CONSTI Case Digests[1]

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS

declaring Ordinance No. 640 as constitutional and valid. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the respondent court but was later on denied.

- POLICE POWER -

WHO EXERCISES POLICE POWER?

ISSUE: WON Ordinance No. 640 is unconstitutional and an invalid exercise of police power.

GR No. 130239, April 15, 2005 MMDA vs. GARIN

HELD: 

FACTS: 

Respondent Garin was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) and

his driver‘s license was confiscated for parking illegally. Garin

wrote to then MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting the return of his license and expressed expressed his preference preference for his case to be file in Court. Without an immediate reply from the chairman, Garin filed for a preliminary injunction assailing among others that Sec 5 (f) of RA 7924 violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative authority, allowing MMDA to fix and impose unspecified and unlimited fines and penalties. RTC rule in his favor, directing MMDA to return his license and for the authority to desist from confiscating driver‘s license without first

giving the driver the opportunity to be heard in an appropriate proceeding. Thus this petition. ISSUE: WON Sec 5(f) of RA 7924 which authorizes MMDA to confiscate and suspend or revoke driver‘s license in the enforcement

of traffic rules and regulations constitutional? 

HELD: 

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The MMDA is not vested with police power. It was concluded that MMDA is not a local government unit of a public corporation endowed with legislative power and it has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power vested in the legislature to make, ordain, establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances either with penalties of without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for good and welfare of the commonwealth and for subjects of the same. There is no provision in RA 7924 that empowers MMDA or its

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council to ―enact ordinance, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila.‖ It

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is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, People‘s Organizations, NGOs and private sector for the efficient

and expeditious delivery of services. All its functions are administrative in nature.

146 SCRA 323; G.R. No. L-63419; 18 Dec 1986 LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ

LAWS

FACTS:

A motion to quash the charge charge against the petitioners for for violation of the BP 22 was made, contending that no offense was committed, as the statute is unconstitutional. Such motion was denied by the RTC. The petitioners thus elevate the case to the Supreme Court for relief. The Solicitor General, commented that it was premature for the accused to elevate to the Supreme Court the orders denying their motions to quash. However, the Supreme Court finds it justifiable to intervene for the review of lower court's denial of a motion to quash.

GR. No. L-38429 June 30, 1988 BALACUIT vs. CFI FACTS: 

Ordinance No. 640 was passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan on April 21, 1969 which penalizes ―any person group of

persons, entity or corporation engaged in the business of selling admission tickets to any movie or other public exhibitions, games, contests or other performances to require children between seven (7) and twelve (12) years of age to pay full payment for tickets intended for adults but should charge only one-half of the said

ISSUE: WON BP 22 is constitutional as it is a proper exercise of police power of the State.

ticket.‖ 

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(A)s to the question of the subject ordinance being a valid exercise of police power, the same must be resolved in the negative. While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such regulation must be within the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. A lawful business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be unreasonably interfered with even by the exercise of police power. police measure for the regulation of the conduct, control and operation of a business should not encroach upon the legitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens of their property rights. right of the owner to fix a price at which his property shall be sold or used is an inherent attribute of the property itself and, as such, within the protection of the due process clause. Hence, the proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their property in their own way, to fix what prices of admission they think most for their own advantage, and that any person who did not approve could stay away. The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common right. Ordinance No. 640 clearly invades the personal and property rights of petitioners for even if We could assume that, on its face, the interference was reasonable, from the foregoing considerations, it has been fully shown that it is an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of the property and personal rights of citizens. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot, under the guise of exercising police power, be upheld as valid. WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court in Special Civil Case No. 237 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No. 640 unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void. This decision is immediately executory.

HELD:

The petitioners Carlos Balacuit, Lamberto Tan, and Sergio Yu Carcel are managers of the Maya and Dalisay Theaters, the Crown Theater, and the Diamond Theater, respectively. Aggrieved by the effect of the said ordinance, they filed a complaint before the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City on June 30, 1969 praying that the subject ordinance be declared unconstitutional and, therefore, void and unenforceable. Subsequently, the respondent court rendered its decision

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The enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. The offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt.

UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010) Marianne Cabacungan 1

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS 

The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise of its police power.

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"SECTION 1. Objectives. — This Act provides for and shall govern (a) the standardization and regulation of medical education; (b) the examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines."

GR. No. 88265 December 21, 1989 DEL ROSARIO vs. BENGZON FACTS: 

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This is a class suit filed by the officers of the Philippine Medical Association, the national organization of medical doctors in the Philippines, on behalf of their professional brethren who are of kindred persuasion, wherein the Supreme Court is asked to declare as unconstitutional, hence, null and void, some provisions of the Generics Act of 1988 (Republic Act No. 6675), and of the implementing Administrative Order No. 62 issued pursuant thereto. The said law requires the use of generic terminology or generic names in writing prescriptions by medical, dental, and veterinary doctors. Government health agencies agencies and their personnel as well as other government agencies are likewise obliged to use generic names ―in all transactions related to purchasing, prescribing,

the Board of Medical Education;‖ 

HELD:

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152 SCRA 730; G.R. No. 78164; 31 July 1987 TABLARIN VS. JUDGE GUTIERREZ FACTS: 

The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order

Section 7 prescribes certain m inimum requirements for applicants to medical schools: "Admission requirements. — The medical college may admit any student who has not been convicted by any court of competent jurisdiction of any offense involving moral turpitude and who presents (a) a record of completion of a bachelor's degree in science or arts; (b) a certificate of eligibility for entrance to a medical school from the Board of Medical Education; (c) a certificate of good moral character issued by two former professors in the college of liberal arts; and (d) birth certificate. Nothing in this act shall be construed to inhibit any college of medicine from establishing, in addition to the preceding, other entrance requirements that may be

ISSUE: WON the Generics Act of 1998 and its implementing Administrative Order Order No. 62 are unconstitutional.

The Court has been unable to find any constitutional infirmity in the Generics Act. It, on the contrary, implements the constitutional mandate for the State "to protect and promote the right to health of the people" and "to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable (Section 15, Art. II and Section 11, Art. XIII, 1987 cost" (Section Constitution). There is no merit in the petitioners' theory that the Generics Act impairs the obligation of contract between a physician and his patient, for no contract ever results from a consultation between patient and physician. A doctor may take in or refuse a patient, just as the patient may take or refuse the doctor's advice or prescription. As aptly observed by the public respondent, no doctor has ever filed an action for breach of contract against a patient who refused to take prescribed medication, undergo surgery, or follow a recommended course treatment by his doctor ( p. 53, Rollo). In any event, no private contract between doctor and patient may be allowed to override the power of the State to enact laws that are reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, good order, comfort, or general welfare of the community. This power can neither be abdicated nor bargained away. All contractual and property rights are held subject to its fair exercise.

The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical Education. Its functions as specified in Section 5 of the statute include the following: "(a) To determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a recognized college of medicine; x x x (f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical school and keep a register of those issued said certificate; and to collect from said applicants the amount of twenty-five pesos each which shall accrue to the operating fund of

dispensing and administering of drugs and medicines‖. Certain penalties are imposed for violation of the said provisions of the law.

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NMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled. Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the "Medical Act of 1959" defines its basic objectives in the following manner:

deemed admissible.‖ 

MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports and dated 23 August 1985, established a uniform admission test called the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) (NMAT) as an additional requirement requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987. This Order goes on to state that: "2. The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an instrument toward upgrading the selection of applicants for admission into the medical schools and its calculated to improve the quality of medical education in the country. The cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every year by the Board of Medical Education after consultation with the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges. The NMAT rating of each applicant, together with the other admission requirements as presently called for under existing rules, shall serve as a basis for the issuance of the prescribed certificate of eligibility for admission into the medical colleges.

ISSUE: WON Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as

amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 are constitutional. requiring HELD: Yes. We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring






















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the public order — of the general community. An important component of that public order is the health and physical safety and well being of the population, the securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation. Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current stage of our social and economic development, are widely known. We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of of medical education in the country. We are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma. WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of the respondent trial court denying the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

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ISSUE: WON Section 4(a) of the Expanded Senior Citizens Act is

unconstitutional or not violative of Article 3 Section 9 of the Constitution Constitution which provides that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation and the equal protection clause of Article 3 Section 1. HELD: 

GR No. 166494, June 29, 2007 CARLOS SUPERDRUG CORP. vs. DSWD, ET. AL

Petitioners, belonging to domestic corporations and proprietors operating drugstores in the Philippines, are praying for preliminary injunction assailing the constitutionality of Section 4(a) of Republic

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Act (R.A.) No. 9257, otherwise known as the ―Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003.‖ On February 26, 2004, R.A. No. 9257,

amending R.A. No. 7432, was signed into law b y President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and it became effective on March 21, 2004. Section 4(a) of the Act states: SEC. 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens . – The senior citizens shall be entitled to the following: (a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to the utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers, and purchase of medicines in all establishments for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens, including funeral and burial services for the death of senior citizens;

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The establishment may claim the discounts granted under (a), (f), (g) and (h) as tax deduction based on the net cost of the goods

The permanent reduction in their total revenues is a forced subsidy corresponding to the taking of private property for public use or benefit. This constitutes compensable taking for which petitioners would ordinarily become entitled to a just compensation. Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker‘s gain but the owner‘s

FACTS: 

the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended. The DSWD, on May 8, 2004, approved and adopted the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA No. 9275, Rule VI, Article 8 which contains the proviso proviso that the implementation implementation of the tax deduction shall be subject to the Revenue Regulations to be issued by the BIR BIR and approved by the DOF. With the new law, the Drug Stores Association of the Philippines wanted a clarification of the meaning of tax deduction. The DOF clarified that under a tax deduction scheme, the tax deduction on discounts was subtracted from Net Sales together with other deductions which are considered as operating expenses before the Tax Due was computed based on the Net Taxable Income. On the other hand, under a tax credit scheme, the amount of discounts which is the tax credit item, was deducted directly from the tax due amount. The DOH issued an Administrative Order that the twenty percent discount shall include both prescription and non-prescription medicines, whether whether branded branded or generic. It stated that such discount would be provided in the purchase of medicines from all establishments supplying medicines for the exclusive use of the senior citizens. Drug store owners assail the law with the contention that granting the discount would result to loss of profit and capital especially that such law failed to provide a scheme to j ustly compensate the discount.

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loss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word compensation , and to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample. The law grants a twenty percent discount to senior citizens for medical and dental services, and diagnostic and laboratory fees; admission fees charged by theaters, concert halls, circuses, carnivals, and other similar places of culture, leisure and amusement; fares for domestic land, air and sea travel; utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers; and purchases of medicines for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens. As a form of reimbursement, the law provides that business establishments extending the twenty percent discount to senior citizens may claim the discount as a tax deduction. The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its object. Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances, thus assuring the greatest benefits. Accordingly, it has been described as ―the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public






















ZONING & REGULATORY ORDINANCES 20 SCRA 849; G.R. No.L-24693; 31 July 1967 ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSO. VS. MAYOR OF MANILA FACTS:

Petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association with one of its members, Hotel del Mar Inc., and Go Chiu, the president and general manager of the second petitioner, filed a petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 against the respondent Mayor Mayor of the City of Manila who was sued in his capacity as such charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary necessary orders for for the execution and enforcement enforcement of such ordinances. It was alleged that the petitioner non-stock corporation is dedicated to the promotion and protection of the interest of its eighteen members operating hotels an d motels, characterized as legitimate businesses duly licensed by both national and city authorities and regularly paying taxes. It was alleged that on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by the then acting City Mayor, ViceMayor Herminio Astorga. After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set forth in detail. There was the assertion of its being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar as it regulate motels, on the ground that in the revised charter of the City of Manila or in any other law, no reference is made to motels. it also being provided that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized representatives. The lower court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963. ISSUE: Whether or Not Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is

unconstitutional, therefore, null and void. HELD: 

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A decent regard for constitutional doctrines of a fundamental character ought to have admonished the lower court against such a sweeping condemnation of the challenged ordinance. Its decision cannot be allowed to stand, consistently with what has been the accepted standards of constitutional adjudication, in both procedural and substantive aspects. Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to offset the presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. As was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of validity x x x . The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts and circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action. The local legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the well being of the people x x x . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation. It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face which is not the case here. The principle has been nowhere better expressed than in the leading case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire

constitutionality of legislation of this character, the resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside. 123 SCRA 569 (1983) CRUZ vs. PARAS FACTS:

Petitioners were night club operators in Bocaue Bulacan, who filed on November 5, 1975, two cases for prohibition with preliminary injunction. They contended that the enforcement of Municipal Ordinance no. 84, an ordinance prohibiting the operation of nightclubs, cabarets, and dance halls in that municipality or the renewal of licenses to operate them, should be stopped as the municipal has no power to prohibit a lawful business and that such ordinance is violative to their right to due process and the equal protection of the law, as the license previously given to petitioners was in effect withdrawn without judicial hearing. The lower court upheld the validity of the ordinance in the name of police power and dismissed the petition. Hence, this petition for certiorari. ISSUE: WON a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan, represented

by respondents, can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses

HELD:

Supreme Court states that reliance on the police power is insufficient to justify the enactment of the assailed ordinance. It is to be noted that the municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein. However, it is only valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the Philippine Islands, or an Act of the Philippine Legislature, or unless it is against public policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in derogation of common right .

A municipal corporation, therefore, cannot prohibit the operation of nightclubs. Nightclubs may be regulated regulated but not prevented from carrying on their business. RA 938, as originally enacted, granted municipalities the power to regulate the establishment, maintenance and operation of nightclubs and the like. While it is true that on 5/21/54, the law was amended by RA 979 w/c purported to give municipalities the power not only to regulate but likewise to prohibit the operation of nightclubs, the fact is that the title of the law remained the same so that the power granted to municipalities remains that of regulation, not prohibition. To construe the amendatory act as granting granting municipal corporations the power to prohibit the operation of nightclubs would be to construe it in a way that it violates the constitutional provision that "every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed expressed in the title thereof." Moreover, the the recently-enacted LGC (BP 337) speaks simply of the power to regulate the establishment, and operation of billiard pools, theatrical performances, circuses and other forms of entertainment. Certiorari granted.






















separately from those operating barber shops and (2) To prevent immorality which might probably arise from the construction of separate rooms. However, petitioner argues that such ordinance amounts to a deprivation of property of petitioners-appellants of their means of livelihood without due process of law.

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ISSUE: WON the ordinance was unconstitutional. HELD:

Considering the two-fold purpose of the ordinance, it is clear that such law is a police power measure. This Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare clause. WHEREFORE, the appealed order of the lower court is affirmed. 234 SCRA 255 (1994) MAGTAJAS VS. PRYCE PROPERTIES

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problem at hand is to hold that under the Local Government Code, local government units may (and indeed must) prevent and suppress all kinds of gambling within their territories except only those allowed by statutes like P.D. 1869. Lastly, The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious. Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioners.

FACTS: 

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On 1992, PAGCOR decided to expand its operation in Cagayan de Oro City and to this end leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties. Upon announcement of the opening of the casino, several organization in the said area objected, including Cagayan de Oro‘s sangguniang panglungsod who later enacted Ordinance no. 3353. Such ordinance was entitled, AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ISSUANCE OF BUSINESS PERMIT AND CANCELLING EXISTING BUSINESS PERMIT TO ANY ESTABLISHMENT FOR THE USING AND ALLOWING TO BE USED ITS PREMISES OR PORTION THEREOF FOR THE OPERATION OF CASINO. Less than a month from the passage of such ordinance, the sangguniang panglusod of Cagayan de Oro adopted a sterner ordinance no. 3375-93 which was an AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE OPERATION OF CASINO AND PROVIDING PENALTY FOR VIOLATION THEREFORE. Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervener and supplemental petitioner. Their challenge succeeded. On March 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement. Reconsideration of this decision was denied on July 13, 1993.Cagayan de Oro City and its mayor are now before the court in this petition for review.

GR No. 110249, August 27, 1997 ALFREDOI TANO vs. GOV. SALVADOR P. SOCRATES FACTS: 

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the inspection is to check if the shipper had the required mayor‘s 

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ISSUE/S: 1. 2.

WON the ordinances enacted by the sangguniang panglusod of Cagayan de Oro are valid. WON the Local Government Code should prevail over and above an existing statute (in this case PD1869)

HELD: 

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First, it should be noted that the morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se . While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Although it is true that local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling and other prohibited games of chance, it should be understood that, obviously, this provision excludes games of chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law. The apparent flaw in the ordinances in question is that they contravene P.D. 1869 and the public policy embodied therein insofar as they prevent

15 Dec 1992: Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa City enacted Ordinance No. 15-92 which banned the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside the city from 1993-1998. 22 Jan 1993: Acting Mayor Lucero issued Office Order No. 23. It authorized officers to inspect cargoes containing live fish and lobster that are shipped out of Puerto Princesa. The purpose of permit issued by their office. 19 February 1993: Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan enacted Resolution No. 33 which prohibited the catching, gathering, possession, etc. of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for a period of 5 yrs. he respondents implemented the ordinances, depriving all the fishermen, marine merchants, and shippers of the entire province of their only means of livelihood. The petitioners directly invoked the original jurisdiction of the SC arguing as follows: 1. It deprived deprived them them of due process process of law, law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, violating Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of the 1987 Constitution. 2. Office Order No. 23 contained contained no no regulation regulation nor nor condition condition under which the Mayor‘s permit could be granted or denied;

ie. Mayor had absolute authority in issuing the permit. The Ordinance Ordinance took away the the right of the fishermen to earn earn their livelihood in lawful ways. The respondents contended that it was a valid exercise of the

3. 

Provincial Government‘s power under the general welfare clause

(Sec. 16 of the LGC). The Ordinance, they argued, only covered live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms and excluded those not dwelling in the coral reefs and that it shall only last for 5 years. The court must also distinguish between catching live fish and selling it live and those who have no intention at all of selling it live. ISSUE: WON the questioned ordinances enacted in the exercise of

powers under the LGC relative to the protection and preservation of the environment are a valid exercise of the police power of a municipal corporation. HELD: Yes. Laws enjoy the presumption of constitutionality. 

Section 5 (c) of the LGC explicitly mandates that the general welfare provisions of the LGC ―shall be liberally interpreted to give






















welfare of the LGU and its inhabitants. The centerpiece of the LGC is decentralization. Indispensable to this is devolution. One of these powers is the enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation of

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mangroves. The term ―municipal waters‖ includes not only

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streams, lakes, and tidal waters within the municipality, but also marine waters included between two lines drawn perpendicularly to the general coastline from points where the boundary lines of the municipality or city touch the sea at low tide and a third line parallel with the general coastline and 15 km from it (Sec. 131 [r] LGC). Two principal objectives of the Ordinances: 1.

2.

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Establish a ―closed season‖ for the species of fish covered

therein for 5 years (This falls within the devolved power to enforce fishery laws in municipal waters); Protect the coral in the marine waters of the city and the province from further destruction due to illegal fishing activities (this falls within the general welfare clause of the LGC and the express mandate there to cities and provinces to protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which harm the environment.

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G.R. No. 118127 April 12, 2005 CITY OF MANILA vs. HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR. FACTS: 

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Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses. On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a RTC Petition with the lower court praying that the Ordinance of the City of Manila be declared invalid and unconstitutional.8 MTDC argued that the Ordinance erroneously and improperly included in its enumeration of prohibited establishments, motels and inns such as MTDC's Victoria Court considering that these were not establishments for "amusement" or "entertainment" and they were not "services or facilities for entertainment," nor did they use women as " tools for entertainment," and neither did they "disturb the community," "annoy the inhabitants" or "adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community." The Ordinance ordered the removal of motels, inns, massage parlors, beer houses, nightclubs in the Ermita-Malate area. MTDC further advanced that the Ordinance was invalid and unconstitutional for the following reasons: The City Council has no power to prohibit the operation of 1. motels as Section 458 (a) 4 (iv)12 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (the Code) grants to the City Council only the power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments 2. The Ordinance is void as it is violative of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 49913 which specifically declared portions of the Ermita-Malate area as a commercial zone with certain restrictions 3. The Ordinance does not constitute a proper exercise of police power as the compulsory closure of the motel business has no reasonable relation to the legitimate municipal interests sought to be protected The Ordinance constitutes an ex post facto law by punishing 4. the operation of Victoria Court which was a legitimate business prior to its enactment 5. The Ordinance violates MTDC's constitutional rights in that: (a) it is confiscatory and constitutes an invasion of plaintiff's property rights; (b) the City Council has no power to find as a fact that a particular thing is a nuisance per se nor does it

not outside of this area. Petitioners City of Manila and Lim maintained that the City Council had the power to "prohibit certain forms of entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community" as provided for in Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Local Government Code. Petitioners likewise asserted that the Ordinance was enacted by the City Council of Manila to protect the social and moral welfare of the community in conjunction with its police power. Hon. Laguio decided in favor of the private respondents and declared the Ordinance null and void. Petitioners filed an appeal with the lower court alleging that the following errors were committed by the lower court in its ruling: (1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires , or otherwise, unfair, unreasonable and oppressive exercise of police power; (2) It erred in holding that the questioned Ordinance contravenes P.D. 499 31 which allows operators of all kinds of commercial establishments, except those specified therein; and (3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional. unconstitutional. Petitioners contend that the assailed Ordinance was enacted in the exercise of the inherent and plenary power of the State and the general welfare clause exercised by local government units provided for in Art. 3, Sec. 18 (kk) of the Revised Charter of Manila and conjunctively, Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code. 34 They allege that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power; it does not contravene P.D. 499; and that it enjoys the presumption of validity.

ISSUE: WON the Ordinance of the City of Manila shows a valid exercise of police power. HELD: No. The Ordinance was nullified barring the operation of motels

and inns within the Ermita-Malate area. The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common right. The Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and impairs personal privileges. It is discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City Council under the Code had no power to enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires , null and void. Police power legislation of such character deserves the full endorsement of the judiciary we reiterate our support for it. But inspite of its virtuous aims, the enactment of the Ordinance has no statutory or constitutional authority to stand on. Local legislative bodies, in this case, the City Council, cannot prohibit the operation of the enumerated establishments under Section 1 thereof or order their transfer or conversion without infringing the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection of laws not even under the guise of police power.

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G.R. No. L-24670 December 14, 1979 ORTIGAS & CO., LIMITED PARTNERSHIP vs. FEATI BANK AND TRUST CO. FACTS: 

Plaintiff is engaged in real estate business, developing and selling lots to the public, particularly the Highway Hills Subdivision along EDSA. On March 4, 1952, plaintiff, as vendor, and Augusto Padilla and Natividad Angeles, as vendees, entered into separate agreements of sale on installments over two parcels of land of the
























1.

2.

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The parcel parcel of land shall shall be used exclusively for residential residential purposes, and she shall not be entitled to take or remove soil, stones or gravel from it or any other lots belonging to the Seller. All buildings and other other improvements improvements (except the fence) which may be constructed at any time in said lot must be, (a) of strong materials and properly painted, (b) provided with modern sanitary installations connected either to the public sewer or to an approved septic tank, and (c) shall not be at a distance of less than two (2) meters from its boundary lines.

Eventually said lots were bought by defendant. Lot 5 directly from Chavez and Lot 6 from Republic Flour Mills by deed of exchange, with same restrictions. Plaintiff claims that restriction is for the beautification of the subdivision. Defendant claimed of the commercialization of western part of EDSA. Defendant began constructing a commercial bank building. Plaintiff demand to stop it, which forced him to file a case, which was later dismissed, upholding police power. Motion for recon was denied, hence the appeal.

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ISSUE: WON Resolution No. 27 is a valid exercise of police power 

HELD: Yes. Resolution is a valid exercise of police power. 

EDSA, a main traffic artery which runs through several cities and municipalities in the Metro Manila area, supports an endless stream of traffic and the resulting activity, noise and pollution are hardly conducive to the health, safety or welfare of the residents in its route. Health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the people in the locality are justifications for this. It should be stressed, that while non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power.

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GR Nos. 142359 & 142980, May 25, 2004 PASONG BAYABAS FARMERS vs. CA FACTS: 

201 SCRA 13 PRESLEY vs. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION FACTS: 



A complaint for specific performance was filed by respondent against Teofilo & Rollo Almendras (both deceased and substituted by petitioner) for violating a Bel-Air Subdivision restriction that the subject house and lot shall be used only for residential and not for commercial purposes, and for non-payment of association dues to BAVA (respondent) Deceased petitioners were the registered owners of the property while Presley, as lessee of the property, is the owner and operator of ―Hot Pan de Sal Store‖ located in the same address.

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The RTC rendered decision in favor of respondent which was affirmed by the CA Motion for reconsideration was denied hence this petition.

on December 22, 1988 Apparently, when the respondent court promulgated the questioned decision on November 28, 1988 the Sangalang case had not yet been decided by this Court, etc. Apparently, when the respondent court promulgated the questioned decision on November 28, 1988 the Sangalang case had not yet been decided by this Court. The respondent court in the case at bar was not at all entirely wrong in upholding the Deed of Restrictions annotated in the title of the petitioners. It held that the provisions of the Deed of Restrictions are in the nature of contractual obligations freely entered into by the parties. Undoubtedly, they are valid and can be enforced against the petitioner. But they are, like all contracts, subject to the overriding demands, needs, and interests of the greater number as the State may determine in the legitimate exercise of police power. Our jurisdiction guarantees sanctity of contract and is said to be the 'law between the contracting parties,' (Civil Code, supra, art. 1159) but while it is so, it cannot contravene 'law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.' (supra, art. 1306). Above all, it cannot be raised as a deterrent to police power, designed precisely to promote health, safety, peace, and enhance the common good, at the expense of contractual rights, whenever necessary. With respect to the demand for payment of association dues in the sum of P3,803.55, the records reveal that this issue is now moot and academic. The demand for payment of attorney's fees is now without legal or factual basis. Petition granted.

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Lakeview Development Corporation (LDC) bought a parcel of land, issued it in the name of its successor, successor, the Credito Asiatic, Asiatic, Incorporated (CAI) and subsequently subdivided it into two parcels LDC/CAI undertook to develop its 75-hectare property into a residential and industrial estate CAI embarked on the development of the housing project into three phases and secured a locational clearance for the project from the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC CAI decided to continue with the development of its Hakone Housing Project but the project was stymied stymied by a Complaint for Damages with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction The plaintiffs alleged that they had reached an agreements with the respondent that they would remain in peaceful possession of their farmholdings but notwithstanding such, the defendant ordered the bulldozing of the property





















CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS 1. 2.

3.

4.

5.

Whether the property subject of the suit is covered by Rep. Act No. 6657, the Agrarian Reform Law (CARL); whether the DARAB had original and appellate jurisdiction over the complaint of the petitioner PBFAI against the private respondent; whether the petitioners-members of the PBFAI have a cause of action against the private respondent for possession and cultivation of the property in suit; whether the dismissal by the RTC of the complaint in Civil Case No. BCV-87-13 is a bar to the complaint of the petitionersmembers of the PBFAI; and whether the appellate court committed a reversible error in dismissing the petition for review in CA-G.R. SP No. 49363.

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HELD:  

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The contention of the petitioners has no merit. Rep. Act No. 6657 took effect only on June 15, 1988. But long before the law took effect, the property subject of the suit had already been reclassified and converted from agricultural to nonagricultural or residential land. With our finding that the property subject of the suit was classified as residential land since 1976, the DARAB had no original and appellate jurisdiction over the property subject of the action of the petitioner PBFAI and its members. Since the members of the petitioner PBFAI were not the tenants of the private respondent CAI, the petitioners and its members had no cause of action against the private respondent for possession of the landholding to maintain possession thereof and for damages. When the complaint was filed, twenty-five (25) of the thirty -seven (37) members of the petitioners had already executed separate deeds of quitclaim in favor of the private respondent CAI over the portions of the landholding they respectively claimed, after receiving from the private respondent CAI varied sums of money. In executing the said deeds, the members of the petitioner PBFAI thereby waived their respective claims over the property. Hence, they have no right whatsoever to still remain in possession of the same. Petition denied.

ADMINISTRATIVE RULES RULES & REGULATIONS REGULATIONS 127 SCRA 329, 1984 BAUTISTA vs. JUNIO FACTS: 

This prohibition proceeding filed by petitioners, spouses Mary Concepcion Bautista and Enrique D. Bautista, for being allegedly violative of the due process and equal protection guarantees 1 of the Constitution as it was provided in LOI 869 that the use private

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'The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute.' It is true, of course, that there may be instances where a police power measure may, because of its arbitrary, oppressive or unjust character, be held offensive to the due process clause and, therefore, may, when challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding, be declared void on its face. This is not one of them. In the interplay between such a fundamental right and police power, especially so where the assailed governmental action deals with the use of one's property, the latter is accorded much leeway. That is settled law. What is more, it is good law. Due process, therefore, cannot be validly invoked. Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason. It suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Absent therefore the alleged infringement of constitutional rights, more precisely the due process and equal protection guarantees, this Court cannot adjudge Letter of Instruction No. 869 as tainted by unconstitutionality. unconstitutionality. Petition dismissed.

119 SCRA 597, 1982 TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA VS. BOT FACTS:

On 10 October 1977, the Board of Transportation (BT) issued Memorandum Circular Circular 77-42 phasing out old and dilapidated taxis; refusing registration to taxi units within the National Capitol Region having year models over 6 years old. Pursuant to the above BOT circular, the Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) issued Implementing Circular 52, dated 15 August 1980, instructing the Regional Director, the MV Registrars and other personnel of BLT, all within the National Capital Region (NCR), to implement said Circular, and formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public conveyances. In accordance therewith, cabs of model 1971 were phased-out in registration year 1978; those of model 1972, in 1979; those of model 1973, in 1980; and those of model 1974, in 1981. On 27 January 1981, Taxicab Operators






















with the Supreme Court. ISSUE: WON the implementation and enforcement of Memorandum Circular 77-42 violates the petioner‘s constitutional righ ts to (1) Equal protection of the law; (2) Substantive due process; and (3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard.

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HELD: 

Regarding the and Substantive Due Process, Presidential Decree 101 grants to the Board of Transportation the power to fi x just and reasonable standards, classification, regulations, practices, measurements, or service to be furnished, imposed, observed, and followed by operators of public utility motor vehicles. The overriding consideration in the issuance of Memorandum Circular 77-42 is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. It may also regulate property rights. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded. Dispensing with a public hearing prior to the issuance of the Circulars is not violative of procedural due process. Previous notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of general rules or regulations promulgated to govern future conduct of a class or persons or enterprises, unless the law provides otherwise. It is impractical to subject every taxicab to constant and recurring evaluation to determine its road-worthiness, not to speak of the fact that it can open the door to the adoption of multiple standards, possible collusion, and even graft and corruption. A reasonable standard must be adopted to apply to all vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and justly. The span of six years supplies that reasonable standard. The product of experience shows that by that time taxis have fully depreciated, their cost recovered, and a fair return on investment obtained. They are also generally dilapidated and no longer fit for safe and comfortable service to the public specially considering that they are in continuous operation practically 24 hours everyday in three shifts of eight hours per shift. With that standard of reasonableness and absence of arbitrariness, the requirement of due process has been met. alleged that the Circular in question violates their right to equal protection of the law because the same is being enforced in Metro Manila only and is directed solely towards the taxi industry. At the outset it should be pointed out that implementation outside Metro Manila is also envisioned in Memorandum Circular No. 77-42. In fact, the same is also implemented in Cebu City. The Board's reason for enforcing the Circular initially in Metro Manila is that taxicabs in this city, compared to those of other places, are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant use. This is of common knowledge.

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declaration of nullity of Department Order (DO) 74, DO 215 and the TRB Regulations contravene RA 2000. Petitioners also also sought to declare Department Order No. 123 (DO 123) and Administrative Order Order No. 1 (AO 1) 1) unconstitutional. unconstitutional. Previously, pursuant to its mandate under R.A. 2000, DPWH issued on June 25, 1998 Department Order (DO) No. 215 declaring the Manila-Cavite (Coastal Road) Toll Expressway as limited access facilities. Pursuant to Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2000, a limited access facility is defined as "a highway or street especially designed for through traffic, and over, from, or to which owners or occupants of abutting land or other persons have no right or easement or only a limited right or easement of access, light, air or view by reason of the fact that their property abuts upon such limited access facility or for any other reason. Moreover, petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of the total ban on motorcycles along the entire breadth of North and South Luzon Expressways and the ManilaCavite (Coastal Road) Toll Expressway under DO 215. On July 18, 2001, the DPWH acting thru the TRB, issued Department Order No. 123 allowing motorcycles with engine displacement of 400 cubic centimeters inside limited access facilities (toll ways). DO 123, as petitioner contends, is violative of equal protection clause of the constitution. Consequently, on March 10, 2003, the trial court issued the assailed decision dismissing the petition but declaring invalid DO 123. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the dismissal of their petition; but it was denied by the trial court in its Order dated June 16, 2003.

ISSUE: WHETHER or UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

not

AO

1

AND

DO

123

ARE

HELD: 

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Under EO 546, it is the DOTC, not the DPWH, which has authority to regulate, restrict, or prohibit access to limited access facilities. Thus, DO 74 and DO 215 are void because the DPWH has no authority to declare certain expressways as limited access facilities. Under the law, it is the DOTC which is authorized to administer and enforce all laws, rules and regulations in the field of transportation and to regulate related activities. Since the DPWH has no authority to regulate activities relative to transportation, the TRB cannot derive its power from the DPWH to issue regulations governing limited access facilities. The DPWH cannot delegate a power or function which it does not possess in the first place. Since DO 74 and DO 215 are void, it follows that the rules implementing them are likewise void. DPWH has no authority to regulate limited access highways since EO 546 has devolved this function to the DOTC. Thus, DO 123 is void for want of authority of the DPWH to promulgate it.






















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certain types of vehicles is but one of these. None of these rules violates reason. The purpose of these rules and the logic behind them are quite evident. A toll way is not an ordinary road. The special purpose for which a toll way is constructed necessitates the imposition of guidelines in the manner of its use and operation. Inevitably, such rules will restrict certain rights. But the mere fact that certain rights are restricted does not invalidate the rules. The DPWH, through the Solicitor General, maintains that the toll ways were not designed to accommodate motorcycles and that their presence in the toll ways will compromise safety and traffic considerations. The DPWH points out that the same study the petitioners rely on cites that the inability of other drivers to detect motorcycles is the predominant cause of accidents. Arguably, prohibiting the use of motorcycles in toll ways may not be the "best" measure to ensure the safety and comfort of those who ply the toll ways. However, the means by which the government chooses to act is not judged in terms of what is "best," rather, on simply whether the act is reasonable. The validity of a police power measure does not depend upon the absolute assurance that the purpose desired can in fact be probably fully accomplished, or upon the certainty that it will best serve the purpose intended. Reason, not scientific exactitude, is the measure of the validity of the governmental regulation. Arguments based on what is "best" are arguments reserved for the L egislature‘s discussion. Judicial intervention in such matters will only be warranted if the assailed regulation is patently whimsical. We do not find the situation in this case to be so. AO 1 is not oppressive. Petitioners are not being deprived of their right to use the limited access facility. They are merely being required, just like the rest of the public, to adhere to the rules on

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how to use the facility. AO 1 does not infringe upon petitioners‘

right to travel but merely bars motorcycles, bicycles, tricycles, pedicabs, and any non-motorized vehicles as the mode of traveling along limited access highways. Several cheap, accessible and practical alternative modes of transport are open to petitioners. There is nothing oppressive in being required to take a bus or drive a car instead of one‘s scooter, bicycle, calesa , or motorcycle upon using a toll way. 

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Petitioners‘ reliance on the studies they gathered is misplaced.

Police power does not rely upon the existence of definitive studies to support its use. Indeed, no requirement exists that the exercise of police power must first be conclusively justified by research. The yardstick has always been simply whether the government‘s

act is reasonable and not oppressive. The use of "reason" in this sense is simply meant to guard against arbitrary and capricious government action. Scientific certainty and conclusiveness, though desirable, may not be demanded in every situation. Otherwise, no government will be able to act in situations demanding the exercise of its residual powers because it will be

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circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not identical is analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding the rest. The real and substantial differences exist between a motorcycle and other forms of transport sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the toll ways. Amongst all types of motorized transport, it is obvious, even to a child, that a motorcycle is quite different from a car, a bus or a truck. The most obvious and troubling difference would be that a two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned than a fourwheeled vehicle. A classification based on practical convenience and common knowledge is not unconstitutional simply because it may lack purely theoretical or scientific uniformity. Petitioners complain that the prohibition on the use of motorcycles in toll ways unduly deprive them of their right to travel. A toll way is not an ordinary road. As a facility designed to promote the fastest access to certain destinations, its use, operation, and maintenance require close regulation. Public interest and safety require the imposition of certain restrictions on toll ways that do not apply to ordinary roads. As a special kind of road, it is but reasonable that not all forms of transport could use it. The right to travel does not mean the right to choose any vehicle in traversing a toll way. The right to travel refers to the right to move from one place to another. Petitioners can traverse the toll way any time they choose using private or public four-wheeled vehicles. Petitioners are not denied the right to move from Point A to Point B along the toll way. Petitioners are free to access the toll way, much as the rest of the public can. The mode by which petitioners wish to travel pertains to the manner of using the toll way, a subject that can be validly limited by regulation. Petitioners themselves admit that alternative routes are available to them. Their complaint is that these routes are not the safest and most convenient. Even if their claim is true, it hardly qualifies as an undue curtailment of their freedom of movement and travel. The right to travel does not entitle a person to the best form of transport or to the most convenient route to his destination. The obstructions found in normal streets, which petitioners complain of (i.e., potholes, manholes, construction barriers, etc.), are not suffered by them alone. 11/30/09 Finally, petitioners assert that their possession of a driver‘s

license from the Land Transportation Office (LTO) and the fact that their vehicles are registered with that office entitle them to use all kinds of roads in the country. Again, petitioners are mistaken. There exists no absolute right to drive. On the contrary,





















CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS hearing the parties‘ evidence and arguments, denied the application for Port Service,

Corporation, Anda Stevedoring Corporation, Ben Paz Inc., Manila Stevedoring and Arrastre Services, Inc. (members of the Philippine Association of Stevedoring Operators and Contractors, Inc. [PASOC]), competed at the South Harbor for the performance of stevedoring work. The licenses of these contractors had long expired when the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA, created by Presidential Decree 505 [11 July 1974], later superseded by Presidential Decree 857 [23 December 197]5) took over the control and management of ports but they continued to operate afterwards on the strength of temporary permits and hold-over authorities issued by PPA. On 4 May 1976, the Board of Directors of PPA passed Resolution 10, approving and adopting a set of policies on Port Administration, Management Management and Operation. The PPA adopted as its own the Bureau of Customs‘ policy

of placing on only one organization the responsibility for the operation of arrastre and stevedoring services in one port. On 11 April 1980, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Letter of Instruction 1005-A which, among other things, directed PPA to expeditiously evaluate all recognized cargo handling contractors and port-related service operators and to determine the qualified contractor or operator in order to ensure effective utilization of port facilities, etc. This was followed by the President‘s memorandum to Col. Eustaquio S. Baclig Jr . dated 18 April 1980, directing submission of a report on the integration of the stevedoring operations in Manila South Harbor and emphasizing the need for such integration as well as the strengthening of the PPA in order to remedy the problems therein. On 28 April 1980, the committee submitted its report recommending the award of an exclusive contract for stevedoring services in the South Harbor to Ocean Terminal Services, Inc. (OTSI) after finding it the best qualified among the existing contractors. The PPA submitted the committee report to the President, who, on 24 May 1980, approved the recommendation to award an exclusive management contract to OTSI. On 27 June 1980, PPA and OTSI entered into a management contract which provided, among others, for a 5-year exclusive operation by OTSI of stevedoring services in the South Harbor, renewable for another 5 years. The Board of Directors of the PPA gave its approval on 27 June 1980. On 23 July 1980, PIPSI instituted an action before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila against PPA and OTSI for the nullification of the contract between the two, the annulment of the 10% of gross stevedoring revenue being collected by PPA, and injunction with preliminary injunction. An ex-parte restraining order was issued. On 21 August 1980. with leave of court, Anglo-Fil, et al., filed their complaint in intervention. The motion was granted and on 22 August 1980, the CFI issued another ex-parte restraining order in the case to include Anglo-Fil et. al., under the benefits of such order. On 30 August 1980,

the writ. It is also not grave abuse of discretion when a court dissolves ex-parte abuse of discretion when a court dissolves ex-parte a restraining order also issued ex-parte. Further, the contention that due process was violated resulting to a confiscatory effect on private property is likewise without merit. In the first place, Anglo-Fil, et. al. were operating merely on ―hold -over‖ permits, which were based on PPA Memorandum Order 1 (19 January 1977). All hold-over permits were by nature temporary and subject to subsequent policy guidelines as may be implemented by PPA. Such should have served as sufficient notice that, at any time, PIPSI‘s and Anglo -Fil et.al.‘s authorities may be terminated. Whether PIPSI, and Anglo-Fil, et. al. would be issued a Permit to Operate (PTO) depended on the sound discretion of PPA and on the policies, rules and regulations that the latter may implement in accordance with the statutory grant of power. The latter, therefore, cannot be said to have been deprived of property without due process because, in this respect, what was given them was not a property right but a mere privilege and they should have taken cognizance of the fact that since they have no vested right to operate in the South Harbor, their permits can be withdrawn anytime the public welfare deems it best to do so. Thus, unless the case justifies it, the judiciary will not interfere in purely administrative matters. Such discretionary power vested in the proper administrative body, in the absence of arbitrariness and grave abuse so as to go beyond the statutory authority, is not subject to the contrary judgment or control of others. In general, courts have no supervisory power over the proceedings and actions of the administrative departments of the government. This is particularly true with respect to acts involving the exercise of judgment or discretion, and to findings of fact. G.R. NO. 145742 JULY 14, 2005 PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY AND ARRASTRE INC. (CISAI)

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the long delay in the resolution of the injunction incident and the

countervailing public interest involved.‖ On 1 September 1980, the CFI

dissolved, lifted and set aside the restraining orders without prejudice preliminary injunction prayed for. On 5 September 1980, PPA sent a letter to the General Manager of PIPSI informing him that due to the

CIPRES STEVEDORING

FACTS:

the PPA filed an urgent motion to lift the restraining orders ―in view of

to the Court‘s resolution on the propriety of issuing the writ of

VS.



Petitioner PPA is a govt. entity created by virtue of P.D. no. 857 and is tasked to implement an integrated program for the planning, development, financing, and operation of ports and port districts in the country. Respondent CISAI is a domestic corporation primarily engaged in stevedoring, arrastre, and porterage business, including cargo handling and hauling services in Negros Oriental and Dumaguete and Bais. Since 1976, CISAI had been granted permits to operate the cargo handling operations in Dumaguete. In 1991, PPA awarded an 8-year contract to CISAI to pursue its business endeavor. Upon this time, PPA Administrative Order No. 03-90 took effect providing for the awarding of cargo handling services through public bidding. Following the expiration of its contract, CISAI was able to continue with its business by virtue of hold-over permits given by PPA. During this time, another administrative order PPA AO No.
























handling operations because the continuance of their business was due to hold over permits given by PPA, and such may be revoked anytime by the granting authority. As held in the case of Anglo-Fil Trading Corporation vs. Lazaro, hold over permits are merely temporary subject to the policy and guidelines as may be implemented by the authority granting it. Stevedoring services are



imbued with public interest and subject to the state‘s police

power, therefore, whatever proprietary right the CISAI may have acquired must necessarily necessarily give way to valid exercise of police power. PPA, being created for the purpose of promoting the growth of regional port bodies, it is empowered to make port regulations. With this mandate, the decision to bid out cargo holding services is properly within the province and discretion of PPA. As for CISAI‘s claim that PPA AO No. 03 -2000 violated the constitutional provision of non-impairment of contract, suffice it to state that all contracts are subject to the overriding demands, needs, interests of the greater number as the State may determine in the legitimate exercise of its police power. Wherefore, Petition is granted. G.R. No. 157036 June 9, 2004 FRANCISCO CHAVEZ VS. HON. ALBERTO ROMULO AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, PNP CHIEF HERMOGENES EBDANE FACTS: 

Chavez is a gun- owner who filed a petition for prohibition and injunction seeking to enjoin the implementation of the ― Guidelines

in the Implementation of the Ban on the Carying of Firearms Outside of Residence‖ issued by PNP Chief Hermogenes

Ebdane, Jr. In January 2003, Pres. Arroyo delivered a speech before the members of the PNP stressing the need for a nationwide gun ban in all public places to avert the rising crime incidents. She directed PNP Chief Ebdane to suspend the issuance of permits to carry firearms outside of residence (PTCFOR). Thus, Chief Ebdane issued the assailed Guidelines. Chavez contends that such guidelines was a derogation of his constitutional right to life and to protect life as he, being a law-

those of a particular class, require the exercise of the police power; and The means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. It is apparent from the assailed Guidelines that the basis for its issuance was the need for peace and order in the society. Owing to the proliferation of crimes, particularly those committed by NPA, which tends to disturb the peace of the community, Pres. Arroyo deemed it best to impose a nationwide gun ban. Undeniably, the motivating factor in the issuance of guidelines is the interest of the public in general. Such means of revocation is, thus, a valid exercise of police power. Petition is hereby dismissed.
























- EMINENT DOMAIN -

FACTS: 

WHO EXERCISES THE POWER? GR No 14355 Oct. 31, 1919 CITY OF MANILA VS. CHINESE COMMUNITY CEMETERY FACTS: 

The City of Manila, in exercising the owner of Eminent Domain, presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of said City raying that certain lands described therein, be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement, namely, the extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila. Herein respondents contend that there are other parcels of land offered for such improvement proposed by the City at a lesser cost and that the chosen parcel of land by the City is a cemetery where the dead loved ones of the Chinese community were buried. Herien respondents also averred that the City of Manila will have to spend a great deal amount of money in the relocation and rebuilding of sepulchres, tombstones and monuments of those affected by the expropriation should they pursue to use the Chinese Cemetery. The trial judge, Hon. Del Rosario decided that there was no necessity for the expropriation of the particular strip of land in question. The City of Manila appealed contending that under the law, it has the authority to expropriate any land it may desire and neither the court not the land owners can inquire into the advisable purpose of the expropriation or ask concerning the necessities therefore; and that the courts are mere appraisers of the land involved.

ISSUE: May the courts inquire into, and hear proof upon, the necessity of the expropriation? HELD: Section 241 of Act no. 190 provides that ― the govt. of the Phil 









On July 23, 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Bunawan in Agusan del Sur passed Resolution No. 43-89, "Authorizing the Municipal Mayor to Initiate the Petition for Expropriation of a One (1) Hectare Portion of Lot No. 6138-Pls-4 Along the National Highway Owned by Percival Moday for the Site of Bunawan Farmers Center and Other Government Sports Facilities." In due time, Resolution No. 43-89 was approved by then Municipal Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo and transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for its approval. On September 11, 1989, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved said Resolution and returned it with the comment that "expropriation is unnecessary considering that there are still available lots in Bunawan for the establishment of the government center." The Municipality of Bunawan, herein public respondent, subsequently filed a petition for Eminent Domain against petitioner Percival Moday before the RTC at Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur. On March 6, 1991, public respondent municipality filed a Motion to Take or Enter Upon the Possession of Subject Matter of This Case stating that it had already deposited with the municipal treasurer the necessary amount in accordance with Section 2, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court and that it would be in the government's best interest for public respondent to be allowed to take possession of the property. Despite petitioners' opposition and after a hearing on the merits, the RTC granted respondent municipality's motion to take possession of the land. Petitioners' motion for recon was denied by the trial court. Petitioners elevated the case in a petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, but was dismissed by appellate court. The CA held that the public purpose for the expropriation is clear from Resolution No. 43-89 and that since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur did not declare Resolution No. 43-89 invalid, expropriation


























The CA declared that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's reason for disapproving the resolution "could be baseless, because it failed to point out which and where are those available lots.'" Respondent court also concluded that since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan did not declare the municipal board's resolution as invalid, expropriation of petitioners' property could proceed. The Court finds no merit in the petition and affirms the decision of the CA. Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the instant case, is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is government's right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or purpose. Inherently possessed by the national legislature, the power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to local governments, other public entities and public utilities. For the taking of private property by the government to be valid, the taking must be for public use and there must be just compensation. The Municipality of Bunawan's power to exercise the right of eminent domain is not disputed as it is expressly provided for in Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the local Government Code in force at the time expropriation proceedings were initiated. Section 9 of said law states:







Sec. 9. Eminent Domain.  A local government unit may,



through its head and acting pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian, exercise the right of eminent domain and institute condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose. Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337 provides: Sec. 153. Sangguniang Panlalawigan Review.  (1) Within

thirty days after receiving copies of approved ordinances, resolutions and executive orders promulgated by the municipal mayor, the sangguniang panlalawigan shall examine the documents or transmit them to the provincial attorney, or if there be none, to the provincial fiscal, who shall examine them promptly and inform the sangguniang panlalawigan in writing of any defect or impropriety which he may discover therein and

allege that the municipality owns a vacant seven-hectare property adjacent to petitioners' land, evidenced by a sketch plan. The limitations on the power of eminent domain are that the use must be public, compensation must be made and due process of law must be observed. The Supreme Court, taking cognizance of such issues as the adequacy of compensation, necessity of the taking and the public use character or the purpose of the taking, has ruled that the necessity of exercising eminent domain must be genuine and of a public character. Government may not capriciously choose what private property should be taken. After a careful study of the records of the case, however, we find no evidentiary support for petitioners' allegations. The uncertified photocopy of the sketch plan does not conclusively prove that the municipality does own vacant land adjacent to petitioners' property suited to the purpose of the expropriation. In the questioned decision, respondent appellate court similarly held that the pleadings and documents on record have not pointed out any of respondent municipality's "other available properties available for the same purpose." The accusations of political reprisal are likewise unsupported by competent evidence. Consequently, the Court holds that petitioners' demand that the former municipal mayor be personally liable for damages is without basis. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The questioned Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court is LIFTED.

GR No. 136349, January 23, 2006 MASIKIP vs. CITY OF PASIG FACTS: 



Petitioner Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land with an area of 4,521 square meters located at Pag-Asa, Caniogan, Pasig City, Metro Manila. In a letter dated January 6, 1994, the then Municipality of Pasig, now City of Pasig, respondent, notified petitioner of its intention to






















court. Forthwith, it appointed the City Assessor and City Treasurer of Pasig City as commissioners to ascertain the just compensation. This prompted petitioner to file with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari . On October 31, 1997, the Appellate Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. 



Petitioner‘s Motion for Recon was denied.

ISSUE: What constitutes a genuine necessity for public use. HELD: 





Where the taking by the State of private property is done for the benefit of a small community which seeks to have its own sports and recreational facility, notwithstanding that there is such a recreational facility only a short distance away, such taking cannot be considered to be for public use. Its expropriation is not valid. In this case, the Court defines what constitutes a genuine necessity for public use. In the early case of US v. Toribio , this Court defined the power of eminent domain as "the right of a government to take and appropriate private property to public use, whenever the public exigency requires it, which can be done only on condition of providing a reasonable compensation therefor." It has also been described as the power of the State or its instrumentalities to take private property for public use and is inseparable from sovereignty and inherent in government. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of the government. It delegates the exercise thereof to local government units, other public entities and public utility corporations, subject only to Constitutional limitations. Local governments have no inherent power of eminent domain and may exercise it only when expressly authorized by statute. Section 19 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. 7160) prescribes the delegation by Congress of the power of eminent domain to local government units and lays down the parameters for its exercise, thus:

property owner consistent with such benefit." Applying this standard, we hold that respondent City of Pasig has failed to establish that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate petitioner‘s proper ty. ty. Our scrutiny of the records shows that the basis for the passage of the Ordinance authorizing the expropriation, indicates that the intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound Homeowners Association, a private, nonprofit organization, not the residents of Caniogan. It can be gleaned that the members of the said Association are desirous of having their own private playground and recreational facility. Petitioner‘s lot is the nearest vacant space available. The purpose



is, therefore, not clearly and categorically public. The necessity has not been shown, especially considering that there exists an alternative facility for sports development and community recreation in the area, which is the Rainforest Park, available to all residents of Pasig City, incl uding those of Caniogan. WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED. The challenged Decision and Resolution of the CA are REVERSED. The complaint for expropriation filed before the trial court by respondent City of Pasig, is DISMISSED.

GR No. 155746, October 03, 2004 LAGCAO vs. JUDGE LABRA FACTS: 



In 1964, the Province of Cebu donated 210 lots to the City of Cebu. One of these lots was Lot 1029, situated in Capitol Hills, Cebu City, with an area of 4,048 square meters. In 1965, petitioners purchased Lot 1029. But then, in late 1965, the 210 lots, reverted to the Province of Cebu. Consequently, the province tried to annul the sale of Lot by the City of Cebu to the petitioners. This prompted the latter to sue the province for specific performance and damages in the then CFI. On July 9, 1986, the court a quo ruled in favor of petitioners and on June 11, 1992, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
























unconstitutional. The trial court dismissed the complaint filed by petitioners whose subsequent motion for recon was also denied. In this appeal, petitioners argue that Ordinance No. 1843 is unconstitutional as it sanctions the expropriation of their property for the purpose of selling it to the squatters, an endeavor contrary to the concept of "public use" contemplated in the Constitution. They allege that it will benefit only a handful of people. The ordinance, according to petitioners, was obviously passed for politicking, the squatters undeniably being a big source of votes. 

ISSUE: Whether or not the intended expropriation by the City of Cebu

of a 4,048-square-meter parcel of land owned by petitioners contravenes the Constitution and applicable laws. HELD: 



Local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it only when expressly authorized by the legislature. By virtue of RA 7160, Congress conferred upon local government units the power to expropriate. Ordinance No. 1843 was enacted pursuant to Section 19 of RA 7160: SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. － A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws xxx. (italics supplied). Ordinance No. 1843 which authorized the expropriation of



petitioners‘ lot was enacted by the SP of Cebu City to provide



socialized housing for the homeless and low-income residents of the City. There are two legal provisions which limit the exercise of this power: (1) no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws; and (2) private property shall not be

lands for purposes of this Act shall include, among others, community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation to the Government, joint venture agreement, negotiated purchase, and expropriation: Provided, however, That expropriation shall be resorted to only when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted : Provided further, That where expropriation is resorted to, parcels of land owned by small property owners shall be exempted for purposes of this Act: xxx. (Emphasis supplied). In the recent case of Estate or Heirs of the Late Ex-Justice Jose B.L. Reyes et al. vs. City of Manila, we ruled that the abovequoted provisions are strict limitations on the exercise of the power of eminent domain by local government units, especially with respect to (1) the order of priority in acquiring land for socialized housing and (2) the resort to expropriation proceedings as a means to acquiring it. Private lands rank last in the order of priority for purposes of socialized housing. In the same vein, expropriation proceedings may be resorted to only after the other modes of acquisition are exhausted. Compliance with these conditions is mandatory because these are the only safeguards of oftentimes helpless owners of private property against what may be a tyrannical violation of due process when their property is forcibly taken from them allegedly for public use. We have found nothing in the records indicating that the City of Cebu complied strictly with Sections 9 and 10 of RA 7279. Ordinance No. 1843 sought to expropriate petit ioners‘ property without any attempt to first acquire the lands listed in (a) to (e) of Section 9 of RA 7279. Likewise, Cebu City failed to establish that the other modes of acquisition in Section 10 of RA 7279 were first exhausted. Moreover, prior to the passage of Ordinance No. 1843, there was no evidence of a valid and definite offer to buy petitioners‘ property as required by Section 19 of RA 7160. We



therefore find Ordinance No. 1843 to be constitutionally infirm for being violative of the petitioners‘ right to due process. It should also be noted that, as early as 1998, petitioners had already obtained a favorable judgment of eviction against the
























reasonable relation between the end sought and the means adopted. While the objective of the City of Cebu was to provide adequate housing to slum dwellers, the means it employed in pursuit of such objective fell short of what was legal, sensible and called for by the circumstances.





G.R. No. 152230. August 9, 2005 JESUS IS LORD CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION, INC. MUNICIPALITY (now CITY) OF PASIG, METRO MANILA

vs .

The assailed decision affirmed the order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, Branch 160, declaring the respondent Municipality (now City) of Pasig as having the right to expropriate and take possession of the subject property. FACTS: 

The Municipality of Pasig needed an access road from E. R. Santos Street, a municipal road near the Pasig Public Market, to Barangay Sto. Tomas Bukid, Pasig, where 60 to 70 houses, mostly made of light materials, materials, were located. located. The road had to be at least three meters in width, as required by the Fire Code, so that fire trucks could pass through in case of conflagration.









splitting the lot into two halves, and making it impossible for the petitioner to put up its school building and worship center. During the trial, the plaintiff presented witnesses, who were residents of the town, testifying that it was they who requested for the construction of the road. The defendant, on the other hand, presented some residents who counterclaimed that there are other roads leading to E. R. Santos Street. On September 3, 1997, the RTC issued an Order in favor of the plaintiff. The RTC held that there was substantial compliance with the definite and valid offer requirement of Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, and that the expropriated portion is the most convenient access to the interior of Sto. Tomas Bukid. Dissatisfied, JILCSFI elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated March 13, 2001, the CA affirmed the order of the RTC. The appellate court upheld the public necessity for the subject property based on the findings of the trial court that the portion of the property sought to be expropriated appears to be, not only the most convenient access to the interior of Sto. Tomas Bukid, but also an easy path for vehicles entering the area, particularly fire trucks. Moreover, the CA took into consideration the provision of Article




























cancelled and new titles were issued by the Register of Deeds of Cebu. Two parcels covered by T.C.T. Nos. 128197 (Lot No. 933B-3) and 128198 (Lot No. 933-B-4) were acquired by defendantappellee. In 1995, defendant-appellee begun construction of townhouses on the subject parcels of land. On 22 February 1996, plaintiff-appellant filed the present case alleging that it is the owner of the subject parcels of land by virtue of the 1938 Decision in the expropriation case, thus, T.C.T. Nos. 128197 and 128198 are null and void. It argued that defendantappellee, had no right to possess the subject properties because it was not its lawful owner. In its Answer defendant-appellee claimed that it was a buyer in good faith. It also claimed that there was no valid expropriation because it was initiated by the executive branch without legislative approval. It also alleged that the expropriation was never consummated because the government did not actually enter the land nor were the owners paid any compensation On August 25, 1998, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the Republic's complaint and upholding SRRDC's ownership over the subject properties as supported by SRRDC's actual possession thereof and its unqualified title thereto. The RTC ruled that SRRDC's ownership is borne out by the original owner's title to

Deeds. Said provision reads, to wit: SEC. 251. Final Judgment, Its Record and Effect . – The record of the final judgment in such action shall state definitely by metes and bounds and adequate description. The particular land or interest in land condemned to the public use, and the nature of the public use. A certified copy of the record of judgment shall be recorded in the office of the registrar of deeds for the province in which the estate is situated, and its effect shall be to vest in the plaintiff for the public use stated the land and estate so described. (Emphasis supplied)









From the foregoing, it is clear that it was incumbent upon the Republic to cause the registration of the subject properties in its name or record the decree of expropriation on the title. Yet, not only did the Republic fail to register the subject properties in its name, it failed to do so for fifty-six (56) years. Another basic question is whether or not SRRDC is a buyer in good faith. The CA found SRRDC wanting in good faith because it should be imputed with constructive knowledge, or at least, sufficiently warned that the Republic had claims over the property in view of indications that the subject land belonged to a military reservation. An innocent purchaser for value is one who, relying on the certificate of title, bought the property from the registered owner,


























and rented from, the PLDT, and prescribing its (the Bureau's) own schedule of rates. Through these trunk lines, a Government Telephone System (GTS) subscriber could make a call to a PLDT subscriber in the same way that the latter could make a call to the former. On 5 March 1958, the plaintiff, through the Director of Telecommunications, entered into an agreement with RCA Communications, Inc., for a joint overseas telephone service whereby the Bureau would convey radio-telephone overseas calls received by RCA's station to and from local residents. On 7 April 1958, the defendant Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, complained to the Bureau of Telecommunications that said bureau was violating the conditions under which their Private Branch Exchange (PBX) is interconnected with the PLDT's facilities, referring to the rented trunk lines, for the Bureau had used the trunk lines not only for the use of government offices but even to serve private persons or the general public, in competition with the business of the PLDT; and gave notice that if said violations were not stopped by midnight of 12 April 1958, the PLDT would sever the telephone connections. When the PLDT received no reply, it disconnected the trunk lines being rented by the Bureau at midnight on 12 April 1958. The

ISSUE: WON PLDT is compelled to enter into a contract compulsory

rendering the company to provide inter-connectivity services, despite its objection. HELD: 



The Supreme Court agreed with the court below that parties cannot be coerced to enter into a contract where no agreement is had between them as to the principal terms and conditions of the contract. Freedom to stipulate such terms and conditions is of the essence of our contractual system, and by express provision of the statute, a contract may be annulled if tainted by violence, intimidation, or undue influence (Articles 1306, 1336, 1337, Civil Code of the Philippines). But the court a quo has has apparently overlooked that while the Republic may not compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract with it, the Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, require the telephone company to permit interconnection of the government telephone system and that of the PLDT, as the needs of the government service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation to be determined by the court.


























with greater tenacity, and none is guarded by the constitution and laws more sedulously, than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. When the legislature interferes with that right, and, for greater public purposes, appropriates the land of an individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubtly interpretation. The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation, and before it can exercise the right some law must exist conferring the power upon it. When the courts come to determine the question, they must only find ( a ) that a law or authority exists for the exercise of the right of eminent domain, but (b ) also that the right or authority is being exercised in accordance with the law. In the present case there are two conditions imposed upon the authority conceded to the City of Manila: First , the land must be private; and, second , the purpose must be public. It is a well known fact that cemeteries may be public or private. The former is a cemetery used by the general community, or neighborhood, or church, while the latter is used only by a family, or a small portion of the community or neighbourhood. Where a cemetery is open to public, it is a public use and no part of the ground can be taken for other public uses under a general authority. And this immunity extends to the unimproved and unoccupied parts which are held in good faith for future use. The

RTCs shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over expropriation case as provided for by Section 19 (1) of BP 129, which states that RTCs shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over "all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;…‖. estimation;…‖. 



If the issue is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, or where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, like in suits to have the defendant perform his part of the contract (specific performance) and in actions for support, or for annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance. In the present case, an expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it deals with the exercise by the government of its authority and right to take private property for public useHence, the courts determine the authority of the government entity, the necessity of the expropriation, and the






















essential elements, to wit: (1) entrance and occupation by condemn or upon the private property for more than a momentary or limited period, and (2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. This appellee argues that in the instant case the first element is wanting, for the contract of lease relied upon provides for a lease from year to year; that the second element is also wanting, that the contract of lease does not grant the Republic the "right and privilege" to buy the premises "at the value at the time of occupancy." ISSUE:

WON

the

―Taking‖

of

properties

under

expropriation

commenced with the filing of the action. (What are the requisites of ―Taking‖ of proper ty ty of eminent domain?) HELD: 

It is clear that the "taking" of Catellvi's property for purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy the property as lessee thereof. We find merit in the contention of Castellvi that two essential elements in the "taking" of property under the power of eminent domain, namely: (1) that the entrance and occupation by the condemnor must be for a permanent, or indefinite period,

The city government of Quezon tried to enforce Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled "ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF" through the passing of a resolution wchich reads: reads: RESOLVED by the council of Quezon assembled, to request, as it does hereby request the City Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for paupers burial. But Respondent Himlayang Pilipino questioned the validity of the ordinance specifically its sec9 w/c provides that ―At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial

park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. The area so designated shall immediately be developed and should be open for operation not later than six months from the date of approval of the application.‖ . respondent alleged that this is

contrary to law and further contended that contends that the taking or confiscation of property is obvious because the questioned ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all


























Plaintiff National Power Corporation, a government owned and controlled entity, planned to construct 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines but the lines have to pass the lands belonging to defendants Matias Cruz, Heirs of Natalia Paule and spouses Misericordia Gutierrez and Ricardo Malit and filed an eminent domain proceedings against the defendants. The defendant spouses were authorized to withdraw the fixed provisional value of their land in the sum of P973.00 by the court after NPC deposited the amount amount upon filing the complaint. The



amended, the NPC is authorized to enter private property provided that the owners thereof shall be indemnified for any actual damage caused thereby. For the construction of its San Manuel-San Jose 500 KV Transmission Line and Tower No. SMJ-389, NPC negotiated with Maria Mendoza San Pedro, then represented by her son, Vicente, for an easement of right of way over her property, Lot No. 2076. The property, which was partly agricultural and partly residential land, was located in Barangay Partida, Norzagaray, Bulacan and
























heavy bombers, other planes of the heavier type, and its fighter planes have frequently passed over respondents' land buildings in considerable numbers and rather close together. They come close enough at times to appear barely to miss the tops of the trees and at times so close to the tops of the trees as to blow the old leaves off. The noise is startling. And at night the glare from the planes brightly lights up the place. As a result of the noise, respondents had to give up their chicken business. As many as six to ten of their chickens were killed in one day by flying into the

prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. On behalf of the respondent Comelec, the Solicitor General claimed that the Resolution is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision (police power) of the Comelec over the information operations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election.























CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS petitioner ‘s failure to property

expropriation was not for public purpose for present evidence that the intended beneficiaries of the expropriation are landless and homeless. ISSUES: 1. 2.

W/N the respondents are qualified as small property owners and are thus exempt from expropriation under RA no. 7972. W/N the subject property is the only real property of respondents for them to comply with the second requisite for small property



consists of residential lands with an area of not more than 300 square meters in highly urbanized cities and 800 square meters in other urban areas; and (2) that they do not own real property other than the same. In the case at bar involves two (2) residential lots Mandaluyong City, a highly urbanized City. The lot totalled 1, 636 square meters was issued in the names of the herein five (5) respondents. The respondents are co-owners of the said lot. Under Article 493 of the Civil Code, every co-owner has the absolute ownership of his
























Filstream is the registered owner of the subject land which filed an ejectment suit against the occupants of the parcels of land on the grounds of termination of the lease contract and non-payment of rentals. The MTC rendered decision in favor of the petitioner and ordered private respondents to vacate the premises and pay back rentals to the petitioner. The RTC and CA affirmed this decision. It was at this stage that respondent City of Manila approved an Ordinance authorizing Mayor Lim to initiate the acquisition by negotiation, expropriation, purchased and other legal means certain parcels of land



of Cebu and the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) from enforcing and implementing the writs of possession issued in four (4) expropriation cases filed by PTA against the petitioners. The Philippine Tourism Authority filed four (4) Complaints with the Court of First Instance of Cebu City for the expropriation of some 282 hectares of rolling land situated in barangays Malubog and Babag, Cebu City, under PTA's express authority "to acquire by purchase, by negotiation or by condemnation proceedings any private land within and without the tourist zones" for the purposes
























ISSUE: Whether socialized housing constitutes ―public use‖ for

purposes of expropriation. HELD: YES. 

This Court is satisfied that "socialized housing" fans within the confines of "public use". As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. As just



that the expropriations are for a public purpose. Asked by the Court of Appeals to give his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor General stated that under Section 9 of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337), there was no need for the approval by the Office of the President of the exercise by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the right of eminent domain. However, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the Province of Camarines Sur must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































- TAXATION -

PURPOSE

107 SCRA 104, 1981 THE PROVINCE OF ABRA VS HONORABLE HAROLD M. HERNANDO FACTS: 

G.R. No. L-28896 February 17, 1988 COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. ALGUE FACTS:

The Philippine Sugar Estate Development Company (PSEDC) appointed Algue Inc. as its agent, authorizing it to sell its land, factories, and oil manufacturing process. The Vegetable Oil Investment Corporation (VOICP) purchased PSEDC properties. For the sale, Algue received a commission of P125,000 and it was from this commission that it paid Guevara, et. al. organizers of the VOICP, P75,000 in promotional fees. In 1965, Algue received an assessment from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in the amount of P83,183.85 as delinquency income tax for years 1958 amd 1959. Algue filed a protest protest or request for for reconsideration which which was not acted acted upon by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). The counsel for Algue had to accept the warrant of distrant and levy. Algue, however, filed a petition for review with the Coourt of Tax Appeals. ISSUE: Whether the assessment was reasonable. HELD: 

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Taxes are the lifeblood of the government and so should be collected without unnecessary hindrance. Every person who is able to pay must contribute his share in the running of the government. The Government, for his part, is expected to respond in the form of tangible and intangible benefits intended to improve the lives of the people and enhance their moral and material values. This symbiotic relationship is the rationale of taxation and should dispel the erroneous notion that is an arbitrary method of exaction by those in the seat of power. Tax collection, however, should be made in accordance with law as any arbitrariness will negate the very reason for government itself. For all the awesome power of the tax collector, he may still be stopped in his tracks if the taxpayer can demonstrate that the law has not been observed. Herein, the claimed deduction (pursuant to Section 30 [a] [1] of the Tax Code and Section 70 [1] of Revenue Regulation 2: as to compensation for personal services) had been legitimately by Algue Inc. It has further proven that the payment of fees was reasonable and necessary in light of the efforts exerted by the payees in inducing investors (in VOICP) to involve themselves in an experimental enterprise enterprise or a business requiring millions of pesos. The assessment was not reasonable.

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exclusively used by the Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued, Inc. ." for religious or charitable purposes ." HELD: 

TAX EXEMPTIONS 33 PHIL 217, 1916 YMCA VS. CIR *no case digest submitted* 51 PHIL 352, 1927 BISHOP OF NUEVA SEGOVIA VS PROVINCIAL BOARD *no case digest submitted*

The Supreme Court ruled that the petition be granted since the judge would not have made such a grave mistake if he had only made a clear distinction between the present provisions of the constitution to the provisions of the 1935 constitution regarding tax exemptions on land, buildings and improvements. The main difference is that in order for a land, building, or improvement to be tax exempt, there must be and exclusive, actual and direct use of the enumerated for religious or charitable purposes. It is also a rule that tax exemption is not favored nor presumed so that if granted it must be strictly construed against the taxpayer. Affirmatively put, the law frowns on exemption from taxation, hence, an exempting provision should be construed strictissimi juris



177 SCRA 27, 1989 COMMISSIONER VS. MAKASIAR *no case digest submitted*

In this case the provincial city assessor of Abra filed a certiorari and mandamus against the ruling made by Judge Harold M. Hernando of the Court of First Instance of Abra, it was because respondent denied a motion for declaratory relief by Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued desirous of being exempted from a real estate tax followed by a summary judgment granting such exemption without even hearing the side of the petitioner. Petitioner further argued that clearly the judge ignored the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court and disregards the basic laws of procedure and basic provisions of due process in the constitution. The important argument made by the petitioner is that the judge failed to abide by the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 464 which states that" No court shall entertain any suit assailing the validity of a tax assessed under this Code until the taxpayer, shall have paid, under protest, the tax assessed against him nor shall any court declare any tax invalid by reason of irregularities or informalities in the proceedings of the officers charged with the assessment or collection of taxes, or of failure to perform their duties within this time herein specified for their performance unless such irregularities, informalities or failure shall have impaired the substantial rights of the taxpayer; nor shall any court declare any portion of the tax assessed under the provisions of this Code invalid except upon condition that the taxpayer shall pay the just amount of the tax, as determined by the court in the pending proceeding." The judge responded by saying there is no dispute that the properties including their procedure are actually, directly and

The petition was also justly invoked on the grounds for the protection of due process to clearly show if the respondents really did not violate any constitutional provisions in regards to tax exemption but instead, what respondent judge did was directly ruled on the case of declaratory relief on the basis that it was exclusive, actual, and directly as sources of support of the parish priest and his helpers and also of private respondent Bishop as compared to the motion to dismiss the case due to lack of jurisdiction since the validity of a tax assessment may be questioned before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals and not with a court. There was also mention of a lack of a cause of action, but only because, in its view, declaratory relief is not proper, as there had been breach or violation of the right of government to assess and collect taxes on such property. It clearly appears, therefore, that in failing to accord a hearing to petitioner Province of Abra and deciding the case immediately in






















FACTS: 

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This is a case for a review or certiorari on the decision made by the defunct Court of First Instance of Abra Branch I, dated June 14, 1974, rendered in Civil Case No. 656. In this case the court decided that the seizure and sale by the Municipal Treasurer of Bangued, Abra Abra and Provincial Provincial Treasurer of the said province of the lot and building of Abra Valley College, Inc. to be valid since the said school was not tax exempt. What transpired was the school was issued a ―Notice of Seizure‖ of the lot and building of the school covered by Original Certificate of Title No. Q-83 duly registered in the name of petitioner for failure to pay the amount of P5,140.31 back taxes by the respondent The "Notice of Sale" was caused to be served upon the petitioner by the respondent treasurers on July 8, 1972 for the sale at public auction of said college lot and building, which sale was held on the same date. Dr. Paterno Millare, then Municipal Mayor of Bangued, Abra, offered the highest bid of P6,000.00 which was duly accepted. The certificate of sale was correspondingly issued to him. After the sale Dr. Paterno filled a case for the dismissal of the case and after exchange of pleadings the court ordered the respondent treasurers to deliver the proceeds of the auction sale. Finally the parties involved entered into a Stipulation of Facts administered by the court dismissing the notice of seizure and notice of sale in favor of Dr. Paterno and relieving him of all the back taxes of the school upon the payment of the auction price. Despite the Stipulation of Facts the trial courts found out that the school was recognized by the government offering Primary High School and College courses and has a population of more than 100,000 students all in all; that the school was situated right in the heart of town of Bangued, Abra a few meters from the plaza and about 120 meters from the Court of First Instance building; that the elementary pupils are housed in a two-storey building across the street; that the high school and college students are housed in the main building; that the Director with his family is in the second floor of the main building; and that the annual gross income of the school reaches more more than one hundred thousand pesos. In light of the evidences it was left after the courts to determine whether the said school was exclusively for educational purposes. The succeeding Provincial Fiscal, Hon. Jose A. Solomon and his Assistant, Hon. Eustaquio Z. Montero, filed a Memorandum for the Government on March 25, 1974, and a Supplemental Memorandum on May 7, 1974, wherein they opined "that based on the evidence, the laws applicable, court decisions and jurisprudence, the school building and school lot used for educational purposes of the Abra Valley College, Inc., are exempted from the payment of taxes. The trial court disagreed because of the use of the second floor by the Director of petitioner school for residential purposes. He thus ruled for the government and rendered the assailed decision. After having been granted by the trial court ten (10) days from August 6, 1974 within which to perfect its appeal petitioner instead availed of the instant petition for review on certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction before this Court, which petition was filed on August 17, 1974. In the resolution dated August 16, 1974, this Court resolved to give DUE COURSE to the petition Respondents were required to answer said petition. The petitioners raised the arguments that the courts a quo: 1. made an error in sustaining a valid seizure and sale of the college lot and building used for educational purpose 2. Made an error in declaring that the college was not exclusively for educational purposes merely because the college president resides in it 3. made an error in declaring the college not tax exempt from property taxes and in ordering petitioner to pay P5,140.31 as realty taxes. 4. made an error in ordering the confiscation of the P6,000.00 deposit made in the court by petitioner as payment of

president? HELD: 

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



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In the case at bar the Supreme Court used Section 22, paragraph 3, Article VI, of the then 1935 Philippine Constitution, which expressly grants exemption from realty taxes for "Cemeteries, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable or educational purposes ... Relative thereto, Section 54, paragraph c, Commonwealth Act No. 470 as amended by Republic Act No. 409, otherwise known as the Assessment Law, provides that churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific or educational purposes The Supreme court ruled that the exemption in favor of property used exclusively for charitable or educational purposes is 'not limited to property actually indispensable but extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of said purposes and that while this Court allows a more liberal and non-restrictive interpretation of the phrase "exclusively used for educational purposes" as provided for in Article VI, Section 22, paragraph 3 of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, reasonable emphasis has always been made that exemption extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the main purposes. While the use of the second floor of the main building in the case at bar for residential purposes of the Director and his family, they may find justification under the concept of incidental of incidental use, which is complimentary to the main or primary purpose —educational, the lease of the first floor thereof to the Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered incidental to the purpose of education. Under the 1935 Constitution, the trial court correctly arrived at the conclusion that the school building as well as the lot where it is built should be taxed, not because the second floor of the same is being used by the Director and his family for residential purposes, but because the first floor thereof is being used for commercial purposes. However, since only a portion is used for purposes of commerce, it is only fair that half of the assessed tax be returned to the school involved. PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Abra, Branch I, is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the modification that half of the assessed tax be returned to the petitioner

101 PHIL 386, 1957 AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY vs. CITY OF MANILA FACTS: 

In this case the plaintiff is a foreign, non-stock, religious, missionary organization duly registered in the Philippines and doing business through its agency here in Manila. In the course of their ministry, their Philippine agency has been distributing and selling bibles and/or gospel portions thereof (except during the Japanese occupation) throughout the Philippines and translating the same into several Philippine dialect Upon knowledge the acting City Treasurer of the City of Manila informed plaintiff that it was conducting the business of general merchandise since November, 1945, without providing itself with the necessary Mayor's permit and municipal license, requiring the plaintiff to secure, within three days, the corresponding permit and license fees, together with compromise covering the period from the 4th quarter of 1945 to the 2nd quarter of 1953, in the total sum of






















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being collected which was done on the same date by filing the complaint that gave rise to this action. The plaintiff prays that judgment be rendered declaring the the said Municipal Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028 and 3364 illegal and unconstitutional, and a refund should be made by the defendant of the payments made and the legal costs. The defendant replied that, maintaining in turn that said ordinances were enacted by the Municipal Board of the City of Manila by virtue of the power granted to it by section 2444, subsection (m-2) of the Revised Administrative Code, superseded on June 18, 1949, by section 18, subsection (1) of Republic Act No. 409, known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, and praying that the complaint be dismissed, with costs against plaintiff. This answer was replied by the plaintiff reiterating the unconstitutionality of the often-repeated ordinances Before the trial the party submitted a stipulation of facts stating the sales made by the petitioner from 1945 to 1953. When the case was set for hearing the plaintiff argued that it never made any profit from the sale of its bibles, which are disposed of for as low as one third of the cost, and that in order to maintain its operating cost it obtains substantial remittances from its New York office and voluntary contributions and gifts from certain churches, both in the United States and in the Philippines, which are interested in its missionary work. The defendant answered that due to the cross-examination of the lone witness of plaintiff it was proven that the claim of plaintiff that if having no profit from the sales is evidently untenable. This made the judge to dismiss the case for lack of merit on the grounds thatfrom the repealed section (m-2) of the Revised Administrative Code and the repealing portions (o) of section 18 of Republic Act No. 409, although they seemingly differ in the way the legislative intent is expressed, yet their meaning is practically the same for the purpose of taxing the merchandise mentioned in said legal provisions, and that the taxes to be levied by said ordinances is in the nature of percentage graduated taxes (Sec. 3 of Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and Sec. 1, Group 2, of Ordinance No. 2529, as amended by Ordinance No. 3364). Not satisfied with the decision, they took up the matter to the Court of Appeals which was certified to the Supreme Court where the petitioner argued these points 1. In holding that Ordinances Nos. 2529 and 3000, as respectively amended, are not unconstitutional 2. In holding that subsection m -2 of Section 2444 of the Revised Administrative Code under which Ordinances Nos. 2592 and 3000 were promulgated, was not repealed by Section 18 of Republic Act No. 409; 3. In not holding that an ordinance providing for taxes based on gross sales or receipts, in order to be valid under the new Charter of the City of Manila, must first be approved by the President of the Philippines; and 4. In holding that, as the sales made by the plaintiff-appellant have assumed commercial proportions, it cannot escape from the operation of said municipal ordinances under the cloak of religious privilege.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinances of the City of Manila, Nos.

3000, as amended, and 2529, 3028 and 3364, are constitutional and valid; and (2) whether the provisions of said ordinances are applicable or not to the case at bar. HELD: 

In the case at bar the Supreme court held that that Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be considered unconstitutional, even if applied to plaintiff Society. But as Ordinance No. 2529 of the City of Manila, as amended, is not applicable to plaintiff-appellant and defendantappellee is powerless to license or tax the business of plaintiff Society involved herein for, as stated before, it would impair plaintiff's right to the free exercise and enjoyment of its religious

defendant return to plaintiff the sum of P5,891.45 unduly collected from it. Without pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

DOUBLE TAXATION 95 PHIL 46, 1954 PUNZALAN VS MUNICIPAL BOARD OF MANILA *no case digest submitted*

LICENSE FEES GR No. 10448, August 30, 1957 PHYSICAL THERAPY ORG. VS MUNICIPAL BOARD *no case digest submitted*






















- EQUAL PROTECTION 

SEXUAL DISCRIMNINATION 163 SCRA 386, 1988 PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS vs. DRILON FACTS: 

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The Department of Labor and Employment issued Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988 in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD

WORKERS‖. 



The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm "engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement," challenges its Constitutional validity. On May 25, 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondents Secretary of Labor and Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, filed a Comment informing the Court that on March 8, 1988, the respondent Labor Secretary lifted the deployment ban in the states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada, Hongkong, United States, Italy, Norway, Austria, and Switzerland. * In submitting the validity of the challenged "guidelines," the Solicitor General invokes the police power of the Philippine State.

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stated, the right itself is not absolute. The disputed Order is a valid qualification thereto. Neither is there merit i n the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power. It is true that police power is the domain of the legislature, but it does not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated. As we have mentioned, the Labor Code itself vests the Department of Labor and Employment with rulemaking powers in the enforcement whereof. "Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of employment alone. What concerns the Constitution more paramountly is that such an employment be above all, decent, just, and humane. It is bad enough that the country country has to send its sons and daughters to strange lands because it cannot satisfy their employment needs at home. Under these circumstances, the Government is duty-bound to insure that our toiling expatriates have adequate protection, personally and economically, while away from home. In this case, the Government has evidence, an evidence the petitioner cannot seriously dispute, of the lack or inadequacy of such protection, and as part of its duty, it has precisely ordered an indefinite ban on deployment. The non-impairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by the petitioner, must yield to the loftier purposes targetted by the Government. 31 Freedom of contract and enterprise, like all other freedoms, is not free from restrictions, more so in this jurisdiction, where laissez faire has never been fully accepted as a controlling economic way of life. Petition dismissed.

ISSUE:

WON Department Order No. 1 in the nature of a police power measure is valid under the Constitution, assailing: assailing: "discrimination against males or females;" that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills;" and that it is violative of the right to travel it is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in character.  

 

HELD: 

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The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class. As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen our female labor force abroad, especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions marked by, in not a few cases, physical and personal abuse. The sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers, are compelling motives for urgent Government action. As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the G overnment's efforts. efforts. The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right. The right to travel is subject, among other things, to the requirements of "public safety," "as may be

ADMINISTRATION OF OF JUSTICE 99 PHIL, 1856 PEOPLE vs. HERNANDEZ FACTS: 

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This is a case of kidnapping with murder involving the Huks, members of the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan, the military arm of the Communist Party of the Philippines. Counsel for Faustino del Mundo, alias Commander Sumulong, admits that the said accused ordered the killing of the victim, Marciano T. Miranda, 41, the barrio captain of Barrio Balitucan, Magalang, Pampanga, who was an alleged army informer and who was opposed to the candidacy of Rogelio Tiglao, a provincial board member. The kidnapping and killing were politically motivated. Miranda refused to support Tiglao, the candidate for Congressman of the Huks. He supported Rafael Lazatin, the Nacionalista candidate.

ISSUE: Del Mundo contends that he should be convicted only of

homicide and sentenced to reclusion temporal medium and that the trial court erred in convicting him of the said complex crime and in sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. HELD: 



Del Mundo did not testify in his defense. As already stated, the trial court convicted him of kidnapping with murder together with Pangilinan, Macasaquit and Cabrera, sentenced him to reclusion perpetua and ordered him to pay an indemnity of P17,000 to Miranda's heirs. Macalino and Meneses were acquitted. Salas died during the pendency of the case. Only Del Mundo appealed. His counsel de oficio contends that there was no intention to deprive Miranda of his liberty and no premeditated plan to kill him. That contention is not well-taken. The fact is that Miranda was






















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the kidnapping was utilized as a means to attain that objective. From the surrounding circumstances, it maybe inferred that Del Mundo masterminded the kidnapping or induced it and that, as observed by the Solicitor General, the killing was intended to terrorize the supporters of Lazatin. Miranda was a public officer. His kidnapping is covered by article 267(4) of the Revised Penal Code which imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for that offense. The killing of Miranda was murder because his hands were bound when he was mortally assaulted (U.S. vs. Elicanal, 35 Phil. 209 and other cases). Even without taking into account evident premeditation, the death penalty has to be imposed because article 48 of the Revised Penal Code requires that the graver penalty for kidnapping, which is more serious than murder, has to be meted out to Del Mundo However, inasmuch as Del Mundo is now seventy-eight (78) years old, the death penalty cannot b e imposed upon him. WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is modified in the sense that the death penalty imposable on Del Mundo is commuted to reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided in article 40. In all other respects, the trial court's judgment is affirmed.

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ISSUE: WON the government, through the Presidential Commission

on Good Government (PCGG), be required to reveal the proposed terms of a compromise agreement with the Marcos heirs as regards their alleged ill-gotten wealth. HELD: 

85 PHIL 648, 1950 PEOPLE vs. ISNAIN FACTS: 

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Accused was caught in the act of stealing coconut while his two other companions managed to ran away. Accused admitted to committing the said crime

ISSUE: The only question raised with much earnestness by his

attorney de oficio is that article 310 of the Revised Penal Code classifying as qualified theft, the stealing of coconut is unconstitutional, unconstitutional, because it punishes the larceny of such products more heavily than the taking away of similar produce, such as rice and sugar, and thereby denies him the equal protection of the laws.

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HELD: 

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In the matter of theft of coconuts, the purpose of the heavier penalty is to encourage and protect the development of the coconut industry as one of the sources of our national economy.3 Unlike rice and sugar cane farms where the range of vision is unobstructed, coconut groves can not be efficiently watched because of the nature of the growth of coconut trees; and without a special measure to protect this kind of property, it will be, as it has been in the past the favorite resort of thieves.4 There is therefore, some reason for the special treatment accorded the industry; and as it can not be said that the classification is entirely without basis, the plea of unconstitutionality must be denied The crime is punished by article 309, paragraph 5, in connection with article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 417. (Republic Act No. 120, enacted after the offense, is not applicable.) The penalty is prision correccional to its full extent. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence law, the appellant should be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than 4 years and 2 months of arresto mayor nor more than 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional. Thus modified, the appealed decision will be affirmed, with costs. so ordered.

GR No. 130716, December 09, 1998 CHAVES VS. PCGG FACTS: 

Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, as "taxpayer, citizen and former government official who initiated the prosecution of the Marcoses

deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss banks; and (2) the reported execution of a compromise, between the government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these assets. Petitioner, invoking his his constitutional right to information and the correlative duty of the state to disclose publicly all its transactions involving the national national interest, demands that respondents respondents make public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGG's task of recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. He claims that any compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of "paramount public interest," since it has a "debilitating effect on the country's economy" that would be greatly prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino people.

In general, writings coming into the hands of public officers in connection with their official functions must be accessible to the public, consistent with the policy of transparency of governmental affairs. This principle is aimed at affording the people an opportunity to determine whether those to whom they have entrusted the affairs of the government are honesty, faithfully and competently performing their functions as public servants. Undeniably, the essence of democracy lies in the free flow of thought; but thoughts and ideas must be well-informed so that the public would gain a better perspective of vital issues confronting them and, thus, be able to criticize as well as participate in the affairs of the government in a responsible, reasonable and effective manner. With such pronouncements of our government, whose authority emanates from the people, there is no doubt that the recovery of the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth is a matter of public concern and imbued with with public interest. We may also add that "ill-gotten wealth," by its very nature, assumes a public character. Clearly, the assets and properties referred to supposedly originated from the government itself. To all intents and purposes, therefore, they belong to the people. As such, upon reconveyance they will be returned to the public treasury, subject only to the satisfaction of positive claims of certain persons as may be adjudged by competent courts. Another declared overriding consideration for the expeditious recovery of ill-gotten wealth is that it may be used for national economic recovery. The foregoing disquisition settles the question of whether petitioner has a right to respondents' disclosure of any agreement that may be arrived at concerning the Marcoses' purported ill-gotten wealth. Petition granted.

111 SCRA 433, 1982 NUNEZ VS. SANDIGANBAYAN FACTS: 

Petitioner in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding assails the validity of the Presidential Decree creating the Sandiganbayan, He was accused before such respondent Court of estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all public officials, in several cases. Upon being arraigned, he filed a motion to quash on constitutional and jurisdictional grounds. Respondent Court denied such motion. There was a motion for reconsideration filed the next day; it met the same fate. Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition


























To assure that the general welfare be promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights to liberty and property. Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason. To quote from from the Tuason decision decision anew "that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances which, if not Identical, are analogous. The premise underlying petitioner's contention on this point is set forth in his memorandum thus: " 1. The Sandiganbayan proceedings violates petitioner's right to equal protection, because - appeal as a matter of right became minimized into a mere matter of discretion; - appeal likewise was shrunk and limited only to questions of law, excluding a review of the facts and trial evidence; and - there is only one chance to appeal conviction, by certiorari to the Supreme Court, instead of the traditional two chances; while all other estafa indictees are entitled to appeal as a matter of right covering both law and facts and to two appellate courts, i.e., first to the Court of Appeals and thereafter to the Supreme Court." ,that is hardly convincing, considering that the classification satisfies the test requiring that it "must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class. The Constitution specifically mentions the creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan precisely in response to a problem, the urgency of which cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service. It follows that those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware as far back as January 17, 1973, when the present Constitution came into force, that a different procedure for the accused therein, whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a public official, is not necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause of the Constitution. WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed.

GR No. 142030, April 21, 2005 GALLARDO VS. PEOPLE FACTS: 

Atty. Victor dela Serna, for and in behalf of the Public Health Workers (PHWs) of Bansalan, Davao del Sur, filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao a sworn letter-complaint charging herein petitioners Mayor Gallardo, the vice mayor, Sanggunian

ISSUE: WON the petitioners are denied due process and not accorded

the equal protection of laws. HELD: 

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Petitioners claimed that they were denied due process because Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto disapproved the recommendation of the special prosecutor. The Ombudsman, c ontrary to the investigating prosecutor‘s conclusion, was of the conviction that petitioners are probably guilty of the offense charged, and for this, he is not required to conduct an investigation anew. Whatever course of action that the Ombudsman may take, whether to approve or to disapprove the recommendation of the investigating prosecutor, is but an exercise of his discretionary powers based upon constitutional mandate.[17] Generally, courts should not interfere in such exercise. The equal protection clause requires that the law operates uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons are treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. It allows reasonable classification. If the classification is characterized by real and substantial differences, one class may be treated differently from another. Simply because the respondent Ombudsman dismissed some cases allegedly similar to the case at bar is not sufficient to impute arbitrariness or caprice on his part, absent a clear showing that he gravely abused his his discretion discretion in pursuing the instant instant case. case. The Ombudsman dismissed those cases because he believed there were no sufficient grounds for the accused therein to undergo trial. On the other hand, he recommended the filing of appropriate information against petitioners because there are ample grounds to hold them them for trial. He was only exercising exercising his power and discharging his duty based upon the constitutional mandate of his office. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit

PUBLIC POLICY [G.R. No. 157279. August 9, 2005.] PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. GIOVANNI PALMA ET AL. FACTS: 



PNB was formerly a government owned and controlled corporation but on 26 May 1996, it was already privatized and incorporated as a private commercial bank. R.A. 6758, 'An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation and Position Classification System in the Government' took effect on 1 July 1989 covering all government owned corporations. Section 12 thereof provides for the consolidation of allowances and additional compensation into standardized salary rates, but






















ineffective paved the way to their entitlement to the allowances/fringe benefits. The withholding of their entitlement to the same benefits is an unfair discrimination and a violation of respondents' rights to the equal protection clause of the Constitution since incumbents or employees of PNB who were already in the service as of 1 July 1989 received the benefits and allowances. To rectify the injustice against respondents issued General Circular No. 1-312/97 on 14 March 1997, extending the benefits to respondents effective 1 January 1997. But Respondents contend that extending to them the allowances/fringe benefits meant that they are entitled to the payment of the same and, hence, they should be given their allowances reckoned not only from 1 January 1997 but from the date of their respective appointment, to which PNB did not accede to. The trial court ruled in favor of the Respondents, and the Court ISSUE: Whether or not respondents are entitled to the questioned fringe benefits

by law is unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, and violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. The thrust of petitioner's challenge is that the assailed proviso makes an unconstitutional cut between two classes of employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the BSP officers or those exempted from the coverage of R.A. No. 6758 or the Salary Standardization Law (SSL) (exempt class); and (2) the rank-and-file (Salary Grade [SG] 19 and below), or those not exempted from the coverage of the SSL (non-exempt class). Petitioner contended that the classification is "a classic case of class legislation," allegedly not based on substantial distinctions which make real differences, but solely on the SG of the BSP personnel's position. Petitioner further contended that the assailed proviso is also violative of the equal protection clause because after it was enacted, the charters of the Government Service Insurance System, Land Bank of the Philippines, Development Bank of the Philippines and Social Security System were also amended, and their respective personnel were all exempted from the coverage of the SSL. Thus, within the class of rank-and-file personnel of Government Financial Institutions (GFI), the BSP rank-and-file employees are also discriminated upon.

HELD:

ISSUE: Whether or not a provision of law, initially valid, can become

of Appeals denied petitioner‘s appeal. Thus, this instant petition.









The respondents were not entitled to the benefits because they were hired only after JUNE 30 1989. An incumbent is a person who is in present possession of an office. Finally, to explain what July 1, 1989 pertained to, we held in the prior cases as follows: The date July 1, 1989 becomes crucial only to determine that as of said date, the officer was an incumbent and was receiving the RATA, for purposes of entitling him to its continued grant." Respondents were not deemed incumbents as defined by settled jurisprudence. Petitioner was correct in contending that by extending the assailed benefits to respondents on January 1, 1997, it was not thereby admitting that the latter were priorly entitled to them. It contends that its privatization on May 27, 1996 enabled it to grant benefits as it deemed fit. It could not have granted them while it was still a government agency, because RA 6758 barred such grant as an illegal disbursement of public funds. It allegedly accorded them those benefits, not because it had finally acceded to their interpretation of the law, but because it was only then that — as a private entity — it could legally do so. The collateral attack on the constitutionality of RA 6758 due to alleged violation of the equal protection clause cannot prosper, because constitutionality issues must be pleaded directly — not collaterally. Furthermore, the constitutional issue was not raised in the trial court; hence, it cannot now be availed of on appeal to this Court. Besides, the arguments of respondents rest upon the validity of Section 12 of RA 6758. How then can they now challenge the very basis of their arguments? A law is deemed valid unless declared null and void by a competent court; court; more so when when the issue has has not been duly pleaded in the trial court. The question of constitutionality must be

subsequently unconstitutional, on the ground that its continued operation would violate the equal protection of the law HELD: 



Supreme Court held that with the passage of the subsequent laws amending the charter of seven (7) other governmental financial institutions (GFIs), the continued operation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, constitutes invidious discrimination on the 2,994 rank-and-file employees of the BSP. The Supreme Court struck down the assailed proviso and held that with the passage of the subsequent laws amending the charter of seven (7) other governmental financial institutions (GFIs), the continued operation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7653, constitutes invidious discrimination on the 2,994 rank-and-file employees of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. The disparity of treatment between BSP rank-and-file and the rank-and-file of the other seven GFIs definitely bears the unmistakable badge of invidious discrimination. No one can, with candor and fairness, deny the discriminatory character of the subsequent blanket and total exemption of the seven other GFIs from the SSL when such was withheld from the BSP. Alikes are being treated as unalikes without any rational basis. The Court emphasized that the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality but it requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances which, if not identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden






















and 17,1981, asked for exactly the same opportunity, the same prime time and the same number of television and radio stations all over the country to be used in its campaign for "NO" votes in the plebiscite for the amendments to the 1973 Constitution proposed by the Batasang Pambansa as that utilized by President Marcos in his nationwide "Pulong-Pulong sa Pangulo" in campaigning for "YES" votes on the proposed constitutional amendments. The Commission, in its Resolution of March 18, 1981 denied petitioner's "demand'' being of the view that the President's remarks on the proposed amendments in the forementioned radio-television program carried live by twenty-six (26) television and two hundred forty-eight (248) radio stations throughout the country were initiated under his leadership and capacity as President/prime Minister in the exercise of his constitutional prerogative to determine the program and guidelines of national policy pursuant to Article IX, Section 2 of the Constitution and not as the head of any political party. Petitioner's Motion for reconsideration proved futile, hence this present action, assailing the Comelec's resolutions as contrary to the Constitution, unjust, unfair and inequitable for violating the basic principles of equality, good faith and fair play, the same not conducive to insure a free, orderly and honest elections.

the implementation of the tax exemptions constitutes executive legislation. HELD: 

To limit the tax-free importation privilege of enterprises located inside the special economic zone only to raw materials, capital and equipment clearly runs counter to the intention of the

Legislature to create a free port where the ―free flow of goods or capital within, into, and out of the zones‖ is insured. The phrase ―tax and duty-free importations of raw materials, capital and equipment‖ was merely cited as an example of

for denying UNIDO the same air time in Media as that of the President

incentives that may be given to entities operating within the zone. Public respondent SBMA correctly argued that the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, on which petitioners impliedly rely to support their restrictive interpretation, does not apply when words are mentioned by way of example. It is obvious from the wording of RA No. 7227, particularly the use of the phrase ―such as,‖ that the enumerati on only meant to illustrate incentives that the SSEZ is authorized to grant, in line with its being a free port zone. The Court finds that the setting up of such commercial establishments which are the only ones duly authorized to sell consumer items tax and duty-free is still well within the policy

in campaigning for the ―NO‖ votes in the plebiscite for the amendments

enunciated in Section 12 of RA No. 7227 that ―. . .the Subic

to the 1973 Contstitution.

Special Economic Zone shall be developed into a self-sustaining, industrial, commercial, financial and investment center to generate employment opportunities in and around the zone and to



ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC violated the equal protection clause

HELD:

The Supreme Court, in dismissing the appeal, held that when the President spoke in the nation-wide program "Pulong-Pulong sa Pangulo" on March 21, 1981, he did so in his capacity as PresidentPrime Minister and not as the head of the KBL; and that what petitioner asks cannot be granted for being beyond what the charter, the laws and pertinent Comelec regulations contemplate, for being more than what the opposition is duly entitled vis-a-vis the duty, obligation and/or privilege inherent in the head of state to directly dialogue with the sovereign people when the occasion demands, for being impractical under prevailing circumstance, and for its failure to join in the petition the television and radio stations as indispensable parties, thereby depriving the Court of jurisdiction to act. Appeal dismissed. 227 SCRA 703 (1993) PJA VS PRADO *no case digest submitted* 248 SCRA 700, 1995 OLIVAREZ VS. SANDIGANBAYAN *no case digest submitted* GR No. 127410, January 20, 1999 TIU VS. COURT OF APPEALS

attract and promote productive foreign investments.‖ However,

the Court reiterates that the second sentences of paragraphs 1.2 and 1.3 of Executive Order No. 97-A, allowing tax and duty-free removal of goods to certain individuals, even in a limited amount, from the Secured Area of the SSEZ, are null and void for being contrary to Section 12 of RA No. 7227. Said Section clearly provides that ―exportation or removal of goods from the territory of

the Subic Special Economic Zone to the other parts of the Philippine territory shall be subject to customs duties and taxes under the Customs and Tariff Code and other relevant tax laws of the Philippines.‖

G.R. No. 128845. June 1, 2000 ISAE v. Hon. Leonardo A. Quisumbing FACTS:

Private respondent, International School Inc. is a domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. The school hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying them as foreign-hires and local-hires. The local-hire faculty members of said International School, mostly Filipinos, complained against the better treatment of their colleagues who have been hired abroad. These


























employment opportunities for all." Similarly, the Labor Code provides that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed." It would be an affront to both the spirit and letter of these provisions if the State, in spite of its primordial obligation to promote and ensure equal employment opportunities, closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory terms and conditions of employment. In this case, the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent school to justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires is an invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. The practice of the School of according higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public policy and, certainly, does not deserve the sympathy of this Court. The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries. This rule applies to the School, its "international character" notwithstanding. If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that these employees perform equal work. This presumption is borne by logic and human experience. If the employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he receives less or why the others receive more. That would be adding insult to injury. The employer has discriminated against that employee; it is for the employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly.

GR. No. 143076. June 10, 2003 PHILRECA vs. DILG FACTS:

On May 23, 2003, a class suit was filed by petitioners in their own behalf and in behalf of other electric cooperatives organized and existing under PD 269 which are members of petitioner Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc. (PHILRECA). The other petitioners, electric cooperatives of Agusan del Norte (ANECO), Iloilo 1 (ILECO 1) and Isabela 1 (ISELCO 1) are non-stock, non-profit electric cooperatives organized and existing under PD 269, as amended, and registered with the National Electrification Administration (NEA). Under Sec. 39 of PD 269 electric cooperatives shall be exempt from the payment of all National Government, local government, and municipal taxes and fee, including franchise, fling recordation, license or permit fees or taxes and any fees, charges, or costs involved in any court or administrative proceedings in which it may be party. From 1971to 1978, in order to finance the electrification projects envisioned by PD 269, as amended, the Philippine Government, acting through the National Economic council and the NEA, entered into six loan agreements with the government of the United States of America, through the United States Agency for International Development

Governments? HELD: 1.

No. The guaranty of the equal protection clause is not violated by a law based on a reasonable classification. Classification, to be reasonable must (a) rest on substantial classifications; (b) germane to the purpose of the law; c) not limited to the existing conditions only; and (d) apply equally to all members of the same class. We hold that there is reasonable classification under the Local Government Code to justify the different tax treatment between electric cooperatives covered by PD 269 and electric cooperatives under RA 6938. First, substantial distinctions exist between cooperatives under PD 269 and those under RA 6938. In the former, the government is the one that funds those so-called electric cooperatives, while in the latter, the members make equitable contribution as source of funds. a. Capital Contributions by Members – Nowhere in PD 269 does it require cooperatives to make equitable contributions to capital. Petitioners themselves admit that to qualify as a member of an electric cooperative under PD 269, only the payment of a P5.00 membership fee is required which is even refundable the moment the member is no longer interested in getting electric service from the cooperative or will transfer to another place outside the area covered by the cooperative. However, under the Cooperative Code, the articles of cooperation of a cooperative applying for registration must be accompanied with the bonds of the accountable officers and a sworn statement of the treasurer elected by the subscribers showing that at least 25% of the authorized share capital has been subscribed and at least 25% of the total subscription has been paid and in no case shall the paidup share capital be less than P2,000.00. b. Extent of Government Control over Cooperatives – The extent of government control over electric cooperatives covered by PD 269 is largely a function of the role of the NEA as a primary source of funds of these electric cooperatives. Amendments were primarily geared to expand the powers of NEA over the electric cooperatives to ensure that loans granted to them would be repaid to the government. In contrast, cooperatives under RA 6938 are envisioned to be self-sufficient and independent organizations with minimal government intervention or regulation. Second, the classification of tax-exempt entities in the Local Government Code is germane to the purpose of the law. The Constitutional mandate that ―every local government unit shall enjoy local autonomy,‖ does not mean that the exercise of the

power by the local governments is beyond the regulation of Congress. Sec. 193 of the LGC is indicative of the legislative intent to vet broad taxing powers upon the local government units and to limit exemptions from local taxation to entities specifically provided therein. Finally, Sec. 193 and 234 of the LGC permit reasonable






















GR Nos. 133640, 133661 and 139147, 25 November 2005, RODOLFO S. BELTRAN vs. SECRETARY OF HEALTH FACTS: 



Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 was enacted into law on April 2, 1994. The Act seeks to provide an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and by regulating blood banks in the country. It was approved by then President Fidel V. Ramos on May 15, 1994 and was subsequently published in the Official Gazette on August 18, 1994. The law took effect on August 23, 1994. On April 28, 1995, Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, constituting the Implementing Rules and Regulations of said law was promulgated by respondent Secretary of the Department of Health (DOH).



Section 7 of R.A. 7719 provides, Phase-out of Commercial Blood Banks - All commercial blood banks shall be phased-out

over a period of two (2) years after the effectivity of this Act, extendable to a maximum period of two (2) years by the 

Secretary.‖ Section 23. Process of Phasing Out. -- The Department shall

effect the phasing-out of all commercial blood banks over a period of two (2) years, extendible for a maximum period of two (2) years after the effectivity of R.A. 7719. The decision to extend shall be based on the result of a careful study and review of the blood



in the exercise of the State‘s police power in order to promote and 

supply and demand and public safety.‖ 

Years prior to the passage of the National Blood Services Act of 1994, petitioners have already been operating commercial blood banks under Republic Act No. 1517, entitled ―An Act Regulating

the Collection, Processing and Sale of Human Blood, and the Establishment and Operation of Blood Banks and Blood Processing Laboratories.‖ 



The law, which was enacted on June 16, 1956, allowed the establishment and operation by licensed physicians of blood banks and blood processing laboratories. On May 20, 1998, prior to the expiration of the li censes granted to petitioners, they filed a petition for certiorari with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the constitutionality and validity of the aforementioned Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.

2. 3.

FACTS: 

Whether or not Section 7 of RA 7719 constitutes undue delegation of legislative powers Whether or not Section 7 of RA 7719 and its implementing rules violate the equal protection clause Whether or not RA 7719 is a valid exercise of police power 

HELD:

preserve public health and safety. Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of the National Blood Services Act of 1994 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality of the law. As to whether the Act constitutes a wise legislation, considering the issues being raised by petitioners, is for Congress to determine.

GR No. 158793, June 8, 2006 Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and Highways

ISSUES: 1.

discriminating against some and favoring others is prohibited but classification on a reasonable basis and not made arbitrarily or capriciously is permitted. The classification, however, to be reasonable: (a) must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (b) must be germane to the purpose of the law; (c) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and, (d) must apply equally to each m ember of the class. We deem the classification to be valid and reasonable for the following reasons: First, it was based on substantial distinctions. Second, the classification, and the consequent phase out of commercial blood banks is germane to the purpose of the law, that is, to provide the nation with an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and treating blood transfusion as a humanitarian or medical service rather than a commodity. Third, the Legislature intended for the general application of the law. Its enactment was not solely to address the peculiar circumstances of the situation nor was it intended to apply only to the existing conditions. Lastly, the law applies equally to all commercial blood banks without exception. The promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation of the State. The health of the people is a primordial governmental concern. Basically, the National Blood Services Act was enacted

On January 10, 2001, petitioners filed before the trial court a Petition for Declaratory Judgment with Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunction docketed as Civil Case No. 01034. The petition sought the declaration of nullity of the following administrative issuances for being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Act 2000, entitled "Limited Access Highway Act" enacted in 1957: a. DPWH Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1968; b. DPWH Department Order No. 74, Series of 1993; c. Art. II, Sec. 3(a) of the Revised Rules on Limited Access Facilities promulgated in 199[8] by the DPWH thru the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB). Previously, pursuant to its mandate under R.A. 2000, DPWH issued on June 25, 1998 Department Order (DO) No. 215 declaring the Manila-Cavite (Coastal Road) Toll Expressway as




























Cornejo, both the petitioners and respondents were required to file their respective Memoranda. Petitioners likewise filed [their] Supplemental Memorandum. Thereafter, the case was deemed submitted for decision. Consequently, on March 10, 2003, the trial court issued the assailed decision dismissing the petition but declaring invalid DO 123. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the dismissal of their petition; but it was denied by the trial court in its Order dated June 16, 2003. Hence, this petition.



ISSUES: 1. 2.

Whether DO 74, DO 215 and the TRB regulations contravene RA 2000 Whether AO 1 and DO 123 are unconstitutional

special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations. The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accusedappellant‘s status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.

HELD: 

The Supreme Court declared constitutional AO 1, issued by the then Department of Public Works and Communications on February 19, 1968, that bans the use of bicycles, tricycles, pedicabs, motorcycles, or any nonmotorized vehicle on limited access highways. The Court explained that since the tollway is not an ordinary road, the same ―necessitates the impos ition of

GR No. 179817, June 27, 2008 Trillanes vs Pimentel FACTS:

violation of ―The Limited Access Highway Act‖ (RA 2000)

At the wee hours of July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the resignation of the President and key national officials.

Department Orders 74 and 215 released by the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) as well as the Revised Rules and Regulations on Limited Access Facilities of the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB). Department Orders 74 and 215, dated April 5, 1993 and June 25, 1998, respectively, declared the North and South Luzon (DO 74), and the Manila-Cavite Toll Expressways (DO 215) as limited access facilities. The Court explained that at the time DPWH issued these orders, it no longer had authority to regulate activities related to transportation. In contrast, AO 1 was issued in 1968 by the then Department of Public Works and Communications when it had the authority to

Later in the day, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion.[1] A series of negotiations quelled the teeming tension and eventually resolved the impasse with the surrender of the militant soldiers that evening. In the aftermath of this eventful episode dubbed as the "Oakwood Incident," petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged, along with his comrades, with coup d'etat defined under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of



guidelines in the manner of its use and operation.‖ 



On the other hand, the Court declared unconstitutional and in

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







application for bail or imported from a trial court's judgment of conviction, justifies the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized by the court to be released on bail or on recognizance. Let it be stressed that that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence can not practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention. Petitioner pleads for the same liberal treatment accorded certain detention prisoners who have also been charged with nonbailable offenses, like former President Joseph Estrada and former Governor Nur Misuari who were allowed to attend "social functions." Finding no rhyme and reason in the denial of the more serious request to perform the duties of a Senator, petitioner harps on an alleged violation of the equal protection clause. In arguing against maintaining double standards in the treatment of detention prisoners, petitioner expressly admits that he intentionally did not seek preferential treatment in the form of being placed under Senate custody or house arrest, yet he at the same time, gripes about the granting of house arrest to others.\ Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation situation not only elevates elevates accused-appellant's status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.

G.R. No. 148571. September 24, 2002 USA vs PURGANAN FACTS: 

Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty ,# the United States Government, through diplomatic channels, sent to the Philippine Government Note Verbale No. 0522 dated June 16,



amount of P100,000. The Court directed the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash .# After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty via the challenged Order dated July 4, 2001.

ISSUE: Whether or not being an elected member of the House of

Representatives is compelling enough for the Court to grant his request for provisional release on bail. HELD: 







After being taken into custody, potential extraditees may apply for bail. Since the applicants have a history history of absconding, they have have the burden of showing that (a) there is no flight risk and no danger to the community; and (b) there exist special, humanitarian or compelling circumstances. circumstances. The grounds used by the highest court in the requesting state for the grant of bail therein may be considered, under the principle of reciprocity as a special circumstance. In extradition cases, bail bail is not a matter of right; it is subject to judicial discretion in the context of the peculiar facts of each case. In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of constitutional equal protection. The Constitution guarantees: ‗x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws. ‘ This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. imposed. The organs of government government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed. The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly [from] prison. The duties imposed imposed by the ‗mandate of the people ‘ are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate,
































Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices, while Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by considering them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. candidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006. The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code, leaving intact Section 66 thereof which imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials, thus: SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position . – Any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive officials. By the repeal of Section 67, an elective official who runs for office other than the one which he is holding is no longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing his certificate of candidacy. candidacy. Elective officials continue continue in public office even as they campaign for reelection or election for another elective position. position. On the other hand, Section Section 66 has been retained; thus, the limitation on appointive officials remains they are still considered ipso facto resigned from their offices upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy. The respondents petitions contending, preliminarily, that the petitioners have no legal standing to institute the present suit. Invoking the ―enrolled bill‖ doctrine. The signatures of the Senate President and the Speaker of the House, appearing on the bill and the certification signed by the respective Secretaries of both houses of Congress, constitute proof beyond cavil that the bill was duly enacted into law.











to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. electorate. They are elected to an office office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions.# conditions.# On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenur e# tenur e# while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority. Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take take part in any election except except to vote. Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities. By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, the legislators deemed it proper to treat these two classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on their tenure in the office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for any position other than those occupied occupied by them. Again, it is not within the power of the Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom of this cl assification. Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected officials vis-a-vis appointive officials, is anchored upon material and significant distinctions and all the persons belonging under the same classification are similarly treated, the equal protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed. In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched principles in constitutional law is that the courts do not involve themselves with nor delve into the policy or wisdom of a statute. That is the exclusive concern of the legislative branch of the government. When the validity of a statute is challenged on constitutional grounds, the sole function of the court is to





















- THE NON IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE -

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS constructed thereon,… The BUYER shall not erect… any sign or billboard on the roof…for advertising purposes… restrictions shall

run with the land and shall be construed as real covenants until December 31, 2025 when they shall cease and terminate…These

EMERGENCY POWERS 93 PHIL 68, 1953 RUTTER VS ESTEBAN *no case digest submitted*



ZONING AND REGULATORY ORDINANCES 154 SCRA 142, 1987 VILLANUEVA VS CASTANEDA *no case digest submitted*



G.R. No. 71169 December 22, 1988 SANGALANG VS IAC FACTS: 







Bel-Air Village is l ocated north of Buendia Avenue extension (now Sen. Gil J. Puyat Ave.) across a stretch of commercial block Bel-Air Village was owned and developed into a residential subdivision in the 1950s by Makati Development Corporation (hereinafter referred to as MDC), which in 1968 was merged with appellant Ayala The lots which were acquired by appellees Sangalang and spouse Gaston and spouse and Briones and spouse in 1960, 1957 and 1958, respectively, were all sold by MDC subject to certain conditions and easements contained in Deed Restrictions which formed a part of each deed of sale The owner of this lot/s or his successors in interest is required to be and is automatically a member of the Bel-Air Association and must abide by such rules and regulations laid down by the Association in the interest of the sanitation, security and the general welfare

and the other conditions were duly annotated on the certificate of title issued to Emilia. In 1981, the Metropolitan Manila Commission (now Metropolitan Manila Development Authority) enacted MMC Ordinance No. 8101, also known as the Comprehensive Zoning Area for the National Capital Region. The ordinance reclassified as a commercial area a portion of Ortigas Avenue from Madison to Roosevelt Streets of Greenhills Subdivision where the lot is located. On June 8, 1984, private respondent Ismael Mathay III leased the lot from Emilia Hermoso and J.P. Hermoso Realty Corp.. The lease contract did not specify the purposes of the lease. Thereupon, private respondent constructed a single story commercial building for Greenhills Autohaus, Inc., a car sales company.

ISSUES: 1.

2.

Whether or not the restrictions must prevail over the ordinance, specially since these restrictions were agreed upon before the passage of MMC Ordinance No. 81-01? Whether or not respondent Mathay III, as a mere lessee of the lot in question, is a total stranger to the deed of sale and is thus barred from questioning the conditions of said deed

HELD: 

The legal system upholds the sanctity of contract so that a contract is deemed law between the contracting parties ,# nonetheless, stipulations in a contract cannot contravene ―law,

morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. Non impairment of contracts or vested rights clauses will have to yield to the superior and legitimate exercise by the State of police power to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people .# Moreover,






















21. ISSUE:



The core issue is whether or not Circular No. 21 is valid and enforceable and the answer is definitely in the affirmative.

HELD: 



The salary check of a government officer or employee such as a teacher does not belong to him before it is physically delivered delivered to him. Until that time the check belongs to the Government. Accordingly, before there is actual delivery of the check, the payee has no power over it; he cannot assign it without the consent of the Government. On this basis Circular No. 21 stands on firm legal footing. Zafra's claim that the Circular impairs the obligation of contracts with the teachers is baseless. For the Circular does not prevent Zafra from collecting the loans. The Circular merely makes the Government a non-participant in their collection which is within its competence to do.

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ADMIN REG - RENTAL LAWS LAWS G.R. No. 77365 April 7, 1992 Caleon vs. Agus Development Corporation FACTS:

Respondent is the owner of a parcel of land which it leased to petitioner Rita Caleon for a monthly rental of P180.00. Petitioner constructed on the lot leased a 4-door apartment building. Without the consent of the private respondent, the petitioner sub-leased two of the four doors of the apartment for a monthly rental of P350.00 each. Upon learning of the sub-lease, private respondent through counsel demanded in writing that the petitioner vacate the leased premises. For failure of petitioner to comply with the demand, private respondent filed a complaint for ejectment against the petitioner citing as ground therefor the provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25, Section 5, which is



In any event, it is now beyond question that the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by and subject to the exercise of police power of the state in the interest of public health, safety, morals and general welfare. This power can be activated at anytime to change the provisions of the contract, or even abrogate it entirely, for the promotion or protection of the general welfare. Such an act will not militate against the impairment clause, which is subject to and limited by the paramount police power. Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 is derived from P.D. No. 20 which has been declared by this Court as a police power legislation, applicable to leases entered into prior to July 14, 1971 (effectivity date of RA 6539), so that the applicability thereof to existing contracts cannot be denied. Finally, petitioner invokes, among others, the promotion of social justice policy of the New Constitution. Like P.D. No. 20, the objective of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 is to remedy the plight of lessees, but such objective is not subject to exploitation by the lessees for whose benefit the law was enacted. Thus, the prohibition provided for in the law against the sublease of the premises without the consent of the owner. As enunciated by this Court, it must be remembered that social justice cannot be invoked to trample on the rights of property owners, who under our Constitution and laws are also entitled to protection. The social justice consecrated in our Constitution was not intended to take away rights from a person and give them to another who is not entitled thereto. The petition is denied for lack of merit.

ADMIN REG - TAX EXEMPTIONS EXEMPTIONS G.R. No. 131359 May 5, 1999 MERALCO vs. Province of Laguna and Benito Balazo FACTS:
























national or local authority on earnings, receipts, income and privilege of generation, distribution and sale of electric current.‖ 

The claim was denied; respondents relied on a more recent law, Republic Act No. 7160 than the old decree invoked by petitioner. Petitioner MERALCO filed a complaint for refund.

FACTS: 

ISSUE: WON Laguna Provincial ordinance is violative of the non-

impairment clause of the Constitution and of PD No. 551.

HELD: 

Local governments do not have the inherent power to tax except to the extent that such power might be delegated to them either by the basic law or by statute. Under the now prevailing Constitution, where there is neither a grant nor a prohibition by statute, the tax power must be deemed to exist although Congress may provide statutory statutory limitations and guidelines. The basic rationale for the current rule is to safeguard the viability and self-sufficiency of local government units by directly granting them general and broad tax powers. Nevertheless, the fundamental law did not intend the delegation to be absolute and unconditional; the constitutional objective obviously is to ensure that, while the local government units are being strengthened and made more autonomous, the legislature must still see to it that (a) the taxpayer will not be over-burdened or saddled with multiple



La Insular is a commercial partnership engaged in the manufacture of cigars and cigarettes in the city of Manila. On 1913, a contract was entered into between its general agent and the two defendants, Manuel Nubla Co-Siong and Rafael Machuca Go-Tauco, whereby the plaintiff became obliged to supply cigarettes daily to Manuel Nubla. The price was fixed at 172 per box. Manuel is the principal obligor while Rafael Machuca bound himself as surety, jointly and severally with Manuel Nubla. It appears that when the contract was executed cigarettes were subject to a specific tax of the peso for each thousand cigarettes. This tax was, under the law then prevailing, paid by the manufacturer, and the liability for said tax naturally fell upon the plaintiff. By Act No. 2432, enacted December 23, 1914, the Philippine Legislature increased the specific tax on cigarettes from P1 to P1.20 per thousand cigarettes, and by amendatory Act No. 2445, effective from January 1, 1915, it was declared that, as regards contracts already made for future delivery, the burden of the increased tax should, unless the parties should have otherwise agreed, be borne by the person to whom the article taxed should be furnished. After this provision become effective, the plaintiff continued, as before, to pay the internal-revenue taxes and in order to
























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impaired, in a constitutional sense, the obligation of the contract which is the basis of this action nor changed that obligation in such sense as to occasion the discharge of the surety. The surety is clearly bound by the application of the payments made by the creditor with the assent of the principal debtor, and no doubt that when Manuel Nubla from time to time paid the bills submitted by the plaintiff, and which, after January 1, 1915, showed an increased of P10 per case in the price of the cigarettes, he very well knew that this additional amount was due to the inclusion of the new tax paid by the plaintiff. The judgment appealed from is affirmed.

ADMIN REG - POLICE POWER GR L-63419, 18 December 1986 LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ FACTS: 

Lozano vs. Martinez (GR L-63419), Lobaton vs. Cruz (GR L66839-42), Datuin vs. Pano (GR 71654), Violago vs. Pano (GR 74524-25), Abad vs. Gerochi (GR 75122-49), Aguiliz vs. Presiding

having refused to agree thereto, said respondents — and three other tenants whose claims were dismissed by the Court of Agrarian Relations — instituted this proceedings, in said court, on November 16, 1960. The main defense set up by petitioners herein, as respondents in said court, is that the aforementioned Section 14 of Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, is unconstitutional, which was rejected by the lower court. Hence this appeal in which the Ilusorios maintain: (1) that said provision is unconstitutional; and (2) that the lower court had acted arbitrarily in fixing the rentals collectible by them from respondents herein at 20% of the average harvest for the agricultural years 1959-1960, 1960-1961, and 1961-1962. ISSUES: 1. 2.

Whether the prohibition against impairment of contracts is absolute. Whether R.A. 1199 is constitutional.

HELD: 1. NO. The prohibition contained in constitutional provisions against

impairing the obligation of contracts is not an absolute one. Such provisions are restricted to contracts with respect property, or some object of value, and confer rights which may be asserted in a court of justice, and have no application to statute relating to






















ISSUE: The petitioners' challenge to the constitutionality of P.D. No.

ISSUE: Whether Circular No. 21 impairs the obligation of contracts.

1808.

HELD: NO.

HELD:







Zafra's claim that the Circular impairs the obligation of contracts with the teachers is baseless. For the Circular does not prevent Zafra from collecting the loans. The Circular merely makes the Government a non-participant in their collection which is within its competence to do. The salary check of a government officer or employee such as a teacher does not belong to him before it is physically delivered to him. Until that time the check belongs to the Government. Accordingly, before there is actual delivery of the check, the payee has no power over it; he cannot assign it without the consent of the Government. On this basis Circular No. 21 stands on firm legal footing.

207 SCRA 748 CANLEON VS AGUS DEVELOPMENT CORP. *no case digest submitted* GR No. 109405, September 11, 1998 BLAQUERA VS ALCALA *no case digest submitted*



The stated objective of the decree, namely, to resolve the land tenure problem in the Agno-Leveriza area to allow the implementation of the comprehensive development plans for this depressed community, provides the justification for the exercise of the police power of the State. The police power of the State has been described as "the most essential, insistent and illimitable of powers.1 It is a power inherent in the State, plenary, "suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that man in organizing the state and imposing upon the government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable individual citizens or group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measure to ensure communal peace, safety, good order and welfare. The objection raised by petitioners that P.D. No. 1808 impairs the obligations of contract is without merit. The constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by and subject to the exercise of the police power of the State in the interest of public health, safety, morals and general welfare. For the same reason, petitioners can not complain that they are being deprived of their property without due process of law.

CONSTI Case Digests[1]

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