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CRIMPRO – 1 set of digest
1.) PEOPLE v. GREY GR. no. 180109 July 26, 2010 Facts: An Information for Murder was filed against respondent Joseph Grey, former Mayor of San Jorge, Samar; his son, respondent Francis Grey; and two others for the death of Rolando Diocton before the RTC of Gandara, Samar. The Information was accompanied by other supporting documents and a motion for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Meanwhile, Presiding Judge Rosario Bandal denied the motion for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Judge Bandal found the prosecution’s evidence to be insufficient to link respondents to the crime charged. She directed the prosecution to present, within five days, additional evidence. Later, the judge inhibited. Thereafter, the venue was changed and Judge Naviadad continued the proceedings of the case. Respondents filed a petition for certiorari seeking TRO and preliminary injunction alleging that the filing of the murder charge are based on perjured statements since Joseph Grey announced his candidacy for the Congressional election. The CA held that Judge Naviadad failed to abide with the constitutional mandate of personally examining the existence of probable cause. Thus, this petition. Issue: Whether or not Judge Naviadad erred in personally examining for the existence of probable cause. Ruling: No. What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal’s report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. He should not rely solely on the report of the investigating prosecutor. It is not mandatory in the determination of probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest. In this case, the judge, upon his personal examination of the complaint and evidence before him, determined that there was probable cause to issue the warrants of arrest after the provincial prosecution, based on the affidavits presented by complainant and her witnesses, found probable cause to file the criminal Information. This finding of the Provincial Prosecutor was affirmed by the Secretary of Justice.
2.) BORLONGAN v. PENA GR.no. 143591 May 5, 2010 Facts: Respondent Atty. Peña instituted a civil case for recovery of agent’s compensation and expenses, damages, and attorney’s fees against Urban Bank and herein petitioners, before the RTC of Negros Occidental, Bago City. Atty. Peña anchored his claim for compensation on the Contract of Agency for preventing any intruder and squatter from unlawfully occupying Urban Bank’s property. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that they never appointed the respondent as agent or counsel. Atty. Pena claimed that the documents were falsified. The City prosecutor found probable cause for the indictment of petitioners for four (4) counts of the crime of Introducing Falsified Documents. Thereafter, Judge Primitivo Blanca issued the warrants for the arrest of the petitioners. Petitioners insisted that they were denied due process because of the non-observance of the proper procedure on preliminary investigation prescribed in the Rules of Court. Specifically, they claimed that they were not afforded the right to submit their counter-affidavit. Issue: Whether or not the prosecution and the court a quo properly observed the required procedure in the instant case Ruling: No. The inclusion of Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. in the complaint was a mistake that is tainted with carelessness in the issuance of the warrant of arrest since he is not a member of the Board. Although the extent of the judge's personal examination depends on the circumstances of each case, to be sure, he cannot just rely on the bare certification alone but must go beyond it. This is because the warrant of arrest issues not on the strength of the certification standing alone but because of the records which sustain it. He should even call for the complainant and the witnesses to answer the court's probing questions when the circumstances warrant. An arrest without a probable cause is an unreasonable seizure of a person, and violates the privacy of persons which ought not to be intruded by the State. Measured against the constitutional mandate and established rulings, there was here a clear abdication of the judicial function and a clear indication that the judge blindly followed the certification of a city prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest with respect to all of the petitioners.
3.) TAMARGO v. AWINGAN
GR.no. 177727
Jan. 19, 2010
Facts: Atty. Tamargo and his eight-year-old daughter, Gail Franzielle, were shot and killed in Binondo, Manila. A witness told that Lucio Columna was ordered by respondent Lloyd Antiporda to facilitate the killing. After conducting a preliminary investigation, the investigating prosecutor issued a resolution finding probable cause against Columna. Corresponding Informations for murder were filed against them in RTC Manila, and Columna was arrested in Cagayan. Columna then executed an affidavit admitting that he was the lookout on the said event and a certain Richard Mecate was the Gunman. The defense presented an unsolicited handwritten letter from Columna stating therein that he was only forced to admit to the killing and that all he said was untrue in the affidavit. Respondents further denied involvement in the killings. The RTC, after a clarificatory hearing initiated granted the withdrawal of the information. The case was re-raffled and presided by Judge Zenaida R. Daguna. She granted the MR of petitioner and ruled that, based on Columna’s affidavit which he affirmed before the investigating prosecutor, there was probable cause to hold the accused for trial. The CA ruled that the RTC judge gravely abused her discretion because she arbitrarily left out of her assessment and evaluation the substantial matters that the DOJ Secretary had fully taken into account in concluding that there was no probable cause against all the accused. Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in finding that Judge Daguna had committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the withdrawal of the Informations for murder against respondents. Ruling: Yes, Judge Daguna limited herself only to Columna’s affidavit. She completely ignored other relevant pieces of evidence. It is settled that, when confronted with a motion to withdraw an Information (on the ground of lack of probable cause to hold the accused for trial based on a resolution of the DOJ Secretary), the trial court has the duty to make an independent assessment of the merits of the motion. It may either agree or disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary. Reliance alone on the resolution of the Secretary would be an abdication of the trial court’s duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case. The court must itself be convinced that there is indeed no sufficient evidence against the accused. Although there is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable cause since the same must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in given situations and its existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination, such a finding should not disregard the facts before the judge nor run counter to the clear dictates of reason. The judge or fiscal, therefore, should not go on with the prosecution in the hope that some credible evidence might later turn up during trial for this would be a flagrant violation of a basic right which the courts are created to uphold.
4.) JUDGE ABELITA III v. DORIA GR.no. 170672 Facts: Judge Abelita III filed a complaint for Damages against P/Supt. Doria and SPO3 Ramirez. Petitioner alleged that while he and his family are on their way home, these two officers requested them to proceed to the Provincial PNP Headquarters at Camp Boni Serrano, Masbate, Masbate. He was forcibly taken and was searched without warrant. A shotgun was found in his possession and he was arrested. Petitioner was charged with illegal possession of firearms and frustrated murder. The trial court found that petitioner was at the scene of the shooting incident in Barangay Nursery. The trial court ruled that the police officers who conducted the search were of the belief, based on reasonable grounds, that petitioner was involved in the incident and that the firearm used in the commission of the offense was in his possession. The trial court ruled that petitioner’s warrantless arrest and the warrantless seizure of the firearms were valid and legal, thus, rejecting petitioner’s claim for frame up. Issue: Whether the warrantless arrest and warrantless search and seizure were illegal under Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure; Ruling: No. For the warrantless arrest under this Rule to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the offender has just committed an offense; and (2) the arresting peace officer or private person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure does not require the arresting officers to personally witness the commission of the offense with their own eyes. In this case, P/Supt. Doria received a report about the alleged shooting incident. SPO3 Ramirez investigated the report and learned from witnesses that petitioner was involved in the incident. They were able to track down petitioner, but when invited to the police headquarters to shed light on the incident, petitioner initially agreed then sped up his vehicle, prompting the police authorities to give chase. Petitioner’s act of trying to get away, coupled with the incident report which they investigated, is enough to raise a reasonable suspicion on the part of the police authorities as to the existence of probable cause. The seizure of the firearms was justified under the plain view doctrine. The plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (2) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (3) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The police authorities were in the area because that was where they caught up with petitioner after the chase. They saw the firearms inside the vehicle when petitioner opened the door. Since a shooting incident just took place and it was reported that petitioner was
involved in the incident, it was apparent to the police officers that the firearms may be evidence of a crime, hence they were justified in seizing the firearms.
5.) PEOPLE v. REYES GR.no. 178300 Mar. 17, 2009 Facts: Applellants were charged of the complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide after having conspiring to extort money from the Yaos by carrying away and depriving Robert Yao, Yao San, Chua Ong Ping Sim, Raymond Yao, Ronald Matthew Yao, Lennie Yao, Charlene Yao, Jona Abagatnan ang Josephine Ortea against their will and consent on board their Mazda MVP van at the their poultry farm, for the purpose of extorting money in the amount of P5,000,000.00 and that during the detention of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymong Yao, said accused strangled Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond Yao to death. During the arraignment, the appellants pleaded ―not guilty‖. Affidavits were presented and the defense contended that it was only a frame- up. Appellant Arnaldo surrendered to the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) at Camp Crame, Quezon City. Thereupon, appellant Arnaldo, with the assistance of Atty. Uminga, executed a written extra-judicial confession narrating his participation in the incident. Appellant Arnaldo identified appellants Reyes and Flores, Pataray and a certain Tata and Akey as his coparticipants in the incident. Appellant Arnaldo also described the physical features of his cohorts and revealed their whereabouts.. RTC ruled against the appellants. A reduced penalty was given by the CA. Appellant filed an MR but was denied. Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in giving weight and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Ruling: No. In resolving issues pertaining to the credibility of the witnesses, this Court is guided by the following well-settled principles: (1) the reviewing court will not disturb the findings of the lower court, unless there is a showing that the latter overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that may affect the result of the case; (2) the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect and even finality, as it had the opportunity to examine their demeanor when they testified on the witness stand; and (3) a witness who testifies in a clear, positive and convincing manner is a credible witness. After carefully reviewing the evidence on record and applying the foregoing guidelines to this case, we found no cogent reason to overturn the RTC’s ruling finding the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses credible. The court held that an extra-judicial confession is admissible in evidence if the following requisites have been satisfied: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing
6.) MALACAT v. COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 123595 December 12, 1997 Facts: Petitioner was charged with violating Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for having a hand grenade, without first securing the necessary license and/or permit therefor from the proper authorities. He was apprehended by virtue of a warrantless arrest of ―stop and frisk‖ when the police noticed their suspicious acts. Upon being approached by the police officers, the accused immediately run from different directions and was chased by the police officers. Thereafter, they already arrested the suspects. The said police officers was said to be already trying to apprehend the said accused here, for almost 2 days. The trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of petitioner was akin to it a "stop and frisk," where a "warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest" and "whose object is either to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information." Moreover, it ruled that the seizure of the grenade from petitioner was incidental to a lawful arrest, and since petitioner "[l]ater voluntarily admitted such fact to the police investigator for the purpose of bombing the Mercury Drug Store," concluded that sufficient evidence existed to establish petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, due to the loss of his case in the trial court, it was directly appealed to the court of appeals who also affirmed the validity of the warrantless arrest. Issue: Whether or not the arrest was valid? Ruling: No. The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in order to validly effect the same. The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures refers to those effected without a validly issued warrant, subject to certain exceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest. 5(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1) customs searches; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; (5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest; and (6) a "stop and frisk." Having thus shown the invalidity of the warrantless arrest in this case, plainly, the search conducted on petitioner could not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest.
Here, here are at least three (3) reasons why the ―stop-and-frisk‖ was invalid: First, we harbor grave doubts as to Yu’s claim that petitioner was a member of the group which attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda two days earlier. This claim is neither supported by any police report. Second, there was nothing in petitioner’s behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were ―moving very fast‖ – an observation which leaves us incredulous. Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that petitioner was armed with a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was ―discovered‖ ―inside the front waistline‖ of petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance between Yu and petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming that petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu. Further, Serapio conducted the custodial investigation on petitioner the day following his arrest. No lawyer was present and Serapio could not have requested a lawyer to assist petitioner as no PAO lawyer was then available. Thus, even if petitioner consented to the investigation and waived his rights to remain silent and to counsel, the waiver was invalid as it was not in writing, neither was it executed in the presence of counsel. Thus, the admission is inadmissible as evidence against the petitioner.
7.) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JESUS NUEVAS, et. al. G.R. No. 170233 February 22, 2007
Facts: Police officer received information that a certain male person a man would make a delivery of marijuana dried leaves. While stationed thereat, they saw a male person who fit the description, carrying a plastic bag, who was Nuevas. They confronted the latter and ask. Later on, Nuevas voluntarily pointed to the police officers a plastic bag which, when opened, contained marijuana dried leaves and bricks wrapped in a blue cloth. Nuevas disclosed where the two (2) other male persons would make the delivery of marijuana weighing more or less five (5) kilos. The police officers together with Nuevas, then proceeded the place where according to Nuevas was where his two (2) companions, Din and Inocencio, could be located. From there, they saw and approached two (2) persons along the National Highway, introducing themselves as police officers. Din was carrying a light blue plastic bag. When asked, Din disclosed that the bag belonged to Nuevas. Officers then took the bag and upon inspection found inside it "marijuana packed in newspaper and wrapped therein." are violated. All of the said materials are confiscated and the 3 are arrested. The trial court found them guilty with illegal possession of marijuana in violation of Section 8, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended. Nuevas, by manifestation, waived his right of appeal. The appellate court found Fami and Cabling’s version of how appellants were apprehended to be categorical and clear. However the other 2 filed there recourse in the Court of Appeals base on their allegations that they are not guilty and their constitutional rights against warrantless arrest. However, the appellate court stated that the search in the instant case is exempted from the requirement of a judicial warrant as appellants themselves waived their right against unreasonable searches and seizures. According to the appellate court, both Cabling and Fami testified that Din voluntarily surrendered the bag. Appellants never presented evidence to rebut the same. Thus, in the instant case, the exclusionary rule does not apply. Hence, the petition. Issue: Whether or not the arrest was valid? Ruling: No. The conviction or acquittal of appellants rests on the validity of the warrantless searches and seizure made by the police officers and the admissibility of the evidence obtained by virture thereof. Our Constitution states that a search and seizure must be carried through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure 35 becomes "unreasonable" and any evidence obtained therefrom is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The constitutional proscription, however, is not absolute but admits of exceptions, namely: 1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. (Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence); 2. Search of evidence in "plain view." The elements are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search; 3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity; 4. Consented warrantless search; 5. Customs search; 6. Stop and Frisk; and 7. Exigent and emergency circumstances. In the instances where a warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be performed except without a warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched and the character of the articles procured. Arrest must preced the search. A search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can make the arrest as the outset of the search. Reliable information alone is not a sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under Sec. 5(a), Rule 113. A peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a concent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. A
waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest. In Nuevas’s case, the Court is convinced that he indeed voluntarily surrendered the incriminating bag to the police officers. Thus, the Court would have affirmed Nuevas’s conviction had he not withdrawn his appeal. However, with respect to the search conducted in the case of Din, the Court finds that no such consent had actually been given. Thus, their arrest was indeed a violation of their rights. The arrest was an invalid warrantless arrest.
8.) PEOPLE v. IDEL AMINNUDIN G.R.No. 74869 July 6, 1988 Facts: PC officers received a tip from one of their informers that the accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. He was Identified by name. Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the evening of June 25, 1984, and approached him. Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 .They detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. It was found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner. An information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. 2 Later, the information was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that same evening and likewise investigated. Both were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers absolving her after a 'thorough investigation." The motion was granted, and trial proceeded only against the accused-appellant, who was eventually convicted. In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants. He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a search warrant. The trial court did not believe the appellant. Issue: Whether or not the arrest was valid? Ruling: No. In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination by him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of the government, the accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Even expediency could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention of the warrant as in the case of Roldan v. Arca, for example. Here it was held that vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and seizures for violation of the customs law because these vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction before the warrant can be secured. The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was Identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his own authority that a "search warrant was not necessary." In the many cases where this Court has sustained the warrantless arrest of violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act, it has always been shown that they were caught red-handed, as a result of what are popularly called "buy-bust" operations of the narcotics 25 agents. Rule 113 was clearly applicable because at the precise time of arrest the accused was in the act of selling the prohibited drug. While this is not to say that the accused-appellant is innocent, for indeed his very own words suggest that he is lying, that fact alone does not justify a finding that he is guilty. The constitutional presumption is that he is innocent, and he will be so declared even if his defense is weak as long as the prosecution is not strong enough to convict him. He must be acquitted.
9.) PEOPLE v. MOLINA 352 SCRA 174 Facts: SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, received an information regarding the presence of an alleged marijuana pusher in Davao City. At around 9:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, while the team were positioned in the house of SPO1 Paguidopon, a "trisikad" carrying the accused-appellants passed by. At that instance, SPO1 Paguidopon pointed to the accused-appellants as the pushers. Thereupon, 11 the team boarded their, vehicle and overtook the "trisikad." SPO1 Paguidopon was left in his house, thirty meters from where the 12 accused-appellants were accosted. The police officers then ordered the "trisikad" to stop. At that point, accused-appellant Mula who was holding a black bag handed the same to accused-appellant Molina. Subsequently, SPO1 Pamplona introduced himself as a police officer and asked accused-appellant
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Molina to open the bag. Molina replied, "Boss, if possible we will settle this." SPO1 Pamplona insisted on opening the bag, which 15 revealed dried marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter; accused-appellants Mula and Molina were handcuffed by the police officers. On December 6, 1996, accused-appellants, through counsel, jointly filed a Demurrer to Evidence, contending that the marijuana allegedly seized from them is inadmissible as evidence for having been obtained in violation of their constitutional right against 16 17 unreasonable searches and seizures. The demurrer was denied by the trial court. A motion for reconsideration was filed by accusedappellants, but this was likewise denied The Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and MO1ion (In Lieu of Brief), wherein he prayed for the acquittal of both accusedappellants. Issue: Whether or not the warrantless arrest, search and seizure in the present case fall within the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement? Ruling: No. As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it is settled that "reliable information" alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, are not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. Thus, in People v. Aminnudin, it was held that "the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the MN Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension." Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. In the case at bar, accused-appellants manifested no outward indication that would justify their arrest. In holding a bag on board a trisikad, accused-appellants could not be said to be committing, attempting to commit or have committed a crime. Withal, the Court holds that the arrest of accused-appellants does not fall under the exceptions allowed by the rules. Hence, the search conducted on their person was likewise illegal. Consequently, the marijuana seized by the peace officers could not be admitted as evidence against accused-appellants, and the Court is thus, left with no choice but to find in favor of accused-appellants. They are acquitted.The law mandates that searches be carried out with a search warrant upon the existence of probable cause. Likewise, the law protects against unreasonable searches and seizures and holds evidence taken from such incidents as inadmissible as evidence. There are exceptions to this, the first being seizure conducted incidental to a lawful arrest For this, there should be a lawful arrest first, before a search can be made.
10.) PEOPLE v. ROGELIO MENGOTE G.R. No. 87059 June 22, 1992 FACTS: The Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that there were three suspicious looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place. The patrolmen saw two men looking from side to side, one of whom holding his abdomen. They approached the persons and identified themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried to run but unable to escape because the other lawmen surrounded them. The suspects were then searched. One of them the accused-appellant was found with a .38 caliber with live ammunitions in it, while his companion had a fan knife. The weapons were taken from them and they were turned over to the police headquarters for investigation. An information was filed before the RTC convicting the accused of illegal possession of firearm arm. A witness testified that the weapon was among the articles stolen at his shop, which he reported to the police including the revolver. For his part, Mengote made no effort to prove that he owned the fire arm or that he was licensed to possess it but instead, he claimed that the weapon was planted on him at the time of his arrest. He was convicted for violation of P.D.1866 and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. In his appeal he pleads that the weapon was not admissible as evidence against him because it had been illegally seized and therefore the fruit of a poisonous tree. Issue: Whether or not the arrest was valid? Ruling: No. Section 5 (a) of Rule 113 of the Rules of court requires that the person be arrested (1) after he has committed or while he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (2) in the presence of the arresting officer. These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in question, the accused-appellant was merely "looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen," according to the arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that had just been committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempted by Mengote in their presence. The Solicitor General submits that the actual existence of an offense was not necessary as long as Mengote's acts "created a reasonable suspicion on the part of the arresting officers and induced in them the belief that an offense had been committed and that the accused-appellant had committed it." The question is, What offense? What offense could possibly have been suggested by a person "looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen" and in a place not exactly forsaken?
11.) PEOPLE vs. BINAD SY CHUA G.R. Nos. 136066-67 February 4, 2003 Facts: SPO2 Mario Nulud and PO2 Emmeraldo Nunag received a report from their confidential informant that accused-appellant was about to deliver drugs that night at the Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago, Angeles City. The informer further reported that accusedappellant distributes illegal drugs in different karaoke bars in Angeles City. On the basis of this lead the PNP Chief of Angeles City immediately formed a team of operatives. At around 11:45 in the evening, their informer pointed to a car driven by accused-appellant which just arrived and parked near the entrance of the Thunder Inn Hotel. After accused-appellant alighted from the car carrying a sealed Zest-O juice box, SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag hurriedly accosted him and introduced themselves as police officers. As accused-appellant pulled out his wallet, a small transparent plastic bag with a crystalline substance protruded from his right back pocket. Forthwith, SPO2 Nulud subjected him to a body search which yielded twenty (20) pieces of live .22 caliber firearm bullets from his left back pocket. When SPO2 Nunag peeked into the contents of the Zest-O box, he saw that it contained a crystalline substance. SPO2 Nulud instantly confiscated the small transparent plastic bag, the Zest-O juice box, the twenty (20) pieces of .22 caliber firearm bullets and the car used by accused-appellant. Afterwards, SPO2 Nulud and the other police operatives who arrived at the scene brought the confiscated items to the office of Col. Guttierez at the PNP Headquarters in Camp Pepito, Angeles City. The initial field test conducted by SPO2 Danilo Cruz at the PNP Headquarters revealed that the siezed items contained shabu. Accused-appellant narrated a different version of the incident. However, the trial court convicted him guilty as charged with illegal possession of Drugs. Issue: Whether there is a valid warrantless arrest. Held: No. In the case at bar, neither the in flagrante delicto nor the ―stop and frisk‖ principles is applicable to justify the warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure made by the police operatives on accused-appellant. In in flagrante delicto arrests, the accused is apprehended at the very moment he is committing or attempting to commit or has just committed an offense in the presence of the arresting officer. Accordingly, for this exception to apply two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it has been held that ―reliable information‖ alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. A stop-and-frisk was defined as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. The police officer should properly introduce himself and make initial inquiries, approach and restrain a person who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check the latter’s outer clothing for possibly concealed weapons. The apprehending police officer must have a genuine reason, in accordance with the police officer’s experience and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to be held has weapons (or contraband) concealed about him. It should therefore be emphasized that a search and seizure should precede the arrest for this principle to apply. Considering that the identity, address and activities of the suspected culprit was already ascertained two years previous to the actual arrest, there was indeed no reason why the police officers could not have obtained a judicial warrant before arresting accusedappellant and searching his person.
12.) * refer to no. 09
13.) PEOPLE v. HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR. & LAWRENCE WANG Facts: Police operatives of the Public Assistance and Reaction Against Crime of the Department of Interior and Local Government, arrested SPO2 de Dios, \Anoble and a certain Arellano, for unlawful possession of shabu. In the course of the investigation of the three arrested persons, Redentor Teck, alias Frank, and Joseph Junio were identified as the source of the drug. An entrapment operation was then set after the three were prevailed upon to call their source and pretend to order another supply of shabu. That same date, Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio were arrested while they were about to hand over another bag of shabu to SPO2 De Dios and company. Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio did not disclose their source of shabu but admitted that they were working for Wang. They also disclosed that they knew of a scheduled delivery of shabu early the following morning, and that their employer (Wang) could be found at the Maria Orosa Apartment in Malate, Manila. The police operatives decided to look for Wang to shed light on the illegal drug activities of Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio. Police Inspector and his men then proceeded to Maria Orosa Apartment and placed the same under surveillance. Wang, who was described to the operatives by Teck, came out of the apartment and walked towards a parked BMW car. On nearing the car, he (witness) together with Captain Margallo and two other police officers approached Wang, introduced themselves to him as police officers, asked his name and, upon hearing that he was Lawrence Wang, immediately frisked him and asked him to open the back compartment of the BMW car. When frisked, there was found inside the front right pocket of Wang and confiscated from him an unlicensed Pistol loaded with ammunitions. At the same time, the other members of the operatives searched the car and found inside it were the following items: (a) transparent plastic bags of shabu; (b) P650,000.00 cash ; (c) one
electronic and one mechanical scales; and (d) an unlicensed Daewoo 9mm Pistol with magazine. Then and there, Wang resisted the warrantless arrest and search. The trial court held that the warrantless arrest was illegal and that warrantless search incidental to the arrest was also unlawful. Issue: Whether or not Hon. Laguio erred in acquitting the accused due to the invalid warrantless arrest? Held: No. The pertinent provisions of Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on warrantless arrest provide: Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. Therefore, there can be no valid warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of Section 5. It is settled that "reliable information" alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arre sting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. Neither may the warrantless arrest be justified under paragraph (b) of Section 5. And doubtless, the warrantless arrest does not fall under paragraph (c) of Section 5. The inevitable conclusion, as correctly made by the trial court, is that the warrantless arrest was illegal. Ipso jure, the warrantless search incidental to the illegal arrest is likewise unlawful. The People’s contention that Wang waived his right against unreasonable search and seizure has no factual basis. While we agree in principle that consent will validate an otherwise illegal search, however, based on the evidence on record, Wang resisted his arrest and the search on his person and belongings. The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. Moreover, the continuing objection to the validity of the warrantless arrest made of record during the arraignment bolsters Wang’s claim that he resisted the warrantless arrest and search.
14.) PEOPLE v. GABRIEL GERENTE Facts: Appellant Gabriel Gerente, together with Fredo and Totoy Echigoren, started drinking liquor and smoking marijuana in the house of the appellant which is about six (6) meters away from the house of the prosecution witness who was in her house on that day. She overheard the three men talking about their intention to kill Clarito Blace. Fredo and Totoy Echigoren and Gerente carried out their plan to kill Clarito Blace. The prosecution witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, testified that she witnessed the killing. Patrolman Jaime Urrutia of the Valenzuela Police Station received a report from the Palo Police Detachment about a mauling incident. He went to the Valenzuela District Hospital where the victim was brought. He was informed by the hospital officials that the victim died on arrival. They were informed by the prosecution witness, Edna Edwina Reyes,that she saw the killing and she pointed to Gabriel Gerente as one of the three men who killed Clarito. The policemen proceeded to the house of the appellant who was then sleeping. They told him to come out of the house and they introduced themselves as policemen. Patrolman Urrutia frisked appellant and found a coin purse in his pocket which contained dried leaves wrapped in cigarette foil. The dried leaves were sent to the National Bureau of Investigation for examination. The Forensic Chemist found them to be marijuana. Issue: Whether or not admitting the marijuana leaves as evidence is a violation of appellant’s constitutional right as it is an illegal search and seizure. HELD: No, it is legal. The search of appellant's person and the seizure of the marijuana leaves in his possession were valid because they were incident to a lawful warrantless arrest. Paragraphs (a) and (b), Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court provide: 'SECTION 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: "(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;" "(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; . . .' The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions had killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the crime, they found the instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used to bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those circumstances, since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as his two companions did.
The search conducted on Gerente's person was likewise lawful because it was made as an incident to a valid arrest. This is in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides: "SECTION 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant." The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his arrest was a permissible precautionary measure of arresting officers to protect themselves, for the person who is about to be arrested may be armed and might attack them unless he is first disarmed. 15.) JUDGE FELIMON ABELITA III v. P/SUPT. GERMAN B. DORIA & SPO3 CESAR RAMIREZ August 14, 2009 G.R. No. 170672
Facts: Judge Felimon Abelita III filed a complaint for Damages against P/Supt. Doria and SPO3 Ramirez. He alleged that he was framed up and arrested without any appropriate charged while he parked his car in front of their house. SPO3 Ramirez forcibly took the key of van, barged into the vehicle, and conducted a search without a warrant. The search resulted to the seizure of a licensed shotgun and .45 caliber pistol. On the other hand, P/Supt. Doria alleged that he receive a telephone call about a shooting incident in Barangay Nursery where certain William Sia was wounded while petitioner, who was involved in the incident, and his wife left the place. P/Supt. Doria looked for petitioner and when he found him, he informed him of the incident report. He requested petitioner to go with him, petitioner agreed but suddenly sped up his vehicle and proceeded to his residence. P/Supt. Doria and his companions chased petitioner. Upon reaching petitioner’s residence, they caught up with petitioner as he was about to run towards his house. The police officers saw a gun in the front seat of the vehicle beside the driver’s seat as petitioner opened the door. The police officers confiscated the firearms and arrested petitioner. Petitioner alleges that for the warrantless arrest to be lawful, the arresting officer must have personal knowledge of facts that the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. Petitioner alleges that the alleged shooting incident was just relayed to the arresting officers, and thus they have no personal knowledge of facts as required by the Rules. The trial court ruled that petitioner’s warrantless arrest and the warrantless seizure of the firearms were valid and legal. The trial court rejected petitioner’s claim of frame-up as weak and insufficient to overthrow the positive testimonies of the police officers who conducted the arrest and the incidental search. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence this petition. . Issue: Whether the warrantless arrest were illegal under Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure Held: NO. For the warrantless arrest under this Rule to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the offender has just committed an offense; and (2) the arresting peace officer or private person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure does not require the arresting officers to personally witness the commission of the offense with their own eyes. In this case, P/Supt. Doria received a report about the alleged shooting incident. SPO3 Ramirez investigated the report and learned from witnesses that petitioner was involved in the incident. They were able to track down petitioner, but when invited to the police headquarters to shed light on the incident, petitioner initially agreed then sped up his vehicle, prompting the police authorities to give chase. Petitioner’s act of trying to get away, coupled with the incident report which they investigated, is enough to raise a reasonable suspicion on the part of the police authorities as to the existence of probable cause.
16.) PEOPLE v. ELVIE EJANDRA et, al. G.R. No. 134203 May 27, 2004 Facts: Ed Henderson Tan, a nine-year-old minor child, while in the store was approached by the appellants threatened and forced to take him. Thereafter, appellants called, demanded and negotiated the payment of ransom money from Eddie Tan, father of the child. Subsequently, Ed was released and reunited to his family. Three days after, Eddie Tan gave a sworn statement in the Criminal Investigation Division in Camp Crame. Appellants denied and gave their alibi on the involvement on the alleged kidnapping. On part of Appellants Ejandra and Calunod, they do not dispute that they kidnapped Ed Henderson but merely assert that the prosecution failed to prove that they had a cellular phone, implying that they could not have used it to demand ransom for the victim’s release. They also assert that they were arrested without any warrant therefor. The Trial Court rendered decision convicting the appellants of the crime charged. Issue: Whether appellant’s assertion that they were arrested without any warrant may be credited. Ruling: No. The Court agree with the Office of the Solicitor General that the appellants Ejandra and Calunod waived any irregularities relating to their warrantless arrest when they failed to file a motion to quash the Information on that ground, or to object to any irregularity in their arrest before they were arraigned. They are now estopped from questioning the legality of their arrest.
17.) PEOPLE v. ROMEO G. JALOSJOS G.R. Nos. 132875-76 February 3, 2000 Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented. He claim that he has an immunity from arrest. Having been re-elected by his constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions of a Congressman. He calls this a covenant with his constituents made possible by the intervention of the State Issue: Whether appellant may invoke the immunity of arrest. Ruling :No. The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives, the latter customarily addressed as Congressmen, arises from a provision of the Constitution. The history of the provision shows that the privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations. The accused-appellant states that the plea of the electorate which voted him into office cannot be supplanted by unfounded fears that he might escape eventual punishment if permitted to perform congressional duties outside his regular place of confinement. It will be recalled that when a warrant for accused-appellant’s arrest was issued, he fled and evaded capture despite a call from his colleagues in the House of Representatives for him to attend the sessions and to surrender voluntarily to the authorities. Ironically, it is now the same body whose call he initially spurned which accused-appellant is invoking to justify his present motion. This cannot be countenanced because, to reiterate, aside from its being contrary to well-defined Constitutional restrains, it would be a mockery of the aims of the State’s penal system.
18.) PEOPLE v. VASQUEZ G.R. No. 200304 January 15, 2014 Facts: Initially the case of illegal possession of drugs was raffled but upon motion it was consolidated with the case of illegal sale of drugs. On arraignment, the appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. The pre-trial conference of the cases was held, but the same was terminated without the parties entering into any stipulation of facts. During the trial of the case the prosecution stated the events. There was a confidential informant reported to PO2 Trambulo about the illegal drug activities. Fajardo form a buy-bust team. It was in the buy-bust operation that Don was arrested. RTC convicted the appellant of the crimes charged. The RTC gave more credence to the prosecution’s evidence given that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty on the part of the police officers was not overcome. On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of the appellant. Hence this appeal. He argues that the police officers did not have a search warrant or a warrant of arrest at the time he was arrested. This occurred despite the fact that the police officers allegedly had ample time to secure a warrant of arrest against him. Inasmuch as his arrest was illegal, the appellant avers that the evidence obtained as a result thereof was inadmissible in court. Issue: Whether the appellant Don may assail the validity of arrest. Ruling: No. At the outset, the Court rules that the appellant can no longer assail the validity of his arrest. We reiterated in People v. Tampis52 that "[a]ny objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea on arraignment. Having failed to move for the quashing of the information against them before their arraignment, appellants are now estopped from questioning the legality of their arrest. Any irregularity was cured upon their voluntary submission to the trial court’s jurisdiction."53 Be that as it may, the fact of the matter is that the appellant was caught in flagrante delicto of selling illegal drugs to an undercover police officer in a buy-bust operation. His arrest, thus, falls within the ambit of Section 5(a), Rule 11354 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure when an arrest made without warrant is deemed lawful. Having established the validity of the warrantless arrest in this case, the Court holds that the warrantless seizure of the illegal drugs from the appellant is likewise valid. We held in People v. Cabugatan55 that: This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not absolute and such warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by jurisprudence in instances of (1) search of moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3) customs searches, (4) waiver or consented searches, (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search), and search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate [if] effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrest, to wit: (1) arrest in flagrante delicto, (2) arrest effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrest of escaped prisoners. (Citation omitted.) Thus, the appellant cannot seek exculpation by invoking belatedly the invalidity of his arrest and the subsequent search upon his person.
19.) PEOPLE v. NAZARENO VILLAREAL G.R. No. 201363 March 18, 2013 Facts: This is an appeal Decision of CA affirming the decision of RTC convicting Nazareno Villareal y Lualhati (appellant) for violation of Illegal possession of dangerous drugs. PO3 Renato de Leon (PO3 de Leon) was driving his motorcycle on his way home along 5th Avenue, he saw appellant from a distance, holding and scrutinizing in his hand a plastic sachet of shabu. He then alighted from his motorcycle and approached the appellant whom he recognized as someone he had previously arrested for illegal drug possession. Appellant tried to escape but was quickly apprehended. Upon qualitative examination, the plastic sachet, tested positive a dangerous drug. Consequently, appellant was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 for illegal possession of dangerous drugs in an Information. Appellant defended himself that he approached PO3 de Leon who frisked him and took his wallet. That he was detained, mauled and forced to answer about stolen cellphone. That the following day he was informed of being charged with resisting arrest. RTC gave full faith and credit to PO3 de Leon’s testimony. Moreover, the RTC found the plain view doctrine to be applicable, as the confiscated item was in plain view of PO3 de Leon at the place and time of the arrest. The CA sustained appellant’s conviction, finding "a clear case of in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest" as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The CA held that appellant "exhibited an overt act or strange conduct that would reasonably arouse suspicion," aggravated by the existence of his past criminal citations and his attempt to flee when PO3 de Leon approached him. Issue: Whether the CA erred in affirming in toto the RTC’s Decision convicting appellant of the offense charged. Ruling: Yes. Absent any other circumstance upon which to anchor a lawful arrest, no other overt act could be properly attributed to appellant as to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 de Leon that he (appellant) had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime, for the acts per se of walking along the street and examining something in one’s hands cannot in any way be considered criminal acts. In fact, even if appellant had been exhibiting unusual or strange acts, or at the very least appeared suspicious, the same would not have been sufficient in order for PO3 de Leon to effect a lawful warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5, Rule 113. The factual circumstances of the case failed to show that PO3 de Leon had personal knowledge that a crime had been indisputably committed by the appellant. It is not enough that PO3 de Leon had reasonable ground to believe that appellant had just committed a crime; a crime must in fact have been committed first, which does not obtain in this case. In fine, appellant’s acts of walking along the street and holding something in his hands, even if they appeared to be dubious, coupled with his previous criminal charge for the same offense, are not by themselves sufficient to incite suspicion of criminal activity or to create probable cause enough to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5 above-quoted. "Probable cause" has been understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. Specifically with respect to arrests, it is such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested, which clearly do not obtain in appellant’s case. Thus, while it is true that the legality of an arrest depends upon the reasonable discretion of the officer or functionary to whom the law at the moment leaves the decision to characterize the nature of the act or deed of the person for the urgent purpose of suspending his liberty, it cannot be arbitrarily or capriciously exercised without unduly compromising a citizen’s constitutionallyguaranteed right to liberty
20.) PEOPLE v. SALVADOR G.R. No. 201443
April 10, 2013
Facts: The charges against the accused-appellants stemmed from the following Information charging them of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for having abducted Pinky, forcing her to abode a Toyota Hi-Ace Van, and she was brought to a undisclosed lplace in Caloocan City; of kidnapping for ransom for having abducted Albert, forcing him to abode the same van, and demanding ransom thereof. The detention of both victims was allegedly lasted for 6 days. During arraignment, the accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the charges. The RTC acquitted the appellant s for kidnapping Pinky but they were convicted with the crime charge with regard to Albert’s abduction. Issue: Whether or not the claims of having been subjected to mauling, illegal arrest, intimidation and extortion attempts committed by the police authorities entitles credit for their acquittal.
Held:
No.
It is settled that irregularities attending the arrest of the accused-appellants should have been timely raised in their respective motions to quash the Informations at any time before their arraignment, failing at which they are deemed to have waived their rights to assail the same. No such motions were filed by the accused-appellants. Further, without meaning to downplay or take the allegations of the accused-appellants lightly, we, however, note that these were unsubstantiated as to the identities of the offenders and uncorroborated by other pieces of evidence. To date, no complaints against the supposed abusive police officers had yet been filed by the accused-appellants. If the abuses were indeed committed, we exhort the accused-appellants to initiate the proper administrative and criminal proceedings to make the erring police officers liable. We stress that while the criminal justice system is devised to punish the offenders, it is no less the State’s duty to ensure that those who administer it do so with clean hands.
21.) RONTOS v. PEOPLE G.R. No. 188024 January 5, 2013 Facts: PO2 Masi dispatched PO1 Pacis and PO1 Labaclado of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Task Force to conduct surveillance in Sampaloc St., Camarin, Caloocan City because of reports of illegal drug activity in the said area. Upon coming closer, they saw that the plastic sachets appeared to contain a white crystalline substance similar to shabu. PO1 Pacis approached petitioner and confiscated the plastic sachets. Thereafter, he introduced himself as a police officer and informed petitioner of the offense the latter had committed. The two police officers informed petitioner of his constitutional rights, while he just remained silent. A Complaint for possession of dangerous drugs, Article II of R.A. 9165, was drawn up and referred to the city prosecutor for the filing of charges before the court. The RTC ruled that the prosecution was able to establish the concurrence of all the elements of possession of dangerous drugs. On appeal, The CA ruled that the question over the legality of the arrest was deemed waived by petitioner when he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by entering a plea of "Not Guilty" and participating in the trial of the case. In any case, the CA explained that while the arrest was without a warrant, it was with probable cause since petitioner was arrested in flagrante delicto. He committed a crime in plain view of the police officers, as he was spotted in the act of holding and examining plastic sachets containing shabu Issue: Whether or not the CA erred when it held that the question of legality was deemed waived when petitioner entered a plea of not guilty? Held:
No.
In his arraignment before the trial court, petitioner never raised any issue and instead "freely and voluntarily pleaded Not Guilty to the offense charged." Thus, he was estopped from raising the issue of the legality of his arrest before the trial court, more so on appeal before the CA or this Court. However, on the basis of the non-observance of the rules of procedure for handling illegal drug items, we resolve to acquit petitioner on the ground of reasonable doubt. In illegal drugs cases, the identity and integrity of the drugs seized must be established with the same unwavering exactitude as that required to arrive at a finding of guilt. The case against the accused hinges on the ability of the prosecution to prove that the illegal drug presented in court is the same one that was recovered from the accused upon his arrest.
22.) PEOPLE v. VELASCO Facts: Roberto Velasco, stepfather of Lisa, a minor 14 years of age, raped his stepdaughter [Lisa] for three consecutive time while they were alone in the house. A year thereafter, at midnight, when the other members of the family were asleep, appellant succeeded in touching and kissing Lisa’s private parts. Appellant was arraigned for the three charges of rape; and one charge of acts of lasciviousness to which he entered a plea of not guilty on all charges. At the conclusion of trial, the trial court convicted appellant on all the charges leveled against him. Issue:
Whether or not the accused should be acquitted because of the irregularities which attended his warrantless arrest?
Held:
No.
With regard to purported irregularities that attended appellant’s warrantless arrest, we are of the same persuasion as the Court of Appeals which ruled that such a plea comes too late in the day to be worthy of consideration. Jurisprudence tells us that an accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before arraignment, thus, any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the
procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction of the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the 16 objection is deemed waived. Nevertheless, even if appellant’s warrantless arrest were proven to be indeed invalid, such a scenario would still not provide salvation to appellant’s cause because jurisprudence also instructs us that the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error.
23.) VIVENCIO ROALLO v. PEOPLE G.R. No. 198389, December 11, 2013 Facts: This case is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which calls to annul and set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals where it affirmed with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) finding Vivencio Roallos y Trillanes (Roallos) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of sexual abuse punished under Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610 (R.A. No. 7610), otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation, and Discrimination Act." Roallos asserted that his arrest was illegal since the same was effected without any warrant of arrest. He said he was not informed of his rights when he was arrested nor was he made to undergo any preliminary investigation. Issue: Whether or not Roallos’ claim that his arrest was illegal for lack of warrant of arrest , non-information of his rights when he was arrested nor was he made to undergo any preliminary investigation tenable. Held: Roallos’ claim that he was denied due process since he was arrested without any warrant of arrest and that he was not afforded a preliminary investigation is untenable. An accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before arraignment. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. At the time of arraignment, Roallos did not raise any objection to the supposed illegality of his arrest and the lack of a proper preliminary investigation. He actively participated in the proceedings before the RTC. Therefore he is deemed to have waived any perceived irregularity in his arrest and has effectively submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the RTC. He is likewise deemed to have waived his right to preliminary investigation.
24.) PEOPLE v. REBOTAZO 698 SCRA 452 Facts: Informant Torremocha went to the NBI office in Dumaguete City to report that appellant was selling several sachets of shabu in his possession. The informant also told the NBI that he was going to meet with appellant later. Hence, NBI planned a buy-bust operation and formed a buy-bust team. Diaz flagged them down, and Torremocha introduced him to appellant. After a brief conversation, Diaz told appellant that he was interested in buying shabu and handed to him the P300 marked money. In exchange, appellant handed to Diaz a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. Upon completing the transaction, Diaz executed the pre-arranged signal by removing his cap and the appellant was immediately arrested. Appellant was subjected to a body search, and, in the process, voluntarily informed the NBI agents that he had another sachet of shabu inside one of his socks. However, according to the appellant, the NBI agents pointed at him then searched him but found nothing on him.That he was arrested, but was not informed of his constitutional rights. The accused was brought to the NBI Office and was searched again. In its ruling, the RTC gave more weight to the evidence presented by the prosecution. Thus, the appellant was found guilty of illegal sale and possession of shabu. The appellant questions the NBI’s lack of coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). Allegedly, the NBI failed to send a filled-out pre-coordination form by facsimile message, as required by R.A. 9165 and its implementing rules and regulations. Because of this omission, appellant argues that the buy-bust operation should be considered unauthorized, and his subsequent arrest illegal. The evidence supposedly obtained thereby must be declared inadmissible. Hence, the cases of drug-pushing and possession of prohibited drugs must fall together. Issue:
Whether or not the appellant was illegally arrested?
Held:
No.
The arrest of the accused in flagrante during a buy-bust operation is justified under Rule 113, Section 5 (a) of the Rules of Court. From the very nature of a buy-bust operation, the absence of a warrant does not make the arrest illegal. The court heLd in People v. Marcelino, the illegal drug seized was not the fruit of the poisonous tree, as the defense would have this Court believe. The seizure made by the buy-bust team falls under a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. Since the buy-bust operation was legitimate, it follows that the search was also valid.
25.) PEOPLE v. COLLADO SCRA 698 v. 628 Facts: PO2 Noble received information from a civilian asset that spouses Marcelino and Myra were engaged in selling shabu. After recording the report in the police blotter, PO2 Noble relayed the information to his superior, P/Insp. Castillo, who in turn ordered the conduct of a surveillance operation. PO2 Noble, et al., conducted surveillance on the couple’s residence. A buy-bust operation team was thereafter formed, and the team proceeded to Marcelino’s and Myra’s residence. Upon reaching the target area, the asset introduced PO2 Noble to Marcelino as a regular buyer of shabu. During the negotiation regarding the price, Marcelino then took from his pocket a small metal container from which he brought out a small plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance and gave the same to PO2 Noble. While PO2 Noble was inspecting its contents, he noticed smoke coming from a table inside the house of the couple around which were seven persons. When PO2 Noble gave the pre-arranged signal, the backup team rushed to the scene. The appellate court found the warrantless arrest of the appellants to be lawful considering that they were caught in the act of 22 committing a crime. Thus, the CA affirmed the conviction of Marcelino and Myra for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 (sale of dangerous drugs), as well as the conviction of Marcelino for violation of Section 11 of RA 9165 (illegal possession of dangerous drugs). It therefore affirmed with modification the ruling of the trial court. Issue:
Whether or not there were irregularities in the arrest of the appellant-spouses?
Held:
No, the arrest was valid.
Section 5(a) is what is known as arrest in flagrante delicto. For this type of warrantless arrest to be valid, two requisites must concur: "(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and, (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer." A common example of an arrest in flagrante delicto is one made after conducting a buy-bust operation. The arrest of the appellants was an arrest in flagrante delicto made in pursuance of Sec. 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. The arrest was effected after Marcelino and Myra performed the overt act of selling to PO2 Noble the sachet of shabu and Ranada of having in his control and custody illegal drug paraphernalia. Moreover, assuming that irregularities indeed attended the arrest of appellants, they can no longer question the validity thereof as there is no showing that they objected to the same before their arraignment. Neither did they take steps to quash the Informations on such ground. They only raised this issue upon their appeal to the appellate court. By this omission, any objections on the legality of their arrest are deemed to have been waived by them. Anent their claim of unreasonable search and seizure, it is true that under the Constitution, "a search and consequent seizure must be carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable and any evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding." This proscription, however, admits of exceptions, one of which is a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. The arrest of the appellants was lawful. Under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, "[a] person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant." The factual milieu of this case clearly shows that the search was made after appellants were lawfully arrested. 26.) DELOS SANTOS-DIO v. COURT OF APPEALS 699 SCRA 614 Facts: Dio, the majority stockholder of H.S. Equities, Ltd. (HS Equities) and authorized representative of Westdale Assets, Ltd. (Westdale), was introduced to Desmond, the Chairman and CEO of the Subic Bay Marine Exploratorium, Inc. (SBMEI), and the authorized representative of Active Environments, Inc. and JV China, Inc. Dio, on behalf of HS Equities, decided to invest a total of 6 US$1,150,000.00 in SBMEI’s Ocean Adventure. Dio claimed that Desmond led her to believe that SBMEI had a capital of 7 US$5,500,000.00, inclusive of the value of the marine mammals to be used in Ocean Adventure, and also guaranteed substantial returns on investment. Desmond even presented a Business Plan. Dio claimed that she SBMEI actually had no capacity to deliver on its guarantees, and that in fact, as of 2001, it was incurring losses. She likewise claimed to have discovered false entries in the company’s books and financial statements – specifically, its overvaluation of the marine animals and its non-disclosure of the true amount of JV China’s investment– which prompted her to call for an audit investigation. Consequently, Dio discovered that, without her knowledge and consent, Desmond made certain disbursements from Westdale’s special account, meant only for Miracle Beach expenditures (special account), and diverted a total of US$72,362.78 therein for the operating expenses of Ocean Adventure. Eventually, she filed a two criminal complaint for estafa against Desmond. After the preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution dated August 26, 2004, finding probable cause against Desmond for the abovementioned crimes. However, the RTC ruled in favor of Desmond and declared that no probable cause exists for the crimes charged against him since the elements of estafa were not all present. Consequently, the RTC denied the issuance of a warrant of arrest and hold departure order against Desmond and ordered the dismissal of the cases against him. The CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling. Issue: whether or not the CA erred in finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC when it dismissed the subject information for lack of probable cause.
Held:
Yes.
Determination of probable cause may be either executive or judicial. The first is made by the public prosecutor, during a preliminary investigation, where he is given broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists for the purpose of filing a criminal information in court. Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon. The second is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. In this respect, the judge must satisfy himself that, on the basis of the evidence submitted, there is a necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge, therefore, finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant. Notably, since the judge is already duty-bound to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused immediately upon the filing of the information, the filing of a motion for judicial determination of probable cause becomes a mere superfluity, if not a deliberate attempt to cut short the process by asking the judge to weigh in on the evidence without a full-blown trial. In the case of Co v. Republic, the Court emphasized the settled distinction between an executive and a judicial determination of probable cause, viz: We reiterate that preliminary investigation should be distinguished as to whether it is an investigation for the determination of a sufficient ground for the filing of the information or it is an investigation for the determination of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The first kind of preliminary investigation is executive in nature. It is part of the prosecution's job.1âwphi1 The second kind of preliminary investigation which is more properly called preliminary examination is judicial in nature and is lodged with the judge. On this score, it bears to stress that a judge is not bound by the resolution of the public prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation and must himself ascertain from the latter’s findings and supporting documents whether probable cause exists for the purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest. This prerogative is granted by no less than the Constitution which provides that "no warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce." In other words, once the information is filed with the court and the judge proceeds with his primordial task of evaluating the evidence on record, he may either: (a) issue a warrant of arrest, if he finds probable cause; (b) immediately dismiss the case, if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause; and (c) order the prosecutor to submit additional evidence, in case he doubts the existence of probable cause. Applying these principles, the Court finds that the RTC’s immediate dismissal, as affirmed by the CA, was improper as the standard of clear lack of probable cause was not observed. 27.) PEOPLE v. MENDOZA 700 SCRA 42 Facts: PO2 dela Cruz testified that on May 15, 2004 at about 8:15 in the evening, their confidential informant arrrived at their office reporting that a certain alias Monica, who turned out to be accused-appellant, was involved in the rampant sale of illegal drugs. Their Action Officer, SPO4 Arsenio Mangulabnan formed a buy-bust team led by SPO1 Jose Magallanes to effect the arrest of accusedappellant. A briefing was conducted regarding the anti-narcotics operation and PO2 dela Cruz was designated as poseur-buyer. He was tasked to buy Php200.00 worth of shabu from accused-appellant. Two (2) pieces of one hundred peso bills were provided and marked with "AMM" for use in the buy-bust operation. After the transaction between PO2 dela Cruz and accused-appellant having been consummated, he then made a motion of giving a high five to accused-appellant which was the pre-arranged signal for the rest of the back-up team. Operations back-up PO2 Sangel then approached the area of transaction, introduced himself as a police officer and placed accused-appellant under arrest. Accused-appellant was apprised of the nature of the arrest and of her constitutional rights. Accused-appellant for her part, denied the charges against her. She denied that she was caught selling shabu and that she was caught in possession of the same. The RTC, found the evidence of the prosecution sufficient to prove the guilt of accusedappellant for the crimes charged beyond reasonable doubt. The CA affirmed the decision and dismissed the appeal. Hence, the petition. Issue:
Whether or not a valid warrant should have been secured first before they proceeded to arrest her.
Held:
No.
Section 5(a) of Rule 113 is commonly known as in flagrante delicto arrest. For a warrantless arrest of an accussed caught in flagrante delicto to be valid, two requisites must concur: 1) person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; 2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. In the instant case, the prosecution completely and fully established that accused-appellant was arrested in flagrante delicto. At any rate, accused-appellant failed to raise any objection to the manner of her arrest before arraignment.1âwphi1 In fact, she participated in the trial. She even took the witness stand and testified in her own behalf. She is now estopped from assailing the legality of her arrest as she waived any irregularity, if any, that may have tainted her arrest. Significantly, the proof of an in flagrante delicto an-est, removes whatever credibility there may have been about the testimony of the accused-appellant of the alleged circumstances that made her go with the police to the DEU unit. Her version that she was a frame-up victim cannot stand against the testimony of the police, supported by evidence of corpus delicti.
28) ESPINO vs PEOPLE Facts: The accused was a senior sales executive in charge of liaising with import coordinators of the company Kuehne and Nagel, Inc. (KN Inc.). His duties included the delivery of its commissions to the import coordinators. On 14 October 2002, the Fiscal’s Office of Paranaque charged the accused with six (6) counts of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) for allegedly rediscounting checks that were meant to be paid to the company’s import coordinators. After trial, the RTC convicted 17 the accused of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a). In response, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that the trial court committed a grave error in convicting him of estafa under paragraph 2(a), which was different from paragraph 1(b) of Article 315 under which he had been charged. He also alleged that there was no evidence to support his conviction. Thus, he contended that his right to due process of law was thereby violated. In turn, the prosecution argued that jurisprudence had established that the nature and character of the crime charged are determined by the facts alleged in the information, and not by a reference to any particular section of the law. Subsequently, the RTC 26 denied the Motion. In the present Petition, the accused raises his right to due process. Specifically, he claims that he was denied due process when he was convicted of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) despite being charged 27 with estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b). He argues that the elements constituting both modes of estafa are different, and that 28 this difference should be reflected in the Information. According to him, a charge under paragraph 1(b) would not merit a conviction under paragraph 2(a). Issue: WON Espino was denied of his right of due process because of his conviction of Estafa under Art 315 par 2(a) instead of Art 315 par 1(b) of Revised Penal Code?
Held:
NO.
It is hornbook doctrine, however, that “what determines the real nature and cause of the accusation against an accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the information or complaint and not the caption or preamble of the information or complaint nor the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law.‖ x x x. (Emphasis supplied) This doctrine negates the due process argument of the accused, because he was sufficiently apprised of the facts that pertained to the charge and conviction for estafa.
The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that an information shall be deemed sufficient if it states, among others, the designation of the offense given by the statute and the acts of omissions complained of as constituting the offense. However, the Court has clarified in several cases that the designation of the offense, by making reference to the section or subsection of the statute punishing, it [sic] is not controlling; what actually determines the nature and character of the crime charged are the facts alleged in the information Clearly, the fiscal’s statement in the Informations specifying the charges as estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC, did not bind the trial court insofar as the characterization of the nature of the accusation was concerned. The statement never limited the RTC’s discretion to read the Information in the context of the facts alleged. Every element of which the offense is composed must be alleged in the complaint or information by making reference to the definition and the essentials of the specific crimes. This is so in order to fully apprise the accused of the charge against him and for him to suitably prepare his defense since he is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. It is not necessary, however, that the imputations be in the language of the statute. What is important is that the crime is described in intelligible and reasonable certainty.
29) MANGILA v. PANGILINAN Facts: Seven criminal complaints charging petitioner Anita Mangila and four others with syndicated estafa in violation of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Presidential Decree No. 1689,and with violations of Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995) were filed. The complaints arose from the recruiting and promising of employment by Mangila and the others to the private complainants as overseas contract workers in Toronto, Canada, and from the collection of visa processing fees, membership fees and on-line application. After examining Miguel Aaron Palayon, one of the complainants, Judge Pangilinan issued a warrant for the arrest of Mangila and her cohorts without bail. the entire records of the cases,including the warrant of arrest, were transmitted to the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City for further proceedings. Mangila filed in the Court of Appeals (CA)a petition for habeas corpus to obtain her release from detention. Her petition averred that the remedy of habeas corpus was available to her because she could no longer file a motion to quash or a motion to recall the warrant of arrest considering that Judge Pangilinan had already forwarded the entire records of the case to the City Prosecutor who had no authority to lift or recall the warrant. The CA denied the petition for habeas corpus for its lack of merit Issue:
W/N CA err in ruling that habeas corpus was not the proper remedy to obtain the release of Mangila from detention?
Held: Their authority to conduct preliminary investigations shall include all crimes cognizable by the proper court in their respective territorial jurisdictions. (2a) Under Section 6(b) of Rule 112of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the investigating judge could issue a warrant of arrest during the preliminary investigation even without awaiting its conclusion should he find after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and the witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers that a probable cause existed, and that there was a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.1âwphi1 In the context of this rule, Judge Pangilinan issued the warrant of arrest against Mangila and her cohorts. Consequently, the CA properly denied Mangila’s petition for habeas corpus because she had been arrested and detained by virtue of the warrant issued for her arrest by Judge Pangilinan, a judicial officer undeniably possessing the legal authority to do so.
30) ANTIQUERA VS PEOPLE Facts: Assistant City Prosecutor of Pasay City charged the accused George Codes Antiquera* and Corazon Olivenza Cruz with illegal ·possession of paraphernalia for dangerous drugs. The prosecution evidence shows that at around 4:45 a.m. of February 11, 2004, PO1 Gregorio Recio, PO1 Laurence Cabutihan, P/Insp. Eric Ibon, PO1 Rodelio Rania, and two civilian operatives on board a patrol car and a tricycle were conducting a police visibility patrol on David Street, Pasay City, when they saw two unidentified men rush out of house number 107-C and immediately boarded a jeep. Suspecting that a crime had been committed, the police officers approached the house from where the men came and peeked through the partially opened door. PO1 Recio and PO1 Cabutihan saw accused Antiquera holding an improvised tooter and a pink lighter. Beside him was his live-in partner, Cruz, who was holding an aluminum foil and an improvised burner. They sat facing each 4 other at the living room. This prompted the police officers to enter the house, introduce themselves, and arrest Antiquera and Cruz. While inspecting the immediate surroundings, PO1 Cabutihan saw a wooden jewelry box atop a table. It contained an improvised burner, wok, scissors, 10 small transparent plastic sachets with traces of white crystalline substance, improvised scoop, and seven unused strips of aluminum foil. The police officers confiscated all these and brought Antiquera and Cruz to the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Philippine National Police in Pasay City for further investigation and testing 8
RTC rendered a Decision that found accused Antiquera and Cruz guilty of the crime charged. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) rendered a Decision affirming in full the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether CA erred in finding accused Antiquera guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of drug paraphernalia based on the evidence of the police officers that they saw him and Cruz in the act of possessing drug paraphernalia?
HELD: YES. Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a "peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." This is an arrest in flagrante delicto. The overt act constituting the crime is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. But the circumstances here do not make out a case of arrest made in flagrante delicto. 1. The police officers claim that they were alerted when they saw two unidentified men suddenly rush out of 107 David Street, Pasay City. Since they suspected that a crime had been committed, the natural thing for them to do was to give chase to the jeep that the two fleeing men boarded, given that the officers were in a patrol car and a tricycle. Running after the fleeing suspects was the more urgent task but the officers instead gave priority to the house even when they heard no cry for help from it. 2. Admittedly, the police officers did not notice anything amiss going on in the house from the street where they stood. Indeed, even as they peeked through its partially opened door, they saw no activity that warranted their entering it. Clearly, no crime was plainly exposed to the view of the arresting officers that authorized the arrest of accused Antiquera without warrant under the above-mentioned rule. Considering that his arrest was illegal, the search and seizure that resulted from it was likewise illegal. Consequently, the various drug paraphernalia that the police officers allegedly found in the house and seized are inadmissible, having proceeded from an invalid search and seizure The failure of the accused to object to the irregularity of his arrest by itself is not enough to sustain his conviction. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest
31) PEOPLE VS MONTIVIRGEN
Facts: Jay Montevirgen y Oza.raga (appellant) for the crime of illegal sale and possession of shabu under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 or the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002." RTC found him of guilty such crime based the buy bust operation transpired on July 18, 2005 by the Makati City Police. The RTC gave credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses on the events that transpired prior to and during the buy-bust operation On appeal, the CA concurred with the RTC’s findings and conclusions. Appellant now contends that the police officers involved in the buy-bust operation failed to observe the proper procedure in the custody and control of the seized drug by not marking the confiscated specimens in the manner mandated by law. He claims that the arresting team did not immediately conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and photograph the same in the presence of his representative or counsel, representative from media, Department of Justice, and any elected public officials pursuant to Section 21 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9165. ISSUE: Whether the trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant despite non-compliance with the requirements for the proper custody HELD: No. The failure of the prosecution to show that the police officers conducted the required physical inventory and take photograph of the objects confiscated does not ipso facto render inadmissible in evidence the items seized. There is a proviso in the implementing rules stating that when it is shown that there exist justifiable grounds and proof that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence have been preserved, the seized items can still be used in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused. Here, the absence of evidence that the buy-bust team made an inventory and took photographs of the drugs seized from appellant was not fatal since the prosecution was able to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the shabu. PO3 Ruiz, the poseur-buyer and apprehending officer, marked the seized items in front of appellant, the barangay captain and other members of the buy-bust team, immediately after the consummation of the drug transaction.
32.) PEOPLE VS IBANEZ Gr. 191752 2013 Facts: Around 9:00 a.m. of July 26, 2004, Henessy arrived at WSC and rang the doorbell, but no one opened the door. She went to the back of the office where the firing range was located, and called Zaldy Gabao, another employee of WSC. Zaldy answered from inside the store but Henessy did not understand what he said. Henessy returned to the front door and called again. Zaldy repl ied that he could not open the door because his hands were tied. Henessy called Raymundo Sian, the company’s operations manager, and informed him that Zaldy’s hands had been tied. After one hour, the police arrived; they opened the gate at the back using acetylene. When Henessy and the police entered the premises, they saw that Zaldy had been handcuffed to the vault. Zaldy informed the police that the company’s gunsmith, Rex Dorimon, was inside the firing range. The police entered the firing range, and saw the lifeless body of Rex. Dr. Voltaire Nulud conducted an autopsy on the body of Rex, and found that the victim suffered several gunshot wounds on the head, thorax and abdomen, caused by a .45 pistol. NBI received an information from an asset that the group of Cachuela was involved in the robbery of WSC and in the killing of one of its employees; and that Cachuela had been looking for prospective buyers of firearms. The NBI formed an entrapment team and proceeded to Bacoor. NBI caught Ibanez and then Cachuela in a follow up operation, a certain nabiglas was instructed by cachuela and Ibanez to look for certain buyers of the weapons was arrested and he implaceted cachuela, Ibanez and even zaldy Prosecution filed an Information for robbery with homicide before the RTC against the appellants, Nabilgas and Zaldy, docketed as Criminal Case No. 04-0943. The accused all pleaded not guilty on arraignment Trial on the merits ensued thereafter. During trial, Zaldy died. The RTC found the appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. The CA ruled that the totality of these circumstances point to the appellants as the perpetrators of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. It disregarded the appellants’ defenses of alibi, denial and frame-up for being self-serving. The CA likewise found unmeritorious the appellants’ argument that the firearms confiscated from them were inadmissible in evidence, pointing out that the seizures were the result of lawful entrapment operations. It further held that the appellants failed to impute any ill or improper motive against the police officers who conducted the entrapment operations. Issue: Whether extra-judicial confession is admissible as evidence? Held
No. After a careful examination of the evidence on hand, the SC held that Nabilgas’ extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence. The Court has consistently held that an extrajudicial confession, to be admissible, must satisfy the following requirements: ―(1) the confession must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel[,] preferably of the confessant’s choice; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing
The records bear out that Nabilgas executed an extrajudicial confession at the NBI Main Office, where he implicated the appellants and Zaldy in the crime charged. During trial, he repudiated this confession, and claimed that he had been tortured by the NBI agents, and that he was forced to copy a previously prepared statement. Nabilgas’ confession was not made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel. The services of Atty. Melita Go, the lawyer who acted in Nabilgas’ behalf, were provided by the very same agency investigating Nabilgas – the NBI itself; she was assigned the task despite Nabilgas’ open declaration to the agency’s investigators that he already had a lawyer in the person of Atty. Donardo Paglinawan. Atty. Paglinawan confirmed this fact when he stated that he was already representing Nabilgas at the time his client made the alleged confession. Nabilgas also testified that Atty. Go did not disclose that she was a lawyer when she was called to assist him; she merely represented herself to be a mere witness to the confession. There was also nothing in the records to show that Atty. Go ascertained whether Nabilgas’ confession was made voluntarily, and whether he fully understood the nature and the consequence of his extrajudicial confession and its impact on his constitutional rights. In addition, the extrajudicial confession of Nabilgas was not corroborated by a witness who was present at the time the written confession was made. We note in this regard that the prosecution did not present Atty. Go at the witness stand despite hints made during the early stages of the trial that she would be presented. At any rate, Nabilgas’ extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence against the appellants in view of the res inter alios acta rule. This rule provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant and is not admissible against his or her co-accused because it is considered as hearsay against them. An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. This provision states that the act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy, and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. Thus, in order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that: (a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself; (b) the admission relates to the common object; and (c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. This exception, however, does not apply in the present case since there was no other piece of evidence presented, aside from the extrajudicial confession. Conspiracy cannot be presumed must be shown conclusively. 33. TANENGEE VS. PEOPLE Gr 179448 2013 Facts: March 27, 1998, five separate Informations for estafa through falsification of commercial documents were filed against Tenengee through falsification of commercial document: By taking advantage of his position as such, prepared and filled up or caused to be prepared and filled up METROBANK Promissory Note Form No. 366857 with letters and figures reading ―BD#083/97‖ after the letters reading ―PN‖, with figures reading ―07.24.97‖ after the word ―DATE‖, with the amount of P16,000,000.00 in words and in figures, and with other words and figures now appearing thereon, typing or causing to be typed at the right bottom thereof the name reading ―ROMEO TAN‖, feigning and forging or causing to be feigned and forged on top of said name the signature of Romeo Tan, affixing his own signature at the left bottom thereof purportedly to show that he witnessed the alleged signing of the said note by Romeo Tan, thereafter preparing and filling up or causing to be prepared and filled up METROBANK CASHIER’S CHECK NO. CC 0000001531, a commercial document, with date reading ―July 24, 1997‖, with the name reading ―Romeo Tan‖ as payee, and with the sum of P15,362,666.67 in words and in figures, which purports to be the proceeds of the loan being obtained, thereafter affixing his own signature thereon, and [directing] the unsuspecting bank cashier to also affix his signature on the said check, as authorized signatories, and finally affixing, feigning and forging or causing to be affixed, feigned and forged four (4) times at the back thereof the signature of said Romeo Tan, thereby making it appear, as it did appear that Romeo Tan had participated in the [preparation], execution and signing of the said Promissory Note and the signing and endorsement of the said METROBANK CASHIER’S CHECK and that he obtained a loan of P16,000,000.00 from METROBANK, when in truth and in fact, as the said accused well knew, such was not the case in that said Romeo Tan did not obtain such loan from METROBANK, neither did he participate in the preparation, execution and signing of the said promissory note and signing and endorsement of said METROBANK CASHIER’S CHECK, much less authorize herein accused to prepare, execute and affix his signature in the said documents; that once the said documents were forged and falsified in the manner above set forth, the said accused released, obtained and received from the METROBANK the sum of P15,363,666.67 purportedly representing the proceeds of the said loan, which amount, once in his possession, with intent to defraud, he misappropriated, misapplied and converted to his own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said METROBANK in the same sum of P15,363,666.67, Philippine currency. RTC entered a plea of not guilty for the petitioner after he refused to enter a plea. the RTC rendered a consolidated Decision dated June 25, 1999 finding petitioner guilty of the crimes charged . CA affirmed Petitioners arguments While he admits signing a written statement, petitioner refutes the truth of the contents thereof and alleges that he was only forced to sign the same without reading its contents. He asserts that said written statement was taken in violation of his rights under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, particularly of his right to remain silent, right to counsel, and right to be informed of the first two rights. Hence, the same should not have been admitted in evidence against him. Issue: Whether or not petitioners written statement is admissible as evidence.
Held:
Yes.
The right to counsel applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation. Here, petitioner’s written statement was given during an administrative inquiry conducted by his employer in connection with an anomaly/irregularity he allegedly committed in the course of his employment. No error can therefore be attributed to the courts below in admitting in evidence and in giving due consideration to petitioner’s written statement as there is no constitutional impediment to its admissibility. Petitioner’s written statement was given voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. As the trial court noted, the written statement (Exhibit N) of appellant is replete with details which could only be supplied by appellant. As the trial court noted, the written statement (Exhibit N) of appellant is replete with details which could only be supplied by appellant
34.) PEOPLE v. JONAS GUILLEN G.R. No. 191756 (2013) Facts: About May 20, 2002, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, by means of force, violence and intimidation, by entering the room of "AAA", poking a balisong at her neck, forcing her to lie down on the floor, pressing her with his thighs and removing her duster and panty and thereafter pulling down his brief and shorts, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously raped "AAA" against the latter’s will and consent, thereby gravely endangering her growth and development to the damage and prejudice of the said "AAA". Upon arraignment july 12 2002 appellant pleaded not guilty. Appellant denied the charge against him. He claimed that he had a drinking spree at Galas, Quezon City and went home to Sampaloc, Manila at around 1:00 o’clock in the morning of May 20, 2002. He surmised that "AAA" filed the charge against him because of his prior altercation with "AAA’s" husband. On June 10, 2008, the trial court found appellant guilty as charged. CA affirmed ISSUE: WON the trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of rape despite the prosecution’s failure to overthrow the constitutional presumption of innocence in his favor. Yes but still accused was convicted. HELD: Although the appellant was right ( SC said: Clearly, when appellant remained silent when confronted by the accusation of "AAA" at the police station, he was exercising his basic and fundamental right to remain silent. At that stage, his silence should not be taken against him. Thus, it was error on the part of the trial court to state that appellant’s silence should be deemed as implied admission of guilt. In fact, this right cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel and any admission obtained in violation of this rule shall be inadmissible in evidence.) still The trial court’s Decision convicting appellant of rape was anchored not solely on his silence and so-called implied admission. More importantly, it was based on the testimony of "AAA" which, standing alone, is sufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Appellant could only offer alibi and denial as his defenses. However, alibi and denial are weak defenses especially when measured up against the positive identification made by the victim pointing to appellant as the malefactor. Besides, appellant failed to prove that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene at the time of its commission. Aside from claiming that he was at Galas, Quezon City when the rape incident happened, he failed to submit any proof to show that it is physically impossible for him to be at Sampaloc, Manila where and when the rape happened. Besides, appellant’s alibi crumbles in the face of his apprehension near the scene of the crime immediately after "AAA" reported the incident to the police authorities.
35). LUZ v. PEOPLE Facts: PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at the Sub-Station 1 of the Naga City Police Station as a traffic enforcer, saw the accused, who was coming from the direction of Panganiban Drive and going to Diversion Road, Naga City, driving a motorcycle without a helmet; that this prompted him to flag down the accused for violating a municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet (sic) while driving said motor vehicle\ that while he and SPO1 Rayford Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, he noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket; that he was alerted and so, he told the accused to take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it; that the accused obliged and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-like tin or metal container about two (2) to three (3) inches in size, including two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife; that upon seeing the said container, he asked the accused to open it; that after the accused opened the container, he noticed a cartoon cover and something beneath it; and that upon his instruction, the accused spilled out the contents of the container on the table which turned out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were empty while the other two (2) contained suspected shabu. Petitioner was convicted for violation of The Dangerous Drugs law. Petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and seizure, because there was no lawful arrest. He claims that the finding that there was a lawful arrest was erroneous, since he was not even issued a citation ticket or charged with violation of the city ordinance. Even assuming there was a valid arrest, he claims that he had never consented to the search conducted upon him.
Issue: Whether or not there was no lawful search and seizure, because there was no lawful arrest. Held:
No.
The Court finds the Petition to be impressed with merit, but not for the particular reasons alleged. In criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court’s decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors. First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested. Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that person’s voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary. Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the driver’s license of the latter; Second, circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are not such that the motorist feels completely at the mercy of the police. To be sure, the aura of authority surrounding an armed, uniformed officer and the knowledge that the officer has some discretion in deciding whether to issue a citation, in combination, exert some pressure on the detainee to respond to questions. But other aspects of the situation substantially offset these forces. Perhaps most importantly, the typical traffic stop is public, at least to some degree. In both of these respects, the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called ―Terry stop,‖ than to a formal arrest Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was deemed ―arrested‖ upon being flagged down for a traffic violation and while awaiting the issuance of his ticket, then the requirements for a valid arrest were not complied with. This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform the latter of the reason for the arrest and must show that person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement they might make could be used against them. It may also be noted that in this case, these constitutional requirements were complied with by the police officers only after petitioner had been arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs. If it were true that petitioner was already deemed “arrested” when he was flagged down for a traffic violation and while he waiting for his ticket, then there would have been no need for him to be arrested for a second time after the police officers allegedly discovered the drugs as he was already in their custody. Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it was likewise illegal. The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in ―plain view;‖ (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) a ―stop and frisk‖ search; and (vii) exigent and emergency circumstances. None of the above-mentioned instances, especially a search incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable to this case. It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be inadvertently discovered, was not in ―plain view.‖ It was actually concealed inside a metal container inside petitioner’s pocket. Clearly, the evidence was not immediately apparent. Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Neither does the search qualify under the ―stop and frisk‖ rule. While the rule normally applies when a police officer observes suspicious or unusual conduct, which may lead him to believe that a criminal act may be afoot, the stop and frisk is merely a limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons. The foregoing considered, petitioner must be acquitted. While he may have failed to object to the illegality of his arrest at the earliest opportunity, a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not, however, mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest. The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law implemented without contravening the constitutional rights of citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government. The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible. The drugs are the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls for the acquittal of the accused.
36.) UY v. JAVELLANA
Facts: This administrative case arose from a verifled complaint for "gross ignorance of the law and procedures, gross incompetence, neglect of duty, conduct improper and unbecoming of a judge, grave misconduct and others," filed by Public Attorneys Cierlie M. Uy (Uy) and Ma. Consolacion T. Bascug (Bascug) of the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO), La Carlotta District, against Presiding Judge Erwin B. Javellana (Javellana) of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), La Castellana, Negros Occidental. Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug alleged that first, Judge Javellana was grossly ignorant of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Second, Judge Javellana gave the impression that he was a co-agent in a surety company with a certain Leilani ―Lani‖ Manunag (Manunag). Judge Javellana had conveyed to the public on several occasions that Manunag was in a special position to influence him in granting provisional liberty to the accused. Third, Judge Javellana violated Section 6(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and issued warrants of arrest without propounding searching questions to the complainants and their witnesses to determine the necessity of placing the accused under immediate custody. As a result, Judge Javellana issued warrants of arrest even when the accused had already voluntarily surrendered or when a warrantless arrest had been effected. Fourth, Judge Javellana failed to observe the constitutional rights of the accused as stated in Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution. Fifth, Judge Javellana was habitually tardy. Sixth, Judge Javellana whimsically or inconsistently implemented laws and rules depending on stature of the parties, persons accompanying the parties, lawyers of the parties, and his personal relations with the parties/lawyers. Seventh, Judge Javellana also adopted the mantra that the ―litigants are made for the courts‖ instead of ―courts for the litigants.‖ Eighth, Judge Javellana did not observe the proper procedure in airing his complaints against public attorneys. Lastly, to support their complaint, Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug attached a hand-written note20 relating the observations of an anonymous member of Judge Javellana’s staff Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug prayed that Judge Javellana be removed from the MTC of La Castellana. Judge Javellana discounted the allegations of Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug as ―baseless, untruthful, intrigues, malicious and a harassment tending to intimidate [him]. Issue: Held:
Whether the judge is grossly ignorant of the law Yes.
Without any showing that the accused in People v. Cornelio and People v. Lopez, et al. were charged with the special cases of malicious mischief particularly described in Article 328 of the Revised Penal Code, then Article 329 of the same Code should be applied. Judge Javellana’s issuance of a Warrant of Arrest for the accused in People v. Cornelio is in violation of Section 16 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, categorically stating that ―[t]he court shall not order the arrest of the accused except for failure to appear whenever required.‖ Judge Javellana never claimed that the accused failed to appear at any hearing. His justification that the accused was wanted for the crime of attempted homicide, being tried in another case, Crim. Case No. 04-096, is totally unacceptable and further indicative of his ignorance of law. People v. Cornelio, pending before Judge Javellana’s court as Crim. Case No. 04-097, is for malicious mischief, and is distinct and separate from Crim. Case No. 04-096, which is for attempted homicide, although both cases involved the same accused. In People v. Lopez, et al., Judge Javellana conducted a preliminary investigation even when it was not required or justified.36 The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure does not provide for a preliminary investigation prior to the filing of a criminal case under said Rule. The Court further agree with the OCA that Judge Javellana committed a blatant error in denying the Motion to Dismiss filed by the accused in People v. Celeste, et al. and in insisting that said Motion was a prohibited pleading, even though the case was never previously referred to the Lupong Tagapamayapa as required by Sections 18 and 19(a) of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
36.) People vs almodiel Facts: Almodiel did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, trade, deliver two (2) sachets of methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu weighing zero point one two zero five (0.1205) grams, a dangerous drug. uUpon arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty. During pre-trial, the defense admitted all the allegations in the Information except the specific place of the alleged incident and the allegation of the sale of dangerous drugs. Thus, trial ensued. The accused denied the charges of the prosecution, and narrated that on the morning of 20 March 2003, he and his girlfriend stayed in Cadez Lodging House, located at Purok 9, Brgy. 15, Butuan City. At about 10 a.m., the accused’s girlfriend left but promised to return later. While waiting, the accused and Felix played with the slot machine. Then, Max approached the accused and requested to buy shabu from him. The accused told Max that he was not selling shabu. Thus, Max left. However, Felix alleged that he saw Max talking to police officers. Felix informed the accused that Max is a police asset, but the accused ignored his remark and stated that he had nothing to fear. Issue: Whether the court a quo gravely erred in finding that the arrest and the search of the accused-appellant without a warrant would fall under the doctri[n]e of warrantless search as an incident to a lawful arrest. Held: Under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, a person may be arrested without a warrant if he ―has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.‖28 The accused was caught in the act of committing an offense during a buy-bust operation. When an accused is apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation, the police officers are not only authorized but duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant.29 An arrest made after an entrapment operation does not require
a warrant inasmuch as it is considered a valid ―warrantless arrest.‖30 The accused argues that force and intimidation attended his arrest when four police officers arrested him and one of them pointed a gun at him. However, his allegations were not supported by evidence. On the contrary, the CA found that the defense neither objected to the accused’s arrest nor filed any complaint against the police officers. Considering that an arrest was lawfully made, the search incidental to such arrest was also valid. A person lawfully arrested may be searched, without a search warrant, for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense.31 Accordingly, the two sachets of shabu seized in the present case are admissible as evidence. 38.) PEOPLE v. DELA TORRE-YADAO Facts: This case, which involves the alleged summary execution of suspected members of the Kuratong Bale/eng Gang, is once again before this Court this time questioning, among other things, the trial qmrt's determination of the absence of probable cause and its dismissal of the criminal actions. The combined forces of the Philippine National Police's Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (PNP ABRITG) composed of Task Force Habagat (then headed by Police Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson), Traffic Management Command ([TMC] led by then Police Senior Superintendent Francisco G. Zubia, Jr.), Criminal Investigation Command (led by then Police Chief Superintendent Romeo M. Acop ), and National Capital Region Command (headed by then Police Chief Superintendent Jewel F. Canson) killed 11 suspected members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang2 along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City. SPO2 Eduardo Delos Reyes of the Criminal Investigation Command told the press that it was a summary execution, not a shoot-out between the police and those who were slain. After investigation, the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs absolved all the police officers involved, including respondents Panfilo M. Lacson, Jewel F. Canson, Romeo M. Acop, Francisco G. Zubia, Jr., Michael Ray B. Aquino, Cezar O. Mancao II, and 28 others (collectively, the respondents).3 On review, however, the Office of the Ombudsman reversed the finding and filed charges of murder against the police officers involved before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases 23047 to 57, except that in the cases of respondents Zubia, Acop, and Lacson, their liabilities were downgraded to mere accessory. On arraignment, Lacson pleaded not guilty. Two years later or on March 27, 2001 PNP Director Leandro R. Mendoza sought to revive the cases against respondents by requesting the Department of Justice (DOJ) to conduct another preliminary investigation in their cases on the strength of the affidavits of P/Insp. Ysmael S. Yu and P/S Insp. Abelardo Ramos. In response, then DOJ Secretary Hernando B. Perez constituted a panel of prosecutors to conduct the requested investigation. CA rendered a Decision granting Lacson’s petition on the ground of double jeopardy but on appeal to the SC, the latter directed the RTC to try the case. It was re-raffled to branch 81 presided by Judge Yadao. Yadao in 2003 junked the murder case against Lacson and other police officials for lack of probable cause. On March 3, 2004 the prosecution filed the present special civil action of certiorari. Issue: Whether or not Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when she dismissed the criminal actions on the ground of lack of probable cause and barred the presentation of additional evidence in support of the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration. Held: The prosecution claims that Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when she set the motions for determination of probable cause for hearing, deferred the issuance of warrants of arrest, and allowed the defense to mark its evidence and argue its case. The prosecution stresses that under Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court Judge Yadao’s duty was to determine probable cause for the purpose of issuing the arrest warrants solely on the basis of the investigating prosecutor’s resolution as well as the informations and their supporting documents. And, if she had some doubts as to the existence of probable cause, the rules required her to order the investigating prosecutor to present additional evidence to support the finding of probable cause within five days from notice. Rather than take limited action, said the prosecution, Judge Yadao dug up and adopted the Ombudsman’s findings when the latter conducted its preliminary investigation of the crime of robbery in 1996. Judge Yadao gave weight to the affidavits submitted in that earlier preliminary investigation when such documents are proper for presentation during the trial of the cases. The prosecution added that the affidavits of P/S Insp. Abelardo Ramos and SPO1 Wilmor B. Medes reasonably explained the prior inconsistent affidavits they submitted before the Ombudsman. The general rule of course is that the judge is not required, when determining probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrests, to conduct a de novo hearing. The judge only needs to personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence. But here, the prosecution conceded that their own witnesses tried to explain in their new affidavits the inconsistent statements that they earlier submitted to the Office of the Ombudsman. Consequently, it was not unreasonable for Judge Yadao, for the purpose of determining probable cause based on those affidavits, to hold a hearing and examine the inconsistent statements and related documents that the witnesses themselves brought up and were part of the records. Besides, she received no new evidence from the respondents. 39.) PEOPLE VS GODOFREDO MARIANO Facts: Regional Trial Comt of Sorsogon City, Branch 65 found Godofredo guilty of the crimes of illegal sale of shabu and illegal possession of drug paraphernalia, and Allan Doringo y Gunan3 (Allan) guilty of the illegal sale of shabu. He did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver, dispose, distribute and/or give away for value two (2) transparent plastic sachets containing methamphetamine hydrochloride locally known as ―Shabu‖, a prohibited drugs (sic), containing 0.5680 gram to a poseur-buyer in exchange of One Thousand Peso Bill.
SPO1 Go ez produced the marked money consisting of one (1) One Thousand Peso bill and six (6) One Hundred Peso bills. PO1 Olleres placed his initials on the marked bills.8 On 17 October 2004, the team conducted a buy-bust operation in the house of a certain Gerry Angustia located at Pier Uno, Zone 2, Bulan, Sorsogon. PO1 Olleres, PO3 Razo and the asset proceeded to the target house and they witnessed an ongoing pot session. They looked for ―Galog‖ and they were introduced to Godofredo. They asked Godofredo if they can ―score.‖ Godofredo immediately left the house and went to a street at the back of the house. He returned carrying two (2) sachets of shabu, which he handed to PO1 Ollares. In exchange, PO1 Olleres paid him the One Thousand Peso marked bill. Allan also offered PO3 Razo two (2) more sachets of shabu. The latter asked for the Six Hundred Peso marked bills from PO1 Olleres and handed them to Allan as payment for the shabu. After these exchanges, they requested appellants for an actual test of shabu. Godofredo provided them with a tooter and aluminum foil. While they were testing said shabu, they declared an arrest. PO1 Olleres and PO3 Razo identified the appellants in open court. Issue:
Whether the warrantless arrest is illegal.
Held: Appellants’ insistence on the illegality of their warrantless arrest equally lacks merit. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court allows a warrantless arrest under any of the following circumstances: Sec 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful – A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. In the instant case, the warrantless arrest was effected under the first mode or aptly termed as in flagrante delicto. PO1 Olleres and PO3 Razo personally witnessed and were in fact participants to the buy-bust operation. After laboratory examination, the white crystalline substances placed inside the four (4) separate plastic sachets were found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug. Under these circumstances, it is beyond doubt that appellants were arrested in flagrante delicto while committing a crime, in full view of the arresting team.
