“LAW OF LIMITATION REGARDING CRIMINAL PROSECUTION”
Submitted by GUNJAN CHANDAVAT BC0140023
Project Submitted to Dr. N. S. SOMAN Criminal Law Faculty
TAMIL NADU NATIONAL LAW SCHOOL
(A State University established by Act No. 9 of 2012) NavalurKuttapattu, Srirangam (TK), Tiruchirappalli – 620009. 620009.
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DECLARATION
I Gunjan Chandavat , Register Number BC0140023, hereby declare that this project work entitled “Limitation period regarding Criminal Prosecution” has been originally carried out by me under the guidance and supervision of Dr.N. S. Soman, Tamil Nadu National Law School, Tiruchirappalli - 620 009. This work has not been submitted either in whole or in part of any Degree / Diploma at any University.
Place : Tiruchirappalli Date: 20.10.2017
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ACKNOWLEDGMENT
I would like to express my special thanks of gratitude to my teacher Dr. N.S. Soman who gave me the golden opportunity to do this wonderful project on the topic “Expectation of Privacy” Which also helped me in doing a lot of Research and I came to know about so many new things I am really thankful to them.Secondly I would also like to thank my parents and friends who helped me a lot in finalizing this project within the limited time frame.
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Contents
CHAPTER- I INTRODUCTION: ............................................................................................................... 5 CHAPTER-II ANALYZING SECTION 468 OF CrPC ............................................................................... 7 CHAPTER-III DETERMINING THE RELEVANT DATE FOR COMPUTATION OF LIMITATION PERIOD ........................................................................................................................................................ 9 CHAPTER-IV ANALYSING SECTIONS 469 TO 473 OF CrPC ............................................................ 12 CHAPTER-V CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 17 REFERENCES: .......................................................................................................................................... 18
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LAW OF LIMITATION REGARDING CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
CHAPTER- I INTRODUCTION:
A maxim used in Roman Law which justifies the concept of Limitation period in every branch of litigation "vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt "which means only a vigilant person should be allowed to exercise his rights. A section 467 to 473 of Code of Criminal prescribes distinct limitation periods for taking cognizance of various offences, depending upon the gravity of those offences linked with the punishments. The objective behind inclusion of Chapter- XXXVI in the code was to see that there no loose testimony of the witness due to lapse of time and that result in the increasing probability of errors in the judgment. Criminal justice evolved so as to give deterrent effect, but this objective is defeated if the punishment is given after lapse of time. 1 In the earlier code which was repealed did not have the concept of limitation period and hence the court could not reject solely on the basis of that.2 Limitation Act 1963 does not apply to criminal proceedings except for appeals or revision which has been laid down under Article 114,115,131 and 132.3 In certain offences there is a special provision laid down in CrPC section 198(6) and 199(5).4 Here it is pertinent to note the statement given by Joint Committee of the Parliament:5 "These are new clauses prescribing periods of limitation on a graded scale for launching a criminal prosecution in certain cases. At present there is no period of limitation for criminal prosecution and a court cannot throw out a complaint or a police report solely on the ground of delay although inordinate delay may be a ground for entertaining doubts about the truth of the prosecution story. Periods of limitation have been prescribed for criminal prosecution in the laws
1
Shweta Vashist and Vishal Gera, Crime Never Dies, available at: http://www.mondaq.com/india/x/407104/Crime/Crime+Never+Dies ,accessed on (13/10/2017). 2 G.D.Iyer v. State, 1978 Cr LJ 1180 (Del-DB). 3 II Surendra Malik, Supreme Court on Criminal Procedure Code & Criminal Trial, (2d ed. 2015). 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 5
of many countries and the Committee feels that it will be desirable to prescribe such periods in the Code as recommended by the Law Commission" There are three kinds of limitation period of as per section 468(1): (a)for offences punishable with fine only the period is six months; (b)for offences punishable with imprisonment not exceeding one year the period is one year and lastly (c) for offences punishable with imprisonment exceeding one year but not exceeding three years the period is three years. Thus only for the offences punishable with imprisonment upto three years bar of limitation has been made applicable. There is no application of limitation to serious offences in which the punishment exceeds three years. Further, Section 469 of the Code speaks of the commencement of the period of limitation and specifies broadly three alternatives for this. They are (1) the date of the offence or (2) the first date of knowledge about the commission of the offence, when it is not known or (3) the first date of knowledge of the identity of the offender when he is not known. Section 469(2), 470 and 471 contain methods of computation of the period of limitation and broadly they are on same lines with that of Limitation Act, 1963 with required addition and modification suitable to a criminal case. The provisions of Section 472 relating to continuing offence are also modeled on those of Section 22 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for continuing breach of contract and continuing tort. Lastly, Section 473 for extension of the period of limitation is similar as Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 suitably adopted for purpose of a criminal case.6 The paper in the subsequent chapters will deal with the procedure laid down under section 467 – 473 and the case laws which have cleared the position of law through these years and also the interface between the provisions of CrPC and Art.21 of the Constitution. Comparing with the similar provisions under Limitation Act.
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Sri S.M. Deka, THE SUPREME COURT ON THE BAR OF LIMITATION IN CRIMINAL CASES, http://jaassam.gov.in/pdf/article/Article-58.pdf . 6
CHAPTER-II ANALYZING SECTION 468 OF CrPC
468. Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation. (1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub- se ction (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation. (2) The period of limitation shall be(a) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine o nly (b) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year; (c) three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years. (3) For the purposes of this section, the period of limitation in relation to offences which may be tried together, shall be determined with reference to the offence which is punishable with the more severe punishment or, as the case may be, the most severe punishment. Section 468 deals with cognizance of offence and no limitation period is prescribed for investigation of an offence. This section does not create bar on investigation of an offence by the police even if the limitation period for taking cognizance by the court has expired.7 Section 467 clearly mentions that the limitation period is prescribed for taking cognizance by the court and not the filing of complaint. The word cognizance has not been defined anywhere in CrPC and hence by looking at various provisions in CrPC it can be inferred that, when a Magistrate or Judge applies his mind to take judicial note of the offence and then initiates the proceedings. This interpretation of the word cognizance has to be in line with the meaning intended by the legislative framers and hence by way of harmonious construction Supreme Court
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Chanchal Bhatti v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2011 Cr LJ 1195 (1197) (Del.). 7
has interpreted in such a way.8The onus of proving that the limitation period has expired rests on the accused.9 There is an implied meaning that the investigation should be completed within relevant period of particular category of cases.10The limitation period which is prescribed under sec.167(5) is applicable apart from the period under sec.468.11 The court under this section has discreationary power to condone the delay if proper reasons are found.12 Under 468 (2)(a) the limitation period is of 6 months. The date of complaint is essential while for taking cognizance of an offence under sec.468.Date of taking cognizance or issue of process cannot be the determining criteria.13 Once the limitation has begun to run, it runs its full course
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. Sub-section (3) of section 468
which was added by Cr. P (Amendment Act), 1978 provides that in relation to offences which may be tried together, the period of limitation shall be tried together, the period of limitation shall be determined with reference to the offence which is punishable with the more or most severe punishment. The language of sub-section (3) of section 468 makes it imperative that the limitation provided for taking cognizance in section 468 is in respect of offence charged and not in respect of offence finally proved15.When the respondents were charged under section 468 read with 120 B per which the impossible punishment is 7 years and section 5(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act 1947, which is punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 7 years and for such offences no period as limitation having been provided for in section 468, the cognizance taken by Special Judge cannot said to be barred by limitation16
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Malik, supra note 5. Bhawarlal Pruthviraj Jain v. State of Maharastra,1982 Cr LJ 1647 (Bom). 10 Elumalai v. State of Tamil Nadu,1983 LW (Cr) 121 (Mad). 11 Raj Singh v. State (Delhi Admnistration), (1984)1Crimes 755. 12 Kelkar, R.V. Criminal Procedure, (5th Ed. 2011). 13 Kamal H. Javeri v.Chandulal, 1985 Cr LJ 1215 (Bom). 14 Venkappa Gurappa Hosur v. Kasawwa, (1997) 4 Supreme 217. 15 State of Himachal Pradesh v. Tara Dutta, AIR 2000 SC 297. 16 Ibid. 9
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There is limitation period prescribed even in other cases apart from the penal provisions like in case of Child Labour Act,1986
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,Dowry Prohibition Act,196118,Prevention of Corruption
Act,198819 etc.
CHAPTER-III DETERMINING THE RELEVANT DATE FOR COMPUTATION OF LIMITATION PERIOD
It has been observed that over the years there has been a doubt as to whether the relevant date for computation of limitation period starts from the date of filing of complaint or from the date of cognizance. In this regard Supreme Court has clarified the stand. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Mrs. Sarah Mathew Vs The Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases20 held that for the purpose of computing the period of limitation in Criminal Cases the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution and not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance.21This was constituted to clear the doubt which has been created by two previous judgments namely: two-Judge Bench decision in Bharat Damodar Kale & Anr. v. State of Andhra Pradesh22 and a three-Judge Bench
decision in Krishna Pillai v.
T.A.Rajendran & Anr.23 In Krishna Pillai Vs. T.A. Rajendran and Anr. ,24 where the Court stated that no court shall
take cognizance of any offence under the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929 after the expiry of one year from the date on which the offence is alleged to have been committed. Whereas on the
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Mohammad Safiq v. Inspector ,Labour,2007 Cr LJ 2007(2008). Harbans Singh v. Gurcharan Kaur, 1990 Cr LJ 1591. 19 Pramod Kumar Kishorpuria v. Superintendent of Police ,CBI 2014 LJ 960. 20 Mrs. Sarah Mathew v. The Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases, (2014) 2 SCC 104. 21 http://www.livelaw.in/in-criminal-cases-period-of-limitation-starts-from-the-date-of-complaint-not-from-date-ofcognizance-constitution-bench/ accessed on (15.10.2017). 22 Bharat Damodar Kale & Anr. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2003) 8 SCC 559. 23 Krishna Pillai v. T.A.Rajendran & Anr, 1990 supp. SCC 121. 24 Ibid. 18
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other hand in Bharat Damodar kale v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 25 where it was held that for the purpose of computing the period of limitation , the relevant date if the date of filing of complaint or initiating criminal proceedings and not the date of taking cognizance by a Magistrate or issuance of a process by court. This judgment was further referred and relied upon in the judgment titled as "Japani Sahoo Vs. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty;26, where the Court upheld the decision given by it in the "Bharat Kale" case and stated that mere delay in approaching a Court of Law would not by itself afford a ground for dismissing the case though it may be a relevant circumstance in reaching a final verdict.27
The "Sarah Mathew" case, majorly talks about the objective behind insertion of this chapter to the code which lays emphasis on the fact that this was inserted to make quicker disposal of cases and not to undermine any party’s interest. Also was intended to make people act diligently but not to the reject cases solely on the basis of lapse of time. It has further been stated that where the legislature wanted to treat certain offences differently, it provided for limitation in the section itself, for instance, Section 198(6) and 199(5) of th e Code of Criminal Procedure.28 The Supreme Court, in "Sarah Mathew" case, laid down the meaning and the scope of term 'taking cognizance'. When on a petition or complaint being filed before a Magistrate, he applies his mind or takes judicial notice of an offence, with a view to initiate proceedings in respect of an offence which is said to have taken place, the Magistrate is said to have taken cognizance of the offence. The Court states that Section 473, which provides for the extension
of the period of limitation in certain cases, is a non obstante clause, which has an overriding effect on Section 468 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Court in its reasoning relied on the decision in Vanka Radhamanohari vs. Vanka Vankata Reddy and Ors,29where it carved out the difference between section 5 of Limitation Act and section 473 of CrPC. The difference highlighted in the judgment was that the onus is on the applicant to satisfy the court that there was sufficient cause for condonation of delay, whereas, Section 473 enjoins a duty on the court
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Supra note 22. Japani Sahoo v. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty, AIR 2007 SC 2762. 27 Supra note 21. 28 Supra note 20. 29 Vanka Radhamanohari vs. Vanka Vankata Reddy and Ors (1993) 3 SCC 4. 26
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to examine not only whether such delay has been explained, but as to whether it is the requirement of justice to ignore such delay.30 The Court, has dealt with the two contradicting maxims namely, 'vigililantibus et non dormientibus, jura subveniunt' which means law assists only those who are vigilant about their rights and the other being 'nullum tempus aut locus occurrit regi' meaning the crown is not subject to law of limitation. The Chapter XXXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure which provides the limitation period for certain types of offences for which lesser sentence is provided, draws support from the maxim 'vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt" and that even certain offences such as section 384 or 465 of the Indian Penal Code, which have lesser punishment, may have serious social consequences and hence, the provision for the condonation of delay was made. The Court was thus, of the opinion that Chapter XXXVI is a part of the Code of Criminal procedure, which is a procedural law and it is a well settled principle that procedural laws must be liberally construed to serve as hand maid of justice and not as its mistresses.31 Hence, the Court, in this matter, held that the decision given by the Court in the "Krishna Pillai" as stated above would not be the authority for deciding as to what is the relevant date for computing the period of limitation under Section 468 of the Code of Criminal procedure since in that case, the Court was dealing Section 9 of the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929, which is a special Act and there is no reference to Section 468 or 473 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in that judgment. Also, the Hon'ble Supreme observed that the said judgment is restricted to its own facts and constitution bench does not endorse the view taken in "Krishna Pillai", which was by 3 Judges Bench. Finally, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in "Sarah Mathew",held that "Bharat Kale" lays down the correct position of law. In the light of the same, the Court held that the relevant date, for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 of the Criminal Procedure Code is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution and not the date on which a Magistrate takes Cognizance.
30
Vashist, Supra note 1. Ibid.
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One of the most well-recognized principles of criminal jurisprudence is that "crime never dies'. Even though this concept has been well-established, its implementation raised several questions with regard to the trigger point for computing the period of limitation. The Supreme Court, in this landmark judgment has provided a much-required clarification as to the ambiguity created by the contradicting views qua the running points with respect to limitation.32
CHAPTER-IV ANALYSING SECTIONS 469 TO 473 OF CrPC
Section 469 talks about commencement of Limitation period. The section reads as follows: 1. The period of limitation, in relation to an offence, shall commence,33 a. on the date of the offence; or b. where the commission of the offence was not known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to any police officer, the first day on which such offence comes to the knowledge of such person or to any police officer, whichever is earlier; or c. where it is not known by whom the offence was committed, the first day on which the identity of the offender is known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to the police officer making investigation into the offence, whichever is earlier. 2. In computing the said period, the day from which such period is to be computed shall be excluded. Cases decided under section 469 by different courts:34 R. Aghoramurthy, ROC, Bombay v. Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Company Limited35 this was a prosecution for offences under Section 205 of the Companies Act, 1956. The principal 32
Vashsist, Supra note1. http://devgan.in/criminal_procedure_code/chapter_36.php#ixzz4vpgYRC9B accessed on (14.10.2017). 34 Supra note 6 33
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question there was the date of knowledge of the offence of the complainant under Section 469(1)(b) of the Code. The Registrar of Companies issued notice to the company and on receipt of the reply sent a Report to the Department of Company Affairs, Govt. of India who ordered an Enquiry. Question was whether the date of knowledge would be the date of receipt of the Report. The Supreme Court agreed with the concurrent findings of the two Courts below and held that limitation is to be counted from the date of knowledge of the complainant that is when the notice was issued specially when the complaint did not approach the Court under Section 473 of the Code. State of Rajasthan v. Sanjay Kumar and others36 this case answers the question as to when does the period of limitation commence in a prosecution under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act 1940. It was held that the period of limitation commences not on the date when the sample was taken but commences only on the date of receipt of the Govt. analyst’s Report within Section 469(1) (b) of the Code. ROC v. Rajashree Sugar & Chemicals Ltd. and others 37this was decided by a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court deals with limitation for an offence under Section 113(2) of the Companies Act, 1956. Offence is punishable by fine only and as such the period of limitation is six months. The Magistrate overlooked the provision of Section 469(1) (b) and dismissed the complaint as barred even though it was found that the offence came to the knowledge of the Registrar of Companies on examination of the Books of Accounts only on 20.07.1992 and the complaint was filed on 20.08.1992. In the High Court the point took a different turn. The High Court overlooked the provisions of Section 621 of the Companies Act, 1956 and held that the Registrar of Companies is neither a person aggrieved nor a police officer within Section 469 (1)(b). According to the High Court prosecution under Section 113 of the 8 Companies Act, 1956 can only be launched by an affected share-holder. The Supreme Court corrected the errors of the High Court and the Chief Judicial Magistrate by reading Section 469(1)(b) with Section 621 of the Companies Act and holding that the Registrar of Companies is a person aggrieved and competent to maintain the prosecution counting the period of limitation from the date of knowledge within Section 469(1)(b) of the Code. 35
R. Aghoramurthy, ROC, Bombay v. Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Company Limited, 1991- JT-S-432. State of Rajasthan v. Sanjay Kumar and others, AIR 1998 SC 1919. 37 ROC v. Rajashree Sugar & Chemicals Ltd. and others, AIR 2000 SC 1643. 36
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Section 470:
The scope of this section includes exclusion of time in five instances namely:38 1. The time during which a person has been prosecuting with due diligence another prosecution. 2. Time during which proceedings were stayed by an injunction or order 3. The period of notice , if given or the time required for obtaining sanction for prosecution. 4. The time in which the offender remains absent from India or any territory belonging or controlled by India. 5. The time during which the offender avoids his arrest. Rakesh Kumar Jain v. State39 deals with an offence under Section 5(4) read with Section 5(2) and (3) of the Official Secrets Act, 1923. The period of limitation in that case commenced from the 24th April, 1985 and the complaint was filed on the 19th of May 1988. Thus the complaint was filed beyond 25 days of the three years period of limitation for the offence. But both the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate and the High Court applied Section 470(3) of the Code by equating the provisions of Section 13(3) of the official Secrets Act, 1923 with provisions requiring sanction or consult. The Supreme Court held that Section 13(3) of the official Secrets Act, 1923 does not provide for requirement of any sanction or consent and as such as Section 470(3) would not be attracted. However, the Supreme Court held that the complaint deserves to be saved under Section 473 of the Code and the condoned the delay without remitting the case to the Trial Court. Section 471:40 Where the period of limitation expires on a day when the Court is closed, the
Court may take cognizance on the day on which the Court reopens. Explanation – A Court shall be deemed to be closed on any day within the meaning of this section, if, during its normal working hours, it remains closed on that day. Section 472:
38
Jst. M.L.Singhal, Sohoni’s Code of Criminal Procedure, 21st Edition, Lexis Nexis. p.1240. Rakesh Kumar Jain v. State, AIR 2000 SC 2754. 40 Supra note 33. 39
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Continuing offence: It can be of two types namely: a) continuing in the same arena( section 178(c) and b) continuing in time(section 470).The below mentioned cases best enunciate the concept of continuing offence. There were also cases which determined whether offences under section 498 A of IPC can be called a continuing offence. Bhagirath kanoria and others v. State of M.P41 this case breaks further ground on the question of limitation in prosecution of offences. The principal question in the decision was regarding continuing offence spoken about in Section 472 but the Supreme Court also drew pointed attention of the Courts to the provisions of Section 473 of the Code. On the concept of continuing offence in para 19 of the Judgment the Supreme Court spoke thus :- “The question whether a particular offence is a continuing offence must necessarily depend upon the language of the statute which creates that offence, the nature of the offence and, above all, the purpose which is intended to be achieved by constituting the particular act as an offence.” In the Judgment it was held that Section 473 of the Code enacts an overriding provision and courts confronted with provision laying down a rule of limitation governing prosecution will give due weight and consideration to provisions of Section 473 and take cognizance even after expiry of limitation if interest of justice so requires. Gokak patel volkart ltd. v. Dundayya gurushiddaiah hiremath and others,42 contains a detailed enunciation of the law relating to continuing offence provided for in Section 472 of the Code. Offence dealt with was under Section 630 of the Companies Act, 1956 on the allegation of continuing to occupy premises allotted to employees by the Company even after their retirement. The period of limitation under Section 468 (2) (a) of the Code is six months since the offence is punishable with fine only. The Trial Court held that the complaint having not been filed within six months of the retirement, the prosecution is barred by limitation. The High Court concurred. The Supreme Court reiterated the law laid down in BHAGIRATH KANORIA) and spoke thus in para 26 of the Judgment :“Applying the law enunciated above to the provisions of Section 630 of the Companies Act, we are of the view that the offence under this Section is not such as can be said to have consummated once for all. Wrongful withholding or wrongful obtaining possession and wrongful 41
Bhagirath Kanoria and others v. State of MP, AIR 1984 SC 1688. Gokak Patel Volkart Ltd. v. Dundayya Gurushiddaiah Hiremath and others, (1991) 2 SCC 141.
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application of the company’s property, cannot be said to be terminated by a single act or fact but would subsist for the period until the property in the offender’s possession is delivered up or refunded. It will be a recurring or continuing offence until the wrongful possession, wrongful withholding or wrongful application is vacated or put an end to.” Orders of the Trial Court and the High Court were, in view of the law laid down, set aside. Section 473: This section talks about extension of date of limitation , there can b two perspective
of looking at this section. It can be used in procedural nature and also substantive as well. If we look at the equivalent provision i.e. section 5 of Limitation Act,1963 , it lacks the phrase “in the interest of justice”. Disjunctive proposition at the end of the section 473 it is obligatory on the Court to consider whether interests of justice would be better served by extending the period rather than by terminating the prosecution on the ground of limitation. While for exercise of powers under Section 5 of the Limitation Act ,the appellant or the applicant respectively has to move the Court for exercise of powers under Section 473 of the Code the Court can even act Suo Moto. This is so because unlike in a Civil Case where private rights are only involved in a criminal case in a way interest of the society at large and public right is involved and the Court must act as the guardian of those rights.43 Rakesh Kumar Jain v. State,44 deals with an offence under Section 5(4) read with Section 5(2) and (3) of the Official Secrets Act, 1923. The period of limitation in that case commenced from the 24th April, 1985 and the complaint was filed on the 19th of May 1988. Thus the complaint was filed beyond 25 days of the three years period of limitation for the offence. But both the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate and the High Court applied Section 470(3) of the Code by equating the provisions of Section 13(3) of the official Secrets Act, 1923 with provisions requiring sanction or consult. The Supreme Court held that Section 13(3) of the official Secrets Act, 1923 does not provide for requirement of any sanction or consent and as such as Section 470(3) would not be attracted. However, in para 10 of the Judgment, the Supreme Court held that the complaint deserves to be saved under Section 473 of the Code and the condoned the delay without remitting the case to the Trial Court.
43 44
Supra note 6. Supra note 39. 16
Ramesh Chandra Sinha and others v. State of Bihar and others,45 decision dealing with the application of Section 473 of the Code. In that case the Trial Court on an application under Section 473 of the Code condoned a delay of about three years on the ground that further proceedings were stayed by the High Court. On facts it was found that there was no such stay. The High Court refused to interfere with the order condoning the delay. The Supreme Court set aside the order condoning the delay on irrelevant consideration and quashed the criminal proceedings because of the bar of limitation.
CHAPTER-V CONCLUSION Four key features emanating from these decisions of the Supreme Court appears to be:
(1) To emphasize that limitation is for institution; (2) To remind the Trial Courts to consider the question of limitation before taking cognizance; (3) To remind the trial Courts about the difference between the power of extension of limitation under Section 5 of the limitation Act and Section 473 of the Code and; (4) Lastly to hear the affected person that is the would be accused before deciding to extend the period even if sought to be done Suo Moto and pass a reasoned order on the matter. Also to add Law of Limitation and condonation of delay are two effective implementations in the quick disposal of cases and effective litigation. On the one hand if the law of limitation keeps a check on the pulling of cases and prescribes a time period within which the suit can be filed and the time available within which the person can get the remedy conveniently. The theory of Condonation of Delay keeps the principle of natural justice alive and also states the fact that different people might have different problems and the same sentence or a singular rule may not apply to all of them in the same way. Thus it is essential to hear them and decide accordingly whether they fit in the criteria of the judgment or whether they deserve a second chance. Even Art. 21 of the Constitution also acts as a shield in cases of long lapse of time.
45
Ramesh Chandra Sinha and others v. State of Bihar and others, (2003)7 SCC 254. 17
REFERENCES: PRIMARY SOURCES STATUTES REFERRED:
1. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 2. The Constitution of India, 1950. 3. The Limitation Act, 1963. CASES REFERRED:
1. Bhagirath Kanoria and others v. State of M.P Air 1984 S.C. 1688. 2. Bharat Damodar Kale Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh(2003) 8 SCC 559. 3. Bhawarlal Pruthviraj Jain v. State of Maharastra, 1982 Cr LJ 1647 (Bom). 4. Chanchal Bhatti v. state (NCT of Delhi),2011 Cr LJ 1195 (1197) (Del.). 5. Elumalai v. State of Tamil Nadu,1983 LW (Cr) 121 (Mad). 6. G.D.Iyer v. State, 1978 Cr LJ 1180 (Del-DB). 7. Gokak patel volkart ltd. v. Dundayya gurushiddaiah hiremath and others, (1991)2 SCC 141. 8. Harbans Singh v. Gurcharan Kaur, 1990 Cr LJ 1591. 9. Japani Sahoo Vs. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty AIR 2007 S.C. 2762. 10. Kamal H. Javeri v.Chandulal, 1985 Cr LJ 1215 (Bom). 11. Krishna Pillai Vs. T.A. Rajendran and Anr 1990 supp. SCC 121. 12. Mohammad Safiq v. Inspector ,Labour,2007 Cr LJ 2007(2008). 13. Pramod Kumar Kishorpuria v. Superintendent of Police ,CBI 2014 LJ 960. 14. R. Aghoramurthy, Registrar of Companies, Bombay v. Bombay dyeing and manufacturing company limited 1991- jt-s-432. 15. Raj Singh v. State (Delhi Admnistration),(!984)1Crimes 755. 16. Rakesh Kumar Jain v. State Air 2000 S.C. 2754. 17. Ramesh Chandra Sinha and others v. State of Bihar and others(2003)7 SCC 254.
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18. Registrar of Companies v. Rajashree sugar & chemicals ltd. And others air 2000 S.C. 1643. 19. Sarah Mathew Vs The Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases(2014) 2 SCC 104. 20. State of Himachal Pradesh v. Tara Dutta, AIR 2000 SC 297. 21. State of Rajasthan v. Sanjay Kumar and others air 1998 S.C. 1919. 22. Vanka Radhamanohari vs. Vanka Vankata Reddy and Ors(1993) 3 SCC 4. 23. Venkappa Gurappa Hosur v. Kasawwa, (1997) 4 Supreme 217.
SECONDARY SOURCES BOOKS REFERRED:
1. Gaur, KD, Criminal Law: Cases and Materials, (6th Ed. 2009). 2. Gupte and Dighe, Criminal Manual , (7th Ed. 2007). 3. I, Kathuria, R.P. Supreme Court on Criminal Law, 1950-2002, ( 6th Ed. 2002). 4. II, Mitra, B.B., Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (20th ed. 2006). 5. II, Nandi, Criminal Ready Referencer , ( 2nd Ed. 2007). 6. Kelkar , R.V. Criminal Procedure, (5th Ed. 2011). 7. Surendra Malik & Sudeep Malik, Criminal Procedure Code & Criminal Trail , 2nd Edition, EBS. 8. Jst. M.L.Singhal, Sohoni’s Code of Criminal Procedure, 21st Edition, Lexis Nexis. WEBSITES REFERRED:
1. http://www.mondaq.com/india/x/407104/Crime/Crime+Never+Dies 2. http://www.livelaw.in/in-criminal-cases-period-of-limitation-starts-from-the-date-ofcomplaint-not-from-date-of-cognizance-constitution-bench/
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