Climate Security Index

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CLIMATE SECURITY INDEX

Bernard I. Finel and Christine Bartlf

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MISSIoN The American Security Project is organized around the belie that honest public discussion o national security requires a better-inormed citizenry — one that understands the dangers and opportunities o the twenty-frst century and the spectrum o available policy responses. Security is a undamental responsibility o government. In the new millennium, however, U.S. national security policy has not kept pace with rapidly changing threats to American interests. Globalization has quickened, but the United States has not built alliances or institutions to protect and advance American security. Terrorists have expanded their reach and lethality, but the moral authority o the United States is at an all-time low. Changes in the Earth’s climate are more evident every day, but the United States has ailed to act, alone or with allies, to avoid disaster.

Changes in the

America needs a new national security vision or this new era and a dialogue at home that is a s robust as it is real-

Earth’s climate are more evident every day, but the United

istic. Yet Yet the quality o our discussion on national security has been diminished. Fear has trumped conversation. Artifcial dierences have been created and real dierences have been let unexamined. The character o our national dialogue has grown increasingly shrill while the

States has failed to

need or honest discussion has grown more urgent.

act, alone alone or with wi th

Only by developing real analysis and thoughtul answers can a genuine oreign policy consensus be rebuilt or

allies, to avoid disaster.

a dangerous and decisive age. Only then will America again marshal all her resources — military, diplomatic, economic, and moral — to meet the challenges o a complex world.

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Board of directors

The Honorable Richard L. Armitage

Brigadier General Stephen A. Cheney, USMC (Ret.)

Lieutenant General Daniel Christman, USA (Ret.)

Maine Militay Academy

United States Chambe  Cmmece

Vice Admiral Lee Gunn, USN (Ret.)

The Honorable Chuck Hagel

The Honorable Gary Hart

ASP Pesident

United States Senate

ASP Chaiman

General Lester L. Lyles, USAF (Ret.)

Ed Reilly

The Honorable Warren B. Rudman

Amitage Intenatinal

The Lyles Gup

climate security initiative

FD Intenatinal Intenatinal

Nelson W. Cunningham

Kenneth M. Duberstein

McLaty Assciates Assciates

The Dubestein Gup

Lieutenant General Claudia Kennedy, USA (Ret.)

The Honorable John Kerry United States Senate

Ppulatin Actin Intenatinal

StnebidgeIntenatinal Intenatinal L LC

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introduction Vice AdmirAl lee Gunn (U.S. Navy, Retired) President, American Security Project I spent 35 years in uniorm serving our nation around the world in the United States Navy. I entered the Navy during the Vietnam War and retired ater the Berlin Wall ell. I helped evacuate UN orces rom Somalia, weathered enormous storms at sea, oversaw many billions o dollars o the Navy budget, and I have seen threats materialize rom crowds that, the moment beore, looked like peaceul civilians. I have also seen the incredible power o the United States military, and I have been humbled by the challenges we’ve aced, even with that mighty military, in dealing with complex emergencies,

Addessing the

whether they are caused by corrupt leaders or nature’s ury. So it is with this perspective that I write to introduce this report

cnsequences  changes in the Eath’s climate is nt simply abut saving pla beas 

rom the American Security Project. The scientifc community is warning us about a new threat to our security — a threat I believe is still misunderstood and underappreciated — but a threat to which we must respond. The threat is climate change.

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his examination o the national security implications o climate change adds an important piece to the public debate — a piece

that has been missing or too long. Addressing the consequences o changes in the Earth’s climate is not simply about saving polar bears or preserving the beauty o mountain glaciers, important as those are.

peseving the beauty

Climate change is a threat to our national securit y. Taking Taking it head on is about preserving our way o lie.

 muntain glac glacies, ies,

The consequences o climate change will be ound, and are being

imptant as thse ae. Climate change is a theat t u natinal secuit secuity. y.

ound now around the world. New climate conditions will drive human beings to move in ever larger numbers, seeking ood, water, shelter and work. No region will be immune. Climate reugees will increasingly cross our own borders. The stress o changes in the environment will urther weaken marginal states. Failing states will incubate extremism. In South Asia, the melting o Himalayan glaciers jeopardizes resh water supplies or more than one billion human beings. In North America, agriculture could be disrupted by increases in temperatures and shiting weather patterns that limit rainall. Globally, major urban centers could be threatened by rising sea levels. Malaria and other tropical diseases are moving into new areas, and outbreaks are increasing in requency as

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climate security indeX

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the planet warms and weather patterns change. All o this is just the oretaste o a bitter cup rom which we can expect to drink should we ail to address, urgently, the threats posed by

and that Navy ships are designed to last 30 to 50 years. With these extended time-rames, a basing structure secure rom threats posed by climate as well as more traditional oes is

climate change to our national security.

a real national security consideration. W st atiipat

A changing and uncertain climate will demand we adapt to new conditions aecting:

w ad visd issios o o iitay os ad ato thos ito o aatios o th osqs o iat hag o Aia’s atioa s ity.

 Why we apply our nation’s power (in all its orms),

around the world,  How and where specically our military is likely to

have to ght,  The issues driving alliance relationships (and whom

are we likely to nd on our side on the battleeld). Why We Appl Apply y poWer

AlliAnces

The Arctic is a prime example o how alliances will be orced to adapt to the realities o climate change. Just a ew years ago, the scientic community was predicting that the Arctic wouldn’t be ice-ree until the middle o this century. Now the predictions put that da te at 2013; just our years rom now.

Climate change will orce changes in “why” the United States

In the Arctic, the loss o sea-ice has caused concern in the U.S. Navy or nearly a decade. What naval planners know

gives aid, supports governments, provides assistance, and anticipates natural and manmade disasters, or goes to war. It will do so because iat hag thats st

is that loss o sea-ice at the North Pole has the potential to increase commercial and military activity by other powers. As i we needed any evidence o this, look no urther than the

ad xtis as optitio o dwidig sos,

governments will lose credibility and the support o their

2007 expedition by Russia to plant its fag in the sea-bed at the North Pole. Not surprisingly, Canada, Norway, Denmark, and the United States — all nations bordering on the arctic

citizens. Under these conditions, extremists will increasingly nd willing recruits. In particular, climate change will certainly expand the number o humanitarian relie and disaster

— responded critically to Russia’s actions. Undeterred, Russia recently declared her intention to parachute troops into the vicinity o the Pole as an exercise.

spiay wat, spads. Weak or poorly unctioning

assistance operations acing the international community. America’s men and women in uniorm will be called on increasingly to help in these operations directly and to support the work o legitimate governments and non-governmental organizations alike. hoW We Fight

New climate conditions, new geographic realities, changes in economic and commercial circumstances, and pressures o migrating populations; all will test old alliances. Some changes may create new international riendships that will depend on America’s ability to help smooth the turmoil associated with those changes. Supporting other nations’

Climate change will orce changes in how we operate our orces around the world; changes will eect ground operations and logistics as well as operations at sea and in the air.

successes will continue to be an important part o our military’s role in U.S. national security.

Sea level rise threatens large investments in U.S. acilities around the world. Desertication and shits in the availability o water can change logistic patterns drastically or

Climate change poses a clear and present danger to the United States o America. But i we respond appropriately,

all our orces. The fexibility o America’s military will be tested, with our orces rendering aid, supporting peaceul solutions to tough problems, and pivoting to combat i and when necessary. These challenges are not insurmountable. But they will be expensive to address and have to be thought through careully lest a prousion o missions impact readiness. In any case, conronting changes in the military’s operating environment and mission set may lead to somewhat dierent decisions about U.S. orce structure. Consider that it takes 20 or more years to build a new aircrat or the U.S. Air Force or Navy

climate security initiative

I believe we will enhance our security, not simply by averting the worst climate change impacts, but by spurring a new energy revolution. The report that ollows seeks to document both some o the core evidence or the reality o climate change and many o the likely security implications. It highlights the undamental problem o reliance on ossil uels to p ower our economy. And it provides a compelling call to action and an outline o some o the most promising potential responses. I, ater reading this report, you eel as compelled to act as I do, I hope you will join us at the American Security Project to chart a new course to ensure our nation remains prosperous and secure.

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Even when climates changed slwly, in espnse t gadual centuies millennia-lng cycles, species died ut and civilizatins cllapsed.

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CLIMATE CHANGE AND CONSEQUENCES T

he overwhelming consensus o climate scientists is

a sel-reinorcing process, a vicious cycle that threatens to

that increased greenhouse gases in the atmosphere

transorm the earth’s climate dramatically.

— particularly carbon dioxide (CO2 ) — are transorming

global climate. While it is true that CO 2 levels have varied over time, there is compelling evidence that current trends are both unprecedented and man-made.

The earth’s climate has undergone several major transormations in its history. But or the most part, change has been gradual enough or the planet’s creatures to adapt over time. Animals migrated to more welcoming climates and

Scientists have been able to reconstruct several millennia

plants adapted and spread as the environment changed.

worth o atmospheric records by examining ice cores drawn

But even these broad adaptations were marked by tremen-

1

rom miles-deep ice sheets. These records show a constant

dous destruction. Climate change throughout history has

uctuation o CO2 levels, ranging rom roughly 200 parts per

been a signifcant orce in the expansion and extinction o

million (PPM) to roughly 300 PPM. Over an ice core record o

species. 9 Noting that the climate has changed in the past

800,000 years, scientists have never ound any levels signif-

is not a source of comfort, but rather a warning about

cantly higher than than 300 ( PPM) — until now. In the 1950s,

the fragility of our reliance on an interconnected web of

CO 2 levels were recorded above 300 PPM. They have risen

climate-constrained climate-constrai ned habitats.

consistently since, and are now approaching 400 PPM.

2

Total carbon dioxide emissions doubled between 1900 and 1950. They increased nearly our-old between 1950 and 2000. Today, human activity is responsible or producing nearly 20 billion tons o carbon dioxide annually. 3 Roughly orty-fve percent o that total remains trapped in the atmosphere, while the remaining fty-fve percent is absorbed by plants, land, and oceans.4 There is no doubt that this increased level of carbon dioxide emissions is responsible for the dramatic increase in atmospheric carbon above levels recorded over the past million years. The connection between carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere — as well as the increase in other “greenhouse” gases which only exist due to industrial activity — and climate change is also increasingly a matter o settled scientifc act.5 Greenhouse gases trap heat in the atmosphere. This causes temperatures to rise globally, with the most extreme temperature increases at the poles. High temperatures reduce the extent o seasonal ice. In the northern hemisphere, the Northwest Passage rom the Atlantic to the

Indeed, even within the historical record, there are numerous instances o climate change leading to massive political upheaval.10 Many scholars attribute the movement o the Huns and the Mongols to changes in the climate o the Eurasian steppes. The Mayan civilization collapsed under the stress o climate change, as did Native American civilizations in the American Southwest.11

Pacifc was ice ree in 2006 or the frst time in centuries. 6

Even when climates changed slowly, in response to gradual

In the southern hemisphere, huge chunks o the Antarctic

centuries- or millennia-long cycles, species died out and

ice shel have broken up and oated away over the past

civilizations collapsed.

decade and there is increasing concern over the status o the massive West Antarctic ice sheet.7 Less ice results in less sunlight reected back into space and more sunlight absorbed by now ice-ree expanses o land and sea.8 This promotes urther warming. At this point, global warming is

CLIMATE CHANGE AND CONSEQUENCES

But now we live in a world o rapid climate change due to human activity. And we live in a world with more people than ever. The consequences o the best case assumptions are dire, o the worst, they are catastrophic.

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GreenHouse Green House Gas Ga s emissions geenhoe ae h a abon doxde ae a majo ae o lmae hane. cabon doxde level n he amophee ae enly 30% hhe han a any pon n he pa mllon yea and ae pojeed o neae.

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he Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

World Carbon Emissions From Fossil-Fuels

(IPCC ) has determined that greenhouse greenhouse gas emissions are very likely to have caused modern climate

change occurring since the 1950s.12 Specically, emissions increase greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere, which cause temperature levels to increase by trapping heat. The increase in temperature creates other climate changes including sea level increases, changes in precipita-

n9000 o b r 8000 a C7000 f o s 6000 n o T5000 c4000 i r t e3000 M n2000 o i l 1000 l i M 0

tion patterns, desertication, fooding, and extreme weather

1 8 5 2 9 6 3 0 7 4 1 8 5 2 9 6 3 0 7 4 1 8 5 2 9 6 3 0 7 4 1 8 5 2 9 6 3 5 5 6 7 7 8 9 0 0 1 2 2 3 4 4 5 6 7 7 8 9 9 0 1 1 2 3 4 4 5 6 6 7 8 8 9 0 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 Year

discussed in other sections o this report. lookig at ghos gas issios is tho sstia wh osid-

SoUrCE: http:// cdiac.nl.gv/ten cdiac.nl.gv/tends/emis/te_glb.html ds/emis/te_glb.html

ig iat hag, its ipats, ad ways to itigat it.

CO 2 Levels CO 2 makes up 70% o total greenhouse gas emissions and

CO 2 Levels Over Last 800 Millenni Millennia a

thus is the primary contributor to climate change. 13 The majority o CO2 comes rom the combustion o ossil uels or electricity generation and transportation. CO 2 levels in the

400

350

atmosphere have spiked to levels signicantly higher than any measured over the last 800 millennia. Globally, CO 2 levels have risen sharply since the mid-nineteenth century as a consequence o the Industrial Revolution.

300 v m p p

250

200

150

900,000BC 800,000BC 700,000BC 600,000BC 500,000BC 400,000BC 300,000BC 200,000BC 100,000BC 2009 Year

CO 2 Levels Over Last 50 Years 400

350

300 v m p p

250

200

150 1956

1966

1976

1986

1996

2006

Year

SoUrCE: Maland, G., T.A. Bden, and r.J. Andes. 2008. Glbal, reginal, and Natinal Fssil Fuel Co 2 Emissins. In Trends: A Compendium of Data on Global Change . Cabn Dixide Inmatin Analysis Cente, oak ridge Natinal Labaty, U.S. Depat ment  Enegy, oak ridge, Tenn., U.S.A.

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CO 2 Emissions

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percentage o overall emissions, it is 21 times more powerul at warming the atmosphere than CO 2. Additionally, methane

1,800,000

dissipates rom the atmosphere in 12 years. In comparison,

1,600,000

CO2 takes nearly one hundred years to dissipate.17 As a consequence, policies to control or harness methane emis-

n 1,400,000 o b r a C 1,200,000 f o s n 1,000,000 o T d n a 800,000 s u o h 600,000 T

sions could have a signicant short-term impact, but in the long-run addressing carbon emissions will be a crucial element o managing climate change. International debate over measures to reduce CO2 will refect these statistics and

400,000

play an important role in shaping the positions o individual

200,000

governments in the debate.

0

l n t e d d y y a i a s n i a n y a m a n o l a i a a i a e i i s n n n e n e o a n d o r e r a i c a i c c l c z s i t i i a a a i t r b a n r a a d t d a l a k r r I x I h a n p a e f p E r a l r f o t a I a n a r t m a g K e n A s r B S e k u o i C S r A a T J r l A o n h F P h e i r u e M C i U h d d d d t d n e A T G K t d e e i u u I h t F d u t i o o a e S M n n O t S S i r U a i n e s h U t s u O R

CO 2 Metric Tons Per Capita – 2006 Qatar Kuwait United Arab Emirates Bahrain Trinidad And Tobago Luxembourg Netherland Antilles Aruba

SoUrCE: Cabn Dixide Inmatin Analysis Cente (CDIAC)

chia ad th uitd Stats a th highst itts o cO2 . eah otibts w ov th tis th goba cO2 issios o rssia, th xt agst itt. However,

when CO2 emissions are measured per capita, the United States ranks 9th and China 82nd.14 Wealthy oil nations make up our o the ve top emitters per capita with Qatar nearly producing more than double America’s emissions on a per capita basis. These countries typically have relatively small populations and hydrocarbon intensive economies ocusing on the extraction o petroleum. They also have high energy

United States

Australia Falkland Islands (Malvinas) Canada Oman Saudi Arabia Brunei (Darussalam) Faeroe Islands Gibraltar Estonia Finland Kazakhstan Singapore New Caledonia Taiwan 0

needs due to their climates. Several European states with high population density also emit signicant amounts o CO 2

2

4 6 8 10 12 CO2 Metric Tons Per Capita – 2006

14

16

SoUrCE: Intenatinal Enegy Annual 2006

on a per capita basis.

Historical Emissions

CO 2 emissions increased consistently around the world between the 1960s and 1980s. A brie dip in emissions associated with the recession o the early 1980s and increased emphasis on uel economy ollowing the 1970s oil shocks was ollowed by steady renewed growth in the 1990s.15 Western Europe has or the most part stabilized its CO2 emission rate, while China recently overtook the United States. In addition to CO 2, methane also is a signicant contributor to climate change, making up an estimated 24% o total 16

greenhouse gas emissions. Slightly over hal o methane emissions come rom human activity, typically rom the extraction o natural gas elds. But methane also comes rom more mundane things, such as decaying trash in solid

1800000 n 1600000 o b r a C1400000 f o s n 1200000 o T c i r t 1000000 e M d 800000 n a s u 600000 o h T n 400000 i

Middle East Japan India China United States

Africa Western Europe

2

O C

200000 0

2 7 2 7 2 7 2 7 2 7 2 7 2 7 2 7 2 7 2 7 2 0 9 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 9 9 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2

Year SoUrCE: Cabn Dixide Inmatin Analysis Cente (CDIAC)

waste landlls. While methane makes up a signicantly lower

climate cHanGe and conseQuences

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climate cHanGe clmae hane ove he pa eny ha eled n hhe lobal empeae and neaed ea level. in he e we an expe nan dpon n anall paen and ae o eh e h wae. wae.

C

urrent global climate change eects include increased global surace temperatures, a rise in global sea levels, altered precipitation patterns, and thawing o

sea ice and glaciers. Assessments o climate change are most reliable or the past ty years — during which accurate data has been systematically gathered all over the globe and throughout the upper atmosphere.18 For data on the climate in the distant past, scientists rely on a variety o sophisticated methods including using coral rees, pollen samples drawn rom lake beds, and arctic glaciers to ascertain climate conditions. While temperatures around the world have risen, it is important to note that temperature changes have not been uniorm. So aas wi ad a gttig od, bt tds i th a ad ad oa tpat hav iasd by 1° c, ay 2° F i th past hdd yas.19 While seem-

ingly minor, warming o 3° F is enough to reduce crop yields signicantly. Projected temperature increases in tropical

change. Regions such as the Middle East and Northern Arica

areas would reduce important calorie rich staple crops by 20-

are predicted to see their temperatures increase by over 6°

40%, a reduction that would dramatically increase malnutri-

F by the end o the century. 21 These increased temperatures

tion levels in many o the world’s poorest countries. 20 Areas

will aect everything rom sea levels, to resh water avail-

around the equator will be particularly hard hit by climate

ability, to sanitation, to the spread o disease.

Global Temperature Trends 0.8

0.6

0.4 s u i c 0.2 l e C s e e r 0 g e D

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SoUrCE: Natinal Climate Data Cente — U.S. Depatment  Cmmece

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Global Sea Level 200

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Arctic

12 Month Running Mean Monthly Anomaly

6

12 Month Running Mean Monthly Anomaly

Linear Trend

) n 4 a e M 0 2 y 0 l 0 a 2 m o 9 n 7 9 A 1 0 t n m o e r t x f . -2 E v e d . t s # -4 (

150

100 s r e 50 t e m i l l i M 0

-50

-100

-6 -150

-8 1979

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2007

0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 7 7 8 8 9 9 0 0 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 9 9 0 0 8 8 8 8 8 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2

Year

Year

SoUrCE: Natinal Ice Cente, 2000

SoUrCE: Chuch and White Glbal Mean Sea Level recnstuctin — Pudman oceangaphic Labaty

The increase in temperatures has caused sea

Precipitation PrecipitationTrends Predictions

ice to melt beyond seasonal thaws and glaciers to shrink. The Arctic is particularly aected by the increase in temperature and its melting ice contributes to climate change. Scientists looking at long-term trends believe that sea ice is declining by 3.3% per decade, or 15,500 square miles each year. 22 Arctic sea ice refects sunlight and helps moderate the global climate. As it melts, it produces a vicious cycle o increased warming leading to urther reductions in sea ice. Ice on land suraces also melts as temperatures warm.

SoUrCE: Slman, Susan; Plattne, Gian-Kaspe; Knutti, ret; Fiedlingstein, Piee. “Ievesible climate change due t cabn dixide emissins.” PNAS 106, PNAS 106, n 6, 2009: 1707.

The melting ice will increase sea levels and coastal erosion, which also contributes to urther erosion o continental ice

increase and place urther stress on limited resh-water sources.

shelves. Similar to global temperatures, global sea levels have

As a result, the salinity o water will increase, threatening its

risen, although not uniormly, by roughly eight inches in the

suitability or irrigation or human consumption. This requently

past 100 years.

23

risig sa vs i obiatio with xptd hags i pipitatio wi at ass to sh wat. As tempera-

results in migration to areas already environmentally stressed, where the cycle is then repeated — highlighting the act that climate change oten begets urther climate change.

ture increases, demand or resh water to irrigate crops will


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security impacts of climate cHanGe the ey oneqene om lmae hane nlde woenn povey,, polal nably, and k povey o onf. thee ae aleady aen lae poon o he lobe.

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he regions most at risk rom climate change are also those regions with the highest incidents o interstate confict, radicalism, and terrorism. These regions include

South Asia, North Arica, Sub- Saharan Arica, and Central America. Climate change will urther exacerbate regional tensions, increasing the risk o confict, mass migration, and humanitarian emergencies that will jeopardize U.S. national interests and — i history is a guide — orce U.S. intervention. Even i climate change does not result in more numerous American military operations, it will aect the stability and capabilities o numerous riends and allies. Climate change will, in a undamental sense, be a key element in dening threats to American national security in the uture. centrAl AmericA Coastline Erosion

Disease

Confict

Etreme Weather

Desertication

Reugees/Mass Migration

Political Instability

Increased Radicalism

Projected climate change will aect the security o North America primarily through the second-order impact o migration rom Central and South America into the United States. The result will be continued stress on the United States’ southern border, which is already a conduit or drug tracking, human smuggling and gang violence. Climate change poses a signicant risk to Mexico which is already vulnerable to political instability due to its rapid population growth, poverty, and government corruption. 24

sub-sAhArAn AFricA Projected climate change will have a devastating impact on Sub-Saharan Arica. Already home to the most vulnerable populations in the world, climate change will exacerbate poverty, increase the spread o disease, and overwhelm the limited governance capacity o many Sub-Saharan Arican states. State collapse, massive reugee fows, and increased confict — both between countries and within them — will be more common. 25 Arica may witness some classic “resource” conficts, particularly over water. But a more signicant risk is violence stemming rom either state collapse or inter-communal disputes. Studies have shown, or instance, that the Rwandan genocide was most severe precisely in those districts where population growth and soil erosion had reduced arm sizes to below subsistence levels. Climate change will bring stresses such as this throughout Sub-Saharan Arica. 26

Water Shortage

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north AFricA Projected climate change will have a signicant impact on North Arica and the Middle East primarily as a consequence o diminished access to resh water. The region is already very vulnerable to water shortages and droughts. Poor subsistence armers will be hardest hit, but or countries already struggling with rapidly rising populations and lagging economic growth, the broader impact will be signicant. 27 Projected sea level rise could also displace millions in the Nile river delta. 28 Water scarcity could provoke mass-migration rom North Arica to southern Europe, resulting in increased social tensions within European states. North Arica is already home to large, powerul, and sometimes violent radical movements. Corrupt and illegitimate governments ace a great deal o public discontent. Climate change will exacerbate these dynamics, making the region even more prone to violence and increase the risk o the development o radical groups willing to use terrorism to pursue their interests. The nexus between authoritarian regimes, radicalism, violence, and climate change will play an important role in politics in the region over the coming years.


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south AsiA Projected climate change could have serious and destabilizing impacts on Asia. The expected rise in sea level will likely cause coastal fooding that would displace one million people in South and Southeast Asia, as well as increasing the incidents o cholera, malaria, and other diseases. The eects o climate change may jeopardize the development and stability o parts o Asia. Tensions among states over water, especially in South Asia, are probable. The Himalayan glacier — the Earth’s third largest ice sheet — is expected to continue melting, resulting in a dramatic reduction in the supply o resh water to much o Asia, especially Pakistan, and large parts o China and India. 29 South Asia is already a dangerous region. India and Pakistan remain locked in a decades long conrontation, and both sides continue to build up their nuclear arsenals. Violence by extremists in India, Pakistan, and Aghanistan could destabilize the region and all three states are among the top-ten countries surveyed by the U.S. Marine Corps or instability and potential confict. 30

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F the United States, enegy is als a me naw secuity issue. reliance n eign enegy is a maj U.S. vulneability.

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limate change is inextricably linked to energy use

Wos, o doas hp d ay o o advsais.

patterns. Carbon emissions are largely a unction o

We buy oil rom Russia, a country that has become increas-

industrial activity and transportation. Nonetheless,

ingly authoritarian in the last decade while it has also helped

controlling carbon requires addressing patterns o energy

Iran develop nuclear technology that some suspect is really

production and consumption.

intended to produce nuclear weapons. Our dollars help und

For the United States, energy is also a more narrow security issue. Reliance on oreign energy is a major U.S. vulnerability. Ensuring access to oreign energy sources is costly, both militarily and politically.

Hugo Chavez in Venezuela who bitterly condemns the United States and is seeking to oment revolutionary politics in the Western hemisphere. And in the Middle East, American dollars have served to und some o our bitterest enemies. Muammar Qadday in Libya, Saddam Hussein in Iraq,

In 1973 and 1979, developments in the Middle East and

the Islamists regimes in Sudan and Iran, and even Saudi

Persian Gul caused energy prices to spike. The resultant

supporters o Osama bin Laden have all benetted rom our

economic disruptions caused trillions o dollars in cumula-

reliance on oreign oil.

tive lost economic growth.1 In 1991, the United States went to war in the Persian Gul to prevent Saddam Hussein rom controlling orty percent o proven global oil reserves when he invaded Kuwait. Eighteen years later, the United States — ollowing a second war with Hussein — is still ghting to stabilize Iraq. Annually, the cost o buying oreign oil adds to American trade decits.

Th goba gy iastt is tdosy vab to disptios. Oil transits through a large number o

naval choke points, several o which have been disrupted by confict over the past ew decades. The Persian Gul acilities were targeted targeted during the the Iran-Iraq War (1980 -1988 -1988 ). The Suez Canal shut between 1967 and 1975 as a result o the Arab-Israeli confict. In any conrontation with Iran, it is likely that trac through the Strait o Hormuz would be disrupted. Piracy in and around the Strait o Malacca and o the Somali coast also impacts seaborne transit o oil. 2 Most oil reneries are located on coastal sites and many have been damaged by powerul storms — which are predicted to worsen as the climate continues to change. 3 Access to oil and natural gas also raises security concerns because o the vulnerability o pipelines to terrorist attack. The reconstruction o Iraq, or instance, has been dramatically aected by hundreds o attacks on Iraq's pipeline inrastructure. 4 Energy, in act, has two security implications. One, reliance on the harvesting and transportation o ossil uels creates national vulnerabilities and thus is a direct security challenge. Two, burning ossil uels contributes to climate change which has its own security implications. Energy, climate change, and security, as a consequence, create a powerul nexus that must be addressed and resolved together.

enerGy security

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american enerGy dependence the uned sae mee he majoy o  eney need om dome oe, b eman vlneable o dpon n ol pply.

T

he United States produces about 74% o its energy

Dependence on Imported Energy by Sector

requirements domestically; however, certain key sectors o the U.S. economy are heavily dependent on 5

imported energy. Nevertheless, the United States possesses vast, and oten underappreciated, resources.

50

m Dmestic m Impted

40 s U T B n o i l l i r d

30

Approximately 22% o U.S. energy comes rom the burning o coal, virtually all o which is mined domestically. In act, the United States is a net exporter o coal. Similarly, 23% o U.S. energy comes rom natural gas, o which 83% is

20

a u Q

10 0

6

produced domestically. Nuclear energy contributes signicantly to electricity production and makes up 8% o total

Trans ranspo port rtat atio ion n

Indu Indust stri rial al

Resi Reside dent ntia iall and and Commercial

Electrical Power

SoUrCE: Depatment  Enegy’s Enegy Inmatin Agency, Agency, http: //ww w.eia.de.gv/

energy use, while renewable energy sources, taken together, provide or 7% o U.S. energy needs.7

Petroleum Sources (2008)

The United States remains signicantly reliant on imported petroleum, however. Petroleum helps ulll 39% o U.S.

m United States Petleum

energy needs and only 43% o U.S. petroleum requirements are met rom domestic sources. As a osq, s-

57%

43%

m Net Impts

sfiy i pto is aost taiy ahivab.8

According to the CIA

World Factbook ,

the United States has

less than 2% o the world’s proven oil reserves. 9 Increased

SoUrCE: Depatment  Enegy’s Enegy Inmatin Agency, http://www.eia.de.gv/

Total Energy 74%

m United States Pduced m Impted Enegy

26% SoUrCE: Depatment  Enegy’s Enegy Inmatin Agency, Agency, http:// www.eia.de.gv/ www.eia.de.gv/

United States Energy Consumption

7% 22%

8% m renewable Enegy m Nuclea Electic Pwe m Petleum

23%

40%

m Natual Gas m Cal SoUrCE: Depatment  Enegy’s Enegy Inmatin Agency, http://www.eia.de.gv/

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17% SoUrCE: Depatment  Enegy’s Enegy Inmatin Agency, http://www.eia.de.gv/

Crude Oil Reserves 300,000,000,000 250,000,000,000 200,000,000,000 L B150,000,000,000 B

100,000,000,000 50,000,000,000 0

t s a a a a n s a r a l i o l a a n q i a n y n i a n n i i y i a i e l a r a a t a e n t c o j a a o d a a r t r z t i b d e s b r a i i w i a I e s a I w a u s i r x a h a e n m d a r n I u r n r z u L i g h t C g B e g u i Q n l U O S b a o A R N k S K m e A r N n A M i C n a e E e z d a d z e t a e u V b A p a K i a n r o S r U A u d E e t i n U

SoUrCE: https://www.cia.gv/libay/publicatin/the-wld-actbk/ankde/217Bank.htm

2008 United States Net Imports by Country Ttal Cude oil and Pducts 250,000

drilling — whether oshore or in protected wildlie areas — is, at best, a temporary stop-gap measure to alleviate American reliance on oreign petroleum. Petroleum contributes a small amount to domestic electricity production, but is the overwhelming source o energy or America’s transportation sector — and that has its own

y a D r e 200,000 p s r a l l o 150,000 D d n a s 100,000 u o h T l a 500,000 u n n A

0

t r l a a d y a a n a a l a i a o q i a a i a ) . i m o i z i y a a e b a d i c r a r l e r i o s S . a o a b i b h w i i a b n u j x I e g s U w d d r a u e m n r g e g n u ( u g a C r u r a z i l u B l o L a A e o G A b R n K r A s c A i C i n N M o N l e d E K d e z C a n i u V d A a r l a e o s t t S i I a n n u i U q g r E i V

SoUrCE: Depatment  Enegy’s Enegy Inmatin Agency, Agency, http: //ww w.eia.de.gv/

10

security implications. The U.S. economy is tremendously complex and interrelated. interrelated. It depends on advances in supply-

Greater energy independence, thereore, will require

chain management, management, the wide-spread adoption o “just-in-

dramatic changes in America’s transportation inrastructure,

time” logistics, and a tremendous amount o specialization

including a greater reliance on mass transit, high-speed rail,

and trade. In other words, the entire American economy is

and ultimately hydrogen-powered or advanced electric cars

stitched together by the cheap and reliable transportation o

and trucks.

goods. With 58% o the U.S. transportation sector dependent on oreign energy,11 Aia’s ooi sity is tdosy ssptib to disptios i th oi akts.

enerGy security

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reliaBility of foreiGn enerGy sources the va majoy o Amean ol mpo m po ome om one aed a “hh k” o “vey hh k” o polal nably na bly..

A

merica’s reliance on oreign oil jeopardizes key

Risk o Instability

national security interests. Most oil consumed in the C OU NT R Y

United States comes rom regimes at high risk o

RISK INCREASE/DECREASE

INDE x SC OR E

political instability. In addition, several major suppliers pursue

Canada

2.8

Lw risk

international objectives strongly at odds with American

Saudi Aabia

6.1

High risk

interests. Finally, there is compelling evidence that the dollars

Venezuela

7.3

High risk

we spend on oreign oil impede democratization and urther

Nigeia

7.0

High risk

entrench oppressive authoritarian governments around

Mexic

6.1

High risk

Iaq

7.9

Vey High risk

12

the world.

Algeia

6.6

High risk

Canada, which is the United States’ single largest supplier

Angla

7.6

Vey High risk

o oil, is a stable, democratic and riendly neighbor. The next

russia

6.5

High risk

eight largest suppliers o oil to the United States are rated by the

Economist as

either at “high risk” or “very high risk” o

political instability.13 In act, 68% o U.S. petroleum petroleum imports

m Vey High risk m High risk m Mdeate risk m Lw risk

SoUrCE: Ecnmist ’s Plitical Instabilit y Index, http :/ /ww w.ecnmist.cm/ makets/ankings/displa makets/ankings/displaysty.cm?sty ysty.cm?sty_id=1334 _id=1334

come rom countries in those two categories, akig th uitd Stats stikigy vab to pottia oi sppy shoks arising rom domestic disturbances or broader

11%

regional conficts aecting just one

Risk o Instability or Oil Eporting Nations 21% m Vey High risk

o the major oil exporters.

m High risk

Some o our key suppliers

13%

m Lw risk

include Iraq (5% o total imports), a nation

m Mdeate risk

55% SoUrCE: Ecnmist’s Plitical Instabiity Index, http:// www.ecnmist.cm/makets/ankings/displaysty. cm?sty_id=13349331

still in the midst o severe domestic confict and at risk o splintering along ethnic and

a country that within the past 15 years suered a civil war that resulted in over 160,000 deaths.

sectarian lines;

In addition to the risk o instability, several large suppliers are

Angola (4%), a

actively hostile to to American interests. interests. American oil dollars

corrupt, quasi-

und Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez who has gradually

democracy that

eroded democracy in Venezuela and has sought to export his

only recently emerged rom a decades-long civil war; Nigeria (8%), another another quasi- democracy with a long history o



military rule and governmental corruption; and Algeria (4%),

unique brand o authoritarianism and anti-American demagoguery throughout the Western Hemisphere. Oil dollars also und an increasingly authoritarian Russia that seeks to reassert some control over ormer Soviet Republics and may be threatening U.S. eorts to contain nuclear prolieration, particularly acting as a

de facto protector

o Iran’s nuclear


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Natural Gas Imports (2008)

90% 7%

m Canada (90%)

m Nway (<1%)

m Tinidad (7%)

m Nigeia (<1%)

m Egypt (1%)

m Qata (<1%)

m Mexic (<1%)

1% SoUrCE: Depatment  Enegy’s Enegy Inmatin Administatin (EIA), http://www.eia.de.gv/

Petroleum Imports (2008)

19% 25%

4% 4% 4% 5%

12% 10% 8%

9%

m Canada

m Iaq

m Saudi Aabia

m Algeia

m Mexic

m Angla

m Venezuela

m russia

m Nigeia

m rest  Wld

SoUrCE: Depatment  Enegy’s Enegy Inmatin Administatin (EIA), http://ww.eia.de.gv/

ambitions. Even Saudi Arabia, a nominal U.S. ally, is a signicant cause o concern or American interests. Saudi Arabia has dramatically curtailed aid to radical Islamist terror organizations since 9/11, but continues to und schools, charities, and severe interpretations o Islam that serve as incubators or violent extremists. mo gay, th assiv aots w spd o oi sv to di Aia’s itst i pootig th spad o doay. Oil money allows authoritarian govern-

ments to maintain power without popular consent. It creates a tremendous incentive toward corruption and the establishment o kleptocracies. Oil money encourages unnecessary arms races and promotes regional confict.14 U.S. dependence on oreign oil increases the risks aced by the nation and signicantly jeopardizes core U.S. national security interests in democratization and regional stability. The imperatives o climate change as well as traditional U.S. national security calculations both support greater energy independence and an overall reduction in our reliance on petroleum.

enerGy security



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american enerGy GeoGrapHic cHokedependence points inenaonal eney fow — palaly ol — pa hoh a elavely mall nmbe o hokepon and ae hhly vlneable o dpon de o eonal onf, eom, and pay.

W

orld oil supplies are not just threatened by political instability. Th iastt qid to ov assiv aots o

oi is both vast ad highy vab. There are three

principle risks to oil transportation. First, much o the world’s oil transits through relatively constricted passages that can be closed to trac by states and others with a desire to do so. Second, tankers travelling in large numbers

PANAMA CANAL

along predictable routes are vulnerable to the rapidly growing threat o piracy. Third, oil pipelines, the major alternative to seaborne shipment o oil, are also susceptible to attack.

Existing waterway choke points are easy targets o terrorist attacks, have seen trac disruptions by states in times o confict, and continue to be hubs o piracy. The threat rom state actors is severe. Over 50 countries possess signicant inventories o anti-ship missiles.15 And in 200 6, Lebanese Hezbollah used anti-ship missiles against Israeli vessels.16 Nearly twenty percent o the world’s oil fows through the Strait o Hormuz, a 21 milewide body o water vulnerable to Iranian anti-ship missiles.17 Nearly the same amount o oil transits the 1.7 mile-wide Strait o Malacca between Malaysia and Indonesia.




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Maj oil Wateway Shipping rutes Middle East Fme Sviet Unin Aica Cental & Suth Ameica Nth Ameica Chke Pints Piacy Activity BOSPHORUS

SUEZ CANAL

STRAIT OF HORMUZ

BAD EL-MANDEB

STRAIT OF MALACCA

In addition to this high-tech threat, there has been an

There is no good alternative to moving oil by sea. Pipelines

increasing amount o piracy reported globally. Tota attaks

cannot cross oceans, and even those constructed to move

by piats dobd o 2007 to 2008, ad ths a i 2009

oil rom inland drilling sites to sea coasts or shipment are

18

a o pa to dob agai. Remarkably, even the largest

expensive to construct and maintain. Pipelines are also highly

ships are vulnerable, as evidenced by the November 2008

vulnerable. The Iraq Pipeline Watch, or instance, docu-

seizure o the

mented over 450 attacks on Iraqi pipelines and oil acilities

Sirius Star o

the coast o Somalia. In this

case, small bands o pirates seized control o a 350,000 ton, 1000 oot-long ship.19 Most o the attacks have occurred near three key sea lanes or oil tankers: o the Somali coast at the exit to the Persian Gul and Red Sea; in proximity to the Strait o Malacca; and in the Caribbean where oil transits to the American Gul Coast. With more than 2,600 tankers transporting oil globally, there is no shortage o attractive targets. 20

enerGy security

rom 2003 to 2008. 21 The costs o saeguarding this oil inrastructure is massive. Some analysts believe that “total [U.S.] military expenditures related to oil now tota l $132.7 billion annually,”22 though other analysts place the gure closer to $50 billion annually. 23 Regardless, the expense is a massive addition to the other costs — climate and security related — o oil dependence.

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While thee is a slid — and gwing — cnsensus in the United States that climate change change is bth eal and a cnsequence  human activity, thee emain signicant chal challenges. lenges.

0


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policy alternatives

A

ddressing the security

The state o existing tech-

implications o climate

nology is also a challenge.

change is simple in

Transitioning to alternative

concept and dicult in execu-

energy on a mass scale

tion. The policy responses are

would be tremendously

straightorward. Th uitd

costly, and in the case o

Stats wod b o s

some economic sectors

i w dd o abo

essentially impossible at the

issios ad psadd

present time. There is a great

oths to do th sa. The

deal o uncertainty about

best way to do so would be to

the uture costs. Optimists

invest in a dramatic expansion

argue that greater investment

o alternative energy production

in alternative energy would

capacity — notably, wind, solar,

generate economies o scale

and nuclear — combined with a

and more rapid innovation.

massive investment in shiting

Pessimists argue that much

our transportation inrastructure

o the science o alternative

rom its reliance on internal

energy is mature and that

combustion engines ueled

transormational develop-

by gasoline to electric and

ments are unlikely. Nuclear

hydrogen-powered vehicles.

energy also raises a special

Translating this concept into

set o concerns as memories

action is hampered by two sets

o Three Mile Island and

o actors — public opinion and

Chernobyl linger in the public

the state o existing technology.

consciousness.

While there is a solid — and growing — consensus in the

As a patia att, a daati shit away o th s

United States that climate change is both real and a

o oa o tiity podtio wod qi a sigif-

consequence o human activity, there remain signicant

at ivstt i a pow. But nuclear plants are

challenges. First, a large percentage o the public remains

large and expensive, raising challenges o both power trans-

skeptical o the science despite the overwhelming evidence.

mission and nancing. Nuclear plants also produce hazardous

Some o these skeptics are proessional contrarians, but

waste that must be saely stored or many centuries.

many are simply poorly inormed individuals. The public education challenge remains signicant. Second, many are concerned about the capacity o the ederal government to address climate change airly and eectively, and preer not to enact policies that would expand the reach and power o Washington. Finally, there are many Americans who consider climate change a pressing issue, but who are worried about supporting a vigorous eort to address climate security because o the potential and real costs to themselves, their communities, and the nation.

Transorming the transportation inrastructure could be even more daunting. There are over 250,000,000 motor vehicles on American roads.1 Replacing or converting even a signicant percentage o them would be a massive undertaking. Investing in additional electricity generation or batterypowered vehicles, or in a hydrogen distribution system would be even more expensive. As a consequence, changes are likely to be made at the margins over a period o decades, ensuring that unless we begin charting a new course immediately, our actions could occur too late to mitigate the worst consequence o climate change.

policy alternatives

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puBlic opini opinion on the Amean pbl only ppo eo o adde lmae hane, even  meae o do o neae he o o eney domeally.

A

merican public opinion is important when considering climate change action and viable energy alternatives. Public understanding o the phenomenon and its

implications are important considerations as voters choose policy makers and policy makers choose courses o action to enact preventative measures and deal with the ramications o climate change. Public attitude surveys yield three major ndings. The rst is that Americans see climate change as a problem. The second is that the American public wants to see political action on climate change. The third is that Americans are willing to pay to do something about climate change. According to a poll conducted by NBC News and the Street Journal in

Wall

2006, 66% o Americans believed believed climate

change was occurring and required action. This was up 12% rom when the question was asked in 1999. In addition, 35% were concerned enough to state that immediate action is needed. In 1999, only 24% o respondents said the same. 2 Similar polling as recent as April 2009, suggests that the trend has not reversed despite the downturn in the economy. 3 55% o Americans according to an American Security Project poll believe climate change is a threat to national security. 4 Data suggests that growing numbers o 1999

2006

From what you know about global climate change or global warming, which one o the ollowing statements comes closest to your opinion? 24% 30%

35%

31%

m Glbal climate change has been established as a seius pblem, and immediate

actin is necessay m Thee is enugh evidence that climate change is taking place and sme actin

12% 34%

8%

26%

shuld be taken m We dn’t knw enugh abut glbal climate change, and me eseach is necessay bee we take any actins m Cncen abut glbal climate change is unwaanted

SoUrCE: HatMcIntu/The Wall Steet Junal/NBC News Methdlgy: Telephne inteviews with 1,002 Ameican adults, cnducted m June 9-12, 2006, Magin  e is 3.1 pecent.




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Do you avor or oppose the United States taking action to reduce the carbon pollution that causes climate change?

13% 18%

56%

C

4% 6% 3%

m Fav, stngly m Fav, nt s stngly m oppse, stngly m oppse, nt s stngly m Undecided m N pinin/dn’t knw

SoUrCE: Ameican Secuity Pject Natinal Suvey, August 2009

Americans believe climate change is a real issue and ewer Americans believe that we should wait or additional inormation beore taking action. A large majority o Americans also eel the government should do more to deal with climate change. Nearly three ourths o those polled, 72%, think the government should do more now to deal with the eects o climate change. Only 7% o those eel the government should be doing less. In our poll conducted in August o 2009, 60% o Americans strongly supported the government taking action to reduce carbon pollution. In an earlier poll conducted in July o 2009, 58%

Do you think the United States should take action on global warming only i other major indus trial countries such as China and India agree to do equally eec tive things, that the United States should take action even i these other countries do less, or that the United States should not take action on this at all?

o Americans believe that climate change should be a higher government priority than it is today. 5 The American public

60%

clearly wants action to meet the climate change challenge. Some Americans worry about the risk to America’s economic competitiveness i the United States takes action alone

19%

to reduce carbon emissions while India and China do not.

21%

However, 60% o Americans believe the United States should take action even i China and India

don’t implement

similar measures.6

m Take actin even i the cunties SoUrCE: ABC News/Washingtn Pst Pll, June 18-21, 2009

d less m Take actin nly i the cunties d m Shuld nt take actin at all

While Americans seem ready to do something about climate change, economic actors matter. According to Rasmussen Reports, 21% o Americans are willing to pay $100 more per year or cleaner energy, but only 14% are willing to pay more.7 In a similar poll, 56% o people were willing to 24%

support a cap and trade program that signicantly lowered

23%

greenhouse gases, but raised monthly electrical bills by $10. O note, respondents supporting a cap and trade

4% 3%

6%

program dropped to 44% when the cost was raised to $25 per month. 8 The percentage o those supporting cap and

40 %

m Much me secue m Smewhat me secue

trade programs, also slightly decreased rom 2007 to 2008,

m Much less secue

suggesting that the price people are willing to pay is elastic and sensitive to economic downturns.

I the United States took action to reduce the carbon pollution that causes climate change, would it make the United States more secure, less secure or would it have no eect on the security o the United States?

SoUrCE: Ameican Secuity Pject Natinal Suvey, August 2009

m Smewhat less secue m N aect m N pinin/dn’t knw

policy alternatives

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enerGy consumption By sector replan oal wh nlea, ola, and wnd o eley eneaon and nean he el eeny o Amean vehle ae he mo eeve way o ede Amean abon doxde emon and ede dependene on oen ol.

T

ransportation and electricity generation are the two

1%

greatest practical challenges to America’s desire to

Electricity Generation by Source

9%

address climate change. The challenges these sectors

pose are quite dierent and dicult to resolve.

20%

m Petleum

20%

m Natual Gas m Cal

The generation o electricity in the United States is heavily

m Nuclea

reliant on coal. Roughly 50% o all electricity consumed in

m renewable Suces

50%

the United States comes rom coal-red power plants. With

SoUrCE: http://www.eia.de.gv/eme http://www.eia.de.gv/emeu/ae/txt/ u/ae/txt/ ptb0802b.html

the introduction o better emissions controls, coal plants have

managed to signicantly reduce the level o pollutants they emit, but nevertheless continue to produce CO2 at alarming rates. Technology to capture and sequester carbon emission remains in its inancy. No coal-red power plant captures any signicant amount o its carbon emissions at present. 9 There are also tremendous logistical problems with sequestering massive amounts o carbon even i it were captured. rdig th b o oa-fd pats is a ssay stp to addss cO2 issios, but doing so would require

a signicant investment in an alternative inrastructure to produce and eciently distribute electricity. In comparison, the transportation sector has the astest energy demand growth rate and it is also most reliant on the most problematic energy source — imported petroleum.

Energy Consumption by Sector 40000 35000 30000 s U25000 T B n 20000 o i l l i r T 15000

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Years

Energy Consumed by the Industrial Sector Energy Consumed by the Transportation Sector

Energy Consumed by the Residential Sector Energy Consumer by the Commercial Sector

SoUrCE: http://www.eia.de.gv/emeu/ae/cnsump.html




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The United States lags behind many industrialized nations in mass transportation and inter-city connectors like highspeed rail. Going rom London to Paris by rail — a distance o slightly more than 200 miles — takes two-and-a-quarter hours.10 Amtrak rom New York to Boston — roughly the same distance — takes three-and-a -hal hours, literally 50% longer.11 Because the United States is so large and spread- out, compared to many other industrialized nations, we ace unique challenges in the transportation sector. Nonetheless, total vehicle uel eciency has barely improved in over 20 years, even as the number o vehicles on the road has continued to increase dramatically.12 nw  ooy stadads aod by th Obaa adiistatio i may o 2009 wi hopy ad to ipovts. Progress on this

ront would signicantly reduce both America’s carbon emissions and reliance on oreign oil. In the past 20 years, energy consumption per real dollar o GDP has declined by approximately 50%.13 Interestingly, cost savings measures and greater eciency in American industry have resulted comparatively in less energy consumption growth than in other major sectors o the U.S. economy. This demonstrates that economic incentives can drive signicant improvements in energy eciency.

Fuel Eciency o Vehicles Vehicles on U.S. Roads: 1923-200 6

Energy Consumption per Real Dollar o GDP r a20 l l o D ) 0 0 0 215 ( d e n i a h C10 r e p

25 20 15

G P M

10 5 0

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All vehicles

Cars

All trucks

Light trucks

Medium and heavy trucks

U T B d n a s u o h T

5

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SoUrCE: Sivak, M. and Tsimhni, o. (20 09) . Fuel Eciency  Vehicles n US rads:

1923–2006, Energy Policy , vl. 37, pp. 3168-3170

policy alternatives

SoUrCE: http://www.eia.de.gv/emeu/ae/txt/ptb0105.html

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alternative enerGy Fe neae n eley demand an ealy be me by nvemen n enewable eney. Alenave eney ehnoloe alo eae ewe ae vlneable o he uned sae.

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reater energy independence is possible. Increased

still more expensive than coal and natural gas, will need to

eciency is projected to reduce the rate o growth

serve as a bridge until clean, renewable energy sources and

o electricity demand in the United States. In the

technologies mature

uture, the price o renewable energy is projected to drop, while the price o non-renewables will remain static, and may, in act increase i requirements or carbon capture are implemented.14 Nonetheless, or at least a generation, higher priced alternative energy will have to compete with lower cost coal and natural gas by promoting its small carbon ootprint. Nuclear energy, less expensive than renewable, but

ti — say s o high, p-ot osttio osts, bt bft o ow  ad aita osts.

Because they do not produce carbon, their contribution to climate change is negligible. Additionally, alternative energy technologies create ewer strategic vulnerabilities. They do not rely on imports and are less vulnerable to disruption due to political disturbances. Because o the unortunately

United States Electricity Demand Growth

high cost o some o these energy sources, however, it is clear that the short-term alternative is increased reliance on

12 History

Projections

nuclear energy.

10 h t w o r G d n a m e D %

rwab gy — otaby soa, wid, ad hydo-

In order or nuclear power to have an impact on emissions,

8

it would need to make up a higher percentage o the United

6

States’ overall electricity production. In the past, however,

4

growth o nuclear power has been stymied by concerns

2

over saety and the risk o prolieration. France already uses nuclear power to supply over 75% o its electricity while

0

1950

1970

1990

2007 2010

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the United States only uses nuclear power to supply around 20% o its electricity.15 Without some mechanism to penalize carbon emissions emissions — such as a c arbon tax or a cap -and-trade

SoUrCE: DoE/EIA-0383(20 09) http ://www.eia.de.gv/ia/ae/electicity. ://www.eia.de.gv/ia/ae/electicity.html html

system, nuclear power will remain more expensive than coal and natural gas due primarily to higher capital costs, particu-

Electricity Costs or New Power Plants 2020

larly or construction.16 Nuclear

Nuclear energy is, like other non-renewable energy, dependent on resource availability. The Massachusetts Institute o

Wind

Technology (MIT) conservatively estimates that at least an 80 year global supply o nuclear uel exists or 800 reactors

Natural Gas

(there are nearly 440 commercial reactors operating worldwide today) and specically states that, “the world-wide

Coal

supply o uranium ore is sucient to uel the deployment o 0

20

40

60 80 Mills per Kilowatt Hour

100

120

1000 reactors over the next hal century”.17

 Capital  Operations and Maintenance  Fuel  Transmission

SoUrCE: http:// www.eia.de.gv/ia/ae/electi www.eia.de.gv/ia/ae/electicity.html city.html

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Americans continue to worry about the saety o nuclear

Electricity Supplied by Nuclear Power Reactors in 200 6

reactors and ear reactor accidents and the eects o nuclear waste. However, the Nuclear Regulatory

France Lithuania Slovakia Belgium Sweden Ukraine Bulgaria Armenia Slovenia South Korea Hungary Switzerland Czech Republic Germany Finland Spain

Commission’s saety standards are rigorous. There is a strong scientic consensus that nuclear reactors can be built and operated saely.18 The issue o nuclear waste remains unresolved. Yucca Mountain, originally intended to store nuclear waste, is no longer a politically viable option and does not have the capacity needed now or America’s nuclear waste. Since the United States has not come up with a long-term waste management solution, nuclear plants currently store their waste on site. As

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a result, with over one hundred reactors operating in thirty

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country with ew problems or protests.19 Ths atos highight th at that a gy od sv as a bidg thoogy btw today’s ia o ossi s ad

SoUrCE:IAE A, http:// www-pub.iaea.g/MTCD/publicati www-pub.iaea.g/MTCD/publicatins/PDF/rDS1-27_w ns/PDF/rDS1-27_web.pd eb.pd

a t ooy powd by wab gy sos sh as soa ad wid.

Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage

2129 646

1037

488 287

299

1765

2546 541

348

1640

584 3727 12475

2032

385

1768 886

427

479 1763

2138

2512

667 1158

2803 560

3241

1781

780 1219

2105

Measuements ae in metic tns.

SoUrCE: Andews, Anthny. “Spent Nuclea Fuel Stage Lcatins and Inventy.” CrS rept  Cngess, Washingtn DC, 2004

policy alternatives

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american Government capaBility and responses clmae hane and  mpa wll e he u.s. ovenmen’ ably o epond a home and aboad.

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limate change will aect human lie and secur ity.

Aid as a Percentage o GDP

Because it is unlikely that even concerted action will wholly prevent all negative climate change conse-

quences, the United States will need to take steps to mitigate the eects. As a result, we must consider how well prepared

0.9

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the United States is to deal with some o the predicted security ramications o climate change such as humanitarian emergencies, military confict, and the spread o disease. Climate change will increase global poverty and cause humanitarian emergencies. The United States will need to

P0.6 D G f o t 0.5 n e c r e P0.4

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und a generous program o oreign assistance. U.S. capacity

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to alleviate global poverty is at a low ebb. The U.S. Agency or

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International Development shed a great deal o exper tise over

0

the past two decades, and now serves largely as a contracting instrument rather than an eective instrument o U.S. policy. Furthermore, even with increases in oreign assistance under President George W. Bush, American oreign assistance has

2 4 6 8 0 2 4 6 8 0 2 4 6 8 0 2 4 6 8 0 2 4 6 8 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 0 0 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2

Year

SoUrCE: Budget  the United States Gvenment: Histical Tables Tables http:/ /www.gpaccess. gv/usbudget/y10/hist.html

been declining as a percentage o GDP or nearly 50 years. 20

Ocial U.S. Development Assistance to All Recipients

economic migration, and confict.

30000 25000

According to current predictions, climate change will also

D S U t 20000 n e r r u C 15000 s n o i l l i 10000 M

lead to an increase in communicable diseases including malaria and dengue ever, and, indirectly — due to human migrations — HIV/AIDS. As a result, the United States will

5000

need to ocus on eorts to eradicate and contain these

0 1960

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Appropriations to USAID Global Health Programs

diseases abroad as well as establish eective monitoring and rapid response measures at home. In 2002, the World Health Organization documented the eects o climate change on global health. The authors examined ten major risks, including: temperature extremes; weather disasters; disease vectors; ood- and water-borne illnesses; smaller harvests; diseases

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aecting plants and animals; resh-water scarcity; air pollution; and armed confict. These developments — essentially climate change and its eects — were responsible or 2.4% o the world’s cases o diarrhea, 6% o malaria cases in some

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2005

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SoUrCE: Salaam-Blyther, Tiaji, “Global Health: Appropriations to USAID Programs rom FY2001 through FY2008”, CRS Report or Congress. Washington, DC: 2008. http://pd.usaid.gov/pd_docs/PCAA http://pd.usaid.gov/pd_docs/PCAA B934.pd



Increasing poverty w ill mean a higher likelihood o amine,

in some industrialized countries. 21 By o stiat, iat hag otbts otbts to 300,000 aths aay. 22 Under

President Bush, the United States dramatically increased glob al


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Potential Water Conficts

KASHMIR AFGHANISTAN

INDUS RIVER

PAKISTAN

ARABIAN SEA

INDIA

The Indus rive system, iginating in India and unning thugh Kashmi int Pakistan, is shaed thugh the Indus rive Teaty. The teaty has thus a suvived tw was between the natins; but inceased iiga tin needs, allegatins that India is misapppiating wate, cntinued lw-level cnfict in the aea, and the melting  the Siachen Glacie (the suce  the ive system) due t climate change, theaten the ageement and peace in the egin.

LEBANON KASHMIR SYRIA

SEA OF GALILEE

WEST BANK

GOLAN HEIGHTS

JORDAN RIVER JORDAN

INDIA

DEAD SEA ISRAEL

health expenditures, notably under the President’s Emergency

EGYPT

Plan or AIDS Relie (PEPFAR) and the President’s Malaria Initiative Initiative (PMI) .23 These expenditures will need to continue to

NILE RIVER

increase in the uture.

ERITREA

SUDAN

The U.S. government will also need to t ake a leadership role in

BLUE NILE

establishing principles or the equitable sharing o increasingly scarce resources — particularly water — beginning in North America. 24 Establishing a North American water agreement may require a contentious revision o the 1922 Colorado River Compact, but doing so would show the world that the United States is working seriously to alleviate the worst impac ts o climate change — despite domestic political pressure. 25 Such

ETHIOPIA

CENTRAL AFRICAN REP.

WHITE NILE

DEM. REP. OF THE CONGO

Few wate ageements that gven the divisin  suace and gundwate esuces in the Middle East egin exist. The majity  cunties have signicant ppula tins highly dependent n agicultue and despeate  scace wate. Access t wate esuces cntinues t play a lage le in teitial disputes including the Glan Heights and the Palestinian Teities.

The Nile Basin is shaed between ten Aican cunties with Egypt dminating wate usage. Allcatin  the wate esuces cntinues t be a cntentius issue dealt with  the mst pat successully unde the Nile Basin Initiative. Egypt has in the past indicated that it was willing t use ce t guaantee its access t the Nile—a gwing cncen as ppulatins cntinue t ise in the aea.

UGANDA KENYA

RWANDA

LAKE VICTORIA

BURUNDI

TANZANIA

an agreement would also serve as a useul model to the world o how states can peaceully negotiate sustainable solutions to the impacts o climate change. MALAWI

In order to cope with these and other consequences o climate change, the US military will need the ability to

ZAMBIA

ZAMBEZI RIVER

respond to amines, epidemics, interstate confict, mass

MOZAMBIQUE

migrations, and resource scarcity. Whi th uitd Stats

ZIMBABWE

iitay aady has sigifat apaity o haitaia itvtio, o ais hav aggd i dvopig

The Zambezi ive basin and ive system is seveely explited. Disputes within and between the cunties bdeing the ive will likely escalate as ames intensiy iigatin, natinal gvenments insti tute wate tanses m the ive t distant aeas with dught, individual cunties g thugh with plans  wide-scale wate withdawal, and cnficts ve aeas  land cntinue.

siia apabiitis.26

Nonetheless, with US orces committed to a large, open-

LANCANG RIVER

INDIA

ended deployment to Aghanistan, it seems unlikely that the United States will be in a position to respond quickly to any but the most extreme crises. Darur, or instance, has languished in the shadow o Iraq and Aghanistan. There is little reason

CHINA BURMA

MEKONG RIVER

VIETNAM LAOS

to assume that the United States will be able or willing to do more in the uture than it has done there. American leaders will ace a multitude o tough choices as climate-induced national security threats begin to compete with and crowd out our ability to respond to traditional threats such as terrorism, rogue states, and the rise o peer competitors.

policy alternatives

THAILAND

CAMBODIA

Althugh Thailand and Las shae the bulk  the Mekng rive Basin, China is able t stngly infuence distibutin  wate esuces due t its plitical clut and gegaphic psitin upsteam. Cunties diveging inteests inteests in t he ive including cheap hydpwe, sheies, and iigatin  agicultue ae mediated by the Mekng rive Cmmissin, withut China’s paticipatin. China cntinues t build dams inceasing the ate  envinmental degada tin and putting the livelihds  cunties dwnive at stake.

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conclusion clmae hane  eal and hman avy  onbn o .

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he United States is conronted by the related threats

wars. These predictable consequences will strain the capacity

o climate change and energy insecurity, which place

o the United States and its allies to adapt and meet the chal-

in jeopardy lives, property, our economic health, and

lenges o the coming century.

— potentially — our very way o lie. As such, they constitute a clear and present danger to the national security o the United States.

We ace a troubling climate uture because o our dependence on ossil uels — coal, petroleum, and natural gas. Imported petroleum makes us doubly vulnerable. Not only

Climate change is real and human activity is contributing to it.

do we do urther damage to the climate with its use, but we

Atmospheric CO2 concentrations are now at unprecedented

also make ourselves — and our economy — susceptible to

levels due to industrial activity and the burning o ossil uels.

disruptions in global oil supplies and subject to the whims

As a result, the planet’s atmosphere and seas are getting

o authoritarian despots who undermine our interests and

warmer. The cascading consequences o continued warming

values around the world nanced with the money we spend

are sobering to consider: insucient water supplies, shiting

on oil.

rainall patterns, disruptions to agriculture, human migrations, more ailing states, increased extremism, and even resource

To meet these threats, we must harness a new American revolution in energy — becoming more ecient across our entire economy, investing in renewable energy technologies, and increasing our use o sae and reliable nuclear power. We must leverage the inventiveness o American industry — yes, the same industry that produced dramatic increases in vehicle uel eciency rom the mid1970s to the late-1980s and allowed American wealth to rise while reducing the cost o energy used in manuacturing. The economic opportunities o the twentyrst century will be ound in developing solutions to meet the challenges o climate change and energy dependence. I we ignore the warnings o scientists and national security leaders, we will only deepen our addiction to imported oil, hamstring our economy, and weaken our country. But i we heed those warnings, the United States will lead the world in a new wave o protable, green technology, reduce our dependence on oreign energy supplies, and reduce our contribution to global warming. Our economic strength and our national security will grow in tandem.

0


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endnotes The endnotes in this online fle are updated rom the printed report to correct or an error in the numbering o the notes.

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10 Brian Fagan, Floods, Famines, and Emperors: El Emperors: El Niño and the Fate o Civilizations . New York: Basic Books, 1999. 11 Diamond, Jared. Collapse . London: Viking Penguin, 2005, 311-328. 12 IPCC. “IPCC Working Group I: The Physical Science Basis Basis o Climate Climate Change.” Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change . 2007. ttp://ipcc-w1.ucar. eu/w1/Report/AR4Wg1_Print_FrontMatter.p (accessed June 15, 2009). 13 United States Environmental Protection Agency. “International “International Analyses.” Climate Change-Climate Economics . 2001. ttp://www.epa.ov/cimatecane/economics/internationa.tm (accessed July 7, 2009).

27 Parr y, M.L., O.F. Canziani, J.P. J.P. Palutiko, P.J. P.J. van der Linden, and C.E. Hanson . Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability . IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 443-445. 28 Parr y, M.L., O.F. Canziani, J.P. J.P. Palutiko, P.J. P.J. van der Linden, and C.E. Hanson . Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 443. 29 Diamond, Jared. Collapse . London: Viking Penguin, 2005, 311-328. 30 Viniegra, María Eugenia Ibarrarán, and Salimah Salimah Mónica Cossens González. “Climate Change Research and Policy in Mexico: Implications or North American Securit y. y.”” Politics and Policy 35, Policy 35, no. 4 (December 2007): 684-701.

ENERgY SECURITY 1

14 Marland, G., T.A. T.A. Boden, and R.J. Andres. 2008. Global, Regional, and and National Fossil Fuel CO2 Emissions. In Trends: A Compendium o Data on Global Change . Carbon Dioxide Inormation Analysis Center, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, U.S. Department o Energy, Oak Ridge, Tenn.

Ikenberry, John G. “The Irony Irony o State Strength: Comparative Comparative Responses to the Oil Shocks in the 1970s.” International Organization 40, Organization 40, no. 1 (Winter 1986): 107-109.

2

Otterman, Sharon. Sharon. “Pirates Briefy Rattle Oil Market.” The New York Times , November 17, 17, 200 8.

15 Ibid.

3

16 United States Environmental Protection Agency. “Global “Global Mitigation o Non-CO2 Greenhouse Gases.” Oce o Atmospheric Programs, Washington, DC, 2006.

“Climate Change, Extreme Events, and Coastal Cities.” Cities.” Conerence Report, Rice University & University College o London, Houston, 2005.

4

Christo, Joseph A., interview by United States Senate Committee Committee on Foreign Relations. Rebuilding Iraq: Stabilization, Reconstruction, and Financing Challenges (February Challenges (February 8, 2006).

5

Energy Inormation Administration. Energy Price Impacts on the U.S. economy since the early 1970s? April 1970s? April 10, 2001. ttp://www.eia.oe.ov/oia/ economy/enery_price.tm (accessed July 10, 2009).

17 Ibid. 18 IPCC. “IPCC Working Group I: The Physical Science Basis Basis o Climate Climate Change.” Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change . 2007. ttp://ipcc-w1.ucar. eu/w1/Report/AR4Wg1_Print_FrontMatter.p (accessed June 15, 2009).

endnotes

31

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6

—. Ofcial Energy Statistics rom the US Government . http://www.eia.doe. gov/ (accessed June 15, 2009).

6

“ABC News/Washington Post Poll.” June 18-21, 18-21, 2009.http://www.washing tonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/polls/postpoll_e tonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/polls/postpoll_environm nvironment_042007.html ent_042007.html.

7

Ibid.

7

8

—. Renewable & Alternative Fuels . http://www.eia.doe.gov/uelrenewable. html (accessed June 15, 2009).

“56% Don’t Want to Pay More to Fight Global Warming.” Warming.”Rasmussen Rasmussen Reports . July 1, 2009. www.rasmussenreports.com/publ www.rasmussenreports.com/public_conte ic_content/politics/ nt/politics/ general_politics/56_don_t_wan general_politics/56_don_t_want_to_pay_mo t_to_pay_more_to_ght_glo re_to_ght_global_wa bal_warming rming (accessed July 20, 2009).

9

Central Intelligence Agency. “Country Comparison: Comparison: Oil-Proved Oil-Proved Reserves.” Reserves.” The World Factbook . January 1, 2008. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/ the-world-actbook/rankorder/2178rank.html (accessed July 20, 2009).

8

(ABC News/Washington Post Poll 2009 ).

9

MIT Energy Initiative. The Future o Coal. Massachusetts Institute o Technology, 2007. http://web.mit.edu/coal/ (accessed July 28, 2009).

10 (Energy Inormation Administration n.d.) 11 Ibid. 12 Ross, Michael Lewin. “Does “Does Oil Hinder Demoncracy.”World Demoncracy.”World Politics 53, Politics 53, no. 3 (April 2001): 325-361.; Barro, Robert J. “Determinants o Democracy.”Journal Democracy.”Journal o Political Economy 107 Economy 107,, no. 6/2 (December 1999) 1999) : Supplement 158-183.; Tsui, Kevin K. More Oil, Less Democracy? Theory Democracy? Theory and Evidence rom Crude Oil Discoveries . Job Market Paper, Chicago: University o Chicago, 2005. 13 The Economist . “Political Instability Index.” March 25, 2009. http://www. economist.com/markets/ranking economist.com/markets/rankings/displaysto s/displaystory.cm?story_i ry.cm?story_id=13349331 d=13349331 . 14 Colgan, Je. “Oil “Oil and Revolutionary Regimes: A Toxic Toxic Mix.” Paper prepared or International Political Economy Society Annual Meeting, Philadelphia, 2008. 15 “Leth al Sting.” Anti-Ship Missiles . http://www.global-deence.com/2003/ anti_ship.htm (accessed July 24, 2009). 16 Mazzetti, Mark, and Thom Shanker. Shanker. “Hezbollah’s unexpected frepower.” The New York Times . July 19, 2006. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/19/ world/arica/19iht-missile.2238629.html (accessed July 23, 2009). 17 Energy Inormation Administration. Administration. “World Oil Transit Transit Chokepoints.” Chokepoints.” Country Analysis Bries . January 2008. http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/World_Oil_ Transit_Chokepoints/Full.html (accessed May 28, 2009). 18 ICC Commercial Commercial Crime Services. “IMB Live Piracy Map.” 2009. http://www. icc-ccs.org/inde.ph icc-ccs.org/inde.php?option=com_abrik&vie p?option=com_abrik&view=visualizatio w=visualization& n& controller=visualizat controller=visualization.goo ion.googlemap&Itemid=219 glemap&Itemid=219 (accessed July 27, 2009). 19 Glendinning, Lee, and James Sturcke. “Pirates take over oil tanker with British crew on board.” Guardian . November 17, 2008. http://www.guardian.co.uk/ world/2008/nov/17/oil-tanker-pirates (accessed July 20, 2009). 20 “Intern ational Tanker.” OSG. http://www.osg.com/inde.cm?pageid=46 (accessed July 15, 2009). 21 IAGS. Iraqi Pipeline Watch . March 27, 2008. http://www.iags.org/iraqpipelinewatch.htm (accessed July 23, 2009). 22 Copulos, Milton R. Testimony or the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Washington DC, (March 30, 2006). http://oreign.senate.gov/testimony/2006/CopulosTestimony060330.pd. 23 Delucchi, Mark A., and James J. Murphy. “U.S. military military expenditures to protect the use o Persian Gul oil or motor vehicles.” Energy Policy 36 Policy 36 (April 2008): 2253-2264.

POLICY ALTERNATIVES 1

Research and Innovative Technology Administration.Table Administration.Table 1-11: Number 1-11: Number o U.S. Aircrat, Vehicles, Vessels, and Other Conveyances . http://www.bts.gov/publications/national_trans cations/national_transportation_statisti portation_statistics/html/table_01_1 cs/html/table_01_11.html 1.html.

2

“Hart/McIntur /The Wall Street Journal/NBC News poll.” poll.” June 9-12, 9-12, 2006. http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/view/12286.

3

“Marist College Poll.” April 1-3, 2009. 2009 . http://www.pollingreport.com/enviro.htm.

4

“American Security Project Project poll.” poll.” August 5, 2009.

5

“World Public Opinion Assessing Governments on Climate Climate Change.” Change.” World World Public Opinion. July 29, 2009. http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/ pd/jul09/W PO_ClimateChan PO_ClimateChange_Jul09_qua ge_Jul09_quaire.pd ire.pd.



10 Eurostar. Timetable Core Destinations . http://www.eurostar.com/pd/time tables/timetables_english2.pd (accessed July 28, 2009). 11 Amtrak. Northeast Corridor Boston and Virginia Beach . http://www.amtrak. com/timetable/july09/W04.pd (accessed July 28, 2009). 12 Research and Innovative Technology Administration. Administration.Table Table 1-11: 1-11: Number o U.S. Aircrat, Vehicles, Vessels, and Other Conveyances . http://www.bts.gov/publications/national_trans cations/national_transportation_statistic portation_statistics/html/ s/html/ table_01_11 table_01_11.html .html. 13 Energy Inormation Inormation Administration. Table 1.5: Energy Consumption, Expenditures, and Emissions Indicators, 1949-2008 . http://www.eia.doe. gov/emeu/aer/tt/ptb0105.html (accessed July 27, 2009). 14 Energy Inormation Inormation Administration. Annual Energy Outlook 2009 with Projections to 2030 . March 2009. http://www.eia.doe.gov/oia/aeo/elec tricity.html (accessed July 10, 2009). 15 International Atomic Atomic Energy Agency.Energy, Agency. Energy, Electricity and Nuclear Power Estimates or the Period up to 2030 . Reerence Data Series No. 1, Vienna: IAEA, 2007. 16 MIT Energy Initiative. Initiative. The Future o Nuclear Power 2009 Update to the 2003 Report . Massachusetts Institute o Technology, 2009. http://web.mit.edu/ nuclearpower/ (accessed July 22, 2009) 17 (MIT Energy Initiative 2009 ), World Nuclear Association. Association.Nuclear Nuclear Power in the World Today . March 2009. www.world-nuclear.org/ino/in01.html (accessed July 20, 2009). 18 (MIT Energy Initiative 2009 ). 19 Energy Inormation Inormation Administration. U.S. Nuclear Reactors . 2007. www.eia. doe.gov/cnea/nuclea doe.gov/cnea/nuclear/page/nuc_reactors/reactsu r/page/nuc_reactors/reactsum.html m.html (accessed June 24, 2009). 20 Tarno, Chris, and Larry Nowells. “Foreign Aid: An Introductory Overview o U.S. Programs and Policy.” CRS Report or Congress, Washington DC, 2004. http://www.as.org/man/crs/98-916.pd . 21 World Health Organization. “Quanitiying Selected Major Risks Risks to Health.” Health.” In The World Health Report 2002 , 49-97. 2002. http://www.who.int/whr/2002/ en/whr02_ch4.pd. 22 Global Humanitarian Humanitarian Forum. “Human “Human Impact Report: Climate Change.“ Change.“ Geneva, 2009. http://ghgeneva.org/Portals/0/pds/human_impact_report.pd. 23 Salaam-Blyther, Tiaji. Tiaji. “Trends in USAID Global Health Spending: FY2001FY2009.” 35th Annual Global Health Conerence . Washington, DC, 2008. http:// www.globalhealth. www.globalhealth.org/conerence org/conerence_2008/ _2008/ presentations/ps6_t_salaam_ presentations/ps6_t_salaam_ blyther.pd . 24 Nikioruk, Andrew. On the Table: Water, Energy, and North American Integration . Munk Centre or International Studies, University o Toronto, Toronto: The Program on Water Issues, 200 7. http://www.powi.ca/pds/waterdiversion/ waterdiversion_onthetable_new.pd . 25 Ewegen, Bob. “McCain suggests raiding Colorado’s Colorado’s water.” water.” The Denver Post , August 16, 2008. http://www.denverpost.com/opinion/ci_10218277. 26 O’Hanlon, Michael E. Expanding Global Military Capacity or Humanitarian Intervention . Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003.


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American Security Project 202.347.4267 www.americansecurityproject.org www.secureamericanfuture.org

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Climate Security Index

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