from liability is specified: For actions taken in accordance with this Convention, neither the aircraft commander, any other member of the crew, any passenger, the owner or operator of the aircraft, nor the person on whose behalf the flight was performed shall be held responsible in any proceeding on account of the treatment undergone by the person against whom the actions were taken. (The Tokyo Convention, Article 10)

The UAE

The UAE is a signatory to the Tokyo Convention (Effective date 15/7/81). The Tokyo Convention is mentioned specifically in the introduction the UAE Civil Aviation Law document where reference is made to Federal Decree No. 9 (1981), which recognises the UAE’s accession to the Tokyo Convention. The Tokyo Convention is also specifically mentioned in the UAE Civil Aviation Regulations, Part 7, the relevant section is reproduced below: 1.2.5 The UAE is a contracting party to the three principal conventions concerning aviation security; these are: (a) Tokyo Convention 1963: contracting states recognise offences committed on board aircraft on international flights, acknowledge powers accorded to aircraft commanders, and undertake to restore an aircraft subject to unlawful interference to its lawful commander; they also accept a range of procedures for bringing offenders to justice; (b) Hague Convention 1970: contracting states agree to make the seizure of an aircraft by force or intimidation - "hijacking" - an offence punishable by severe penalties; and to make offenders subject to prosecution or extradition; (c) Montreal Convention 1971: contracting states agree to make an increased range of offences relative to the safety of aircraft (acts of violence against persons



communication of false information, etc.) punishable by severe penalties, with offenders subject to prosecution or extradition.

The UAE, unlike other legal jurisdictions, does not elaborate in law in matters relating to the Tokyo Convention. Most jurisdictions specifically legislate against certain acts mentioned in the Tokyo Convention, and specifically mention punitive measures that may be taken against offenders. The UAE Civil Law does make mention of certain criminal acts on board aircraft, the relevant section is reproduced below:

Notice under paragraph one, that an act of violence is mentioned specifically in relation to possible danger to the safety of the flight! Aircraft Commanders should also be aware that in the event of a passenger suffering injury or death whilst under restraint, civil action would probably be taken against the Aircraft Commander for breach of his duty of care to the passenger. The implications of this are obvious, should a passenger be restrained, ensure that he/she is placed under close supervision for the remainder of the flight!



In Summary •

•

•

•

The Aircraft Commander has the power to restrain any passenger who he/she suspects of committing, or being about to commit an offence, or any act that compromises good order and discipline on board the aircraft. Pursuant to this Convention, the Aircraft Commander has the right to have any person disembarked in a signatory country. All signatory States agree to receive any passenger offloaded in such circumstances. According to this Convention, the Aircraft Commander's authority takes effect the moment the external doors are closed. In the event of action being taken against a passenger, make careful notes of the events, preferably with a timeline, and take the names of passengers who could supply evidence at any later enquiry.

Taxying Accidents/Incidents Should the aircraft suffer an accident or incident during taxy, the local legislation of the State I which the aircraft is located would apply. No International Conventions would be applicable in this instance. The UAE

In the UAE, an accident during taxy which resulted in death/injury or damage to property would be treated in a similar manner to a road accident! The Local Police authorities would take action based on the Statutes relating to road law. Dubai Airpo rt (Nov ember 99)

In conversation with the Dubai Airport Safety Officer, it was verified that agreement has been reached between Dubai Police and the Airport Safety Officer, that the Safety Office will exercise jurisdiction in any incident related to aircraft ground taxying

In Summary •

In the event of a taxying accident, remain with the aircraft (quoting safety concerns), until the Company has been notified of the circumstances, and appropriate legal assistance has been obtained.

OTHER AREAS OF LEGAL INTEREST TO THE AIRCRAFT COMMANDER False Im priso nm ent


•


If a passenger requests to disembark the aircraft, and this can be done without major disruption or inconvenience, y o u m u s t a ll o w t h e m t o d o s o . Failing to allow a passenger to disembark in these circumstances could conceivably result in a civil action against the Aircraft Commander for "false imprisonment".

Diplomats •

Diplomats enjoy a high level of immunity from legal process. The specific document of International Law which documents this is the “Vienna Convention on International Relations and Optional Protocols (1961)”. This document, of course, does not relate specifically to aviation, but deals with the way that diplomats, diplomatic mail, and diplomat’s possessions are dealt with, and the immunities that they enjoy.

•

Diplomatic mail cannot be opened or x-rayed.

•

Be cautious in dealings with Diplomats

Carrying Deportees •

•

•

•

In some jurisdictions (e.g., Australia and Singapore), the Aircraft Commander shares responsibility with the Operator for landing an individual with unsatisfactory documentation. If you are required to carry a deportee, ask to see the notice of deportation. (Note: The Flight Operations Manual [FOM] specifically states that the Captain must be informed when Deportees [DEP] or Inadmissible [INAD] passengers are carried.) The Immigration authorities can authorise the offload of a commercial passenger to allow the carriage of a deportee. Be courteous in dealings with Immigration authorities.

Overflig ht Clearances / Righ t To Search •

•

•

In Air Law there is no "right of innocent passage" as in Maritime Law. All transits of another State's airspace must be pre-arranged in bilateral negotiations. Be able to quote overflight clearances when queried. Every State has the right to search any aircraft. In the event of being involved in such a search, ensure the authorites are accompanied by aircraft crew, (quoting safety concerns). Any State has the right to demand that an aircraft in it’s airspace land and be searched.

C u s t o m s A u t h o r i t i es


•


Customs Authorities have broad reaching powers to search and detain. Unlike the Police they do not have to show reasonable cause to conduct a search. Co-operate at all times, if they wish to search an aircraft, ensure that they are accompanied by aircraft crew.



Ac tions In The Event of An A cc ident/Inc ident The natural tendency after a traumatic event is to want to talk about it DO NOT! State that you wish to consult a medical practitioner, eat and obtain rest. DO NOT ADMIT TO ANY FORM OF LIABILITY! Ensure that the Company is notified, so that appropriate legal resources can be marshalled. In S u m m a r y •

Do not in terfere with co ckp it settings after the event

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Have yourse lf and crew transp o rted to Hospital

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Do no t speak to the Press at all!

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Ensure that the Com pany h as bee n notified

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If poss ible - alert you r embassy i n the cou ntry you ar e in

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When inte rviewed - coo perate fully w ith the accid ent inv estigator and the Pol ice. Limit y our sta tements to de scrip tions o f events, do not sp eculate, or attem pt to apporti o n blame in a ny w ay.

•

If interview ed by th e Police, have you r legal representative present.

Disclaimer T h e m a t er i a l p r e s en t e d i n t h i s d o c u m e n t i s p r e s e n t e d a s i n f o r m a t i o n t o p r o m o t e a w a r en e s s o f l e g a l m a t t e r s . Th e a b o v e d o e s n o t c o n s t i t u t e l e g a l a d v i c e p e r s e . T o o b t a i n l e g a l a d v i c e c o n s u l t a n accredited Aviation Lawyer!



Suggested Further Reading For copies of all ICAO Conventions and Protocols, refer to the following Internet address:

http://icarus.iasl.mcgill.ca/ For information on ICAO, refer to the following Internet address:

http://www.icao.org/

Books Diederiks-Verschoor, I.H.Ph. (1997), An introduction to air law (6th. Ed.). The Hague, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International Gifis, S.H. (1996), Law dictionary (4th Ed.). New York: Barron's Educational Series Goldhirsch, L.B. (2000). The Warsaw convention annotated: A legal handbook. The Hague, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International Pengilley, W & McPhee, J. (1994), Law for aviators . Sydney, Australia: Legal Books Unmack, T. (1999). Civil aviation: Standards and liabilities. London, U.K.: LLP Professional Publishing


Rights and responsibilities of an Aircraft Commander

A330 Training Departm ent

Rights and Responsibilities of The Aircraft Commander


Rights and Responsibilities Of The Aircraft Commander UAE Civil Aviation Law

(Federal Act No. 20 1991)

Article 11 The pilot-in-command shall be responsible for the operation and safety of the aircraft, and the safety of all persons on board during flight time. He may take necessary measures to maintain order on board the aircraft and must comply with the applicable rules in this respect. The following references are drawn from the United Arab Emirates Civil Aviation Regulations, issue 2003-2, issued 1/7/2003, valid until 1/1/04.

UAE CARS

(ISSUE 2003-2)

PART I: DEFINITION OF TERMS Pilot-In-Command: The pilot designated by the operator or in the case of general aviation, the owner, as being in command and charged with the safe conduct of a flight.

PART III: RULES OF THE AIR 1.3 RESPONSIBILITY FOR COMPLIANCE

1.3.1 Responsibility of Pilot in Command The pilot-in-command of an aircraft shall, whether manipulating the controls or not, be responsible for the operation of the aircraft in accordance with these regulations 1.3.2 Deviation from Regulations The pilot in command may depart from a Civil Aviation Regulation in circumstances that render such departure absolutely necessary in the interests of safety. The pilot in command shall submit a written report to the GCAA within 24 hours. 1.3.3 Pre-flight Action Before beginning a flight, the pilot-in-command of an aircraft shall become familiar with all available information appropriate to the intended operation. Pre-flight action for flights away from the vicinity of the aerodrome, and for all IFR flights, shall include a careful study of available current weather reports and forecasts, taking into consideration fuel requirements and an alternative course of action if the flight cannot be completed as planned.




1.4 AUTHORITY OF PILOT IN COMMAND The pilot in command of an aircraft shall have final authority as to the disposition of the aircraft while in command. 1.5 INTERFERENCE WITH CREW MEMBERS No person shall assault, threaten, intimidate, or interfere with a crew member in the performance of the crew member's duties aboard an aircraft being operated. 1.6 USE OF INTOXICATING LIQUOR, NARCOTICS OR DRUGS 1.6.1 General No person whose function is critical to the safety of aviation shall undertake that function while under the influence of any psychoactive substance, by reason of which human performance is impaired. No such person shall engage in any kind of problematic use of substances. 1.6.2 Flight Crew No person shall act or attempt to act as a flight crew member of an aircraft: (a) within 8 hours after the consumption of any alcoholic beverage; or (b) while under the influence of alcohol; or (c) while using any drug that effects the person’s faculties in any way contrary to safety; or (d) while having 0.04 percent or more blood alcohol level. 1.6.3 Other Than Flight Crew Except in an emergency, no pilot shall allow a person who appears to be intoxicated or who demonstrates by manner or physical indications that person is under the influence of drugs (except a person under proper medical care) to be carried in that aircraft. 1.6.4 Testing For Psychoactive Substances A crew member shall submit to a test to indicate the use of psychoactive substances and/or alcohol in the blood when the GCAA has a reasonable basis to believe that a person may have violated the provisions of paragraph 1.6.2 above, or as part of a GCAA authorized screening programme. That person shall, upon request by the GCAA, furnish the GCAA, or authorise any clinic, hospital, doctor, or other person to release to the GCAA, the results of each test taken. Refusal to submit to a drug or alcohol test is grounds for immediate suspension of that person’s licence. 1.6.5 Test Information Any test information obtained by the GCAA under paragraph 1.6.2 above may be evaluated in determining a person’s qualifications for any pilot or flight engineer licence or possible violations of this Chapter and may be used as the basis for suspension or sanctions against that licence as well as evidence in any legal proceeding. 1.7 CARRIAGE OF ILLEGAL SUBSTANCES No person shall operate an aircraft within the United Arab Emirates with knowledge that illegal substances, such as narcotic drugs, marijuana, depressant or stimulant drugs or substances, are carried in the aircraft.

2.23.3 Inadvertent Changes [To Flight Plan] 2.23.3.1 In the event that a controlled flight inadvertently deviates from its current flight plan, the following action shall be taken:




(a) Deviation from track: if the aircraft is off track, action shall be ta ken forthwith to adjust the heading of the aircraft to regain track as soon as practical. (b) Variation in true airspeed: if the average true airspeed at cruising level between reporting points varies or is expected to vary by plus or minus 5 per cent of the true airspeed, from that given in the flight plan, the appropriate ATC unit shall be so informed. (c) Change in time estimate: if the estimate for the next applicable reporting point, flight information region boundary or destination aerodrome, whichever comes first, is found to be in error in excess of three minutes from that notified to ATC, or such other period of time as prescribed by the appropriate ATS authority or on the basis of air navigation regional agreements, a revised estimated time shall be notified as

PART IV: AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS 4.4 DUTIES OF PILOT IN COMMAND

4.4.1 The pilot in command shall be responsible for the safety of all crew members, passengers and cargo on board the aircraft when the doors are closed. The pilot in command shall also be responsible for the operation and safety of the applicable aircraft from the moment: (a) the aeroplane is ready to move for the purpose of taking off until the moment it finally comes to rest at the end of the flight and the engine(s) used as primary propulsion units are shut down, or (b) the helicopter engine(s) are started until the helicopter finally comes to rest at the end of the flight, with the engine(s) shut down and the rotor blades stopped. 4.4.2 The pilot in command shall be responsible for reporting all known or suspected defects in the aircraft to the operator, at the termination of the flight. 4.4.3 The pilot in command shall be responsible for notifying the nearest appropriate authority by the quickest available means of any accident involving the aircraft, resulting in injury or death of any person or substantial damage to the aircraft or property.soon as possible to the appropriate ATS unit. 4.4.4 The pilot in command shall ensure that the checklists specified in this Subpart are complied with in detail. 4.4.5 The pilot in command shall be responsible for the journey log book or the general declaration containing the information listed in Subpart B. 4.4.6 The pilot in command shall not permit any activity during a critical phase of flight, which could distract any flight crewmember from the performance of his or her duties and interfere in any way with the proper conduct of those duties. For the purposes of this paragraph, critical phases of flight includes all ground operations involving taxi, takeoff and landing, and all other flight operations conducted below 10000 feet, except cruise flight.




PART 6: AVIATION SAFETY, CHAPTER 1: PASSENGER CABIN SAFETY 1.4 LEGAL POWERS OF THE PILOT-IN-COMMAND The Pilot-in-Command is empowered to take reasonable and necessary measures, including restraint, as may be necessary to prevent: (a) any incident in an aircraft registered in the UAE which is an offence under the laws of that State; (b) anything which endangers, or may endanger, the safety of passengers and crew, the safety of the aircraft or of property on board the aircraft, or the good order and discipline on board the aircraft. 1.4.2 Delegation of Responsibility While it is the clear responsibility of the Pilot-in-Command to maintain order and discipline on board an aircraft, he may delegate such responsibility and authority. However, there is no provision in law for transferring his responsibility and authority for control of passengers on board an aircraft, to another crew member.

1.5.2 Authority When immediate actions are necessary to protect the safety of the aircraft or of persons or property on board the aircraft, any crew member and any other person on board an aircraft may (without the authority of the Pilot-in-Command), take such reasonable measures including restraint. As he has reasonable grounds to believe, such situations would be deemed to have been so critical, from a safety viewpoint that no time was available to obtain the authority of the Pilot-inCommand, for instance: (a) to prevent a person from opening an aircraft door; or (b) to prevent self-inflicted bodily harm to any person on board an aircraft. Note: Criminal or civil proceedings could be brought against crew members for assault or false imprisonment if restraining measures are applied other than in good faith and in circumstances as described above. Crew members finding it necessary to act without the authority of the Pilot-inCommand, can expect to be protected by law provided the action can be proved to be reasonable and necessary in the circumstances. The interpretation of what is "reasonable and necessary" may be difficult for an individual CCM to determine. The use of immediate and direct measures to restrain a person will be rare and only employed when the safety of the aircraft or persons or property on board is at immediate risk. 1.5.3 Legal powers Any action by a Cabin Crew Member to control a disruptive passenger on board an aircraft can, in general, only be exercised under, and in pursuant to, the authority and direction of the Pilot-in-Command. Cabin Crew Members have no direct and independent authority themselves to initiate measures for the restraint and control of passengers. Similarly, Cabin Crew Members cannot, on their own authority, prevent undesirables from boarding the aircraft nor can they refuse carriage or disembark any person. These powers can only be exercised by the Pilot-in-Command directly or by delegation .




1.7 RESTRAINT EQUIPMENT When all other means of placating a violent passenger have been exhausted, the Pilot-in-Command will give the order to effect restraint of that passenger, to be accomplished as follows: (a) the Pilot-in-Command must ensure that sufficient force is available to effect the restraint and he has the authority to co-opt and direct the assistance of anyone on the aircraft; (b) on no occasion may the restraint equipment be used without the authority of the Pilot-in-Command except as outlined in subparagraph 1.7.1, above; (c) if deemed prudent and practical, the Pilot-in-Command should arrange for a Flight Crew member to be present as a witness, but he should not become physically involved; (d) passengers seated adjacent to the disturbance should be reseated, or asked to vacate the area, to ensure that they are not harmed; (e) when effecting the restraint, only sufficient force should be used as is necessary to overpower the passenger; check the restraint at intervals to ensure no injury is caused; (f) at no time must the person who has been restrained be secured to any part of the aircraft; (g) the recommended method for effecting the restraint is as follows: (1) handcuff or otherwise secure the hands : pinion arms with straps also securing the passenger in the seat; strap legs, if required (2) seat the passenger in a seat other than an aisle seat (3) fasten the seat belt (h) when restrained and seated a crew member must stay seated alongside the passenger and be equipped with special shears to release the passenger in event of an emergency; (i) obtain witness reports and pass them, together with Voyage Reports from crew members involved, to the pilot-in-command; (j) on landing, all other passengers should depart the aircraft prior to the removal of restraint and the turn-over of the restrained passenger to civil police and/or medical authorities. 4.7.2 Air Turbulence (a) If air turbulence is forecast, the Pilot-in-Command should brief the Senior Cabin Crew Member prior to departure. (b) When air turbulence is encountered, the Pilot-in-Command should direct appropriate action via the Senior Cabin Crew Member. (c) If in-flight service is to be discontinued, all trolleys, galleys and cabin equipment are to be secured and checks undertaken to ensure that passengers are seated with seat belts fastened. (d) Cabin Crew Members should take their seats and fasten harnesses as soon as reasonably practicable.




CHAPTER 7: AVIATION SAFETY SECTION 5.0 SEARCHING OF VIPS, DIPLOMATS AND COURIERS 5.1 VIPS AND DIPLOMATS All intending passengers are considered as being subject to search. However, Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, 1961, specifically exempts the personal baggage of a diplomat from security searches (in the country to which he/she is accredited only) unless there are serious grounds for presuming it contains articles other than those for official use or for the personal use of the diplomat or members of his family forming part of his household. Any such searches however, shall only be conducted in the presence of the diplomat or his authorized representative. 5.2 DIPLOMATIC BAGS AND POUCHES Diplomatic bags/pouches are inviolable and shall not be opened or detained. They are exempt from pre-board security screening by any means including X-ray and metal detection equipment. 5.3 DIPLOMATIC AND MINISTRY OF DEFENCE COURIERS 5.3.1 Diplomatic couriers convey diplomatic bags/pouches under conditions outlined in Article 27 of the Vienna Convention, 1961. 5.3.2 Diplomatic couriers are identified by: (a) a document indicating their status, issued by the state which they serve; and (b) a document (Way-Bill) indicating the number of packages which comprise the consignment or diplomatic bag/pouch for which they are responsible. Each package has a label bearing a serial number which identifies it with the Way-Bill. 5.3.3 Diplomatic couriers may be engaged wholly on the conveyance of diplomatic bags/pouches or may be persons accredited on a one- time basis as "casual couriers". The documents of accreditation differ from state-to-state, but the status of a courier and the diplomatic bag/pouch are similar. 5.3.4 Ministry of Defence couriers may convey packages which merit the same immunity from screening as diplomatic bags/pouches. Ministry of Defence couriers are identified by: (a) a courier certificate; and (b) a document (Way-Bill) issued by the Ministry of Defence. 5.4 SECURITY SCREENING OF COURIERS The persons and personal baggage of diplomatic and/or military couriers are not exempt from screening procedures. 5.6 REPORTING DIFFICULTIES The Appropriate Authority of the relevant Emirate should be notified of any difficulties in implementing the procedures outlined in this section. Specific difficulties should be dealt with as follows: (a) UAE couriers: to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; (b) Military couriers: to the Ministry of Defence; (c) Foreign cour iers: to the appropriate Embassy/Consulate of the country to which the courier is accredited; and (d) Any person seeking exemption from screening on grounds of protocol or diplomatic status to: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a representative of the airline concerned.

Induction CRM Course Pre-reading

Emirates Induction C CRM C Course Pre-reading

CRM Course Pre Reading

Page 0

Emirates CRM Course Pre-reading

Contents

Page 2-3

6 Generations of CRM

Page 5-6

Qantas 1, Bangkok

Page 7-8

Gulf Air 072, Bahrain

Page 9-12

American Airlines 1420, Little Rock

Page 13-15

American Airlines 965, Cali

Page 16-17

Air Inter Strasbourg A320 accident.

Page 18-19

Swiss Air 111, Nova Scotia

Page 20-21

Singapore SQ 006, Taipei

Note, wherever possible, all accident reports are taken from the official findings, edited for sake of brevity

For training purposes only


Page 1

First Generation CRM 1980-1986 Derived from corporate management development training Focus on individual management style/interpersonal skills Goals to fix the “Wrong Stuff” captains – Make junior crewmembers more assertive

Second Generation CRM 1986 - present

Team building Focus on concepts – situational awareness – stress management Modular – error chain – individual decision making models 

Third Generation CRM 1993 - present

Systems approach Focus on specific skills/behaviors Integration with technical performance Emphasis on evaluating human factors Special training for Check Airmen/Instructors Broadened perspective – Flight attendants, dispatchers, maintenance 

Fourth Generation CRM 1994 - present Integration of CRM into technical training Proceduralization of CRM – Checklists include CRM issues Specialized curriculum topics – automation, etc. Evaluation of human factors in full mission simulation (LOFT/LOE) CRM Course Pre Reading

Page 2

Fifth Generation CRM : Error Management 1996Focus on managing human error Training in limitations of human performance – Universal nature of human error – use of incident & accident data to illustrate Continuation of earlier generation training topics under error management framework

Sixth Generation CRM: Threat and Error Management 1999 Fifth generation was useful, but created resistance among pilots who did not like the idea that their task was managing their own errors LOSA documents not only errors but also the nature and prevalence of threats in the operating environment – shows superior performance as well as problems


Page 3

QANTAS 1 Summary Overview

On 23 September l999, at about 2247 local time, a Qantas Boeing 747-438 aircraft registered VH-OJH (callsign Qantas One) overran runway 21 Left (21L) while landing at Bangkok International Airport, Thailand. The overrun occurred after the aircraft landed long and aquaplaned on a runway which was affected by water following very heavy rain. The aircraft sustained substantial damage during the overrun. None of the three flight crew, 16 cabin crew or 391 passengers reported any serious injuries. The accident flight

The first officer was the handling pilot for the flight. The crew elected to use flaps 25 and idle reverse as the configuration for the approach and landing. in accordance with normal company practice (since December 1996). At various stages during the approach to runway 21L, the crew were informed by air traffic control that there was a thunderstorm and heavy rain at the airport, and that visibility was 4 km (or greater). At 2240, a special weather observation taken at Bangkok airport noted visibility as 1,500 m and the runway visual range (RVR) for runway 21 Right (21R) as 750 m. The Qantas One crew was not made aware of this information, or the fact that another aircraft (callsign Qantas 15) had gone around from final approach at 2243:26. At 2244:53, the tower controller advised that the runway was wet and that a preceding aircraft (which landed at approximately 2240) reported that braking action was ‘good’. The Qantas One crew noted no effect from the weather until visibility reduced when the aircraft entered very heavy rain as it descended through 200 ft on late final approach. The aircraft then started to deviate above the 3.15 degree glideslope, passing over the runway threshold at 169 kts at a height of 76 ft. Those parameters were within company limits. (The target speed for the final approach was 154 kts, and the ideal threshold crossing height was 44 ft.) When the aircraft was approximately 10 ft above the runway, the captain instructed the first officer to go around. As the first officer advanced the engine thrust levers, the aircrafts mainwheels touched down (1,002 m along the 3,150 m runway, 636 m beyond the ideal touchdown point). The captain immediately cancelled the go-around by retarding the thrust levers, without announcing his actions. Those events resulted in confusion amongst the other pilots, and contributed to the crew not selecting (or noticing the absence of) reverse thrust during the landing roll. Due to a variety of factors associated with the cancellation of the go-around, the aircraft's speed did not decrease below the touchdown speed (154 kts) until the aircraft was 1,625 m or halfway down the runway.

The investigation established that, during the landing roll, the aircraft tyres aquaplaned on the water-affected runway. This limited the effectiveness of the wheelbrakes to about one third of that for a dry runway. In such conditions and without reverse thrust, there was no prospect of the crew stopping the aircraft in the runway distance remaining after touchdown. The aircraft overran the 100 m stopway (at the end of the runway) at a speed of 88 kts, before stopping 220 m later with the nose resting on an airport perimeter road. The depth of water on the runway when the aircraft landed could not be determined but it was sufficient to allow dynamic aquaplaning to occur (i.e. at least 3 mm). The water buildup was the result of heavy rain on the runway in the preceding minutes, and possibly because the runway was ungrooved. During the examination of the performance of the aircraft on the runway, it became evident that the flaps 25/idle reverse thrust landing procedure used by the crew (and which was the 'preferred' company procedure) was not appropriate for operations on to water-affected runways. The appropriate approach/landing procedure was flaps 30/full reverse thrust. This had the characteristics of a lower approach speed, of being easier to fly in terms of speed control and runway aim point (for most company pilots), and of providing maximum aerodynamic drag after touchdown when the effectiveness of the wheelbrakes could be reduced because of aquaplaning Had this configuration been used, the overrun would most probably have been avoided. As with other company B747-900 pilots, the crew had not been provided with appropriate procedures and training to properly evaluate the potential effect the Bangkok Airport weather conditions might have had on the stopping CRM Course Pre Reading

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performance of the aircraft. In particular, they were not sufficiently aware of the potential for aquaplaning and of the importance of reverse thrust as a stopping force on water-affected runways. Post-accident events and cabin safety issues The main areas of damage to the aircraft were the lower forward fuselage, the nose and right wing landing gear and landing gear bays, and the engines. Numerous cabin fittings dislodged during the accident sequence. As a result of the nose landing gear coll apsing rearwards and upwards into the lower fuselage, the cabin passenger address system and the interphone system for communications between the flight deck and the cabin became inoperable.

No evidence of fire was was found during the post-accident examination examination of the aircraft. After the aircraft came to a stop, the flight crew initiated a process of gathering information from the cabin concerning the extent of the aircraft damage. The failure of the passenger address and cabin interphone systems was a major hindrance to the crew s efforts to assess the situation in the cabin. Some important information regarding the cabin environment and the external condition of the aircraft did not reach the flight crew. In addition, there were gaps in the information available to the flight crew, the possible significance of which was not considered by them in deciding whether or not to keep the passengers on the aircraft. The captain assessed that the appropriate response was to wait for outside assistance and then conduct a precautionary disembarkation, rather than initiate an immediate evacuation. Normal radio communications between the aircraft and the control tower were lost for a few minutes after the aircraft came to a stop. Additionally, the aircraft could not be seen from the tower because of the reduced visibility and the emergency response vehicles were restricted to sealed surfaces by the wet conditions. These issues contributed to the emergency response vehicles arriving at the aircraft about 10 minutes after the accident. Approximately 20 minutes after the accident, the crew initiated a precautionary disembarkation from the right side of the aircraft using the emergency escape slides. Although the disembarkation was achieved largely without incident, there were arguably sufficient 'unknowns' concerning the condition of the aircraft, and possible related hazards, for an earlier evacuation to have been conducted


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Gulf Air 72 Summary On 23 Aug 2000, at 1930 local time, Gulf Air flight GF-072 from Cairo, an airbus A320, crashed at sea 3 miles north-east of Bahrain Airport. GF-072 was cleared for a VOR/DME approach for Runway 12 at Bahrain. 1 nm from touchdown at an altitude 600 feet, the crew requested a left hand orbit, which ATC approved. Having flown the orbit beyond the extended centreline on a south-westerly heading, the crew initiated a missed approach. Observing the manoeuvre, the ATC offered a Radar Vector which the crew accepted. GF-072 crossed the runway on a north-easterly heading with a shallow climb to 1000 feet. GF-072 entered into a descent until impact. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and all 143 persons on board were killed. The Flight The airplane had been cleared to land on Rway 12 at BAH, but crashed at sea 3 miles NE of the airport soon after initiating a go-around following the second landing attempt. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces, and all 143 persons on board were killed. Night, VMC existed at the time of the accident. accident. According to the cockpit voice recorder (CVR), the captain was performing the pilot-flying (PF) duties, and the first officer was performing the PNF duties. At 1921:48, as GF-072 was descending through approx 14,000 feet amsl and 30 nm north-west of Bahrain, Dammam Dammam App gave the following i nstruction to GF-072: Gulf Air 072, uh, self navigation for 12 is approved. Three point five (3,500 feet) as well approved and Bahrain Approach (127.85 MHz) approved. Several seconds later, the captain asked, “Gulf Air 072, confirm we can go for 12?” Dammam App responded, “Affirmative. Three approves (approvals) you have. Direct for one two (Runway 12). Three point five (3,500 feet) approved. (127.85 MHz) approved.” The CVR then recorded the captain instructing the first officer to contact Bahrain Approach. After the first officer made contact, Bahrain Approach stated, “……cleared (for) self position and, uh, as you’re cleared by Dhahran. Confirm 3,500 feet.” The CVR then recorded the captain telling the first officer, “tell them we are cleared to 7,000 feet.” The first officer complied and Bahrain Approach responded again to flight GF-072 to continue descent to 3,500 feet. After the flight-crew began executing the approach checklist, Bahrain Approach instructed GF-072At 1923:21 to continue descent to 1,500 feet and report when established on the VOR/DME for Runway 12. At 1923:36, the CVR recorded the first officer asking, “V bugs?” and the captain responded, “V bugs, 136, 206 knots, set.” At 1924:38, the CVR recorded the captain saying to the first officer, Now you see you have to be ready, for all this, okay? If (it) change on you all of a sudden, you don’t say I’ll go. You have to know DME. If you can make it or not. Okay? This was followed by another comment by the captain, Now, I’ve just changed all the flight plan, RADNAV, RADNAV, everything for y ou, before you even blink. Yeah? Okay Ammy? At 1925:15, with the airplane 9 nm from Runway 12, 1873 feet AGL, and an airspeed of 313 knots, the captain stated, “final descent is seven DME.” At 1925:37, with the airplane 7.7 nm from Runway 12, 1715 feet AGL, and an airspeed of 272 knots, the captain instructed the first officer to “call established”. At 1925:45, 7 nm from the runway, Bahrain Approach cleared GF-072 for the VOR/DME approach to Runway 12 and instructed the flight to contact Bahrain Tower. At 1926:00, the CVR recorded the captain saying, “final green”, At 1926:04 the first officer contacted Bahrain Tower and stated that GF-072 was “eight DME, established.” Tower controller then cleared GF-072 to land and reported wind from 090 degrees at eight knots. The first officer acknowledged the transmission. At 1926:13, with the airplane 5.2 nm from the runway, 1678 feet AGL, and an airspeed of 224 knots, the captain called for “flaps one.” Seconds later, the captain called for “gear down”, and FDR data subsequently showed the landing gear moving to the gear-down position. At 1926:37, the CVR recorded the captain stating, “Okay, visual with airfield.” Seconds later, FDR data showed the autopilot and flight director being disengaged. At 1926:49 and 2.9 nm from the runway, the airplane descended through 1,000 feet AGL. At 1926:51, with the airplane 2.8 nm from the runway, 976 feet AGL, and 207 knots, the captain stated, “Have to be established by five hundred feet.” Flaps “two” “two” were then selected. As the flight continued on its approach for Runway 12, the captain stated at 1927:06 and again at 1927:13, “….we’re not going to make it.” CRM Course Pre Reading

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At 1927:23, the captain instructed the first officer to “Tell him to do a 360 left (orbit).” The first officer complied and the request was approved by Bahrain Tower. The left turn was initiated 0.9 nm from the runway, 584 feet AGL, and an airspeed of 177 knots. During the airplane’s left turn, FDR data showed the flap configuration going from flaps “two” to flaps “three” and then to flaps full. At 1928:17, the captain called for landing checklist. At 1928:28, with the airplane approximately half-way through the left turn, the first officer stated, “landing checklist completed.” After three-fourths of the 360 turn, the airplane rolled out to wings level. FDR data showed that the airplane’s altitude during the left turn ranged from 965 feet to 332 feet AGL, and that the airplane’s bank angle reached a maximum of 36 degrees. At 1928:57, after being cleared again by Bahrain Tower to land on Runway 12, the captain stated, “…we overshot it.” FDR data then showed the airplane beginning to turn left again, followed by changes consistent with an increase in engine thrust. At 1929:07, the captain stated, “tell him going around” and FDR data indicated an increase to maximum TOGA engine thrust. Bahrain Tower responded with, “I can see that. 072 sir uh….would you like radar vectors….for final again?” The first officer accepted, and Bahrain Tower instructed the crew to, “fly heading 300, climb (to) 2,500 feet.” The first officer acknowledged the transmission. During this time, the flaps were moved to position “three” and the gear was selected up. FDR data showed that the gear remained retracted until the end of the recording. At 1929:41, with the airplane at 1054 feet AGL, at an airspeed of 191 knots, and h aving just crossed over the runway, the CVR recorded the beginning of a 14-second interval of the aural Master Warning 11 (consistent with a flap-overspeed condition), followed by the statement from the first officer, “speed, overspeed limit…” Approximately two seconds after the beginning of the Master Warning, FDR data indicated a forward movement movement of the captain’s side stick. The captain’s side stick was held forward of the neutral position for approximately 11 seconds, with a maximum forward deflection of 9.7 degrees reached. During this time, the airplane’s pitch attitude decreased from 5 degrees nose-up to 15.5 degrees nose-down, the recorded vertical acceleration decreased from +1.0 “G” to +0.5 G’s, and the airspeed increased from 193 knots to 234 knots. At 1929:51, with the airplane descending through 1004 feet AGL at an airspeed of 221 knots, the CVR recorded a single aural warning of “sink rate” from the Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS), followed by the repetitive GPWS aural warning warning “whoop whoop, pull up”, which continued until the end of the recording. At 1929:52, the captain requested, “flaps up.” At 1929:54, the CVR indicated that the Master Warning ceased for about 1 second, but then began again and lasted about 3 seconds. Approximately 2 seconds after the GPWS warnings began, FDR data indicated movement of the captain’s side stick aft of the neutral position, with a maximum aft deflection of approximately 11.7 degrees reached. However, the FDR data showed that this nose-up command was not maintained and that subsequent movements never exceeded 50% of full-aft availability. FDR data indicated no movement from the first officer’s side stick throughout the approach and accident sequence. At 1929:59, the captain requests, “flaps all the way” and the first officer responded, “zero.” This was the last comment from the crew recorded on the CVR, which stopped recording at 1930:02. The FDR data showed continuous movement of the flap position toward t he zero position after the captain’s “flaps up” command. The last flap position recorded on the FDR was 2 degrees of extension. The last recorded pitch attitude was 6 degrees nosedown and last recorded airspeed was 282 knots. FDR data indicated that TOGA selection and corresponding maximum engine thrust remained remained until the end of the recording. FDR data indicated that during the go-around after selection of TOGA thrust, GF-072 was initially at a 9 degree nose-up pitch attitude. However, the pitch attitude gradually decreased to 5 degrees nose-up over the next 25 seconds, where it remained until the captain’s forward sidestick commands resulted in nose-down pitch changes. Note: All information information collated collated from, official official accident accident investigation investigation findings findings on the Bahrain Bahrain Airport Official Official Website


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American Airlines Flight 1420 Little Rock American Airlines Flight 1420 crashed after it overran the end of the runway at Little Rock, Arkansas, during a breaking thunderstorm on the night of June 1999. Many of the 139 passengers and 6 crew on the flight where injured and the Captain and 10 passengers died in the accident. The weather conditions were appalling. The official investigation’s review of the meteorological data showed 46 lightning strikes occurred within five miles of the centre of the airport in the five-minute period leading up to the crash. Witnesses reported torrential rain, strong gusty winds and intermittent golf ball-sized hail. Flight 1420’s departure was more than two hours late from Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport in Texas, because bad weather had delayed delayed the arrival of the aircraft intended for the flight. flight. The first officer was concerned. He notified gate agents that the flight would need to depart by 2316 because of duty time limitations. He then telephoned the flight dispatcher to suggest he get another aircraft for the flight, or cancel it. Another aircraft was substituted, and the flight departed at 2240. Shortly after departure, the flight crew received a warning indicating that the weather around Little Rock might be a factor during the arrival. The dispatcher suggested the flight crew expedite the arrival to beat the thunderstorms if possible. At 2304, another weather advisory (SIGMET) was issued for an area of severe thunderstorms that included the Little Rock airport area. The cockpit voice recorder indicated that the flight crew discussed the weather and the need to “expedite the approach”. About 2325 the captain (flying) said, “we got to get over there quick’. Five seconds later, the first officer said, “I don’t like that lightning’. The flight crew had the city of Little Rock airport area in sight about 2327. When the crew contacted Little Rock air traffic control seven minutes later, the controller advi sed that a thunderstorm northwest of the airport was moving through the area and that the wind was gusting to 44kts. About 2339 the controller notified flight 1420 of a windshear alert. The flight crew then asked for a change of runway to ensure a headwind during landing. After the crew advised the controller that they had lost visual contact with the airport, they were cleared for an instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 04R. At 2347:53, seconds after the captain called for “landing gear down”, the controller issued a second windshear alert. The flight crew did not acknowledge this transmission. According to the cockpit voice recorder, at 2350 the first officer said, “We’re way off”. One second later the captain said, “I can’t see it”. Three seconds afterward, the first officer asked, “got it?” to which the captain replied, “ Yeah, I got it”. Flight data indicated the aircraft touched down on the runway about 2350:20. Four seconds after touchdown the first officer stated, “We’re sliding”. Flight data indicates that over a seven-second period after touchdown, both thrust thrust reversers were deployed. deployed. The spoilers did not deploy symmetrically at touchdown, but a momentary eight degree deflection of the left outboard flight spoiler concurrent with a left aileron deflection was recorded. At 2350:36, flight data indicated a full 60 degree deployment of t he right inboard flight spoiler, concurrent with a full aileron deflection. The aircraft was swerving out of control as it careered down runway 4R. It crashed through a chain fence and a metal ILS structure and pitched over an embankment, before coming to rest at the edge of the Arkansas River. Tragedy: There on the river’s marshy banks, the smoking MD-82 lay broken in pieces, while passengers and crew, many of them injured, scrambled to safety through exits and fissures in the hull. From the wrecked cockpit of the aircraft, the co-pilot called American Airlines’ operations centre with his cell phone. Flight 1420 had crashed. His captain captain lay dead next to him. Ten passengers had died in the crash crash and 110 people were injured. In the control tower tower the controller was making making frantic efforts to contact the flight crew. crew. In the poor conditions, he could not see the aircraft and requested requested Flight 1420 report that it was clear clear of the runway. There was no response. He tried five times over the next two minutes, before alerting rescue and fire fighting units that Flight 1420 was down on runway 4R.


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All three fire trucks went to the approach end of runway 4R. Eight minutes later, fire truck two called the tower to report the aircraft was not there. Should they sweep the runway? After a five second delay, the controller sent them to the departure end of 4R where they located the aircraft. The delayed emergency response was among several factors investigators examined during a 28-month inquiry into the crash by the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). The NTSB found the delayed emergency response was a result of a communication failure between the tower controller and the rescue response team. The team was directed by the tower controller to go to the end of runway 4R which they interpreted as going to the “4R” painted on the runway. The misunderstanding took them away from the crash site. The Safety Board considered whether a shorter rescue response time could have prevented any fatalities, but concluded passenger lives would not have b een saved if emergency responders had arrived on the scene earlier. The NTSB report recommended annual briefings between airport tower and fire and rescue personnel, to ensure they had a common understanding of the local airport emergency plan. Investigators found the immediate reason the aeroplane roared off the far end of runway 4R was the crew’s failure to arm the spoilers prior to landing. In the 26 seconds between touchdown and flight data recorder shut-off, there is no indication that the crew took belated action to manually depl oy the spoilers. Procedures: The investigation also found American Airlines’ procedures regarding spoiler operation at the time of the accident, differed from other carriers operating DC-9/MD-80/MD-90 series aircraft. At American, the practice was for the pilot not flying to arm the spoilers by moving the handle on the centre console to the armed position, and then moving the appropriate switch on the carrier’s mechanical landing checklist to indicate that the spoilers had been armed. The process did not require a verbal call-out and read-back between both pilots, the practice at other carriers. Nor was a positive call-out of spoiler deployment required at American, as it was at other carriers operating the same type of aircraft. NTSB investigators found a variance variance between practices taught taught during simulator training sessions, sessions, and actual practice “flying the line’. In simulator training, the pilot not flying would arm arm the spoilers, but during actual flight operations where the captain was the pilot flying, the captain would often arm the spoilers, as the handle is on the left side of the console. The pilot not flying might not notice, due to the absence of a requirement for positive verbal dual-confirmation that the spoilers were armed. Flight crews should verbally confirm arming of the spoilers, and conduct a call-out of spoiler deployment after touchdown. Without spoilers, Flight 1420 was doomed to overrun. The aircraft touched down about 2,000ft from the threshold of the 7,200ft runway. As the pilot flying, the captain had elected to use manual brakes, but delayed using them until 11 seconds after touchdown. He made aggressive use of reverse thrust, exceeding the maximum 1.3 engine pressure ratio (EPR) authorised for landing on wet runways. runways. Overrun: In a last minute effort to maintain control, as the aeroplane swerved down the runway, the right engine recorded a maximum 1.9 EPR, and the left hit 1.7 EPR. Because the spoilers were not deployed, the aircraft could not stop in time. Computer simulations showed showed if the spoilers had been used, even with an 11 second delay in braking and the use of reverse thrust as actually recorded during the incident, the aeroplane could have been stopped with about 700ft to spare. Investigators were also concerned that the landing was attempted at all in the face of the severe thunderstorms moving across the airfield. Flight 1420 flew into a wall of thunderstorms on its final descent to runway 4R Comments on the cockpit voice recorder indicate that the flight crew was aware of the weather and wanted to expedite the arrival. However, the cockpit voice recorder did not contain any discussion about the possibility of holding to allow the storm to pass or diverting to one of the alternative aerodromes.


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1. 10 people slipped out from the tail cone just ahead of toxic smoke. 2. At least three people escaped through a partially buckled gallery door. 3. Passenger In seat 27E died. 4. Flames made escape through through the emergency exit over the left wing treacherous but several made it. 5. Many people escaped through the right over wing emergency exit before flames engulfed the area. 6. Four people crawled out after after the aircraft broke apart. Five others near them perished. 7. Passengers in seat 17A, seat 18A, seat l8B, seat 1YD and seat 19A perished. 8. Passenger in seat 19B died 9. Several people crawled through a fissure 18 inches wide, falling loft to the ground. 10. Passenger n seat 3A died 11.The pilot died when the left side of the cockpit took a direct hit from a steel pole 12. The crash ripped out the left side of first class, leaving an opening of mangled metal through which more than 30 people escaped.

A Massachusetts Institute of Technology study of airline thunderstorm penetrations published just two days after the crash at Little Rock, found pilots were more likely to penetrate convective weather when they were: Near the destination airport rather than further away. Following another aircraft. More than 15 minutes behind where they ought to be, based on the nominal flying time scheduled for the trip. Flying after dark. • • •

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Factors: Three of these four factors were present in the case of Flight 1420. The flight was more than two hours late departing, it was dark, and the convective weather “blanketed” the airport and its immediate surroundings. Investigators believe the final approach to runway 4R should have been aborted. Among the many reasons they cited, was the aircraft’s unstabilised approach. Twenty seconds before touchdown the first officer (not flying) remarked, “We’re way off”. The final flap setting to 40 degrees, which should have been completed as the aeroplane descended through 1,000ft above ground level (AGL), was not completed until 900ft AGL. Nor was the aeroplane on a proper flight path for imminent landing, as shown by the computerised reconstruction of the final descent, and by the first officer’s belief that the aircraft was not stabilised for landing at 400ft AGL. Among its nearly 40 conclusions, the NTSB said, “It is imperative that air carriers have specific approach criteria’ Fatigue: The crash occurred after the crew had been on duty for 13.5 hours, and awake for more than 16 hours. Flight 1420 was the end of the first day of a three-day sequence for the flight crew. As the aeroplane descended for landing at Little Rock, first on Runway 22L, then on Runway 4R, the crew’s apprehensions about the situation mounted. They became task fixated as a result of fatigue and stress. Despite having plenty of fuel to abort the landing, they painted themselves into a corner. Evan Bryne, a human factors expert with the NTSB, cited three examples of fatigue at work in the events leading to the accident: Checklist — improper execution of the pre-landing checklist, in which the spoilers were not armed, possibly due to the forgetfulness, distraction and inattention to detail that are some of the effects of fatigue. Recall — the momentary confusion of the final flap setting before landing. Twelve seconds after the crew had descended through 1,000 feet, the first officer said: “Want 40 flaps?” when the flaps were set to 28 degrees. The captain replied: “Oh yeah, I thought I called it.” Failure to confirm that the landing gear was down and locked is another indication of forgetfulness aggravated by fatigue. The captain commanded gear down at 1147:44, but positive confirmation, as required by the carrier’s procedures, was never never given. CRM Course Pre Reading

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Information processing — Byrne pointed to a readback error regarding wind direction as a further suggestion that fatigue was at work. Little Rock tower told the crew that the wind was ~‘three five zero, gusts four five” i.e. 3Okt, gusting to 45kt from a direction of 350 degrees. The First Officer replied “zero three zero at four five”’ 330 rather than 350 degrees. It is possible the first officer momentarily confused wind speed which was reported at 30kt, for wind direction. The tower controller should have corrected the error in acknowledgement, but this was not done. Perhaps an even greater indication of fatigue was the extensive discussion between the pilots about the crosswind limits for landing. At 1147:22, the runway visual range was reported as 3,000ft, with crosswinds of more than 30kt. The captain declared, ‘We can’t land on that? ’ He was correct — the company crosswind limit was 20kt. About 50 seconds later, the tower controller advised that the runway visual range was now just 1,600ft. Declaring, “We’re established on final” the captain continued the approach. The NTSB concluded that the probable causes of the accident were the flight crew’s failure to Conclusion: discontinue the approach when severe thunderstorms moved into the airport area, and the crew’s failure to ensure that the spoilers had extended after touchdown. Contributing to the accident where: The flight crew’s impaired performance resulting from fatigue and the situational stress associated with the intent to land under the circumstances. Continuation of the approach to a landing when the company’s maximum crosswind component was exceeded. Use of reverse thrust greater than 1.3 engine pressure ration after landing. In the wake of the Little Rock disaster, American Airlines and Little Rock National Airport have started making important safety changes to minimise the chances of another such accident. American now offers its pilots fatigue countermeasure programs and pilots have the right to refuse a flight if they feel fatigue is stopping them from performing to the best of their ability. •

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AA965 Cali Accident Report NEAR CALI, COLOMBIA, DECEMBER 20, 1995 History of Flight

At 2142 (est) on December 20, 1995, American Airlines Flight 965 ( AA965), a Boeing 757-223, on a regularly scheduled passenger flight from Miami to Cali, Colombia, operating under instrument flight rules (IFR), crashed into mountainous terrain during a descent from cruise altitude in visual meteorological conditions (VMC). The accident site was near the town of Buga, 33 miles northeast of the Cali VOR (CLO). The airplane impacted at about 8,900 feet mean sea level (msl), near the summit of El Deluvio and approximately 10 miles east of Airway W3. Of the 155 passengers, 2 flightcrew members, and 6 cabincrew members on board, 4 passengers survived the accident. Both the captain and first officer were in his office about 40 minutes before the required check-in time, and appeared to be in good spirits. According to the AA flight dispatcher at MIA, AA965 was delayed about 34 minutes, waiting for the a rrival of connecting passengers and baggage. The flight departed the gate at 1714, and then experienced another ground delay of 1 hour 21 minutes that the flight dispatcher stated was related to gate congestion due to airport traffic. AA965 departed MIA at 1835, with an estimated time enroute to Cali of 3 hour 12 minutes. AA965 was cleared to climb to flight level (FL) 370 [3]. The route of flight was from MIA through Cuban airspace, then through Jamaican airspace, and into Colombian airspace, where the flight was cleared to fly direct from BUTAL to the Tulua VOR (ULQ) At 2103, AA965 Bogota Center again cleared the flight from its present position to UL Q, and told the flight to report when they were ready to descend. At 2110, AA965 communicated via ACARS with AA's System Operations Control (SOC) center, asking for weather information at Cali. At 2111, Cali weather was reported as clear, visibility greater than 10 kilometers, and scattered clouds. At 2126:16, AA965 requested descent clearance. The flight was initially cleared to FL 240 and then to FL 200. At 2134:04, the flight was instructed to contact Cali Approach Control (Approach). AA965 contacted Approach at 2134:40. The captain, making t he radio transmissions said, "Cali approach, American nine six five." The approach controller replied, "American niner six five, good evening. go ahead." The captain stated, "ah, buenos noches senor, American nine six five leaving two three zero, descending to two zero zero. go ahead sir." The controller asked, "the uh, distance DME from Cali?" The captain replied, "the DME is six three." The controller then stated, "roger, is cleared to Cali VOR, uh, descend and maintain one, fve thousand feet. altimeter three zero zero two.... no delay expect for approach. report uh, Tulua VOR." The captain replied, "OK, understood. cleared direct to Cali VOR. uh, report Tulua and altitude one five, that's fifteen thousand three zero.. zero.. two. is that all correct sir?" The controller stated, "affirmative." The captain replied at 2135:27, "Thank you. At 2135:28, the captain informed the first officer that he had "...put direct Cali for you in there." At 2136:31, Approach asked AA965, "sir the wind is calm. are you able to [execute the] approach [to] runway one niner? ( "VOR DME Rwy 19" and "ILS RWY 01") The captain responded, "uh yes sir, we'll need a lower altitude right away though." The approach controller then stated, "roger. American nine six five is cleared to VOR DME approach runway one niner. Rozo number one, arrival. report Tulua VOR." The captain, replied, "cleared the VOR DME to one nine, Rozo one arrival. will report the VOR, thank you sir." The controller stated, "report uh, Tulua VOR." The captain replied, "report Tulua." At 2137:29, AA965 asked Approach, "can American airlines uh, nin e six five go direct to Rozo and the n do the Rozo arrival sir?" The Cali approach controller replied, "affirmative. take the Rozo one and runway one niner, the wind is calm." The captain responded, "alright Rozo, the Rozo one to one nine, thank you, American nine six five." The controller stated, "( thank you very much) [8].... re port Tulua and e'eh, twenty one miles ah, five thousand feet." The captain responded, "OK, report Tulua twenty one miles and five thousand feet, American nine uh, six five."


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At 2137, after passing ULQ , during the descent, th e airplane began to turn to the left of the cleared course and flew on an easterly heading for approximately one minute. Then the airplane turned to the right, while still in the descent. At 2139:25, Morse code for the letters "VC" was recorded by navigation radio onto the airplane's CVR. At 2139:29, Morse code similar to the letters "ULQ" was recorded. At 2140:01, the captain asked Approach, "and American uh, thirty eight miles north of Cali, and you want us to go Tulua and then do the Rozo uh, to uh, the runway, right to runway one nine?" The controller answered, "...you can [unintelligible word] landed, runway one niner, you can use runway one niner. what is (you) altitude and (the) DME from Cali?" The flight responded, "OK, we're thirty seven DME at ten thousand feet." The controller stated at 2140:25, "roger. report (uh) five thousand and uh, final to one one, runway one niner." The CVR recorded the flightcrew's conversations as well as radio transmissions. At 2140:40, the captain stated, "it's that [expletive] Tulua I'm not getting for some reason. see I can't get. OK now, no. Tulua's [expletive] up." At 2140:49 the captain said, "but I can put it in the box if you want it." The first officer replied, "I don't want Tulua. let's just go to the extended centerline of uh...." The captain stated, "which is Rozo." At 2140:56, the captain stated, "why don't you just go direct to Rozo then, alright?" The first officer replied, "OK, let's...The captain said, "I'm goin' to put that over you." The first officer replied, "...get some altimeters, we'er out of uh, ten now." At 2141:02, Cali Approach requested the flight's altitude. The flight replied, "nine six five, nine tho usand feet." The controller then asked at 2141: 10, "roger, distance now?" The flightcrew did not respond to the controller. At 2141:15, the CVR recorded from the cockpit area microphone the mechanical voice and sounds of the airplane's ground proximity warning system (GPWS), "terrain, terrain, whoop, whoop." The captain stated, "Oh [expletive]," and a sound similar to autopilot disconnect warning began. The captain said, "...pull up baby." The mechanical voice and sound continued, "...pull up, whoop, whoop, pull up." The FDR showed that the flightcrew added full power and raised the nose of the airplane, the spoilers (speedbrakes) that had been extended during the descent were not retracted. The airplane entered into the regime of stick shaker stall warning, nose up attitude was lowered slightly, the airplane came out of stick shaker warning, nose up attitude then increased and stick shaker was re-entered. The CVR ended at 2141 :28. The wreckage path and FDR data evidenced that the airplane was on a magnetic heading of 223 degrees, nose up, and wings approximately level, as it struck trees at about 8,900 feet msl on the east side of El Deluvio. The airplane continued over a ridge near the summit and impacted and burned on the west side of the mountain. When entering navaid information into the database, the navaid identifier is used as the key identifier. This means that the letter R is the default value for the Romeo NDB and the Rozo NDB. Since the Bogota city and airport is larger than Cali, the larger airports are entered sequentially at the beginning to satisfy the greatest amount of users. The letter R was entered for the Romeo NDB as the "key" to the navaid. Therefore, when using most FMSs, entering the letter R when in Colombia will call up the Romeo NDB since it is the identifier for the Romeo NDB. When the Rozo NDB was entered into the database, the letter R was attempted, but the computer rejected the letter R since it had already been used for the Romeo NDB. According to the ARINC 424 standards, when a duplicate exists, the name of the NDB can be used as the identifier for entry into the database. In the case of Rozo, since the name is four letters or less, the complete name of Rozo was used as the identifier. Simulations found that when R was entered into the CDU, a white dashed line pointed off the map display towards the east-northeast. When R was "executed," the airplane turned towards R (in the City of Bogota) and the white dashed line turned to a solid magenta colored line on the display.


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Air Inter Strasb ourg A320 accident. Following an uneventful flight from Lyons the crew prepared for a descent and approach to Strasbourg. At first the crew asked for an ILS approach to runway 26 followed by a visual circuit to land on runway 05. This was not possible because of departing traffic from runway 26. The Strasbourg controllers then gave flight 148 radar guidance to ANDLO at 11DME from the Strasbourg VORTAC. Altitude over ANDLO was 5000ft. After ANDLO the VOR/DME approach profile calls for a 5.5% slope (3.3deg angle of descent) to the Strasbourg VORTAC. While trying to program the angle of descent, "-3.3", into the Flight Control Unit (FCU) the crew did not notice that it was in HDG/V/S (heading/vertical speed) mode. In vertical speed mode "-3.3" means a descent rate of 3300ft/min. In TRK/FPA (track/flight path angle) mode this would have meant a (correct) -3.3deg descent angle. A -3.3deg descent angle corresponds with an 800ft/min rate of descent. The Vosges mountains near Strasbourg were in clouds above 2000ft, with tops of the layer reaching about 6400ft when flight 148 started descending from ANDLO. At about 3nm from ANDLO the aircraft struck trees and impacted a 2710ft high ridge at the 2620ft level. Because the aircraft was not GPWS-equipped, the crew were not warned.

CTRL = Strasbourg ATC PF = Captain (Pilot Flying) PNF = First Officer (Pilot Non-Flying) Source Contents PNF I don't understand why you do not try a zero-five VOR DME after all PF Because the zero five VOR DME, we've got to arrive here, leave, go t o God knows where, and come back again (*) PNF Ah, yes, OK PF If not, it's necessary to go out to 11 STR, that makes eleven, 22 miles means another 10 minutes' flight (*) (*) PNF Sierra Echo identified PF I'v set you the return track to STR eh, ... zero-five-zero PNF OK PF We'll do the pre-descent procedure PNF (*) PF I doesn't matter PNF I'm ready PF Pre-descend checklist PNF ECAM status checked. Speed bugs PF They are set PNF Standby altimeter PF One thousand and twenty-three PNF One thousand and twenty-three, altimeter (*) checked. Engine anti-ice PF To OFF PNF FMGS parameters inserted and the harnesses PF (*) PNF Checklist completed. We descend in one minute, it's OK? PF In one-and-a-half minutes, two minutes, we've enough time PNF Air Inter one four eight Delta Alpha we'd like to descend in one minute CTRL Delta Alpha descend level one hundred thrity PNF To one hundred thrity, we'll descend Delta Alpha CTRL Delta Alpha heading to ANDLO PNF Heading to ANDLO correct? CTRL Affirmative PF To? PNF ANDLO PF ANDLO, oh there, they are a nuisance (*) CTRL Air Inter Delta Alpha what's your heading to ANDLO? PNF Our heading is zero fifty three to ANDLO CTRL Delta Alpha, maintain heading zero fifty-three until further advised PNF We'll maintain until further advised. Ah, I say, Reims, their control there (*) t hat one goes to Epinal CTRL Air Inter Delta Alpha continue descent to level seventy PNF Continuing descent to seventy Delta Alpha PF There we're of. Idle open PNF Idle open descent CA Ladies and gentlemen, we are starting our descent. We ask you t o please return to your seats. Thank you CTRL Air Inter Delta Alpha the level on descent CRM Course Pre Reading

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PNF (*) one fifty descending to seventy Delta Alpha CTRL Delta Alpha received, no more restrictions on heading, contact Strasbourg one t wenty dot seven. Goodbye PNF No more restrictions on heading one twenty seven, Strasbourg approach, good day. Air inter one hundred forty-eight Delta Alpha CTRL One hundred forty-eight Delta Alpha, good day. Proceed to ANDLO. Your distance? PF (*) PNF Yes ANDLO, and we are at twenty-two nautical DME from STR CTRL Received, continue the descent to five thousand feet QNH one thousand twenty-three call ANDLO five thousand feet PNF Five thousand feet, thousand twenty-three, we'll call ANDLO five thousand PNF There one thousand... PF And sixty (*). PF Safety height twenty-two. OK it's alright... f ive thousand two hundred feet ... twenty one ... OK it's good. PNF (*) PF One thousand and five ... we'll do the procedure at two thousand ... initial approach (*) eleven thousand twohundred feet now. PNF OK. PF TOP PNF No. Eleven thousand feet, one thousand five..one thousand five not one thousand eight PF Yes it's one t housand eight PNF One thousand twenty-three that makesone thousand five. PF One thousand five? PNF For Delta Alpha, you confirm Fox Echo one thousand five, zero five correct? CTRL The Fox Echo is one thousand five, zero f ive and QNH one thousand twenty-three PNF Thank you Sir. One thousand five. Ten thousand four hundred... PF Ten thousand four hundred feet ready, now PNF It's correct. it's OK. Checklist initial approach Baro ref altimeters set compared. Seatbelts ON. PF It's set PNF Engine anti-ice OFF for the moment (*) PF No PNF Marker selected to listen on righthand side. Engine mode selector set to normal. Checklist completed PF We're passing ANDLO PNF We're passing ANDLO, Air Inter Delta Alpha, level ... er! Sorry seven thousand five hundred feet, descending. CTRL Received one hundred forty-eight Delta Alpha, you are number one for te VOR DME zero five, call passing the VOR in final PNF Number one for the VOR DME zero five PNF We could ask him to confirm the cloud base now... how many miles? PF Ten miles. It's not going to work, tell him, we'll make a ... PNF Yes, 'maxi maxi'. Confirm cloud base Strasbourg? CTRL We have three-eighths at elevenhundred feet and six-eighths at two thousand six hundred feet PF That's good PNF Yeah, we planned to proceed Sierra Echo, do an ILS, t hen an indirect for zero five. PF [Chime] (*) CTRL Received Delta Alpha PF What's the temperature? PNF The temperature...? CTRL Delta Alpha, initially maintain five thousand, QNH, one thousand twenty three and as there will be three takeoffs on zero five, you may have to hold in the stack at five t housand feet. PF We'll have to go back to doing a VOR DME procedure ... then ... PNF We'll go back to the VOR DME procedure at this time t hen CTRL OK PF We would not have made an India Mike descent like t hat of they had told us beforehand, but there we are, we're arriving flat out CTRL Delta Alpha ... Strasbourg PNF I'm listening to you CTRL If you want I can take you on the radar to bring ou to ANDLO at five thousand PF Er! Yeah, that's good PNF Yes CTRL OK! Then six one zero zero, turn left heading two hundred thirty PNF Sixty-one zero zero and heading two hundred thirty to the left CTRL There you are, that will save you time PF (*) PNF Thank you ? I'll give you zero five (*) CRM Course Pre Reading

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CTRL Maintain five thousand on reaching it and until ANDLO, the QNH is one thousand twenty three PNF QNH one thousand twenty-three, maintaining five thousand. PF The distances there ... er! ... Ah yes, there (*) overhead the 250 moving out to eleven STR, we repass ANDLO on the track and we leave at eleven STR .. 4500 feet, nine STR, 3800, seven, three,two hundred. In case of go around we climb on the centreline CTRL Delta Alpha, six nautical radial two hundred ninety f or Strasbourg PNF Received Delta Alpha PF The coud-break is made on zero fifty. It's a slope of 3 point five er! five point five ... That is three (*) three. PF We'll select anti-ice (*). PF And the lot, the wings as well. PNF Yes PF What's up? PNF It's nice and new, but that's what's wrong PF Yes, yes, there is ice on it. PF It's crazy, eh? When you're not ready the time it takes to get to five thousand feet to ANDLO flat out. It doesn't work eh? And also at ... what ... ten miles from final. CTRL Air Inter Delta Alpha turn left (*) heading ninety, zero nine zero PNF Heading ninety, zero nine zero to the left Delta Alpha PF Flaps to one PNF Flaps to one. (*) One CTRL Air Inter Delta Alpha continue left turn to establish yourself on zero fifty one, you are four miles from ANDLO, passing left of ANDLO PF OK PNF Received, we will call established on QDM zero fifty one CTRL Affirmative sir PNF We will (*) (*) PNF Il aurait fallu qu'tu ouvres au zero sept zero PF Yeah, yeah PNF At least CTRL Air Inter Delta Alpha passing right of ANDLO, authorized (*) final approach VOR DME zero five PNF Delta Alpha PF Flaps to two PNF Flaps to two, (*) two PF Gear down PNF I'll prepare the lights without putting them on CTRL Delta Alpha call the VOR on final PF OK PNF Call the VOR on final (*) pass eight hundred feet PF (*) PNF On centerline. (*) Half a dot f rom centerline. There is is, it had been at sixty, it's good, you see here [Two hundred] - radio altimeter callout End of Recording Follow-up / safety actions: As a result of this accident Airbus made some design improvements to the FCU giving the digital VS mode read-out 4 digits and the FPA read-out just 2. Furthermore, 34 safety recommendations were issued by the French BEACockpit voice recorder transcript of the February 20, 1992 accident of Air I nter Flight 148, an Airbus A320 near Strasbourg (France).


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Swissair 111 Investigation Report - Executiv e Summary The following is an executive summary of the report by t he Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) into the accident involving Swissair Flight 111 near Peggy's Cove, Nova Scotia, on the night of 2 September 1998. The aircraft, a McDonnell Douglas MD-11 with 215 passengers and 14 crew members on board, was on a scheduled flight from New York to Geneva Summary of Occurrence About 53 minutes after departure, while flying at Flight Level 330 (about 33,000 feet), the flight crew smelled an abnormal odour in the cockpit. A small amount of smoke became visible in the cockpit; then, it is likely that the smoke stopped entering the cockpit for an undetermined length of time. The flight crew assessed that there was an anomaly associated with the air conditioning system. After conversing with air traffic services, the flight crew decided to divert to the Halifax International Airport in Nova Scotia, Canada. While the flight crew was preparing for t he landing in Halifax, they were unaware that a fire was spreading above the ceiling in the front area of the aircraft. About 13 minutes after the abnormal odour was first detected, the aircraft's flight data recorder began to record a rapid succession of aircraft systems-related failures. The flight crew declared an emergency and indicated a need to land immediately. About one minute later, radio communications and secondary radar contact with the aircraft were lost, and the flight recorders stopped functioning. About five and one-half minutes later, at 10:31 p.m. Atlantic daylight saving time (ADT), the aircraft crashed into the ocean about five nautical miles southwest of Peggy's Cove, Nova Scotia, Canada. The aircraft was destroyed and there were no survivors. Summary o f Findings and Board Recommendations Approximately 98 per cent of the aircraft, measured by weight, was recovered. From the examination of the pieces of wreckage, it was determined that a fire had occurred in the forward, overhead area of the aircraft. Portions of the front section of the aircraft were reconstructed to allow a thorough analysis of potential ignition sources, and to assess how the fire propagated. It was determined that the fire most likely started from an electrical arcing event that occurred above the ceiling on the right side of the cockpit near the cockpit rear wall. The arcing event ignited the flammable cover material on nearby metallized polyethylene terephthalate (MPET) covering on the thermal acoustic insulation blankets. As the fire spread across the surface of the insulation blankets, other flammable materials became involved, including silicone elastomeric end caps, hook-and-loop fasteners, foams, adhesives, thermal acoustic insulation splicing tapes, and metallized polyvinyl fluoride (MPVF) insulation blanket cover material. The fire progression was rapid, and involved a combination of these materials that t ogether sustained and propagated the fire. Material Flammabilit y The Board concluded that aircraft certification standards for material flammability were inadequate, in that they allowed the use of materials that could be ignited and sustain or propagate fire Initial Wire Arcing Reconstruction of the wreckage indicated that a segment of arced electrical cable associated with the in-flight entertainment network (IFEN) had been located in the area where the fire most likely originated. The Board concluded that the arc on this electrical cable was likely associated with the fire initiation event. The Board also concluded that it is likely that one or more additional wires were involved in the lead arcing event, and that the additional wire or wires could have been either IFEN or aircraft wires. Therefore, it could not be concluded that the known arcing event on the IFEN cable located in the area where the fire most likely originated was by itself the lead event. During the course of the investigation, in efforts t o find and eliminate potential ignition sources in MD-11 aircraft, more than 70 Airworthiness Directives have been promulgated by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). These airworthiness directives required various measures to be taken, such as one-time inspections of wires and electrical components, primarily in the front ceiling area of the aircraft. During the lead arcing event, the associated circuit breaker or breakers did not trip. The Board concluded that, although the type of circuit breakers used in the aircraft, including those used for the IFEN, were similar to those in general aircraft use, the circuit breakers were not capable of protecting against all types of wire arcing events. The Board recommended that a certification test regime be mandated that evaluates aircraft electrical wire failure characteristics under realistic operating conditions, and against specified performance criteria, with the goal of mitigating against the risk of igniting nearby flammable material. There was no information available to indicate that the SR 111 crew reset circuit breakers. However, during the course of the investigation, it became evident that the circuit breaker CRM Course Pre Reading

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resetting philosophy and procedures varied considerably among manufacturers, operators, flight crews, and maintenance personnel throughout the industry. While considerable standardization has taken place during the course of the investigation, the Board is calling for clearer guidance from regulators. Fire Detection and Suppression Airflow patterns in the aircraft and fire propagation scenarios were analyzed to assess cues that may have been available to the pilots during the early stages of the fire. It was determined that the small amount of odour and smoke first noticed by the pilots originated from a small creeping fire propagating aft from the area of the initial ignition, toward the area above the forward passenger cabin ceiling. As the fire propagated aft, it is likely that the associated smoke temporarily stopped migrating forward into the cockpit. As the aircraft was not required to be equipped with built-in fire detection in the hidden area where the fire was located, the pilots were not alerted to the presence of the fire. The Board concluded that the actions by the flight crew in preparing the aircraft for landing, including their decisions to have the passenger cabin readied for landing and to dump fuel, were consistent with them being unaware that an on-board fire was under way. A theoretical descent profile calculation, conducted by the TSB during the investigation, confirmed that, because of the rapid progression of the fire and its adverse effects on various aircraft systems and the cockpit environment, they would not have been able to complete a safe landing in Halifax, even if they had undertaken to do so at the time of the PAN PAN urgency radio communication at 10:14 p.m. ADT. The Board issued several recommendations to mitigate against potential fires in hidden areas of aircraft, including a recommendation that appropriate regulatory authorities, together with the aviation community, review the methodology for establishing designated fire zones within the pressurized portion of the aircraft, with a view to providing improved smoke and fire detection and suppression capability. Adequ acy o f In -Fligh t Fi ref ig ht ing The available information indicates that, by the time the aircraft crew became aware that there was an in-flight fire, the fire had developed to a condition where it is unlikely that available firefighting equipment and methods would have been effective. The Board concluded that industry-wide changes are necessary to provide aircraft crews with effective means to detect and suppress fires in hidden areas, including the provision for ready access to hidden areas for the purpose of firefighting. There was no integrated in-flight firefighting plan in place for the accident aircraft, nor was such a plan required by regulation. Therefore, the aircraft crew did not have procedures or training directing them to aggressively attempt to locate and eliminate the source of the smoke, and to expedite their preparations for a possible emergency landing. In the absence of such a firefighting plan, the aircraft crew concentrated on preparing the aircraft for the diversion and landing. Addi ti on al Safety Risks Iden ti fi ed During the course of this investigation, some additional risks that have the potential to degrade aviation safety were identified. Although these factors could not be shown to have played a direct role in this occurrence, the associated deficiencies could potentially lead to other accidents if the deficiencies are not rectified. Areas of Concern - checklists that do not adequately deal with smoke conditions; - aircraft designs that do not facilitate the rapid de-powering of electrical systems; - MD-11 map light design and installation; - lack of clarity in guidance material and regulations regarding wire separation in confined areas; and - inadequacy of Supplemental Type Certificate standards to ensure that add-on equipment is compatible with the aircraft's type certificate


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A330 Performance (General)

 Flight Operations Training

Performance Notes VMCG VMCG, assuming that the path of the AC accelerating with all engines operating is along the centreline of the runway, its path from the point at which the critical engine is made inoperative to the point at which recovery to a direction parallel to the centreline is completed, may not deviate more than 30 ft laterally from the centreline at any point.”

Determination of VMCG: Lateral deviation under 30 ft “VMCG must be established, with: • The AC in each take-off configuration or, at the option of the applicant, in the most critical take-off configuration; • Maximum available take-off power or thrust on the operating engines; • The most unfavourable centre of gravity; • The AC trimmed for take-off; and • The most unfavourable weight in the range of take-off weights.”

VMC[A] VMC[A] is the calibrated airspeed, at which, when the critical engine is suddenly made inoperative, it is possible to maintain control of the AC with that engine still inoperative, and maintain straight flight with an angle of bank of not more than 5 degrees.

VMC[A] may not exceed 1.2 VS with, • Maximum available take-off power or thrust on the engines; • The most unfavourable centre of gravity; • The AC trimmed for take-off;


• The AC in the most critical take-off configuration existing along the flight path after the AC becomes airborne, except with the landing gear retracted; and • The AC airborne and the ground effect negligible

VMCL VMCL, the minimum control speed during approach and landing with all engines operating, is the calibrated airspeed at which, when the critical engine is suddenly made inoperative, it is possible to maintain control of the AC with that engine still inoperative, and maintain straight flight with an angle of bank of not more than 5º.

VMCL must be established with: • The AC in the most critical configuration (or, at the option of the applicant, each configuration) for approach and landing with all engines operating; • The most unfavourable centre of gravity; • The AC trimmed for approach with all engines operating; • The most unfavourable weight, or, at the option of the applicant, as a function of weight. • Go-around thrust setting on the operating engines

Maximum Brake Energy Speed: VMBE

When the takeoff is aborted, brakes must absorb & dissipate the heat corresponding to the AC kinetic energy at the decision point. Info: Demonstrated is conducted with no more than 10% of the allowable brake wear range remaining on each of the AC wheel brakes.


Maximum Tire Speed

Max Gnd Speed that can be reached, in order to limit the centrifugal forces & heat elevation that may damage the tire structure VTIRE = 204kts (EK GEN LIMITATIONS 3.01.20 p5) Speed Definitions V1 Max speed at which the crew can decide to reject the takeoff & is ensured to stop the AC within the limits of the RWY (Considered to be VEF + 1 second = V1)

VR Speed at which the pilot initiates the rotation at about 3 deg per second. Not less than …. * V1 105% of VMCA Speed that allows reaching V 2 before a ht of 35’ above Takeoff surface A speed that, if AC is rotated at max practicable rate, will result in a satisfactory Vlof • •

•

V2 Min climb speed that must be reached at a ht of 35’ above the RWY surface in case of an engine failure May not be less than 1.13 VS1G •

Stall Speed 1 : Identified stall speed for the Airbus fly by wire Aircraft (JAR Vs g 25) – corresponds to the maximum lift drag (just before the lift starts


Aircraft Weight Definitions

(EK applicable and reference for Weight & Balance, Manual Loadsheet & Manual Trim) Dry Operating Weight: (Definition) Total wt of an aircraft ready for a specific type of operation excluding all usable fuel & traffic load. •

EK reference – Route Manual Ch5 page 6 & 7

•

DOW = Basic Operating Wt + Crew Wt + Pantry Wt

Info - EK Basic Op wt & Configuration wt … outlines AC Rego / Weight / Index / Cabin Config / AC Wt Limits

•

•

•

Crew Weight & Index (RM Ch5 page 8) Caution …. 2 columns exist WITHOUT or WITH Crew Bags Pantry Weight & Index (RM Ch 5 page 9) Caution …. Ensure correct valid AC rego before confirming destination Pantry requirement (Wt & Index)

Additional Crew member occupying PAX Seat Note …. Cabin Area (OA, OB, OC, OD) as per Manual Loadsheet & Manual Trimsheet. Confirm AC rego


•

LMC’s (FOM Ch 16, page 18 & 19) Std Pax Wts (16.2.2.4) (Also Normal Load Sheet … “Loadmessage & Captains Information before LMC”) Adult Male 85kg Adult Female 70kg Children 38kg Infant 10kg o

•

LMC LIMITS (FOM Ch16, page 19) A332 ….. Total LMC permitted … 700kg FUEL ……………………………. NO LMC Cargo ……………………… +/- 700kg Pax (incl bags) ……... up to 6 DOW LMC …………… up to 3 CREW or +/- 300kg Pantry Note: Up to +/- 300kg only LMC table amended, 301 to 700kg Complete LMC table & Amend also the ……. AZFW, ATOW, & ALW

IF you exceed any of the above – New Loadsheet Required…

(supplemental - see FCI 2005-132 ACARS-PAX COUNT MSG .. for Purser Use)

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Info & References of where to find … Manual Loadsheet & Manual Trimsheet Samples ref Route Manual Ch 5 Page 21 & 22

•

•

•

A330 Fuel Index Table: Assuming STD fuel loading RM Ch 5 page 23 ….. Caution uses RAMP fuel + density for required Index (Additional : Reverse side of Manual Trimsheet) RM Ch 5 A330 Fuel Index Table: NON STD refueling page 24 ….. Uses INDIVIDUAL tanks & Index as applicable. (nb. assumes fuel density 0.80 kg/ltr) (Additional ref , Blank Documents folder on AC behind FO - Caution this is a photocopy ref & may not be as up to date as Route Manual)

•

Diversion Flight Loadsheet : Explanation RM Ch5 page 25 Sample - RM Ch5 page 27 Followed by Manual Trimsheet required … note only the lower section of the sheet from the Fuel Index & Fuel Correction line. Sample RM Ch5 page 28 .

Diversion Flight Log: Multiple Flt Plans for use after a Diversion & destination now DXB . ( Location - Blank Forms Folder, Behind FO) Based on …. ZERO WIND / MAX ZFW / Max Structural TOW / FLT PLAN ALT is Departure AP (user instructions are on front page of DFL •

•

Computerised Load Sheets – List of Approved Stations RM Ch 5 page 13 …. MANUAL Loadsheet currently only stations – Hyderabad, Jeddah & Khartoum

3

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Upgrade Notes

[Version1.0]

March 2006

Author: R J Capps

Type- [Information] Page 6 of 18


Take Off •

N1 Rating – (FCOM 3.05.06 p9)

Must check for take off to maintain an awareness of the required N1, to ensure the engine probe is not frozen or blocked (737 Potamac River)

Take Off Run

Take Off Run (TOR) with Clearway •

TOR

dry

= max of {TOR N-1 dry , 1.15 TOR N dry }


•

•

•

TOR

wet

= max of {TOR N-1 wet , 1.15 TOR wet }

Wet screen height from Brake release to V LOF to 15’ to achieve TOR N1-wet ensuring V 2 achieved before 35’. With wet RWY, TOR with 1 eng out is always equal to TOD with 1 eng out (brakes release to 15’). Therefore a Clearway does not give any performance benefit on a wet RWY, as TOR ia always more limiting. (TORA less than TODA)

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Accelerate-Stop Distance

•

ASDdry = max of {ASDN1 dry, ASDN dry }

•

ASDwet = max of {ASD dry, ASDN1 wet, ASDN wet }


Line Up Corrections •

•

LPC accounts for line up corrections for 90 deg & 180 deg & shown depending on which is used (Ref FCI 2005-130 “AIRBUS LPC WT & RWY LINE UP MODIFICATION INPUTS”)

Take Off Segments & Climb Requirements •

•

•

Take Off flight path begins 35’ above the take off surface at the end of the Take Off Distance Take Off flight path can then be divided into several segments (see below as reminder)

Take Off flight path ends at 1,500’ above the take off surface


•

Net Gradient = Gross Gradient – Gradient Penalty For 2 eng AC 0.8% Penalty INFO Net Take Off flight path clears all obstacles by vertical distance of at least 35’ This may sometimes require 2 nd SEG Gradient to be greater than 2.4%. Note: if AC bank is greater than 15deg then the Net vertical distance is increased to 50’ obstacle clearance (JAR OPS 1.495)

•

A330 THRUST SETTING / EGT LIMITS (FCOM 3.01.70) Take off GA – 10 min / 900deg (1 eng out) MCT - Unlimited / 850 deg


Take Off Funnel (JAR OPS 1.495)

•

If intended Flight Path does not require TRK changes of more than 15deg – need not consider OBS which have lateral distance greater than …. 300m if able to maintain req nav accuracy through OBS accountability area 600m for all other conditions

•

TRK changes of greater than 15deg need not consider OBS which have a lateral distance greater than …. 600m if able to maintain req nav accuracy through OBS accountability area 900 m for all other conditions

TRK changes of less than 15deg


TRK changes of greater than 15deg INFO: ICAO recommendations for departure sector are same as for JAR OPS definitions

Runway Definitions EK references: * FOM Ch18 p21 (Adverse & All Wx Ops) Runway Surface Condition * FOM Ch 18 p22 Perf Basis for a given RWY state Operational Limitations Captain’s Considerations * FCOM 2.04.10 (Special Operations) Fluid Contaminated Runway (particular reference given to “TakeOff Performance” & use of the “Equivalence Tables” * A330 max Xwind – FCOM 2.04.10 p4 & QRH S 3


EK Definitions .... (FOM Ch 18 p21 – Adv & All Wx Ops) Runway Surface Condition: For Take Off & Ldg performance purposes, runways surfaces are categorised as DRY, SLIPPERY or CONTAMINATED See FOM for expanded definitions P22 states …… Max TO thrust on CONTAMINATED RWYS • •

TO not allowed on ICY RWY’s TO & LDG not allowed on RWY’s covered in MORE than… 13mm standing water 13mm slush 100mm dry snow 13mm wet snow TO not commenced if risk of icing during initial climb .. antiicing sys not able to cope with exp ice secretion

Avail cleared or treated RWY width less than 30m Snow banks cleared RWY / Taxiways & edges of Aprons limited in ht , protection against eng ingestion, damage to eng pods, extended flaps or slats. With AC maneuvering … Follow taxi & Rwy center lines as closely as possible … require guidance if in doubt


JAR OPS Definitions .... Dry runway: A dry runway is one which is neither wet nor contaminated, and includes those paved runways which have been specially prepared with grooves or porous pavement and maintained to retain ‘effectively dry’ braking action even when moisture is present” Damp runway: A runway is considered damp when the surface is not dry, but when the moisture on it does not give it a shiny appearance.” Wet runway : A runway is considered wet when the runway surface is covered with water or equivalent, [with a depth less than or equal to 3 mm], or when there is a sufficient moisture on the runway surface to cause it to appear reflective, but without significant areas of standing water.” In other words, a runway is considered to be wet, as soon as it has a shiny appearance, but without risk of hydroplaning due to standing water on one part of its surface. The water depth is assumed to be less than 3 mm. Contaminated runway: A runway is considered to be contaminated when more than 25% of the runway surface area within the required length and width being used is covered by … Standing water Slush Wet snow Dry Snow Compacted snow Ice (See also EK FCI 2006-003 Icy Rwy Definition) • • • • • •


Take Off Calculations …. Preference is via LPC for Optimization

RTOW Charts available in AC (Normal AC configuration) EK Dispatch (eg MEL, CDL) to optimize DXBOVEK on ACARS – provide relevant RWY, surface conditions & known defects. Unserviceablity Effects: LPC Module – FCOM 2.02.15 RTOW – A330-200 Destination AP Vol 1 of 11 A-H (Removed fm Contents pages on AC) RTOW – User Manual (Disk & Portal)

Take Off Thrust….

Flex Temperature Principle


A330-200 EK AC MCDU DATA PAGE – ENG TRENT 772B-60 ie … 7 series, 72 thousand lb thrust, B = increased temp for Tref or ISA + 22deg (SL) Tflex Max – ISA + 48deg




Section 5 Course Layout

5. COURSE LAYOUT Basically the course will consist of the following phases: 12345-

Ground School (Modu les 1,2,3,4,5,6) Full Flig ht Simu lato r Sess io ns (F1U, F2U, F3U, PPCI, F5U) Lin e Orientation Simulatio n (LOS), com bined with Line Training Phase. Final Line Check (FLC) Standard Progress Check (SPC)

Daily Program

After the successful completion of the above mentioned phases you will congratulated for being a new Commander on Emirates Airbus Fleet ☺.

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1. Ground School Foreword The Upgrade Ground School forms the initial part of the Upgrade training programme. During the course a variety of topics will be addressed in the form of lectures, presentations, discussions and practical application thereof. Thorough preparation is required by the up grade candidate. Candidates are required to log on to the Crew Portal, Training / Generic / Upgrade, as required pre-reading and questionnaires must be downloaded from the crew portal Topics, summarized below will be presented in a modular format. Please refer to the downloadable course footprint and timetable sent by Flight Training Administration for the exact dates and times.

Objective At the end of the modular ground school candidates should: 1. Show enhanced knowledge of the duties and responsibilities of a Captain, 2. Understand company policy and procedures to be app lied in normal and emergency situations and 3. Demonstrate sound management skills, decision-making abilities and leadership traits expected of a newly-upgraded Captain.

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Ground Course Modules and Subjects Module 1 - Management Model (CRM) Trainees will, through an extensive review of relevant CRM topics and case studies, decide how effective management, decision making, leadership and communication can be achieved in a flight deck environment. Topics will be covered with the emphasis place from a human factors perspective. Module 2 – Perfor mance A review is conducted on certification, ICAO, JAR-OPS and Jeppesen/LIDO performance requirements. Demonstration of practical application of procedures is required during and as part of pre-course study. Module 3 – Responsibilities, Expectations, Standards and LOS Scenario 1 A major component of upgrade training is being fully conversant with a Captains’ duties and responsibilities. A pre-course questionnaire on policy and procedures and pre-reading on the subject of aviation law will assist a candidate to gain extensive knowledge and awareness of international, local (GCAA) and company legal requirements. A thorough understanding of when and how to apply the procedures provided in company documentation is required to ensure that both individual and company integrities are maintained. Module 4 – LOS Scenario 2-5 In-flight normal and abnormal scenarios will be proposed at various stages of flight, requiring, through role play, practice of all the topics briefed and trained in Module 1 – 3. Candidates will be required to provide input through review and discussion on various aspects of flight operations. The topics will include: • •

• •

•

• •

Flight Planning – LIDO requirements and practicalities. Aircraft Systems Management - Normal and Emergency procedures and awareness of effective management of various major emergencies, i.e. fuel leek, bo mb on board, flight control failure. All Weather Operations (AWOPS) - company and international legal requirements. Extended Twin Operations (ETOPS) - normal and abnormal operations when a failure may effect the safe operation. Diversion and Suitable Airport planning - Selection of diversion airports using resources and guidance provided in aircraft manuals, Discussion on procedures when diverting to EK and non-EK airports whether continuing or terminating a flight. Fuel Management - The current fuel policy is reviewed and its practical application discussed. Aviation Law - The FOM will be reviewed with emphasis on an Emirates Captains’ duties and responsibilities. Legal responsibilities, the boundaries and authority bestowed upon an Aircraft Commander as derived from International and National Law will also be reviewed.

Module 5 - LOS Scenario 6 and 7 Module 4 dealt with small scenarios based on various stages of flight. In this module two full flights are given as examples requiring the candidates, through group exercise, to plan and complete a safe and efficient flight i n the given circumstances. Through this classroom practice of LOS training, all aspects of the airli nes operation should be fully understood.

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Module 6 – Fleet To enable better understanding of the airli nes’ operation, briefings are conducted by representatives from the flowing departments in Flight Operations, Fleet Planning, Network Control and Fli ght Safety representatives.

Full Flight Simulator Sessions (Pre PPC Training) Foreword This phase will provide a training forum to prepare the candidate for successful completion of the PPC and AWOPS/ZFT phases, whilst operating from the LHS. Objectives 1. To become proficient with operating the aircraft from the LHS. 2. To develop a sound decision-making process whilst re-familiarising the candidate with certain abnormal and emergency failures. 3. To prepare the candidate for the successful completion of the Upgrade PPC and 4. AWOPS/ZFT Simulator sessions. 5. To prepare the candidate for the successful completion of the LOS/LOE phase. Upgrade Full Flight Simulator (FFS) Training The FFS Training for type-rated First Officers is divided into two phases, i.e. RHS to LHS conversion and preparation for the LOS/LOE phase. The first 3 sessions encompass the pre-PPC training. The candi date must display a good understanding of failure items and the handling of the aircraft during normal a nd abnormal operations, before recommendation for the PPC can be made. F1U: provides a familiarization from the LHS, a review of flight characteristics, and a review of some Emergency and Abnormal Procedures. F2U & F3U: provides a review of some additional Emergency and Abnormal procedures. PPCI: is the Initial Pilot Proficiency Check as per OM-D - Training Manual Vol A33/4 Part 2. On successful completion of the PPCI the student will proceed to F5U. F5U: All Weather Operations, Zero Flight Time and CAT C Airport Familiarization (If Required). Refer to relevant chapters. Note: FIU / F2U / F3U may be conducted with 2 Upgrade Trainees swapping seat’s or with a Line F/O in the R.H.S. In the case of a Li ne F/O in the RHS, Item’s that have been covered in the 1st half of the session need not be repeated.

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Full Flight Simulator Sessions Details F1U Lesson Summary This session is conducted in Manchester. The focus of the lesson is on left hand seat familiarisation, using supplementary techniques, aircraft handling and abnormal/emergency procedures. The trainee is introduced to the left seat position, arm rest position, flight controls and general aspects of the flight deck from a di fferent perspective. A transit cockpit preparation is carried out and engine 1 is started using the manual engine start procedure during which there is a hot start After start the aircraft is taxied to the holding point for runway 24R. Before take off a 180° turn is carried out on the runway. A TCAS event occurs after takeoff and then IR 1+ 2 fault leads into a low altitude stall warning and recovery. An emergency descent will be carried out from high altitude. The final exercise involves a Flap fault after takeoff, the aircraft returns for a non-precision approach, during which there is a Slat fault. Training Objectives • To review normal cockpit procedures from the LHS in accordance with the latest FCOM and FCTM amendments. • To review Manual Engine start procedure. • To review the correct recovery procedure for TCAS events. • To review the correct procedure for recovery from a stall warning. • To review the correct procedure for an Emergency Descent. • To review the correct procedure for Abnormal Slats/Flaps Configuration. • To review the correct procedure for conducting a 180° turn on the runway. • To revise the correct procedure for flying a non-precision Approach.

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F2U Lesson Summary This session is conducted in Zurich. The focus of the lesson is on engine starting supplementary techniques, aircraft handling and abnormal/emergency procedures. The APU is unserviceable so the engines are started using external pneumatic power and a cross bleed start. Reactive and predictive windshear events are encountered on takeoff and approach. Selected and Managed non-precision approaches are flown to runways 16 and 28, a circling approach is flown to RWY 28. A generator 1 + 2 fault results in flight in electrical emergency configuration and a raw data approach is flown to runway 16. The final exercise involves smoke in the cabin/cockpit, a diversion to EDDM with approach and landing in electrical emergency configuration. Training Objectives • To review Engine Start with External Pneumatics and Cross-Bleed Start procedure. • To review the correct avoidance and recovery procedure for Windshear and Windshear Ahead. • To review the correct procedure for flying a Non Precision Approach. • To review the correct procedure for handling the Electrical Emergency Configuration. • To review the correct procedure for Smoke/Fumes/Avionics Smoke and Smoke Removal. • To revise the correct procedure for flying a ILS approach Raw Data.

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F3U Lesson Summary This session is conducted in Johannesburg. The focus of the lesson is on aircraft handling (heavy weight with high density altitude), engine failure and abnormal/emergency procedures. Engine failure after V1 results in a return to JNB with fuel jettison due to approach climb limitation. A VOR/DME approach is flown to runway 21R (single engine) followed by a go- around. After cleanup from the go-around, the engine and all effected systems are restored. A Green hydraulic reservoir low level followed by Blue system low pressure (Yellow system for nd 2 trainee) leads to a non-precision approach to runway 21R (No Auto pilot). The aircraft is repositioned to runway 03L and during takeoff suffers unreliable airspeed, resulting in return to JNB and an ILS approach to runway 03L. Training Objectives • To review and practice engine inoperative handling and procedures, including non- precision approach and go-around. • To review the correct procedure for fuel jettison. • To review the correct procedure Single and dual hydraulic Failures. • To review the correct procedure for handling of unreliable airspeed. • To review and perform a rejected takeoff and emergency evacuation.

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4. LOS (Line Orientated Simulation)/LOFTs The following are extracts from Training Manual-Volume A33/4-Part1 Training (TM 334 Part1), Chapter 5.19, It high lights how LOS is being practiced and structured.

Line Orientated Simulation (LOS) Foreword This phase consists of 4 FFS sessions, with the emphasis being again on training. The first 3 sessions will be Line Orientated Simulation (LOS), with the last one being the Line Orientated Evaluation (LOE). The 4 simulator sessions will be interspersed with normal upgrade line training sectors, during which time the line training syllabus will be completed to a satisfactory standard. These sectors have been inserted between the 3 LOS and the 1 LOE session to further enhance the overall training value, and to generally assist in building the confidence and ability of the upgrade candidate. The allotted amount of sectors, as per FTPM, will be completed before the LOE, followed by the Final Line Check (FLC). Training rostering will endeavor to produce a roster, whereby the candidate will fly between 4 to 8 line sectors from the LHS, between each simulator session.

Objectives To observe and develop the ability of the candidate to handle various emergencies and abnormalities in (real time), and realistic operational conditions. To observe and develop the candidates knowledge in technical and procedural matters. To observe CRM behaviours and task management when subjected to potentially demanding scenarios. To develop the skills, knowledge and the application of knowledge so that upgrade candidates will have the tools to: • Successfully complete the upgrade training, and • Use sound judgment and make sensi ble decisions in accordance with Company Policies upon promotion to Captain.

Training Guidelines During the LOS phase, the emphasis is on training. The scenarios will be run as realistically as possible, however the TC is encouraged to intervene and discuss pertinent issues as required to assist in developing the candidate. If necessary the use of the simulator (freeze) facility is acceptable for the TC to stress an important point o f instruction. During this phase the candi date must demonstrate a good standard, or show signs of improving towards this, before being recommended for the LOE. Should the standard not be achieved within the allocated sessions, then extra training may be scheduled at the discretion of VPFT and/or CFI/CFE.

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During the LOS and LOE sessions, the TC will act as engineer, purser, ATC and any other character as may be required. The emphasis on training must be maintained during the LOS phase. The final LOS is conducted as a Progress Review without any instructor intervention. On successful completion of this exercise, the candidate will be recommended for the LOE. The LOE will be run as a normal flight in all aspects. All LOS and LOE forms consist of 2 pages, filling in and signing of these forms is as per standard Emirates practise.

Use Of Video It is recommended that the video equipment be used to record the entire Loft as this gives increased value to the debriefing. It clearly highlights CRM aspects and in many cases will greatly assist in getting across an important teaching point. The student should provide a blank 180 minute video tape for each session, if he wishes he can use the same tape and record over it. The tape must be erased after each session and the student must not be allowed to take it home. A video eraser is available in briefing room 4 for this purpose. During the simulator session the instructor should note the times at which items of interest occur and use this as a guide during replay. Debriefing in this manner may increase the debriefing time however this method has been well received by the crews that have undergone upgrade training.

LOS Rules LOS sessions are designed with the following rules: • Only 1 MEL prior to pu shback. This may or may not be combined with further failures to affect the outcome of the flight. • Only 1 Failure allowed dur ing taxi. This can be in addition to the MEL above. • After takeoff, only 1 x Recoverab le Failur e, and 1 x Unrecoverable Failure may be given. These failures may be the secondary result of a primary failure, eg. Hydraulic system failure due to engine shutdown. • Weather conditions are to be realistic with changes as indicated on the forecast The content and failure scenarios of each LOS will be at the discretion of the TC in accordance with the prescribed guidelines in OM-D.

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LOS/LOE Guid elines Furthermore, one prescribed scenario will be included in each LOS: LS1U: LS2U: LS3U:

the first LOS will include a Monsoon Weather scenario. will include a Cold weather Operation scenario. will include an ETOPS flight.

LOEU:

is the Line Orientated Evaluation. The content will be at the discretion of the TRE in keeping with the above rules.

If a particular LOFT does not take up the entire simulator session, then a second mini-loft may be introduced and conducted by the TC.

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Category C Airfield Training (If Required) Category C Airfield training will include Sanaa and/or Sychelles Familiarization.

Sanaa Familiarisation Overview This is an airport familiarisation of a category C airfield, with a great deal of emphasis on training. As this training takes place after a LOS session there is little time available for a formal briefing. The instructor is required to ensure that the student has had a complete review of the route manual briefing for the destination. During the simulator session the instructor is to highlight important aspects and considerations required to operate at Sanaa.

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Seychelles Familiarisation Overview This is an airport familiarisation of a category C airfield, with a great deal of emphasis on training. As this training takes place after a LOS session there is little time available for a formal briefing. The instructor is required to ensure that the student has had a complete review of the route manual briefing for the destination. During the simulator session the instructor is to highlight important aspects and considerations required to operate at Seychelles.

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Line Flying Under Supervision (LIFUS)/Line Training General The Line Training Syllabus presented has been developed from the Airbus recommended listing of Line Training subjects. Line Training is intended to familiarise new entry, upgraded pilots, and pilots who are transferring fleets, with the operation of their new aircraft type, their respective crew duties, and the characteristics of our route network environment. It must highlight the duties, and the characteristics of our route network environment. It must highlight the difficulties and traps that could affect the safety and the efficiency of the flight, and provide comprehensive guidance regarding the use of all the resources that are available to support the Company’s flying operations. Line Training will also include the technical items on the syllabus, which can not be taught in the simulator. These may include: weather radar, ETOPS and comprehensive use of the FMS. The main objective of Line Training is to consolidate the training received on the ground in order to deliver to the Fleet hi ghly competent, safe and standardised pilots. At the completion of their Line Training, these pilots must have demonstrated that they have reached a high level of technical and operational knowledge, as well as good flying skills, and that they are capable and efficient cockpit resource managers. The Briefings are listed in flight phase order until parking. The topics are then listed in procedural order.

Line Training Preparation This guide is to help prepare you for the transition from Simulator Training (Aircraft Type Rating) to Line Training (operating on the line according to Emirates procedures.) Preparation is key: Before each flight thorough route study is essential. OM-C RAIG (Route and Aerodrome Information Guide) is a good starting point. You can obtain old LIDO en-route charts and Aerodrome charts from Nav Services, located in the Emirates Operations Centre (EOC). These charts will be out d ated but are still useful for route study. We recommend you buy an ATLAS. You are bound to be flying over unfamiliar territory and a ‘geographical awareness’ is essential. When you get transferred to “LVIV Control” it would be nice to know which country you are over, not to mention the pronunciation. A day or two before your flight you can ask the operations clerks at the CBC to print off a CFP and NOTAMS for that particular sector. It will not be exactly as per the flight you will be doing but it will be a great aid in preparation, especially when covering NOTAMS. It will also help with time management, as you will know which items are need-to-know and which can be covered later, in flight. A good time to get these is immediately following a duty when signing off, obtain the CFP/NOTAMS for your next flight, so you can study at home.

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Study: Line Training will require an in-depth knowledge of the FOM and the FCOM’s. Thorough knowledge of all chapters is expected and required. For study purposes we recommend you give particular emphasis to FOM chapters 11-15 and chapter 20. Your Training File contains a Line Training Syllabus. Each subject will be covered by your various Training Captains you must arrive for you flig ht well prepared. The Line T raining Study Guide and Completion standard is designed to help you study, please use this document to your advantage. Time Management: Your pick-up will be approximately 2hrs15mins prior to flight (depending on location – check FOM). Arrival time at CBC will vary, however, cabin crew are instructed to depart CBC for the aircraft at STD -75 mins. The bus ride from CBC to the aircraft can take 15- 20mins depending on the parking bay. Time Management at the briefing stage is critical. Prioritisation is essential, make sure you know the minimum requirements FOM 12.2.

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“FFS Details” (F1U, F2U, F3U, Skill Test, CAT C Aerodrome Training) “INSTRUCTOR NOTES”

FFS Instructor Notes (An Extract from the EK A330 Nomination as Commander Training Manual)

Abnormal Situation or One Requiring a Decision ( F L Y T H E A I R CR A F T ) • •

Stabilise Flight Path Consider Use of Automation ( W H E RE A R E W E GO I N G ? )

•

• •

Think “BIG PICTURE”

Assign Duties Any immediate notification required (ATC, CC)

Available Information Sources** Radio/ACARS/Phone Manuals ATC SMNC Flight Tech Fleet Engineering Medical

Factors/Considerations** TASK Needs

I f A f A p p r o p r i a t e • • •

Complete immediate Checklist Action Verify Failure/Malfunction Apply Checklists if Applicable

•

Aircraft Time Fuel Performance Configuration

W h e n S i t u a t i o n S t a b i l i s e d •

Mini Brief –Update Crew on Situation

•

En-Route Wx Terrain

Decision Making Model Assess Make Time-Set a Decision Deadline Understand the Problem

AIRSPACE ETOPS RVSM

• • •

• •

•

Landing

Gather information from all available sources**

NAV Aids Runway Lighting ATC RFF Go Around

Identify factors & considerations** Test several options and select a solution

Action • • • •

Communicate decision Action Decision Continually test decision for correctness Re-assess if required

Manage Manage the effects of your decision Organise resources Consider Task, Group and individual Needs** • • •

GROUP Needs Pax-(Pax Handling) Crew Company Hotel Transport Food

INDIVIDUAL Needs

Control stress Medical assistance ** Information Sources, Factors and considerations are not limited to those listed •

Re-assess your decision for correctness

FOM MEL AFM FCOM’s Route Manual Jeppesen/LIDO Laptop


-

-

-


7. LOS (Line Orientated Simulation)/LOFTs The following are extracts from Training Manual-Volume A33/4-Part1 Training (TM A334 Part 1), Chapter 5.19, It high lights how LOS is being practiced and structured.

Line Orientated Simulation (LOS) Foreword This phase consists of 4 FFS sessions, with the emphasis being again on training. The first 3 sessions will be Line Orientated Simulation (LOS), with the last one being the Line Orientated Evaluation (LOE). The 4 simulator sessions will be interspersed with normal upgrade line training sectors, during which time the line training syllabus will be completed to a satisfactory standard. These sectors have been inserted between the 3 LOS and the 1 LOE session to further enhance the overall training value, and to generally assist in building the confidence and ability of the upgrade candidate. The allotted amount of sectors, as per FTPM, will be completed before the LOE, followed by the Final Line Check (FLC). Training rostering will endeavor to produce a roster, whereby the candidate will fly between 4 to 8 line sectors from the LHS, between each simulator session.

Objectives To observe and develop the ability of the candidate to handle various emergencies and abnormalities in (real time), and realistic operational conditions. To observe and develop the candidates knowledge in technical and procedural matters. To observe CRM behaviours and task management when subjected to potentially demanding scenarios. To develop the skills, knowledge and the application of knowledge so that upgrade candidates will have the tools to: • Successfully complete the upgrade training, and • Use sound judgment and make sensi ble decisions in accordance with Company Policies upon promotion to Captain.

Training Guidelines During the LOS phase, the emphasis is on training. The scenarios will be run as realistically as possible, however the TC is encouraged to intervene and discuss pertinent issues as required to assist in developing the candidate. If necessary the use of the simulator (freeze) facility is acceptable for the TC to stress an important point of instruction. During this phase the candidate must demonstrate a good standard, or show signs of improving towards this, before being recommended for the LOE. Should the standard not be achieved within the allocated sessions, then extra training may be scheduled at the discretion of VPFT and/or CFI/CFE.

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During the LOS and LOE sessions, the TC will act as engineer, purser, ATC and any other character as may be required. The emphasis on training must be maintained during the LOS phase. The final LOS is conducted as a Progress Review without any instructor intervention. On successful completion of this exercise, the candidate will be recommended for the LOE. The LOE will be run as a normal flight in all aspects. All LOS and LOE forms consist of 2 pages, filling in and signing of these forms is as per standard Emirates practise.

Use Of Video It is recommended that the video equipment be used to record the entire Loft as this gives increased value to the debriefing. It clearly highlights CRM aspects and in many cases will greatly assist in getting across an important teaching point. The student should provide a blank 180 minute video tape for each session, if he wishes he can use the same tape and record over it. The tape must be erased after each session and the student must not be allowed to take it home. A video eraser is available in briefing room 4 for this purpose. During the simulator session the instructor should note the times at which items of interest occur and use this as a guide during replay. Debriefing in this manner may increase the debriefing time however this method has been well received by the crews that have undergone upgrade training.

LOS Rules LOS sessions are designed with the following rules: • Only 1 MEL prior to pu shback. This may or may not be combined with further failures to affect the outcome of the flight. • Only 1 Failure allowed dur ing taxi. This can be in addition to the MEL above. • After takeoff, only 1 x Recoverab le Failur e, and 1 x Unrecoverable Failure may be given. These failures may be the secondary result of a primary failure, eg. Hydraulic system failure due to engine shutdown. • Weather conditions are to be realistic with changes as indicated on the forecast The content and failure scenarios of each LOS will be at the discretion of the TC in accordance with the prescribed guidelines in OM-D.

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Furthermore, one prescribed scenario will be included in each LOS: LS1U: LS2U: LS3U:

the first LOS will include a Monsoon Weather scenario. will include a Cold weather Operation scenario. will include an ETOPS flight.

LOEU:

is the Line Orientated Evaluation. The content will be at the discretion of the TRE in keeping with the above rules.

If a particular LOFT does not take up the entire simulator session, then a second mini-loft may be introduced and conducted by the TC.

FURTHER INFORMATION FROM PEOPLE WHO ALREADY DONE LOS IN THEIR TRAINING: LOFT FORMAT: All of the LOFT’s followed a similar format: •

1 MEL requirement. If not already in the tech log would get a problem on taxi / start requiring you to check MEL (especially i f ETOPS).

•

Usually a start problem or an abnormal start (on bat / ground cart etc)

•

1 Failur e – resetable (watch for this one).

•

1 Failure majo r – safety related.

•

1 Failure minor – non-safety .

•

Either, Passenger p roblems / Boarding problems, ATC s lo t or VIP movement s to put pressure on you. Remember not to try and fix everything yourself. Make it the station managers problem.

No sudden changes in weather or any bullshit like the old days. If the forecast was good it would be good.

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Line Oriented Simul ation (LOS) Training Introduction Upgrade Trainees and Direct Entry Captains will be rostered for three LOS sessions and one LOE session. After LOS1 the line training will commence. Approximately 4 sectors will be flown before returning to the Simulator for LOS2. Approximately 2 sectors will be flown before returning to the Simulator for LOS3. Approximately 4 sectors will be flown before returning to the Simulator for the LOE. Instructors and students should make contact approximately one day prior to the event and discuss the upcoming session. This will allow the trainee sufficient time to prepare for the session. Trainee Preparation Emirates expects’ trainees to be prepared for their training sessions. It is assumed that the trainee must be familiar with Emirates procedures and policies, basic technical knowledge as well as the network structure. Instructor input is encouraged to assist trainees in the d evelopment of the various skills required for the successful completion of LOS exercises. Instructors, however, will not compensate for a lack of preparation by the trainee. The instructor will assess areas of weakness and focus training where required. Focused Training The elements of fo cused training inc lude: • SOPs and Company Policy • Flight Deck Management • Task Prioritization and Planning • System Knowledge • Situation Awareness Decision Making • Non-Normal Management • Communication Skills and CRM Environment The LOS will take place i n a line operational environment with a complete crew. A complete crew will always be scheduled and every effort will be made to maintain crew integrity. During a LOS, each crewmember performs both as an individual and as a member of a team, as i s normal during line operations. LOS scenarios are to be conducted in real time and in real-world line operational situations. The Instructor will endeavour to check the progress of the trainee to date with regards to: Environmental (wet, dry, contaminated, heavy, ETOPS day or night). Technical (Failure scenarios, MEL, Eng start problems, other distractions), and routes flown. Trainee Progress and problem areas (if any). This is normally done by consultation with the instructor who conducted the trainees last LOS and/or reference to the trainee’s training file held at the ETC. Unofficial Document

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Using the above information, a LOS scenario can be constructed based on the Emirates rules. A trainee is normally required to cover Monsoon, Cold Weather and ETOPS conditions during upgrade training. This is usually achieved by assigning a different topic for each LOS session. Constructing Scenarios Using Emirates Rules Instructors will assign specific training objectives to each scenario. These training objectives will be based on the particular needs relevant to Emirates’ operations and the trainee’s progress. A variety of scenarios can be constructed by choosing different combinations of elements and manipulating conditions (i.e. failures) however, these manipulations will be carried out while adhering to Emirates’ rules. The follow ing are Emirates’ LOS trainin g/evaluation rules (Ref: OM-D 5.19), which instruct ors are to follow w hen creating and con ducting any LOS/LOE session: • Only one MEL item active before pushback. This may or may not be combined with further failures to affect the outcome of the flight. • A start malfunction or alternative start procedure. • Only one failure allowed during taxi. This can be in addition to the MEL above. • After takeoff, only one recoverable failure and one unrecoverable failure may be given. These failures may be the secondary result of a primary failure e.g. hydraulic system failure due to an engine shutdown. Some performances commo nly ob served from trainees are: • A high level of knowledge leading to instant solutions, or failing to involve the other crewmember in effective communication. • A high stress level leading to poor flight deck management, either through poor communication or poor resource management. • Poor preparation demonstrated by an observed lack of technical knowledge, operational resource management or prioritisation. Some common t rainee errors are listed below: • Poor task prioritisation and planning. • Not delegating tasks during high workload. • No structure in flight management. • Under confident / over confident. • Not prepared and poor knowledge of systems and procedures.

Additi onal Guideli nes Realism Scenarios will contain realistic circumstances e.g. messages from ATC, cabin crew or operations. Just as crewmembers cannot anticipate all flight operational situations, instructors will try to prevent crewmembers from anticipating the entire content of the scenarios. ATC Air traffic control actions will be reasonable. If radar vectors would normally be available, and the local system is not affected by NOTAM, then radar vectors will be available. If the crew requests help from ATC, and help would normally be available at a chosen destination, then that help will be available. Weather All weather parameters will be realistic. The actual weather experienced in the simulator will reflect the weather in the forecast. Airfield conditions will reflect the NOTAM.

Unofficial Document

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Time Management The instructor will not use “Speedx2” or “Speedx4” and will allow the flight to proceed in real time. The instructor will not use, position freeze to give the crew extra time to get through an exercise. The trainee must learn to create time for hi mself, perhaps by slowing down, or holding. In the same sense, fuel freeze will not be used to give the crew extra time. Fuel management is an essential part of normal operations. Distractions These may be used to good effect. This could be an unruly passenger, a failure that requires ECAM action but does not affect the overall flight e.g. loss of a fuel pump or generator or ATC instructions to report abeam, or track DIR to a specific WPT, etc. Weather avoidance or TCAS TA events are other suitable examples of distractions. Role Playing Instructors will brief First Officers to act normally. They are not to “play a role”. If the trainee is losing situational awareness because of overload, or perhaps poor cooperation from his First Officer, the instructor may wish to allow the trainee to regroup to better assess the problem and to provide necessary guidance without distraction. When this situation occurs, and instructor guidance is required, it is acceptable to freeze the flight or the position. This is not the same as freezing the position just to complete preparation for an approach, or something similar. Freezing in these si tuations is counter-productive. Time management is part of the training, and the trainee has to learn to manage the time normally available to him. Pre-flight Planning Documents and Activities Pre-flight planning documents such as weather reports, flight plans, NOTAMs and load sheets will be prepared by instructors in advance with the particular training objectives in mind.

Unofficial Document

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UPGRADE LOS & LOE SUMMARIES

SCENARIO

ALTERNATIVE ROUTES

LOS 1

WX: 6km OVC 1500’ (Or at TC’s discretion) MEL - PRIM 1 INOP Non-standard Fuel distribution (if short route used, use Normal Distribution) Low Oil pressure ENG #2, or high oil temp S/E diversion & landing. NPA app Other possibilities, Eng Stall, Eng high Vibration. LOS 2

Wx: 6km BKN 1000’ (Or at TC’s discretion) MEL: APU U/S TR 1 FAIL AVIONICS SMOKE with Loss of CM1 probe icing. CM2 as PF LOS 3

WX Fair R.OUTER INLET VALVE stuck closed during refuelling – R.OUTER TANK empty - Non-standard Fuel Distribution During taxi – PRIM 2 Fault – RESET OF COMPUTERS checklist IR ROLL DRIFT on takeoff Birds reported on final Approach Possible ENG SEVERE DAMAGE + loss of Green Hyd fluid (RAT Level)

Unofficial Document

MXP-DXB MAN-DXB LGW-DXB BOM-DXB (Choose from available CFP’s) LGW-DXB ZRH-DXB MXP-DXB (Choose from available CFP’s) Any short sector, or (Choose from available CFP’s)

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LOS 4

Wx – Rain and cross winds Red BOMB warning, EIU Fault (Man Thrust) Flaps Jam

LOS 5

Wx – Fair MEL – EPR indication fault – N1 Rated Mode Avionics Smoke (AC BUS 2) – Emerg Descent, High Altitude airport

LOS 6

Wx: Winter Ops TCAS GREEN HYD LOW LEVEL PAX heart attach BLUE HYD LOW AIR PRESS – recoverable at low level LOS 7

WX: Fair MEL – APU BLEED INOP After Start – STANDBY ATTITUDE FAIL (MEL) FUEL LEAK – decision making LOS 8

WX: Fair MEL – Nil ETOPS Procedures ENG STALL ON START ENG VIBRATION ENG OIL LEAK ENG SHUTDOWN NPA, LOS 9

WX; Fair TAXI: RAD ALT 1 FAULT (MEL) TAKEOFF: RH MLG ABNORMAL Return to land – management, APP CLB, jettison LOS 10

WX: Monsoon On takeoff FLAPS JAM Runway closed due crashed aircraft Divert to another AD with FLAPS JAM Diversion AD requires a NPA approach

Unofficial Document

DAR-NBO SAH-DXB ZRH-DXB (Choose from available CFP’s) SAH-DXB JNB-DXB NBO-DXB THR-DXB (Choose from available CFP’s) MXP-DXB LGW-DXB MAN-DXB (Choose from available CFP’s) FCO-DXB KHI-DXB (Choose from available CFP’s) CMB-DXB JNB-DXB MRU-DXB (ETOPS) If Non ETOPS (Choose from available CFP’s)

SAH-DXB JNB-DXB NBO-DXB ZRH-DXB SAH-DXB NBO-DXB NBO-DAR (Choose from available CFP’s)

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SCENARIO

ALTERNATIVE ROUTES

LOS 11

WX: Rain and low cloud MEL - ENG 2 BLD INOP R INR TK FUEL LEAK finally causing ENG 2 FLAMEOUT Diversion and landing LOS 12

WX: Good with HZ Pre-Departure – Pax wanting to carry gun on board TCAS TOD – ATTITUDE DISCREPANCY F/O becomes sick – incapacitation Runway lighting failure – missed approach Return for landing LOS 13

Wx Low Cloud MEL – SLAT SYS 2 INOP (GREEN) After T/O – SLAT SYS 1 FAULT, Slats stuck in extended position Sick PAX Return for Ldg – unable due wx Diversion and landing LOS 14

Wx above circling minima. MEL - APU u/s GPU failure, requiring a START ON BATTERY POWER TAXI - FMGS 1 FAIL, RESET OF COMPUTERS checklist & reset OK CRUISE – Gen 1 Over Voltage (single gen ops) Considerations. (Possibly Lightning strike causing EMERG ELEC CONFIG. OR ENG 2 HIGH VIBRATION (Within limits at Idle Thrust) single GEN ops Diversion airports require circling or have high crosswinds. LOS 15

WX: CBs MEL: SATCOM U/S Enroute – LIGHTNING STRIKE causing AC BUS 2 FAIL and total loss of comms Approach NBO, heavy rain causes go-around and diversion to Alternate(fuel state) LOS 16

Wx: Monsoon OR Winter Ops. MEL: APU INOP GEN 1 FAULT DC ESS BUS FAULT Engine shutdown required via Fire Handle

Unofficial Document

MXP-DXB FCO-DXB ZRH-DXB LGW-DXB (Choose from available CFP’s) DAR-NBO NBO-DAR (Choose from available CFP’s)

DXB-MCT DXB-KWI FCO-MXP (Choose from available CFP’s)

ETOPS? MRU-DXB CMB-DXB NBO-DXB JNB-DXB Non ETOPS (Choose from available CFP’s)

DAR-NBO Any short route (Choose from available CFP’s)

SAH-DXB KHI-DXB BOM-DXBq Or can use this as a Winter Ops scenario using: LGW-DXB ZRH-DXB MAN-DXB

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SCENARIO

ALTERNATIVE ROUTES

LOS 17

WX: CBs MEL – APU INOP LIGHTNING STRIKE causing GEN 1 FAULT – single GEN operations If no diversion (no Galleys/PES etc), then IDG OVHT ADVISORY Return, jettison, and landing (Refer to Los. #15) If Non ETOPS, considerations, Part Galley, PES, Length of flight, Routing, etc

LOS 18

WX: TC’s Discretion. MEL – Nil Tire burst on T/O causing BLUE HYD LO LEVEL ENG 2 LO OIL PRESS causing ENG 2 shutdown – DUAL HYD LO PR If used on a short route (due time) consider ENG 2 HIGH VIB or ENG STALL Eng Ops OK at Idle Thrust LOS 19

WX: Good for return. LH MLG STUCK DOWN Diversion considerations, depending on Airfield. Landing, NPA App.

Unofficial Document

(ETOPS)

MRU-DXB NBO-DXB JNB-DXB CMB-DXB (NON-ETOPS )

LGW-DXB MAN-DXB ZRH-DXB FCO-DXB MXP-DXB LGW-DXB MAN-DXB ZRH-DXB FCO-DXB JNB-DXB (Choose from available CFP’s) JNB-DXB NBO-DXB MAN-DXB ZRH-DXB SAH-DXB

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FAILURE TYPE SUMMARY:

DISPATCH/MEL

PRIM 1 INOP NON-STANDARD FUEL DISTRIBUTION APU U/S EPR FAIL – RATED N1 MODE APU BLD RAD ALT FAIL ENG BLD INOP

FLIGHT FAIL URE

LOW OIL PRESSURE TR 1 FAIL AVIONICS SMOKE - 2 IR ROLL/ATTITUDE DRIFT BOMB OB BOARD - 2 TCAS - 2 GREEN HYD LOW LEVEL BLUE HYD LOW PRESS STANDBY HORIZON FAIL FUEL LEAK - 2 FADEC FAIL RH MLG ABNORMAL FLAPS OR SLATS JAM - 3 INCAPACITATION EIU FAULT SICK PAX ENG 2 HIGH OIL TEMP AC BUS FAULT = 2 NO COMMS ENG GEN INOP DUAL HYD LO PR

ROUTES:

AIRPORTS:

FCO-DXB MAN-DXB DXB-MAN NBO-DXB ZRH-DXB DXB-KWI BOM-DXB DXB-MCT NBO-DAR DAR-NBO KHI-DXB JNB-DXB SAH-DXB MRU-DXB (new route) THR-DXB FCO-MXP MXP-DXB CMB-DXB LGW-DXB

FCO MAN DXB NBO ZRH LGW KHI JNB SAH MRU (new AD) DAR BOM

ETOPS CONSIDERATIONS:

ETOPS scenarios: Smoke - Cargo smoke caused by Dangerous Goods? • EMERG ELEC • Engine Fail with full driftdown and diversions considerations • Depressurisation • Unofficial Document

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ETOPS routes: CMB-DXB • JNB-DXB • MRU-DXB • WINTER OPERATIONS:

Routes: • • • •

ZRH-DXB LGW-DXB MAN-DXB THR-DXB

A330 UPGRADE LOS SCENARIO DETAILS:

All the scenarios below are designed as basic guides to allow TCEs to develop the general chronology and flow of the LOS. It should be stressed that the TCE is permitted to deviate from the planned scenario if he considers circumstances warrant. TCEs should also be mindful that trainees may become aware of the planned scenario at an early stage and may begin to use a planned response. Under these circumstances changes to the planned scenario may be appropriate. Any changes to the planned scenario should try to keep the general objectives of the LOS in mind, and in any case must conform to the LOS requirements contained in the ETPM 13-2.

Unofficial Document

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SCENARIO

ALTERNATIVE ROUTES

FCO-DXB MXP-DXB MAN-DXB LGW-DXB BOM-DXB (Choose from available CFP’s)

LOS 1

WX: At TC’s discretion, depending if a diversion or return to departure airfield is required, MEL – PRIM 1 INOP (Check MEL as a recent Mod allows certain of our aircraft, dispatch) Non-standard Fuel distribution Low Oil pressure ENG #2, S/E diversion & landing OBJECTIVES:

1. 2. 3. 4.

To observe the trainee correctly interpret the MEL and correctly carryout the necessary actions. To Observe the trainee use the non-standard fuel distribution chart and work out a new trim sheet. To Observe the trainee manage an ENG Low oil pressure, correctly diagnosing the problem. To Observe the trainee conduct a single engine diversion and landing.

If using a short route, ignore NON STD FUEL Distribution

DETAILS:

1.

MEL – PRIM 1 INOP. Consider MEL dispatch requirements. MEL is quite involved with an extensive flight control check required prior to start.

2.

Ensure that after refuelling, no fuel is present in the Trim tank (or approx 600Kgs) by manually inserting each tank quantity. Engineer’s advise they have been unable to sort out the problem. This should cause the TOMAC to be outside the 2% limit. This will require a non-standard Fuel distribution calculation and a new Trim sheet. Ensure CG inserted in IOS

3.

Approaching TOC or in cruise reduce ENG 2 OIL QTY and increase ENG 2 OIL TEMP. Reduce OIL QTY until 4 qts, at which time the ECAM advisory will activate. ECAM OIL TEMP HI warning occurs at 190 °C. Observe troubleshooting and decisions. Reduce OIL QTY to zero, or reduce Oil Press to 0.

4.

ENG 2 will need to be shutdown. Diversion required for an overweight landing. Jettison may not be necessary. Arrange for an NPA to be required at diversion airport.

COMMON ERRORS • • • • •

Failing to carry out the correct procedure in the MEL. Not noticing the fuel was incorrectly distributed, or TOMAC outside limits. Poor handling of the emergency, poor prioritisation and management. Mismanagement of the diversion. Poorly executed NPA.

Unofficial Document

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SCENARIO

ALTERNATIVE ROUTES MAN-DXB LGW-DXB ZRH-DXB MXP-DXB (Choose from available CFP’s)

LOS 2 Wx: 6km BKN 1000’ or at TC’s discretion. MEL: APU U/S TR 1 FAIL AVIONICS SMOKE with Loss of CM1 probe icing. CM2 as PF. OBJECTIVES:

1. 2. 3.

To observe the trainee correctly interpret the MEL. To observe the trainee deal with TR1 Failure. To observe the trainee manage the avionics Smoke and Removal procedure.

DETAILS:

To be truly effective this LOS should be conducted in WINTER enroute weather conditions that contain icing. It is not necessary for full winter weather operations to be present at departure airport. If using a short route, have Rain and CB’s 1.

MEL – APU INOP. GPU and External Pneumatics required for departure.

2.

Provide Slot time to give pushback requirement of 1 hour after entering simulator.

3.

FCOM procedure of ENG START WITH EXTERNAL PNUEMATICS required. If one engine is started on stand and the GPU disconnected, the PES is lost and cannot be rebooted until after 2 nd engine start. This reboot may take up to 20 mins. This means that Safety video cannot be used after the 1st engine is started. Purser to advise Captain by Interphone of this problem if it occurs. Options: Start both engines on stand using GPU. • Ask Purser for crew to conduct a Manual Safety demonstration for Pax. •

4. 5. 6.

Insert turbulence during climb. Crew comms Approaching TOC, insert TR 1 FAIL. This is the first sign of a problem in AC BUS 1. Advise Sim engineers prior to session that you wish to use smoke, as they need to isolate the smoke warning for the building. Remember to PRIME smoke 10 mins before you need to use it.

7.

In cruise, insert AVIONIC SMOKE with cockpit smoke until AC BUS 1 is isolated. Regulate the amount of smoke in the cockpit by selecting the failure on and off. This will allow the crews to go for bus isolation as opposed to directly jumping into Emerg Elec Config. Crews to divert and conduct and Emergency Descent.

8.

A lot of systems are affected, including the anti-icing of CM1 and STANDBY probes. On descent introduce a blockage of these probes due to icing. CM2 should become PF.

9.

If diverting to an airport in the JEPP “Other Airports” Manual, there is only one set of approach plates, so good crew co-ordination required.

10. All checklists, including Overweight Landing is to be conducted. Normal landing. 11. No APU on ground means: GPU is required for Electrics – note that BUS TIE should be OPEN to isolate AC BUS 1 before • using GPU as this caused the smoke External Pneumatics should be used if readily available to ensure air is available in case of a • problem during shutdown of the second engine Common Errors • • • • •

Poor prioritising of the external pneumatic start Incorrect donning of oxygen mask with Avionics smoke. Emergency Descent poorly flown. Failure to carryout overweight landing checklist. Rushing into Isolation of all busses by going in Emerg Elec Config.

Unofficial Document

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SCENARIO

ALTERNATIVE ROUTES

Any short sector.

LOS 3

Wx: At TC’s discretion R.OUTER INLET VALVE stuck closed during refuelling Non-standard Fuel Distribution PRIM 2 Fault IR ROLL DRIFT Birds reported on final of one of the runways Possible ENG SEVERE DAMAGE on final app.

Choose from available CFP’s

OBJECTIVES : • • • •

To Observe the trainee make use of the non standard fuel distribution table and Trim Sheet. To Observe the trainee use the reset computers checklist. To Observe the trainee correctly deal with a CHECK ATT problem. To Observe the trainee deal with a multiple bird strike, leading to a Dual Hyd Failure

DETAILS:

1.

During refuelling R. OUTER INLET VALVE reported stuck closed by engineer. No reset possible. Not possible to get fuel into R.OUTER TANK. There is 1.0T of fuel in L.OUTER TANK at that stage. Engineer asks Captain “what to do?” Check limitations – do not allow more than 1.7T in L.OUTER TANK. • Obtain T/O CG and STAB using Non-Standard Fuel distribution table. • MEL (28-25-04d) states Flt Ops performance section to calculate new CG, but Captain is • to be asked to do this manually using the A330 Fuel Index Table for Individual tanks, the manual Loadsheet, and the CFP computer loadsheet for LIZFW.

2.

During taxi after the checklist has been completed, insert PRIM 2 FAULT. After a RESET OF COMPUTERS checklist, the fault clears, but a new FLT CTL check is required. If the QRH is not referenced, a flight control check may not be done as required.

3.

ATC to give revised T/O clearance “immediate left turn after takeoff to intercept a radial or Hdg. Pre-set failure “IR ROLL DRIFT – variable of 60 deg/sec at 120 kts for PF IRS. Revert initially to STBY HORIZON, determining which IR is at fault, and then handing • over control when flight path is safe. ATT HDG switching will resolve problem. •

4.

At destination, ATC advise large flock of birds on approach to runway. Crew to consider alternative runways, conditions permitting. • During approach, when passing 1000’ Bird Strike leading to ENG SEVERE DAMAGE • with loss of GREEN HYDRAULICS Fluid, down to RAT level. No Auto RAT deployment as no 2 systems low levels. • Considerations, Go Around, Fuel requirements for return, Ldg Gear stuck down, • Slat/Flap position. If continue to Land, Braking on Accumulator pressure, no Nose wheel steering. •

Common Errors

Misinterpreting non-standard fuel table. Not following the correct reset of computer QRH procedure. Too slow to use standby horizon on CHECK ATT problem and Transfer of controls. • Not positively taking control of the aircraft after the bird strike. • •

Unofficial Document

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SCENARIO

ALTERNATIVE ROUTES BOM-DXB DAR-NBO ZRH-DXB THR-DXB KHI-DXB (Choose from available CFP’s)

LOS 4 Wx – Heavy rain and crosswinds at the departure airport. EIU FAULT – A/THR LOST RED BOMB warning FLAPS JAMMED OBJECTIVES:

To Observe trainee deal with complicated procedures while flying with MAN THR To Observe handling of SLATS/FLAPS JAM procedures while under time pressure • To Observe task management and CRM during high workload and time pressure • To Observe communication and handling of Cabin Crew and Pax with regard to sensitive information • and panic control. To Observe leadership and decision making capability • DETAILS: CM1 to be PF. High terrain considerations. On certain routes. No MEL items. •

1.

Contaminated runway operations due to heavy rain – 5mm standing water. RTOW & crosswind performance considerations Braking action MED crosswind limits. • •

2.

Normal takeoff. During climb passing approx. FL200 ENG EIU FAULT leading to loss of A/THR. Operational considerations, and flight should continue.

3.

Just before TOC or in cruise (depending if diversion to another airfield) ACARS message from company advising RED BOMB WARNING. No specific information on type of bomb or location. • •

If a bomb search is conducted, a suspicious article is found in the forward toilet behind the waste bin.

4.

Diversion considerations: Contaminated runway at departure airport • Emergency facilities available in case bomb explodes • Time/distance considerations in case bomb explodes • Performance requirements at high altitude airports • High speed or CONF 1 diversion considerations •

5.

Descent and or diversion in accordance with BOMB ON BOARD checklist. Flight using manual Cabin Pressure control and manual thrust requires close attention. •

6.

About 20 mins from landing further information provided by ACARS that device is prob ably a timeactivated device and is due to explode at his ETA + 10 mins.

7.

After CONFIG 1 has been set, insert FLAPS JAM.(use more criteria on IOS) This will become apparent when CONF 2 is selected for landing. Landing performance considerations, which may involve Fuel Jettison. • Use of the SLATS/FLAPS JAM checklist and procedures • Prioritisation considerations due to time pressures. •

8.

After landing consider Pax evacuation using slides or waiting for steps. Slides are the preferred alternative, due time constraints. Common Errors: Trainee not familiar with Bomb on Board Checklist/ FOM policy • Incorrect handling of cabin pressure controls • Incorrect speed management due to MAN THR • Insufficient considerations of contaminated runway operations • Ineffective leadership style and lack of prioritisation • Ineffective communication with cabin crew and passengers. • Unofficial Document

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SCENARIO

ALTERNATIVE ROUTES

NBO-DXB SAH-DXB JNB-DXB THR-DXB

LOS 5

Wx – TC’s discretion MEL – EPR indication fault – N1 Rated Mode (control mode MEL 2.73.3) AVIONICS SMOKE (AC BUS 2)

(Choose from available CFP’s)

OBJECTIVES:

1. 2. 3. 4.

To Observe the trainee deal with the operational and performance considerations with thrust control in N1 mode. To Observe the handling of the Smoke drill and subsequent emergency descent. To Observe the considerations of high terrain and high altitude operations. To Observe task management and CRM in a high workload situation.

DETAILS:

1.

During cockpit preparation insert ENG EPR INDICATION FAULT. This requires a takeoff procedure with A/THR re-engaged at LVR CLB in N1 rated • Mode. Performance penalties for takeoff, and approach climb performance penalties for a • possible return, need to be considered prior to takeoff, especially due to the high altitude of the airport.

2.

Depending on choice of diversion airports, insert AVIONICS VENT SMOKE with small amounts of visible smoke in the cockpit.(control this by modulating the failure on the IOS panel) Arrange with sim technicians prior to the session to ensure smoke is available and that • they isolate the smoke warning for the building. Do not insert too much Smoke as crew may be tempted to revert directly to EMER ELEC • CONF. The intent is to isolate only AC BUS 2.

3.

When AC BUS 2 is isolated the smoke disappears. PF must be CM1. Ensure diversion is initiated promptly in accordance with FOM requirements to the • nearest suitable airport.

4.

A descent is required at some stage when approaching diversion airport, however an Emergency Descent may not always required. If an Emergency Descent was initiated, ensure correct procedures are used.

5.

High altitude, overweight landing, and performance requirements will need to be considered. Go Around weight penalty due to N1 Rated mode.

6.

Evacuation requirements and options to be considered after landing. If normal landing has occurred an evacuation should not be required.

Common Errors: • • • • •

Trainee not familiar with N1 Thrust tables Incorrect handling of Smoke Drill – refer to FCTM. Not commencing a diversion when smoke drill presented on ECAM. If initiated, not conducting Emergency Descent correctly Not appreciating the performance aspects of high altitude operations and it’s affect on aircraft speeds

Unofficial Document

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SCENARIO

ALTERNATIVE ROUTES ZRH-DXB MXP-DXB LGW-DXB MAN-DXB

LOS 6

Wx: Winter Ops TCAS GREEN HYD LOW LEVEL PAX heart attack BLUE HYD LOW AIR PRESS


OBJECTIVES: • • • •

To Observe the trainee prepare the aircraft in cold weather following the correct procedures. To Observe decision making process and task management with the single hydraulic failure. To Observe how the trainee manages the diversion, particularly planning, delegation, and communication. To Observe how the trainee copes with a deteriorating situation after the second hydraulic system Low Air Press.

DETAILS :

This flight involves cold weather operations with low cloud, snow, and low visibility at the departure airport.. 1.

Full cold weather operations are required for departure, with instructor adding pressures r egarding deicing, hold over times, and slot times.

2.

After takeoff, introduce some FMGS exercises followed by a TCAS RA ( Aircraft must be in level flight). Approaching TOC insert a SLOW GREEN HYD SYSTEM LEAK ( approx 3 lts/min)leading to a complete loss of green hydraulic fluid (no RAT available). Operation considerations include whether a diversion is required. • Dubai Engineering should be consulted as part of decision making process for information and • recommendations. Best option is to continue flights as remaining two systems are o perational. •

3.

After a further 10-15 min of cruise, Purser advises of a sick passenger (suspected heart attack). MEDILINK and any on-board doctor should be consulted. They recommend a diversion ASAP.

4.

Diversion to be executed to a suitable airport. Operational considerations of loss of Green Hydraulics to be considered. •

5.

Once diversion has been initiated a BLUE HYD LO AIR PR leads to a loss of Blue Hydraulics Blue Hydraulic system is recoverable at low altitude. • If trainee does NOT recover Blue Hydraulics then landing with GREEN + BLUE HYD LO PR will • occur. If Blue Hydraulics are recovered, then landing with GREEN HYD inop. will occur • Operational and performance considerations of DUAL HYD or loss of Green Hydraulics to be • considered.

6.

Diversion and landing.

Common Errors : • • • • • •

Trainee unfamiliar with cold weather operations and fails to delegate. Trainee diverting with the single hydraulic failure rather than obtaining more information and continuing. Poor workload management when handling the sick passenger options. Poor workload management when handling the diversion. Failing to restore the Blue Hydraulic system at low altitude. Incorrect TCAS manuever.

Unofficial Document

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SCENARIO

ALTERNATIVE ROUTES

DXB-KWI FCO-DXB KHI-DXB SAA-DXB

LOS 7

WX: TC’s discretion MEL – APU BLEED INOP After Start – STANDBY ATTITUDE FAIL (MEL) FUEL LEAK – decision making

(Choose from available CFP’s) A short sector works well.

OBJECTIVES: • • •

To Observe the management of engine start with external pneumatic power. To Observe the trainee’s correct use of the fuel leak procedure. To Observe how the trainee manages the diversion, particularly planning, delegation and communication.

DETAIL

Non – tanking sector. ADD – APU bleed fault –leading to an external pneumatic & cross bleed start. After engines have been started, standby Attitude indicator fails ( acceptable MEL 34 – 22 – 01 ) ATC requires deviation 10nm miles north of track. Passenger reports seeing vapour from wing area. Crew investigate and a fuel leak. Is confirmed. “”Leak not from engine or leak not located”” Diversion and Landing at a Suitable airfield.

COMMON ERRORS

1. 2. 3. 4.

Poor sequencing of check lists during external pneumatic start Failing to notice standby attitude failure. Incorrect use of the fuel leak checklist. Poor diversion choice and management.

Unofficial Document

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SCENARIO

ALTERNATIVE ROUTES (ETOPS)

LOS 8

WX – Tc’s Discretion (NPA) NOTAMS – ILS at most likely diversion airport is u/s

CMB-DXB JNB-DXB MRU-DXB

ETOPS procedures ENG STALL ON ENG START ENG VIBRATION ENG OIL LEAK ENG SHUTDOWN NPA OBJECTIVES: •

• •

•

To observe the trainees understanding of ETOPS – planning, pre-flight, & enroute procedures and considerations. To Observe the trainees handling of an engine vibration and oil leak – communication, contingency planning. To observe the trainees workload and task management and prioritisation with regard to a single-engine diversion. To observe the correct execution of a non-precision approach.

DETAILS:

The flight involves full use of all normal ETOPS procedures during flight planning and aircraft preparation. 1.

During pre-flight preparation, introduce a distraction of an FOM related item (pregnant Pax, firearms etc.)

2.

During engine start introduce an ENG 1 STALL that clears during the subsequent engine auto start. Normal taxi and takeoff

3.

In cruise after 20-30 mins (consider using SPEED x 2 and FUEL FLOW x 2), introduce a VIBRATION ADVISORY for ENG 1. This in turn results in a SLOW LEAK of ENG 1 OIL QUANTITY. Crew should consider operational options and also contact Engineering on SATCOM, • whilst making contingency plans for a possible diversion Engine should not be shutdown while sufficient oil remains.(this needs to be set through • the IOS panel) Eventually ENG 1 OIL QTY reduces sufficiently to require an ENG SHUTDOWN and a • diversion. Observe workload management and communication techniques in handling diversion. •

4. NOTAMs indicate a NPA is required at the diversion airport. If another airport is selected for diversion, ATC advice ILS is temporarily unserviceable. 5.

Single-engine NPA approach and landing required.

Common Errors: • •

• •

Trainee not being familiar with ETOPS procedures and planning considerations. Poor flight management techniques and workload management when implementing the diversion. NPA approach procedures conducted incorrectly. Shutting down of engine on advisory condition only.

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SCENARIO

ALTERNATIVE ROUTES

LGW-DXB SAH-DXB JNB-DXB NBO-DXB MAN-DXB ZRH-DXB

LOS 9

WX; TC’s discretion TAXI: RAD ALT 1 FAULT (MEL) TAKEOFF: RH MLG ABNORMAL Return to land – management, APP CLB, jettison

OBJECTIVES •

• •

To observe the trainee deal with all the precautions required for an emergency landing and evacuation. To allow the trainee to deal with the problem in real time and complete the full drill. To observe the trainees knowledge of approach climb limits. Observe handling of the fuel jettison system.


DETAIL

On taxi out, RAD ALT 1 fault for MEL discussion. GPWS, High terrain Airfields. On gear retraction, RH main landing gear shows abnormal indication, does not recycle and shows unsafe. Crew must prepare for landing with abnormal gear, however in this instance it is a false warning and gear locks on touchdown. COMMON ERRORS • • •

Failure to hand over control of the aircraft and effectively manage the situation. Incorrect calculation of the approach climb limits. Not using all available resources, under the circumstances.

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SCENARIO

ALTERNATIVE ROUTES

BOM-DXB SAH-DXB NBO-DXB NBO-DAR

LOS 10

WX: Monsoon. On takeoff FLAPS JAM. Runway closed due crashed aircraft. Divert to another AD with FLAPS JAM. Diversion AD requires a NPA approach.


OBJECTIVE • •

• •

• •

To observe the trainee deal with the ‘’Flap locked ‘’ problem during the acceleration phases and manage for another approach. To observe the decision making process and task management when the runway closes and diversion implemented. To check trainees knowledge of limitations and performance restrictions in this configuration. To observe the trainee demonstrate use of QRH tables and FCOM references as above to deduce new burn off and alternate decision. To observe FMGS reprogramming and execution of diversion. To observe a NPA approach with uneventful landing.

DETAIL

This exercise is a flight during the monsoon season. The weather is typical with heavy rain, storms in the area and associated turbulence. Normal pre-flight, engine start, taxi and takeoff. Flap2 or 3 config for takeoff. On flap retraction, flap stuck between 3 and 1. Slats are still operative. Whilst aircraft is manoeuvring for holding or an approach, a B747 has a runway excursion on landing and closes airport for an indefinite period. Diversion to available alternates. NPA approach to be flown. ILS is notamed inop.The weather is around NPA minima. Fuel is critical due to cruise now at FL200 (flap limit) and increased fuel burn. The CM 1 needs to analyse all the information before arriving at an alternate decision. QRH 4.13 – burn off FCOM 3.02.27 p4 x 2.2

COMMON ERRORS • • •

• • •

Trainee failing to fly the aircraft accurately and getting a VFE exceedence Not flying a selected speed as soon as the problem occurs Incorrect task management when implementing diversion. Someone must always fly the aircraft Incorrect use of FCOM and QRH to solve performance considerations. Poor alternate chosen, as being fuel critical. Incorrect programming of FMGS for d iversion.

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SCENARIO

ALTERNATIVE ROUTES

MXP-DXB FCO-DXB ZRH-DXB LGW-DXB

LOS 11

WX: Rain and low cloud, cross winds MEL - ENG 2 BLD INOP R INR TK FUEL LEAK finally causing ENG 2 FLAMEOUT Diversion and landing


OBJECTIVES • • • • •

To Observe use of MEL and considerations. To Considerations for wet Runway with cross winds, and limits To Observe the use of the weather Radar. To Observe task management of FUEL LEAK, Eng Fail and diversion To Observe Single Eng Ops, Approach and Landing, on WET Rwy with 15 kt Xwind.

DETAILS

Rain and low clouds with crosswinds of 15kts. Rwy wet. Braking action MED MEL- ENG Bleed 2 Inop. During climb, Fuel Leak from Right Inner tank. 1.

MEL Bleed Inop. 36-11 Requires APU to be left running for the entire flight. Fuel considerations!

2.

Wet runway with cross winds considerations. (2.04.10)

3. Normal takeoff with climb to cruising Altitude. 4.

Thunderstorms and weather avoidance, use of weather radar, during climb.

5.

During climb or in cruise, depending on diversion airfields available. Fuel Leak form right inner tank. Crew may notice this, if not, then during ECAM advisory, or Pax report of white vapour from Rt. wing. This should draw the crew’s attention to the fuel leak procedure. • •

Leak not located C/L to be actioned. Gravity fuel feeding C/L to be actioned. If less than 30 mins FL 150

6.

The engine should flame out during the procedure.

7.

A diversion to a suitable airfield is required.

8.

Fuel imbalance considerations and limitations.

9.

An approach in rain, low cloud.

10. Landing on a wet Rwy, with a crosswind of 15 kts. Reverses not usable as per fuel leak C/L Common Errors • • • • • • •

Not allowing enough fuel for APU use due Bleed Inop. Not using the weather radar correctly. Trainee not familiar with the fuel leak proc. Trainee not descending to correct altitude for fuel gravity feeding. Insufficient considerations given to fuel imbalance and limitations. Using reverse after touch down Ineffective communication with crew and Pax

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SCENARIO

ALTERNATIVE ROUTES

DXB-MCT DAR-NBO NBO-DAR

LOS 12

WX: Good with HZ Pre-Departure – Pax wanting to carry gun on board TCAS TOD – ATTITUDE DISCREPANCY F/O becomes sick – incapacitation Runway lighting failure – missed approach Return for landing

Use a short sector flight. (Choose from available CFP’s)

OBJECTIVE •

• •

To observe the trainee handle the attitude discrepancy and deal with it accordingly without losing control of the aircraft. To conduct a lightweight, low level missed approach. To successfully fly and land aircraft safely as single pilot with incapacitated F/O

DETAIL

This exercise is based on a short flight at night. In this exercise the trainee actually completes the flight without diverting. Prior to departure FOM related problem ( body guard carrying gun etc ) All ops normal with FMGS or TCAS exercises at instructor’s discretion. At top of descent, when the A/C pitches down for descent, insert attitude discrepancy on IRS flying autopilot. Recovery is possible with proper analysis, crosschecking and switching. Descending through 7000ft F/O complains of severe abdominal pains ( appendix ) and dashes to the toilet immediately. Does not come back ! Approach to minima where the runway lights fail ( wayward driver smashes into relay station ) resulting in a missed approach. Trainee to conduct another approach as single pilot IFR with slight improvement in the weather and lights back on standby generator . Runway lights strength 3 to allow landing. COMMON ERRORS: • • • • •

Clear determination of who is flying the aircraft during abnormals. Hand flying when autopilot is available Incorrect prioritisation during single pilot operation. Diverting when not really necessary. Incorrect TCAS manouvering.

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SCENARIO

ALTERNATIVE ROUTES

NBO-DAR DXB-MCT DXB-KWI FCO-MXP

LOS 13

WX: Low cloud and visibility at minimum for NPA MEL – SLAT SYS 2 INOP (GREEN) 27-81 After T/O – SLAT SYS 1 FAULT, Slats stuck in extended position Sick PAX ILS U/S at Departure and Destination Airfield Return to Departure,G/A - due wx Diversion and landing, NPA A short route will highlight the fuel problems.


OBJECTIVES: • • • • •

To observe the trainee use the MEL To observe the trainee handle the Slat jam procedure. To observe the decision making process and task management with the failure and sick Pax. To observe how the trainee manages the diversion, particularly the fuel requirements, delegation and communication. To observe an NPA being flown.

DETAILS

The flight involves Weather at NPA minimum at Departure and Destination. A MEL with Slat sys 2 INOP. After takeoff and at Flap retraction,Slat Sys 1 fault, causing the Slats to be stuck.(insert this fault using the more criteria on IOS) Initially speed management is important. This fault will manifest itself with the flap lever in • the ‘0’ position, with the slats actually stuck at position 1. Thus having a speed limit. After ECAM and reference to QRH with C/L completed, Purser advises of a passenger • suffering from severe stomach pains. Normally a decision to return would be made and a NPA flown. The Visibility being on the • low side will necessitate a Go Around. A diversion to a suitable airfield is to be made, before fuel becomes a problem. • Considerations, Max Altitude with Slats out (200000 Ft.). Fuel burns (3.02.27 pg 4. 1.5 • times) Sick passenger? ILS inop at diversion, requiring a NPA (At the instructors discretion. If the first one went • well, then continue for an ILS, or a selected if the first was managed)

Common Errors •

• • • • •

The trainee is not familiar with the S/F jam procedure and as per ECAM Status reads it from Go Around. NPA procedures not being followed correctly. Overspeed with Slats stuck out. Not observing the 20000-ft altitude limit with Slats stuck out. Poor fuel management. Poor workload management when handling the sick passenger options.

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SCENARIO

ALTERNATIVE ROUTES

LOS 14 WX - above EK circling minimas at departure airport ETOPS diversion airports have high crosswinds that approach the 80% limit for ETOPS planning purposes. ETOPS procedures MEL – APU GEN INOP GPU failure, START ON BATTERY POWER GEN 1 OVERVOLTAGE EMERG ELEC CONFIG considerations, Or Eng 2 high Vibration (OK at idle thrust) Diversion & landing OBJECTIVES: To observe the trainees understanding of ETOPS – planning, pre-flight, & enroute procedures and • considerations. To observe the trainee handle the associated ground problems on a battery start and running one engine • on the ground during boarding etc.. To observe the crew demonstrate FMGS knowledge during exercises on climb. • To observe the trainees workload and task management and prioritisation with regard to a diversion to a • non-ETOPS routing.. To observe the correct execution of a circling approach. •

ETOPS

MRU-DXB CMB-DXB NBO-DXB JNB-DXB

DETAILS:

The flight involves full use of all normal ETOPS p rocedures during flight planning and aircraft preparation. 1.

During pre-flight planning the ETOPS diversion airport should have crosswinds approaching the 80% limit for planning pruposes. The crew should detect this and note that the airports are still available.

2.

During engine start the GPU fails requiring a Battery Start. The management, planning, considerations, communications with ground crew, cabin crew and • passengers result in a busy time. One engine needs to be run ning while checks are completed. Possibly IRS align and resetting of • CIDS for Cabin crew to use video equipment. During climb introduce some FMGS exercises. In cruise after 20-30 mins (consider using SPEED x 2 and FUEL FLOW x 2), but before entering the ETOPS sector, Company ACARS message advises that crosswinds at ETOPS airport are approaching 32 kts. Crew to consider what other ETOPS airports are available. • Is 180 mins ETOPS a consideration? • Are they in the ETOPS sector? If so then no route changes are required, but if not then a re-routing • to a non-ETOPS route may be required.(fuel requirements)

3. 4.

5.

Introduce a GEN 2 OVERVOLTAGE causing a loss of GEN 2 before entering the ETOPS sector. Crew should consider operational options and also contact Engineering on SATCOM, whilst • making contingency plans for a re-routing o r diversion.(1 Gen. means no PES and part Galley) Observe workload management and communication techniques in handling re-routing or diversion. • Does crew have enough fuel for non-ETOPS routing? If not, then a diversion is required. •

6.

During the diversion, Lightning strike takes away Gen. 1 leaving the Aircraft with EMERG ELEC CONFIG. OR Eng. 1 High Vibration or Eng Stall (Both OK at Idle Thrust)

7.

If diversion does occur the crew arrange for a circle-to-land to be required at the diversion airport.

Common Errors: • • • • • •

Trainee not being familiar with ETOPS procedures and planning considerations. Poor flight management techniques and workload management when considering and implementing rerouting or diversion. Circling approach procedures conducted incorrectly. Not ascertaining that the electrical status of the aircraft is getting critical – single generator ops. Not considering best diversion options in case EMERG ELEC CONFIG becomes required. Poor communication and resource management during failures.

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SCENARIO

ALTERNATIVE ROUTES

DAR-NBO FCO-MXP

LOS 15

WX: CBs MEL: SATCOM U/S Enroute – LIGHTNING STRIKE causing AC BUS 2 FAIL and total loss of comms Approach Destination, heavy rain causes go-around and diversion to Alternate


OBJECTIVES •

• • • •

To observe the trainee take the necessary precautions with regard turbulence and thunderstorm avoidance. To observe the trainee carry out the correct actions associated with an AC BUS 2 fault. To observe the trainee conduct the promulgated ICAO loss comms procedure To observe the trainee correctly manage a low fuel state. To observe the trainee execute a safe go around and diversion to an alternate.

DETAIL

The flight is short sector, The aircraft has a Tech log MEL SATCOM u/s. The weather is typical rainy season, with thunderstorms (with associated problems of heavy rain and low vis). There are CB’s to avoid en route and the weather at alternates fair, but reducing to 2000m in rain. After reaching top of climb CB avoidance. During this phase the aircraft experiences a lightning strike causing an AC BUS 2 fault. The flight continues but now they have lost comms completely. No responses from any radio call. The LOS continues to develop with the crew having to carry out the proper procedure for total loss of comms. The correct course of action is continuing the flight. On arrival at Dest heavy rain is experienced and a PWS is activated, resulting in a go around and subsequent diversion due marginal WX and fuel state. They should execute a diversion without delay otherwise a low fuel situation will develop.

COMMON ERRORS • • • •

Incorrect procedures followed for flight in turbulence and weather avoidance. Failing to carry out the correct loss comms procedure. Allowing the loss of comms to distract them from the low fuel state. Poor execution of the go around and diversion to alternate.

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SCENARIO

ALTERNATIVE ROUTES

BOM-DXB SAH-DXB KHI-DXB

LOS 16

Wx: Monsoon MEL: APU INOP GEN 1 FAULT DC ESS BUS FAULT Engine shutdown required via Fire Handle.

Or can use this as a Winter Ops scenario using: LGW-DXB ZRH-DXB MAN-DXB

OBJECTIVES • •

•

To Observe the trainee correctly interpret the MEL. To Observe the trainee correctly manage the aircraft with a severely degraded electrical system. To Observe the trainee manage a diversion

DETAIL

The A/C has an MEL item APU u/s. This necessitates an external pneumatic start with all relevant Precautions being taken. In climb there can be FMGS exercises or weather avoidance as required. Once in the cruise introduce GEN 1 fail. Observe comms and decision to continue or divert. Pax comfort, Part galley and no PES. Some time later when well established en route introduce DC Ess Bus Fail. AP 2 is still available The A/c has a severely degraded electrical system and a decision must be made on whether a diversion should be made. ACP 1 & 2 are u/s and the a/c has no wing A/I no L WINDOW heat so a winter scenario can prove interesting. The A/C is CAT 1 only due to loss of standby horizon. Captain has lost his flight instruments. Common Errors • • •

Poor prioritising of external start. Operating in icing conditions with a degraded anti icing system. (Winter option only). Poor decisions to continue or divert with one gen (Pax concerns, part galley. PES)

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SCENARIO

ALTERNATIVE ROUTES (ETOPS)

LOS 17

WX: CBs MEL – APU INOP LIGHTNING STRIKE causing GEN 1 FAULT – single GEN operations If no diversion back to JNB (no Galleys/PES etc) then IDG OVHT ADVISORY Return to JNB, jettison, landing

JNB-DXB MRU-DXB CMB-DXB (NON-ETOPS )

OBJECTIVES • • • •

To observe the trainee carry out the correct procedures associated for an ETOPS flight To observe the trainee accomplish an external pneumatic start. To observe the trainee manage a departure in thunderstorms and rain. To observe the trainee handle a GEN problem and manage a diversion with all the necessary procedures being followed.

LGW-DXB MAN-DXB ZRH-DXB FCO-DXB MXP-DXB

DETAIL

If used on an ETOPS sector the trainee should carry out the extra pre flight duties. (Refer to LOS 14) APU is inop, so a start with external sources is required. Numerous CB’s are encountered on departure and all the relevant precautions with regard weather avoidance and turbulence must be undertaken. Once established in the cruise the aircraft experiences a lightning strike which results in a GEN 1 FAULT. The trainee must decide whether to continue or return to departure airfield. The purser will complain about lack of galley power and the fact that a number of passengers are angry because their IFE is not working. Once a decision has been reached, as to whether to continue or return An IDG OVHT ADVISORY on GEN 2 could also be introduced leading to Emerg Elec • Config Or an Eng problem eg. High Vib, Eng Stall, that requires no Eng shutdown and the thrust to • remain at Idle. The trainee must now return to departure airport with all the considerations of performance, weather, runway state, fuel jettison etc.

COMMON ERRORS • • • •

Failing to carry out the necessary precautions for an ETOPS flight. Poor prioritising with the external start Poorly managed departure in thunderstorms Failing to take into account all the considerations with a diversion.

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SCENARIO

ALTERNATIVE ROUTES

LGW-DXB MAN-DXB ZRH-DXB FCO-DXB JNB-DXB

LOS 18

WX: TC’s Discretion MEL – Nil Tire burst on T/O causing BLUE HYD LO LEVEL ENG 2 LO OIL PRESS causing ENG 2 shutdown – DUAL HYD LO PR OBJECTIVES • • • •


To observe the trainee prioritise his actions in the event of a tire burst. To observe the trainee manage a Blue Hydraulic low level. To observe the trainee carry out the correct actions for an ENG LOW OIL PRESS. To observe the trainee manage a DUAL HYD LO PR

DETAILS

On the T/O run (20kts below V1) a tire burst on the LH MLG. The decision should be GO. Possible consideration is leaving the MLG down (FOM ch 25-13) performance permitting. As the tyre burst is very subtle most trainees will probably retract the MLG. The damaged tyre causes a leak in the blue hydraulic system and during the climb out the A/C experiences a BLUE HYD LOW LEVEL. If the MLG is down the trainee will have to decide whether to return to point of departure or divert, but continuing en route would probably not be a good option. All issues should be considered, fuel, landing weight, performance, unsafe gear, etc. If the MLG has been retracted the trainee should gather as much information as possible as to whether he should divert or continue. It is a single failure so continuing is a consideration but as much information about possible further damage caused by the tyre should be sought i.e. ATC should be asked about Tyre deposits on the runway. Engineering asked about likely further damage – engineering response should be that if there is no vibration and that if all other system parameters are normal, then the a/c should continue. Only when a decision on whether to divert or continue has been made ENG 2 LO OIL PR should be introduced. This will result in Engine being shut down with the ensuing loss of the yellow hydraulic system DUAL HYD LO PR – Despite this being LAND ASAP the trainee must consider ,landing weight, Performance, fuel jettison, etc before deciding where to go. The procedure for DUAL HYD LOW PR must be methodically run through handing over control where necessary. As this is a very demanding situation, radar vectors to an ILS should be made available. If the LOS is used as a short exercise, the Low Oil Press can be replaced by Eng High Vib or Eng Stall, leaving the aircraft with one Eng in Idle Thr. and a single HYD Sys Lo Press. Common Errors • • •

Rejecting for a tyre burst. Failing to gather sufficient information about the single hydraulic failure. Failing to complete all the actions for a DUAL HYD LOW PR and rushing the approach.

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SCENARIO

ALTERNATIVE ROUTES

SAA-DXB ZRH-DXB JNB-DXB

LOS19

Wx : Variable MEL Nil LH MLG Stuck Down Diversion consideration and landing, NPA approach

OBJECTIVES •

• •

To observe the trainee initially concentrate on flying the a/c during climb out and not be distracted by MLG problem. To observe the trainee gather information prior to either Landing or diverting To observe a NPA being flown.

DETAIL

On T/O LH MLG will not retract. Trainee should “fly the a/c” making sure all altitude constraints for the SID are met. Once at a safe height ECAM actions can be completed the outcome being the MLG is stuck down. With the excessive vibration a quick PA to the Pax should be made to reassure them. This scenario is not time critical and the trainee should “ stay below the line” whilst making a decision on where to divert. This scenario works best at airfield with large performance penalties: Go around & landing distance.(SAH RWY 18) The trainee will have to calculate whether he can achieve go around climb gradient with the gear down, whether he should use higher minima, circling app, divert with gear down etc. Good comms with SMNC/Engineering are required Approach should be via NPA.

Common Errors • •

•

Failing to fly the A/c and getting too preoccupied with the gear problem. Failing to establish all the facts (particularly) performance, before committing to a diversion or return. NPA approach procedures not being adhered to.

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BOM – DXB Weather Notams MEL Failure 1 Failure 2 Problems Fuel

Thunderstorm activity whilst boarding.

Start Fault. Manual start Valve BMC 1 + 2 Fault Failure 3 BMC Fault Failure 4 Drunk passenger, over assertive SFS wanting to Man handle pax

RAK is the alternate on the flight plan, there are no charts for RAK in the sim so change alternate to OOMS, gives excuse for extra fuel. Route manual company NOTAM’s cannot use Ahmedabad as an alternate on A330. Remember, in an abnormal situation can disregard. If airborne and want to divert there, then call the company and find out why can’t use it. Maybe just no handling agreement. Start Fault. Manual start Valve operation. Thunderstorm activity whilst boarding. Briefed for windshear and checked to see if rwy contaminated. Passenger trouble. Ask CSD if wants to off load passenger or not? Involve station Manager. Make it someone else’s problem. BMC Fault at holding point. Drunk passenger, over assertive SFS wanting to Man handle pax. Get purser involved. Lots of very bad weather around. Divert L and R. Keep ridiculously clear or get severe turbulence! Don’t get flight level, start running tight on Fuel. Review fuel policy. BMC 1 + 2 Fault. Now have no bleed monitoring so won’t know if have an overheat until the pack auto shuts down! Sent ACARS to engineering to warn them, decided to continue to DXB. Sick passenger, establish if genuine or Indian sick. If genuine call Medlink on Sat phone before calling for doctor on board. Prepare secondary incase divert to KHI or MCT. Lightning strike and lose radome. Resulting in unreliable airspeed. Establish flight path hand over to F/O, so can run QRH (obscure location 5.05) and monitor. Elect to divert to KHI. Fully configure in level flight on a very long final. Check GS on ND. Or from Radar. +/- wind component to get IAS. Can only use FPV if altitude info is ok. Get block Altitude clearance. Check Altitude on GPS monitor page (Data / GPS monitor). Or with Radar.

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BOM-DXB Weather Notams MEL Failure 1 Failure 2 Problems Fuel

TS and rain over the field although Vis > Cat 1 14/32 closed for works ENG 1 EPR Mode fault (rated mode) Failure 3 Failure 4

Dispatch in N1 rated mode, lots of consids in the MEL A few pax probs, ENG STALL on start, auto restart OK Had another computer reset on taxi, can’t remember what it was but straight forward from the QRH. T/O into the wx and FLAPS fault on retraction somewhere between 2 and 1. Return for landing BOM but another jet runs off the runway and 09/27 blocked. Diverted to VAAH with slats flaps out as not the gas for anywhere else, landed via NPA to 23 (notam effecting ILS).

BOM - DXB Weather Notams MEL Failure 1 Failure 2 Problems Fuel

Thunderstorms Pack 1 u/s Restricted to Fl310, took extra gas GPS 1 and 2 Failure 3 FMGEC independent operation Failure 4

Eng flame out HYD G&B

Got F/O to fly the sector GPS 1 and 2 fault on push back On T/O FMGEC independent operation Thunderstorms in the area weather avoidance Eng flame out descend to relight the engine on relight it blow up engine damage shutdown checklist Divert to Muscat as wind was 20 across and slight tailwind at KHI so did not want to fly visual to 07 On descent the HYD G&B ( was suppose to be Blue with Rat on Green ie will lose it at 140 kts Difficult to fly and consider A/thr off as the eng where hunting lots of power changes Took up hold to get check list done and 25 mile final for configuring • • • • • • •

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Failure 3 Failure 4

Slats or Flaps don’t retract on T/O. Run ECAM, do checklist, return. Traffic ahead blows tyres on runway. ATC says 1 hr to clear. Don’t trust them. Check status of cross runway. Immediately start heading towards KHI, (AMD is basically on the way). On the way calculate divert fuel (KHI 455nm away, AMD is 240nm) with slats or flaps out. Refer 2.05.50. Corrections from FCOM3.02.10 p8., QRH 4.13 gives the same. 455nm = 6,800 kg + (19 * 40) = 7,560 kg = 7,600kg. Slats Extn 7,600 kg * 1.5 = 11,400 kg Flaps Extn 7,600 kg * 2.2 = 16,720 kg Slats & Flaps 7,600 kg * 2.5 = 19,000 kg +Final fuel 240nm = 4,169 kg + (19 * 40) = 4,929 kg = 5,000 kg. Slats Extn 5,000 kg * 1.5 = 7,500 kg Flaps Extn 5,000 kg * 2.2 = 11,000 kg Slats & Flaps 5,000 kg * 2.5 = 12,500 kg +Final fuel.


Failure 3 Failure 4

Double IRS failure on take off. Return, runway blocked, Go-around divert to KHI.

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BOM – DXB ALT OOMS

THUNDERSTORMS IN VICINITY, HEAVY RAIN. Weather NOTHING SIGNIFICANT Notams NIL. MEL Failure 1 Failure 3 Failure 2 Failure 4 Problems TOOK 1T EXTRA WEATHER. (TAKE MORE!!!) Fuel LOTS OF DISTRACTIONS AS WE WE’RE DOING SET-UP. CONFIG 2 FOR RWY 27. NO START VALVE OPENING ON #2. CONFIRMED NO N1 WITH GROUND. MANUAL VALVE OPENING PROCEDURE. ON TAXI, CALL FROM THE SFS WHO HAD A DRUNKEN PAX, SFS WAS AGGRESSIVE; ASK ME TO RESTRAIN THE PAX. TOLD HIM TO STAND BY, HAD THE PURSER TAKE CONTROL AND HAD THE PAX ISOLATED IN BUSINESS WHERE HE WAS HAPPY AND WOULD NOT BOTHER ANYONE. ATC TRIED TO RUSH US INTO AN IMMEDIATE WITH 747 TRAFFIC 8 NM FINAL. SAID WE’D WAIT AS WE WANTED TO HAVE A GOOD RADAR LOOK PRIOR TO THE ROLL. HAD THE FO SCAN THE RADAR, CLEAR SO ROLLING. (WET X-LIMIT APPROX 20KTS.) IN POSITION…. BMC 1 FAULT….TOLD FO WE’D LOOK AT IT IN THE AIR…. AFTER TO VISUAL WITH A MASSIVE LINE OF CBS PERPENDICULAR TO OUR TRACK ABOUT 100NM LONG........NOTHING ON RADAR, AND AS IT TURNS OUT WE HAD THE RADAR INCORRECTLY SET UP?? ANYWAY HUGE DIVERSION LEFT AND RIGHT ……..BURNT LOTS OF FUEL…BMC 1 + 2 FAULT……DISCUSSION FCOM 3……. FL280 ONLY IN LOTS OF WEATHER…..LIGHTNING STRIKE (WE THOUGHT IT WAS SEVERE ICING ONLY…SIM DOESN’T DO A VERY GOOD LIGHTNING STRIKE……JUST A LOUD BANG AND SHAKING???)….LEADING TO UNRELIABLE AIRSPEED DRILL AFTER A VERY SLOW SUBTLE LOSS OF SPEED TAPE……DECLARED PAN AND ASKED FOR SLOW DESCENT AND LOST SOME ALTITUDE TRYING TO MAINTAIN SPEED (ICING???)…..MEANWHILE…..15000 IN DESCENT…..BOTH PACKS OVERHEATING……SEVERAL RESETS…CONFUSING DUE TO LOSS OF BMCS…..STARTED APU….. MAYDAY…DIVERSION TO MUSCAT (KARACHI ONLY 50 NM CLOSER...) FOR ILS 25 VECTORS LANDED WITH 1TON FUEL ONLY…….. TOTAL TIME 3 HRS (SIM NEEDED A RESET AND ANOTHER TAKE OFF DUE TO SEVERE TURB…) SELF DEBRIEF/VIDEO……..LIGHTNING STRIKE AND RADOME DESTRUCTION FED IN. ☺ • • •

•

•

• •

•

•

•

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Failure 3 Failure 4

Good Weather BOM and DXB, no weather enroute APU GEN U/S Planned on Start at the gate after all passengers were onboard Just prior to start, Ground Power unit fails, no replacement available Battery Start procedure Normal taxi Departed RWY 27 SLATS LOCKED during the acceleration phase Continued enroute, requested FL200 while we addressed the problem Decided to return to BOM Approaching BBB, Aeroflot departs runway, airport is closed Divert to Ahmedadab At FL200, using ALT Planning charts QRH X 1.5, 45 minutes enroute LOC ONLY RWY 23 VAAH Landed

De-Brief

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-

During Battery start procedures, consider turning OFF the IRSs Saves battery life and they have to be restarted anyway o Full align takes about 10 minutes o when engine starts, restart the IRSs o check the MCDU, database may have changed o Gives you time to reset the CIDs , if necessary, and o o Reset the N1 EPR mode (N1 mode ON then OFF)

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Refer to the QRH CRM stuff more often, especially if diverting Use the CORS method of problem solving Be careful when talking to the Purser about ‘Evacuations’. It might be the only word she hears even if you say it is not needed! OK to let the PNF do the flying and the approach

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Failure 3 Failure 4

ON GROUND DURING COCKPIT PREP "APU BLEED LEAK" (ECAM, THEN FCOM 3) MAN ENG START WITH EXTERNAL BLEED (DUE PRESSURE <25PSI ), START MALFUNCTION WITH HIGH EGT, MANUAL SHUT DOWN (REMEMBER, ONCE ABOVE 700°C, MAINT. REQ) DURING TAXI, PRIM 1 FAULT, USE QRH RESET OF COMPUTERS ATIS STATED RVR OF 550M IN MOD RA (T/O MINIMA FOR F/O 2 KM, ALSO CHECK MIN T/O VIS IN BOM ON JEPP PLATES) LOTS OF WX ON DEPT SECTOR (MONSOON COND), ND SETTING FOR WX CHECK MIN 40 NM CONF 3 T/O, AFTER COMMAND "FLAPS 1", ECAM "F/CTL FLAPS LOCKED" ENTERED THE HOLD OVERHEAD BBB, ASKED FOR WX, RVR WAS LESS THAN REQ FOR CAT 1 LANDING, NO IMPROVEMENT, WX KHI AND AMD NOT BRILLIANT, BUT OK USED SEC FLIGHT PLAN TO FIGURE OUT DISTANCE ALONG AWY'S TO OPKC (~465NM), VAAH(~230NM), I WAS WESTBOUND MINDED, FORGOT TO CONSIDER VOHY(~334NM), (TURNED OUT THAT HYD RWY LENGTH SIGN. LESS THAN AMD AND WX WAS WORSE) USED THE TABLE FCOM 3.02.27 P4 AND THE ALTN FLIGHT PLANNING TABLES INITIALLY, KHI WAS TO TIGHT, DECIDED TO PROCEED TO AHMEDABAD CLIMB TO FL 200, THEN AGAIN COMPUTATION OF FUEL REQ ACCORDING ACTUAL FF INFORMED PUR, PAX AND COMPANY UNEVENTFUL LANDING IN AMD

TOTAL TIME CA 3 HRS, THEREAFTER TWO MINI LOFTS (1. UNRELIABLE SPEED DURING ROTATION AND 2. ELEC EMER CONFIG DURING INITIAL CLIMB)

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BOM-DXB Weather Notams MEL Failure 1 Failure 2 Problems Fuel

Failure 3 Failure 4

Wx: TS and rain over the field although Vis > Cat 1 Notams 14/32 closed for works MEL: ENG 1 EPR Mode fault (rated mode) Dispatch in N1 rated mode, lots of consids in the MEL A few pax probs, ENG STALL on start, auto restart OK Had another computer reset on taxi, can’t remember what it was but straight forward from the QRH. T/O into the wx and FLAPS fault on retraction somewhere between 2 and 1. Return for landing BOM but another jet runs off the runway and 09/27 blocked. Diverted to VAAH with slats flaps out as not the gas for anywhere else, landed via NPA to 23 (notam effecting ILS).

BOM – DXB Weather Notams MEL Failure 1

SLATS / FLAPS JAM ON RETRACTION

Failure 2 Problems Fuel

Failure 3 Failure 4

SLATS / FLAPS JAM ON RETRACTION. RETURN TO BOM, UNABLE TO LAND DUE DISABLED A/C ON THE RWY. DIVERT TO AHMEDABAD.

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JNB to DXB Weather Notams MEL Failure 1 Failure 2 Problems Fuel

Bomb Threat

Failure 3 Failure 4

Bomb Threat – must descend aircraft immediately as per the checklist to get the cabin within 1 PSI of the outside air pressure. Minimizes explosive damage. - do not jettison fuel, explosion could ignite fuel that is being dumped Bomb Threat – (or avionics smoke) go direct to nearest suitable airport, immediately and declare an emergency, then follow the checklist. Rudder Jam – use FCOM 3 as there is a reset procedure that should fix the problem EMERG ELEC CONFIG – this scenario occurred right after take-off. - fly the aircraft (Capt) and remember to get the autopilot back on, use the FMA to help - landing gear lever was stuck down, both LGCIUs are off line Land Recovery gives back LGCIU # 1. - If this is the only problem, use the summary page in the QRH - In the event of a go-around, turn off the Land Recovery P/B to regain use of autopilot Unreliable airspeed – scenario was that we flew through a locust swarm - all 3 ADRs became blocked, thus, as you climb, the indicated airspeed increases - this then results in the aircraft pitching up to combat the apparent overspeed, even if you push forward on the stick. If you climb higher the problem gets worse. - The only way out of this scenario (aircraft continuously pitches up) is to turn off all 3 PRIMs. This results in Alternate Law and the Overspeed protection is disabled Climb Performance Charts - FCOM 3 provides S\E Climb Gradient charts - QRH has Approach climb gradient charts for overweight approach and landing - AFM contains 2 engine climb gradient performance charts

Dual Engine Failure – the AFM states that relight is not possible until aircraft is below FL300, but continue to follow the procedure on ECAM or the QRH if necessary. - if you get one of the engines back (ie) #2 , even though you have green hydraulics, still use the Gravity extension for the gear. - Reason is that the green system could be overloaded by the excess demand and the Emergency generator (in the green system) is still powering the essential buses at this stage. An over demand on the green system could stall the emergency generator. African airspace – use the 1NM offset to the right in African airspace - utilize the blind broadcast procedures ( 126.7) - have all approach plates ready for Harare, Dar and JNB - need both HFs so test them both Unofficial Document

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review use of the Satellite Comms

High Altitude Airport – calculate your return weight for emergency landing - calculate runway distance needed for emergency (remember Press Alt correction) - S/E Climb Gradient for Go-Around - Maximum true airspeed for tires Vr + 2KTS per 1000’ ASL ????????? - Max tire speed is 195 knots

These are my LOFTS, there were a number of minor things along the way in each of them but I have just included the main items. (That’s all I can remember anyway…!)

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JNB - DXB (Etops) T/S Nil significant Weather Notams Nil MEL Smoke Failure 1 APU Failure 3 Failure 2 FCU Failure 4 Problems The Sheikh wanted to carry his hunting rifle on board Fuel A/C had an APU Gen Fault, which had been fixed??? APU dropped off line just before Start check the FMGEC again use the Hat Cabin in dark, make PA to Pax Had to get ground Elec cart start one on stand then push Pax problem new the Sheikh wanted to carry his hunting rifle on board no way in the cabin Normal T/O after airborne lost FCU Red Alt and Spd on PFD A/P and A/thr gone you get the Bird so fly this set manual thrust say 85% N1 10 deg pitch up Get clearance from ATC for heading and block clearance cancel Sid Restore using QRH reset Computers Thunderstorms avoidance In cruise smoke, Descend and carry out drill mask on etc Smoke would not go away so you get to the Smoke removal checklist we did not want to slow down so elected not to do the checklist till near JNB but you can get Ram air to help so do the checklist to Ram air ie packs off and carry out to Ram air on Remember that you also have Harare as and airport use ETP page to keep aware of Alternates Keep O2 cover area clear Call a May Day • • • • •

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JNB - DXB - ETOPS Weather Notams MEL Failure 1 Failure 2 Problems Fuel

Failure 3 Failure 4

Had APU Gen U/S in brfg>> no effect on ETOPS capability. Given max ZFW of 168 T for departure. Wx in DXB was not good. Elected to take reduced reserve to carry the load as Muscat wx was good. After takeoff & following gear retraction, had low tire press. Got tower to check out runway and indeed had left shredded rubber on runway>>> burst tire. No problem. kept on going to DXB & consulted with MCC on SATCOM. MCC suggested review low tire press limits in FCOM 3.01good info. Through FL 200, had blue hyd f ail. Kept going to DXB & called MCC again to advise/consult. Around 250 mi N of JNB had severe eng vibrations & eng shutdown leading to dual hyd failure & Land ASAP in amber. Driftdown proc. Although I was closer to Harare (by about 75mi) and the wx was good in both places I elected to turn back to JNB rather than go to Harare. Was good decision as I needed lots of time to dump fuel anyway. Advised Purs, Pax, Company etc. Continued to JNB dumping fuel. Use ETOPS diversion procedure from FCOM 2. Yes, I said FCOM 2 ! Could not dump below 180T because of hvy ZFW so elected to land slightly O/W (183 T) Vectors back for ILS 03L (better than 03R) Landed & stopped on Runway due to burst tire. Engineers inspected & shutdown on rwy due lack of NWS (gravity gear ext).

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JNB to DXB ETOPS sector

Weather Notams MEL Failure 1 Failure 2 Problems Fuel

Failure 3 Failure 4

MEL R/H Landing Light U/S (Etops restriction) concession granted by MCC Pregnant passenger FOM During Taxi, Spoiler Fault, OEB, reset procedure PRIM 1 Tire Burst at rotation Blue Hydraulic Loss Oil Leak #2 Engine TOC Returned to JNB using high speed strategy S/E ILS 21L (one engine at idle thrust) De-Brief

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read the MEL carefully, the R/H Landing light issue could possibly apply to either light tire blown after takeoff, discussed possible damage to aircraft…good at TOC check, FO missed the low oil quantity and I missed it 5 minutes later. MCC advised that they could see the problem and advised us to retard the thrust lever in an attempt to save the engine, it did. Utilized high speed profile single engine back to JNB. Harare and Lilongwe were closed at night and Biera was too short to help us. CAREFUL, if Biera were unuseable, then the first leg out of JNB would have to be considered an ETOPS sector. More than 420 nm from a suitable airport. Continue to use the diversion checklist in the QRH, helped a lot. Fuel dumped enroute down to 180 tonnes. Enough for alternate and a few circuits at JNB and under max landing weight. Considered the possibility of losing the low oil engine, effects on approach, further diversion to Gabarone, Dual Hydraulics failure, etc. Discussions about landing and the sister tire blows, land on the right side of the runway, idle reverse on good engine. Taxi with blown tire procedures 7 knots for 1 tire blown, 3 knots for 2 tires blown

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JNB-DXB Weather

Notams MEL Failure 1 Failure 2 Problems Fuel

TYPICAL JOHANNESBURG AFTERNOON, SOME CU, POSSIBILITY OF SHOWERS AND 90* X-WIND, RWY 03L IN USE FOR T/O. EN-ROUTE WEATHER OK, DUBAI FORECASTING 100M IN FOG. NO TRAPS, VARIOUS EN-ROUTE AIRPORTS WITH UNSERVICEABILITIES AS PER NORMAL. APU U/S.

SCENARIO:

Failure 3 Failure 4

ESTIMATED ZFW 168T, FUEL LOAD REQD WITH 2800 ALL-WX ADDITION WAS VERY HIGH---60T. UNABLE TO LIFT THAT WT AT 20*C, TOLD LOAD TO STANDBY, REQUESTED REDUCED RESERVE FLT PLAN. NO COMMS WITH DUBAI---NEW FLIGHT PLAN NOT FORTHCOMING. DECIDE TO REDUCE FUEL BY 3T, TO TAKE AS MUCH LOAD AS POSSIBLE. (STILL LEFT 1 CONTAINER BEHIND). PNEUMATIC GND AIR AND ELECTRICS USED FOR STARTING 1, THEN XBLEED START ON 2 DURING PUSHBACK. DURING THE PUSHBACK, ECAM PRIM 2 AND SEC 2 FAULT. RESET OK. TOGA TAKE-OFF UNEVENTFUL, DURING CLIMB OUT THE YELLOW HYDRAULIC LEVEL SLOWLY REDUCED UNTIL ECAM HYD YELLOW LO PRESS. APPROACHING OVANA, HEAVY VIBRATION---ENGINE 2, N3 WELL ABOVE 4 UNITS. THROTTLE REDUCED, EVENTUALLY TO IDLE THRUST. RETURN TO JNB, DUMPING ALL THE WAY IN. LANDS VIA ILS 03L.

MINI-LOFTS

1.

ENGINE FAILIURE ON TAKE-OFF, CANNOT LAND BACK DUE WX, DIVERT TO CLOSE ALTERNATE, LOC APPROACH AND LANDING.

2.

DURING CLIMB-OUT, PASSING FL 280, INTERMITTENT SMOKE WARNING, THEN AVIONICS SMOKE WARNING. RUN QRH TO EVENTUAL ELEC EMER CONFIG. VECTORS BACK TO CLOSEST RUNWAY, EMERGENCY DESCENT TO FINAL, EVACUATION ON RUNWAY.

3.

ON TAKE-OFF, ENGINE FIRE. WILL NOT EXTINGUISH. REQUEST VECTORS BACK TO TAKE-OFF RUNWAY. ON DOWNWIND ENGINE BURNS OFF AND FALLS FREE OF THE WING, RESULTING IN DIFFICULT CONTROL AND DUAL HYDRAULIC EMERGENCY. LAND BACK, NO EVACUATION REQUIRED, NO FIRE.

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JNB – DXB Weather Notams MEL Failure 1 Failure 2 Problems Fuel

Failure 3 Failure 4

MAX WEIGHT T/O. RWY CHANGE RESULTING IN SEVERE PAYLOAD RESTRICTION. OPT TO TAKE REDUCED RESERVE CFP TO MAXIMIZE PAYLOAD. AT TOC, #2 ENG LO OIL PR INTERMITTENT WARNING, FOLLOWED BY #2 ENG FAIL. RETURN TO JNB. FUEL JETTISON DURING DESCENT. DURING DESCENT, BLUE HYD LO PR WARNING, RESULTING IN #1 ENGINE AND GREEN HYD SYS ONLY. REGAIN YELLOW HYD SYS THRU AUTOMATIC ELECTRIC PUMP OPERATION, ON FLAP SELECTION, RESULTING IN #1 ENGINE WITH GREEN & YELLOW HYD SYS.

JNB-DXB Weather Notams MEL Failure 1 Failure 2 Problems Fuel

JNB- WIND ACROSS THE RUNWAY WITH POSSIBLE RAIN SHOWERS. DXB- AWO FORECAST, ALTERNATE MCT. APU U/S.

Failure 3 Failure 4

DISPATCH: MAX ZFW, MAX TOW AND MAX LDGW. AFTER START FMS 2 FAULT, THE COMPUTER WAS RESET FOLLOWING QRH, SUCCESSFUL. TAKE OFF ON 21R. WHEN IN MAPUTO AIR SPACE GEN 1 IDG OIL LOW PRESS, AFTER FOLLOWING ECAM GEN 1 U/S. DECIDED TO CONTINUE USING A NON ETOPS ROUTE. ABOUT 15 MINUTES LATER GEN 2 WENT OFF LINE. EMERG ELEC CONFIG. AFTER FOLLOWING ECAM, GEN 2 WAS RECOVERED. DECIDED TO RETURN TO JNB, WE JETTISON FUEL DOWN TO 180 T AND LANDED IN JNB.

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KHI – DXB. Weather Notams MEL Failure 1 Failure 2 Problems Fuel

APU power cart failure FM1 Eng 1 Thrust lever Fault

Failure 3 Failure 4

Eng 2 Low oil pressure

APU power cart failure. Start on Batteries. Hand signals only available for start. Can’t see the bottom ECAM screen. Can check it by switching. Pressing ALL key. Would have been better to call the bridge back and ask the engineer how long to get another cart. Company preference is to take the delay rather than start on batteries. No Communications with engineer so use hand signals. PA to PAX about the lights flickering on / off etc. On taxi out FM1 failed, carried out switching. Forgot to try reset procedure as per QRH. Would have got it back if had! Depart KHI from rwy 07L. Weather avoidance / direct to Enroute etc. Eng 1 Thrust lever Fault. The “MN” note in the FCOM is mach number. Effectively when the slats are extended the engine will be commanded to idle (like a simulated engine failure except cannot get the thrust back when cleaned up) inform ATC purser and company. Eng 2 Low oil pressure. Unable to shut down engine as would become a glider at slats extend. Diagnosed the fault as being a faulty oil press transmitter so elected not to go to Muscat. Which had a NPA and Xwind. Continued to DXB. Failed to keep ATC adequately in the loop so they blocked the runway to force a go-around. Went around stayed in the circuit kept Flap 1 1500’ and landed.

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KHI – DXB (Final Loft check) Weather Notams

MEL Failure 1 Failure 2 Problems Fuel

KHI 070/15-20 kts vis 5000m, DXB Cavok, MCT 350/20 gusting 25 kts Cavok KHI Rwy 25R/07L closed.Taxiways F+B closed MCT G/S rwy 26 u/s AUH Aerodrome closed until 1400hrs due VIP movements (ie still closed at the time we would need it if we had to divert there from Dubai) APU Gen u/s Failure 3 Failure 4 Took Extra 3 tons

At planning stage Cfp had OMRK as primary alternate. No charts in sim for OMRK. Second alternate was OMAA but closed at expected time of arrival due VIP movements. No other alternates listed on Cfp. Had wx and Notams for OOMS, fuel difference was roughly 3 tons between OMRK as an alternate and OOMS. Told KHI Atc to change our filed alternate to OOMS and briefed F.O that our first option would be to check with ATC to see if OMAA had re-opened should we need it. Ordered CFP fuel plus 3 tons. On board, confirmed GPU available and that DXB had been advised we would need a GPU on arrival. Normal set up. Problem with a family who had not been seated together, Purser asked me what she should do, I asked her and the F.O what they thought was the best idea, between them they came up with the solution.(Which was to move our engineer from Business into First and then bring the 2 kids seated down the back to join their folks in business) On start, eng #1 start pressure initially good (30psi) but rapidly decayed to around 8psi.Confirmed no N1 Rotation with engineer. Apu air had given up the ghost. Refer to Mel and dispatch without APU. Request ground air. Start eng #1 on gate with GPU and Gnd pneumatic air, push back and x-bleed start the other engine. Normal taxi. On line up IRS#3 fault. Request to hold position. Run ecam. Not really enough info. Refer to Vol3 3.02.34 pg4a. Attempt the reset procedure mentioned in the note on the page but no success. Refer to MEL and off we go. Advise Ek engineering via ACARS of IRS fault. Airborne and wx radar picks up large cell on track at about 60nm.Ask ATC about it and they report new met info indicates a tropical storm enroute. (Not on wx briefing) Divert Left of track by approx 50nm to clear wx by approx 40nm.Talk to purser and advise her that will release the crew (light turb only at this point) but keep pax seat belts on. Passing approx FL150, moderate turbulence. Sit the crew down. PA to pax advising I have instructed the crew to take their seats and may be a while before the service starts. FMS!/FMS2 position mis match picked up by F.O on MCDU screen. Ran accuracy check on KHI VOR…both FMGC’s check o.k. Held down to FL310 due traffic. (Requested level 390).Fuel still o.k at 310 but only just for OOMS by approx 200kg. Another FMS!/FMS2 pos mis match. Confirmed GPS still primary, ran another accuracy check on MCT Vor and asked Muscat to confirm our radial and distance…all checked o.k. Pushing for higher level but no go by ATC AC Bus 2 fault. All goes blank on F.O’s side. Shortly after, #2 eng gen u/s. Down to one eng gen and emer gen only with AC bus 2 lost. Approx 100nm from OOMS and 220nm from OMDB Sort out failure which basically is just a very long list of minor inop systems and nothing left on the F.O’s side (no screens or FM),overhead switch internal light failures but the switches are still working, reverse 2 U/S and in manual thrust due N1 mode reversion. Unofficial Document

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Quick discussion with F.O, get OOMS weather and OMDB weather. Same conds as when left KHI. Decide to continue to OMDB but if we lose another gen source will divert to either OOMS or OMDB whichever is the closest. Cant handover of course so instruct F.O to advise Purser of situation and that she has lost partial galley systems and continuing to DXB etc. Get F.O to do P.A and advise Dubai. Discussion on what to say to ATC. We decide to tell them we have a technical difficulty but not to declare an emergency or raise a Pan. Ask F.O to review Vol3 for both AC2 Bus fault and also EPR mode fault to obtain N1 values for Toga and MCT in the event we are reverted back to N1 unrated mode for any eason. Rest of cruise is just setting up for arrival etc. Passing through 4000 feet and cleared to intercept LLZ 30R (for the ILS) and lose IRS#2. Altn Law, no AP, no F.D, no A.thrust. Got F.O to stop ecam and ask ATC for hold in current position at 3000’. Confirmed that Atc had us under radar and clear of terrain. Ran the Ecam. Very quick procedure and only change was now for a config 3 landing. Fuel had just gone under CMR for OOMS so got F.O to check if OMAA had re-opened and it had so re-nominated OMAA, got F.O to change alternate in MCDU 3 . Radar heading from ATC to manually flown ILS and Landing 30 R. No reverse 2 , selected idle reverse only on 1 and low auto brake. Multiple glasses of bubbly later ☺ Debrief points: Nil

(CHECK) KHI - DXB Weather Notams MEL Failure 1 Failure 2 Problems Fuel

FINE. APU GEN INOP. FUEL LEAK

Failure 3 Failure 4

ALL WENT SMOOTHLY THEN JUST AFTER DOORS CLOSED WE HAD GPU FAILURE. NO OTHER GPU’S HANDY SO HAD TO DO BATTERY START. FOLLOW BATTERY START CHECKLIST AND MANUAL START CHECKLIST. NO PROBLEMS ON THE TAXI AND TAKE-OFF. ON THE CLIMB OUT GOT AN ENGINE BLEED LEAK. ECAM DONE, DECIDED TO STOP CLIMB AT 350. APPROACHING ALPOR CSD REPORTS VAPOUR COMING OFF THE LEFT WING. CHECKED FUEL AND SURE ENOUGH FUEL FROM THE LEFT SIDE DIMINISHING RAPIDLY. GOT THE CHECKLIST OUT. UNABLE TO CONFIRM ENGINE LEAK SO DESCENDED TO GRAVITY FUEL FEEDING CEILING. (YOU HAVE TO GO TO GRAVITY FUEL FEEDING PROCEDURE QRH 2:08). IN THE MEANTIME STARTED DIVERSION TO OOMS, AND DECLARED AN EMERGENCY. WHEN GRAVITY FUEL FEEDING CEILING WAS REACHED SWITCHED OFF ALL LEFT FUEL PUMPS. QRH THEN STATES THAT IF ENGINE FLAMES OUT WHEN THERE IS STILL FUEL IN THE TANK, GO BACK TO THE LEAK FROM ENGINE PROCEDURE. ENGINE CARRIED ON SO ASSUMED WING DAMAGE AND CONTINUED THE DIVERSION. ACCORDING TO THE INSTRUCTOR, IT WAS ACTUALLY AN ENGINE LEAK AND IT DOESN’T ALWAYS FLAME OUT? WHILST BUSY WITH THE CHECKLIST GOT AN ECAM WARNING, WING TANK LO LVL. BE CAREFUL AS THIS IS ONE CASE WHERE ECAM LEADS YOU UP THE GARDEN PATH. IT Unofficial Document

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TELLS YOU TO SWITCH ON FUEL X-FEED WHICH IS THE LAST THING YOU WANT WITH FUEL POURING OUT OF THE WING. ABOUT 5MINS OUT OF MUSCAT, LEFT ENGINE FLAMED OUT, NO MORE FUEL IN LEFT WING TANKS. SORTED IT OUT, WENT IN AND LANDED ON 08, 3.5 TONS OF FUEL LEFT IN THE RIGHT SIDE. STOPPED ON THE RUNWAY SO THAT AIRCRAFT COULD BE CHECKED OUT BY FIRECREW. MY MISTAKES. CONSIDER SWITCHING IRS’S OFF BEFORE BATTERY START AS THEY USE A LOT OF BATT POWER. COULD HAVE TROUBLESHOOTED MORE WITH REGARDS TO ESTABLISHING WHETHER IT WAS AN ENGINE OR WING LEAK.

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KHI – DXB ALT OMRK

GOOD WEATHER ALL ROUND Weather NOTHING SIGNIFICANT Notams APU GEN INOP. MEL Failure 1 Failure 3 Failure 2 Failure 4 Problems TOOK 1T EXTRA AS NEW CAPTAIN. Fuel

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LOTS OF DISTRACTIONS AS WE WE’RE DOING SET-UP. MISSED 500 KG FUEL IN TAIL. BRIEFED START #1 AT GATE DUE TO MEL. AS WE STARTED, GPU KICKED OFF, DID NOT DISCONTINUE START UNTIL GROUND CONFIRMED NO N1 ROTATION. STOPPED THE START. ASK FOR NEW GROUND CART, TOLD WOULD TAKE A WHILE. MEANWHILE TOWER ADVISES A/P WILL BE CLOSED IN 13 MINS DUE TO VIP MOVEMENT. DECIDED ON BATTERY START, STILL NO N1 ROTATION, COULD NOT MONITOR START VALVE DUE TO LOSS OF SD (BATTERY ONLY). OKAY NO PROBLEM ASK IF GRND WAS PREPARED FOR MANUAL START VALVE OPERATION, THEN REALISED WE HAD FORGOT TO TURN ON APU BLEED AIR!! FO MISSED IT IN HIS SET UP, AND I DIDN’T CHECK… OK SO BACK TO BATTERY START ON 1, ALL OK EXCEPT NO FM1 OR FM2 AFTER POWER TRANSFER, TOLD THE FO WE WOULD CONTINUE WITH PUSH AND START ON 2 AND THEN IF STILL NO FMS WOULD TRY RESET.TWO GOOD STARTS, PARK BRAKE SET….QRH RESET OF FMGEC 1 AND 2 FAILED……FO WANTED TO REALIGN IRS BUT I BELIEVED THIS WAS NOT THE PROBLEM…….TRIED FMGEC RESET AGAIN…..NO JOY…..QUICK REALIGN NO JOY……FULL REALIGN…..NO JOY…..ASKED INSTUCTOR FOR ENGINEER INPUT, HE ASSISTED AND SUGGESTED ONLY OTHER OPTION TO CHECK MEL…..NOGO……..BACK TO THE GATE. (ACTUAL SIM SNAG) BURNED THE 1T EXTRA ALREADY! WENT WITH CFP FUEL. ON TAXI MCDU #2 FAIL, SWITCHED IT OFF, FO USED #3, BRIEFED WE WOULD RESET IN THE AIR, AS WE WE’RE NOW LATE. TAKE OFF CLIMB UNEVENTFUL. NOTICED FUEL FWD XFR IN CLIMB, HAD A LOOK AT FUEL PAGE, THOUGHT THAT’S STRANGE…..IT WAS THE 500KG WE HAD MISSED AT THE GATE THRU 12000 MC AND L + R WING TANK LO LVL DISCUSSED BRIEFLY WHY WE WOULD GET THIS SO EARLY IN THE FLIGHT, FUEL BURNT PLUS FUEL IN TANKS LOOKED OK, ECAM ACTIONS OK……FO HAD NEVER SEEN THIS IN HIS 2 YEARS ON THE LINE…..FO THEN ADDED UP ALL THE FUEL AND BRIEFED THAT WE HAD LOST 1.2 T, STILL FUEL PAGE LOOKED OK TO ME, HAD THE PURSER LOOK AT THE WINGS OK, ASK FO TO RECALCULATE, YUP, WE HAD LOST 1.3 NOW…..I THOUGHT OK THIS WAS IN ADDITION TO THE FUEL WE HAD BURNT ON THE GROUND…MEANWHILE FMS SHOWED ARRIVAL AT DXB 2T BELOW MIN FUEL……SO WE TURNED AROUND AND AS A PRECAUTION RAN THE FUEL LEAK CHECKLIST….. RESET MCDU #2IN DESCENT THR LEVER FAULT #2 ECAM …..DISCUSSION……ILS 25R…. A/C ON RWY GO-AROUND….. VECTORS NOW WITH #2 STUCK AT IDLE…..ILS STOP 25 R….. ENG#1 FLAMED OUT ON TAXI IN……ECAM….. COULDN’T TAXI WITH #2 AT IDLE SO WAITED FOR TOW BAR THEN SHUT DOWN #2 …ON BATTERY PWR AND TOWED IN …….LOTS OF PA’S TO PAX!!

SELF DEBRIEF/VIDEO……NO ACTUAL FUEL LEAK…..

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KHI-DXB

090/15kts 5k 1000” Weather Nil Sig at KHI, no glides slope ILS 26 OOMS Notams APU Gen INOP MEL Failure 1 Failure 3 Failure 2 Failure 4 Problems Fuel GPU Tripped off line at engine start, no others available so battery start. FM 2 failed on taxi, reset OK via QRH T/O normal. ENG 2 vibes in cruise, reduced at idle. LO OIL PRESS 2 a few minutes later so shut down, diverted to OOMS LOC 26. SIM placed the R/W in the wrong place so stayed vis at 1000 and circled back onto 26 for land.

KHI - DXB Weather Notams MEL Failure 1 Failure 2 Problems Fuel

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Failure 3 Failure 4

DURING COCKPIT PREP, PUR CAME AND SAID, FIVE MEN ARE CARRYING 10 FALCONS IN FIRST CLASS, ARE WE ALLOWED? (GAVE F/O FOM TO LOOK FOR APPROP. PAGE AND CLARIFIED) CHECK ATT MESSAGE CAME ONTO PFD'S, AFTER EVAL RESETTED IRS 1, PROBLEM CURED AFTER T/O: HYD Y RSVR LO LVL, AFTER HYD ECAM, ANOTHER ECAM WARNING STATED WHEEL TIRE LO PR (ON THE WHEEL PAGE TWO TIRES HAD LO PR) ATC CONFIRMED TIRE DEBRIS ON THE RWY, WE DIDN'T NOTICE ANYTHING LEADING US TO TIRE BURSTS (SIM ), SO GEAR WAS ALREADY UP, CONTINUED TO DXB A MINUTE LATER HYD G RSVR LO LYL CAME UP STOPPED CLIMB AT 8000FT, DECLARED EMERGENCY, RETURNED TO KHI. IT IS A TRICKY THING TO DETERMINE THE LDG DISTANCE, G+Y HYD = X 1.7, NO TIRE PROBLEMS INDICATED IN CHART QRH 2.26 CHOSE BRK RELEASE FAULT, WHICH IS X 1.4, SO TOTAL LDG DIST REQ IS FOR 2 FLAT TIRES: 1,4X1,4X 1,7=3,332 ZWF WAS 168TO AND EVEN WITH E.G. 170TO LW THE REQ LDG DISTANCE WITH THIS FACTOR WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE THAN THE AVAILABLE 25R 3200M(25L CLOSED) SO DIDN'T JETT FUEL, LW CA 180TO, BRIEFED F/O THAT I WILL FLY BELOW THE GS WHEN VISUAL AND ALMOST ON TOP OF THE RWY IN ORDER TO LAND ON THRESHOLD TO GAIN MORE DISTANCE LANDING AND BREAKING WITH ACCUMULATOR WAS NO PROBLEM, STOPPED AFTER 2/3RD OF THE RWY, ACC TCE SIM DOESN'T REFLECT THE LDG DIST PROBLEM PROPERLY ONE ENG FAILURE AFTER T/O MINI LOFT

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KHI – DXB Weather Notams MEL Failure 1 Failure 2 Problems Fuel

APU GEN INOP FM2

Failure 3 Failure 4

GPU FAILS

PRIOR TO START, GPU FAILS. BATTERY START. ON TAXI, FM2 FAILS. RESET. ENROUTE, GEN 2 FAILS, TWICE, RESET, THEN FAILS AGAIN. LEAVE OFF. IDG 1 LO OIL PR, RESULTING IN EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL CONFIGURATION. DIVERT TO MCT.

KHI-DXB Weather Notams MEL Failure 1 Failure 2 Problems Fuel

090/15kts 5k 1000” Nil Sig at KHI, no glides slope ILS 26 OOMS APU Gen INOP

Failure 3 Failure 4

GPU Tripped off line at engine start, no others available so battery start. FM 2 failed on taxi, reset OK via QRH T/O normal. ENG 2 vibes in cruise, reduced at idle. LO OIL PRESS 2 a few minutes later so shut down, diverted to OOMS LOC 26. SIM placed the R/W in the wrong place so stayed vis at 1000 and circled back onto 26 for land.

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LGW – DXB Weather Notams MEL Failure 1 Failure 2 Problems Fuel

Failure 3 Failure 4

PRIM 3 Fault at the gate Trim Tank empty after fuelling, Manual Trim sheet Weather avoidance ENG High Oil Temp in cruise Icing conditions Diversion to EDDF LOC Approach to 25R -

when you decide on final fuel be sure to advise mechanic downstairs, check fuel page at this time. You may catch a trim tank problem at that time

-

some discussion about what altitude to set in the FCU for the SID. I briefed the final altitude FL 60 and using the managed climb, the enroute constraints would be respected. Further investigation in the FCOM , SOPs and FCTM does not give guidance about this procedure. Peter agreed with our selection.

-

RVSM discussion enroute. Are we at the right altitude? Usually, the CFP Is correct and the charts can confirm the altitude. Be careful in Africa, instructor may give wrong altitude for direction of flight. You have to correct it.

-

Stick to the engine failure in cruise procedure MCT, A/THR disconnect, ATC o Start descent by checking the FMA o Consider engine anti-ice for descent o

-

anytime you have a problem at altitude, consider, Belts ON and Eng A/I ON!

-

STATUS page, give it a quick review even though it is flashing. It may help you decide where to divert. The status page may be interrupted during the descent because of the higher airspeed and resulting windmilling. The hydraulics page will cycle because of pressure fluctuations in the descent.

-

Landing Distance Procedure apply QRH 2.43, when multiple factors for landing must be calculated, always multiply o the factors together unless both failures HAVE an asterisk !

-

if PNF has control, plan to take control back at a better time. Not at a high workload point, (ie) crossing the FAF. As long as it is done by 1000’ AGL.

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LGW-DXB Weather Notams MEL Failure 1 Failure 2 Problems Fuel

LGW OVERCAST AT 400’, RAIN, TEMP 4*. MOST OF LONDON AIRPORTS ARE FORECASTING MUCH THE SAME. NORMAL LOADS OF INFO, BUT NOTHING TO DIRECTLY INFLUENCE THE FLIGHT. NIL

Failure 3 Failure 4

SCENARIO:

SLOW BOARDING, DIFFICULT PAX, SLOT TIME. CHECK FOR ICE, WORK WET FIGURES. ON TAXI, RA 1 FAILS---NOT RECOVERED. DURING CLIMB, LANDING GEAR WOULD NOT RETRACT. RECYCLED, NOW WOULD NOT EXTEND. (RIGHT MAIN JAMMED IN INTERMEDIATE POSITION). REQUESTED HOLD AT MAYFIELD VOR, ASSESSED THAT WOULD NEED TO DUMP ABOUT 40 TONS OF FUEL AND ALSO REDUCE FUEL LOAD IN RIGHT WING AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE. REQUESTED VECTORS TO JETTISON AREA, HELD FOR ABOUT 45 MINS, DUMPING FUEL. USED TIME FOR COMMS WITH EK AND TO BRIEF PURSER ON REQUIREMENTS FOR LANDING WITH ABNORMAL GEAR. GATWICK ADVISED WE COULD LAND ON 26 R, AFTER APPROACH ON LEFT. BURNT AS MUCH FUEL AS POSSIBLE FROM RIGHT WING, THEN BRIEFED FOR AND FLEW APPROACH, WITH LAST MINUTE SIDE STEP. EVACUATED ON SIDE OF RUNWAY, (WE HAD “GROUND LOOPED” OFF THE RUNWAY).

RMK:

BEWARE OF RUNNING TWO FUEL CHECKLISTS AT THE SAME TIME. RATHER DUMP FIRST, AND THEN CHANGE FUEL FEED CONFIG.

LGW – DXB Weather Notams MEL Failure 1 Failure 2 Problems Fuel

Failure 3 Failure 4

PRIM 3 Fault at the gate Trim Tank empty after fuelling, Manual Trim sheet Weather avoidance ENG High Oil Temp in cruise Icing conditions Diversion to EDDF LOC Approach to 25R -

when you decide on final fuel be sure to advise mechanic downstairs, check fuel page at this time. You may catch a trim tank problem at that time

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-

some discussion about what altitude to set in the FCU for the SID. I briefed the final altitude FL 60 and using the managed climb, the enroute constraints would be respected. Further investigation in the FCOM , SOPs and FCTM does not give guidance about this procedure. Peter agreed with our selection.

-

RVSM discussion enroute. Are we at the right altitude? Usually, the CFP Is correct and the charts can confirm the altitude. Be careful in Africa, instructor may give wrong altitude for direction of flight. You have to correct it.

-

Stick to the engine failure in cruise procedure o MCT, A/THR disconnect, ATC Start descent by checking the FMA o Consider engine anti-ice for descent o

-

anytime you have a problem at altitude, consider, Belts ON and Eng A/I ON!

-

STATUS page, give it a quick review even though it is flashing. It may help you decide where to divert. The status page may be interrupted during the descent because of the higher airspeed and resulting windmilling. The hydraulics page will cycle because of pressure fluctuations in the descent.

-

Landing Distance Procedure apply o QRH 2.43, when multiple factors for landing must be calculated, always multiply the factors together unless both failures HAVE an asterisk !

-

if PNF has control, plan to take control back at a better time. Not at a high workload point, (ie) crossing the FAF. As long as it is done by 1000’ AGL.

These are my LOFTS, there were a number of minor things along the way in each of them but I have just included the main items. (That’s all I can remember anyway…!)

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LGW – DXB: Weather Notams MEL Failure 1 Failure 2 Problems Fuel

Ice

Unreliable Airspeed/Alt

Failure 3 Failure 4

Take Off, company calls and asks you to divert to LHR to pick up passengers because of a broken B777. Get authorisation from them to dump fuel as we are way over weight. Co-ordinate with ATC and go and dump to Max ldg weight. Go to LHR, have to hold due traffic. Ice starts to build rapidly. In close succession lose airspeed and altitude info. Run the unreliable airspeed QRH. Can’t control pitch when visual due to ice. Try other stick i.e. F/O. Conduct a very gentle go-around incase can’t control pitch. Inc speed to get more control. (VLS +15kts FCOM 3.04.91). Conduct a high speed approach and land.

LGW- DXB (Pre check) Weather Notams MEL Failure 1 Failure 2 Problems Fuel

LGW: 270/06 4 degrees in rain, Bkn 600’ forecast to improve. Most of the U.K the same or worse. Nil Nil Failure 3 Failure 4 As per Cfp

Confirmed with engineer that the aircraft had no ice on arrival so therefore no deice required. Eng a.ice on for T.Off. Slot time given, asked F.O to load FMGS to speed things up. Normal start up, after start “Blue electric hyd pump” u/s Checked MEL and continued. During taxi, “Rad Alt #1” fault. Stopped on taxiway to sort out. MEL checked and o.k to go but also implicates to GPWS. Checked MEL for this also and it states that you should not leave either DXB or any place that the GPWS can be repaired at. We had already dispatched so MEL did not apply. Quick chat with the F.O and we checked with engineering in LGW to ensure they were happy for us to continue or would they prefer to repair it. We continued. On departure “Land gear retraction fault” (Right main L.Gear), briefed to continue on track hoping we could sort it out initially. Limited speed to 230 kts (250 max) and altitude to FL210. F.O ran ecam and after recycling still no good so ecam says put gear down. Now we end up with “Land gear not downlocked fault”. Ecam says to recycle for this fault also, ran the recycle and still not locked down. Stopped the ecam procedure at this point,handed over control to F.O, discussion with F.O…obviously not going to be able to continue to DXB stacks of fuel on board so no hurry to do anything, got weather for LHR,MAN and LGW. Only one with good wx was LGW (improved to 1000’ base) Requested vectors to a suitable hold and asked ATC to liase with other control centers to establish who would be most likely to accept an aircraft with the possibility of an abnormal landing gear problem.They cleared us to LYD holding position and said they would get back to us. Unofficial Document

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Chat to Purser to tell not sure of nature gear status yet but definitely not continuing to Dxb, released her and the crew but said don’t start service yet. PA to pax telling them of technical difficulty and to reamin seated. Advised LGW station manager of problem and asked him to contact Dubai and to liase with our engineers there and we would keep a listening watch on the frequency. Returned to ecam procedure. Lower ecam screen now fails (S.D).Switched Ecam N.D to Capt postn and it did not recover S.D on my N.D. Reset the switch. Located QRH and ran QRH2.10 (which said to do exactly what I had just done) and this time it did recover the screen on my N.D. Quite confusing and difficult to monitor the F.O’s flying and run the ecam via screen switching. Decided to wait until safely established in hold before continuing ecam actions. Atc advise that LGW would be in a position to accept us if we end up with a gear problem. Entering hold ( had stopped climb at FL150) realize that we are above the freezing level and with gear hanging out that’s not a good thing so ask for descent to 6000’ as are probably going to have to burn a lot of fuel off anyway. Started descent to FL60 in hold. Finally return to ecam and after the second manual gear extension procedure (ecam says to do twice) gear is still not locked down. Dragged out Vol3 and find a note saying that if second attempt unsuccessful refer to “Landing with abnormal gear procedure” Located this in Vol3 and briefed that although it is also in the QRH Vol3 has more notes and so will read it from Vol 3 and then do the actions when required from the QRH for the approach. Now that we knew we for sure had a gear that we couldn’t get down we declared an emergency and requested emergency services. Asked which runway to expect, ATC advise 26R , quick talk to F.O and refuse as don’t want to side step to smaller rwy near buildings etc. Cleared to use 26L. Returned to Vol3.Worked out we needed to dump around 30tons of fuel. Asked ATC for vectors to an area to dump fuel, held at FL60 in 5 min race pattern dumping fuel. Used time to brief Purser and Pax and company etc programme FMGS and finish Vol3. Reset the fuel dump at 8 tons, opened up X-feed and started fuel imbalance procedure as per Vol3. When finished, took control again, transferred S.D to F.O’s side got clearance for radar vectored ILS and got F.O to run the QRH 2.13 from where it says “Approach”. “Attention crew at stations” at 2000’ and “Brace Brace” at 1000’. Landed on 26L stopped ,completed the QRH procedure and evacuated on the rwy.☺

Debrief points:

Have a very good look after landing at the state the aircraft may be in. In my case I followed the QRH all the way which automatically lead to an evacuation being announced. I must admit that I was surprised we had remained on the runway as I was expecting quite a vicious ground loop. In actual fact the gear didn’t collapse and when the right hand Mlgear finally came down (as I had been holding up the right wing on touchdown) I thought that the ‘thump’ was the engine pod touching the runway. It was just because I had finally run out of airspeed holding the wing up and the MLGear came down harder than normal. Therefore an evacuation was probably not necessary.(I am sure you would notice this if it happened for real) Miniloft

Ex 26L LGW for DXB. Airborne and #1 eng fire, Pan Call. Fire didnt go out ,Mayday. Mid down wind , engine seperates and lose B+G hyds. Fire light still on, quick check with Purser confirms engine gone, so reasoned at least no more engine fire. Downgraded to Pan call but still wanted emer services obviously. Asked F.O to go straight to status page to tell me what config I needed for landing and quickly what we had left. Config 2 for app and land. Gear collapses on touchdown and I get to see what a ground loop really does! Evacuate on the grass.☺ Unofficial Document

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Debrief point: Discussion on downgrade to Pan Call. Probably a fair comment, should have left it at a Mayday.

CHECK LGW – DXB ALT OMAA Weather Notams MEL Failure 1 Failure 2 Problems Fuel

WINTER 3000 RASN OVC 005 3/-5 ALL OVER EUROPE DEST/ENROUTE: GOOD NIL. #2 BLEED AIR (MAX FL370…..APU RUNNING…..XBLEED OPEN) Failure 3 Failure 4 CFP + 1T (APU) +2T (FL370)

RWY: 26L WET FLEX • • • • • • • •

• •

• •

NO DE-ICE. SLOT TIME….15 MINS TO DO SET-UP…..GOT FO TO DO PANEL WHILE I DID FMS. NORMAL START AND PUSH THEN CONFIG FOR MEL. NOISE ABATEMENT CLIMB 3000 AND ‘S’ SPEED FOR TURN. TOC ‘ADV’ FUEL IMBALANCE. CALCULATIONS INDICATE LOSS OF 6T FUEL. RECHECKED, PURSER TO INVESTIGATE. FUEL LEAK CHECKLIST…….RETURN TO LGW. COULDN’T PINPOINT ENG/WING LEAK LEFT SIDE SO KEPT ENGINE SO AS NOT TO DEPRESSURIZE DUE MEL. OVERWEIGHT LANDING @187T HAD TO CONVINCE FO NOT TO RUN FUEL IMBALANCE CHECKLIST AND NOT TO SHUT DOWN THE ENGINE. VECTORS ILS 26L FULL STOP. SHUTDOWN #1 ON RWY…..CLEARED ON TAXIWAY….SHUTDOWN STAIRS FOR PAX. TOTAL TIME 2 HRS….DEBRIEF IN SIM……☺ •

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LHR - DXB Weather Notams NIL MEL Failure 1 Failure 2 Problems Fuel

Failure 3 Failure 4

WX, AS ABOVE. A MINI-LOFT WITH AN UNEVENTFUL TAKE-OFF. ON DEPARTURE, PASSING THROUGH 5000’ (IMC) MASTER WARNING, NO1 ENGINE ON FIRE. CARRIED OUT ECAM ACTIONS, FIRE BECAME UNCONTROLLABLE, SO ASKED FOR VECTORS BACK FOR THE ILS. APP AND LANDING UNEVENTFUL AND CARRIED OUT EMERGENCY EVAC ON THE RUNWAY.

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MAN – DXB (Cold Weather ops) Weather Notams MEL Failure 1 Failure 2 Problems Fuel

Sigmet Turbulence and Icing

ENG2 EPR Mode fault Smoke deicing

Failure 3 Failure 4

Sigmet Turbulence and Icing. Briefed Crew. Cold Weather ops out of MAN. Weather not that bad. De-iced on stand. Co-ordinate with Station manager / engineer / purser / ATC / loaders / deicers. Don’t rush and don’t multi-task, do one checklist at a time. Don’t start deicing one wing thinking the door will be closed by the time they get there etc… No, no, no. Set S speed on the climb page for the departure to make aircraft fly the noise abatement SID out of MAN. Otherwise accelerates at 1,000’ and the turning circle is too big. Just prior to V1, ENG2 EPR Mode fault. RH EPR goes blank and left goes automatically into N1 mode. Looked across and saw it was rated. So delayed ECAM actions until after the after T/O checklist. Could have perhaps done them earlier, as the ECAM didn’t inhibit the warning until 1,500’ therefore it must be reasonably serious. Remember to powered back to set 1.10 EPR before selecting N1 Mode so as not to over boost. Check QRH, Check FCOM, confirmed that the N1 was rated and looked at the charts to do manual calculations should the rated function fail. Advised Ops via Speed bird Manchester and continued. FADEC restored the system later on. Weather avoidance. Turbulence. QRH 5.01 Man Thrust. At FL370 got ECAM cold fuel which calls to increase TAT. Fuel Temp was exactly the same as TAT. Figured if the TAT didn’t get any lower then nor would the fuel temp. Decided that we would stay at FL370 and monitor the Temp. Should have checked QRH and FCOM 3 and limitations to confirm this decision. Turbulence got bad sat down crew and descended to FL 330. Turbulence better but got Smoke. Masks on, ECAM actions down to Avionics smoke procedure. Called for QRH, signs on sat down crew, MAYDAY and high dive into FRA. Isolated the Smoke to AC bus 2. Determined that the cockpit window did not need opening so stopped the checklist. Note Vol3, the RAM AIR does nothing to remove smoke from the aircraft but it allows you to turn the Packs off so can open cockpit window. Kept high speed and flew a short circuit into FRA. Very brief approach brief, quick review of the overweight landing checklist. Didn’t dump fuel with fire. CSD said sick passenger when on finals. Landed in FRA stopped on runway. Confirmed no fire from cabin or external, continue to gate, didn’t switch on APU or take ground power as wanted to keep AC BUS 2 isolated. Shut down, told pax’s to remain seated as ambulance people coming on board, as was engineer to check Fire status. Spoke to station manager and sent pax to terminal area.

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MAN-DXB Weather Notams MEL

Failure 1 Failure 2 Problems Fuel

RAIN SHOWERS WITH SNOW, TEMP +2C, 220/10 OVC 500’. L4 DOOR, DEVICE FOR KEEPING IT OPEN U/S. DOOR CAN’T BE USED FOR PAX, EMERGENCY LIGHTING MUST BE MASKED, RED NO EXIT SIGN POSTED BY THE DOOR, CABIN CREW BRIEFED, PAX BRIEFED. Failure 3 Failure 4

AT AIRCRAFT, TIGHT SLOT, TRY AND GET A NEW SLOT AT LEAST 20MIN BEFORE OLD SLOT EXPIRES. DE-ICING NOT REQUIRED. ON AUTO START, NO LIGHT UP ON NO2, FADEC SORTED IT OUT AND SECOND START SUCCESSFUL. TAXIED WITH EAI DUE TO ICING CONDITIONS, BE CAREFUL AS SPEED PICKS UP VERY QUICKLY. TAKE-OFF UNEVENTFUL, ON FLAPS RETRACTION GOT A FLAPS LOCKED WARNING. ACCORDING TO THE INDICATOR FLAPS WERE ALL THE WAY UP, SO DECIDED TO CONTINUE TO DXB AND CARRY OUT A NO FLAP LANDING THERE. JUST TO BE SURE, ASKED F/O TO GO BACK AND CHECK VISUALLY. THIS TURNED OUT TO BE A SIM FAULT AS THE INDICATOR WAS SUPPOSED TO SHOW SOME FLAP STILL DOWN. ROD DULY GAVE F/O THIS MESSAGE. STOPPED CLIMB AT FL200, INFORMED ATC AND ASKED FOR WX. MAN RUNWAY HAD BECOME BLOCKED; LHR, LGW AND LSS WERE ALL OVC WITH RAIN AND HOWLING X-WINDS. ORIGINAL FORECAST FOR AMSTERDAM WAS FINE, BUT ON REQUEST ATC NOW INFORMED US THAT IT WAS CLOSED, FREEZING RAIN ETC!!! STANSTEAD WAS THE BEST OF A BAD BUNCH, SO DIVERTED THERE AND ENTERED THE HOLD AT LOGAN. GAVEF/O CONTROL AND RAN THROUGH THE CHECKLISTS AND SET UP THE APP. DECIDED NOT TO JETTISON FUEL AND RATHER TAKE THE OVERWEIGHT LANDING, AS I DIDN’T WANT TO END UP DIVERTING FROM SS WITH LESS FUEL AND FLAPS STUCK DOWN. TOOK OVER AND CARRIED OUT APP AT SS. MY MISTAKES. TERMINOLOGY, “STANDARD LEFT/RIGHT SEAT TAKE-OFF” IS NOT RECOGNIZED ON A330 FLEET. CHECK X-WIND LIMITS FOR WET RUNWAY TAKE-OFF. ENTERED THE HOLD AT LOGAN AT 230KTS, F/O FLYING BUT I SHOULD HAVE PICKED IT UP. TAKE SLATS TO SLOW DOWN AS O SPEED AT THAT WEIGHT WAS 230. ADDED SPEED INCREMENT FOR FLAPS PROCEDURE TO VAPP INSTEAD OF VLS. LEFT IT TOO LATE TO ASK FOR REVISED SLOT.

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LOFT Check

MAN – DXB

Most of UK was just hazy , Western EUR was below cat 1 clearing to the west. Weather NPA only at LGW, one r/w at LHR, 16/34 closed at LSZH Notams AP 2 u/s (Cat III single) MEL Failure 1 Failure 3 Failure 2 Failure 4 Problems Pax probs with school football team (UMs) Fuel EPR MODE FAULT in climb out (rated) Held low for ages, re-routing required to get higher level. Double Eng flame out (unknown reason), only one restarted when APU available. Diverted to LSZH for VOR r/w 28. (Wind was from the west with 15kts down wind on 14, could go either way but no app climb probs off 28). MAN – DXB Weather Notams MEL Failure 1 Failure 2 Problems Fuel

Failure 3 Failure 4

NORMAL TAKE OFF. FROM TOC, LOTS OF WEATHER AVOIDANCE. IN THE VICINITY OF CB, DUAL ENGINE FLAMEOUT. RESTARTED #2 ENGINE, APU ASSISTED BELOW FL 200. UNABLE TO START #1. DIVERTED TO ZRH. FUEL JETTISON AND LAND VIA RWY 28 NPA.

LOFT Check

MAN – DXB

most of UK was just hazy , Western EUR was below cat 1 clearing to the west. Weather NPA only at LGW, one r/w at LHR, 16/34 closed at LSZH Notams AP 2 u/s (Cat III single) MEL Failure 1 Failure 3 Failure 2 Failure 4 Problems Pax probs with school football team (UMs) Fuel

EPR MODE FAULT in climb out (rated) Held low for ages, re-routing required to get higher level. Double Eng flame out (unknown reason), only one restarted when APU available. Diverted to LSZH for VOR r/w 28. (Wind was from the west with 15kts down wind on 14, could go either way but no app climb probs off 28)

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MAN – DXB ALT OMRK Weather Notams MEL Failure 1 Failure 2 Problems Fuel

OVC SNOW +2, MIST/LOW CEILING AT DEST SIGMET: LONDON FIR SEVERE TURB 50-200, TRW. NOTHING SIGNIFICANT NIL. Failure 3 Failure 4 TOOK 3.6T EXTRA FOR ENROUTE/DEST WX. RWY: WET CHARTS ONLY, FLEX TO.

A FEW MINOR DISTRACTIONS AS WE WE’RE DOING SET-UP. CONFIG 1 + F WET CHARTS FOR RWY 24, NO WEIGHT LIMITATIONS/PENALTY. DE-ICE FCOM 3, ONE STEP, 75/25, TYPE II, LIGHT SNOW, HOLDOVER 30MINS. DELAYED FLAPS AND FLIGHT CONTROL CHECK UNTIL HOLDING SHORT/EAI AFTER START. CONSULT FCOM 2 FOR PROCEDURES. 50% N1 RUNUP PRIOR TO BRAKE RELEASE. EPR MODE FAULT PRIOR TO V1…..CONTINUE. MANUAL THRUST FOR CLIMBOUT. ECAM ACTION N1 MODE EPR BACK TO 1.1-1.2 FOR CLIMB…….N1 RATED MODE, MANUAL THRUST……FCOM 3 FOR SETTINGS. WX AND SEVERE ICING IN CLIMB. WAI ON. TOC WX AVOIDANCE. TCAS TA. ATC REROUTE DUE TRAFFIC. FCOM 3 TO SORT OUT EPR MODE FAULT. FADEC RECOVERED EPR MODE…….FCOM 3/ECAM (N1 MODE….OFF). CRUISE 10 MINS. AVIONICS SMOKE…..ECAM ACTIONS….SMOKE FROM AVIONICS IN COCKPIT…..EDDF RAPID DESCENT VECTORS FOR ILS 25R MAYDAY……..ISOLATED AC1 THEN AC2…….SMOKE DISSIPATED……OVERWEIGHT LANDING CHECKLIST WITH FUEL IN TT……. PAX HEART CONDITION ON APPROACH. STOP ON RWY TO ASSESS WITH FIRE TRUCKS…CONTINUE WITH PROGRESSIVE TO GATE QUICKLY WITH SICK PAX. DID NOT START APU AT RISK OF REACTIVATING SMOKE. UNABLE TO CONNECT GPU DUE TO ISOLATION PROCEDURE……SHUT DOWN ON BATTERY ONLY AS SICK PAX NEEDED IMMEDIATE ATTENTION….DID NOT WANT TO MESS WITH THE ELECTRICS. SELF DEBRIEF/VIDEO…….. ☺ • • • •

• • •

• • • • •

• •

• •

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NBO-DXB Weather Notams MEL Failure 1 Failure 2 Problems Fuel

APU shut down on start ACP 2 fails Blue HYD overheat

Failure 3 Failure 4

Gen 2 fault DC ESS BUS

APU shut down on start. Start on Ground cart. Check MEL. Depart MEL inop. Just before line up. ACP 2 fails (F/O can’t transmit and no lights). Switching carried out. Again forgot to check QRH reset procedure. Would have got it back! Check MEL as not allowed ETOPS? Blue HYD overheat on departure. Pumps switched off. ECAM doesn’t call for Blue elec pump off, whereas VOL 3 does. This is because the ECAM knows that the Blue elec pump is not on, Vol 3 does not! Gen 2 fault. Tried reset no joy so now single Gen ops. Could have tried one more reset, certainly no more though. Decided not to continue all the way to DXB on one Gen and over Africa. Returned to NBO. Forgot to check Vol 3 Gen Fault. On return. Lost DC ESS BUS. Loads of important stuff in Vol 3, such as no gear indications, no brake indications (stop on taxi way, apply power to check brakes ok), no shut down with MSW so use Fire handles, plus no interphone to speak to engineer / purser this combined with losing VHF1 and ACP 1 and ACP 2, made life difficult. Had to call engineer via radio to organise ground cart so could shut down (no APU – MEL, and no APU because of DC problem). PAN call as had a serious electrical problem. Got F/O to fly so could monitor and do checklist. Didn’t adequately explain to the F/O why I wanted him to fly, causing confusion. Restored Blue HYD. So got the Slats back for landing. Non standard switched Blue pumps off again so would not get an ov erheat in the go around which would mean divert to Mombassa with Slats extended. Ended out going around because of confusion over whether the gear was extended. (Lack of system knowledge again). Pulled out Vol 1 to check whilst downwind. Gear was safe returned to land.

Unofficial Document

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NBO - DXB Weather Notams MEL


OVC WITH CB’S, NOTAM, NO GLIDE-SLOPE IN NBO. MMR1 U/S AND APU GEN INOP. MULTI-MODE RECEIVER NOT FOUND IN THE MEL (SUSPECTED A PAGE MISSING) SO SENT A MESSAGE TO DUBAI ENGINEERING. THEY SAID WE COULD GO AS IT ONLY AFFECTED ILS1. CHECKED ILS1 IN MEL- ALL OK. Failure 3 Failure 4

ONLY PROBLEM ON THE STAND WAS AN IRATE FEMALE PAX, CAUSED LOTS OF PROBLEMS AND EVENTUALLY THREW A TANTRUM. (VERY REALISTICALLY DONE BY ROD!!!). TOLD GROUNDSTAFF TO SORT IT OUT AND EVENTUALLY OFF-LOADED HER WITH HER BAGGAGE. START AND TAXI OUT ALL NORMAL. AFTER T/O AT LVR CLIMB, GOT A MASTER CAUTION WITH A THRUST LOCK WARNING. EPR INDICATION FAULT (NO2). FAILED IN N1 RATED MODE. ECAM TELLS YOU TO PUT N1 MODE 1 AND 2 ON BUT DOES NOT TELL YOU TO BRING THE POWER BACK TO 1.1 EPR TO AVOID AN OVERBOOST. QUITE STRAIGHTFORWARD, EXCEPT THAT YOU HAVE TO GO INTO THE IN-FLIGHT PERFORMANCE TABLES TO GET YOUR N1 THRUST SETTINGS. ALSO YOU DON’T GET AUTO-THRUST BACK, SO MONITOR SPEED. TOC, MASTER WARNING – AVIONICS VENT SMOKE. STRAIGHT FORWARD PROCEDURE EXCEPT REMEMBER TO PUT THRUST LEVERS TO IDLE FOR THE EMER DESCENT, AS YOU HAVE NO AUTO-THRUST DUE TO THE EPR PROBLEM. TURNED BACK TOWARDS NBO, ONCE FINISHED WITH THE CHECK-LISTS, DECIDED THAT WX THERE WAS BELOW LIMITS FOR A NPA, SO GOT MOMBASA AND DAR WX. MOMBASA OK BUT HAD A GUSTY X-WIND, DAR MUCH BETTER SO ELECTED TO GO THERE FOR THE COMPANY SUPPORT. FUEL WAS NO PROBLEM AS WE HAD FUEL FOR DXB, PLUS I HAD TAKEN EXTRA FOR FORECAST FOG AT DEST. GOT THE F/O TO PROGRAMME FMS AS I COULD NOT GIVE HIM CONTROL DUE TO THE FACT THAT HE HAD NO INSTRUMENTS. (AC BUS 2 WAS OFF DUE TO THE SMOKE PROCEDURE). THIS PROVED QUITE TRICKY WITH HANDS ACROSS THE COCKPIT WHILST I WAS CONTROLLING THRUST. SELECTED VOR APP INTO DAR. COULD HAVE DONE MANAGED BUT WE HAD LOST GPS PRIMARY AND WERE GETTING A HIGH DRIFT RATE ON THE IRS’S. MY MISTAKES. EVEN THO’ NOT ACTUALLY REFUELING, L4 SHOULD STILL BE ARMED WHEN THE BOWSER IS CONNECTED. LOADSHEET WASN’T SIGNED. LOOKOUT FOR WINDCHANGES BEFORE TAKE-OFF – MAY NEED TO GO BACK INTO RTOW CHARTS. ENSURE BRIGHTNESS ON ND TO SEE THE CB’S BETTER. MAYDAY – GIVE CALLSIGN, POSITION AND INTENTIONS. MORE INFO TO ATC. RATHER NOT INTERRUPT ECAM ON THE SMOKE PROCEDURE. NEED TO GET TO THE SOURCE OF THE PROBLEM ASAP. DOWNGRADE THE EMERGENCY TO PAN. CALL COMPANY REGARDING THE DIVERSION. ASK ATC IF NECESSARY. MUST DO ACCURACY CHECK WHENEVER GPS PRIMARY IS LOST. Unofficial Document

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NBO – DXB ALT OMRK

GOOD EVERYWHERE, ENROUTE. Weather NOTHING SIGNIFICANT Notams NIL. MEL ESS DC BUS FAIL Failure 1 ACP #2 Failure 3 GEN #1 Failure 2 Y SYS OVERHEAT Failure 4 Problems TOOK 1.3T EXTRA FOR POSSIBLE LOWER ALT. Fuel A FEW MINOR DISTRACTIONS AS WE WE’RE DOING SET-UP. CONFIG 1 + F FOR RWY 06. APU GEN FAIL, THEN APU AUTO SHUTDOWN AFTER DOORS CLOSED…….MEL FOR RELIEF…….RE-OPEN DOORS TO GET ENG TO SIGN OFF…..EXT AIR START THEN XBLEED START ON PUSH. NORMAL TAXI AND TAKEOFF. ACP #2 FAIL ON DEPARTURE……. RESET AT TOC. Y SYS OVERHEAT……ECAM ACTIONS…….LEFT PUMPS OFF UNTIL TOD. ESS DC BUS FAIL IN CRUISE……QUICKLY FOLLOWED BY GEN #1 FAULT……ECAM ACTIONS SHORT DISCUSSION AND DECISION TO RETURN TO NAI WITH PAN AS FLIGHT WITH ONLY ONE GEN …..QRH…..FCOM 3……TO DISCOVER ENGINES NEED TO BE SHUT DOWN WITH FIRE SWITCH ON GND AND TT FUEL UNUSEABLE (5T IN TT AT THIS POINT, ANOTHER GOOD REASON TO RETURN!) CONTROL TO F/O FOR THE RETURN AS I WAS MISSING ENOUGH ON MY SIDE INCLUDING WINDOW HEAT, ND, MCDU, and FMGS1…….ETC……. RETURN TO NAI FOR VOR/DME 06 …….A LOT OF HF COORDINATION WITH ADDIS AND NAIROBI…..INCORRECT PROCEDURE TURN IN DATABASE SO SELECTED UNTIL FINAL THEN MANAGED……SET–UP AND BRIEFED BY FO WHILE I ADVISED ALL REQUIRED AND HAD A GOOD LOOK AT REQUIRED REFERENCES. LARGE FUEL IMBALANCE DUE TO LOSS OF FUEL PUMP ON LEFT SIDE WHILE RUNNING VARIOUS CHECKLISTS…... THEN RAN THE QRH FUEL IMBALANCE CHECKLIST….CHECKED LIMITATIONS AND ALLOWED 1T IMBALANCE TO SAVE TIME. REMEMBER NO GEAR DOWN INDICATION EXCEPT ON SD (LGCIU2). REQUIRED GND PWR AND REQUESTED AIR FOR SHUT DOWN WITH FIRE SWITCHES…..DIDN’T WAIT FOR THE AIR, BUT REQUESTED ANYWAY IN CASE OF TAILPIPE FIRE ON SHUTDOWN…….. SELF DEBRIEF/VIDEO…….. ☺ • • •

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NBO – DXB Weather Notams MEL Failure 1 Failure 2 Problems Fuel

All the usual diverts were hovering around NPA minimas, NBO was at minimas for VOR 06. Heaps, check all the available aids at NBO and ALTS and how they effect approaches, I made a list which helped. MMR 1 and 2 U/S

Failure 3 Failure 4 DEPO pax problem B4 start (FOM for guidance)

Start was normal for a change T/O normal although heavy, TCAS on climb out. AVIONICS VENT SMOKE ECAM, nothing in the cabin, returned to NBO, smoke cleared with AC Bus 2 isolation. Managed VOR 06 then NAV ACC Down grade so continued selected. NBO to DXB Weather Notams MEL Failure 1 Failure 2 Problems Fuel

Failure 3 Failure 4

HDAM weather not suitable, no other available or useable, ETOPS, new Flt Pln TRW +, contaminated runway MEL Inner Fuel Tank Unreliable indications APU failed during pushback, halfway through #1 Start Return to gate for Ground Air Start Weather avoidance after takeoff At Cruise, intermittent high vibrations N3 Vibration worsened, engine back to Idle Returned to NBO, weather improving 45 minute transit, planned on Mombassa as alternate (9000’MEA) ILS 06 via NV CB to the west of approach course causing large wind variations Autopilot could not hold the LOC, Go-Around Second attempt, same problem Asked for radar vectors, did a hand flown ILS and landed Rolled to a stop , check ride done

De-Brief

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Read the MEL operational requirements carefully, Trim Tank forward switch was not selected Forward before departure

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If APU fails during engine start, cockpit goes black and the first priority is the Eng Master selected to OFF, then save the battery, IRS off, etc. Good. - Take time to ensure everyone is aware of how the start on pneumatics will be done, good brief, have the Engine Start faults FCOM ready, elected to do a Manual start, NBO, high altitude, low pressure cart etc. - No refuel needed because I took lots to start with due to TRW, +1500KG - Normal departure, weather avoidance, try to tell ATC but no answer, did a few avoidance vectors anyway but did a blind broadcast - After AVITU, IFBP for African airspace, 1nm right of track - Some high vibrations, called MCC on SAT, got worse during the conversation and told MCC to stay on the line, used QRH to retard thrust lever, in cruise shutdown procedures but engine was running at idle - Mayday declared routing direct NV - Asked MCC if they see any more damage to engine, should we shut it down, NO was the reply. - 3 approaches to get in to NBO, remember to mention FOM limit of 2 approaches talk to passengers (EVAL) NBO - DXB Weather Notams MEL Failure 1 Failure 2 Problems Fuel

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APU AUTO SHUTDOWN

Failure 3 Failure 4

NO GROUND PROBLEMS

ELECTR GND POWER CONNECTED ON STAND DURING PUSH BACK, APU AUTO SHUTDOWN AND THEREAFTER INOP FINISHED PUSH BACK, ASKED ATC IF WE CAN STAY AT PRESENT POSITION WITH A DELAYED ENG START, "YES" ASKED GROUND MECH TO MOVE GROUND ELECT CARTS TO A/C AND ORGANISE GROUND PNEUMATIC POWER AFTER PNEUM CONNECTION PRESSURE WAS 28 PSI, ALTHOUGH 25 IS ENOUGH, ELECTED TO DO A MAN START 3 CHECKLISTS IN FCOM 3 SUPPL TECHN. ARE NECESSARY TO START THE ENG, AT A CERTAIN TIME TWO PARALLEL (ENG START WITH EXT PNEUM PWR, MAN ENG START PROC AND CROSSBLEED START PROC) IT IS IMPORTENT NOT TO FORGET TO FINISH ENG START WITH EXT PNEUM PWR AFTER MAN ENG START PROC THEREAFTER DURING LINE-UP, FM 1 FAULT, DID ECAM BUT DELAYED RESET OF COMPUTERS TO AFTER TAKE-OFF DUE TRAFFIC ON 15 NM FINAL DURING CLIMB, AT A PITCH OF ALMOST 15 ° UP, THE VERTICAL SPEED DECREASED TO MINUS 900FT/MIN, QUICK PFD X-CHECK WITH F/O AND STBY INSTR. HORIZON, ALL THE SAME DISCONNECTED AP AND A/THR, UNRELIABLE SPEED CHECKLIST, CLIMB WITH GPS ALT AND ND TAS AND GS TO 22000FT (MORA IN THE NORTH IS 19600 FT (MOUNT KENIA) RETURN TO NBO, PROCEDURAL ILS OUT OF NV VOR STAYED AT ~ 11000FT GPS ALTITUDE (FINAL APPR. ALT IS 8300FT) AND GOT A "PULL UP TERRAIN" WARNING DURING THE PROC TURN

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GPWS RECOVERY, BUT CLIMBED ONLY 1000FT, KEPT (WITH TERR BUTTON ON) THE TERRAIN IN THE GREEN, LINE-UP ONTO THE LOC AND INTERCEPTED THE GS, LANDING I SUSPECTED THE GPWS WAS A FALSE WARNING AS I DON'T THINK THE GPS ALT IN GPS PRIMARY IS 3500FT WRONG, SWITCHED OFF THE GPWS ONCE EST. ON ILS AND VISUAL ACC TCE IT WASN'T HIS SELECTED FAILURE, THE SIM SOFTWARE MADE A 70°C TEMPERATURE JUMP AND CORRUPTED ALL STATIC PRESSURE INSTR. BREAK, I THOUGHT, NICE THAT'S IT, BUT TCE SAID NOW WE WILL DO HIS LOFT SCENARIO, SO BACK INTO THE TUBE SAME DEPARTURE, HYD B OVHT, ECAM, INTENTION WAS TO LEAVE THE PUMP OFF UNTIL LDG IN DXB ALTHOUGH OVHT DISAPPEARED THEN IDG OIL LO PR, DID ECAM , NOW IN SINGLE GEN CONDITION, DECIDED NOT TO CONTINUE TO DXB DURING NIGHT OVER AFRICA CONTACTED SMNC AND ENGINEERING AND STATED INTENTIONS, THEY TRIED TO CONVINCE ME THAT THEY NEED THE A/C URGENTLY IN DXB, DIDN'T CHANGE PLANS PUR, PA BLA BLA BLA ILS NBO IN THE MEANTIME ON MAINTANANCE, BRIEFED FOR A VOR DME APPR 06, 100 NM OUT NO DME INDICATION, QUERIED ATC, ANSWER: VOR+DME OK, THE LOC WILL BE AVAILABLE SOON DIDN'T CHANGE PLANS (NO FAITH IN LOC), TOLD F/O THAT WE PLAN FOR VOR/DME AND IF THE DME IS NOT AVAIL AT 50 NM, SWAP TO LOC APPR (LOC SERV IN THE MEANTIME) EXACTLY THAT HAPPENED, PROCEDURAL LOC OUT OF NV (NO DME AGAIN SIM PROBLEM) 5 NM BEFORE VOR ECAM ELEC DC ESS BUS FAULT, (NASTY FAILURE) LOST ND ON MY SIDE, BUT DDRMI STILL AVAIL, F/O STILL HAD HIS ND, BUT I CHOSE NOT TO HANDOVER CTRL + MADE THE F/O TO SELECT NV ON STBY NAV, THEN F/O STARTED ECAM AND I ENTERED A RAW DATA HOLD WITH F/O ND BACK UP AT NV AP AND A/THR GREEN LIGHT ARE NOT WORKING ON FCU, STATUS OF BOTH ONLY AVAIL ON PFD COMMS IS A BIG PROBLEM, ECAM SAYS "USE VHF 2 OR 3", RMP 1 +2 AND ACP 1+2 U/S, NBO TRIED TO CALL US SEVERAL TIMES, TOOK SOME TIME TO FIGURE OUT THAT ONLY RMP/ACP 3 ARE WORKING AFTER ECAM COMPLETED, HANDED OVER TO F/O TO FLY THE APPR BECAUSE HE HAD THE ND AVAIL AND TOOK HIS HAND-MIKE TO COMMUNICATE WITH ATC AFTER WE BECAME VISUAL, TOOK OVER CONTROL AND LANDED TAXIED ONTO STAND, CONNECTED GROUND POWER AND SHUT THE ENG DOWN W/O CHECKING THE SPOOLING DOWN PUR TO COCKPIT:"CLEARED TO OPEN DOORS?" INITIALLY SAID "YES", BUT CALLED HER IMMEDIATLY BACK TO STOP OPENING THE DOORS (SOMETHING STROKE MY MIND JUST IN TIME), BIG MISTAKE NOT TO READ THE FCOM 3 DC ESS BUS FAULT, A LITTLE NOTE SYAS :"TO SHUTDOWN THE ENG ON GROUND YOU HAVE TO USE THE FIRE PB"

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NBO – DXB Weather Notams MEL Failure 1 Failure 2 Problems Fuel

Failure 3 Failure 4

Wx: All the usual diverts were hovering around NPA minimas, NBO was at minimas for VOR 06. Notams: Heaps, check all the available aids at NBO and ALTS and how they effect approaches, I made a list which helped. MEL: MMR 1 and 2 U/S DEPO pax problem B4 start (FOM for guidance) Start was normal for a change T/O normal although heavy, TCAS on climb out. AVIONICS VENT SMOKE ECAM, nothing in the cabin, returned to NBO, smoke cleared with AC Bus 2 isolation. Managed VOR 06 then NAV ACC Down grade so continued selected.

NBO - EBB Weather Notams MEL Failure 1 Failure 2 Problems Fuel

Good everywhere (Nbo, Ebb, Dar, Mba) 06 in use Nbo Nbo: TV & TH u/s (missed app aids for 06), Ebb: Fir notam to maintain FL250 until 100nm from the Vor Nil Failure 3 Failure 4 Took as per CFP as good wx and tankering sector for return flight to Nbo.

During refueling the engineer advised that the right outer tank refuel valve had failed closed and he is unable to place any fuel in the rt outer.(Tank showing zero fuel) Checked Vol 3 limits for Max allowable fuel imbalance on takeoff in outer tanks and asked for left left outer to be filled to 1500kg.Suspected that might mean that the load sheet would be incorrect with non std fuel distribution. Referred to Mel and Mel tells you to do a manual trim sheet with non std fuel distribution anyway. Obtained the trim sheet and fuel index tables from the blank forms folder and waited for the load sheet. Load sheet arrives, sure enough >2% discrepancy so re did a manual trim sheet to find new ZFWMAC and TOWMAC and trim position, entered all in MCDU and back within limits. Got engineer to complete tech log with Mel. On push back ATC advise a new departure clearance. Re-entered and re-briefed. After second start PRIM fault, reset and continued. On line up left Outboard aileron (Yellow) fault. Aircraft at 10nm final. Asked to hold position. Reset fault via QRH5.03 Flt Ctl Architecture diagram and Prim 3 and then QRH 2.29 Prim reset procedure and subsequent Flt ctl and pitch trim check. On rotate my PFD “Check Att”. Used Standby A.H until rotate complete and then handed over to F.O and I took the radio’s. Yet another departure clearance change onto a radial for an intercept, set that up. Ensured well away from the ground and ran Ecam actions ending up with Att and Hdg switch Capt on 3. After T.Off chks. Couldn’t find any reason for the fault, all IR’s indicating O.K, left switch where it was and continued. Re took control. Unofficial Document

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Normal climb. Changeover to Ebb in cruise wind favouring VOR for 35 (rwy 35 in use) but less than 10 kt tailwind if we needed the ILS onto 17 for any reason. Briefed for full Managed VOR from overhead for 35. Cleared for the descent early…queried them re the 100nm notam and remained at cruise level until normal descent point. Ebb advise “bird activity” reported around 35 approach area, asked if the ILS17 was available and it was, so reset up and briefed for ILS17, tailwind less than 10kts still. At TOD wind swings and increases to 20 kt northerlies, reset up for VOR35 and rebrief again. Crossing overhead the VOR at 7000 we broke visual with excellent visibility, elected to fly the full procedure as I had never been to Ebb even though could have asked for a vis app. Managed Vor app to 35 (codes accurately) visual with the runway from 10 nm out and wind now less than 5 kts. Approx 700 feet and multiple heavy bird strikes, lose engine #1 and Blue and Green hyd systems instantaneously.(No NWS and max1000psi brakes) Hand fly, selected man thrust for good control, kept it straight and decided to land as unsure as to how badly damaged the remaining engine#2 may have been in the event of going round and aircraft nicely stable and handling well. Landed on 35. ☺ Debrief points: Might have considered the option of going round to fully ascertain all services lost.

NBO-DAR (ALT HKMO) Weather Notams MEL Failure 1 Failure 2 Problems Fuel

Failure 3 Failure 4

NOTAMS NBO ILS 06 U/S WX MARGINAL FOR VOR-DME 06 VIS 1500M NO TANKERING. AIRCRAFT ARRIVED FROM PREVIOUS SECTOR WITH SLATS SYSTEM 1 FAULT, DISPATCH UNDER MEL. AFTER TAKE OFF SLATS FAULT, UNABLE TO RETRACT SLATS, ECAM FOLLOWED, DECIDED TO CONTINUE TO DAR. LATER ON SICK PASSENGERS, DECIDED TO RETURN TO NBO FOR A NPA, UNABLE TO SEE RUNWAY, MISSED APPROACH. AFTER CHECKING FUEL DECIDED TO DIVERT TO MOMBASSA.

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NBO-DAR Weather Notams MEL Failure 1 Failure 2 Problems Fuel

NAIROBI OVERCAST AT 1300’, FORECAST TO DROP TO 800’. SCATTERED CB’S, RAIN IN THE AREA. DAR OVERCAST AT 1800’, EN-ROUTE WX OK. OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE---NBO ILS U/S., MOST NDB’S OUT OF SERVICE, INCLUDING THE VOR MISSED APPROACH-HOLDING FIX. SLAT SYS#2 FAILED. Failure 3 Failure 4

SCENARIO: START NORMAL, TAXI NORMAL. IN THE CLIMB, DURING CLEAN-UP, SLAT#1 FAULT, SLATS STUCK. ENTERED HOLD, TRIED TO RECONFIGURE, SET UP FOR VOR APPROACH ONTO 06 AND BRIEFED. SHOT SELECTED APPROACH--DUE CODING ABNORMALITY, NOT VISUAL AT MINIMA, GO AROUND TO NON-STANDARD VOR HOLD. ELECT TO DIVERT TO MOMBASSA (CLOSER THAN DAR AND MORA ACCEPTABLE, UNLIKE DAR ROUTE). LEVEL RESTRICTED TO FL 200, SPEED TO 205 KTS. CHECKED FUEL CONSUMPTION IN QRH 4.13. SICK PAX, REQUIRING IMMEDIATE OPERATION ACCORDING TO MEDLINK. MOMBASSA ILS U/S, BRIEFED FOR AND LANDED VIA MANAGED VOR APP. (+2800KGS FUEL REMAINING).

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Final Loft / DAR-NBO Weather Notams MEL Failure 1 Failure 2 Problems Fuel

Failure 3 Failure 4

Filed alternate Entebbe however no ‘sim’ pubs for Entebbe – fuel for Mombasa on flight plan so advised station staff to changed alternate to Mombasa with DAR ATC MEL – SATCOM u/s

Weather package indicated tempo 800m +R in Nairobi, NOTAMs indicated possible ATC disruptions due to labor unrest Kenya has special Jepp procedures for lost comm following a missed approach Took additional 1500kg fuel for weather On taxi – FM 1 fault – QRH reset successful After departure FM1 fault – QRH reset unsuccessful – “Re enter Weight/CG” message on scratch pad – the weight/CG will be displayed on the FUEL PRED page in small font – just overwrite with the same data Minor deviations for weather Advised to contact Nairobi at GABSO – no contact Moments later DC Bus 2 fault resulting in FM1+2 Fault – no AP, A/THR, FD – use B/U NAV Once ECAM all sorted out – still no contact with Nairobi – contacted another EK 761 enroute to JNB and they had no contact with Nairobi either – decided that with possibly no ATC, weather forecast, minimal automation and potentially insufficient fuel to reach alternate considering the lost comm procedure that an immediate diversion to Mombasa was prudent Broadcast intentions on 121.5 and 126.9 Used back up nav only to proceed direct Mombasa VOR and climbed 1000 feet for appropriate direction – could have climbed much higher but considered it unnecessary as fuel state excellent, had fuel state been a problem or enroute weather been an issue would have climbed higher Able to contact Mombasa once in range and received descent clearance for full procedure VOR/DME approach – flew a selected approach using the NPA 10 to eyeball the descent profile – broke out at 1000’ and followed VASIS to uneventful landing ECAM required us to manually set cabin altitude for Nairobi – don’t forget to change it to Mombasa – we almost did Unofficial Document

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NCE – DXB

Wind shear, CB’s 16L closed RH bleed inop FM failure Fuel Leak Passengers drunk. ATC Slot.

Weather Notams MEL Failure 1 Failure 2 Problems Fuel

Failure 3 Failure 4

RH bleed inop. Photocopy procedure from MEL. Quite a lengthy procedure make a list of the items that will require you to close the x-feed valve.(list in Abnormal bleed config). Restrict FL to 370, as per the MEL, take extra fuel for APU use (FCOM 2). Raining, check contamination. Went Contaminated. TOGA. Check if ZFW limited. Passengers drunk. ATC Slot. Make it the station managers problem. Not your aircraft until the doors are closed. Weather bad. Briefed Windshear recovery. Had RMP preset with the VOR freq and course incase of FM failure. Got exactly that on departure. Just select Rose VOR and continue no probs. Did switching after the checklists. At safe alt ran the reset procedure from the QRH and got FM 1 back. Flashing fuel advisory in cruise. Fuel imbalance, added fuel up and confirmed leak from left hand side. Ran the checklist started descent towards Rome. At gravity feed alt, pumps off. Left hand engine flamed out (know no bleed), APU bleed on. Finished checks. Called Aeroma advised were on our way, told pax, purser etc. 16L closed, 16R LOC approach. Did 2 laps of CMP hold then approach. Elected to land overweight as didn’t want to dump fuel with a leak. Plus there were CB’s around. Landed ok. Forgot to stop on rwy to get Fire services over to check if was large fuel leak / fire hazard.

NCE - DXB Weather Notams MEL Failure 1 Failure 2 Problems Fuel

Nice Wet and windy (not contaminated) 04R in use. Rome O.K South easterly winds. TS and Turb forecast in Nice and Rome Fir’s Nice 04L/22R closed. Eng #2 bleed valve u/s Failure 3 Failure 4 Extra 2 tons (1200kg for Mel and 800kg one level below)

Refer to Mel 36-11-02 Bleed valve. Can go with only one bleed valve providing the failed one is secured closed and a maintenance procedure is completed. Confirmed with the engineer that the procedure had been carried out. It then refers you to Mel 36-11-01 which states that the APU should be running for the entire flight and “In case of depressurisation above 37400 ft the O2 masks may drop during the descent” and refers you to a complex operational procedure to follow.(Basically what to do if you lose the other bleed at altitude in terms of air switching and APU use) Unofficial Document

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Photocopied the operational procedure and took that with us into the sim so that if we had a problem we weren’t diving around trying to remember what to do. The operational procedure also refers you to FCOM Vol 3.02.36 page 2 once you are on board and the upshot of that is that from the Fcom you also have to set the Pack flow to low for the flight. In a nutshell, some non standard air switching on the overhead panel, the APU running for the whole flight and a procedure to follow should you lose the other bleed. We were flight planned at FL370 and with the potential for a mask drop problem I elected to fly at FL330 hence the fuel for one level below and the fuel for the Apu running.(Conservative 6 hours @ 200kg /hr) On board, given a slot time (approx 45 mins ) Set up for flex take off, wet rwy, x-wind (checked limits were o.k), removed the de-rate for the TS activity. Elected for flex t.off but discussed windshear recovery if encountered and the option to use TOGA. During refueling the engineer advised that the refuel truck had broken down and cant pump any more fuel. Asked for another refuel truck , none available. Checked the fuel quantity and 1500 kg less than what we asked for on board at the time of the truck failure. Discussion with F.O. Decided to go with fuel as it was after rebriefing that APU burn at altitude is really only about 60kg/hr (Vol 2.05.10 pg3) which allowed approx 800kg less and the rest could be covered by the route reserve. Briefed to still use FL330 with the option of the climb to FL370 if we needed to for fuel. Normal start and taxi and met the slot time in the last minute. Weather avoidance in the climb. At TOC ran the Ecam scan. Checked the fuel on arrival at Dxb and at FL330 still had CMR. Just as I was advising that to the F.O the fuel on arrival dropped from 6.7 tons to 5.9 tons. Asked for him to check the fuel page and discovered a fuel imbalance with approx 1 ton less in the right inner tank. Retained control and asked him to check the fuel used vs on board etc, then to add each tank individually and re-check. Handed over control and I also did the same to ensure our figures agreed.2 ton difference by now. Let F.O keep control and I checked QRH 2.08 fuel imbalance which leads to Fuel leak procedure. Contacted Purser and asked her to observe both wings/engines and be very particular about describing what she saw in terms of possible spray/ smell etc. While she was off doing this got weather from Rome and Nice, Rome o.k with ILS16R and Nice crappy. Slightly closer to Nice but elected to go to Rome. Quick discussion with F.O and diversion to Nice let him continue flying, declared a Pan as still had plenty of fuel. Purser returns with news that spray observed from RHS but unsure from where. Brief her while she is there re the diversion. Run the leak not located fuel procedure. Descend to gravity feed ceiling of 15000 feet (had been airborne for 26 mins) and turn pumps off. Finish procedure, brief for Config 3 landing in case engine flames out ,that way already set u p, plenty of runway length, brief no reverse on landing and selected med a.brake. PA to pax. Over wt landing checklist and all other checks etc. Advise Rome to contact our ground handling agents in Rome and advise Dub of our situation. F.O flies to a landing onto ILS16R. Engine never flames out. On ground, “Attn crew at stations”. Brake fans on. Stop on rwy, talk to Fire officer, confirms that a large leak from RHS and fuel flowing onto rwy. Elect to shut down engines on rwy while fire services spray away the fuel.

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Talk to purser about possible steps disembarkation of pax on rwy.”Cabin crew revert to normal operations.” P.A to pax to remain seated. Fire services advise fuel leak stopped. Request tug to tow us off rwy to a taxi way, Fire service advise leak totally stopped now and are happy to tow us to gate. Towed to gate. Almost forgot to dis- arm doors!…caught just in time.☺ Debrief points: Could have used just Low a.brake rather than medium as lots of runway and rescue fire probably down at the other end anyway and with Low a.brake the brake temps would have been lower (they got to around 250 degrees) in case of fuel leaking around hot brake areas on rwy. MiniLoft

Ex Rome Rwy25 for DXB, Cavok conditions.Rome ILS16 R for arrivals. Passing 14000’ “Avionics Smoke”…started ecam and almost immediately extremely dense smoke. Turned back , Mayday etc etc. Ran dense smoke procedure, set Emer Elec config , vectors downwind , Rwy 25 visually in sight. Disconnected AP and requested priority for visual onto 25 So much smoke that I couldn’t see F.O, when it came for Land Recovery on he couldn’t see the switch due to the smoke so I set it on. Had to ask him to confirm gear was down as I couldn’t see the ecam or indicator lights and he needed a torch to do the manual gear extension. Masks fogged up, PFD and N.D covered in condensation due to the smoke. Landed on 25 and evacuated.☺

NCE-DXB Weather

Notams MEL

THUNDERSTORMS OVERHEAD, RUNWAY VERY WET, VARIABLE BUT STRONG CROSSWIND. BRAKING ACTION MEDIUM. (MAX X-WIND 20 KTS.) WHOLE OF FRANCE AND MUCH OF ITALY EXPERIENCING SIMILAR WX. ROME AND BRINDISI OK. NO TRAPS, 04L/22R CLOSED DUE WIP. HEAPS OF OTHER INFO, NONE RESTRICTIVE TO THE FLIGHT. #1 BLEED U/S, WIRE LOCKED. (CHECK MEL CAREFULLY---WIRE LOCKED) RESTRICTED MAX FL TO 370.


Failure 3 Failure 4

SCENARIO:

PRE-START, REPORT OF DAMAGED CARGO CONTAINER, CHANGE OF ZFW, CHANGE OF FIGURES. REFUELLER REPORTS DAMAGED NOZZLE, UNABLE TO TAKE FULL FUEL LOAD. ACCEPTED LOWER FUEL FIGURE. ALSO MINOR DAMAGE TO REFUELLING POINT ON WING----INSPECTED BY ENGINEER--“SATIS” FOR DISPATCH, ADD RAISED. WEATHER DODGING AND MODERATE TURBULENCE ON CLIMB OUT, ENG ANTI ICE ON, EVENTUALLY CLEAR OF CLOUD THROUGH ABOUT FL250’. DURING CLIMB, FUEL LEAK NOTICED FROM RIGHT TANKS, ADVISORY ON ECAM. DIVERSION TO ROME AFTER FUEL LEAK PROCEDURE. #2 ENGINE FLAME OUT ON DESCENT, APU RUNNING, NO PRESSURIZATION PROBLEMS. BRIEF FOR AND CONDUCT ILS ONTO 34 R. (FUEL LEAK FROM DAMAGED REFUELLING PORT). Unofficial Document

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THR - DXB Weather

WINTER CONDITIONS IN THR, -1°C, LIGHT TO MED SNOW, DE-ICING REQ, RWY DRY, ONE DE-ICE TRUCK, TYPE II HOLDOVER ONLY 15-30 MIN, CHOSE 20 MIN AS A TARGET.


Failure 3 Failure 4

ATC TRIED TO KEEP ME LOW AFTER T/O DUE INB TRAFFIC, BEWARE OF TERRAIN (MSA) HAD TO LEVEL-OFF LATER AT FL 260 (AGAIN TRAFFIC), INB TRAFFIC WAS ACC TCAS ONLY 600 FT ABOVE AND MASKED BY ANOTHER TRAFFIC 6000FT ABOVE , DIV IMMED TO THE RIGHT AND AVOIDED TCAS RA - EST IN FL 370, PASSED IFN (AIRFIELD CLOSED), THEN DISCOVERED THAT ARR FUEL DROPPED FROM 5,5 TO 4.2TO (CMR 4.5TO), STARTED FUEL LEAK PROC - LEFT INNER TANK HAD ALREADY 2TO LESS, UNABLE TO RECTIFY WHERE THE LEAK IS (LEAK NOT LOCATED PROC) - STARTED TO DO A HIGH SPEED DESCEND TO GRAVITY CEILING (FLIGHT TIME >30MIN) AND DIVERTED TO SHIRAZ, NO WAY TO MAKE DXB OR KWI - DURING DESC INFORMED PUR AND PAX, COMPANY - ENG 1 FLAMED OUT DURING SHORT HOLDING OVERHEAD SYZ ALTHOUGH SYZ MISSED APPR CLIMB GRADIENT IS 6%, LACK OF FUEL COMMITTED US TO LAND, SELECTED ILS WITH THE VOR DME MINIMUM (VOR APPR CL GRAD 5%), CEILING WAS 800FT IN SNOW, FUEL WAS ONLY AVAIL FOR A SECOND SHORT APPROACH, WOULD HAVE CONTINUED DOWN TO 50FT BUT GOT VISUAL AT 700FT, LANDING TOTAL TIME AGAIN ~3HRS, THEREAFTER 1 MINI LOFT (I ASKED FOR ANOTHER UNRELIABLE SPEED)

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ZURICH TO DUBAI. Weather

BAD ALL OVER EUROPE. ZRH WAS DRIFTING SNOW AND FOG PATCHES, TEMP –1C, LOTS OF ICE ON THE AIRCRAFT.


Failure 3 Failure 4

RUNWAY IN USE 28. HAD TO GO INTO THE CONTAMINATED RUNWAY CHARTS AND DECIDED TO TAKE A TAILWIND OF 5KTS FOR RWY16 AS WE WERE LESS LIMITED FOR MTOW STILL HAD TO OFFLOAD 5 TONS OF FREIGHT IN ORDER TO GO. HAD A 28 MIN HOLDOVER TIMEFOR THE ANTI-ICE AND WITH A TAXI SPEED OF 10KTS, MADE IT BY 2MINS. DID ICE-SHEDDING ON THE RUNWAY, FOLLOWED BY UNEVENTFUL DEPARTURE. ON CLIMB OUT GOT A GREEN HYD LEAK FOLLOWED BY LO LEVEL. DID ECAM ACTIONS AND DECIDED TO CONTINUE TO DXB. STILL ON CLIMB OUT, CSD INFORMED ME OF A VERY SICK PAX, GIVING HIM OXYGEN BUT HE WASN’T LOOKING GOOD. OBTAINED WX WITH MUNICH BEING THE ONLY PLACE WE COULD POSSIBLY GO TO. TOLD THE CSD TO USE THE CABIN PHONE TO MEDILINK AND OBTAIN ADVICE, ALSO CHECK FOR ANY QUALIFIED MEDICAL PERSONEL ON BOARD. MEDILINK ADVISED US TO DIVERT. CARRIED OUT DIVERSION TO MUNICH TO HOLD AT MIQ. STARTED TO PROGRAMME FMS AND THEN GOT A BLUE HYDRAULIC OVHT. SWITCHED OFF BLUE PUMPS AND DID ECAM ACTIONS FOR DUAL HYD FAILURE. BRIEFED THE APP FOR THE WORST CASE SCENARIO, LANDING WITH DUAL HYD FAILURE. AT THE SAME TIME, A LOT OF PRESSURE PUT ON ME BY CSD REGARDING THE URGENCY OF THE CONDITION OF THE SICK PAX. MUCH OF THIS INVOLVED FOM KNOWLEDGE. THE IDEA IS NOT TO LET THEM RUSH YOU AND THEREFORE JEOPARDIZE THE WHOLE AIRCRAFT FOR ONE PAX. COMMENCED THE APP FROM MIQ, GOT BLUE HYD BACK, DOWNGRADED EMERGENCY TO PAN, AND CONTINUED FOR ILS 08L. DUMB FIRE ENGINE DRIVER GOT STUCK ON THE RUNWAY, SO HAD TO GO AROUND AT MINIMA, GEAR STUCK DOWN BECAUSE OF GRAVITY EXTENSION, SO GOT VECTORS FOR ANOTHER GO AND THIS TIME LANDED SUCCESSFULLY. PARKED ON THE RUNWAY, ADVISED PAX TO REMAIN SEATED WHILST THE MEDICS BOARDED AND REMOVED THE SICK CASE, THEN ASKED FOR THE TOW TO THE STAND. ALL DECISIONS WERE MARKED DOWN AS CORRECT, BUT COULD HAVE CONSIDERED THE FOLLOWING: ASK DUBAI TO REROUTE US FOR A REFUELING STOP IN ISTANBUL SO THAT WE CAN TAKE THE ENTIRE LOAD OUT OF ZRH. WITH NO GREEN HYDRAULICS YOU HAVE NO EMER GEN. A POINT TO CONSIDER FOR ETOPS. THERE ARE NO FUEL TABLES FOR A DIVERSION WITH GEAR DOWN AFTER A GRAVITY EXTENSION.

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ZRH - DXB Weather Notams MEL Failure 1 Failure 2 Problems Fuel

Failure 3 Failure 4

Had APU U/S during briefing. RTOW calculation with slush. Started up with external AC & External air. Elected not to de-ice on stand, rather do it out by runway at the de-icing pad. Had slot time. I was not too concerned about slot, rather doing everything correctly & not rushing. If could not get revised slot, elected to wait for new one & stop enroute if I had to. Took a hit for that in the de-brief - that’s OK though. FMGC 2 fault during taxi. QRH 2.35 procedure. Departure uneventful. At around 30,000 ft had ESS DC Bus fail with AC Ess Bus shed. Lots of systems U/S, including ACP 1&2 & FCU plus numerous display losses. This means you have to use ACP 3 and the microphone from the Jumpseat. PA system U/S as well as cabin call. If you want to talk to Purser, got to get out of seat to grab him. With this malf, tell Purser to come back every 10 mins so you don’t have to get out of your seat! Fuel in trim tank is unusable unless it will gravity feed & it would not for me. You are now time limited as your CG will keep moving aft the more fuel you burn. Watch your lateral fuel imbalance limits & follow ECAM to transfer outer tanks to inners. This helps move CG fwd. Diverted to MUN for O/W ldg. Watch rate of descent at touchdown. Ask F/O to read out V/S at 100 ft & 50 ft, it helps.

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ZRH –DXB Weather Notams MEL Failure 1 Failure 2 Problems

200/15 1700m SNSH +0/-4 1022, runway recently cleared and reported DRY?

HYD Green system fluid loss Failure 3 AVIONICS SMOKE Failure 4 Carriage of Pregnant passenger problem at the gate, Remote de-icing bays closed, de-ice on the gate, Tight slot time given, airborne 40 minutes after arrival at aircraft

Fuel

- Briefed during de-icing at the gate - Elected to use RWY 16 with TOGA and WET numbers (Rwy 28 was reported 2 mm slush) - Discussed Thrust Rating Target for TOGA of 84% N1 (instructor liked that one) - Plan on 15 minute taxi from concourse B (gate 31?) - Normal start , well past minimum Holdover time, PCI check at the runway - Climbing through FL150, HYD Green system fluid loss Elected to continue on to DXB, MCC concurs - At TOC, AVIONICS SMOKE No reported smoke in the cabin and nothing detected in the cockpit Diverted to EDDM (100nm) Decided to jump to the SMOKE source not determined and smoke light went out after AC BUS 2 was isolated. FO displays blank, AP OK, no A/THR Elected to start APU, with APU GEN OFF, did not want to repower any faulty circuits, bleed available for overweight check Overweight landing EDDM - Session finished while taxiing to the gate

De-Brief points

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Departing ZRH, 10,000’ checks on climb out are AGL. Should have done it at 11,400. Consider RWY 28 for shorter taxi time Remember to ask for NOTAMS affecting landing runway when deciding to divert or review NOTAM from briefing folder LOFT stuff, have all possible diversion plates in the mini folder ready (cheating!) Briefed all the approach climb gradient items including gear down penalty and then realized after that we were 2 engines. Aircraft is never limited on 2 engines. Consider fuel dumping enroute to EDDM Be sure to use the new de-icing form every time you de-ice Remember the big ones Delay flaps until runway o Consider Wing Anti-ice airborne o Take-off within 5 minutes of the PCI o Run up engine to 50% N1 for 10 seconds then idle before takeoff o

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ZUH-DXB

Weather cold ops with snow weather in Europe Weather Notams NIL MEL Failure 1 FMGEC exercises Failure 3 Failure 2 Flap lock Failure 4 Problems In cruise BOMB threat Fuel Weather cold ops with snow weather in Europe pretty shitty only Munich not to bad. Remember to liaise with engineers etc re procedures for deicing Keep pax informed if delayed Normal start after cold weather procedure completed If speed control in the turn stay configured till you complete the turn T/O off some FMGEC exercises remember if sent on radial if you want to get predictions then you need to use place bearing /dist so it has something to work on In cruise we had BOMB threat sat phone from company Remember that the FOM has general procedure 14-8/9 with PA etc Also the QRH has specific detail for the A330 the important thing is if Climbing stop and if in Cruise then descent toward cabin Alt you must go Manuel to reduce the Diff get it to 1psi which you want to maintain as this will help the blast effect to exit the aero plane and less damage. The first line in the QRH says If possible land and evacuate the A/C When the cabin is under control then you could consider use of speed brake to get down Once you have the 1 psi diff press then you can set the cabin rate to descend the same as the A/C ie set V/S for A/C then set the cabin descent the same this should maintain the diff at 1psi. Remember that the priority may change ie get down quickly then you can quickly review what need to be done Elected to divert to Munich as about the best weather around on finals got Flap lock. Remember that the F&S speed is only on handle position so you need to maintain the speed near the red over speed line and set 5 kts below this, the only things that are correct are over speed and VLS once you are on finals then bring the speed back to VLS but maneuver at the higher speeds. If time is critical then just a quick check of the landing dist in non normal flap ie check conf and dist factor but MUN is 4000m so x1.3 is nothing. Remember that you can not get G/s capture till you have LOC* remember you can V/S to recapture the G/S or even descend a little early to get the G/S. • • • • •

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DXB/LHR EK5 Weather Notams MEL Failure 1 Failure 2 Problems Fuel

Enroute TURB forecast weather in UK becoming misty, Windshear reported on T/O LH eng bleed U/S FMGEC exercises Flame out on the RH engine

Failure 3 Failure 4

Route over IRAN • •

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Remember to liaise with the CSD re turb and the service consult F/O for opinion Normal start and push back had AIR Abnormal Bleed which had us selecting low flow on the packs concern re long flight and lots of Pax the AIR abnormal bleed check list could be reviewed prior to push back and get confirmation that this is OK + Windshear reported on T/O elected to go TOGA remember + is an increase of speed Some FMGEC exercises remember that you can get the expected height from the FPLAN page as long as the track is correct so use DIR to and keep it on heading if you need to climb then selected spd 260kts and the FMGEC will work out the expected height remember that wind play a part as you have probable not put in the winds yet Remember to set the weather radar T/S around normal around 10,000ft We then had flame out on the RH engine so no bleed except APU so rather then green dot speed should desend as quick as possible to get down to stop cabin climbing, ( NB: keep aware that with only one bleed it will always be a quick desent and get the APU bleed on below FL230.).

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Always chech the PFD as to what is going on and read the ECAM AUTO FLT A/thr Is not the autopilot only the A/thr has dropped out.( Sim fault) BE sure to FLY the Aircraft and that you are flying what you want delay the ECAM actions get the F/O to help to confirm the you our flying safely With this problem it happened just short of Shriaz so desend quickly and once a/c is safely flying turn back to Shiraz do not fly away as in be a little more postive with you intial plan (important in cruise to keep a plan in your mind of what airport you our going to go to so you can intiate this early in the case of an emergency) Once you are safely on the way consider manual control of cabin as some pax medical situation could be improved by a lower cabin Alt the diff is very low but cabin at about 5000ft Tried eng relight but no fuel flow do not leave the master on too long as it use the bleed air not enough for the cabin. So it will start climbing CB’s and poor weather in Shriaz opted to go to DXB as no engine anti icing and no ILS in Shiraz weather on NPA Min Overweight landing into DXB use full length once the stopping is assured so as to help brake temps If on one eng then configure a little later so as to not have high power settings.

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DXB-MAN (ROUTE OVER IRAN AIRSPACE.) Weather Notams NIL MEL Failure 1 Failure 2 Problems Fuel

Failure 3 Failure 4

NO MEL MAX TAKE OFF WEIGHT. OVER IRAN TCAS RA AND WX AVOIDANCE. NEAR ZAJ OIL LOW QTY ENG 2. DIVERTED TO THR, DURING DESCEND ENG 2 SHUT DOWN. NO JETTISON DUE TO THUNDERSTORMS IN THE AREA. LANDING IN THR MARGINAL WX, WET RUNWAY IN LIGHT SNOW. ONLY TABRIZ AND TEHERAN AVAILABLE AS ENROUTE ALTERNATES.

DXB-MCT Weather Notams NIL MEL Failure 1 Failure 2 Problems Fuel

Failure 3 Failure 4

Standard MEL, PAX problems. Minor problem after T/O, run ECAM, advise Ops. Enroute to MCT. F/O goes back to toilet, doesn’t return. Get Purser to find him, he says he can’t return as has crook guts. Do the descent and approach by yourself. Have ambulance if necessary. Check for other crew etc. Easy loft.

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Section 8 FOM Study Notes

8. FOM Study Guides This section includes the FOM study notes done by some colleagues during their upgrade time, although its very brief but it highlights the important operational stuff that you might need in your day to day operation, Having said so, these note are out dated as it returns to the year 2005, So please, Its your responsibility to review and update your self with any changes that have happened on the FOM including any applicable and valid FCI’s, FCN’s through the preceding years and up till now (October 2008). I hope you will find this section a good help to refresh your FOM knowledge.

Note: COMPANY FOM IS THE OFFICIAL DOCUMENT AT ALL TIMES. THESE STUDY GUIDES CAN NOT REPLACE THE FOM AND ARE MEANT TO BE FOR GUIDANCE ONLY.

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FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL (FOM) STUDY GUIDE (as of 2005)

Chairman of Emirates Group; Vice Chairman & Group President; President Emirates Airline; Executive VP Engineering and Ops Senior Vice President Flight Ops;

H.H. Sheikh Ahmed bin Saeed Al Maktoum Maurice Flanagan Tim Clark Adel Al Redha Alan Stealy

It outlines duties & responsibilities of all posts like: Senior Vice President Flight Operations (SVP-FO) Vice President Flight Training (VP-FT) Training Captains (TC) Type Rated Instructors (TRI) Type Rated Examiner (TRE) etc....... It also gives all the abbreviations The Pilot in Command is under the authority of SVP-FO, all other Flight & Cabin Crew are under the PIC Authority of the PIC: - delegated from SVP-FO - has authority to fulfill all his legal and company responsibilities for operation and safety of A/C, persons and material on board during the period of his command - Nothing in the Operations Manual shall be limiting or detracting from his authority - for the Flight & Cabin crew, the PIC’s authority starts at check-in at base until reporting back at base - PIC is responsible for safe, economic and efficient operations - The PIC may delegate his authority in Augmented Flight Crew Operations Duties and Responsibilities of the PIC - Legal representative of Emirates in contact with non-Company personnel as far as his authority is specified - authority over crew on/off duty when away from base and passengers during flight i.e. CLOSING DOORS to OPENING DOORS - Responsible for maintaining discipline amongst crew and passengers - shall ensure compliance with the laws, regulations and procedures of the UAE and of states visited/overflown - must ensure all docs e.g. licenses, visas etc and for cabin crew a report from Purser suffices, are in order - ensure that SOP’s and checklists are followed - Responsible for telling the Ground Engineer all known or suspected defects of the aircraft - The PIC has the authority to declare an emergency and must inform appropriate ATC of intentions - The PIC must inform nearest authority and SMNC if accident, death or injury of/on A/C - If under an emergency a violation of local regulations has been made, a report to the UAE GCAA and SMNC must be made without delay, as well as to the local authorities

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General Responsibilities of the PIC - Proper servicing and maintenance of airworthiness of the aircraft - To maintain safety and good order, the PIC may temporarily remove a crew member from his/her duty or off the aircraft. - The PIC may refuse passengers for onward transportation if, after several requests, they are still offensive or refuse to follow orders. Persons obviously intoxicated with alcohol or drugs/narcotics shall be refused boarding! Supervision and Co-ordination of Flight Duty - co-ordinate and assign crew members various duties according to their licences - delegate his responsibilities, when required, to authorize ground staff and crew members - notify superiors when a crew members behavior/performance is unacceptable - supervise/judge the FO and be able to complete a flight alone (incapacitation) - may delegate to other members within company limits (FOM and FCOM)

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Company Publications Document Priorities in case of a conflict: 0. AFM - 1. FCI - 2. FOM - 3. FCOM. Electronic document takes precedence over a paper copy in ER - Compliance with the AFM is achieved by operating in accordance with FOM, FCOM, QRH, RTOW and l/sheet - As part of type specific FCOM, each fleet publishes supp info of A/C type – 777 uses Bulletins - RM receives quarterly amendments; immediate requirements will be in the form of a COMPANY NOTAM - FCI’s are issued by Flight Ops (changes to OPS manual) and FCI’s will be incorporated in the relevant manual within 6 month of issue. They are issued in two categories; GENERAL FCI and TYPE SPECIFIC FCI - FCI’s become effective 7 days after issue - FCN’s are issues not amending the Ops Manual and have 3 month validity. - Information/amendments needing urgent publication will be: FCI / Memo / Bulletin / TR’s Documents that

be carried onboard

In case of loss / theft of above docs, flight may continue to Dubai or replacement station (Germany - must be onboard if operating to Germany) - AVN / EK / GERMANY - AVN / EK / GERMANY (injury to pax and loss/damage to baggage) - AVN / EK / GERMANY (certain insurance policies) - Third party liability insurance certificate

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Documents or Certificates included in A/C Docs file

- Certificate of Registration - Fuel Carnets - Certificate of Airworthiness - Air Operators Certificate - A/C radio licence - DG Operators Certificate - Noise Certificate - Certificate of Competency - Certificate Approval of Radio Installation - Ops Specs - Certificate of insurance (worldwide and A/C specific) - Approval for RNP 5 and BRNAV ops - Transit check - Approval for RVSM - Pre-Flight check - Approval for MNPS - Daily check - GCAA waivers not included in FOM - ETOPS Supp. Check - Emergency Equip. checklist and Captains Authorisation - Tool bag Contents - “NO EXIT” sign - On Board loadable software list In Addition - Ops Flight Plan - Load and Trim Sheet - FOM, / 2A / 2B, , Cabin Crew Emergency Manual, Ops FCI’s and RTOW charts - Jepps and RM - MEL - ERG and DG Regs, Document - 4 Security Checklists: Pre-flight, Aircraft search on ground, In flight and LRBL (least risk bomb location) Above documents will be updated within 10 days of effe ctive date of revision except FCI’s Bold docs. Are required departing Dubai, not outstations. Any other missing doc does not restrict Ops Medical Regulations Medicine is not to be consumed 24 hours before duty unless authorized by Emirates doctor Viagra must not be consumed within 6 hours of flight duty. Alcohol must not be consumed within 12 hours of flight duty (=1 hour before off-blocks). Diving must not be done within 24 (recreation 40m) or 48 (below 40m) hours of flight duty. Blood donation of max 1 unit must not be done within 48 hours of duty, and 3 months between donations. If pax /crew show signs of infectious disease, Captain must inform port authorities before disembarking No stores may be taken from the A/C. In exceptional circumstances it may be necessary to offload / dispose of stores, the Captain must then give written or verbal instructions to the Purser to do so

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All Flight Crew members must carry: - Valid passport - Company ID - Crew License - Medical Certificate - copy of most recent PPC/IR or Certificate of Test signed by TRE - Certificate of Vaccination - Flight and Cabin Crew members may train or do Supp flights with temp validation certificates but once released to the line they must have a valid UAE GCAA licence - Loss of FOB/Captains Company Credit Card must be reported to fleet office (CBC) + email FAS Airbus - Loss of Captains Company Mobile Phone must be reported to fleet office (CBC), if after hours contact ETISILAT to cancel sim card - Loss of Company ID requires a police report Consecutive sickness/absence longer than 20 days, notify GCAA. More than 30 days, licence suspended If a crew member reports sick less than four hours before starting duty will explain reason to fleet Chief Pilot. Sickness in excess of 48 hours must be approved by a Company Doctor. If sickness is self-certified, it is assumed the pilot is fit after 48 hours subject to min r eport time of 3 hrs. If sickness is declared by a Company Doctor, the Doctor must notify Scheduling when he deems the pilot fit. Overseas the following, in order, is who to consult: Company Doctor, hotel Doc, Foreign airline doc then any other doctor Layovers While at layovers the crew should be contactable at all times (e.g. by the hotel). Captain must give permission for ALL crew wishing to stay away overnight (should be in same city as hotel). Crewmembers shall be back at the hotel FROM TRIPS OUTSIDE THE TOWN at least 12 hrs before takeoff. During the 12 hrs the hotel should not be left for extended periods without leaving a telephone nr with hotel. Moves: Flight Crew shall advise the secretary of the concerned Fleet Manager of new home-details. Crew baggage: the Captain must be informed when an additional piece of checked-in or hand baggage is carried by a crewmember. The Captain will then notify Load Control.

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Renewals - all pilots are required to complete recurrent checks: ● PPC (Pilot Proficiency Check) within e ach 6-month period ● ALC (Annual Line Check) within each 12-month period ● Instrument rating within each 12-month period ● SEP (Safety equipment and Emergency Procedures) within each 12-month period. CRM will also be trained Any check completed within the month prior to the due month are valid, except the ALC Upgrade training: Newly promoted captains will for the first 20 sectors as PIC be limited to: ● Always be the PF At the Planning stage: ● Add 200m & 100’ to the more limiting Company, Jeppesen or State minima (takeoff and approach) ● Only CAT A airfields can be used (CAT B/C for diversion) Recency: PIC Qualifications Within the preceding 35 days; 1 takeoff & landing or 1 route sector Within the preceding 90 days; 3 takeoffs & landings Within 6 months, 6 hours of IFR time (3 actual in flight) & 6 instrument approaches ETOPS – On licence or signed certificate Valid licence and Type rating Valid Instrument rating Night requirements – waived Yearly PPC CAT A Airports - unrestricted CAT B Airports - 13 month validity period; Self Brief, Audio/Visual presentation or Simulator exercise to reval. CAT C Airports - 13 month validity period; Physical Entry or Simulator exercise to revalidate Captains Route Qualification Requirements: Taken care of by an ALC & PPC’s FO’s Route Qualification Requirements: Taken care of by an ALC Captains Aerodrome qualification: CAT A – Self briefing or close to another qualified A/Port CAT B/C – Every 12 months a Physical entry (Sim, audio visual, airfield briefing or actual) FO Restrictions: A Line Captain may allow a FO to carry out a take-off or landing provided: - Runway not contaminated - Crosswind max 20 kts - 2.000 m vis for takeoff - Cloud-base 500’ for ILS - Cloud-base 1.000’ for non-ILS

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Command requirements: - 6000 Total time - 4000 Hard time - Valid UAE ATPL - 3 years in Emirates - 4 PPC’s - 12 months on type - Full Route and Aerodrome recency

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Mobile phones: Must be kept well charged & Emirates Operational Numbers updated EVITA is required to call 30 minutes before pickup & 24-48 hours before duty after leave/extended days off & after 17:00 prior to Available Days Permission to leave Dubai on Days OFF from Chief Pilot Boeing Monthly crew schedules to be delivered no less than 7 clear days before the end of preceding month. If your flight is delayed by 2 hrs or more, Crew Scheduling will contact family between 0600 – 2200LT, after this you must call them if later than 2 hrs If due to sickness in roster month you lose credit, company can get it back on days off Access to Scheduling Department by phone/visits to be done between 11:00 - 14:00 daily. One roster swap pr. month is permitted, using Mutual Roster Change Request. Recently trained Capt will not be rostered to fly with recently trained FO’s, month of FLC + 1 month Standby duty ready in 30 mins and always contactable 42 days leave per year, min 4 days and 14 to 21(in peak). Above 28 in off-peak with authorization.

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Retention of records: - Operational and Personnel Records; 12 months - Load Manifest; 24 months - Fuel and oil records; 3 months - Flight documents (from the trip folder); 3 months - FCOM revisions from Manufacturer must be incorporated within 3 months - The only document required to be filled in on each flight is the VR (This meets requirements of GCAA journey Log) must be written in BLOCK CAPITALS and filed for: - Any deviations from SOP’s - Details of an event not falling within the scope of an ASR - Irregularities which could adversely affect the Company’s operation or reputation - Any other matter the Captain feels warrants a formal report - Comments to improve companies reputation or operation

- Missing documents; AFM, QRH, FCOM and other various documents (FOM 2.9) - Any significant event occurring during a flight - Autolands - Amount and reasons for delay (if a delay exceeds 3 minutes, the reason for delay shall be reported) - If a CSR has been raised. must be filed for: - Extension of Flight Duty or Reduction of Rest must be filed: - If a passenger with or without baggage is offloaded or fails to board after checking in; The form consists of two pages (pink & yellow). Pink copy to be retained and put in the trip folder

- It is the Captains responsibility to ensure a flight departs with a GD, including all crew names, GCAA inspectors and Security personal (permission needed). - If a GD will cause undue delay, fill out a blank one from A/C folder and Capt must sign.

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Penalty-Free Reporting (but willful violations of SOP is not tolerated) An aircraft accident and all listed incidents require immediate notification to the GCAA within 24 hrs. Captain will ensure all affected members write a report and he must notify SMNC ASAP - Flight control system malfunction or failure - Inability of any required Flight Crew member to perform his normal flight duties as a result of injury or illness, - Turbine engine rotor failures, excluding compressor and turbine blades, - In-flight fire, - Aircraft collision in flight, - In-flight major failure of electrical systems, which requires the sustained use of an emergency bus powered by a back-up source such as a battery, APU, or RAT, to retain flight control, or essential instruments, - In-flight failure of hydraulic systems, that results in sustained reliance on the sole remaining hydraulic or mechanical system for movement of the flight control surfaces, - Sustained loss of thrust or power produced by two or more engines, - Evacuation of an aircraft in which an emergency egress system is used, Significant incidents involving: - The transport of dangerous goods, - Breaches of security, - The carriage of important persons, - Maintenance events or failures, - Aircraft departure from taxiways or runways, - Taxiing accidents or collisions, - Flight crew incapacitation, - Decompression resulting in emergency descent, - ATC incidents involving near collisions, - Serious windshear encounter, - Passenger offences affecting safety, - Any other factor affecting or compromising safety. - An aircraft is overdue and is believed to have been involved in an accident.

Preservation of evidence: - If a Captain deems in necessary to preserve info he can do the following o FDR and DFDR(25 hrs), tech log entry “Remove FDR for investigation o CVR (30 – 120 min), “Remove CVR for investigation”. If the CVR circuit breaker is accessible from the flight deck, it may be pulled as a last resort - An ASR can be filed by any crew member but must be filed by the Capt for the following reasons in an expeditious manner, FOM 10-6 - A CHFR (Confidential Human Factors Report) is the means by which an individual may report sensitive human factors that have influenced an incident or may have been a “near miss” in almost causing an incident. - Must be delivered to Flight Safety by the most expeditious means possible

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Ops / Capt may restrict or suspend operations to an A/Field they/he feels is unsafe. Capt may not continue to that airport unless he feels that the problems will be corrected before arrival or in an emergency

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Crew Incidents & Accidents - A PAAR (Passenger/Aircrew Accident Report) must be filed by the Purser + an ASR by the Captain. - Classified as URGENT or NON-URGENT URGENT are death or serious injury that requires medical attention/hospitalization Must fill out a PAAR immediately (if URGENT) or within 2-7 days (if NON-URGENT). Crime on board. - Between “doors closed” and “doors open”, the Captain is responsible for protecting lives, aircraft & cargo + safeguarding of necessary evidence. - He may order a search of belongings (with owners consent) to preserve evidence - The Captain must notify the next landing place, and a CSR or ASR be filed if a crime was committed on board or pax was detained. He/she must be handed over to the law enforcement at the destination. On turnaround stops and during transit stops one flight deck crewmember must remain on board. At some outstations, local authorities might try to gain access to the aircraft WITHOUT valid ID’s. Be alert! The following have access to the flight deck (subject to the Captains discretion, but in UK airspace): - His Highness the Chairman - Vice Chairman - Group President - President Emirates Airline - Executive Vice President Engineering & Operations - Senior Vice President Flight Operations If a request to open ANY aircraft door is received outside the parking area, the aircraft shall return to the parking position and the door only be opened in the presence of Emirates/Handling Agent staff. Sabotage/Bomb Threats - RED at gate: PA: Purser to flight deck Notify ATC & ramp agent Shut down engines, if running, but maintain electrical power (APU) Brief Purser (who will brief Cabin Crew) Make Captains PA Offload pax with hand baggage

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- RED while taxiing: PA: Purser to flight deck Proceed as cleared by ATC Follow the QRH/FCOM procedures (QRH not really applicable on the ground) Use mobile steps if readily available, if not; use slides Notify ATC of intentions & to keep vehicles clear of slides Notify ramp agent Brief purser on nature & disembarkation procedure Maintain electrical power if possible (APU) Shut down engines Make Captains PA (different for Steps Available & Slides to be used) IF DEVICE HAS BEEN DISCOVERED, CARRY OUT FULL EMERGENCY EVACUATION - RED in flight: PA: Purser to flight deck Brief purser on NITS Make Captains PA Follow QRH/FCOM procedure If time permits carry out FD and Cabin search Keep ATC fully informed; keep away from heavily populated areas if possible Prepare for use of Oxygen masks Request details on remote parking, steps and busses available If time allows, make PA regarding B.D. or E.O.D experienced passengers Land as soon as possible - SUSPICIOUS article discovered in flight: Follow QRH/FCOM “Bomb threat in Flight” Keep ATC fully informed; keep away from heavily populated areas if possible Brief Cabin Crew Prepare for use of Oxygen masks Request details on remote parking, steps and busses available If time allows, make PA regarding B.D. or E.O.D experienced passengers Land as soon as possible LRBL – least risk bomb location, AFT RIGHT DOOR Hijacking. - Crew will use the word “DEMAND” - At no time shall a hijacker be allowed access to the flight deck. - Squawk 7500 - Advice ATC - Plan to land as soon as possible, at a suitable airport of choice - Advice SMNC, preferably use SATCOM - When on ground, unless Captain decides it is better, do not leave crew and pax behind.

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Company policy; Minimum total cost & maximum payload. Extra fuel may be required to cater for possible deviations. The following mandatory fuel MUST be carried: - TAXI FUEL (statistical taxi-fuel + 30 min. APU burn + engine start) - TRIP FUEL (from start of takeoff to touchdown at destination including SID and STAR for latest WX) - CONTINGENCY FUEL (used after bowser disconnect) - a full 5% of planned trip fuel - 3% of planned trip fuel with Enroute Alternate ( placed within a circle having a radius equal to 20% of total flight plan distance AND AND a centre on planned route at a distance from destination greater of 25% of total flight plan distance or 20% of total distance + 50nm. - 20 minutes flying at planned trip fuel consumption An amount to fly for 5 minutes at holding speed 1500’ above destination airport in ISA conditions - ALTERNATE FUEL (from go-around at destination to touchdown at alternate (LRC) assuming contingency has been used, +5%, never planned < 100 nm) - FINAL RESERVE FUEL (hold for 30 min. at 1500’ over alternate at ISA at estimated weight) Supplementary fuel shall be carried as and when appropriate: - ADDN (to max 1% below MLW or ETOPS critical fuel) - EXTRA (decided by the Commander. If “Other” is specified as reason, explain briefly on the OFP) Company Minimum Reserve (CMR) for Destination; ALTERNATE FUEL + FINAL RESERVE FUEL Company Minimum Reserve (CMR) for Alternate; FINAL RESERVE FUEL ( = 30 min. @ 1.500’ @ est. weight) Isolated Destination TAXI, TRIP, CONTINGENCY + 2 Hrs HOLDING AT CRUISE SPEED OVERHEAD DESTINATION. For in-flight planning – The last possible en-route alternate point will be determined and at that point the 2 hrs holding fuel and trip fuel to destination must be in tact. At this point you can continue if 2 runways are available and the wx complies with, FC ETA to ETA + 2 hrs, Circling (1200’/5000m) + 300’/1km = 1500’6000m. If not met, proceed to en-route alternate

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A flight that is NOT planned with Contingency Fuel may be dispatched using a Decision Point Procedure. The amount of fuel required must be greater of: a) Sum of: - Taxi Fuel - Trip Fuel to via the Decision Point - Contingency Fuel of not less than 5% of the e stimated fuel used from the DP to Destination + Final Reserve Fuel + Additional (if required) + Extra (Commanders discretion) b) Sum of: - Taxi Fuel - Trip Fuel to via the Decision Point - Contingency Fuel of not less than 3% of the estimated trip fuel from Departure airport to Enroute Alt. - Final Reserve Fuel + Additional (if required) + Extra (Commanders discretion) Load Control will pass final ZFW at ETD - :25 Final ramp fuel should be communicated to the engineer at ETD - :25 If final ZFW is communicated late AND refueling not complete by ETD - :10, delay is caused by late ZFW. A new load sheet may be requested with a change at or above 3.0 tons. Refueling has to be supervised by a responsible person OR one of the Pilots. Fuel uplift check. Actual Fuel Uplift versus Calculated Fuel Uplift must be within; Actual Uplift > Calculated Uplift - max 5% of Calculated Uplift up to 2 tonnes Actual Uplift < Calculated Uplift - max 5% of Calculated Uplift up to 1 ton Refueling with pax onboard is only allowed with at least one Pilot present on the Flight Deck and; Two Way comm. between pilot and ground crew supervising the refueling. Captain is required to inform the Purser when refueling starts & finishes, who will in turn inform crew & pax. A minimum of two normal exits must be available for opening in case of evacuation. At least one exit must be provided with loading bridge or steps. A second exit might be a closed & ARMED door with a CC at the exit, preferably behind the wing. The NO SMOKING signs must be ON and FASTEN SEATBELTS must be OFF No De-Fuelling with Pax Boarding, on board or Disembarking Fuel tankering: Up to 1% below MLW Not to be performed if runway for takeoff is contaminated or expected to be so. For a non-tankering sector, the landing weight is to be planned to 1% below MLW If uplift to MLW, planning to this weight should only be in coordination with Commander / Load Control.

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In-Flight Fuel Management: Fuel checks enroute should be carried out at waypoints not exceeding 60 minutes. Be aware that OFP minimum required fuel does NOT include Contingency Fuel or Additional Fuel If insufficient fuel is remaining, reduce consumption by: - Fly at a more economical speed (Cost Index Zero) & flight level - Fly a more direct routing - Select an alternate closer to the destination, or re-calculate actual distance to alternate (ex LHR-LGW). The Commander SHALL declare an emergency when the actual usable fuel on board is less than Final Reserve Fuel (as stated on the OFP). Commitment to Destination (Alternate Airport discarded) The following conditions must be met: 1) If 1) If a delay is known or an EAT is received from controller, AND a landing at destination is assured AND touchdown with at least Final Reserve Fuel is possible; The flight may continue to destination regardless of the number of runways. A landing is “assured” if it can be completed in the event of any forecast weather deterioration AND plausible single failures of ground and airborne facilities (ex: ILS failure on ground or NO LAND 3 on board). Forecasted weather is used when more than 2 hours from relevant airport. Actual weather reports and trend information is used when closer than 2 hours from relevant airport. 2) If a delay is NOT known, the flight must be able to reach at least two airports (Destination & Alternate) and landing assured with at least Final Reserve Fuel remaining at touchdown. Exception: Within 2 hours of destination and destination having at least two separate & independent runways, the second runway can be nominated n ominated as alternate. A landing is “assured” if it can be completed in the event of any forecast weather deterioration AND plausible single failures of ground and airborne facilities (ex: ILS failure on ground or NO LAND 3 on board). Forecast weather is used when more than 2 hours from relevant airport. Actual weather reports and trend information is used when closer than 2 hours from relevant airport.

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- Within the constraint of route requirements, the flight routing selected shall result in minimum cost operation consistent with ATC restrictions, weather conditions and passenger comfort. - The pilot arriving first at the CBC shall initiate the flight prep and planning process. - Only one FP marked “Master Copy” must be submitted, Capt’s responsibility, legal requirement Changes to departure times: - Change for one flight at least 48 hours before - STD is changed. recorded from this new time. - Short notice changes - STD is not changed. Delays recorded from original STD/STA - In either case, Ops Control will enter the new ETD on t he OFP, since it is the basis for wind and route calculations. Therefore, these times should NOT be copied onto the VR, but use the scheduled STD/STA that should be remarked under the “Remarks” heading. Flight crew should make a quick scan of relevant info, then brief the Cabin Crew, then conduct the remainder of the briefing. The minimum requirements for Pre-flight Planning and Briefing are: - Check OFP for accuracy and validity (date, aircraft to be used and route) - NOTAMS and WX for f or departure, destination and alternates - Enroute NOTAMS for the first hour of flight Cabin Crew briefing: - The Captain is required to brief the Cabin Crew before every duty or change of Cabin Crew. - First Officers should only conduct this briefing when it is certain that the Captain is delayed. - The briefing will establish the role of the Captain as a team leader and team manager, and should encourage interaction and feedback between cabin and flight crew. - Items to be covered: Introduction of Pilots Verbal confirmation from the Purser that all personal documents have been verified Details of the flight and any aspects affecting service or pax comfort Access to the flight deck Only the Purser/SFS should contact the Flight Deck from “ Cabin Crew prepare for Take Off ” to gear is up. Only the Purser/SFS should contact the Flight Deck from “ Cabin Crew prep. for Landing ” to runway vacated. At all other times an abnormality is noted the Cabin Crew should contact the Flight Deck directly. - The importance of strict adherence to all security procedures - Any details from the Purser regarding special pax, VIP’s, deportees etc. - For augmented ops: brief on delegation of command, rest periods and meal arrangements Company Briefing - Flight Doc folders contents - Check CFP for accuracy and validity (date, aircraft to be used and route) - Fuel (gross error check x7 for the -200 and x8 for the -300) - RM, company NOTAMS, fuel requirements, tankering and degradation value - FCI’s Unofficial Document

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- Check NOTAMS for the flight - Check WX for the flight - Check terrain critical sectors for single engine performance (RM ch 5) - Check Safety & Security file - Route briefing should include checking ATC FP - Availability of airports for Depress or Drift down should be assessed in the same manner as adequate airports for NON-ETOPS flights; importantly f/cast wx should not influence the dispatch of the flight. It does however influence dispatch of ETOPS or Reduced Reserve Flights. - If a flight folder is not provided, FD shall obtain relevant info from the local Flight Planning office. Dubai Diversion - Use Master Flight Log in Docs folder (from specific airports). Capt must ensure FP is filed (handling agent) - They are based on zero wind (negligible), Max TOW (land weight limited) + 30 min fuel. Be careful not to use them if MEL has higher f uel consumption - If no load sheet provided, use diversion load sheet in docs folder Selection of Destination and Alternate - Forecast WX must be at applicable PLANNING minima +/- 1 hour ETA or improving to the requirement for supplementary fuel carried - Destination planning minima is Jepp approach minima taking A/Field facilities into account. The only exception is circling minima (higher of Company +1100/5000m or Jepp). If weather at destination +/- 1 hour is below applicable Jeppesen minima - 2 alternates - Emirates normally plans one alternate, if no diversion is foreseen they plan the closest alternate, if diversion is a possibility, they plan the best operational alternate. - One nav-aid is enough if WX is CAVOK, otherwise 2 nav-aids required to be considered an Alternate - Alternate weather minima applies: CAT III  CAT I CAT II  CAT I + 100’/300m CAT I  Non Prec Non Prec  Circling minima (if no circling then NPA + 200’/1000m) Circling Approach  higher of 1200’/5000m or Jeppesen minima if higher REMARK; once airborne, only Jeppesen chart minima needs to be considered. - A Takeoff Alternate must be designated within 420 nm (840 nm for ETOPS a/c) if departure aerodrome is below CAT I. The TO alternate must have weather above applicable minima from 1 hour before to 1 hour after estimated arrival time. Ceiling required for NPA and circling - If No Weather Forecast is available, the airport must be considered below minima. - Emirates policy is to plan for anticipated runway conditions, e.g. wet, hot, snow etc. Regarding pavement strength for destinations and enroute alternates, if it is in the RM, it CAN be used. - If an enroute stop is to an airport not in the RM, the Jeppesen Airport Directory shall be applied. - RFF; VPTFO may nominate 1 below (annotated in RM). GCAA can authorize 2 below (annotated in RM). Departure & Destination: RFF 9 Destination Alternate: RFF 8 ETOPS alternate: RFF 6 Unofficial Document

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- Emirates policy is the more restrictive of FOM or State Law - No cancellation of an IFR flight plan is authorized. MAPS AND CHARTS - Jeppesen takes precedence over the RM when a conflict exists. - Manuscript alterations to any manuals are not permitted (e.g. writing on Jeppesen charts) - Old plates/charts that are superceded by a newer one will be returned to Flight Ops with the ships papers. - ATC will not guarantee terrain clearance, this rests with the Captain. However; if positive radar identified, a clearance to descend below MOCA/MORA is acceptable, as terrain clearance is the responsibility of the radar controller. - ICAO defines the ILS Glide Path to be usable up to “at least” 10 nm. Do not capture the GS outside this. COLD TEMP CORRECTIONS - If Temp is warmer than ISA, True alt is higher than indicated, Pressure Alt under reads. This puts you higher on the GP for NPA’s and is safe. The opposite is therefore a concern. (Hot to Cold, don’t be bold) If FMC NPA’s require altitude corrections, VNAV cannot be used - If OAT is ISA -15 or colder, corrections to en-route MSA’s must be applied - DA or MDA when ISA -30 - IF, MAA etc when ISA -45 with ATC approval - No paperwork should be done below 10.000’ - Only essential items should be done below 20.000’

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- When on duty and a uniform is worn, the Captain is responsible for the correct appearance of all crew. - Summer uniform: on turnaround flights from 15 April - 31 October. During summer and on a layover flight, the jacket may be carried on the arm, at the Captains discretion. - Winter uniform: all year for all layover duties & on turnaround flights from 01 November 14 April. Jacket must be worn when in public. - Decrease of fitness under mental stress can occur and the crew member is responsible to decide whether he is fit for duty or not - If a crewmember needs to be removed (doubt about fitness to operate), the problem will be discussed mutually by the Captain, First Officer and Purser. SMNC should be contacted if a crewmember is to be removed. - The Captain/FO/Purser should brief the remaining crew that the crewmember has stood down from the flight. - Crew transport in Dubai. Contact Central Services if car has not arrived 10 minutes after expected time. - After 20 minutes, make your own way to the CBC. Flight Ops Department will reimburse this expense. - On positioning flights with EK crew must wear uniform and be on GD, report ETD -0130 at briefing, where positioning was decided within 72 hours, a Captain may be downgraded to Y class. - An FO traveling with a Captain travels in the same class. - Minimum Cabin Crew for service: -200 = 8 crew (one for each door) and on a -300 = 10 crew - One cabin crew less is acceptable if that door is considered inoperable and therefore the max number of pax is limited, 1 cabin crew per 50 pax. - A cabin crew may operate one grade higher or lower than their normal position Crew Position and Duty - The A/P must be engaged during seat changes and non permissible below 10 000’. - Capt and TC flying during training, TC is commander. If not training L seat Capt is commander - In the following cases the Capt must assume PF RTO Certain emergency / abnormal situations Any time he considers it necessary for safe conduct - When the First Officer is acting as PF, the Captain shall not countermand the First Officers decisions, unless he considers that flight safety, regulations or Emirates standards are being compromised.

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Augmented Crew: Where Crew Scheduling has not nominated a particular pilot as Augmenting, this will be done by the PIC. The Second in Command must hold a valid UAE ATPL. Augmenting FO’s will be trained in - Rapid Decompression & rapid descent - Engine Failure with drift down - TCAS RA’s When the Captain is resting with a 2 FO crew, t he FO in the right seat (qualified operating seat) will be PF. The PIC should contact his operating crew the day before the flight to draft an in-flight rest plan. T/O crew must be in their seat prior to “Pre-flight Checklist” Before changing seats the incoming crew must be fully briefed on A/C, Destination, Alt, ATC, WX status When changing seats, A/P engaged, speaker on and docs ready PIC must brief crew on severity of situation for his disturbance before retiring Admission to Flightdeck - The following people are allowed to the F/D Sheik Ahmed Flanagan Clark Al Redha Stealy They are however not allowed while in UK airspace - The Capt decides on who gets vacant crew seats - Only 1 flight deck jumpseat may be occupied by a non-crewmember - Vacant crew jump seats are not to be used for T/O and landing - Flight crew resting should be no more than 40 min, then 10 min to regather

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- A checklist may never be recited from memory - Scan actions may be out of sequence but response must be according to checklist - Any paper checklist which is interrupted should be started again from the beginning. - At any time PF is off the primary ATC frequency, control of the aircraft is transferred to the other pilot. - When the First Officer is PF, the Captain shall only handle the CFP from TOC to TOD. - The altimeter of the PF shall be the governing instrument for ALT / Height checks - Whenever an aircraft commences a climb or descent, the PF shall call “Leaving...” “Climbing/Descending...” - Speeds

Between 10 and 5000’ AAL, 250 KIAS unless requested by ATC Below 5000’it is mandatory to be below 250 KIAS - Minimum width of runways for EK operations is 45 m. Otherwise an approval from VPFOT is needed. - When Seatbelt Sign is ON for turbulence, the Purser must be briefed by the Captain. - The Purser must be informed when 20 minutes remains before TOD. - Briefings should always include the airfield CAT - Any non-standard procedure or deviation from the SOP’s is to be reported on CSR - Ground staff must keep Capt aware of any delay longer than 5 min. Captains welcome aboard PA: - Introduce yourself & crew (Capt, FO, Pur, and SFS’s) - Flight plan routing, mention map display on screens - Enroute weather - Destination weather - Expected flight time - Use of seat belts whilst seated (legally important) If time permits – if boarding was delayed get announcements made in terminal to pax. If not pushing back by ETD, give pax reason. Use professional and calm voice, simple facts and known places, do not mention safety v ideos, avoid technical terms, do not use “bad wx, turb, going down or final approach” and use Arabian Gulf. - Flight delays of more than 20 min, crew may request connection info for pax from Company Captain to Ground Engineer: - Ground to Flight Deck - Go ahead - All ground checks are complete and engineering standing by - Roger - Cleared for pushback, facing.... - Pushback facing...., please release brakes - Brakes released, off chocks ...., delay due to...... - Pushback complete, please set brakes - Brakes set - Two good starts, cleared to disconnect, hand signals on the ….. side Ground crew thumbs and by-pass pin held up means all is clear around A/C During pushback if you need to attract the engineer or tug drivers attention, flash A/C wing lights Unofficial Document

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CRS (Certificate of Release to Service) When a defect is entered in the Tech Log, the Certificate of Airworthiness is no longer valid The CRS revalidates the CoA A CRS will be issued by a UAE GCAA licensed engineer A Captain can issue a CRS at outstations if - No faults have been detected - A fault can be deferred to the MEL without a maintenance procedure The aircraft is considered dispatched when the engineer has been released, prior to taxi (EK). The aircraft is considered dispatched when take-off power is set (Boeing MEL). After dispatch the MEL should only be used for reference if: an ECAM/EICAS message appears after dispatch and before T/O - Accomplish non-normal/normal procedure - Communicate with maintenance (LM or MCC) with reference to MEL, FCI, Bulletins etc and decide on course of action. After comms return to stand if, unsafe to continue flight, MEL maintenance procedure needs to be completed before flight or continuing with the problem, even if allowed under MEL, is not appropriate - If you cannot establish comms with maintenance, FC must establish if flight can continue using all the available sources taking the above into account. If they determine maintenance action is required then r eturn to stand. If a fault occurs with no EICAS message, the MEL need not be referenced. Concessions: - For handling of defects not specifically covered in the MEL, a Concession to Operate is needed - The concession must be in written form only, unless special authorization from GCAA received - Capt must receive a copy for the Tech log as well as entries for nature of problem, concession been received and WX for certain conditions if required Technical fault reporting in the Tech Log: (Both pilots must review Tech log together) “Y” for a new defect “N” for no defect (& “Nil Defects” written), or if the defect is a known defect already in the ADD. Brief description “AUTOLAND” in Tech log only if unsatisfactory, downgraded or requested by technical section

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Before Take-off Cannot dispatch if maintenance check expires before the planned time of arrival at next station Daily Check, valid 48 hours (cannot expire during flight) Transit checks, can be performed by a Captain on a contingency basis Flight Crew should be aboard no later that STD-35 Cabin Crew should be aboard no later that STD-55 Emergency briefing: on a multiple-sector day, the Reject briefing need only be briefed for first take off. Cabin Crew will ARM doors as soon as the A/C moves or on ODD occasions at Capt’s discretion A delay is Off Chocks Time later than STD+3 minutes

Taxi - Max 30 KIAS, Max 10 KIAS on slippery surfaces - When A/C is brought to a complete stop, Park Brake must be set - CM1 must taxi A/C when Final turn onto stand until parked 180 deg turn required No published Taxi guidance available Take-off and Climb GCAA Ops Specifications states minima for take off as Ceiling = Zero and minimum RVR as follows: Nil (day only) 500M Runway Edge Lighting and/or Runway Centre Line Marking 250/300M (Notes 1&2) Runway Edge Lighting and Runway Centre Line Lighting 200/250M (Note 1) REL and Runway Centre Line lighting RVR Information 150/200M (Note 1&4) ◊ Notes: 1. The higher values apply to Category D aircraft. 2. For night operations at least runway edge and stop end lights are required. 3. The required RVR/visibility value representative of the initial part of the takeoff run can be replaced by pilot assessment when no reported RVR or visibility is available. The takeoff run shall not be commenced unless it can be determined that the actual conditions satisfy the applicable minima. 4. The required RVR value must be achieved for all relevant RVR reporting points with the exception in note 3

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- AWO are below the values above, down to the values on the 10-AWO chart (typically RVR 125/150m) - When no RVR or visibility is reported, a Captains assessment based on 60m runway edge lights is OK. - Turns shall normally not be initiated below 500’ AGL unless mandated by a SID or noise abatement. - Max bank for all phases of flight is 30 deg - Comms with the company if not AUTO by ACARS should be done above 20 000’at Capt’s discretion Cruise A 1-mile offset is not approved:

In European B-RNAV or in RNP5 or better airspace Below MSA On SID’s or STARS If Nav accuracy is not assured Unless approved by ATC if appropriate - A 1-mile offset should be considered in areas with In-Flight Broadcast Procedures (Africa, Yangon) and while climbing and descending in areas with known bi-directional traffic exists. - If ETA changes by more than 30 min, advise MCC via ACARS - Any A/C unservicebility that might affect dispatch at next station must be sent to EK Eng by ACARS ASAP Descent and Hold - ROD not to exceed the following 5000 fpm down to 5000’ o o 3000 fpm down to 3000’ o 2000 fpm down to 1000’ o 1000 fpm below 1000’ In the decent, ROD should be reduced to below 1000 fpm within 500’ of level off.

Approach - Target for decent is 25 track miles at 250 KIAS at 5000’ AAL An approach should be stabilised by 1000’ ATE, (or at the latest 500’ ATE if rwy lights visible above 1000’) 1. The aircraft is on the correct flight path. 2. Only small changes in heading/pitch are required to maintain the correct flight path. 3. The aircraft speed is not more than V REF + 20 knots indicated airspeed and not less than V REF; or as adjusted by minimum ground speed techniques. 4. The aircraft is in the correct landing configuration. 5. Rate of descent is no greater than 1,000 feet per minute; if an approach requires a rate of descent greater than 1,000 feet per minute, a special briefing should be conducted. 6. Power setting is appropriate for the aircraft configuration and is not below the minimum power for approach as defined by the aircraft operating manual. 7. All briefings and checklists have been conducted. 8. Specific types of approaches are stabilised if they also fulfil the following: Instrument Landing System (ILS) approaches must be flown within one dot of the glideslope and localiser. During a circling approach, wings shall be level on finals by 300 feet above airfield elevation; and,

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9. Unique approach procedures or abnormal conditions requiring a deviation from the above elements of a stabilised approach require a special briefing. Note: An approach that becomes unstabilised below 1,000 feet above airport elevation in IMC, or below 500 feet above airport elevation in VMC, requires an immediate goaround. Approach minimas are as published on the Jepp charts + the following: - Circling: Ceiling of 1000’’ rounded up to the nearest 100’ or Jepp minima and Visibility Visibility 5000m or Jepp minima - Radar vectors to visual approach: 5000m (reported by twr before leaving Vectoring Altitude OR rwy in sight). - Visual Circuit Approach: company VMC (5000m vis, 1,5nm from cloud and 1000’ below cloud) CAT 1 approaches must have specific minima of 200’ DA and 800m met vis or 550 RVR Airfield with vis less than 800m vis must have RVR information to be used Requirements and Applicability of Ceiling, RVR and MET VIS - A circling approach may only be commenced if the ground reported ceiling and vis are equal to or better than company or Jepp minima - An instrument approach in IMC may be commenced / continued to minima irrespective of reported ceiling - Approach may commence if reported VIS / RVR is at least approach minima - If the reported VIS / RVR is below the minima, the approach may commence provided the Capt considers these to be at / above the approach minima before reaching the ABP - For NPA or CAT 1 ILS, only VIS or touchdown RVR need be considered Circling approach is the only one that requires reported ceiling - When an approach chart minima is labeled “JAR OPS” and ONLY reported VIS is given (no RVR), the FACTORED VIS table can be used. - This conversion cannot be used for T/O, AWOPS or where RVR is available and RVR reported for a runway does not qualify it for an alternate runway Approach ban point: CAT II/III - .000’ (or as stated on the 10-AWO chart) CAT I & Non-prec - Outer Marker or equivalent point (unless otherwise stated). If no point exists it will be 1000’ Circling approaches - Initial Approach Fix (IAF), effectively you cannot commence the approach Required visual reference: CAT I requires at least one of the following: - Elements of the approach light system - Runway threshold - Runway threshold markings / lights / identification lights

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Non-Precision Approach Approach requires at least one of the following: - A minimum of seven consecutive approach lights if available - Runway threshold - Runway threshold markings/lights/ identification lights - VASI - Touchdown zone, or touchdown zone markings/lights - Runway edge lights - PF must take control at latest leaving FAF, turning base leg with radar vectors or 1000’ AGL - On a coupled approach with manual landing, AP must be disengaged by 80’ AGL - AUTOLAND can only be performed on runways approved for CAT II / III approaches - Manual approaches may only be flown down to minima with WX above CAT I - Each crew member will try and do 1 NPA approach to MDA, once a month, note it on VR - If a visual circuit (3 legs at / above 1500’) is to be flown, brief the following MA procedure in conjunction with ATC Possible GPWS GS warning Terrain clearance and airport characteristics - Orbits/360° turns are only authorised with Autopilot engaged and are not authorised below 1500’AGL - Pilots can only request orbits in daylight VMC and it must be reported on the VR - If a missed approach is conducted, it is Emirates policy to limit the number of approaches to 2, unless there is a good possibility to land off a third approach. Diversion - If a diversion is required, the Captain should lease with SMNC & Ops Control, and inform the passengers on the PA (PA may be delegated to the Purser) - Alternate Weather – If alternate WX deteriorates it may continue to be used if t he latest forecasts, including TRENDS, indicate it will be above JEPP minima at applicable landing time - Ensure that the diversion A/Field has the required equipment for pushback before accepting a parked in bay - The availability of equipment has no bearing on adequacy of airport. Landing - AUTOBRAKES should be used for CAT II / III landings - Recommended for Wet or Contaminated RWYS o One engine inop landings o Crosswind above 15 kts o - If the A/C has a Tech fault, the Engineer or mechanic should be briefed, if NIL DEFECTS, there is no need to handover to the engineer / mechanic

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- Disruptive passenger is one who imperils the safety of the aircraft, passengers or crew or causes discomfort or make him/her objectionable to other passengers or who f ails to observe the instructions of Emirates staff. - A PIC has the right to refuse r efuse to accept an invalid or incapacitated passenger passenger if he believes the passenger is likely to be placed at risk by the journey or constitutes a flight safety hazard or cause discomfort to others. - The PIC is ultimately responsible for the decision to exclude a passenger from carriage, and the final decision must rest with him. Once dispatched, if PAX must be offloaded, police must be present - A CSR must then be filed (2 independent witnesses names must be included, willing willing to give evidence) - One Flight Deck Crew and all Cabin Crew must be on board while passengers embark/disembark. Autoboarding in DXB shall commence at STD-45 (remote stand) and STD-35 at an aerobidge. PIC consent is not required. If auto-boarding is delayed due late arrival of Flight Crew, this must be noted in the VR. If 14 or more UM’s are traveling, IFS will provide a Supy to look after them. UM’s are the responsibility of the Purser, even in the case of a flight disruption. PIL (Passengers Information List) will include all Wheel Chair requests. If additional WC’s are needed, the Flight Deck Crew will request this, stating the passengers name. WCHR - for pax that can walk to cabin seat, can ascend steps. WCHS - for pax that can walk to cabin seats, can not ascend steps. WCHC - pax completely immobile. Must have escort. (But p 10 states a Non-ambulatory passenger can travel unescorted except if he/she can not manage own bodily functions in the toilet!) If during a transit stop where passengers disembarked, if upon re-boarding a discrepancy between the Transit Passenger Manifest & passengers occurs, this must be reported to the PIC & he must order a baggage identification check. If a checked in passengers fails to show up at the gate at STD-10, offloading of baggage shall commence. If a passenger appears before baggage is found, he may me accepted for the flight. If a passenger appears AFTER the baggage has been located, he will be denied. If a checked in passenger in a “pooled group” (family or group) fails to show up at the gate: - All bags checked in by the group must be off-loaded - The remaining passengers of the group must physically identify their own bags by touching them - In DXB, re-screening of identified, pooled baggage is not a requirement. There is no requirement for the Flight Crew to sight the offloaded baggage. The PIC will then sign the missing passenger report. If the Seat Belt Sign is ON, hot liquids shall not be served to passengers.

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- If smoking in the cabin is noted, an instruction to stop will be issued by a Cabin Crew member. - If the instruction is not followed, the Purser & PIC must be informed, and the Purser must raise a VR. - If a passenger is caught smoking in the toilet the PIC must be informed, and the Purser must raise a VR. - If a passenger has tampered with the Smoke Detector in the toilet, the PIC must be notified. The PIC will then call SMNC to meet the aircraft on arrival. - Life vest DEMO must be done if flight over water, 50 nm from off-shore and over water beyond gliding dist. - 2 Therapeutic O2 bottles can be carried but NO xtra portable O2 bottles may be carried - Diplomatic bags (max 75 kg) will not be screened and must be placed on the seat cushion & fully secured. - INAD passengers - no threat, thr eat, no limit on number. - DEPO passenger - no more than 1 unescorted on any one flight (except for families). - More than 1 DEPO requires prior approval from Chief of Group Security. - No more than 8 DEPO requiring escort on any one flight. More than 8 requires prior approval from CGS. - PRISONER passengers - escorted at all times, usually in some form of physical constraint. - C15 form must be completed and distributed to Purser & PIC for all 3 of the above and the station should ensure that the Purser has all of their travel documents. - It is the PIC’s responsibility to ensure that a DEPO does not disembark within the country of refusal. DEPO and INAD pax may however disembark at other countries with approval from the concerned authorities Pregnancy: - Uncomplicated pregnancy until the end of 27 weeks - no medical certificate required - From the start of the 28 th week a Medical certificate (written within 7 days of travelling and stating delivery date) is required r equired from a doctor or mid-wife. - The limitations on these are: Uncomplicated single pregnancies accepted up to the end of the 36 th week Multiple (twin etc) pregnancies accepted up to the end of the 32 nd week Travel beyond these dates requires special authorization and they must use MEDIF system Medical assistance on Arrival in Dubai: DNATA Ramp on 131.6 must be advised with all pertinent details. OPS Control on 132.6 must be advised that DNATA Ramp has been contacted. Medical Emergency Diversion: Cabin Crew should provide First Aid. Medlink should be contacted if needed. Only if Medlink is not contactable should a Passenger PA for medical personnel be done. The PIC will normally not give assurance of responsibility of Emirates to accept cost of medical care. Medlink will advise the PIC of suitable enroute diversion airport. The PIC will advise Medlink of ETA, and Medlink will arrange all medical services to meet the aircraft and follow-up treatment.

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Passenger misconduct. Can be of many types, abusive/suggestive language, refusal to comply with instructions, indecent exposure, drunkenness, drugs, threatening with physical violence, etc. Cabin Crew will warn passenger, ending in a Formal Warning from the Captain. PIC is responsible that appropriate written reports from the crew are submitted. The authority to use Passenger Restraining Devices rests solely with the PIC. Illness, Birth or Death - Someone aiding must produce a valid qualification - Cabin crew may not give a pax an injection - Cabin crew may open EMK without Capt’s permission - For an in-flight birth a doctor or nurse must be requested and if non available, help from female cabin attendants. The PIC shall make a lengthy report with his signature and 2 other crew members. This report shall be copied & attached to the VR. - Suspected death: A passenger is never declared dead, but considered “Very seriously ill”. After landing a lengthy report must be filed by the PIC in conjunction with the Purser and Station Manager and handed over to the police. A copy of this report must be filed with the ships papers. Loadsheet: - It is the PIC’s responsibility to check that the certificate number & signature is written on the loadsheet, and also periodically inspect such certificates for validity (valid 2 years). - Exception is in Dubai where a gate-printed loadsheet will only bear a name & licence number. - The PIC’s signature is his confirmation that he is satisfied with the loadsheet. LMC: <= 300 kg; no change to loadsheet >300 to 1000 kg; amend ZFW, TOW and LW on loadsheet > 1000 kg; new computer loadsheet. If manual loadsheet is used, amend it & make a new trim sheet. It is acceptable to use 20 kg. as standard passenger baggage. Special loads: - List of animals and compartments in the table provided - Falcons; up to 15 can be carried, must be hooded & chained to handler. In Economy or Business class, only 1 falcon pr. handler. If a further seat is paid for, an additional 2 falcons. In First class, only 2 falcons pr. handler. If a further seat is paid for, an additional 3 falcons can be carried. DFO may grant exceptions for VIP passengers. All weapons and ammunition, incl. replica & knives must be carried in the cargo hold. If a NOTOC was received and crew changed at a transit stop, the departing crew will leave a message to new crew regarding the NOTOC.

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Aircraft Technical Support at Outstation: STATIONS WITH EK OR AUTHORISED ENGINEER - They sign the CRS and the Capt’s signs his acceptance STATIONS WITHOUT AN AUTHORISED ENGINEER - Capt is responsible to ensure A/C is serviceable, correctly fuelled and fluid levels sufficient - If there is no assistance the Capt has authorization for: - Refueling (FCOM) - Transit Check (Docs folder) - Transfer of Defects to ADD section of Tech log provided they are acceptable to PIC for the next leg and in accordance with the MEL - If the A/C is unserviceable and requires maintenance action the PIC will contact SMNC. It is the PIC’s responsibility to determine using MEL / CDL whether the A/C can continue to fly in the current condition. If rectification of a defect is required, with authorization from Dubai, a local maintenance agency can supply spare parts and a local engineer can issue a CRS. A FAX with this authority is required, copy in ships papers. Requirements for CRS NO DEFECT - No requirement to issue CRS DEFECT RAISED - If a competent (non authorized) engineer or crew is able to rectify the defect and the PIC is satisfied the A/C is airworthy, he may accept the A/C without CRS being raised but must report it to UAE GCAA within 10 days. - The CRS should contain the following Type of defect and its circumstances Action taken to rectify defect including people / organization and parts names Comms with EK Engineering DEFECT RAISED AND MEL APPLIES - If the defect is allowable under the MEL: PIC must make appropriate entry in the “Action Taken” column Item transferred to ADD section PIC has authorization to issue CRS, no GCAA notification required - Captains credit card is for use at off-route unscheduled airports where Credit facilities are not in place - If it is needed however SMNC must be contacted to increase the limit - Use the Fuel Carnet for Fuel, handling etc and only the credit card if Credit cannot be arranged - Be aware of what document copies need to be left behind if you diverted and are now returning.

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- Do not place any magnetic or metallic object closer than 75 cm to the compass. - If the Forward Facing Camera was switched off due turbulence/crosswind, a note in the VR is needed. - Throughout an NDB approach, the PNF is to continuously monitor the identification of the beacon. A navaid shall not be used for primary navigation purposes if it is: - On maintenance - Unreliable - On test - The proper identification has not been received If a navaid is reported “Ground checked only” it can ONLY be used for enroute navigation, NOT for approach. - For night operations, at least runway edge lights, threshold lights and runway end lights must be on. - If both high & low intensity approach lights are unserviceable, minimum visibility must be increased by 900 m to a minimum of at least 1500 m visibility. Oxygen: - Emirates O2 is: o Supply all pax for 10 mins or entire time above 15000’cabin alt o 30% of the pax for time between 14 and 15000’cabin alt 10% of the pax after 30 mins between 10 and 14000’cabin alt o - Passengers must use oxygen when cabin altitude is above 15000’ (not at or below 15000’) - Flight Crew must use oxygen above 10000’ (FCI) - If the crew O2 becomes inop in flight, you can descend to FL250 with portable O2 bottles for each flight crew on duty. Above FL250, quick donning masks must be serviceable All flight crewmembers must be secured during moderate or heavy turbulence. Radio two, set on 121.5 can be switch to a Volmet frequency when needed. ACARS should only be used for weather information when it is not readily available from Volmet/Atis. - Satvoice is expensive and should only be used when it is the most appropriate means of communication. - Flight deck loudspeakers may be used during cruise, but only for VHF communication. - When a headset/boom mike is used, the corresponding loudspeaker will be turned OFF. - Headset must be used when radio other than primary VHF is used and when below 10000 - The PNF should not use the PTT-switch on the control wheel when the PF is flying manually.

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- Ground icing condition company policy: “Make it Clean & keep it Clean”. - A light coating of frost is permissible on the top of the fuselage. - Frost up to 3 mm is permissible on the under surface of the wing due fuel cold soaking. - There is no such thing as “a little f rost” on critical surfaces.’ - No A/C may knowingly dispatch with an INOP APU to an airport where de-icing may be required unless ground start facilities are available - Take-off is permissible in light freezing rain (but perhaps not advisable). - Take-off is not permissible in moderate & heavy freezing rain and falling heavy wet snow. - Emirates requires cabin crew during pre-flight to briefed and pax before de-icing takes place - If such a report is made, a Pre take-off Contamination Inspection (PCI) from the Cabin is mandatory. - A PCI is MANDATORY if precipitation has occurred since the final de/anti-ice fluid was applied and MINIMUM holdover time has expired. - It is mandatory for the PIC to inform Cabin Crew of de-icing during preflight briefing, and passengers prior to engine start. - Once a decision to de-ice has been made (either by PIC or Qualified Person), it can not be over-ridden by the other party. - It is imperative to ensure all personal and equipment is clear after De/Anti-icing before you taxi - Ice can form in temps as high as 15 deg - Engine-on de-icing is allowed at specified stations, found in the Route Manual. - At no time may an A/C that has been anti-iced get another treatment unless it is f irst de-iced - A Tech-Log entry with the following is required by the PIC or Engineer; Type of fluid used & ratio + UTC time of starting final application + if 1 car was used, which wing was treated first. - Time spent spraying parts of the fuselage before representative surface is not considered for holdover time A runway is Dry, Slippery or Contaminated Dry - runway is not shiny in appearance Slippery: < 2 mm slush / < 3 mm water / < 4 mm wet snow / < 15 mm dry/loose snow / ice /compact snow Contaminated: => 2 mm slush / => 3 mm water / => 4 mm wet snow / => 15 mm dry snow - Max T/O thrust for contaminated runways - T/O on icy runways is not allowed - T/O or landing on runways covered with more than the following is not allowed: 13 mm standing water 13 mm of slush 13 mm of wet snow 100 mm of dry snow - The available cleared or treated runway width must not be less than 30 m (45 m) - If icing is present, increase approach speed, use anti-icing before slat operation and delay extension - For landing on slippery runways, consider use of idle reverse until directional control is assured.

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- If surface mean winds are => 60 kts, the airport must be considered closed. - On approach, 4 nautical miles between heavy aircrafts are acceptable. - Avoid cells by more than 10 miles above 20 000 AWOPS - AWOPS refers to T/O below T/O minima 150/200 and Landing below CAT I minima - LVP’s come into force when RVR falls below 550 m and ceiling below 200’ - AWO pilot qualifications remain valid between PPC’s. - CAT II / III new Capt limits are 50 hr s or 20 sectors, add 100m to RVR minima TAKE-OFF: AWO qualified crews may reduce take-off minima to 125m (C) / 150 (D) provided: - LVP in force - Rwy Centre Line Lights spaced 15m or less and High Intensity Edge Lights spaced 60m or less. - 90m visual segment available from the flight deck at the take-off point - Required RVR for all reporting points as shown on the 10-AWO chart Abandon take-off if visual reference is lost below 100 KIAS. Reduced thrust take-off is permissible. APPROACH: - For an AWO approach, the 10-AWO must be used. - Aircraft must be stabilised at the latest by 1500’ AGL during an AWO approach. - RVR for the Stop end (Roll Out RVR) is at Captains discretion, but never below 75m

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Emirates ETOPS single-engine cruise speed (still air & ISA) is 420 kts. Fuel planning is NOT in still air/ISA, but considers winds, ISA deviation, icing etc. Fuel must include cruise at selected diversion speed, descent to 1500’ above diversion airport, hold for 15 minutes, one IFR approach with a missed approach and a VFR approach to landing. Fuel must be planned at the actual weight at ETP with 5% contingency fuel, individual aircraft performance degradation, APU fuel (all done automatically by OFP), icing & MEL/CDL items (applied by dispatcher). Recency is ETOPS on licence or signed ETOPS authorization certificate. Critical fuel scenario: 1) Standard fuel from departure to Critical Equitime Point & 2) fuel from Critical ETP to the diversion airport. The highest of the two must be used, and if the diversion fuel required is higher than standard fuel at ETP to destination, it will be included at ETOPS Extra Fuel. Critical Fuel is based on 3 scenarios: 1) Engine Failure - descent at selected speed and cruise to diversion airport (never limiting) 2) Depressurisation - rapid descent at Mmo/Vmo to FL 100, cruise at LRC 3) Depressurisation with Engine failure - rapid descent to FL 100, cruise at selected speed (worst case) ETOPS alternates weather requirements: Planning stage: An adequate airport is Suitable if th e weather is above minima from 1 hr before earliest use to 1 hr after latest use, including forecasted crosswinds being within limits (within 80% of company limits). Typically for an airport with a CAT I approach is Circling Approach minima (5000m & 1100’ ceiling). After dispatch: Once the aircraft is dispatched, the weather needs only to be above landing minima (no planning penalties). If WX minima deteriorates below landing minima before or while inside the ETOPS segment, another alternate must be nominated with required WX If not possible, do not enter ETOPS area, if already in, Capt must decide whether to continue or fly non-ETOPS routing Before an ETOPS flight, an ETOPS SUPPL check must be signed in the Tech Log. If an ETOPS verification flight is needed after maintenance, a 90 minutes segment before entering ETOPS is needed without the failure of an ETOPS critical item. This must be noted in the Tech Log as “ETOPS Verification Flight satisfactory”. The ADD raised will be cleared at the next station. Consider carrying extra fuel to continue the flight non-ETOPS if the verification flight should fail. ETOPS Flight Watch will notify EK flight crew if an enroute alternate goes below minima, and will re-plan.

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Cat A - Unrestricted Cat B - Physical entry or Self Brief or Audio/visual presentation or Simulator exercise. Validity is 12 months. Cat C - PE and Airfield Briefing or Audio/visual or Sim. Validity 12 months. Revalidation by either PE or Sim. Physical Entry (PE) is an operation to the airport as First Officer or flight deck duty travel or Captain under observation of a Training Captain. For new EK destination, flight deck duty travel with another local airline is acceptable. A ZFT simulator is considered at PE for revalidation purposes, but NOT as PE for initial Cat C qualification.

A geographically isolated airport with no suitable alternates. Must be authorised by DFO, and listed in the Route Manual. Weather forecast must indicate at least Circling Minima from ETA-1 to ETA+2 hrs. Additional fuel will be not less than 2 hrs. flying at cruise level using LRC at the calc. weight and ISA at arrival. An ETP (Equitime Point) will be calculated between destination and last suitable alternate, and fuel at ETP must indicate at least Holding Reserve at destination OR unless two separate rwy’s are available at the isolated airport AND expected weather conditions comply with Remote Dest planning minima. 1400’/6000m vis. - R on ICAO flightplan. GCAA approves RNP4/BRNAV for EK. RNP1 for terminal.

(Minimum Navigation Performance Specification) - X and S on an ICAO flightplan. North Atlantic and Polar regions and is RVSM and possible ETOPS; special training and equipment needed. - W on the ICAO flightplan. When approaching a cleared level, vs should be 5001000 fpm, max 1500. - Pilots should complete FANS 1/A Problem Report form (spare forms folder) if unable to log on etc.

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In the following cases, a landing must be affected at the nearest Suitable Airfield: - if the Non-Normal Checklist include the words “Plan to land at the nearest suitable airport” - Any fire on board (incl. engines) if fire fighting is not possible or not effective (QRH states “Plan to land...”) - Persistent smoke of unknown origin (QRH states “Plan to land at the nearest suitable airport”) - Failure of an engine (QRH states “Plan to land at the nearest suitable airport”) - Dual hydraulic failure (QRH states “Plan to land at the nearest suitable airport”) - Red Bomb Threat (QRH states “Plan to land at the nearest suitable airport”) - One power source remaining (both backup generators are considered ONE power source) - Structural damage If two or more Suitable Airports exist, consider; - Glide path assistance - At least Circling Minima (5 km & 1.000’ ceiling) - Flight time In extreme emergencies Captains are authorised to land when reported weather is below minima. Crewmembers shall not enter the avionics compartment, except in an extreme emergency. There should be no reluctance to declare an emergency, it can always be cancelled later on. Aviate - Navigate - Communicate. If Captain is PF, consider handing over control to the First Officer. On ground management of Cargo Fire/Smoke warnings: - Carry our required procedures from EICAS, door must not be opened until all pax are off and fire services are present. - If it is believed to be non fire related (spraying), and there is no evidence of fire in consultation with the ground crew, the door may be opened with pax on board with aerobridges connected or the doors armed.

During a Rejected Take-off, by calling “STOP” the Captain automatically takes control, and FO becomes PNF. Prior to 80 KIAS, reject for: - Activation of the Master Caution System & Take-off Config Warning - System Failures - Unusual noise or vibration - Tire Failure - Abnormally slow acceleration (max 20 seconds from start of roll to 80 KIAS as a “rule-of-thumb”) - Fire or Fire Warning - Engine Failure - Predictive Windshear Warning - Airplane unsafe or unable to fly

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Above 80 KIAS, reject for: - Fire or Fire Warning - Engine Failure - Predictive Windshear Warning - Airplane unsafe or unable to fly - Engine failure during cruise on terrain critical routes, the crew MUST select the alternates and driftdown strategies listed in the Route Manual, and flight must proceed at or above the MOCA/MORA. - A hard landing is 600 fpm or higher in technical terms, if this occurs: ASR, Tech log, advise MCC or local engineer and ensure follow up before leaving A/C - If damage to U/C like a blown tire is suspected on T/O, leave the U/C down - Emergency landing/ditching; Advise “Cabin Crew at Stations” 2 minutes before, & “Brace, brace” 30 sec before and then Capt initiates evacuation when appropriate - If ditching, assign 2 adult males at each exit and try ditch close to a surface vessel Evacuation: Read the latest Incapacitation: - 2 verbal comms above 1000’, 1 verbal comm. Below 1000’, any verbal comm. Associated with significant deviation from flight path or a system malfunction. - Declare an emergency, land ASAP, preferable WX above CAT I and get towed in, cannot park.

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Absolute limits on Flying Hours: - 100 hrs in 28 consecutive days (expiring at the end of the day on which the flight begins - means on the 28 th day you may depart on a single sector flight, even though at the end of the flight the total is more than 100 hrs). - 900 hrs in 12 months (expiring at the end of the previous month). Acclimatised; Crew member has spent 3 consecutive local nights within a timezone +/- 2 hours wide Local Night; a period of 8 hours falling between 22:00 and 08:00 local time Flying Duty Period (FDP); 60 min before ETOB (Estimated Time Off Blocks) until On Chocks at destination Duty period; any period the crew member is required to carry out any task associated with company business Early Start Duty; if a duty commences from 05:00 - 06:59 Late Finish Duty; if a duty commences before 00:59 and finishes in the period 01:00 - 01:59 Night Duty; if any part of the duty falls within the period 02:00 - 04:59 A crew can have max 3 consecutive LATE FINISH, EARLY START or NIGHT DUTY (01:00 06:59), 34 hours of rest interrupts this sequence. Positioning; transferring of crew in surface or air transport, is considered a Duty, but not considered a Sector. Sector; chocks-off to chocks-on WITH a take-off Day Off; a single day off shall include two local nights Delayed reporting time: If a delay of less than 4 hours is informed the crew before leaving the place of rest, the maximum FDP shall be based on the original reporting time, and the actual FDP shall start at the actual reporting time. If a delay of more than 4 hours is informed the crew before leaving the place of rest, the maximum FDP shall be based on the more limiting of the planned & actual reporting time, and the actual FDP shall start 4 hours after the original report time. If a delay of more than 10 hours is informed the crew before leaving the place of rest, and the crew is not further disturbed by the company, then the elapsed time is classified as rest. Standby: If a crew member is called out from standby before completing 6 hours of standby duty, then the total duty period allowed is the SUM of the time spent on Standby + the FDP from Table A or B (page 25). If a crew member is called out from standby after completing 6 hours or more of standby duty, then the total duty period allowed is the SUM of the time spent on Standby + the FDP from Table A or B minus amount of Standby in excess of 6 hours. If crew are at home on Standby duty between 22:00 - 08:00 and called out within 2 hours of reporting time, the allowable FDP will start at the reporting time. Unofficial Document

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Standard reporting times for Flight Deck Crew in Dubai & outstations is STD -1:00 Standard reporting times for Cabin Crew in Dubai is STD -1:30, and at outstations STD -0:45 For Acclimatised Flight Deck Crew on 1 sector, Max FDP is 11-13 hrs, depending on starttime. For Acclimatised Flight Deck Crew on 2 sectors, Max FDP is 10:15 -12:15 hrs, depending on start-time. For Acclimatised Flight Deck Crew on 3 sectors, Max FDP is 9:30 -11:15 hrs, depending on start-time. Cabin Crew has Max FDP 1 hour more. For Non-Acclimatised Flight Deck Crew on 1 sector, Max FDP is 11:30-13 hrs, depending on preceding rest. For Non-Acclimat. Flight Deck Crew on 2 sectors, Max FDP is 11:00 -12:15 hrs, depending on preceding rest. For Non-Acclimat. Flight Deck Crew on 3 sectors, Max FDP is 10:30 -11:15 hrs, depending on preceding rest. Cabin Crew has Max FDP 1 hour more. For 2 Flight Deck Crew on a sector scheduled for more than 7:00 hours, it is considered a multi-sector flight. A table on p. 27 then defines how many sectors this flight will be considered as, generally 2-4 sectors. Variations Dubai (page 49) deals with reducing additional sectors for flights over 7:30 hours leaving Dubai, and is a bit confusing. It makes a DXB - MNL flight of FDP 10:05 legal, since it reduces the 4-sector limit to a 3-sector limit. Minimum rest for Flight Deck: At least as long as preceding Duty Period or 12 hours, whichever is greater. Exceptionally at Home Base, the Company may ask a crewmember to reduce rest up to 1 hr (min 12 hrs). Away from Home Base, the rest may be reduced by 1 hr if total travel time is less than 60 minutes. Extension of Duty: Commanders discretion can be used if he is satisfied that the flight can be made safely, and up to max 3 hrs. If a Flying Duty Period involving 2 or more sectors, a max of 2 hrs discretion can be used prior to first sector. Immediately prior to the last sector (or first sector on a 1 sector flight), full 3 hrs. discretion may be used.

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A Commander may only exceptionally extend a FDP after a reduced rest period, and then GCAA will be informed as well as the Company. If the Commander extended a FDP up to 2:00 hours, he must inform the Company via a Discretion Report. If the Commander extended a FDP from 2:01 - 3:00 hrs, he must inform the Company via a Discretion Report, and the Company will inform the GCAA within 14 days of the aircraft returning to base. A Commander may reduce rest to a minimum of 10 hours IN ROOM. A Discretion Report must be filed, and if the rest was reduced by more than 1 hr, the Company informs GCAA.

Extension of Duty by In-Flight Relief (Flight Deck & Cabin Crew): If rest is taken in a seat: 1/3 of the rest time (min. 3:00 hrs) extension up to a max FDP of 15 hrs (16 C/C). If rest is taken in a bunk: 1/2 of the rest time (min. 3:00 hrs) extension up to a max FDP of 18 hrs (19 C/C). Extension of Duty by Split Duty (Flight Deck & Cabin Crew): Time for post-flight duties (normally 30 minutes) can not be included in the below. Rest less than 3:00 hrs - no extension Rest 3:00 - 6:00 hrs - extension of half of rest taken, and rest in a quiet place is adequate. Rest 6:01 - 10:00 hrs - extension of half of rest taken, and rest in suitable accommodation is required. Extension of FDP by Variations (ex: DXB - DAC - KUL): FDP +30 minutes. When a planned sector does not exceed 7:30 hrs, operators may plan 30 minutes extra on the allowable FDP obtained from Table A - Acclimatised (page 25). Flight Crew members must be acclimatised and off-duty by 22:00 hrs local on the day prior. Commanders normal Discretion to extend a FDP is reduced to 2:30 with no more than 1:30 being exercised prior to departure. A maximum of 4 extended FDP flights may be undertaken in any consecutive 28 day period.

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Company FOM TEST 1 and 2, Technical Questions


Section 9 Questions Bank

COMPANY FOM TEST 1 1. What are the du ties of SMNC? a. keep the operation running smoothly and minimize delays. b. liaise with other stations c. point of contact with difficulties d all of the above (answ d) 2. What statement is incorrect re light ing ? a. >50% of lights U/S and airfield is to be considered unavailable. b. 50% of the lights unavailable in the first half of the runway and runway is unusable c. >25% of the lights unavailable and the runway is to be considered unusable (answ c) 3.What is the company circl ing min ima ? a. the greater of 1000AAL rounded up to the nearest 100 or Jepp minima, vis the greater of 5000m or Jepp minima b. the greater of 1000AAL rounded up to the nearest 100 or Jepp minima, vis the greater of 7000m or Jepp minima c. higher of 1100ft, vis greater of 5000m or Jepp minima. d. higher of 1200ft, vis 1000m or Jepp minima (answ a) (answ ers c and d are pretty cl ose to the exact wor ding ) 4. When can factoring not be used ? a. JAR ops chart b. when RVR available or for take off c. for ILS approaches (answ b) 5. With auto brake med, when does it become activ e ? a weight on main ldg gear b. ground spoiler deployment c. thrust reverse unlock d. weight on nose wheel (answ b) 6. When may the pic be replaced by the relief pilot ? a. 5000ft b. 10000ft c. 20000ft d. 15000ft (answ c) 7. What is not an F/O restriction ? a. slippery runway b. x wind in excess of 20 kts c. visibility less than 2km d A and C (answ c) (yep that’s what their answer sheet said)



8. Who is responsible for th e timely renewal of m edical and keeping caccinations up t o date ? a. medical b. flight ops c. the individual d. HR (answ c) 9. What is c orrect ref factor vi s ? a. HIAL available 1.5 by day 2.0 by night b. ALS available 1.5 by day 2.0 by night c. HIAL available 2.0 by day 2.5 by night d. ALS available 2.0 by day 2.5 by night (answ a) ( I looked it up it is correct) 10. What is not co rrect ref destination alt minima ? a. CAT III app use Cat I minima b. Cat II app use Cat I plus 100ft / 300m c. NPA use comp circling min or if not avail NPA plus 200ft/ 1000m d. CAT II app use CAT I plus 300ft 100m (answ d) 11. What is the min legal number of cabin crew on an aircraft that has 434 seats with 401 passengers and 10 emergency exi ts ? a. 8 b. 9 c. 10 d. 11 (answ c) 12. Diagram of pfd with speed just below Vls at the orange = but above alpha prot, high roc. What is acft doing ? a. alpha floor b. hi aoa prot c. nothing d. load ctl (answ c) 13. What is true about the IDG push button ? a. hold in till the light goes out but less than 10 secs b. hold in till the light goes out but less than 3 secs c. hold in till the light goes out but more than 10 secs d. hold in till the light goes out but more than 3 secs (answ b) 14. How may yo u legally extend FDP ? a. split duty b. captains discretion c. relief crew d. all of the above (answ d)



15. What is the definition of acclimatised ? a. 3 nights sleep on the ground b. 2 nights sleep on the ground c. 48 hours sleep on the ground d. some other answer (I got this one wrong , I went for 3 night sleep) 16. What is the max aob in n ormal law ? a. 33 b. no limit c. 67 d. 80 (answ c) 17. What doc does not need to be left on ground ? a. official flight plan b. load sheet c. sig weather as amended by emirates d. NOTAM as amended by EK (answ c ) (I thi nk they meant NOTOC for d) 18.Diagram showin g batt v olt age at 24 on the over head panel ? a. this above the minimum of 23 v b. this is below the minimum of 25.5v c. this is normal d. you cant check the batt voltage (answ b) (argue that one, I put A accor ding to vo l 3) 19. What happens when you momentarily push the thrust levers forward of the cl detent below 100ft a you go to toga b the a/thr drops out c. you get cl thrust d. nothing (answ b) 20 What is contingency f uel for a. unexpected weather b. deviations en route c. burn higher that dat burn d. all of the above (answ d) 21. What are the crit ical su rfaces a. all the correct shit but including fuselage b. the correct shit c. some more shit that’s correct but mentions the fuselage again (answ b)



22. What are the alti tudes f or f lap and gear a. 22,000 and 22,000 b. 20,000 and 21,000 c. 21,000 and 20,000 d. 21,000 and 21,000 (answ b) 23. A captain can carry out a pre transit ch eck ? a. true b. false (answ a true) 24. What are the wind limits for auto land ? a. 30 head 20 x and 15 tail b 20 head 15 x and 10 tail c. 35 head 20 x and 10 tail d. 35head 20 x and 15 tail (answ c) 25. When must you disengage the autopilot if carrying out a vis landing off an approach ? a. 400ft b. 80ft c. 100ft d. 200ft (answ b) 26. Windshear no SRS what pitch attitude ? a. up to 15 b up to 12.5 c. 15 d. up to 10 (answ b) 27. What are the A330 turb penetrati on s peeds ? a. 250 to 20,000, the 280 into .8 b 240 up to 20,000 ft then 260 into .8 c. 240 up to 25,000 ft then 260 into .8 d. 240 up to 20,000 ft then 260 inot .82 (answ b) 28.What is t he definition of cold w eather operations ? a. when static OAT is less that ISA -15 b. oat less than 10 degrees with visible moisture c. oat less that 3 degrees d. OAT less that – 10 (answ a)



29.What is not stable app criteria ? a. landing chex complete b. brief complete and chex concluded c. app speed less than Vref +20 and higher than Vref -5 d. sink rate 1000ft/min (answ c) 30. Above what terrain altitude is used in determining drift down start ? a. 10,000ft b. 8000ft c. 15,000ft d. some other one (answ b)

I looked at it this way, I could afford to get 9 wrong which is a lot and I was pretty happy I could Jag 21.



COMPANY FOM TEST 2 1. Do you need a ceiling for t/o alternate at planning stage? 2. When can you use factoring to arrive at an RVR equivalent? 3. What are the factoring figures to be used....they give you different options so just know the numbers. 4. You have no engineer and no defect so do you need a CRS? 5. How much can you extend an FDP by? 6. What is min fuel for landing with commitment to destination, destination and alternate .....they gave me two of these options, can't remember which. 7. They gave me 3 different questions with pictures of a PFD and asked me what law we were operating under.....didn't like those at all, just couldn't remember that stuff. 8. Picture of ECAM fuel page with jettison showing on left wing and in Amber....what is happening here? 9. What initial actions for unreliable airspeed? 10. What is initial attitude for double engine flameout and is it weight dependant? 11. ECAM fuel page with aft transfer occurring and upper ECAM showing "trim tank transfer"....why? 12. How do you check if battery voltage is acceptable? 13. At what temp do you correct DH/DA (cold weather)? 14. When can you dispatch without contingency fuel, never or when using decision point procedure? 15. What's true about destination alternate, need one navaid if weather is CAVOK, weather below CAVOK you need 2 navaids or both of the above? 16. For taxi you have toe brake pressure applied and you release the park brake. The triple indicator drops to zero...is this normal? 17. Do tempo or prob30/40 of a transient nature have influence on destination alternate weather when assessing at planning stage? 18. Max alts for gear and flap operation?



1- Do you need a ceiling for t/o alternate at planning stage? 2- When can you use factoring to arrive at an RVR equivalent? 3- What are the factoring figures to be used....they give you different options so just know the numbers. 4- You have no engineer and no defect so do you need a CRS? 5- How much can you extend an FDP by? 6 -What is min fuel for landing with commitment to destination, destination and alternate.....they gave me two of these options, can't remember which. 7- They gave me 3 different questions with pictures of a PFD and asked me what law we were operating under.....didn't like those at all, just couldn't remember that stuff. 8- Picture of ECAM fuel page with jettison showing on left wing and in Amber....what is happening here? 9- What initial actions for unreliable airspeed? 10- What is initial attitude for double engine flameout and is it weight dependant? 11- ECAM fuel page with aft transfer occurring and upper ECAM showing "trim tank transfer"....why? 12- How do you check if battery voltage is acceptable? 13- At what temp do you correct DH/DA (cold weather)? 14- When can you dispatch without contingency fuel, never or when using decision point procedure? 15- What's true about dest alternate, need one n avaid if weather is Cavok, weather below Cavok you need 2 navaids or both of the above? 16- For taxi you have toe brake pressure applied and you release the park brake. The triple indicator drops to zero...is this normal? 17- Do tempo or prob30/40 of a transient nature have influence on dest alternate weather when assessing at planning stage? 18- Max alts for gear and flap operation?



EK Upgrade A330 Performance Questionnaire

Upgrade A330 Performance Questionnaire

 


Whilst answering the following questions, you will explore various performance sections contained in Company and Aircraft documentation and manuals.

1. Calculate the percentage TOMAC and the corresponding Stabilizer Trim Setting for the following two situations using A6- EKS (three class configuration): a)

An sw er

b)

ZFW ZFW Index Fuel SG

160 000kg 110 .80 kg/l

F.O.B

39 000 kg

Standard Fuelling

………………………… ZFW ZFW Index Fuel SG

160 000kg 110 .80 kg/l

Non Standard Fuel distribution as follows: Each Outer Tank “ Inner Tank Trim Tank

An sw er

2,400 kg 17,100 kg Nil

…………………………

2. Where can the performance decrements if a winglet is missing be found, and what are those decrements? Answer

……………………………………………………………………………

3. a) What is the optimum all engine holding altitude for an A330 at 180 tonnes? Answer ……………… b} What is the fuel burn at this altitude ? Answer ……………..

D:\Crew Portal\Portal pre reading\Questionnaires\A330 Performance Questionnaire v3.doc

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A330 Upg Crs Page 1 of 4


c}

 


What is the fuel burn at the above weight at FL 050 ?

Answer

……………..

d} Above what Altitude will the all engine holding efficiency generally decrease? Why is this?

Answer ………………………………………………………………………………………

4. Calculate the MTOW and speeds for the following conditions; ZRH runway 28. Runway wet. Wind calm. 1500m in drizzle. Temperature 5 C, QNH 1005. One thrust reverser inoperative. °

Answer …………………………………………………………….

5. Calculate the MTOW and speeds for the following conditions; a) ZRH runway 16. 25mm of dry snow, braking action medium. Temperature - 5 C. QNH 1005. 5kts of headwind. °

Answer …………………………………………………………… b) What would be the maximum X-wind ? Answer

…………

6. At low weights what is the relationship between V2 and Vmca ? Answer ……………………………………………………………..

7. What would be the Density Altitude, in DXB, in summer with a QNH of 998 and a temp. of 45 C? °

Answer …………………………..


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 


8. At 200 tonnes over Iran, ISA +20, What is the Net ceiling of the A330 on one engine? Answer ………………………….. 9. On a 50 C day using reduced thrust, the assumed temperature is 62 C. Approximately, what is the effective derate, in percentage terms, compared to an ISA day ? °

°

Answer ………………………………………………………… 10. a)

What is the approach climb capability at 5000ft Pressure altitude, ISA + 15 C at MLW ? °

Answer ……………………………………

b)

What is the minimum Jeppersen missed approach gradient if not specified on the chart?

Answer …………………………………… c)

Why is the SAH Missed Approach Climb Gradient limiting weight calculated on a 3.9% climb gradient.

Answer …………………………………… 11. What would the Flap Setting, Flex Temp and Take Off speeds be in the following situation. Technical Fault, MEL Eng 1 REV U/S, locked out. VABB RWY 27 Int H TOW 195,000Kg’s Calm OVC 020 +RA +28 C / +23 C 995 °

°

RWY Contaminated 6mm Water. Answer ……………………………………


[1.1]

02/10/07

Author: D. Granter



 


Decode the following SNOTAM. SWUU0041 UUEE 1031 1435 SNOWTAM 0041 A) UUEE B) 0010311435 - 0011011435 C) 25R F) 5/5/6 H) 3/3/2 T) RWY CONTAMINATION - 100 PER CENT. TWY, MAIN TWY, ACFT STANDS AND APRON - SLUSH.

An sw er:

12. What is the decode of the following codes at the end of a METAR (SA)? a) 75490394 b) 25590592

An sw er:


[1.1]

02/10/07

Author: D. Granter


A330 Performance Questionnaire


1. Calculate the percentage TOMAC and the corresponding Stabiliser Trim Setting for the following two situations using A6- EKS (three class configuration): a)


160 000kg 110 .80 kg/l

F.O.B

39 000 kg

Answer

…………………………

b)


Standard Fuelling

160 000kg 110 .80 kg/l

Non Standard Fuel distribution as follows: Each Outer Tank “ Inner Tank Trim Tank

Answer

2,400 kg 17,100 kg Nil

…………………………

2. Where can the performance decrements if a winglet is missing be found, and what are those decrements? Answer

……………………………………………………………………………

3.

a) What is the optimum all engine holding altitude for an A330 at 180 tonnes? Answer ………………

b} What is the fuel burn at this altitude ? Answer ……………..

c}

What is the fuel burn at the above weight at FL 050 ?

Answer

……………..



d} Above what Altitude will the all engine holding efficiency generally decrease? Why is this?

Answer ………………………………………………………………………………………

4. Calculate the MTOW and speeds for the following conditions;

ZRH runway 28. Runway wet. Wind calm. 1500m in drizzle. Temperature 5 C, QNH 1005. One thrust reverser inoperative. 

Answer …………………………………………………………….

5. At low weights what is the relationship between V2 and Vmca ? Answer ……………………………………………………………..

6. Calculate the MTOW and speeds for the following conditions;

a) ZRH runway 16. 25mm of dry snow, braking action medium. Temperature 2 C. QNH 1005. 5kts of headwind. 

Answer

……………………………………………………………

b) What would be the maximum X-wind ? Answer

………………..

7. What would be the Density Altitude in DXB in summer with a QNH of 998 and a temp. of 45 C? 

Answer …………………………..

8. At 200 tonnes over Iran, ISA +20, What is the Net ceiling of the A330 on one engine? Answer ………………………….. 9. On a 50 C day using reduced thrust, the assumed temperature is 62 C. Approximately, what is the effective derate, in percentage terms, compared to an ISA day ? 





10. a)

What is the approach climb capability at 5000ft Pressure altitude, ISA + 15 C at MLW ? 

Answer ……………………………………

b)

What is the minimum Jepp missed approach gradient if not specified on the chart?

Answer …………………………………… c)

Why is the SAH Missed Approach Climb Gradient limiting weight calculated on a 3.9% climb gradient.

Answer …………………………………… 11. What would the Flap setting, Flex Temp and Take Off speeds be in the following situation.

Mumbai { VABB } RWY 27H TOW 195,000Kg’s Calm OVC 020 RA 28 / 23 995 Rwy WET Answer ……………………………………

12. In the following situation what is the flap setting, associated speeds and Flex Temp.

Manila (RPMM) RWY 24 TOW 230T 240/10 SCT 030 –RA 30/27 996 WET Answer …………………………………… 13. Decode the following SNOTAM.

SWUU0041 UUEE 1031 1435 SNOWTAM 0041



B) 0010311435 - 0011011435 C) 25R F) 5/5/6 H) 3/3/2 T) RWY CONTAMINATION - 100 PER CENT. TWY, MAIN TWY, ACFT STANDS AND APRON - SLUSH.

Answer:

14. What is the decode of the following codes at the end of a METAR (SA)? a) 75490394 b) 25590592

Answer:

EK Policy and Procedures Questionnaire

Policy and Procedures Questionnaire

 


While answering the following questions, you will need to explore various sections of the Company Documentation and manuals pertaining to Policy and Procedures.

General 1.

What are the objectives of the Flight Operations Mission Statement?

2.

When do the Captain’s Duties and responsi biliti es begin and end in relation to a flig ht, the crew and passengers?

3.

What is stated in the FOM / OM-A relating to compli ance wit h regulations and orders?

4.

What is stated in FOM Chap 2 with regard to what the OM const itutes?

5.

What does the Flight Operating Manual secti on of the FOM / OM-A state in regard to more conservative operations?

6.

Where is the Emergency Autho rit y of the Captain stated in the FOM / OM-A?

Destinations 7.

How do you know if a particular destination is authorized for EK operations?

8.

What are the forecast requirements for a destination?

9.

Is a cloud ceiling required to be consi dered for landing minima?

10. For what type of approach does the company require higher landing minima than that charted? 11. What are the flight planning fuel requirements, if the destination forecast is below minima?

Al ter nat es 12. What are the different types of alternate airport s? 13. When do you requi re a takeoff alternate? 14. Within what distance must it be situ ated? 15. For what period must the takeoff alternate be available?

D:\Crew Portal\Portal pre reading\Questionnaires\Policy and Procedures Questionnaire v3.doc

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Author: D. Granter

A330 UP GS Page 1 of 3

Policy and Procedures Questionnaire

 


16. What must t he minimum for ecast weather be for the T/O alternate? 17. What are the for ecast weather requir ements for a Desti natio n Alt ernate? 18. What are the forecast weather requir ements for an ETOPS Alt ernate? 19. Is ETOPS Alt ernate min ima required if the departur e or destin ation are used as ETOPS Altern ates? 20. What minima are required for these airfields in question 19? 21. When does TEMPO and PROB apply? 22. Do TEMPO and PROB appl y to ETOPS Alt ernates?

Take Off 23. Where are takeoff minim a speci fied? 24. Could you still take off if there is no reported meteorolog ical visibilit y or RVR is available? 25. What wil l you use to assess the RVR?

Appr oac h 26. Is an approach allowed to be commenced if the weather is less than approach minima? 27. Is the cloud ceiling required to be consid ered for an approach? 28. If intending to carry out the landing manually when must the autopilot be disconnected? 29. There are three targets for stabilization, when do they apply? 30. What are the stabi lizatio n requir ements? 31. What is the minimum visibility for radar assisted visual contact approaches? 32. When can a vis ual approach be con duct ed? 33. What are the requirements for a visual approach? 34. Is an orbit durin g a visual approach or instrum ent approach allowed? 35. If an orbit is required, what criteria must be met?

D:\Crew Portal\Portal pre reading\Questionnaires\Policy and Procedures Questionnaire v3.doc

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Author: D. Granter

A330 UP GS Page 2 of 3

BOOK 1

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