Mansueto Lamberto raped his niece, Clarissa Arnino, 13 yrs old, with the help of Romulo Solomon. After the consummation of rape, they brought her to a nearby creek and Lamberte ordered her to wash her vagina which she did. Then Lamberte told her to go home but not to tell her father about the incident, otherwise, he would kill her.
Whether or not the crime of rape committed by Lamberte falls under the alternative circumstance by the circumstance of closely-knit family relations. : The alleged “closely“closely -knit family ties” is inaccurate because the relationship between Clarrisa and Lamberte is actually five degrees removed. Besides, while it is true that the alternative circumstance of relationship is always aggravating circumstance of relationship is always aggravating in crimes against chastity, regardless of whether the offender is a relative of a higher or lower degree of the offended party, it is only taken into consideration “when the offended party is the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural or adopted brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the same degree of the offender”. The relationship of uncle and niece is not covered by any of the relationship mentioned.
That during the period from May 1, 1995 to July 1995, in Masantol, Pampanga, and within the Jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused ABUNDIO TOLENTINO, step father of nine (9) year old Rachelle Parco, the former being the common-law spouse of the latter's mother, Teresa David, by taking advantage of his moral ascendancy over Rachel Parco, then eight (8) years old, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously thru force and intimidation, had carnal knowledge of the said minor Rachel Parco, against her will and consent. On May 1, 1995, at past noon, Rachelle Parco, 8 years old, was inside one of the two bedrooms at the second floor of the house of her grandmother, which was located at San Nicolas, Masantol, Pampanga (TSN, January 22, 1997). Rachelle was arranging the clothes while in the room (Ibid, p. 7). Suddenly, Abundio Tolentino, the stepfather of Rachelle Parco, entered the same room and closed the door. Abundio Tolentino ordered Rachelle Parco to stand up and lie down on the bed. When Rachelle Parco was already on the bed, Abundio Tolentino removed his short pants and of Rachelle Parco Abundio Tolentino placed his sex organ on Rachelle Parco's genitals and bumped (binubundol (binubundol -bundol ) hers with his. At that moment, Rachelle Parco remained silent, because she was afraid and did not know what Abundio Tolentino was doing to her. Abundio Tolentino's carnal act lasted only for three minutes, because Rachelle Parco's brother knocked at the door and ask money from Abundio (Ibid, p. 9). Abundio Tolentino told Rachelle's brother to ask money from Lola Iding (ibid). Thereafter, Abundio Tolentino put on his short pants and hers and went down the house (Ibid).
Abundio Tolentino repeatedly did the same thing to Rachelle Parco at least three to four times a week in May, June, and July 1995. Rachelle Parco was overc[o]me by fear that she did not tell anyone about what Abundio Tolentino was doing to her.
rape was committed, has already served as a special qualifying circumstance in this case.
vs. Whether or not alternative circumstance of relationship between the victim and the accused can be considered in the case.
NO. The information specifically alleges that RACHELLE was eight years old when the crime was committed and TOLENTINO was "the stepfather... being the common-law spouse of [RACHELLE's] mother, Teresa David." That allegation is inaccurate. TOLENTINO was not RACHELLE's step-father, for that relationship presupposes a legitimate relationship, i.e ., ., he should have been legally married to Teresa David. A step-father is the husband of one's mother by virtue of a marriage subsequent to that of which the person spoken of is the offspring; offspring;[12] or, a stepdaughter is a daughter of one's spouse by a previous marriage or the daughter of one of the spouses by a former a marriage. marriage.[13] Nevertheless, since the information specifically alleges that TOLENTINO was the common-law-spouse of RACHELLE's mother and that RACHELLE was under eighteen years of age, we shall appreciate these special qualifying circumstances. The alternative circumstance of relationship can be considered only "when the offended party is the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural or adopted brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the same degree of the offender. offender.[15] RACHELLE does not fit in any of the enumeration. At any rate, the circumstance that TOLENTINO was the common-law spouse of RACHELLE's mother, together with the fact that RACHELLE was eight years old when the
Accused-appellant Godofredo Sayat, alias "Bobby" or Buboy," was charged with five crimes of rape in five separate criminal complaints subscribed by eight-year old Marites Sayat and separately docketed. Said complaints were identically formulated, to wit: That on or about (no date given in the website) in the Municipality of Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, by means of threat, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned complainant, Marites, a minor of eight years old, (sic) against her will and consent. The prosecutions version of incident was based principally to the testimony of the offended party Marites Sayat. She was 8 years old then when she was raped by her brother ("kapatid sa ama") 18 years her senior.
Whether or not the alternative circumstance of relationship can be considered as an aggravating circumstance in the case at bar eventhough the certificate of live birth of Marites Sayat, marked as Exhibit "F" was not formally offered in evidence.
The identification of documentary evidence is different from its formal offer. The first is done in the course of the trial and is accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an exhibit; the second is made when the party rests his case. The mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as exhibit does not mean that it will be or has been offered as part of the evidence of the party. The party may decide to formally offer it if he believes this will advance his cause, but then, again, he may decide not to do so at all. Alternative circumstance of relationship between him and the victim can not be proved by said document which was not submitted in court. Unfortunately for said appellant, however, the victim unequivocally testified that he is actually her half-brother ('kapatid sa ama',) and said declaration was never successfully refuted. Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that they reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in evidence of the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. The word "pedigree" includes relationship, family geneology, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. Declarations as to pedigree may not ordinarily be proved by hearsay evidence or by affidavit; but except for evidence of reputation which usually is limited to members of the family, any competent witness, including the person whom the declaration relates, may testify thereto. It has been held proper for one to testify to facts of family history which relate to him, such as the identity of his parents or other relatives or the place of his birth or his age. Parenthetically, it will be observed that Marites and appellant bear the same family name "Sayat." The judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED.
vs.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, convicting the appellant of rape. The complaint filed by the offended party is as follows: (in espanol
☺….)
The court below sentenced the defendant-appellant to seventeen years, four months and one day of reclusion temporal. The attorney de oficio submits submits five assignments of error all of which relate to issues of fact. We have carefully examined the entire record and concur with the court below that the guilt of the appellant has been established beyond any reasonable doubt. The crime of rape is penalized by article 335 of the Revised Penal Code with reclusion temporal. In the present instance, the aggravating circumstance of relationship (article 15 of the Revised Penal Code) must be taken into consideration. The crime in this case was so monstrous that no punishment which it is in the power of this or any other human tribunal to decree, could possibly be a sufficient expiation of the offense. we assess the penalty at twenty years of reclusion temporal , and, as thus modified, affirm the judgment of the court below.
The decision of the court stated therein that the accused was found guilty of the crime of rape beyond reasonable doubt and was imposed for the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and condemns him to pay to Maribel Soriano the amount of P30,000.00 as and by way of moral and exemplary damages and to pay the costs of suit Maribel Soriano, herein herein complainant, a 13 year girl, the daughter of Angelita Angelita De Guzman and Alfredo Soriano. The four-year relationship of her father and mother was turning sour and was growing worse everyday. Since the tender age of 2 years, she has been staying with her paternal grandmother, Juanita Soriano which the latter and her mother are not always in good terms. Sometime on the year 1982, her father died. Angelita de Guzman cohabited with appellant Enrique Ramirez, a casual laborer and a member of the notorious Sigue-Sigue Commando Gang. At that time, appellant Ramirez was already separated from his lawful wife, Cristine Somera, by whom he had a child. Since 1979, appellant Ramirez and Angelita de Guzman stayed and lived in a one-room shanty, a place one can hardly call a house. During the holiday season on the year 1988, when Maribel was at the house of the accused, she was raped by the said accused and also on one other occasion, she was raped again. Whether or not alternative circumstance is present present in the case at bar. The court appreciated the presence of alternative or aggravating circumstance of relationship in this case, as "the relationship of stepfather or stepmother and
stepson or stepdaughter is included by analogy as similar to that of ascendant and descendant." Thus, the award of exemplary damages is likewise proper. The appeal is DISMISSED and the Decision of the trial court finding appellant Enrique Ramirez y Antonio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed against his own stepdaughter Maribel Soriano and imposing on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the modification that he shall indemnify the victim in the amount of eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) broken down as follows: fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) by way of indemnity; plus thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as moral and exemplary damages.
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for murder. The defendant, who, before arraignment, expressed through his counsel willingness to plead guilty to simple homicide if the provincial fiscal would amend the information accordingly, seeks absolute acquittal on appeal, claiming that he acted in defense of his sister's honor. George F. Ott, a private in the United States Army, with two other American soldiers, took Consolacion Noble, a widow, 50 years old; Corazon Apacible, Consolacion's daughter, single, 32 years old; and Paz Fores, a doctor of medicine, single, 25 years of age, to see a cinema showing in an Army camp in Batangas early in the evening of October 22, 1945. After the show, the three ladies invited the three Americans to come into the house. There, the two companions of George F. Ott seated themselves in a sofa in the drawing room, while Ott fetched from his jeep a phonograph which he placed on a table in the ante-room and while the ladies are preparing the foods and drinks. As Ott was fixing the phonograph with one of the ladies standing near him. Isabelo
Noble, brother of Consolacion Noble, came up the stairs and shot the American several times with a .45 caliber pistol. From the effects of his wounds Ott died shortly after. The appellant says that the lady was his sister, Consolacion Noble who was with the deceased in the ante-room. He states that after making four or five steps from the top of the stairs he saw Ott holding Consolacion's hands and trying by force to embrace and kiss her; that he drew his revolver and fired a shot that missed its mark; that, as the American started to pick a chair, perhaps to hurl at him, he fired various other shots; that all he knew afterwards was that Ott had fallen down and he threw away his gun. But there is a deeper reason why he shot in cold blood the deceased in the way he killed him. Jealousy and disappointment drove the defendant to his rash act, Paz Fores testimony that she was engaged to Ott and the defendant is in love with her and that the accused had courted her but she was not interested. (in short ((: ). Not only also that the deceased was his rival suitor but he was also the one who introduced the deceased to her. The defendant alleges that on that faithful night, he felt distressed because he failed to meet the girl he loved. He went to his clinic and after treating a patient he took and drink a glass of wine until he got drunk. As he was about to go home he saw the house of her sister was still lit and he went there and he saw his old uncle who has a heart ailment and he gave his uncle an injection for the his heart, after that he got arrested by one Consorcio Noche, the policeman. Consorcio Noche, the policeman, testifies that when Isabelo Noble and he "were about to reach the Municipal Building," the accused told him "that he will sit down and then he vomited"; and that "he smelled wine. Whether or not the alternative circumstance of intoxication in this case can be considered as mitigating or aggravating.
The presence of three mitigating circumstances is urged: one among others is intoxication. This mitigating circumstance must be proved to the satisfaction of the court to be available as a means to lighten the penalty. The trial court has found the evidence insufficient to "conclusively show that the accused was drunk on the night of the incident. The amount of liquor the accused had taken, if he had taken any, was not of sufficient quantity to affect his mental faculties to the extent of entitling him to a mitigation of his offense. His Honor correctly reasons that "if the accused was thoughtful enough not to neglect giving his uncle his injection, the inference would be that his intoxication was not to such a degree as to affect his mental capacity to fully understand the consequences of his act." We find, in conclusion, that the judgment of conviction appealed from, sentencing the defendant to reclusion perpetua with the accesories of law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P2,000, and to pay the costs, is in accordance with law and the evidence, and that it should be, and the same is hereby, affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
Between 11 and 12 o’clock on the night of November 15, 1902, Appellant and the deceased Charles Marsh had an heated argument in the distillery. they they were ordered by Samuel Brown, an American American who was in the vicinity ordered the two to stopped their argument. The deceased was about to go out but the appellant refused to go out and continued insulting the deceased. The latter went back and gave appellant a blow that knocked him down but he immediately stood up and run towards the ice plant and took a revolver, while the deceased was about 15 feet away and heard the appellant uttering
some words, he turned around to look at him and just at this moment appellant fired his revolver which hit the deceased below the nipple which was considered fatal and Samuel Brown(deceased) died less than two hours later. He also fired his revolver to the two other Americans in the distillery but no one were shot. Notwithstanding the denial and exculpatory allegations of the accused, his guilt as principal by direct participation of the violent death of Charles Marsh is unquestionable, for this fact is proven in the record by the testimony of several witnesses who saw that occurred, and even heard the threatening words uttered by the accused. The record does not contain sufficient evidence to indicate that the accused was a habitual drunkard. On the contrary, several witnesses affirmed that he was not in the habit of getting drunk. Whether or not the alternative circumstance of intoxication in this case can be considered.
The court considered in his behalf the mitigating circumstance No. 6 of article 9 of the Code, there being no evidence that the vice of drunkenness was habitual with the accused. The law does not consider drunkenness as a complete defense, but merely as a mi tigating circumstance, because one under the influence of liquor cannot be regarded as entirely bereft of sense and reason.
This is an appeal from the judgment entered in the Court of First Instance of Bataan, convicting the defendants and appellants Manuel Flores, Irineo de la Cruz, Domingo de los Santos, Doroteo de los Santos, and Lorenzo Orozco of the crime of assassination marked with various aggravating circumstances, and sentencing each and all of them to found guilty as an accessory and sentenced to cedena temporal in its medium degree. The principal witness for the prosecution was one Pedro Flores, a selfconfessed accomplice, He testified that the murder was planned by the appellant Lorenzo Orozco, with whose wife the deceased had been having an illicit relation with, and that he himself as well as the other appellants had joined the party which committed the crime at the invitation the appellant, who gave small sums of money as a sign of saying that he was thankful of their participation (gratificacion). The account of the incident that took place and the participation and how they buried the deceased and its manner on how they did it was fully corroborated by the law and medical officers who found the body of the deceased buried at the place and in the manner indicated by him in his extrajudicial confession. A review of all the records of this case shows that all the defendants are men of a low order of intelligence, with but little "instruction or education." Whether or not the defendants who are men of a low order of intelligence, with but little "instruction or education" can be considered as an alternative circumstance. The court held that in imposing the penalty upon the four defendants and appellants convicted as principals in the commission of the crime these aggravating circumstances should have been compensated by the extenuating circumstances set forth in subsection 7 of article 9 of the Penal Code and in article 11 as amended by Act No. 2142. A review of the whole record convinces us that all these defendants are men of a low order of intelligence, with but little "instruction or education." It also affirmatively appears that the investigator of the crime had been aroused to a high degree of passion and "obfuscation" by the discovery of the fact that the deceased was carrying on
illicit relations with his wife and had recently come into the community for the express purpose of continuing those illicit relations; while his accomplices, who appear to have been ignorant friends, neighbors and defendents, were also aroused by him to a high pitch of anger against the betrayer of the family of their friend. The sentence imposed by the trial judge, modified by substituting for so much thereof as imposes the death penalty upon the defendants and appellants Lorenzo Orozco, Ireneo de la Cruz, Manuel Flores and Doroteo de los Santos, the penalty of cadena perpetua , together with the subsidiary penalties of this instances against the appellants.
On June 11, 1966, about 9:00 o'clock in the evening, testified Danilo Nicolas, a 14-year old boy, while at the corner of Lope de Vega and Misericordia Streets, Manila, scavenging ingarbage cans for scraps of paper to sell, he saw a Chinaman, Chan Siak, walking. He was met by 4 men, who were the accused, and another not in Court. The 4th man was Celso Puzon who is charged with the same offense before the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court, he being only 15 years of age. Casillar and Puzon held the Chinaman's hands while Armalda and Amita pointed a "balisong" at him; the former being then to the right of their victim and the latter in front of him. Armalda thereafter stabbed the Chinese in his right side whilst Amita stabbed him in his neck, after which Armalda took Chan's wallet from the hip pocket of his trousers. This done, the four fled. whether or not the alternative circumstance of lack of instruction can be considered in the case.
It is urged that the accused-appellants should be credited with the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction. Amita is a laborer who reached Grade V; Casillar is a puto vendor, vendor, whose schooling reached Grade III; and Armalda, a push-cart hand (nangangariton), is illiterate. It is for the trial court, rather than the appellate court, to find and consider the circumstance of lack of instruction, for it is not illiteracy alone but the lack of sufficient intelligence and knowledge of the full significance of one's acts that constitute this mitigating circumstance and only the trial court can properly assess the same. FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the judgment under review is hereby affirmed, with the sole modification that the amount of the indemnity shall be, as it is hereby increased to, P12,000.00 Costs against appellants.
On the day of the crime the defendant Francisco Balaba was living in the house of his brother Agapito Balaba, The defendant took care of fighting cocks. On February 20, 1916, he fell out with his sister-in-law, the deceased Fortunata Cabasagan, wife of Agapito Balaba, because she had tethered the defendant's cocks, which were injuring the corn plantings. On the 29th of the same month, in the morning, while the defendant was feeding this cocks, he saw one rooster which it was not his, catched and ate it. This rooster belonged to the deceased Claudia Ligao. In the morning of that same day, the 29th, Donato Duero, second husband of Claudia Ligao, ask the latter to look for the cock that had disappeared and made inquiry about it to the defendant, whom he suspected of having stolen it. In reply to the inquiry, defendant admitted in killing it and will exchange it to one of his cocks. Duero chose one but the defendant would not give it to him for it was not his. Then Duero, backed up
by Sergio Daguplo, obliged the defendant to follow him for the consideration of just paying the cock that was eaten but it appears that the defendant was hesitant in neither to make payment nor exchange for the cock butchered by him. To make the st ory short, he killed three persons.
Whether or not the alternative circumstance of ignorance and lack of education of the accused can be considered in the case for the court stated that the accused is an uneducated and even a densely ignorant man.
Doubtless the convict is an uneducated and even a densely ignorant man. But having in mind the conditions under which he did his three victims to death, we are of opinion that his criminal responsibility for these heinous crimes is not modified in any substantial degree by his ignorance and lack of education. Neither education nor a high degree of intelligence is necessary to teach a man that it is unlawful and criminal in the highest degree to do murder under the circumstances which surrounded the commission of the crime of which this accused stands convicted. In giving way to his vindictive rage aroused by demands for redress for the petty wrong he had done his neighbor and by criticism of his conduct in that connection, he must have known that he subjected himself to the severest penalties of the law, and his ignorance and lack of education offer no justification or excuse for the merciless and murderous assault upon the lives of his r elatives and neighbors. The judgment convicting and sentencing the accused should be affirmed with costs of this instance against him. So ordered.
On February 16, 1958, in the municipality of Muntinglupa, province of Rizal, two known warring gangs inside the New Bilibid Prison as “Sigue -Sigue” and “OXO” were preparing to att end a mass at 7 a.m. However, a fight between the two rival gangs caused a big commotion in the plaza where the prisoners were currently assembled. The fight was quelled and those involved where led away to the investigation while the rest of the prisoners were ordered to return to their respective quarters. In the investigation, it was found out that the accused, “OXO” members, Amadeo Peralta, Andres Factora, Leonardo Dosal, Angel Paramog, Gervasio Larita and Florencio Luna (six among the twenty-two defendants charged therein with multiple murder), are also convicts confined in the said prisons by virtue of final judgments. They conspired, confederated confederated and mutually helped and aided each other, with evident premeditation and treachery, all armed with deadly weapons, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously killed “Sigue -Sigue” sympathizers Jose Carriego, Eugenio Barbosa and Santos Cruz, also convicts confined in the same institution, by hitting, stabbing, and striking them with ice picks, clubs and other improvised weapons, pointed and/or sharpened, thereby inflicting upon the victims multiple serious injuries which directly caused their deaths. (a) Whether of not conspiracy attended the commission of the multiple murder?
(b) Whether or not an aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism is present in the commission of the crime? The trial court correctly ruled that conspiracy attended the commission of the murders. To wit, although there is no direct evidence of conspiracy, the court can safely say that there are several circumstances to show that the crime committed by the accused was planned. First, all the deceased were Tagalogs and members of sympathizers of “Sigue -Sigue” gang (OXO members were from either Visayas or Mindanao), singled out and killed thereby, showing that their killing has been planned. Second, the accused were all armed with improvised weapons showing that they really prepared for the occasion. Third, the accused accomplished the killing with team work precision going from one brigade to another and attacking the same men whom they have previously marked for liquidation and lastly, almost the same people took part in the killing of the Carriego, Barbosa and Cruz. In view of the attendance of the special aggravating circumstances of quasirecidivism, as all of the six accused at the time of the commission of the offenses were serving sentences in the New Bilibid Prison by virtue of convictions by final judgments that penalty for each offense must be imposed in its maximum period, which is the mandate of the first paragraph of article 160 of the RPC. Hence, severe penalty imposed on a quasi-recidivist is justified because of the perversity and incorrigibility of the crime. Accordingly, the judgment a quo is hereby modified as follows: Amadeo Peralta, Andres Factora, Leonardo Dosal, Angel Paramog, Gervasio Larita and Florencio Luna are each pronounced guilty of three separate and distinct crimes of murder, and are each sentenced to three death penalties; all of them shall, jointly and severally, indemnify the heirs of each of the three deceased victims in the sum of P12,000; each will pay one-sixth of the costs.
Luciano Pablo and his co-defendants Demetrio Mostoles, Rufino Lazaro, Pedro Velasco, Benjamin Valdez, Mariano Velasco and Leandro Pablo, were charged
with triple murder for the death of Pablo Saure, Perfecto Marilao and Miguel Marcos, in two separate informations filed in criminal cases Nos. 594 and 608, of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, which by leave of the court, were consolidated in one case. With the exception of Luciano Pablo, Demetrio Mostoles and Rufino Lazaro who pleaded not guilty, the other four accused pleaded guilty and were sentenced accordingly. After a proper trial, Rufino Lazaro was acquitted, while Luciano Pablo and Demetrio Mostoles were each sentenced to reclusion perpetua for the death of each of the three victims, and pursuant to article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, the maximum period of the duration of the three penalties of reclusion perpetua impose upon each culprit shall in no case exceed forty years, with the accessory penalties of the law, to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased Pablo Saure, Perfecto Marilao and Miguel Marcos in the amount of P2,000 for each victim, and to pay one-third (1/3) of the costs. At about 10 o'clock in the morning of August 8, 1948, Pedro Velasco and his wife, Mariano Velasco and Benjamin Valdez and his wife, residents of the barrio of Bantug Petines, municipality of Angadanan, Province of Isabela, came to the house to the house of Rufino Lazaro in the barrio of San Manuel, municipality of San Mateo of said province, for the purpose of borrowing some corn grain for their consumption. Having accomplished their purpose, they did not return, however, to their homes until about 3 o'clock in the afternoon. In the meantime, Luciano Pablo, with Demetrio Mostoles and Emiliano Teñoso in the house of Rufino Lazaro, and although the house of appellant Luciano Pablo was about only one kilometer away from that of Rufino Lazaro, he decided to stay and wait for his companions, because he unintended to load the things that he had bought on their bullcarts. But when they ready to depart, the rain prevented them from doing so and they transferred to a near by store of the daughter in law of Rufino Lazaro and while they drunk some wine. Pablo Saure, Perfecto Marilao, and Miguel Marcos, residence of the barrio of Bantug Petines arrived in the mean time and sought shelter in the store, and at the suggestion of Pedro Velasco, the new arrivals, who were barrio mates of Demetrio Mostoles, agreed that they would all go home together after taking their supper at the house of Rufino Lazaro. After staying for about an hour in the store, Rufino Lazaro, Luciano Pablo, Pedro Velasco and Demetrio Mostoles went to the house of Leandro Pablo,
only about ten meters away, and upon reaching the same, Demetrio Mostoles who was a barrio Lieutenant of Bantug Patines, told his companions that the new arrivals Saure, Marilao and Marcos, were bandits who gave much trouble in his barrio. On his part appellant likewise confided to his companions that he had suspected that those three persons were responsible for the disappearance of his carabao, and so urged to his companions that they be put to death. The proposal of Luciano Pablo having been accepted by his confederates, they discussed the plan to liquidate Saure, Marilao and Marcos. At about 7:30 o'clock in the evening, while the group including the intended victims where partaking supper in the house of Rufino Lazaro, suddenly and expectedly three unknown persons appeared at the door of the kitchen and ordered the inmates not to male any move. Immediately, Pedro Velasco stood up and ordered his companion to bind the hands of Pablo Saure, Perfecto Marilao and Miguel Marcos. It is shown in the record that this appellant helped Pedro Velasco in tying the hands of Pablo Saure behind his back. When the hands of the three persons were thus bound behind their backs, they were herded and ordered to go down the house. Rufino Lazaro, sensing the impending tragedy and unwilling to be implicated in his house; and addressing Pedro Velasco, his brother-in-law, told him: "Please do not do that because there are authorities before whom you could bring these people, if they really commit any fault;" but Pedro Velasco was adamant in his purpose to carry out their plan and said: "Whoever does not recognize my authority will be implicated herein," and told Rufino, "You better come along to indicate the place where we could kill them." Thus, Rufino Lazaro led them to an abandoned well about seven meters away from his house. The three victims, who were hog-tied, were lined up near the well, and Demetrio Mostoles, after flouting Perfecto Marilao, cut his right ear and then slashed him to death. A similar fate met the other two victims, Saure and Marcos, and finally, Mostoles gave bolo blows to all the mortally wounded victims. Upon his suggestion, the life less bodies were thrown and dumped into the abandoned well and covered up with dirt and pieces of wood.
Whether or not the appelant is equally liable as a principal in the three murders
Luciano Pablo had participated in tying Pablo Saure and Marcos Miguel, and therefore, it is quite incredible that he would intercede and implore mercy for the victims when he himself had participated in rendering them defenseless by tying up their hands. But assuming for the sake of argument that he did not participate in tying the victims, the fact that he voluntarily joined Pedro Velasco, Demetrio Mostoles, Mariano Velasco, Leandro Pablo and Benjamin Valdez in bringing the victims to the spot where they were murdered, sho ws that he conspired with them to kill the victims. What is more, his participation in the commission of the crime is not without any motive, because he suspected Jose Saure, the brother of Pablo Saure, as the author of the disappearance of his (Luciano's) carabao. The circumstance of treachery qualified the killing of the three victims. Evident premeditation has also attended the commission of the crimes as an aggravating circumstance. The appellant and his confederates confederates deliberately planned the commission of the offenses of about 4 o'clock in the afternoon and commenced the execution thereof at about 7:30 in the evening, or after lapse of about three and a half hours. They had sufficient time to dispassionately reflect upon the consequences of their act, or to deposit from its execution. The three murders under consideration were committed on August 8, 1948, after the enactment of Republic Act No. 296, the Judiciary Act of 1948, which went into effect on June 17, 1948. In view of the lack of the necessary number of affirmative votes required by the provision of the last paragraph of section 9 of said Act for the imposition of the death penalty, and inasmuch as the coaccused of this appellant have been sentenced to, and are now serving three penalties of reclusion perpetua, in line with the ruling laid down by this Court in People vs. Sakam (61 Phil., 27), subject to the provisions of article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, this appellant is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua, with its accessories, for each of the t hree murders committed by him. The judgment appealed from is, therefore, affirmed. Appellant shall pay the cost
Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo finding the defendants. Rufino Gensola, Fidelina Tan and Felicisimo Tan, guilty as principals of the crime of murder and sentencing each of them to reclusion perpetua and ordering said defendants to pay in solidum the sum of P6,000 as indemnity to the heirs of the deceased Miguel Miguel Gayanilo. Rufino Gensola was the driver, while F idelina Tan and Felicisimo Tan were the conductors, of a passenger truck, Gelveson No. 17 (belonging to Jose Tan, father of Fidelina and Felicisimo) with station at Guimbal, Iloilo. They suspected Miguel Gayanilo of having punctured the tires of the truck while it was parked in front of his carinderia on Gerona St., Guimbal, on November 18, 1958. In the afternoon of November 19, on the return trip of the truck, then driven by a temporary driver, Restituto Gersaneva, from Iloilo City, Enrique Gelario and Enrique Gela were among the passengers of the truck. Before the truck entered the poblacion of Guimbal, it parked on Gonzales St. to discharge a passenger and his baggage. Enrique Gelario and Enrique Gela overheard Fidelina Tan mutter to herself, obviously referring to someone she did not name: "He does not appear because I will kill him." ("No aparece porque le voy amatar.") The truck then continued on its way and parked in front of Teodora Gellicanao's carinderia on Gerona St. in the poblacion. All the passengers got off the truck. Enrique Gelario and Enrique Gela crossed the street towards the carinderia of Pedro Genciana to await another passenger truck for their respective barrios. The Gelveson No. 17 then left in the direction of the nearby carinderia of Violeta Garin, returned a short time later, and parked in front of the bodega of its owner, Jose Tan. The time was about 6:30 p.m. Miguel Gayanilo was crossing the street from the public market in the direction of his carinderia with Rufino Gensola, holding in his right hand a stone as big as a man's fist, following closely behind. At this time, Felicisimo and Fidelina Tan were standing in the middle of the street. After Miguel Gayanilo had crossed the middle of the street near the two, Fidelina Tan shouted, "Rufino,
strike him." Upon hearing the shout Miguel looked back and Rufino suddenly struck him on the left face with the stone. Felicisimo then struck Miguel with a piece of iron on the back of the head causing serious wounds and fracture of the skull. Not content with the two blows already given, Fidelina struck Miguel with another piece of iron on the left forehead causing serious wounds and fracture of the skull. Miguel fell to the ground near the canal along the side of the street. Rufino Gensola immediately left for his house situated on Gonzales St. Felicisimo and Fidelina observed the prostrate body for a few seconds until Fidelina muttered: "He is already dead." ("Ya esta muerto.") The two then left the scene of the crime.
Whether or not the defendants are are equally liable as principals of the crime of murder
The admission of Rufino Gensola that he alone was responsible for the serious wounds and fractures of the skull inflicted upon Miguel Gayanilo in legitimate defense of Fidelina Tan and of himself, has no probative value because it constitutes, in the face of contrary credible evidence for the prosecution, an assumption by Rufino Gensola of the criminal liability of Felicisimo Tan and Fidelina Tan. The penal law does not allow anyone to assume the criminal liability of another. (1) Fidelina Tan's intention revealed by the words she muttered to herself, "He does not appear because I will kill him," was not shared by Felicisimo Tan, who kept silent. Silence is not a circumstance indicating participation in the same criminal design. With respect to Rufino Gensola, he was not even in the truck at the time. (2) When Miguel Gayanilo was crossing Gerona St., it was only Rufino Gensola who followed closely behind. Fidelina Tan and Felicisimo Tan were in the middle of the street. The words shouted by Fidelina Tan, "Rufino strike him," were meant as a command and did not show previous concert of criminal design. (3) The blows given with pieces of iron on the back of the head and on the left forehead by Felicisimo and Fidelina after Rufino had struck with a piece of stone the left face of Miguel, do not in and by themselves show previous concert of criminal design. Particularly when it is considered that Rufino
immediately left thereafter while Felicisimo and Fidelina remained for a few seconds observing the prostrate body of Miguel until Fidelina muttered, "He is already dead." In the absence of conspiracy, the liability of the three appellants is individual, that is, each appellant is liable only for his own act. Appellant Rufino Gensola is liable only for the lacerated wounds inflicted by him on the left face of Miguel Gayanilo. Such lacerated wounds caused disfigurement ("deformity") of the face within the meaning of Article 263 (3) of the Revised Penal Code punishable by prision correccional in its minimum and medium period in relation to the Indeterminate Sentence Sentence Law. The offense having been committed with treachery, the penalty should be imposed in its maximum period. Is appellant Fidelina Tan also liable for the offense considering that she gave the command "Rufino, strike him"? With respect to command, it must be the moving cause of the offense. In the case at bar, the command shouted by Fidelina, "Rufino, strike not," was not the moving cause of the act of Rufino Gensola. The evidence shows that Rufino would have committed the act of his own volition even without said words of command. Are the appellants Felicisimo Tan and Fidelina Tan both liable for the death of Miguel Gayanilo? Yes. The trauma inflicted by Felicisimo and the trauma inflicted by Fidelina, combined, produced death due to traumatic shock. When Fidelina struck with a piece of iron the left forehead of Miguel, he was not yet dead. It was only after the trauma inflicted by Fidelina that the dying Miguel fell to the ground and died seconds later. Although a dead person cannot be killed again, a dying person can still be killed. The trauma inflicted by her hastened the death of Miguel from traumatic shock made doubly severe. She must, therefore, be also held criminally liable for the death of the victim. Was the killing murder? Yes. It was attended with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia. There was alevosia because after Rufino suddenly struck Miguel Gayanilo with a stone, Miguel, defenseless, was struck by Felicisimo Tan with a piece of iron on the back of the head and by Fidelina Tan with a piece of iron on the left forehead. PREMISES CONSIDERED, that part of the appealed judgment sentencing each of the appellants Felicisimo Tan and Fidelina Tan to reclusion perpetua is affirmed. Said appellants are also ordered to pay in solidum the sum of
P12,000 as indemnity to the heirs of the deceased, Miguel Gayanilo. That part of the judgment against appellant Rufino Gensola is modified by sentencing said appellant to an indeterminate penalty of from 3 months of arresto mayor as minimum to 3 years of prision correccional as maximum.
Arraigned and duly tried for the crime of parricide, and having been sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Tayabas in a judgment dated August 14, 1913, to the penalty of life imprisonment and the accessories of the law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs, Jose Guevara appealed from said judgment. About noon of Palm Sunday, March 16 of the present year 1913, in the house of Miguela Soldevilla, mother of Ignacia Salvacion, situated in the barrio of Banuyo of the town of Gasan in this Province of Tayabas, wherein dwelt the defendant Jose Guevarra and his wife, the said Ignacia Salvacion, and while the latter was starching clothes, defendant slashed her with a bolo several times, causing three wounds: one, deep and necessarily fatal, on the left side of her forehead, 5 inches in length, cutting through her skull and penetrating her brain; another, 4 inches in length, also deep and serious but not fatal, in her neck without cutting the bone; and another also 6 inches in length in the right shoulder where it joins the arm, cutting all the muscles of that part; and two slight cuts of the skin in the lower and posterior portion of her forearm; that after wounding the deceased defendant fled; and that the victim died as a result of said wounds on April 24 of this same year.
Whether or not the court erred erred in: (a) classifying the act as parricide (b) not regarding the insanity of the defendant as a ground of exemption (c) imposing the penalty of life imprisonment
(a) There is no ground to support the allegation of the defense to which the first error assigned refers. It was proven at the trial and admitted therein by counsel for the defendant that the latter was lawfully married to the deceased Ignacia Salvacion; and that the said marriage had not been dissolved at the time of the occurrence upon which questioned or disputed by the defendant’s counsel himself in the trial court. (b) There is nothing in the evidence to show that the defendant was not of sound mind or that he acted under influence of a sudden attack of insanity or that he was generally regarded as insane, when he inflicted upon his wife the wound that resulted in her death. It was incumbent upon the defense to prove each of these facts, and in the absence of such proof, the legal presumption is that the defendant acted in his usual state of mind and that he freely, knowingly, and willfully performed the act. (c) There were no mitigating mitigating circumstances. The trial court has not erred erred in imposing upon him the penalty of life imprisonment, which is the lesser of the two indivisible penalties with which such crime is punished, with the accessories of article 54 of the same code, indemnity to the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, and payment of the costs, as the judgment itself sets forth. The judgment appealed from being, therefore, in conformity with the law and the merits of the case, we affirm it, with the costs against the Appellant.
At about 10 o’clock in the evening of May 4, 1956, Angel Olimpo (Victim) and Fausto Broa arrived at the house of Esteban Caimbre and they sat at a mortar. Shortly thereafter, Demetrio Caimbre arrived, sat on the same mortar. Then, without provocation, Demetrio Caimbre slashed Angelo Olimpo with a bolo. Olimpo ran to a nearby palay seed bed pursued by Demetrio Caimbre up to the border of the rice field where Olimpo was overtaken by Demetrio and the latter again slashed Olimpo several times and left him in the rice field. During the pursuit, Edilberto Justimbaste (Appellant) told Demetrio that – you you had better killed him. The victim was removed from the rice field and taken to a higher ground when Vicente Caimbre noticed that Olimpo was still alive, he told his brother Demetrio – finish him, finish him. Whereupon, Demetrio cut Olimpo’s neck.
Whether t he appellant is guilty as principals by inducement for the crime of murder charged against him.
Edilberto Justimbaste and Vicente Caimbre were charged and convicted as for the crime of murder. Demetrio Caimbre pleaded guilty for the lesser offense of Homicide and was sentenced accordingly.
The determining causes of the c rime appear to have been Demetrio’s own determination to kill and his brother’s inducement and not that which is allegedly came from the appellant when he uttered the words: “you had better killed him”. In determining the acts or utterances of an accused are sufficient to make him guilty as co-principal by inducement, it must be shown that the
inducement was of such a nature and made in such a way as to become the determining cause of the crime, and that such inducement was offered precisely with the intention of producing the result.
It must appear that the inducement was made directly with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime and that such inducement was the determining cause thereof.
Paragraph 3, Article 17 of the RPC considers as principals by indispensable cooperation “those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have been accomplished”.
In this case, there is no showing that appellant had any reason to have Angelo Olimpo killed and that the appellant had no sufficient moral influence over Demetrio Caimbre as to make the latter obey him blindly.
Records show that appellant’s participation in the commission of the crime consisted of 1) leading the member of the armed group to the house where the victims were found; 2) tying the victim’s hands; 3) digging the grave where the victims were buried.
The prosecution witnesses testified that the members of the armed group were accompanied by, aside from the appellant, Roderick Padua, known to be a member of the NPA.
The defendant-appellant was charged as for the murder of Esminio Balaan and Edwin Balaan. About 6 o’clock in the morning of June 11, 1986, the deceased Edwin Balaan and Esminio Balaan who are brothers were taken by seven armed men in fatigue uniforms with long firearms, suspected to be NPA members, accompanied by appellant Rudy Fronda and Roderick Padua from the house of one Ferminio Balaan and brought them to the mountain.
Whether the appellant is guilty as principal by indispensable cooperation for the crime of murder.
Undoubtedly, even without appellant’s participation, the assailants could have easily located the Balaan brothers through the assistance of Roderick Padua. Taking into account the number of the assailants alone, it is apparent that the armed men could have nevertheless committed the crime easily without the appellant abetting the commission thereof.
The acts performed by the appellant are not, by themselves, indispensable to the killing of the Balaan brothers. As aforesaid, to be considered as principal by indispensable cooperation, there must be a direct participation in the criminal design by another act without which the crime could not have been committed.
In quarrel, Ramon was chocking the deceased. Then, Jose ran up and delivered a blow with a bamboo stick on the head of the deceased. After the blow struck by jose, which Ramon saw, the latter continued to choke the deceased until life was extinct. The chocking by Ramon was not cause of death. It was the blow delivered by Jose which caused the death of the deceased.
That on or about August 25, 1954 in the evening in the barrio of Port Junction, municipality of Ragay, province of Camarines Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, armed with bolos, confederating, conspiring, and mutually helping each other, and with evident intent to kill Victor Eje and by means of treachery, did then and there intentionally, wilfully criminally, and feloniously, attack and assault said Victor Eje with stones and bolos, as a result of which the victim received contusions and wounds in different parts of his body. Testimony of one of the witnesses: FELIMON ALMARES, who declared that at about 7:30 in the evening of 25 August 1954, in the barrio of Port
Junction, Ragay, Camarines Sur, while he and Victor Eje were walking along the railroad track towards their homes in barrio Catabangan, they met the accused, Santiago Tatlonghari and Tiburcio Lalogo, in front of the house of one Marcos Nacionales; that thereupon, Santiago Tatlonghari shouted, "listo kayo mga bata" (get ready, boys), after which stones rained on them hitting him (Almares) on the left knee; that thus hurt, the witness rolled to the right side of the railroad track and hid himself among the talahib and cogon grasses that abound in the area; that before rolling to safety, he saw Santiago Tatlonghari and Tiburcio Lalogo hitting with bolos Victor Eje who was then lying on the ground with his two hands raised upward; that he saw the stabbing because there were beams of light coming from the houses of Catalino Arellano, Marcos Nacionales and Juan Corod, which were within the vicinity; that Santiago Tatlonghari had also a flashlight in his left hand which was focused on the victim while the latter was being hit with bolos; that thereafter, Fausto Mercado, Agapito Mercado, Cirilo Cueto and Ambrosia Tatlonghari appeared from the cogon grasses along the railroad track and, with Santiago Tatlonghari and Tiburcio Lalogo, viewed the prostrate body of Victor Eje then t hey left the place together, going eastward in the direction of the railroad station; that when the group was gone he left his hiding place and headed for home. He related the incident to Pedro Comia and Epifanio Bico when they came to see him a little later. W/N defendants are equally liable as accomplices in the commission of the crime?
Now although, as thus demonstrated, participation on the part of an accomplice in the criminal design of the principal is essential to the same extent as such participation is necessary on the part of one charged as co-principal, nevertheless, it is evident, - and the cases above cited abundantly prove - that, as against an accomplice, a court will sometimes draw the inference of guilty participation in the criminal design from acts of concert in the consummation of the criminal act and from the form and manner in which assistance is rendered, where it would not draw the same inference for the purpose of holding the same accused in the character of principal. This is because, in case of doubt, the courts naturally lean to the milder form of responsibility.
anymore; that she saw blood on his abdomen and he had a wound on the breast near the left nipple and another wound on the arm; that she saw the club. that it was found that the doors of the store, as well as the door leading to the kitchen in the upper floor, were opened; that the robbers entered the house by climbing a calamungay tree tree near the window and once inside they went down to the store on the ground floor; that the drawer in the store was opened and the cash money amounting to P1,000.00 was gone. Martiniano Ajos, a rural policeman, testified that at about 2:00 o'clock in the morning of September 10, 1956, while he was on his way home from the carnival where he had been on guard duty, he passed through the street in front of the victim's house. Because the night was dark, he had a flashlight with him. At the street corner, as he was about to make a left turn, he happened to focus the light on the face of a man lurking near the front door of the victim's store. The man, whom Ajos recognized to be Balili, ran away. Ahead of him, also running, were two other men, but Ajos failed to recognize them. Hearing the commotion inside the house of the victim, Ajos went in to investigate and found Juliana Respicia wailing over the dead body of her husband. : WN the defendants is an accomplice of the commission of the crime?
That on September 9, 1956, and for sometime previous to that date, the spouses Federico So, nicknamed "Diko" or "Dikoy", were living in their store located at the Serra Street in the sitio of Bungtud, municipality of Tandag, of this province of Surigao; that during that time, September 9, 1956, on the occasion of the celebration of the town fiesta, there was a carnival being held in the town plaza; that in that evening of September 9, 1956, said Juliana Respicia, together with her children, went to the carnival ground to attend the coronation of the carnival queen while her husband remained at home. Went back in their home, that said Juliana Respicia Respicia slept at about eleven o'clock that evening; that about three o'clock that next morning she was awakened by a shout for help from her husband telling that he was wounded; that she immediately stoop up, took a flashlight and went down to where her said husband was, followed by her children and their woman-storekeeper; that she found her husband Federico So lying on the floor face down and as she held him on her arms and asked him what happened he could not answer
SYNOPSIS Manuelito Mendez, a former employee of Bueno Metal Industries, was arrested for stealing product materials from the company warehouse. Mendez admitted the accusation and pointed to Ramon Tan as the one who bought the stolen items. Mendez was forgiven by complainant but Tan was charged with violation of the Anti-Fencing Law. After trial, Tan was convicted of the crime charged, and on appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the same. Hence, this appeal. The issue raised here is whether or not the prosecution has successfully established the elements of fencing as against petitioner. HELD: The Court resolved the issue in the negative. Noted is the fact that the loss was never reported to the police. And as the complainant reported no loss, it cannot be held for certain that the crime of theft or robbery was committed. Thus, the first element of the crime of fencing is absent. The extra judicial confession of Manuelito cannot be considered as evidence against the accused as there must be corroboration by evidence of corpus delicti to sustain a finding of guilt. Further, there was no showing at all that the accused knew or should have known that the very stolen articles were the ones sold to him.
vs.
Prior to the violent death of Bernardo Bagabag on the night of June 24, 1967, he and appellant Teresa Domogma and their children, arrived together in their
house at Sobosob, Salapadan, Abra, some 100 meters distant from the municipal building of the place. For sometime, however, their relationship had been strained and beset with troubles, for Teresa had deserted their family home a couple of times and each time Bernardo took time out to look for her. On two (2) different occasions, appellant Nemesis Talingdan had visited Teresa in their house while Bernardo was out at work, and during those visits Teresa had made Corazon, their then 12-year old daughter living with them, go down the house and leave them. Somehow, Bernardo had gotten wind that illicit relationship was going on between Talingdan and Teresa, and during a quarrel between him and Teresa, he directly charged the latter that should she get pregnant, the child would not be his. About a month or so before Bernardo was killed, Teresa had again left their house and did not come back for a period of more than three (3) weeks, and Bernardo came to know later that she and Talingdan were seen together in the town of Tayum Abra during that time; then on Thursday night, just two (2) days before he was gunned down, Bernardo and Teresa had a violent quarrel; Bernardo slapped Teresa several times; the latter went down the house and sought the help of the police, and shortly thereafter, accused Talingdan came to the vicinity of Bernardo's house and called him to come down; but Bernardo ignored him, for accused Talingdan was a policeman at the time and was armed, so the latter left the place, but not without warning Bernardo that someday he would kin him. Between 10:00 and 11:00 o'clock the following Friday morning, Bernardo's daughter, Corazon, who was then in a creek to wash clothes saw her mother, Teresa, meeting with Talingdan and their coappellants Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides in a small hut owned by Bernardo, some 300 to 400 meters away from the latter's house; as she approached them, she heard one of them say "Could he elude a bullet"; and when accused Teresa Domogma noticed the presence of her daughter, she shoved her away saying "You tell your father that we will kill him". The four appellants fired shots on the victim and made sure that he was dead. Teresa Domogma was there while the shooting was happening but did not fire shots on the victim. The victim’s 12 -year old daughter knew what had
happened. Her teacher who also lives nearby came for help. Teresa pleaded not guilty and even the Sol Gen advised for her acquittal. IS Teresa Domogma liable?
this is not saying that she is entirely free from criminal liability. There is in the record morally convincing proof that she is at the very least an accessory to the offense committed by her co-accused. She was inside the room when her husband was shot. As she came out after the shooting, she inquired from Corazon if she was able to recognize the assailants of her father. When Corazon Identified appellants Talingdan, Tobias, Berras and Bides as the culprits, Teresa did not only enjoin her daughter not to reveal what she knew to anyone, she went to the extent of warning her, "Don't tell it to anyone. I will kill you if you tell this to somebody." Later, when the peace officers who repaired to their house to investigate what happened, instead of helping them with the information given to her by Corazon, she claimed she had no suspects in mind. In other words, whereas, before the actual shooting of her husband, she was more or less passive in her attitude regarding her co-appellants' conspiracy, known to her, to do away with him, after Bernardo was killed, she became active in her cooperation with them. These subsequent acts of her constitute "concealing or assisting in the escape of the principal in the crime" which makes her liable as an accessory after the fact under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, with the above finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the appellants Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides of the crime of murder with two aggravating circumstances, without any mitigating circumstance to offset them, they are each hereby sentenced to DEATH to be executed in accordance with law. Guilty beyond reasonable doubt as accessory to the same murder, appellant Teresa Domogma is hereby
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years of prision mayor as maximum, with the accessory penalties of the law. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed, with costs against appellants.
This case springs from the joint appeal interposed by Appellants Benjamin Ortega, J r. and Manuel Garcia from f rom the Decision dated February 9, 1994 written by Judge Adriano R. Osorio finding them guilty of murder. That on or about October 17, 1992 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one another, without any justifiable cause, with treachery and evident premeditation and with abuse abuse of superior strenght strenght (sic) and with deliberate intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab repeatedly with a pointed weapon on the different parts of the body one ANDRE MAR MASANGKAY MASANGKAY y ABLOLA, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious physical injuries which directly caused his death.
During arraignment, Appellants Ortega and Garcia, assisted by counsel de oficio pleaded not guilty to the charge. Accused John Doe was then at large. After trial in due course, the court a quo promulgated the questioned ques tioned Decision. De cision. The dispositive d ispositive portion reads: reads: [7]
WHEREFORE, finding accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr. y Conje and WHEREFORE, Manuel Garcia y Rivera [g]uilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged, the Court hereby sentenced (sic) them to suffer the penalty of RECLUSI RECLUSION ON PERPETUA PERPETUA and to pay the costs of suit. Accused are hereby ordered to pay the offended party the sum of P35,000.00 for funeral expenses of deceased Andre Mar Masangkay and death indemnity of P50,000.00.
October 15, 1992 at about 5:30 in the afternoon, he, the victim Andre Mar Masangkay, Ariel Caranto, Romeo Ortega, Roberto San Andres were having a drinking spree in the compound near the house of Benjamin Ortega, Jr. at Daangbakal, Dalandanan, Valenzuela, Metro Manila That while they were drinking, accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia who were [already] drunk arrived and joined them. That victim Andre Mar Masangkay answered the call of nature and went to the back portion of the house. That accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr. followed him and later they [referring to the participants in the drinking session] heard the victim Andre Mar shouted, Dont, help me! (Huwag, tulungan ninyo ako!) That he and Ariel Caranto ran towards the back portion of the house and [they] saw accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr., on top of Andre Mar Masangkay who was lying down in a canal with his face up and stabbing the latter with a long bladed weapon. That Ariel Caranto ran and fetched Benjamin Ortega, Sr., the father of accused Benjamin, Jr . That he [Quitlong] went to Romeo Ortega in the place where they were having the drinking session [for the latter] to pacify his brother Benjamin, Jr. That Romeo Ortega went to the place of the stabbing and together with Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia lifted Andre Mar Masangkay from the canal and brought Andre Mar to the well and dropped the latter inside the well. That Romeo Ortega, Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia then dropped stones measuring 11 to 12 inches high, 2 feet in length and 11 to 12 inches in weight to the body of Andre Mar Masangkay inside the well. That Romeo Ortega warned him [Quitlong] not to tell anybody of what he saw. That he answered in the affirmative and he was allowed to go home. That his house is about 200 meters from Romeo Ortegas house. That upon reaching home, his conscience bothered him and he told his mother what he witnessed. That he went to the residence of Col. Leonardo Orig and reported the matter. That Col. Orig accompanied him to the Valenzuela Police Station and some police officers
went with them to the crime scene. That accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia were apprehended and were brought to the police station.
1. Is Ortega guilty of murder or Homicide? 2. Is Manuel Garcia liable?
The witnesses for the prosecution and defense presented conflicting narrations. The prosecution witnesses described the commission of the crime and positively identified appellants as the perpetrators. The witnesses for the defense, on the other hand, attempted to prove denial and alibi. As to which of the two contending versions speaks the truth primarily rests on a critical evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses and their stories. In this regard, the trial court held: The Court has listened intently to the narration of the accused and their witnesses and the prosecution witnesses and has keenly observed their behavior and demeanor on the witness stand and is convinced that the story of the prosecution is the more believable version. Prosecution eyewitness Diosdado Quitlong appeared and sounded credible and his credibility is reinforced by the fact that he has no reason to testify falsely against the accused. It was Diosdado Quitlong who reported the stabbing incident to the police authorities. If Quitlong stabbed and killed the victim Masangkay, he will keep away from the police authorities and will go in hiding. x x x Because the trial court had the opportunity to observe the witnesses demeanor and deportment on the stand as they rendered their testimonies, its evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is entitled to the highest respect. Therefore, unless the trial judge plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, his assessment of credibility must be respected. In the instant case, we have meticulously scoured the records and found no reason to reverse the trial courts assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies insofar as Appellant Ortega is concerned. The narration
of Eyewitness Diosdado Quitlong appears to be spontaneous and consistent. It is straightforward, detailed, vivid and logical. Thus, it clearly deserves full credence. On the other hand, in asserting alibi and denial, the defense bordered on the unbelievable. Appellant Ortega claimed that after he was able to free himself from Masangkays grip, he went home, treated his injuries and slept. This is not the ordinary reaction of a person assaulted. If Ortegas version of the assault was true, he should have immediately reported the matter to the police authorities, if only out of gratitude to Quitlong who came to his rescue. Likewise, it is difficult to believe that a man would just sleep after someone was stabbed in his own backyard. Further, we deem it incredible that Diosdado Quitlong would stab Masangkay ten (10) times successively, completely ignoring Benjamin Ortega, Jr. who was grappling with Masangkay. Also inconsistent with human experience is his narration that Masangkay persisted in choking him instead of defending himself from the alleged successive stabbing of Quitlong. The natural tendency of a person under attack is to defend himself and not to persist in choking a defenseless third person. Appellants argue that the finding of conspiracy by the trial court is based on mere assumption and conjecture x x x. Allegedly, the medico-legal finding that the large airway was filled with muddy particles indicating that the victim was alive when the victim inhaled the muddy particles did not necessarily mean that such muddy particles entered the body of the victim while he was still alive. The Sinumpaang Salaysay of Salaysay of Quitlong stated, Nilubayan lang nang saksak nang mapatay na si Andrew ni Benjamin Ortega, Jr . Jr . Thus, the prosecution evidence shows Masangkay was already dead when he was lifted and dumped into the well. Hence, Garcia could be held liable only as an accessory. accessory.[29] We do not agree with the above contention. Article 4, par. 1, of the Revised Penal Code states that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito ( delito ) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. The essential requisites for the application of this provision are that (a) the intended act is felonious; (b) the resulting act is likewise a felony; and (c) the unintended albeit graver wrong was primarily caused by the actors wrongful acts. In assisting Appellant Ortega, Jr. carry the body of Masangkay to the well, Appellant Garcia was committing a
felony. The offense was that of concealing the body of the crime to prevent its discovery, i.e. that i.e. that of being an accessory in the crime of homicide .[30]Although Appellant Garcia may have been unaware that the victim was still alive when he assisted Ortega in throwing the body into the well, he is still liable for the direct and natural consequence of his felonious act, even if the resulting offense is worse than that intended. True, Appellant Garcia merely assisted in concealing the body of the victim. But the autopsy conducted by th e NBI medico-legal officer showed that the victim at that time was still alive, and that he died subsequently of drowning. drowning.[31] That drowning was the immediate cause of death was medically demonstrated by the muddy particles found in the victims airway, lungs and stomach. stomach.[32] This is evident from the expert testimony given by the medicolegal officer, quoted below: By parity of reasoning, Appellant Garcia cannot be convicted of homicide through drowning in an information that charges murder by means of stabbing. Second. Although the prosecution was able to prove that Appellant Garcia assisted in concealing x x x the body of the crime, x x x in order to prevent its discovery, he can neither be convicted as an accessory after the fact defined under Article 19, par. 2, of the Revised Penal Code. The records show that Appellant Garcia is a brother-in-law of Appellant Ortega ,[38] the latters sister, Maritess, being his wife. wife .[39] Such relationship exempts Appellant Garcia from criminal liability as provided by Article 20 of the Revised Penal Code: ART. 20. Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability. -- The penalties prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are such with respect to their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural, and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees with the single exception of accessories falling within the provisions of paragraph 1 of the next preceding article. On the other hand, the next preceding article provides: ART. 19. Accessories . Accessories are those who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime, and without having participated therein,
either as principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission in any of the following m anners: 1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime. 2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery. 3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principal of the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime. Appellant Garcia, being a covered relative by affinity of the principal accused, Benjamin Ortega, Jr., is legally entitled to the aforequoted exempting provision of the Revised Penal Code.This Court is thus mandated by law to acquit him.
( sorry po hindi ko mahanap case puro citation lang po)
SUPREME COURT said that the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment is generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment or which public sentiments has regarded as cruel or obsolete for instance those inflicted at the whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disempoweling, and the like
That on or about the 29th day of March, 1988 in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila, Philippines,Rafael baylosis and Benjamin de vera, together with one Marco Palo, all known high ranking officers of the Communist Party of the Philippines, and its military arm, the New Peoples Army, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully , unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession, control and custody, in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crimes of rebellion/subversion, the Firearms/Ammunition & Explosives without first securing the necessary license. Baylosis, de Vera, and Palo, filed a motion to quash the information on the grounds THE FACTS CHARGED DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN OFFENSE BECAUSE THEY ARE FOUNDED ON AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL/REPEALED STATUTE & FOR THE SAME REASONS, THIS HONORABLE COURT IS DEVOID OF JURISDICTION TO TRY THIS CASE. But , the Trial Court denied the motion to quash, by an extended Resolution dated April 24, 1990. A motion for reconsideration filed by Baylosis, et al. was also denied in an Order dated July 12, 1990. Baylosis and de Vera thereupon instituted the present action in this Court. Here, they plead for the nullification and setting aside of the Trial Judge's Orders of April 24, 1990 and July 12, 1990; the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 72705 or, alternatively, that the information therein be considered as charging only simple rebellion; and that the public officials impleaded as respondents be "restrained from further initiating, filing or prosecuting cases involving common crimes against t he petitioners." The petitioners further posit the unconstitutionality of the challenged provision because "repugnant to the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, which guarantee full respect for human rights, equal protection of the laws, due process, right to bail, protection against double jeopardy and from cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment, and supremacy of civilian authority over the military." The petitioners further theorize that Section 1 (3) of PD 1866 is invalid because it gives the public prosecutor an option not to file a case for rebellion and instead file as many crimes for murder, frustrated murder, etc. as might have been perpetrated in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with rebellion, insurrection or subversion. WON the argument of petitioner that Sec 1 (3) PD is invalid The argument is not tenable. The fact is that the Revised Penal Code treats rebellion or insurrection as a crime distinct from murder, homicide, arson, or other felonies that might conceivably be committed in the course of a rebellion. It is the Code, therefore, in relation to the evidence in the hands of the public prosecutor, and not the latter's whim or caprice, which gives the choice. The Code allows, for example, separate prosecutions for either murder or rebellion, although not for both where the indictment alleges that the former has been committed in furtherance of or in connection with the latter. Surely, whether people are killed or injured in connection with a rebellion, or not or not , the deaths or injuries of t he victims are no less real, and the grief of the victims' families no less poignant. Moreover, it certainly is within the power of the legislature to determine what acts or omissions other than those set out in the Revised Penal Code or other existing statutes are to be condemned as separate, individual crimes and what penalties should be attached thereto. The power is not diluted or improperly wielded simply because at some prior time the act or omission was but an element or ingredient of another offense, or might usually have been connected with another crime. It is also argued that PD 1866 off ends against the equal protection clause of the Constitution in that government prosecutors may arbitrarily choose those they want to prosecute under said law and those under Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code (or RA 1700, the Anti-Subversion Act). The argument is
unimpressive. It is not much different from saying that a suspected killer is denied the equal protection of the laws because the prosecutor charges him with murder, not homicide, both crimes, though essentially consisting in the taking of human life, being punished with different penalties under separate provisions of the penal code. As already stressed, it is the prerogative of the legislature of determine what acts or omissions shall be deemed criminal offenses and what sanctions should attach to them. Certainly, the public prosecutors should have the option to ascertain which prosecutions should be initiated on the basis of the evidence at hand. That a criminal act may have elements common to more than one offense does not rob the prosecutor of that option (or discretion) and mandatorily require him to charge the lesser offense although the evidence before him may warrant prosecution of the more serious one. Now, if government prosecutors make arbitrary choices of those they would prosecute under a particular law, excluding from the indictment certain individuals against whom there is the same evidence as those impleaded, the fault is not in the law but in the prosecutors themselves whose duty it is to file the corresponding information or complaint against all persons who appear to be liable for the offense involved. The petitioners' invocation of the doctrine of double jeopardy as an argument against the constitutionality of PD 1866 is equally futile. They maintain that a person held liable under PD 1866 can still be made to answer subsequently for rebellion.
Estoista was for acquitted for homicide through reckless imprudence and convicted for illegal possession of firearms under one information by the CFI of Lanao. The firearm with which the appellant was charge with which the appellant was charged with having in his possession was a rifle and belong
to his father , Bruno Estoista, who held a legal permit for it. Father and son live & dame house, a little distance from a 27 hectare estate belonging to the family which was partly covered with cogon grass, tall weeds and second growth trees. From a spot in the plantation 100 to 120 meters from the house , the defendant took a shot at a wild r ooster and hit Diragon Dima, a laborer of the family who was setting a trap for wild chickens and whose presence was not perceived by the accused. Estoista is assailing his conviction saying that the 5-10 years penalty for illegal possession of firearms is cruel and excessive. WON the 5-10 years penalty for the illegal possession of firearms is excessive. It is of the court’s opinion that confinement from 5 to 10 years for possessing or carrying firearms is not cruel or unusual, having due regard to the prevalent conditions which the law proposes to suppress or curb. The rampant lawlessness against property, person and even the very security of the government, directly traceable in large measure to promiscuous carrying and the use of powerful weapons, justify imprisonment which in normal circumstances might appear excessive. If imprisonment from 5 to 10 years is out of proportion to the present case in view of certain circumstances, the law is not to be declared unconstitutional for this reason. The constitutionality of an act of the legislature is not to be judged in the light of exceptional cases. Small transgression for which the heavy net was not spread are, like small fishes, bound to be caught, and it is to meet such a situation as this that courts are advised to make a recommendation to the Chief of Executive for clemency or reduction of the penalty.
Petitioner Reynaldo R. Bayot is one of the several persons accused in more than one hundred (100) counts of Estafa thru Falsification of Public
Documents before the Sandiganbayan. The said charges stemmed from his alleged involvement, as a government auditor of the Commission on Audit assigned to the Ministry of Education and Culture, together with some officers/employees of the said Ministry, the Bureau of Treasury and the Teacher’s Camp in Baguio City, in the preparation and encashment of fictitious TCAA checks for non-existent obligations of the Teacher’s Camp resulting in damage to the government of several million pesos. The first thirty-two (32) cases were filed on July 25, 1978. In the meantime, petitioner ran for the post of municipal mayor of Amadeo, Cavite in the local elections held in January 1980. He was elected. On May 30, 1980, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision convicting herein petitioner and some of his co-accused in all but one of the thirty-two (32) cases filed against them. Whereupon, appeals were taken to this Court and the cases are now pending review in G.R. Nos. L-54645-76. However, on March 16, 1982, Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 was passed amending, among others, Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019. The said section, as amended, reads — "Sec. 13. Suspension of and Loss of Benefits. — Any Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings had been filed against him." cralaw
rtua1aw library Thereafter, in other cases pending before the respondent court in which herein petitioner is one of the accused, the prosecution filed a motion to suspend all the accused-public officers pendente lite from their respective offices or any other public office which they may be occupying pending trial of their cases.chanrobles.com cases. chanrobles.com .ph : virtual law library On July 22, 1982, respondent court issued an order directing the suspension of all the accused including herein petitioner "from their public positions or from any other public office that they may be holding . . ." Herein petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that "to apply the provision of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 to the herein accused would be violative of the constitutional guarantee of protection against an ex post facto law"
pending trial, of the public officer charged with crimes mentioned in the amendatory provision committed before its effectively does not violate the constitutional provision on ex post facto law. Further, the claim of petitioner that he cannot be suspended because he is presently occupying a position different from that under which he is charged is untenable. The amendatory provision clearly states that any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under Republic Act 3019 or for any offense involving fraud upon the government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Thus, by the use of the word "office" the same applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under which he was charged.
WON the respondent court acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction amounting to lack of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in suspending petitioner from office as mayor. NO. The Court find n o merit in petitioner’s contention that Section 13 of Republic Act 3019, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, which includes the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document as among the crimes subjecting the public officer charged therewith with suspension from office pending action in court, is a penal provision which violates the constitutional prohibition against the enactment of ex post facto law. Paragraph 3 of Article 24 of the Revised Penal Code clearly states that suspension from the employment or public office during the trial or in order to institute proceedings shall not be considered as penalty. It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension. Those mentioned in paragraph Nos. 1, 3 and 4 of said Article 24 are merely preventive measures before final judgment. Not being a penal provision, therefore, the suspension from office,
A detailed account of the killing was furnished by prosecution eyewitness Cresencio Lupido.6 According to him, Perpetua C. Adalim went to his house at Sitio Palaspas, Barangay Polangi in Taft, Eastern Samar in the early evening of January 1, 1982 to look for farmlands willing and desiring to work in herricefields. Lupido was an agricultural tenant of Perpetua and lived on one of the properties owned by the latter. Upon her arrival, Perpetua instructed Lupido’s wife to get food from her house in t he poblacion as she had decided to spend the night at Sitio Palaspas.While Perpetua was waiting and standing in the yard of the house, five armed men arrived and confronted Perpetua. Lupido recognized two of the men as Roman Derilo and appellant Isidoro Baldimo, as these two frequently passed by his house at Sitio Palaspas. He did not know the other three men but he claimed that he could identity them if brought before him.Roman Derilo talked momentarily with Perpetua. Then, without any warning, Derilo shot Perpetua three times with the pistol he was carrying. After she fell to the ground, appellant, who was standing at the right side of Derilo, approached Perpetua and stabbed her several times with a knife
that looked like either a Batangas knife or a bolo known locally as “depang.” A third member of the group, with a short and stout physique, followed suit in stabbing Perpetua. After the repeated stabbings, the gang walked around the yard for some time and left, walking in the direction of the mountains. All of them carried long firearms. As soon as the group had left the scene of the crime, Lupido hurriedly went to Perpetua’s house in the poblacion of Taft where he informed the family of the deceased about the incident.Appellant does not deny his participation in the commission of the crime. Rather, in his brief pitifully consisting of two pages, appellant merely ASKS FOR THE MODIFICATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IMPOSED BY THE LOWER COURT TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT.
Whether death penalty can be reduced to life imprisonment since there has been an order that crimes sentenced to death penalty will be reduced to reclusion perpetua as provided by 1987 constitution whether the heinous crime law (imposing the death penalty on certain heinous offenses) that took effect on December December 1993 can be applied to this case case
*** At the time of the commission of the crime on January 1, 1982 and the conviction of the accused on October 12, 1986, the substantive law in force dealing with the crime of murder was Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code which took effect way back on January 1, 1932. Said provision provided that any person guilty of murder shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. Then on February 2, 1987, a new Constitution came into force after its ratification on that date by the people. The 1987 Constitution, regarded by some as progressive since it contains new provisions not covered by our earlier two Constitutions, proscribed in Section 19, Article III (Bill of Rights) thereof the imposition of the death penalty, as follows: Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua Then, Responding to the alarming increase of horrible crimes being committed in the country, Congress passed a law imposing the death penalty on certain heinous offenses and further amending for that purpose the Revised Penal Code and other special penal laws. Said law was officially enacted as Republic
Act No. 7659 and took effect on December 31, 1993. This is now the governing penal law at the time of this review of the case at bar. Although the elements and circumstances which qualify a killing to murder were maintained, Republic Act No. 7659 amended Article 248 of the Code by imposing a heavier penalty for murder t han that originally prescribed, the new penalty provided in Section 6 of said amendatory statute being reclusion perpetua to death. Being a penal law, such provision of Republic Act No. 7659 may not be applied to the crime of murder committed in 1982 by appellant, based on the principle of prospectivity of penal laws. Further, the presumption is that laws operate prospectively, unless the contrary clearly appears or is clearly, plainly and unequivocally expressed or necessarily implied.52 In every case of doubt, the doubt will be resolved against the retroactive operation of laws.53 Nor can the prospective application of Republic Act No. 7659 be doubted just because of the constitutional provision leaving to Congress the matter of the death penalty in cases of heinous crimes, since Congress did not otherwise provide. ****One of the universally accepted characteristics of a penal law is prospectivity. This general principle of criminal law is embodied in Article 21 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that “no felony shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission,” and was applied by the Supreme Court in two early cases to mean that no act or omission shall be held to be a crime, nor its author punished, except by virtue of a law in force at the time the act was committed.55 Besides, to give retroactive effect to the pertinent provision of Republic Act No. 7659 would be violative of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.56 It is settled that a penal law may have retroactive effect only when it is favorable to the accused.58 Obviously, with a penalty more onerous than that provided by the Revised Penal Code for murder, the pertinent amendment thereof by Republic Act No. 7659 cannot fall within the exception to the general rule on prospectivity of penal laws. **Therefore, with or without an official executive issuance on commutation, the death penalty prescribed in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and imposed on appellant by the lower court in 1986 cannot be carried out even though the case was brought to the Supreme Court only in 1994 after Republic Act No. 7659 had taken effect. Nor can this law be deemed to have revived
the death penalty in the case of appellant, for reasons stated earlier. By February 2, 1987, that penalty had already been automatically reduced to reclusion perpetua, not by the grace of the President or of the courts, but by the mandate of the fundamental law of the land. WHEREFORE, for failure of the prosecution to prove the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation and by virtue of the command of the 1987 Constitution, the judgment of the court a quo is accordingly MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Accused-appellant Isidoro Q. Baldimo is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00 in consonance with our current case law and policy on death indemnity.
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended by B.P. Blg. 179. The said law, however, was further amended by R.A. No. 7659. Under Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659, the penalty imposed for the selling, dispensing, delivering, transporting or distributing of shabu of less than 200 grams is prision correccional to correccional to reclusion perpetua. Under Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which has suppletory application to special laws, penal laws shall be given retroactive effect insofar as they favor the accused. Appellant is entitled to benefit from the reduction of the penalty introduced by R.A. No. 7659.
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig, Metro Manila in Criminal Case No. 146B-D, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the D angerous Drugs Act of 1972. Appellant claims that there exists a major discrepancy in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses with regard to the place where appellant was arrested. WON the lower court erred in rendering its decision
Although there is an inconsistency in the testimonies with respect to the exact address of appellant, one witness saying that it was at No. 104 Roces while the other saying that it was at No. 105 Roces, such discrepancy is of minor importance and does not detract from the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. The trial court sentenced appellant to suffer "the penalty of life imprisonment with all its accessory penalties and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) and to pay the costs" pursuant to Section 4, Article II of the
“At around 2:00 o’clock [o]n the afternoon of December 15, 1996, victim Jose Estrada was with his wife and son at the town proper of Pasacao, Camarines Sur. They proce[e]ded to Nacoco, where they boarded a motorboat to go home to Tinalmud, Pasacao, Camarines Sur. Victim Jose Estrada sat at the rear portion of the motor boat while his wife and son sat about two arms length in front of him. “Thereafter, appellants Nomer de los Santos, Rico Ramos, Leopoldo Ab&nentos and co-accused Santiago de Luna (still-at-large) boarded the motor boat and sat at the front portion of the vessel. The group drank liquor while on board the motor boat. When the boat started to move, appellant Nomer de los Santos moved to the rear portion of the boat and sat at about one (1) meter from the victim. “Suddenly Florentina10 Estrada heard a gun shot. She turned and saw her husband Jose Estrada with blood oozing from his nose and mouth. She then saw appellant Nomer de los Santos standing next to her husband holding a gun. Florentina Estrada pleaded for appellant de los Santos to take her husband to the hospital but t he latter refused.
“At “At this time, the other appellants (Rico Ramos and Leopoldo Abarientos), stood up while holding hand grenades, and ordered the people at the motor boat to keep quiet. When the boat reached Calibaya, Dalupaon, appellants and co-accused Santiago de Luna disembarked. Appellant Nomer de los Santos pushed the boat out to sea again. Nobody helped Jose Estrada and his family. “When they reached the shore of Barangay D alupaon, Florentina Estrada went to the barangay captain and asked for help. When they arrived at the boat, Jose Estrada was already dead. “Dr. Melchor Baesa, the Municipal Health Officer of Pasacao, conducted a post-mortem examination on the body of the victim Jose Estrada. Victim Jose Estrada sustained a fatal gun shot wound on his left temple. The cause of his death was intracranial hemorr[h]age secondary to gunshot wound.”11
death penalty under the same circumstances as herein appellant may avail of the benefit of Section 19. The accused, ipso jure, is entitled to a reduction of his sentence. Therefore, with or without an official executive issuance on commutation, the death penalty prescribed in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and imposed on appellant by the lower court in 1986 cannot be carried out even though the case was brought to the Supreme Court only in 1994 aft er Republic Act No. 7659 had taken effect. Nor can this law be deemed to have revived the death penalty in the case of appellant, for reasons stated earlier. By February 2, 1987, that penalty had already been automatically reduced to reclusion perpetua, not by the grace of the President or of the courts, but by the mandate of the fundamental law of the land. (THEREFORE not only penal laws must be given retroactive effect but also judicial decisions decisions since in this case, case, the case of People vs Derilo has been cited) cited)
whether the death penalty imposed to appellant by lower court is correct in consideration of the RA 7659 that took effect on December 1993
“WHEREFORE, in view of al l the foregoing findings that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of accused Nomer delos Santos, Rico Ramos and Leopoldo Abarientos of the crime of murder of which they are presently charged, judgment is hereby rendered whereby in the absence of any of the aggravating or mitigating circumstances, said three (3) accused are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; to pay jointly and severally the surviving heirs of Jose Estrada, particularly his widow Florenia Estrada the sum of TWENTY-THREE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED NINETY TWO (P23,892.00) PESOS, representing actual damages; FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS, as indemnity for the death of Jose Estrada and moral damages in the amount of SEVENTY THOUSAND (P70,000.00) (P70,000.00) PESOS; and to pay the costs.”2 (Emphasis in original.) ** the death penalty prescribed in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and imposed on appellant by the lower court in 1986 cannot be carried out even though the case was brought t o the Supreme Court only in 1994 after Republic Act No. 7659 had taken effect. — effect. — From From the foregoing, it is apparent that no presidential action is necessary in order that any accused sentenced to the
On December 20, 1960, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus was was filed by Jose Lava, et al. before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, praying that being illegally detained by respondents, they be released from confinement or granted provisional liberty under such terms and conditions which the court may deem reasonable to prescribe after filing the bonds that may be required for the purpose. On December 21, 1960, the court issued an order directing respondents to produce the persons of petitioners Jose Lava, et al. on a date therein set, as well as to show cause why the writ
should not be issued, or petitioners should not be given their freedom as prayed for.cvirtual law library It appears that Jose Lava, et al., who filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus , were charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 14071 and 14270 of the Court of First Instance of Manila with the crime of rebellion complexed with other crimes enumerated in the information of which they were convicted in a decision rendered on May 21, 1951, the court sentencing some of them to death penalty and the others to reclusion perpetua . perpetua . Because of the nature of the penalties imposed, as well as the appeals interposed by the accused, the cases were elevated to this Court for review, where they are pending decision up to the present time.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library Subsequently, on July 18, 1956, this Court, in the case of People v. Hernandez Hernandez ,, G.R. Nos. L-6025-26, ruled that the crime of rebellion cannot be complexed with other crimes that may be committed in furtherance thereof, although if the latter are committed with personal motives the accused may be separately convicted thereof and sentenced accordingly, which simple rebellion is punishable under Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code only with prision mayor and mayor and a fine of not more than P20,000.00. And the abovementioned ruling was later reiterated in the cases of People v. Geronimo , G.R. No. L-8936, October 23, 1956 and People v. Togonon , G.R. No. L-8926, June 29, 1957.cha nrob Whether or not Rebellion may be complexed with other crimes?
The Supreme Court had affirmed convictions for the complex crime of treason with murder and other offenses. As a matter of fact, the existence of the 'complexed" rebellion is still upheld to this day by a sizable number of lawyers, prosecutors, judges and even justices of this Court. Hence, the error committed
was correctible only by seasonable appeal, not by attack on the jurisdiction of the sentencing Court .
About March 15, 1945, Amado Hernandez and other appellants were accused of conspiring, confederating and cooperating with each other, as well as with the th e thir th irty ty-on -one(31) e(31) defendants defendants charged in the cr criminal iminal cases cases of the Court of First Instance Instance of Manila. Theywere accused of being members of PKP Community Party of the Philippines which wasactively engaged in an armed rebellion against the government of the Philippines. With the party of HUKBALAHAP (Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa mga Hapon), they committed thecrime of r ebellion causing murder, pillage, looting plunder plu nder,, etc., et c., enumerat enum erated ed in 13 attacks att acks on gove governme rnment nt force forcess or civili civilians ans by HUKS. HUKS.
Rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies
The government, headed by the Solicitor General, argued that the gravity of thecrime committed required the denial of bail. Moreover, the complex crime charged by theg o v e r n m e n t a g a i n s t H e r n a n d e z h a s b e e n s u c c e s s f u l l y i m p o s e d w i t h o t h er a r r es t e d comm commun unis istt lead leader erss and and was was sent senten ence ced d to life life imprisonment.
An appeal prosecuted by the defendants regarding the judgment rendered by theCFI in Manila that rebellion cannot be a complex crime with murder, arson or robbery.
The court ruled that “murder, arson, and robbery are mere ingredient of the crime of rebellion as means “necessary” for the perpetration of the offense. Suc h common offense isabsorbed or inherent of the crime of rebellion. Inasmuch as the acts specified in Article 135constitutes, one single crime it follows that said acts offer no occasion for the application of Article 48 which requires therefore the commission of at least two crimes.***
: Rebellion cannot be complexed with commoncrimes such as killings, destruction of property, etc., committed on the occasion and infurtherance thereof. The thinking is not anymore correct more so that there is no legal basisfor such rule now. Rebellion constitutes ONLY ONE CRIME. ***
On June 24, 1954 a Federico Geronimo, et al. were charged with the complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnapping. These are the ranking officers/ or members of CCP and Huks. In the information it alleged 5 instances including an ambush on Mrs. Aurora Quezon’s convoy on April 28, 1949 and ending on February 1954 where Geronimo killed Policarpio Tipay a Barrio Lieutenant. He pleaded guilty to the accusation and the trial court found him guilty of the complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnappings, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. He appealed raising the sole question of whether the crime committed by him is not the complex crime of rebellion, but simply rebellion, thus punishable only by prision mayor.
Can
rebellion
be
complexed
with
murder,
robbery
or
kidnapping?
Even if the crime is not committed in furtherance of rebellion, without political motivation, the crime would be separately punishable and would not be absorbed in rebellion. - According to the Hernandez resolution; the complexing of rebellion will lead to undesirable results. - It cannot be taken with rebellion to constitute a complex crime, for the constitutive acts and intent would be unrelated to each other. He would be held liable for separate crimes, and these cannot be merged into a juridical whole.
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is modified and the accused convicted for the simple (non-complex) crime of rebellion under article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, and also for the crime of murder; and considering the mitigating effect of his plea of guilty, the accused-Appellant Federico Geronimo is hereby sentenced to suffer 8 years of prision mayor and to pay a fine of P10,000, (without subsidiary imprisonment pursuant to article 38 of the Penal Code) for the rebellion and, as above explained, for the murder, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to not less than 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor and not more than 18 years of reclusion temporal; to indemnify the heirs of Policarpio Tibay in the sum of P6,000; and to pay the costs.
of (such) an unlicensed firearm, a "homicide or murder is committed," the crime is aggravated and is more heavily punished, with the capital punishment.
That on or about the 30th day of December, 1992, in the municipality of Dauis, province of Bohol, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, with intent to kill and without any justifiable motive, with treachery and abuse of superior strength, the accused being then armed with a .38 cal. revolver, while the victim was unarmed, suddenly attacked the victim without giving the latter the opportunity to defend himself, and with evident premeditation, the accused having harbored a grudge against the victim a week prior to the incident of murder, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot Diosdado Iroy y Nesnea with the use of the said firearm, hitting the latter on his head and causing serious injuries which resulted to his death; to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the deceased.
If homicide or murder is committed by the accused with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed.
What is penalized in the first paragraph, insofar as material to the present case is the sole, simple act of a person who shall, among others, "unlawfully possess any firearm x x x (or) ammunition x x x." Obviously, possession of any firearm is unlawful if the necessary permit and/or license therefor is not first obtained. To that act is attached the penalty of reclusion temporal, temporal, maximum, to reclusion perpetua. perpetua. Now, if "with the use
The gravamen of the offense in its simplest form is, basically, the f act of possess ion of a firearm without l icense. The crime may be denominated simple illegal possession, to distinguish it from its aggravated form. It is Aggravated if theunli censed firearm is used in the commission of a homicide or murder under the R evised Penal Code. But the homicide or murder is not absorbed in the crime of possession of an unlicensed firearm; neither is the lat ter absorbed in theformer . There are two distinct crimes that are here spoken of. One is unlawful possess ion of a firearm, which may be simple or aggravated, defined and punished res pectively by the first and second paragraphs of Section 1 of PD1866. The other is homicide or murder, committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm. The mere possession of a firearm without legal authority consummates the crime u nder P.D. 1866, and the liability for illegal possession is madeheavier by the fir earm's use in a killing. The killing whether homicide or murder, is obviously dis tinct from the act of possession, and is separately punished and defined under t he Revised Penal Code. (Emphasis supplied)
(Miguel Lasala was accused of the crime of serious slander by deed with less serious physical injuries and damages) The accused named Miguel Lasala did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and assault Mayor Wenceslao Andanar at the cockpit with fistic blows, thereby exposing the latter to public ridicule, contempt and dishonor and causing bruises and contusions in the different parts of his body which required 14 days medical treatment and incapacitated him from the performance performance of his duty for 12 days. And also the offended offended party suffered mental anguish, wounded feelings, reputation and social humiliation.
WON the accused is guilty of complex crime of serious slander by deed with less serious physical injuries? The Court ruled that the crime committed is less serious physical injuries with the manifest intent to insult and the same acts cannot constitute the complex crime of slander by deed with less serious physical injuries, because such complex crime only exists in cases where the Code has no specific provision penalizing the same with specific penalty. This specific provision should be considered as an exception to the rule contained in Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code relative to complex crimes. Of course, we cannot deny that Article 359 considers as slander by deed any act "which shall cast dishonor, discredit, or contempt upon another person", and if said act results in the infliction of physical injuries it may also be covered by any of the articles compromised in Chapter Two, Title Eight, of the Revised Penal Code, relative to physical injuries, but if such eventuality happens the act cannot come under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which considers as complex a single act that constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies for the simple reason that in this particular case that act is specifically covered by paragraph 2 of Article 265 already abovementioned.
In 1947, when Pres. Manuel Roxas about to end his speech at the meeting of the Liberal Party when the accused Julio Guillen hurled the grenade towar to wards ds the th e Presi Pr esiden dent. t. A general general who was was on the platform platform saw the smoking smoking grenade and kicked it away from the platform then exploded in the middle of a group of persons and grenade fragments seriously injured Simeon Varela, who died the next day due to the mortal wounds, and several other persons were injured.
The facts do not support the contention of of the counsel for the appellant. In throwing the hand grenade at the President with the intention of killing him, the appellant acted with malice and is therefore liable for all the consequences of his wrongful act. As provided by Art. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed without malice. As held by the Court, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence. Where such unlawful act is willfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered reckless imprudence. The sentence of the trial court is affirmed by unanimous vote and death sentence shall be executed in accordance with article 81 of the Revised Penal Code.
- Manuel Y. Tayo convicted of the complex crime of murder and multiple frustrated murder by the Circuit Court - Mauro Ahid, the watchman, saw Tayo, a former army draftee, throwing a hand grenade into the second floor of the Super Chicks Nightclub. The owner, Manuel Toledo, his wife Rose Toledo, who was also the cashier, and his employees were wounded. Jimmy Pongos, the organist, was mortally wounded. He died because of his shrapnel wounds. - After throwing the grenade, Tayo left and fired his handgun four times in the direction of the compound of the Cebu Autobus Company, as if t o scare pursuers. -Tayo’s defense was an alibi which the court did not believe in. WON Tayo is guilty of complex crime in a case
WON the accused was guilty of complex crime only of homicide through reckless imprudence in regard to the death of Simeon Varela and of less serious physical injuries in regard to the other injured persons
Yes! the judgment of the trial court is affirmed with the modification that in lieu of the death penalty, reclu sion perpetua is imposed on the accused. The correct view is that this is a case of killing by explosion. (People vs. Guillen, 85 Phil. 307; People vs. Ganego and Soriano, 82 Phil. 335; People vs. Agcaoili, 86 Phil. 549; People vs. Francisco, 94 Phil. 975.)
The single act of throwing the grenade resulted in murder as to Pongos, frustrated murder as to Toledo and attempted murder as to Ahid.
.
3 unidentified men fired at the first floor of Maket aquare building from the adjacent building. Joji Nograles was killed and Cesar Habaradas was seriously wounded. 1 of the suspects dove into the waters of Pier whenchased by the police. On the same night, a man was seen by the security guards of the nearby compounds- barefoot and with only his pants on, was soaking wet. When asked, he introduced himself as Noel Pama and that he was help up. The guards reported the incident to the police and afte some time, the police arrived and arrested Pama. Pama was charged of the killing og Nograles and Habaradas in two (2) separate Informations for Murder by the RTC. a Motion to Consolidate Cases filed by the prosecution. Consequently, both informations were amended to include two (2) other accused, Leonardo Lava, Jr. and Robert Ignalaga. (both accused could not, however, be found and have thus remained at large.)
: Laurencio Laspadas, who has been working as a farmhand of the Arriesgado spouses, plowing their farm and harvesting their corn. Because he
had not been paid his accumulated wages amounting to more than four hundred sixty pesos, he was very angry with the said spouses. On December 1, 1976 the Arriesgado spouses left the house and he found himself alone with their two daughters, Elizabeth and Josephine, he conceived the idea of killing them and perpetrated the killing in the evening of that day. When Elizabeth was on the verge of dying for receiving fatal wounds like her sister, Josephine, Laurencio had a carnal knowledge with her by inserting about half an inch of his penis penetrated her vagina. On the extrajudicial confession of Laurencio which he had sworn to before the municipal judge of Wao, Laspardas, he confessed his guilt. Upon arraignment in the Court of First Instance, Laspardas, with the assistance of counsel de oficio , again pleaded guilty after the information was translated to him in the Cebuano dialect which he speaks. He answered in the affirmative when the trial judge asked him if he understood the charge. His counsel manifested that he explained to the accused the law involved. The accused admitted to his counsel that he had executed an extrajudicial confession. After the arraignment, Laspardas was placed on the witness stand. He testified that the contents of his confession were explained to him in the Cebuano dialect; that he affixed his thumbmark thereto and that it was true, as stated in his confession, that he killed the two girls because he was mad at their parents; that his organ touched the lips (labia) of the vagina of Elizabeth Arriesgado who was still alive, when he t ried to have sexual intercourse with her, and that he used his bolo in wounding the two victims. : Should Laurencio be accused of rape with homicide although in the information three distinct offenses, namely, rape and two murders. WHEREFORE the trial court's judgment is affirmed with the modification that the accused is found guilty of two separate murders and is sentenced to two death penalties. Costs de oficio . Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, imposes the death penalty "when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed." The instant case presents a novel, reverse situation (analogous to rape accompanying a robbery) where the rape was committed on the occasion of the murder, that is to say, when the female victim of a murderous assault was at death's door, she was raped.
Rape with homicide was committed (1) where the rapist, who was suffering from gonorrhea infected the victim and, as a result of the infection, she died of peritonitis (People vs. Acosta, 60 Phil. 158); (2) where the accused dragged a woman to a canefield, struck her, rendered her unconscious, had sexual intercourse with her and then killed her thereafter (People vs. Lopez, 107 Phil. 1039; People vs. Ramos, L-34355, July 30, 1979) and (3) where the accused had sexual intercourse with a girl below twelve years of age and t hen strangled her (People vs. Yu, 110 Phil, 793; People vs. Francisco, L-37418, September 28, 1979; People vs. Garcia, L-44364, April 27, 1979). Those decided cases are different from the instant case. Since the victim herein was already at the threshhold of death when she was ravished, that bestiality may be regarded either as a form of ignominy causing causing disgrace or as a form of cruelty which aggravated the murder because it was unnecessary to the commission thereof and was a manifest outrage on the victim's person (Arts. 14[17 and 21] and 248 161, Revised Penal Code. See People vs. Ganal, 85 Phil. 743, People vs. Bacsa, 104 Phil. 136 and People vs. Cayeta, 101 Phil. 1258), where the rape was treated as an aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide. We agree with counsel de oficio that that the special complex crime of rape with homicide was not committed in this case and that two separate murders were perpetrated.
On the evening of 17 October 1987, petitioner Isabelita Reodica was driving a van along Doa Soledad Avenue, Better Living Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila. Allegedly because of her recklessness, her van hit the car of complainant Norberto Bonsol. As a result, complainant sustained physical injuries, while the damage to his car amounted to P8,542.00. Should Article 48 of the Revised Code on complex crimes be applied?
No. The less grave felony of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00 and the light felony of reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries. If a reckless, imprudent or negligent act results in two or more grave or less grave felonies, a complex crime is committed. However, in Lontok v. Gorgonio, [27] this Court declared that where one of the resulting offenses in criminal negligence constitutes a light felony, there is no complex crime, thus: Applying article 48, it follows that if one offense is light, there is no complex crime. The resulting offenses may be treated as separate or the light felony may be absorbed by the grave felony. Thus, the light felonies of damage to property and slight physical injuries, both resulting from a single act of imprudence, do not constitute a complex crime. They cannot be charged in one information. They are separate offenses subject to distinct penalties (People vs. Turla, 50 Phil. 1001; See People vs. Estipona, 70 Phil. 513). Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double less serious physical injuries, damage to property amounting to P10,000 and slight physical injuries, a chief of police did not err in filing a separate complaint for the slight physical injuries and another complaint for the lesiones menos graves and damage to property [Arcaya vs. Teleron, L-37446, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 363, 365].
On June 23, 1982, petitioner Jose Lagon purchased from the estate of Bai Tonina Sepi, through an intestate court, [1] [1] two two parcels of land located at Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat. A few months after the sale, private respondent Menandro Lapuz filed a complaint for torts and damages against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sultan Kudarat. In the complaint, private respondent, as then plaintiff, claimed that he entered into a contract of lease with the late Bai Tonina Sepi Mengelen Guiabar over three parcels of land (the property) in Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao beginning 1964. One of the provisions agreed upon was for private respondent to put up commercial buildings which would, in turn, be leased to new tenants. The rentals to be paid by those tenants would answer for the rent private
respondent was obligated to pay Bai Tonina Sepi for the lease of the land. In 1974, the lease contract ended but since the construction of the commercial buildings had yet to be completed, the lease contract was allegedly renewed. When Bai Tonina Sepi died, private respondent started remitting his rent to the court-appointed administrator of her estate. But when the administrator advised him to stop collecting rentals from the tenants of the buildings he constructed, he discovered that petitioner, representing himself as the new owner of the property, had been collecting rentals from the tenants. He thus filed a complaint against the latter, accusing petitioner of inducing the heirs of Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property to him, thereby violating his leasehold rights over it. In his answer to the complaint, petitioner denied that he induced the heirs of Bai Tonina to sell the property to him, contending that the heirs were in dire need of money to pay off the obligations of the deceased. He also denied interfering with private respondents leasehold rights as there was no lease contract covering the property when he purchased it; that his personal investigation and inquiry revealed no claims or encumbrances on the subject lots. Petitioner claimed that before he bought the property, he went to Atty. Benjamin Fajardo, the lawyer who allegedly notarized the lease contract between private respondent and Bai Tonina Sepi, to verify if the parties indeed renewed the lease contract after it expired in 1974. Petitioner averred that Atty. Fajardo showed him four copies of the lease renewal but these were all unsigned. To refute the existence of a lease contract, petitioner presented in court a certification from the Office of the Clerk of Court confirming that no record of any lease contract notarized by Atty. Fajardo had been entered into their files. Petitioner added that he only learned of the alleged lease contract when he was informed that private respondent was collecting rent from the tenants of the building. Finding the complaint for tortuous interference to be unwarranted, petitioner filed his counterclaim and prayed for the payment of actual and moral damages. Does the purchase by Lagon of the subject property, during the supposed existence of Lapuz lease contract with the late Bai Tonina Sepi, constituted tortuous interference for which Lagon should be held liable for damages?
No. Elements of tortuous interference with contractual relations: (a) existence of a valid contract; (b) knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of the contract and (c) interference of the third person without legal justification or excuse. In that case, petitioner So Ping Bun occupied the premises which the corporation of his grandfather was leasing from private respondent, without the knowledge and permission of the corporation. The corporation, prevented from using the premises for its business, sued So Ping Bun for tortuous interference. interference. As regards the first element, the existence of a valid contract must be duly established. To prove this, private respondent presented in court a notarized copy of the purported lease renewal.[10] While the contract appeared as duly notarized, the notarization thereof, however, only proved its due execution and delivery but not the veracity of its contents. Nonetheless, after undergoing the rigid scrutiny of petitioners counsel and after the trial court declared it to be valid and subsisting, the notarized copy of the lease contract presented in court appeared to be incontestable proof that private respondent and the late Bai Tonina Sepi actually renewed their lease contract. Settled is the rule that until overcome by clear, strong and convincing evidence, a notarized document continues to be prima facie evidence of the facts that gave rise to its execution and delivery.[11] The second element, on the other hand, requires that there be knowledge on the part of the interferer that the contract exists. Knowledge of the subsistence of the contract is an essential element to state a cause of action for tortuous interference.[12] A defendant in such a case cannot be made liable for interfering with a contract he is unaware of.[13] While it is not necessary to prove actual knowledge, he must nonetheless be aware of the facts which, if followed by a reasonable inquiry, will lead to a complete disclosure of the contractual relations and rights of the parties in the contract.[14] In this case, petitioner claims that he had no knowledge of the lease contract. His sellers (the heirs of Bai Tonina Sepi) likewise allegedly did not inform him of any existing lease contract. After a careful perusal of the records, we find the contention of petitioner meritorious. He conducted his own personal investigation and inquiry, and unearthed no suspicious circumstance that would have made a cautious man
probe deeper and watch out for any conflicting claim over the property. An examination of the entire propertys title bore no indication of the leasehold interest of private respondent. Even the registry of property had no record of the same.[15] Assuming ex gratia argumenti that petitioner knew of the contract, such knowledge alone was not sufficient to make him liable for tortuous interference. Which brings us to the third element. According to our ruling in So Ping Bun, petitioner may be held liable only when there was no legal justification or excuse for his action[16] or when his conduct was stirre d by a wrongful motive. To sustain a case for tortuous interference, the defendant must have acted with malice[17] or must have been driven by purely impious reasons to injure the plaintiff. In other words, his act of interference cannot be justified.[18] Furthermore, the records do not support the allegation of private respondent that petitioner induced the heirs of Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property to him. The word induce refers to situations where a person causes another to choose one course of conduct by persuasion or intimidation.[19] The records show that the decision of the heirs of the late Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property was completely of their own volition and that petitioner did absolutely nothing to influence their judgment. Private respondent himself did not proffer any evidence to support his claim. In short, even assuming that private respondent was able to prove the renewal of his lease contract with Bai Tonina Sepi, the fact was that he was unable to prove malice or bad faith on the part of petitioner in purchasing the property. Therefore, the claim of tortuous interference was never established. In So Ping Bun, the Court discussed whether interference can be justified at all if the interferer acts for the sole purpose of furthering a personal financial interest, but without malice or bad faith. As the Court explained it: x x x, as a general rule, justification for interfering with the business relations of another exists where the actors motive is to benefit himself. Such justification does not exist where the actors motive is to cause harm to the other. Added to this, some authorities believe that it is not necessary that the interferers interest outweigh that of the party whose rights are invaded, and that an individual acts under an economic interest that is s ubstantial, not merely de minimis, such that wrongful and malicious motives are negatived, for he acts in selfprotection. Moreover, justification for protecting ones financial position should not be made to depend on a comparison of his economic interest in
the subject matter with that of the others. It is sufficient if the impetus of his conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives.[20] The foregoing disquisition applies squarely to the case at bar. In our view, petitioners purchase of the subject property was merely an advancement of his financial or economic interests, absent any proof that he was enthused by improper motives. In the very early case of Gilchrist v. Cuddy,[21] the Court declared that a person is not a malicious interferer if his conduct is impelled by a proper business interest. In other words, a financial or profit motivation will not necessarily make a person an officious interferer liable for damages as long as there is no malice or bad faith involved. In sum, we rule that, inasmuch as not all three elements to hold petitioner liable for tortuous interference are present, petitioner cannot be made to answer for private respondents losses.
On January 9, 1978, at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening, M/B Sweet Lord departed from the log pond of Dibet, Casiguran, Quezon. The boat was around 44 feet in length, 5 feet in height and five feet in width. On board were 23 passengers, 70 sacks of copra with a weight of 80 kilos per sacks , 4 sacks of rice, 4 sacks of carabao hide, luggages of the passengers, 4 pigs, 4 chickens, cash and other valuables. In addition, there were five (5) crew members among whom was the petitioner who boarded the boat in Dinalungan, Quezon. The boat was overloaded as evidenced by the fact that only a palm's width of its height was above the water and its waterline was already submerged. When the boat left Casiguran, it was piloted by Domingo Zamora until the petitioner boarded. At around 1:00 o'clock the following morning the boat left Dinalungan, but this time, upon the orders of the petitioner. The waves then were as big as a hut so that the boat had to stop at the port of Dinadiawan. After three hours of waiting, the petitioner ordered the boat to resume its voyage despite the fact that the sea was still rough. Petitioner made this order over the objection of the employed captain Zamora, who said that the boat could not cope with
the trip anymore. And as expected the boat sank, causing the death of most of the passengers and the loss and destruction of the cargoes. Petitioner Antonio Soriao (Soriao, for brevity) and Domingo Zamora (Zamora, for brevity) were charged with the crime of multiple homicide and damage to property thru reckless imprudence before the Court of First Instance of Aurora Sub-province, Baler, Quezon. Whether or not Soriao is liable to suffer the prison term and civil damages. Yes. Soriao contends that he is neither the owner nor captain of the M/B Sweet Lord but merely a passenger thereof but contrary to his contention, Soriao was not an ordinary passenger in that voyage. The survivors of the illfated M/B Sweet Lord positively declared that Soriao piloted the boat from Dinalungan up to the time just before it sank in the waters of Baler. These testimonies were uncontradicted by Soriao. We find no evidence of any improper motive on the witnesses' part to testify against. Soriao. Hence, their testimonies are worthy of full faith and credit/The relatives of the victims and the survivors themselves believed that Soriao was the owner of the boat and the boss of Captain Domingo Zamora and the crew. Such impression naturally would foreclose any opposition from the passengers to Soriao's alleged suggestion that the voyage continue and his having taken the helm of the boat in lieu of Zamora. The doctrine of pari delicto would, therefore, not apply in this case.
In the morning of Good Friday, some prisoners of dormitory 4-C, while themselves in front of building IV, were feloniously attacked by other prisoners who used improvised bladed weapons. Four, prisoners, namely, Samuel Diaz, Augusta de Guzman, de Villa and Salvador Alcontin, were mortally wounded and died later in the hospital while two prisoners, Josefino So and Abdul Amking Jr., were wounded.
Diaz sustained twenty-five stab wounds of which fifteen were on the back. De Villa, had stab wounds in the lumbar region, neck, abdomen and chest. De Guzman, suffered four frontal stab wounds one of which penetrated his heart and three stab wounds on the back one of which perforated his left lung. Alcontin, had four stab wounds on his side, back and forearm. Amking was stabbed in the lumbar region while Joaquin So had a stab wound on the left arm and on the back near the shoulder and abrasions on the knees. Some victims were stabbed near the water tank and others near the dormitories. The victims were members of the Oxo gang while the assailants were members of the Sputnik gang. The assailants took part in the riot after they learned that Joseph Casey, a member of their gang, had been Stabbed.
Whether the the crime committed by the complinats is a complex crime crime
We hold that the four murders and the double attempted murder should be considered as a complex offense . The assailants were co-conspirators as shown by the simultaneousness of their assaults. They belonged to the same SigueSigue Sputnik (SSS) gang and harbored a common hostility to the members of the Oxo gang. They were impelled by the same motive which was to inflict injury on the six victims, members of the Oxo gang. This case is covered by the rule that when for the attainment of a single purpose, which constitutes an offense, various acts are exe cuted, such acts must be considered as only one offense, a complex one. WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is set aside. Each of the six accused is sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay solidarily an indemnity of twelve thousand pesos to each set of heirs of the four dead victim 9, one thousand pesos to Joaquin So and another one thousand pesos to Abdul Amking Jr. Costs de oficio.
Does Reynaldo’s act of abducting a nd raping the victim considered as complex Crime? While walking home, A was approached by Reynaldo Velasquez, who asked her where she was going. A saw Reynaldo carry a gun. The latter poked the gun at the right ribs of A and held her arms. Accused called a taxi on which the two boarded. They proceeded to the house of Reynaldo’s grandmothers. Inside the house, Reynaldo told A that she could not do anything. In response A warned Reynaldo that he would be jailed. Instead of answering, accused said it would never happen and that he would not let her go home. A stood up but Reynaldo pulled her dress and forced her to sit down. Reynaldo warned A that if she attempted to move, he would then harm her and kill her. Reynaldo made her lie on the floor removed her underwear, including her panty, covered her face with the use of a pillow and then sexually molested her. A tried to ask help from Reynaldo’s u ncle but ignored her because he cannot understand her. When Reynaldo saw her trying to tell his uncle what happened, he threatened her and told her not to tell anybody what happened. While combing her hair, she saw a small screwdriver on the table. She hid said object in her pocket. After a while, the accused again asked A to lie down and sexually assaulted her, and inserted his penis inside her vagina. While molesting her, A pulled out the screwdriver and stabbed him on the neck. This retaliatory move of A angered Reynaldo who then held her her hands and boxed her. A then begged Reynaldo to allow her to go home however the accused refused to do so. When Reynaldo bought a soft drink, A tried to escape by running towards the squatters area however, she was overtook by Reynaldo and brought her back in the house. While inside the house and talking, A found out that Reynaldo’s gun is just a pellet gun. A asked the accused if she could call her parents, however, he refused fearing that she might tell her parents what had happened. A, however, was able to convince Reynaldo that she had previously called her parents informing them that she was at a friend’s house, and that she would again call her parents just to tell them that she would soon be home. Reynaldo believed her and went inside his grandmother’s room to get money for the phone call. Once inside, A immediately ran towards a neighbour’s house and saw a man and told him what Reynaldo did to her. She then begged for help.
Yes. Considering t hat the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that VELASQUEZ forcibly abducted A and then raped her twice, he should be convicted of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape and simple rape. The penalty for complex crimes is the penalty for the most serious crime which shall be imposed in its maximum period. Rape is the more serious of the two crimes and is punishable with reclusion perpetua under under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and since reclusion perpetua is is a single indivisible penalty, it shall be imposed as it is.The subsequent rape committed by VELASQUEZ can no longer be considered as a separate complex crime of forcible abduction with rape but only as a separate act of rape punishable by reclusion perpetua .
THE ACCUSED AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE HOME GUARD COMMENCED FIRING AT A LARGE GROUP OF MARANAOS AT A SIGNAL FROM THE OTHER ACCUSED AND CONTINUED FIRING UNTIL CEASE-FIRE SIGNALED. ABOUT FIFTY (50) MARANAOS DIED IN THE SLAUGHTER.
SC HELD THAT THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF MULTIPLE HOMICIDE UNDER THE REASON THAT THE EVIDENCE POSITIVELY SHOWS THAT THE KILLING WAS THE RESULT OF A SINGLE IMPULSE WHICH WAS INDUCED BY THE ORDER OF THE LEADER TO FIRE, AND CONTINUED WITH THE INTENTION TO COMPLY THEREWITH, AS THE FIRING STOPPED AS SOON AS THE LEADER GAVE THE ORDER TO THAT EFFECT.THERE WAS NO
INTENT ON THE PART OF THE ACCUSED EITHER TO FIRE AT EACH AND EVERYONE OF THE VICTIMS AS SEPARATELY AND DISTINCTLY FROM EACH OTHER.IT HAS BEEN HELD THAT IF THE ACT OR ACTS COMPLAINED RESULTED FROM A SINGLE SINGLE CRIMINAL CRIMINAL IMPULSE, IT CONSTITUTES A SINGLE OFFENSE.
FACT/RULING: This is a case wherein SC held and explained that belonging to two different persons in the same place and on the same occasion having an independent existence of their own because there are not two distinct appropriations nor two intentions that characterize two separate crimes.
THE DEFENDANTS fired guns in rapid succession from outside the house of a family, killing the father, and that defendants then forcibly entered the house, letting loose several shots, killing all the three minor children and wounding the mother The City Fiscal, according to the SC correctly presented 5 separate information4 for murder and one for frustrated murder when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes. how about single pressing of a trigger of an automatic assault rifle causing several deaths?
In many cases, the SC decided that such is not a complex crime explaining that although each burst of shots was caused by one single act of pressing the trigger that should be considered as producing the several felonies, but the number of bullets that actually produced them. Accordingly, the accused accused will be held liable as many deaths deaths or injuries that resulted.
JESUS MUYCO and ARNULFO MUYCO, cousins, were charged with murder for the death of Romeo Boteja Jr. on 13 May 1995. Only Jesus Muyco was apprehended while Arnulfo Muyco remains at large. On 11 September 1997 the Regional Trial Court, Br. 25, Iloilo City, found Jesus guilty as charged and correspondingly sentenced him to reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of Romeo Boteja Jr. P30,000.00 as death indemnity and P27,000.00 as funeral expenses. From 6:00 oclock to 7:00 oclock in the evening of 13 May 1995, Jesus Muyco and Arnulfo Muyco together with Romeo Boteja Jr. were in the house of Narciso Nadales at Barangay Pamuringao-Garrido, Cabatuan, Iloilo. At about 9:00 oclock the trio were seen walking towards the barangay dancehall where they met Ernesto Boteja, an uncle of Romeo and a relative by affinity of Jesus
and Arnulfo. Romeo invited his uncle Ernesto for a drink so they all went to the store of Agnes Cao about a hundred (100) m eters away from the dancehall to buy whisky. As the store was about to close, Jesus, Arnulfo, Romeo and Ernesto decided to drink their whisky under a mango tree nearby. After drinking for a while, Arnulfo suddenly grabbed the hands of Romeo, and while the latter was struggling, Jesus stabbed him with a knife hitting him near his collarbone. It was fatal. Arnulfo then dragged the lifeless body of Romeo towards the nearby sugarcane field with Jesus following them. Ernesto was shocked by the startling occurrence. He was virtually immobilized. He only moved from there to run for his life when he saw Jesus and Arnulfo returning from the field with Jesus pointing a knife at him. Ernesto fled towards the opposite side of the sugarcane field and stayed there until dawn. Romeos body was found lifeless at 11 :00 oclock that same evening. Leticia Boteja, mother of the victim, testified that she incurred P27,000.00 for funeral expenses. Dr. Ricardo Jaboneta autopsied the body of Romeo and found that he sustained one (1) stab wound which penetrated his chest wall. It was fatal.
construction worker. As in People v. Verde, this Court is inclined to grant the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity despite the absence of documentary evidence. To be able to claim damages for loss of earning capacity despite the nonavailability of documentary evidence, there must be oral testimony that: (a) the victim was self-employed earning less than the minimum wage under the current labor laws and judicial notice was taken of the fact that in the victims line of work, no documentary evidence is available; (b) the victim was employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws x x x In the instant case, the victim was nineteen (19) years old at the time of his death and earning P1,600.00 monthly as a farm laborer. Thus, his heirs are entitled to receive an award for lost earnings in accordance with the foll owing formula: 2/3 (80 ATD [age at time of death]) x (GAI [gross annual income]) 80% GAI. [7] Thus2/3 (80 19) x (P1,600 x 12) - 80% (P1,600.00 x 12) 2/3 (61) x P19,200 - 80% (P19,200)
Whether or not Leticia Boteja could claim the award damages that she was claiming? This court notes that the trial court failed to award damages for loss of earning capacity despite the testimony of Leticia Boteja to this effect. In People v. Dizon[6] this Court discussed the requisites for such awardAs a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for loss of earning capacity. In People v. Verde , the non-presentation of evidence to support the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity did not prevent this Court from awarding said damages. The testimony of the victims wife as to earning capacity of her murdered husband, who was then 48 years old and was earning P200.00 a day as a tricycle driver, sufficed to establish the basis for such an award. In this case, Erwin Gesmundo was only 15 years old at the time of his death and was earning a daily wage of P100.00 as a
40.67 x [P19,200 - P15,360] 40.67 x P3,840 = P156,172.80 On the basis of the above computation, the heirs of the deceased Romeo Boteja Jr. are entitled to receive P156,172.80 from accused-appellant Jesus Muyco. , the Decision appealed from the finding accused-appellant JESUS MUYCO guilty of murder aggravated by treachery and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua , and to pay the heirs of Romeo Boteja Jr. P27,000.00 for funeral expenses is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the death indemnity is increased to P50,000.00. Accused-appellant is further directed to pay the heirs of his victim the amount of P156,172.80 for lost earnings conformably with prevailing jurisprudence. Costs against accused-appellant.
The petitioner filed information before the respondent court charging private respondent Camilo Galagar with the crime of serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. During the scheduled arraignment, on February 4, 1982, the accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Immediately after the plea, the respondent Judge rendered judgment and sentence the accused to suffer 30 days imprisonment and to pay the costs. No civil liability was imposed. The accused manifested his intention to avail of the provisions P.D.No.968, the probation law. The respondent court gave the counsel of the accused 5 days within which to file the petition for probation. Petitioner filed an ex parte motion to prove the civil liability of accused but it was denied by respondent court. Then, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
Whether or not the respondent Judge has committed grave abuse of discretion discretion on rendering court orders denying motions to prove the civil liability of the accused. Whether or not the probation law has bearing on civil civil liability.
Yes, the respondent judge has committed grave abuse of discretion on rendering court orders denying motions to prove the civil liability of the accused. No, probation law has absolutely no bearing on civil liability. VIII RATIO DECIDENDI The extinction and survival of civil liability are governed by Chapter Three, Title Five, Book One of the Revised Penal Code as follows: Art. 112 Extinction of Civil Liability-civil liability established in articles 100,101,102 and 103 of this code shall be extinguished in the same manner as other obligations in accordance with the provisions of the civil code.
Art 113 Obligation to Satisfy Civil Liability-Except in case of extinction of his civil liability as provided in the next preceding article, the offender shall continue to be obliged to satisfy civil liability resulting from the crime committed by him, notwithstanding the fact that he has served his sentenced consisting of deprivation of liberty of other rights, or has not been acquired to serve the same by reason of amnesty, pardon, commutation of sentence, or any other reason. If under Art.113 of RPC, the obligation to satisfy civil liability continues notwithstanding service of sentence or non service of sentence due to amnesty ,pardon, commutation of sentence or any other reason,we fail to see what led respondent judge to rule that an application for probation should have an opposite effect insofar as determination of civil liability is concerned. It could have not have been delay because the motion was filed on the day after the judgment of conviction was rendered in open court right after theplea of guilty and the manifestation that the accused was applying for probation. The general rule is that, when a criminal action is instituted, the civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party expressly waives the civil liability or r eserves right to institute it separately. The probation law clearly provides only for the suspension of sentence imposed on the accused by virtue of his application for probation. It has absolutely no bearing on civil liability. There is no legal basis for the respondent court’s conclusion that a hearing to prove the civil liability of the accused under the circumstances of the case would in effect nullify the order of the suspension of the sentence and would defeat the very purpose of probation law.
Petitioner was charged before the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila with violation of Section 4, Article II of Rep. Act No. 6425, otherwise known as t he Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Upon arraignment on September 4, 1981, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty. On October 8, 1981, after the prosecution had presented part of its evidence, petitioner manifested his desire to change his plea of not guilty to that of guilty to the lesser offense of possession of Indian Hemp [marijuana], under Section 8 of Article II of Rep. Act No. 6425. On October 13, 1981, petitioner applied for probation. Respondent judge forthwith directed the probation probation officer of the City of Manila to conduct a post sentence investigation on said application and to file said report thereon within 60 days. After conducting such investigation, the probation officer submitted its report, recommending that petitioner be placed on a two-year probation upon the claim that the latter was already on his way to reformation and that a prison cell would t urn him into a hardened criminal.
seemingly deserving defendant who thereby escapes the extreme rigors of the penalty imposed by law for the offense which he was convicted. Probation is a special privilege granted by the state to a penitent qualified offender. It essentially rejects appeals and encourages an otherwise eligible convict to immediately admit his liability and save the state of time, effort and expenses to jettison an appeal. Being discretionary on the part of the trial court, the favorable recommendation of probation officer is at best merely persuasive upon the courts in the consideration of the application for probation. Both the law and the jurisprudence is clear on this point. As for the fact that the petitioner is a first offender, this does not necessarily entitle him to the approval of his application although it is a factor to be taken into account by the court. Finally, the policy of liberality he invokes cannot prevail against the categorical provisions of the law which clearly call for the denial of his application.
Such recommendation notwithstanding, the respondent judge issued the challenged order of March 9, 1982, denying petitioner's application on the ground that it will depreciate the seriousness of the offense committed. On March 23, 1982, petitioner moved for reconsideration reconsideration of the March 9 order, but the same was denied. The petitioner's "Ex -Parte Motion for Hearing on the case for Probation and for Deferment of Execution of Judgment" was likewise denied .
Whether or not respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in holding that "probation will depreciate the seriousness of the offense committed?
Probation is a mere privilege and its grant rests solely upon the decision of the court. This discretion is to exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused. Probation is not a right of an accused but a mere privilege, an act of grace and clemency or immunity conferred by the state, which may be granted to a
The Court of First Instance of Capiz in its decision dated September 5, 1978 convicted Isidro Balleta, Jr. of consented of consented abduction and sentenced him to an inderterminate penalty of three months and one day of arresto mayor,minimum, mayor,minimum, to two years, four months and one day of prision correccional as as maximum, and to indemnify Josephine Cabison in the sum of three thousand pesos (Criminal Case No. 897). Balleta did not appeal. He filed a petition for probation. The probation officer of Capiz recommended favorable action on t he petition. The trial court denied it on the grounds that it would be better for the accused if he served his sentence so that he could reform himself. correct his selfish tendencies and avoid the scandal in the community that would be caused by the grant of
probation so that the sanctity of marriage and the dignity of womanhood" would be upheld.
Whether or not the trial court gravely abused its discretion in not granting probation?
The Supreme Court said that the accused did not intend to cause a grave wrong and that he deserved to be under probation because he was very remorseful and he has the potential of a good probationer. The Solicitor General manifested that his office had no objection to the grant of probation to the accused. Under those circumstances and considering that the accused does not fall within any of the five classes of disqualified offenders enumerated in section 9 of the Probation Law, he may be placed on probation under the conditions indicated in section 10 of the law and on the basis of the treatment plan proposed by the probation officer.
Petitioner was convicted by respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch) of the crime of estafa for having issued a bouncing check for P5,000.00, and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from seven years and eight months of of prision mayor as minimum, to nine years and four months of prision mayor , as maximum. He appealed to the Court of Appeals which reduced the penalty to one year and one day of prision correccional as minimum, to one year and eight months as maximum.
Upon the Courts of Appeals decision becoming final, petitioner not having appealed therefrom, he filed a petition for probation with respondent judge, who, despite the favorable recommendation of the Probation Office, denied the petition on July 24, 1980, on the following grounds: (a) To grant probation to petitioner will depreciate the seriousness of the offense committed, and (b) Petitioner is not a penitent offender. A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner having been denied by the respondent judge, the present proceeding was resorted to, petitioner averring that the respondent judge erred in denying his petition for probation despite the recommendation for its approval by the Probation Office .
Whether or not the petitioner petitioner can avail the benefits benefits of probation? The Supreme Court ruled that for purpose of probation, what the law gives more importance to is the offender, not the crime. The inquiry is more on whether probation will help the offender along the lines for which the probation system has been established, such as giving the first-time offender a second chance to maintain his place in society through a process of reformation, which is better achieved, at least as to one who has not committed a very serious offense, when he is not mixed with hardened criminals in an atmosphere not conducive to soul-searching as within prison walls. The consciousness of the State's benignity in giving him that second chance to continue in peaceful and cordial association with his fellowmen will advance, rather than retard, the process of reformation in him. The Supreme Court held that the Probation Law was never intended to limit the right of an accused person to present all the relevant evidence he can avail of in order to secure a verdict of acquittal or a reduction of the penalty. Neither does the law require a plea of guilty on the part of the accused to enable him to avail the benefits of probation. A contrary view would certainly negate the constitutional right of an accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved
RESPONDENT LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT EXTENDING THE BENEFITS OF THE PROBATION LAW TO HEREIN PETITIONER, WHO ADMITTEDLY, IS A GOOD SUBJECT FOR PROBATION AND CAN STILL BE REFORMED AND REHABILITATED, BY TOTALLY DISREGARDING THE FACT THAT BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 76 IS NOT EXPRESSLY REPEALED BY PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1990; That on or about the 3rd day of April 1983, at Barangay Burgos, Municipality of Padre Burgos, Province of Quezon, Philippines. The abovenamed accused, without authority of law, have in his possession one point six grams (1.6) dried leaves of Indian Hemp or marijuana, a prohibited drug, and sixty (60) pieces of cigarette wrappers. wrappers . Petitioner Amandy initially entered a plea of not guilty but subsequently withdrew his former plea and substituted it with a plea of guilty, subject, however, to the reservation of proving the mitigating circumstance of drunkenness which was not habitual, in addition to the attenuating circumstance of his voluntary plea of guilty. The petitioner filed an application for probation with a petition for release on recognizance, alleging that he is entitled to the suspended sentence under P.D. 968. The petition, was however, denied by the respondent lower court for the reason that P.D. 1990 removed from the purview of the exceptions to the probation law those 'sentenced to serve a maximum of imprisonment of more than 6 years.' On October 8, 1986, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the lower court denied the motion in a resolution dated October 9, 1986 on the ground that it is the intention of the law to extend the beneficial effects of the Probation Law only to correctional penalties which have six (6) years as their ceiling and that penalties afflictive in scope and nature have to be excluded. Hence, the instant petition for review based on the following alleged errors: RESPONDENT LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE APPLICATION FOR PROBATION DATED 26 JUNE 1986 AND THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DATED 8 OCTOBER 1986 FILED BY THE PETITIONER, BY RELYING SOLELY ON THE PROVISION OF SECTION 2, PARAGRAPH (a) OF PRESIDENTLAL DECREE NO. 1990;
Whether or not the respondent lower court committed reversible error in disallowing the petitioner's application for probation notwithstanding the favorable recommendation of the Probation Officer.
To base the grant of probation on this contention alone would be erroneous because the law clearly declares who are entitled to probation and who are not. Moreover, the grant or denial of the application for probation does not rest solely on the offender's potentiality to reform but also on the observance of demands of justice and public interest (Tolentino v. Alconcel, 121 SCRA 92). These are expressed in statutes enacted by the lawmaker. The arguments of the petitioner are more properly directed to a trial court's exercise of discretion in granting or denying probation to applicants who fall within the coverage of the law, and not to a court which refuses to apply the benefits of a law to persons excluded by that same law.
The petitioners are spouses who were convicted for Staffa in Criminal Case No. 2260 in a decision of the respondent court dated May 20, 1982. The court sentenced the petitioners. to suffer an indeterminate sentence of FOUR (4) MONTHS of arresto mayor as minimum to ONE (1) YEAR and SIX (6) MONTHS of prison correctional as maximum, to pay P5,400.00 to Naty V. Pagdanganan for the value of the piano, and to pay the costs of the suit. On June 22, 1982, when the decision dated May 20, 1982 was promulgated, the petitioners appeared in court without their counsel of record. The respondent court appointed a certain Cesar Villar who happened to be in court to act as petitioners’ counsel de oficio during the promul gation. On that occasion, the petitioners through their counsel de oficio manifested that. They are going to avail of the benefits of the Probation Law and prayed that they be released under the same bond." (Annex "B", Rollo p. 14) The court immediately granted gr anted the petitioners’ prayer. With a condition that the accused will submit within this day a certification from the bonding company that it is willing to accommodate the accused under the same bond for a period of five (5) days beginning today. On June 23, 1982, the petitioners filed with the respondent court an application for probation under Presidential Decree No. 968 as amended by Presidential Decree No.
Whether or not the petitioners whose application f or probation was granted after conviction of the crime of Staffa may still withdraw such application for probation and within the reglementary period appeal the judgment of conviction
not giving due course to the petitioners’ notice of appeal the respondent court relied on paragraph 3, Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968 (ESTABLISHING A PROBATION SYSTEM, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES) as amended which considers an application for probation of a convicted accused to be a waiver of his right to appeal or an automatic withdrawal of a pending appeal. In the case at bar, the respondent court hastily granted the manifestation and application for probation on June 22, 1982, the same day that the decision was promulgated and approved the formal application the following day without taking steps to be informed that the petitioners were aware of the full import of their application. Furthermore, Presidential Decree No. 968 which established the Probation System was envisioned among other things, "to provide an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender which might be less probable if he were to serve a prison sentence" (Section 2(b), Presidential Decree No. 968). Under the facts of this case, the petitioners cannot be considered "penitent offenders." They appeared to have improvidently filed their application for probation and should be allowed to withdraw it and to appeal the decision.
In the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Nang Kay alias Sy Kee was charged with illegal possession of firearms in that in his possession were found three grease guns and two Thompson Submachine guns, and empty magazines, without the necessary license. In court he appeared without counsel and upon being
arraigned, he pleaded guilty. He was sentenced to imprisonment for five (5) years and one (1) day, with the accessories of the law, and to pay costs. The firearms and ammunition in question were ordered confiscated in favor of the Government. He now appeals to this Court on the ground that the trial court failed to inform him at the arraignment of his right to be assisted by counsel. The Solicitor General also questions the correctness of the penalty imposed, expressing the opinion and making the recommendation that the law on indeterminate sentence should have been applied.
Whether or not to the defendant applied applied indeterminate sentence sentence
We are, therefore, of the opinion and hold that in cases where the application of the law on indeterminate sentence sentence would be unfavorable to the accused, resulting in the lengthening of his prison sentence, said law on indeterminate sentence should not be applied. Under this opinion, it is obvious that the trial court did not err in sentencing the appellant to imprisonment for five (5) years and one (1) day.
