Differential Cruelty: a critique of ontological reason in light of the philosophy of cruelty by Reza Negarestani

ANGELAKI journal jou rnal of the theor theoretica eticall huma humanit nities ies volume14 volu me14 number number 3 dece decembe mber r 2009

I

9 0 0 2 r e b m e c e D 4 1 2 4 : 7 1 : t A ] y t i s r e v i n U k r o Y w e N [ : y B d e d a o l n w o D

n the first chapter of his major doctoral thesis, Differ Dif ferenc encee and Rep Repeti etitio tion n, Gi Gill lles es De Dele leuz uzee draws an intriguing, albeit abstruse, connection between cruelty and difference or determination as such. such. In doing so, he pronounces determination as suc uch h or di diff ffer eren ence ce cr crue uell an and d ev even en irredeemably monstrous. The main undertaking of th this is es essa sayy is to sh show ow ho how w th thee eq equa uati tion on of determination determ ination-as-cru -as-cruelty elty has a role more consequential than its auxiliary function in reclaiming difference in itself and ‘‘rescuing difference from its maledictory state.’’1 We shall argue that, on the one hand, such an equation reveals the vistas of an intricate metaphysics wherein ontology is inherently inheren tly problematic problematic or cruel and, on the other, it brings about an ethical opportunity in regard to the problematic determination of ontology as an elaborate system of cruelty. It is in drawing such a connection between difference and cruelty that Deleuze assigns himself a critical task which consists of reinvestigating metaphysics not only thro th roug ugh h a phi philo loso soph phyy of dif diffe fere renc ncee bu butt als alsoo a philosophy of cruelty. Yet the recapitulation of metaphysics in general and ontology in particular throug thr ough h a phil philoso osophy phy of cru cruelty elty req requir uires, es, firs firstt of all, an inte interme rmediat diating ing lev level el of anal analysi ysiss com com-prising three lines of inquiry. The first line of inquiry includes an investigation investigation in order to learn what constitutes constitutes determ determination ination as such and where this determination can be found in its most naked and rigorous form. Second, we need to know the definition of such cruelty which is embedded in the con consti stitut tution ion of met metaph aphysi ysics cs in gen genera erall and ontology in particular. The third line includes a search for a plane of examination or an analytical model capable of intermediating between cruelty and met metaphy aphysic sics/o s/onto ntolog logy, y, a mod model el capa capable ble of

ISSN 0969-725X print/ISSN1469-2899 online/09/030069^16 DOI:1 DOI: 10.108 080/09697250 0/096972509034 903407567 07567

69

reza negarestani DIFFERENTIAL CRUELTY a critique of ontological reason rea son in light of the philosophy of cruelty cruelty recapturing metaphysical necessities and ontological gi cal re relat latio ions ns in te term rmss of det deter ermi mina natio tion n qua crue cr uelty lty.. It is th thee po poss ssibi ibilit lityy of re re-ex -exam amin ining ing ontology in the light of the philosophy of cruelty that this essay attempts to investigate. By pursuing the afo afore reme ment ntio ioned ned lin lines es of inq inquir uiry, y, we sh shall all ultimat ulti mately ely arg argue ue tha thatt the ques questio tion n of ont ontolo ology gy heralds the dawn of the philosophy of cruelty, which assumes a crucial task in regard to bridging that philosophy with a speculative ethics. The task of the philosophy of cruelty, in this sense, is to become the harbinger of enlightenment for the ethics of being and remobilizing ontology in the shadow of its cruelty.

ß

2009 Taylor & Francis and the Editors of Angelaki

different diffe rential ial crue cruelty lty act i: ele eleme ments nts of cru crue elty


What co What cons nstit titute utess th thee ac actt of det deter ermi mina natio tion n as such? Is it merely a unidirectional escape from gravity? Or is it a flight from gravity by coming into in to a co coll llus usiv ivee st stan ance ce wi with th it it?? Th Thee ac actt of determ det erminat ination ion who whose se line of mov moveme ement nt is that of unilateral distinction, Deleuze argues, distinguishes X from its chaotic background to make a dif differ ferenc encee. Ye Yett wha whatt is thi thiss ind indet eter ermi minab nable le background? Deleuze identifies it in terms of two realms of nothingness, black and white. Whilst the former is the void of absolute indifference, the lat latter ter is the dom domain ain of unc unconn onnecte ected d par parts, ts, deter de termi minat natee th thing ingss wh which ich ar aree on only ly ne nega gativ tively ely corr co rrela elate ted d to ea each ch ot other her;; th they ey ar aree mo more re th than an sing si ngul ular ar ye yett le less ss th than an mu mult ltip iple le.. Th Thes esee tw twoo domainss charac domain characterize terize two vecto vectors rs of dissol dissolution ution into the inde indeter termina minable; ble; one is the diss dissolut olution ion into nothing as that to which nothing can belong and an d by wh whic ich h be belo long ngin ings gs mu must st be an annu null lled ed,, thee ot th othe herr is th thee ve vect ctor or of di diss ssol olut utio ion n to th thee unconnec unco nnected ted mult multitud itude. e. The junc junctio tion n bet between ween black and white realms of nothingness is a zone of dramatic illumination, neither inherent to the dark nor to the light, but to the line of unilateral distinc dis tinction tion eme emergi rging ng fro from m the tene tenebro brous us back back-ground. gro und. This emergence emergence from the dar darknes knesss of Tenebrum which generates a luminosity cast upon both realms is the function of determination or the making of difference. A line of illumination of this kind is peculiar to the style of Tenebrism, an accentuated form of chiaroscuro or clear-dark painting in which a type of luminosity is created that makes figures look as if they are ascending from the nigrescent background.2 Shedding light on everything it traverses, the luminosity arising from fr om the bl black ack do doma main in of no noth thing ingnes nesss or th thee teneb te nebro rous us vo void id de desc scri ribes bes the fun funct ction ion of th thee unilater unil ateral al dis distinc tinction tion tha thatt Dele Deleuze uze asc ascrib ribes es to determination or difference as such, i.e., cruelty. Deleuze defines the unilaterality of distinction as follows: There is crue There cruelty lty,, eve even n mon monstr strosi osity, ty, on bot both h side si dess of th this is st stru rugg ggle le ag agai ains nstt an el elus usiv ivee adversary, in which the distinguished opposes some so meth thin ingg wh which ich ca cann nnot ot dis disti ting nguis uish h it itse self lf from it but continues to espouse that which divorces it. Difference is this state in which

determinat determ ination ion tak takes es the for form m of unil unilate ateral ral 3 distinction.

Now that we know what constitutes determination as such, we can move on to the definition of cru cruelt eltyy acco accordin rdingg to whic which h Dele Deleuze uze equa equates tes determi dete rminat nation ion as suc such h wit with h cru cruelty elty,, a ‘‘pr ‘‘precis ecisee point’’ at which a series of implicit and explicit relatio rela tionsh nships ips betw between een the dete determi rmined ned and the undeter unde termine mined d are establish established ed in the form of a chain of nested cruelties. Cruelty is nothing but determination as such, such, that precise precise poi point nt at whi which ch the det determ ermined ined main ma inta tain inss it itss es esse sent ntia iall re rela lati tion on wi with th th thee undetermined, that rigorous abstract line fed by chiaroscuro chiaroscuro..4

Deleuze reveals that he has predicated his concise definition of cruelty on Antonin Artaud’s idea: [. . .] cruelty signifies rigor, implacable intention tio n and deci decisio sion, n, irr irreve eversi rsible ble and abs absolu olute te 5 determination. Cruelt Crue ltyy is ab abov ovee al alll lu luci cid, d, a ki kind nd of ri rigi gid d 6 control and submission to necessity.

A comparison between Deleuze’s definition and Artaud’s germinal idea reveals that determination qua cruelty consists of a transition between a series of necessities in the form of intentions, submissions, sio ns, deci decisio sions ns and inst instruc ructio tions, ns, all rig rigoro orous, us, conscious, irreversible and absolute, which is to say by any means and at all costs. For Artaud, such rigour first and foremost manifests in life in so fa farr as li life fe di dist stin ingu guis ishe hess it itse self lf fr from om th thee void whilst the indifferent void does not partake in su such ch vi vita tali list stic ic se sece cess ssio ion. n. Li Life fe is a st stri rict ct determi dete rminat nation ion in bein beingg dis disting tinguis uished hed fro from m the void at all costs, even if the cost is submission to the necessity of the void. For this reason, life is cruel in an absolute sense as it relentlessly acts upon that which is radically exterior to it. For it seems to me that creation and life itself are define defined d on only ly by a kin kind d of ri rigo gor, r, he henc ncee a fundamental cruelty, which leads things to their ineluctable end at whatever cost.7

If for for Ar Arta taud ud ou ourr very very ex exis isten tence ce is crue cruelty lty,, it is be beca caus usee be bein ingg is is,, on onto tolo logi gica call llyy sp spea eaki king ng,,

70

negarestani


cruelty – a determined act against the void, a struggle at once monstrous and accursed. Here we witness a philosophy of cruelty proposing that the basic assumption of ontology is cruelty and only through remobilizing such cruelty as creativity we can do justice to ourselves and to the world. If cruel uelty ty be beca caus usee it su sugg gges ests ts th that at ex ni nihil hiloo is cr something dis disting tinguis uishes hes its itself elf aga agains instt the inde inde-terminable termin able void through relentl relentless ess determ determination ination and at all costs, then the idea of ontology or the science of being is the very philosophy of cruelty. Now if being something or to be bespeaks of a fundamental determination, then it also bespeaks of a fu fund ndam amen enta tall cr crue uelt lty. y. Fr From om he here re we ar aree directe dir ected d to a rad radical ical conclusio conclusion n whic which h she sheds ds a dramatic light on the ethics of being: ontology is the science of cruelty precisely because it is the science sci ence of being – a mon monstr strous ous dete determi rminat nation ion agai ag ains nstt th thee ind indete eterm rmina inable ble.. The im impli plica catio tions ns of such a thesis signal the advent of an ethical enlight enli ghtenme enment nt whe wherein rein bein beingg str strive ivess for jus justice tice by coming to terms with its cruelty, differentiating justice as a unilateral distinction from cruelty as th that at wh which ich re refu fuse sess to es estr trang angee it itse self lf fr from om jus justic tice. e. In or order der to su supp ppor ortt su such ch a th thes esis is,, we should explain the reason as to why the question of on onto tolo logy gy is th thee qu ques estio tion n of cr crue uelty lty as su such ch.. This Th is ca can n be re recap capitu itula lated ted as th thee po poss ssibi ibilit lityy of redi re disc scov over ering ing on onto tolo logy gy as the ph philo iloso sophy phy of cruelty. In order to develop a speculative ethics of justice, first we need to develop a philosophy of cr crue uelt ltyy in th thee gu guis isee of ont ntoolo loggy so as to fundame fund amenta ntally lly supp support ort its defi definiti nition on of cru cruelt elty, y, its pr prob oblem lemss and co cond nditi ition ons. s. Fo Forr thi thiss re reas ason on,, we pro procee ceed d to a rud rudime imentar ntaryy rec recons onstru tructio ction n of onto on tolo logy gy as th thee ph phil ilos osop ophy hy of cr crue uelt lty. y. Th This is includes a search for an analytical model which can explain ontological ontological necess necessities ities and relatio relationnships in terms of determination qua cruelty and a rigorous dynamics of instructions, submissions and decisions (the third line of inquiry outlined at the beginning of this essay).

act ii: ont ontol olog ogical ical recon reconstr structi uction on of an uns unspeaka peakabl ble e to torr tur ure e Through the history of philosophy, perhaps no one has reached the status of Aristotle as the great philosopher of cruelty. Such an appellation owes

71

to Aristotle’s peculiar approach to the determination ti on of be bein ingg as an in indi disp spen ensa sabl blee bi bind ndin ingg of cruelty cru elty.. Ari Aristo stotle’ tle’ss appr approac oach h is sta stated ted luci lucidly dly in his ea earl rlyy co comm mmen entt on th thee to tort rtur uree inf inflic licted ted by th thee Et Etru rusc scan an pi pirrat ates es on th thei eirr ca capt ptur ured ed enemies enem ies.. Whe Whether ther or not the com commen mentt adv advert ertss to a Pl Plat atooni nicc st stag agee in th thee ph phil ilos osop ophi hicc li life fe of Aristotle, it is indisputably a decisive passage in th that at it ex expo pose sess the ele eleme ment ntar aryy fun funda dame ments nts of Ari Aristo stotle’ tle’ss sys system tem of inte intellig lligible ible ont ontolo ology gy as a set of cru cruel el det determ ermina ination tions, s, sub submis missio sions ns and instructions: Aristotle says, that we are punished much as those were who once upon a time, when they had fallen into the hands of Etruscan robbers, were slain with elaborate cruelty; their bodies, the living [corpora [corpora viva] viva] with the dead, were boun bo und d so ex exac actl tlyy as po poss ssib ible le on onee ag agai ains nstt another: so our souls, tied together with our bodi bo dies es as th thee li livi ving ng fi fixe xed d up upon on th thee de dead ad 8 [nekrous nekrous]. ].

It has been stated by historians that the Etruscans had a genuine form of torture whose terror could not be captured by words but only by imagination. Virgil attributes the practice of this torture to King Mezentius, the king of Etruscans, who punished the soldiers of Aneas with this torture.9 Jacques Jacq ues Bru Brunsc nschwig hwig details this tor tortur turee in his essay ‘‘Aristote et les pirates tyrrhe´ niens.’’10 The Etruscans Etrusc ans dissem disseminated inated terro terrorr throug throughout hout their neighbouring neighbo uring territories territories by fetteri fettering ng the capture captured d living soldiers to rotting corpses in a way that each member of the living person was chained to its putr putrefy efying ing cou counter nterpar partt belo belongin ngingg to the corpse. Face to face, mouth to mouth, hand to hand ha nd an and d le legg to le leg, g, th thee li livi ving ng pe pers rsoon wa wass fastened to the corpse in such an exact way that it could co uld be sa said id the living living an and d the dead lit liter erall allyy bound and mirrored each other on all levels.11 The liv livin ingg pe pers rson on wa wass us usual ually ly no nour uris ishe hed d fo forr a lo long ng ti time me un unti till he pe peri rish shed ed by th thee re reek ek of decom dec ompo posi sitio tion n an and d th thee su subt btle le mo move veme ment ntss of putrefaction from the corpse to the living tissues. The Etruscans unshackled them once the person was ful fully ly pu putr tref efied ied by th thee co corp rpse se an and d tur turned ned black as a result. For the Etruscans, the blackening signalled the disappearance of the literally supe su perf rfic icia iall di diff ffer eren ence ce – ma mani nife fest sted ed as th thei eirr

different diffe rential ial crue cruelty lty


superficial identities – between the dead and the supposedly living. For if the end of the punishment me nt co coin inci cide ded d wi with th th thee bl blac acke keni ning ng of bo both th parties’’ skin and the disappe parties disappearance arance of their superficial difference or identities, then the difference was not to be found between them but within them as a nig nigres rescent cent asc ascens ension ion blac blackeni kening ng rel relatio ations ns between their identities. In the Etruscan torture, thee nig th nigre resc scen entt as ascen censi sion on of dif diffe fere rence nce whi which ch effectu eff ectuate atess the era erasur suree of sup superf erficia iciall diff differe erence nce (the difference difference between X and Y, the dead and the living) corresponds with the line of illumination emer em ergi ging ng fr from om th thee bl blac ack k ba back ckgr grou ound nd in th thee paintings of Tenebrism. Too slow to be depicted by its graphic details and too elaborate to be taken as a mere physical punishm puni shment ent,, the Etr Etrusc uscan an tor tortur turee was a met metaaphysical staging of being in its putative vitality and in its det determ erminat ination ion or dif differ ference ence as suc such. h. A ni nigr gres esce cent nt pr prec ecur urso sorr to Te Tene nebr bris ism m an and d a meta me taph phys ysic ical al pr prot otot otyp ypee fo forr th thee Th Thea eatr tree of Cruelty, the Etruscan torture became a conceptual resource for philosophers, from Aristotle to Cicero, from Iamblichus to Augustine and from Alciati to Bacon. Both Iamblichus and Augustine quote quo te fro from m Cice Cicero ro Ari Aristo stotle’ tle’ss fra fragme gment nt on the Etrusc Etr uscan an rob robber berss with min minor or var variat iations ions.. Thei Theirr accoun acc ounts, ts, how howeve ever, r, exp expres resss an emp emphas hasis is on an onto on to-t -theo heolo logic gical al sh shift ift.. The so soul’ ul’ss bo bonda ndage ge or necr ne cros osis is by th thee dea dead d bo body dy sig signif nifies ies th thee tr trut uth h of human life or human condition on earth as a ˆ ria) punis pu nishm hmen entt (timoˆ ria) ensued by great sins comm co mmitt itted ed pr prio iorr to hu huma man n ex exis iste tence nce an and d pr preeindividu indi vidual al guil guiltt whic which h gen genera era of bein beings gs high higher er 12 than th an hu huma man n ha have ve ta take ken n up upon on th them emse selv lves es.. Aris Ar isto totl tle, e, ho howe wevver er,, no nott on only ly em empl ploy oyss th thee Etru Et rusc scan an to tort rtur uree as a me meta taphy physic sical al mo mode dell fo forr the first time but he also explicates the composite of body–soul with regard to the Etruscan torture through elaborating the relations and necessities at wor work k with within in the ont ontolo ologic gical al trib tribulat ulation ion.. The idea of intelligible ontology is presented through a tra transit nsition ion bet between ween necessitie necessitiess whic which h is com com-prised of determinations, intentions, instructions and an d su subm bmiss issio ions ns,, a gr grad adien ientt of cr cruel ueltie tiess ea each ch more mo re in inte tens nsee th than an th thee pr prev evio ious us.. Th Thee id idea ea of puni pu nish shme ment nt or to tort rtur uree in th this is ca case se em emer erge gess from fr om su such ch a tr tran ansi sitio tion n be betw tween een the nous nous,, the soul and the body – the Ideal, the problem and

its solution – rather than an extrapolated idea of penan pen ance ce wh which ich ov over ersh shad adow owss th thee on onto tolo logi gica call model mod el wit with h an ext extran raneou eously sly theo theolog logical ical fra framemework. wor k. Whe Wherea reass in the pas passag sagee Ari Aristo stotle tle mer merely ely rediscovers the Etruscan torture as a metaphysical model of cruelty for the twofold of body–soul, it is only in his mathematical ideas with regard to ontolo ont ology gy that Ari Aristo stotle tle unf unfolds olds the tre tremen mendou douss consequences of such a model. For Aristotle the ties of the soul as the force of vitality to the body should be rediscovered in terms of the living tied to the dead. The soul is the act of intellect upon the body; yet it needs an instrument – a body – to perform its special activities in regard to its inner part or Ideal which is the nous or the intellect. The task of the soul is to br brin ingg th thee un univ iver ersse in into to un unis ison on wi with th th thee intellect according to its intensive ratio (reason) with wit h the nous nous.. Th Thee bo body dy is an in inst stru rume ment nt by which whi ch the so soul ul can ac acco comp mplis lish h it itss mi miss ssio ion n in regard to the intellect. Accordingly, the soul has two act activit ivities ies whic which h are char charact acteri erized zed by the their ir predispositio predisp ositions. ns. The first activity is charact characterized erized by it itss ne nece cess ssit ity; y; it is th thee un unit itiv ivee an and d in inwa ward rd activity of the soul according to the nous or the undying undy ing (ide (ideal) al) inne innerr par part. t. Con Conseq sequent uently, ly, the inward or necessary activity of the soul is, in fact, its inte intensiv nsivee and endu enduring ring correlati correlation on with its inner part (the nous nous). ). The second activity of the soul is its extensive or outward activity, marked by its contingency since it introduces the soul to that which does not belong to it – that is the body qua cadavera cadavera.. Moving in the direction of what is exterior to the soul, the contingent activity of the sou soull vit vitaliz alizes es mat matter ter acc accord ording ing to the rat ratio io deri de rive ved d fr from om it itss in inte tens nsiv ivee re rela lati tion on wi with th th thee intellec inte llect. t. The contingen contingentt acti activit vityy of the soul – its tie to the body qua dead – is the price of pursu pur suing ing it itss int inter erna nall ti tiee wit with h th thee int intel ellec lectt and being in thrall to the ambition of the nous in acting acti ng upo upon n the universe universe with the inte intentio ntion n of rendering it intelligible. If the act of the nous upon the universe corresponds with the contingent ge nt ac activ tivity ity of the so soul ul an and d al also so co cont nting ingen entt activity of the soul suggests the bondage of the soul to the body qua dead, then the act of intellect is th thee fir first st ins insta tanc ncee of cr crue uelty lty.. Th This is br bring ingss us to Ar Arta taud’ ud’ss dic dictu tum: m: ‘‘e ‘‘eve very rythi thing ng th that at act actss is 13 cruelty.’’ Yet we will show that cruelty as the

72

negarestani act of intellect – harboured by the idea of vitality and an d th thee in inte tell llig igib ible le on onto tolo logy gy – is me mere rely ly an opening to a maze of an inexhaustible cruelty. Determination of being or the idea of ontology, in this sense, is a labyrinth of cruelty from whose turns and twists no one can escape.


The fa The fact ct is th that at ev every ery li livi ving ng th thin ingg am amon ongg us suffers the torment of Mezentius – that the living perish in the embrace of the dead: and altho alt houg ugh h th thee vi vita tall na natu ture re enj enjoy oyss it itse self lf and runs things for a while, the influence of parts neve ne vert rthe heles lesss ge gets ts th thee up uppe perr ha hand nd no nott lo long ng afte af terw rwar ards ds,, an and d do does es so ac acco cord rdin ingg to th thee nature of the substance and not at all to the nature of the living one.14

The metaphysical model of the Etruscan torture explains determination of being as such in terms of bindings that chain the living to the dead – both qua the undetermined and to an internal vitalit vit alityy qua the det determ ermined ined.. The livi living ng req require uire both bot h bind bindings ings to det determ ermine ine the themse mselve lvess aga agains instt thee de th dead ad an and d in re rega gard rd to th thei eirr ow own n vi vita tali lity ty.. In the Aristotelian model, determination of being as su such ch is als alsoo co comp mpri rise sed d of tw twoo bin bindin dings gs or vectors: the positive determination in regard to the nous as a vital necessity within the soul and the negative determination of the soul against the body qua dead. The two activities of the soul, corr co rres espo pond nding ingly ly,, st stan and d fo forr th thee int intens ensiv ivee an and d extensive vectors of determination which respectively tiv ely de dete term rmine ine be being ing in re rega gard rd to an inn inner er necessity (the Ideal of determination) and against the undeter undetermined. mined.

act iii: deter determ min inati ation on of bei being ng or synthesis synt hesis of o f tw two o ind indete eterm rminab inable le deaths Beingg qu Bein quaa be bein ingg or th thee id idea ea of in inte tell llig igib ible le onto on tolo loggy is de dete term rmin ined ed by th thee ra rati tioo of th thee extensive or contingent activities of the soul to its intensive or necessary activities. We shall now argue that the determination of being does not correspond with the ratio of a necrosis (extension to the body as an ephemeral instrument) to a vital immo im mort rtali ality ty (i (inte ntens nsio ion n to towa ward rdss th thee en endu durin ringg nous), nous ), or the ratio of the undetermined to the ultimat ulti mately ely dete determi rminabl nable. e. Suc Such h dete determi rminat nation, ion,

73

we sha shall ll elab elabora orate, te, cor corres respon ponds ds to a syn synthes thesis is between two necroses, two indeterminable lines of dis disso solut lution ion an and d two sy syst stem emss of cr crue uelty lty.. In conclud con cluding ing that the dete determi rminat nation ion of bein beingg as such can be attributed to the reciprocal relation betw be twee een n tw twoo in inde dete term rmin inab able le re real alms ms,, we ca can n return to Deleuze’s philosophy of difference. In the fourth chapter of Diffe Difference rence and Repet Repetition ition,, Ideas Ide as and the Syn Synthe thesis sis of Diff Differe erence nce,, Dele Deleuze uze argues that dx is not determinable in regard to x, nor is dy to y, yet dx and dy as two undifferentiated enti ated rea realms lms of dis dissol solutio ution n are dete determi rminab nable le 15 in regard to each other (dy (dy//dx ). The unbinding dx). of on onto tolog logica icall re reas ason on ge gene nera rate tess a di diffe ffere renti ntial al doma do main in of cr crue uelty lty fo foun unded ded on the re recip cipro rocal cal synt sy nthe hesi siss of tw twoo sy syst stem emss of cr cruel uelty ty.. In dif diffe ferrenti en tiat atin ingg su such ch a do doma main in,, th thee in inte tens nsiv ivee an and d exte ex tens nsiv ivee inv inves estm tment entss of on onto tolog logica icall re reas ason on coalesce into a reason of base cruelty whose site of activity is that of being. In order to fully absorb its conceptual wealth, Aristotle arithmetically captures the metaphysical cruelty cru elty of the Etr Etrusc uscans ans.. The Etr Etrusc uscan an tor tortur turee is thus arithmetically reinvented as a procedure called aphairesis aphairesis,, a negation of belongings and attribut attr ibutes es or sub subtra tractio ction. n. Lat Later, er, neo neo-Pla -Platon tonist istss and apophatic theologians utilized this procedure to determine the One or affirm the Ideal through its ineffability or indifference to the conditional arith ithme metic tic qua belo belongin nging. g.16 Aphairesis is an ar procedure consisting of two vectors correspondingg to th in thee ac acti tivi viti ties es of th thee so soul ul qu quaa li livi ving ng in regard to the nous and the body qua dead. These vectors are intensive and extensive; yet despite their directional polarity, they are operationally reciprocal. The negative vector is the vector of remova rem ovall whe whereb rebyy belo belongin ngings gs or att attribu ributes tes are subt su btra ract cted ed fr from om a ma magn gnit itud ude. e. Th Thee po posi siti tive ve vect ve ctor or,, on th thee ot othe herr ha hand nd,, em emph phas asiz izes es th thee possibility of conservation and persistence against subtra sub tractio ction. n. The vec vector torss of aphairesis respectively effectuate the removed and the remainder in subtraction. The debasing coupling of the soul with wit h th thee bo body dy qu quaa dea dead d ex expr pres esse sess a te temp mpor oral al correlation corre lation with belong belonging ing (qua the instrument or mortal body) which is subjected to removal and subtraction. Yet the enduring bond of the soul with the nous corresponds with the conservable correlation with the inner part (qua the Ideal or



necessity) which continues to remain under any subt su btra ract ctiv ivee co condi nditio tion n – the po posi sitiv tivee ve vect ctor or of aphairesis.. Therefore, the vectors of aphairesis aphairesis arithmetically arithm etically capture the extens extensive ive and intensive vect ve ctor orss of de dete term rmin inat atio ion n as su such ch – ne nega gati tive ve deter de termi minat natio ion n ag agai ains nstt the und undet eter ermi mined ned an and d posi po sitiv tivee de dete term rmin inati ation on in re rega gard rd to an inn inner er Idea Id eall or ne nece cesssi sity ty.. Wh Whil ilst st th thee la latt tter er fi find ndss diffe dif fere renc ncee in af affir firma matio tion n of a nec neces essi sity ty or th thee vita vi tall pe perrsi sist sten ence ce of th thee in inne nerr pa parrt ag agai ains nstt negation, the former negatively binds the undetermined; it is the subtraction of the body qua belonging which is epiphenomenal to the affirmation ti on of th thee in inne nerr ne nece cess ssit ityy or th thee in inte tens nsiv ivee determination. Negation results from affirmation: this means that negation arises in the wake of affirmation or beside it, but only as the shadow of the more profound genetic element – of – of that power or ‘‘will’’ which engenders the affirmation and the difference in the affirmation.17

At this stage, in order to show that being qua being is a site of progressive cruelty, we shall argue that even the enduring and determinable correlation of the soul with the nous is a site of necros nec rosis. is. By unbi unbindin ndingg the ari arithm thmetic etical al twi twists sts impl im plic icat ated ed wi with thin in th thee Et Etru rusc scan an to tort rtur uree as a meta me taphy physi sical cal mo model del,, we sh shall all ar argu guee th that at th thee intensive determination of being in terms of an ontological necessity is a source of indefatigable cruelty. According to the subtractive logic of aphairesis,, persistence with regard to an ideal inner part esis (intens (int ensive ive con conser servat vation) ion) can cannot not be mai mainta ntained ined othe ot herr th than an by th thee co cont ntin inua uati tion on of ex exte tens nsiv ivee subtra sub tractio ction n or neg negatio ation n of belo belongin ngings. gs. By the Idea Id eall we me mean an th that at wh which ich is in inher herent ently ly ‘‘f ‘‘for oreeclosed’’ to the intensive operation of belonging and integrally withstands the dispossessing power of subtraction (i.e., being qua being , the nous or the One). Determination of being in terms of an ontolo ont ologic gical al nece necessi ssity ty beg begins ins with the neg negati ation on of belonging. Likewise, determination of genera of bei ein ng in terms of the nous req require uiress the negative binding of the body qua cadavera cadavera.. In other words, ontological discourse begins with the subtractive binding of belonging. However, this simultaneous negation of belongings (or removal)

and co and corr rrel elat atio ion n wi with th an id idea eall in inne nerr pa part rt (o (orr rema re main inin ing) g) ca can n on only ly ta take ke pl plac acee th thro roug ugh h th thee contraction of the remainder. Contraction is an intensive medium for the making of difference or dete determi rminat nation ion of bein beingg as suc such; h; it bes bespea peaks ks a basic principle of subtraction or aphairesi aphairesiss – the more belo belongin ngings gs are removed, removed, the less the 18 remainder remaind er gets. For this rea reason son,, con contra tractio ction n integrates all the determinants required for the intens int ensiv ivee de deter termin minat atio ion n of be being ing as su such ch:: the shedd sh edding ing of bel belon ongi ging ngss (r (rem emov oval) al);; re repet petiti ition on (subs (s ubsum umed ed wit within hin th thee re reit iter erat ated ed su subtr btrac actio tion n of be belo long ngin ingg in aphairesi aphairesis) s);; co cons nser ervi ving ng the correl cor relatio ation n with an inne innerr par partt (co (contin ntinuati uation on of remaining); and the intensification of the correlation with the Ideal. In aphairesis aphairesis,, such intensificatio fica tion n man manifes ifests ts as shr shrinka inkage ge or dim diminut inution ion of the remainder (remaining less). Chained to the negative contingency imposed by the bo body dy qua cadavera thee so soul ul ca cann nnot ot cadavera,, th continue its correlation with the nous other than throu thr ough gh co cont ntra ract ctio ion. n. In me medie dieva vall so sour urce cess of natural natu ral phil philoso osophy phy as well as eso esoter tericis icism, m, this contraction manifests as a shrivelling body. It is sometimes a corpse, a tree or a shrivelled-up fruit from fr om wh whic ich h a co cosm smic ic ar arrray of en enti titi ties es ar aree 19 individuated and come forth. In late medieval and early Renaissance alchemy as the science of determining determ ining ideas, this contraction contraction is necessary for extracting and revealing the correlation of the substance with its true ideas (ideals), that is to say,, det say determ erminin iningg the substance substance in ter terms ms of its intens int ensiv ivee id ideas eas an and d ne nece cess ssit ities ies.. In me medie dieva vall alchemy alch emy,, the nig nigres rescen centt slim slimee kno known wn as caput mortuum cha charac racter terize izess the sta state te of con contra tractio ction n throug thr ough h whic which h the vital idea ideass of the substance substance can ca n be de dete term rmin ined ed.. Cap Caput ut mor mortuum tuum is the remaini rem aining ng of the sub substa stance nce aft after er its vit vital al idea ideass have been determined and extracted, a shrivelled body bo dy (r (res esidu iduum um)) wh which ich ha hass lo lost st its at attr tribu ibute tess or belo belongin ngings. gs. Wit Withou houtt this contractio contraction n or the rema re main inde derr wh whic ich h ha hass un unde derg rgon onee in inte tens nsiv ivee diminuti dimi nution on and blac blacken kening, ing, the attr attribut ibutes es qua belongings cannot be shed and true ideas of the substance cannot be determined or distilled. Through Throu gh contra contraction, ction, the soul can contem contemplate plate its inn inner er par partt (th (thee nous and d be bein ingg ca can n co connnous)) an template its intensive determination with regard to an ont ontolo ologic gical al nec necess essity. ity. Con Contra tractio ction, n, her here, e,

74

negarestani

Fig.. 1. The vectors of dete Fig determ rminat ination ion and their their respective respective aspects a spects accor accordi ding ng to the metaphy metaphysical sical model model of Etru E truscan scan torture and the arithmeti torture arithmeticc conce concept pt of aphairesis aphairesis.. 9 0 0 2 r e b m e c e D 4 1 2 4 : 7 1 : t A ] y t i s r e v i n U k r o Y w e N [ : y B d e d a o l n w o D

‘‘refers to the fusion of successive tick-tocks in a contemplative soul.’’20 These repeating tick-tocks are the vibrations of the subtractive correlation between bet ween dev develo elopme pment nt and env envelo elopme pment nt of the soul, the negation of belonging and the conservation of an inner part (or ontological necessity). As the intensive medium of ontological determination, contraction is the curse of swinging back and forth bet betwee ween n the nomos of the dead and the nous of the living; it imposes the cruelty of drawing dra wing dif differ ference ence fro from m rep repetit etition ion whic which h her heree is a passage ‘‘from external differences to singular difference,’’21 fr from om ex exten tensi sive ve det deter ermin minat atio ion n through negation of belongings to the intensive determination of being in regard to its ontological nece ne cess ssit ity. y. In th thee me meta taph phys ysic ical al mo mode dell of th thee Etruscan torture, whilst the necrotic correlation with the body qua dead refers to determination via negation of belongings, the putative vitality inher inh eren entt to th thee liv livin ingg su sugg gges ests ts th thee int inten ensiv sivee ontolo ont ologic gical al det determ erminat ination ion via affi affirma rmatio tion n of an innerr nec inne necess essity ity qua Ide Ideal. al. The pen pendula dularr mov moveement me nt be betw twee een n th thee ou outw twar ard d ne necr cros osis is an and d th thee pres pr esum umed ed inn inner er vi vita talit lityy the there reby by br brin ings gs ab abou outt thee po th poss ssibi ibilit lityy of co cont ntra ract ctio ion n as th thee me mediu dium m requir req uired ed for the con contem templat plation ion of ont ontolo ologic gical al necessity. Contraction is a difference or a modification of the contemplative contemplative soul – indeed, the modification of this soul, the only modification which truly belongs to it and after which it dies – it

75

appear appe arss th that at th thee mo most st ma mate teri rial al rep repet etit itio ion n occur oc curss on only ly by me mean anss of an and d wi with thin in a so soul ul 22 which draws a difference from repetition.

We ar argu gued ed th that at co cont ntra ract ctio ion n si simu mult ltan aneo eous usly ly enta en tail ilss th thee sh shed eddi ding ng of be belo long ngin ings gs an and d th thee cons co nser erva vatio tion n of an inn inner er pa part rt qu quaa nec neces essi sity ty.. To put it suc succinc cinctly, tly, con contra tractio ction n env envelo elops ps the require req uiremen ments ts for the inte intensi nsive ve dete determi rminati nation on of being as such. But what is the motor of such cont co ntra ract ction ion or wh what at determines the int intens ensive ive medi me dium um of de dete term rmin inat atio ion n of be bein ingg as su such ch?? In othe herr words, if in aphairesis contraction sugg su gges ests ts th thee st stat atee of re rema main inin ingg, or mor oree accurately, remaining less, then what guarantees this les lessen sening ing or she sheddin ddingg of belo belongi ngings ngs?? Our answ an swer er to th thes esee qu ques esti tion onss is th that at on only ly no nonnbelonging – that – that which belongs to nothing and to which nothing belongs – can extensively guarantee the she sheddin ddingg of belo belongi ngings ngs and inte intensiv nsively ely enssur en ures es th thee le less ssen enin ingg of th thee re rema main inde derr or contraction. The intensive idea of ontology can only distinguish itself by factoring in the primacy of non-belonging qua the void. In or orde derr to sh shed ed be belo long ngin ings gs an and d co cont ntra ract ct towards the Ideal, the primacy of non-belonging qua nothing must be affirmed and internalized. Throug Thr ough h its abs absolut olutee indi indiffer fference ence and ext exteri erioority to belo belongi nging, ng, the voi void d qua non non-bel -belong onging ing becomes a prime guarantor for the determination of being as such, because the intensive realization of su such ch de dete term rmin inat atio ion n li lies es in th thee es esse sent ntia iall



debarring of belongi debarring belonging. ng. In this sense, contra contraction ction towards the Ideal approximates the void and its exteri ext eriori ority ty to belo belongin nging. g. How Howeve ever, r, the voi void d is nott on no only ly ex exte teri rior or to be belon longi ging ng bu butt al also so to th thee onto on tolo logi gica call ne nece cess ssit ityy of th thee Id Idea eal. l. To pu putt it differently, in order to distinguish being in regard to an int inter erna nall ne neces cessit sity, y, de deter termin minat atio ion n mu must st prioritize the reign of the void qua non-belonging which whic h can cannot not be con conflat flated ed wit with h the ont ontolo ologic gical al Idea Id eall und under er any co cond nditi ition on wha whats tsoe oeve ver. r. If we consider the intensive determination of being as the problem, the recourse recourse to the void as the prime guar gu aran anto torr co cons nsti titu tute tess th thee so solu luti tion on.. Bu Butt it is precisely this solution that cannot be reconciled with the ideal which is an ontological necessity inher inh eren entt to bei being ng.. Fo Forr th this is re reas ason on,, so solut lutio ion n is inde in deed ed a ma mani nife fest st cr crue uelt ltyy in th that at it en enta tail ilss a submis sub missio sion n to a pro proble blemati maticc nece necessi ssity: ty: impl implicit icit surrendering to the intervention of the void in order to be explicitly distinguished from it. We arg argued ued tha thatt the inte intensi nsive ve dete determi rminat nation ion of being which tries to correlate being with an ontological necessity is dependent on the intervent ve ntio ion n of th thee vo void id.. Th Ther eref efor ore, e, th thee se seem eming ingly ly conclusive correlation of being with its ontological necessity enforces a higher form of bondage whic wh ich h is al alre read adyy th ther ere. e. Th This is is wh whyy in th thee Etruscan torture the victim is released once its body turns black. The negative binding of the belonging qua dead does not lead to the positive determination of the living but to the intensive binding of the void which manifests as a line of blackening emerging from within. In this sense, ontolo ont ologic gical al rea reason son meti meticulo culousl uslyy imp impleme lements nts a fully fu lly fl fledg edged ed sy syst stem em of bo bond ndag agee fr from om wit within hin.. Cruelty does not end in wedding the soul to the dead, for it is constantly perpetuated by interiorizing the void within the soul to bring about the possibility of the soul’s resistance against the dead de ad and the po poss ssib ibili ility ty of its pe pers rsis isten tence ce in rega re gard rd to th thee nous nous.. Dete Determi rminat nation ion of bein beingg as such is cruelty but such cruelty is not a unified fiel fi eld d of cr crue uelt ltyy be beca caus usee th thee so sour urce cess of su such ch cruelty are more than one. Being as determination tio n ag again ainst st th thee vo void id is cr crue uelty lty,, fo forr it br bridg idges es these the se sepa separat ratee sou source rcess of cru cruelty elty,, and onl onlyy by correlating these two sources can it maintain its pers pe rsis iste tenc ncee an and d pr proc ocliv livit ityy – tha thatt is un unila ilate tera rall distinction or the realization of ex of ex nihilo. nihilo. The two

sources of cruelty are characterized sources characterized as two vectors of ne necr cros osis is,, or tw twoo me mean anss of hu humi milia liati ting ng ye yett necessary bondage to the realm of the dead: .

.

One is the wedding of the soul to the body qua dead or the conting contingency ency of the outsid outside. e. It is the realm of unconnected or subtracted belongings to wh whic ich h be bein ingg ca can n on only ly co cont ntin inge gent ntly ly or negativ neg atively ely ext extend. end. Alt Althou hough gh belo belongin ngings gs are dete de term rmin inab able le,, th ther eree is no de dete term rmin inat atio ion n betwe be tween en the them. m. We cal calll th this is ind indete eterm rmina inable ble realm the realm of death by negative determinati na tion onss or di dissso solu luti tion on by me mean anss of th thee undifferentiated many. many. Thee ot Th othe herr re real alm, m, co cold lder er th than an th thee fi firs rst, t, is inherent to the ontological necessity of being. This source of cruelty entails the binding of the soul to the void in order to preserve its vital bond with the nous nous.. It is recourse to the void vo id in or order der to det deter ermi mine ne th thee on onto tolo logi gica call nece ne cess ssit ityy of be bein ing, g, bu butt si sinc ncee no noth thin ingg ca can n belo be long ng to the vo void id,, su such ch re reco cour urse se – na name mely ly solution as belonging – is essentially a source of th thee pr prob oblem lemati atic. c. The There refo fore re,, the se seco cond nd sour so urce ce of cr crue uelty lty is pr prob oblem lemat atic ic bin bindi ding ng of thee vo th void id;; it is dea death th by the pro proble blemat matic ic or beco be comi ming ng pr prob oble lem mat atic ic by mea eans ns of th thee absolute absolu te indeter indeterminable. minable. Such problem problematicity aticity is neither sponsored by the many nor the One but by the void qua non-belonging.

Determination of being as such is only possible as the rat ratio io bet between ween these two inde indeter termina minable ble deat de aths hs or fo forrms of cr crue uelt ltyy – th thee ne neggat ativ ivee mobi mo biliz lizat atio ion n of be belo long nging ing and th thee bin bindin dingg of the void qua non-belonging. The vitality of the soul qua living can only be determined once it is accur acc urat atel elyy fix fixed ed up upon on th thee de dead ad an and d is fi firm rmly ly fastened to the void. Accordingly, the reciprocal relat re latio ion n of th thee tw twoo ind indete eterm rmina inate tess or sy syst stem emss of cruelty presents a problem that could not be hitherto solved or posed – that is the problem of being qua being , the intensive idea of ontology. Deter Det ermi mina natio tion n as cr crue uelty lty is si simu mult ltane aneou ousl slyy a struggle strugg le agains againstt and a submis submission sion to the synthesis of two indeterminable deaths which reign from with wi thin in an and d fr from om wi with thou out. t. De Dete term rmin inat atio ion n is crue cr uelty lty be beca caus usee it is ne neith ither er ge gener nerat ated ed by the synthesis synthe sis of determ determinables inables nor an indeter indeterminable minable realm re alm (ne (nega gati tive ve mo mobi biliz lizat ation ion of co cont nting ingenc ency) y)

76

negarestani


against a determinable one (the secured necessity of wit withi hin). n). In Inst stea ead, d, det deter ermi mina natio tion n of bei being ng as such is ensued by submission to the reciprocal synthesis of two indeterminable realms (dy (dy//dx ). dx). Cons Co nsta tant ntly ly in st stru rugg ggle le to di dist stin ingu guis ish h it itse self lf through such a synthesis, determination as such is reckless; it is bent on securing a ground at all costs even by means of coupling with the dead and being problematically intimate with the void. The tenacity of such a determination is no less cruel than its consequences and the prices it must pay. pa y. If de dete term rmin inat atio ion n of be bein ingg is th thee id idea ea of ontology and if this determination is cruelty in all directions, then ontology is an elaborate science of cruelty.

ac t iv act iv:: determi determinati nation on as a s a problem problemaa tizing tizing corr correl elatio ation n between tw two o systems syste ms of crue cruelty lty, or the pos possi sibi billity of non-d non-dial ialectical ectical sado sadomasochi masochism sm The impact of Deleuze’s philosophy of difference qua cruelty on ontology is – without exaggeration – imbued with inconclusive complications. Such com complic plicati ations ons equa equally lly and inev inevitab itably ly pro pro-blematize not only traditional ontology but also Deleuze’s own seemingly vitalistic philosophy.23 Perhaps the most critical of such complications – by vi virt rtue ue of ac acti ting ng on bo both th th thee ph phil ilos osop ophy hy of di diff ffer eren ence ce an and d on onto tolo logy gy – is th thee pr prob oble lem m of duplic duplicitous itous determ determination ination:: be bein ingg qu quaa be bein ingg is de dete term rmin inati ation on ag agai ains nstt th thee vo void id but su such ch a determination requires, by necessity, an implicit recourse to the void. It is through this implicit return to the void as the problematizing solution that th at th thee vo void id det deter ermi mine ness dif diffe fere renc ncee or de deter ter-mination as such. According to the problem of bein ingg qu quaa be bein ingg is duplicitous duplic itous determi determination nation,, be both the determining subject and the problematically determined object of the void. By underpinning ontological reason through ratifying the univocity of being, the philosophy of difference remains reticent toward the problem of duplicitous determination, determination, since it mainly envelopes the problem in favour of the universal idea of being rather than arresting the idea of being in favour of th thee pr prob oble lem m thr throu ough gh whi which ch det deter ermin minat atio ion n of bein beingg as suc such h is imp implici licitly tly gua guaran rantee teed. d. The philo ph iloso sophy phy of cr crue uelty lty,, ins instea tead, d, su suppl pplant antss th thee

77

corrob corr obor orati ating ng ro role le of on onto tolo logi gical cal re reas ason on fo forr onto on tolo logy gy wit with h th thee pr prob oblem lemati atizi zing ng ro role le of it itss own. This problematizing role determines being through its problematical bondage to that which does do es no nott bel belon ongg to it ra rathe therr th than an th thro roug ugh h it itss presup pre suppos posed ed vit vital al cor correl relatio ation n with an inte internal rnal ontological necessity. To put it differently, for the philoso phil osophy phy of cru cruelty elty,, the ont ontolo ologic gical al pro problem blem bespeak bes peakss of cru cruelty elty rat rather her than det determ erminat ination ion,, because the problem is essentially a submission to a nece necessi ssity ty at what even en if th thee co cost st whateve everr cos costt, ev implicit impl icitly ly unde undermi rmines nes the pre presum sumed ed nece necessi ssity ty and ren render derss it pro problem blematic atic.. It is pre precise cisely ly this embracing of the cost against the priority of the necessi nece ssity ty that the phil philoso osophy phy of cru cruelty elty insinuates uat es.. Det Deter ermi mina natio tion n of be being ing in te term rmss of an ontological necessity is a problem qua cruelty in so far as it costs a return to the void as that which is exterior to the ontological necessity. For the philosophy of cruelty, the problem of duplicitous determination substantiates ontology unde un derr th thee ae aegi giss of it itss bo bond ndag agee to th thee voi oid; d; therefore, therefo re, it speaks of principle (of cruelt cruelty) y) which must be brought to the foreground rather than be dissembled or disavowed in favour of saving the ontological reason. Whereas, in ontology, being cannot be determined other than in terms of itself (univocity as applied to ens in communi), communi), in the philosophy of cruelty, being is implicitly determine mi ned d by th thee vo void id un unde derr th thee he head adin ingg of th thee problematic. Before it can be ‘‘said in one and the samee sen sam sense se of all its indi individu viduatin atingg diff differe erence ncess 24 or intrinsic modalities,’’ being must be said or determined in the sense of itself.25 Yet determination of being as such is dependent upon the intervention of the void; which is to say, being-initself cannot be said or determined in the sense of itself. If according to the philosophy of cruelty the univocality of being is ultimately determined by no non-b n-belo elong nging ing of the void as tha thatt wh which ich is simulta sim ultaneo neously usly outs outside ide of bein beingg and imm immanen anentt to it, then univocality of being is determined by the equ equiv ivoc ocali ality ty of it itss ine inexi xist sten ence ce.. Eq Equiv uivoc ocal al inexistence is not being-nothing, for it suggests that th at be bein ingg ca cann nnot ot be sa said id in th thee on onee an and d th thee same sense, whether it is in the sense of being or th thee vo void id.. Ph Phil ilos osop ophy hy of cr crue uelt ltyy pr prop opos oses es that the univ univoca ocality lity of bein beingg is det determ ermined ined by an irreversibly problematic bondage to that which



does not belong to it, and hence it is equivocally inexistent, which is another way of saying that bein be ingg is ex exis iste tent nt an and d in inde deed ed un univ ivoc ocal al only problematically by virtue of the void. Equivoc Equi vocity ity of inex inexist istenc encee does not sug sugges gestt any inter int erna nall div divisi ision on wit within hin be being ing or plu plura ralit lityy of onto on tolo logi gica call se sens nses es;; it st stil illl co conf nfor orms ms to th thee univocity of being but only under the heading of pro problem blematic aticity ity of det determ erminat ination ion of bein beingg as such. In short, the philosophy of cruelty stages thee un th univ ivooca cali lity ty of be bein ingg im impl plic icat ated ed in th thee philo ph iloso sophy phy of di diffe ffere rence nce as a pr prob oblem lemat atica icall bondage to the void. Determination emerges through a subtractive synt sy nthe hesi siss be betw twee een n tw twoo fo form rmss of cr crue uelt lty, y, an expl ex plici icitt fo form rm co corr rres espo pondi nding ng to th thee Et Etru rusc scan an torture of binding the living to the dead and an implicit form which mandate mandatess recons reconsummatio ummation n with the voi void. d. Ont Ontolo ology gy is ulti ultimat mately ely a diff differerential between these two forms of cruelty, each with its own mec mechani hanisms sms of tor tortur ture, e, atr atroci ocious ous creativities, rules and problems. It is in the light of a ph phil ilooso soph phyy of cr crue uelt ltyy th that at De Dele leuz uze’ e’ss philosophy of difference can be integrated with his inve investi stigat gation ion of for formal mal sys system temss of cru cruelty elty,, name na mely ly sa sadis dism m an and d ma maso soch chis ism. m. In th this is se sens nse, e, Difference and Repetition can also be understood as a wo work rk tha thatt co cont ntinu inues es th thee st study udy of cr crue uelty lty from fr om a no non-d n-dial ialect ectic ical al ap appr proa oach ch to th thee fo form rmal al system sys temss of cru cruelty elty in ‘‘Co ‘‘Coldne ldness ss and Cru Cruelty elty’’ ’’ in Masochism (1967) to a differential formulation of cruelty in Difference and Repetition (1968). This Th is cr crit itic ical al sh shif iftt ma mark rkss a tr tran ansi siti tion on fr from om a particular definition of cruelty to a universal and hence more radical definition. Determination of being as such or the idea of ontology brings forth two systems of cruelty in the form of metaphysical sadism and masochism. The distinction between between the two is not antithetical antithetical but rather stems from their exclusive or incommensurable mensur able sets of rules and respec respective tive problems. According Accor ding to Deleuze Deleuze’s ’s analys analysis is in ‘‘Coldne ‘‘Coldness ss and Cruelty,’’ such distinction spontaneously emerges from fr om th thee ins insti titut tutio iona nal/i l/imp mpos osing ing re relat latio ions ns in sadism sad ism and con contra tractu ctual al bon bonds ds in mas masoch ochism ism..26 Forr de Fo dete term rmin inati ation on of bei being ng,, in th thee sa same me ve vein, in, metaphysical sadism corresponds with the cruelty ensued by the instruction of the Ideal directed at bei being ng.. Th Thee di diale alect ctic ic be betw tween een pr prob oblem lem an and d

solution or between the soul and the body must be conducted under the heading of the Ideal or the nous whic which h pos posits its an ins institu titutio tional nal netw network ork of re rela lati tion onss be betw twee een n th thee so soul ul an and d th thee bo body dy.. Thee so Th soul ul mu must st ex exte tend nd to th thee bo body dy qu quaa de dead ad following followi ng the instru instruction ction of the nous nous.. The domain of sad sadism ism is thus founded founded thr throug ough h impo imposit sition ion which is instructed and executed with a certain degre deg reee of ex expli plicit citne ness ss tha thatt Del Deleuz euzee as asso socia ciate tess with the ‘‘demonstrative language’’ of sadism.27 In ot other her wo word rds, s, th thee ex expli plicit cit dia diale lecti cticc be betwe tween en problem and solution in determination of being as su such ch is en ensu sued ed by the em empha phatic tic in inst stru ruct ction ion of th thee Id Idea eall an and d th ther eref efor oree co corr rres espo pond ndss to a domain dom ain of met metaphy aphysica sicall sad sadism ism.. Her Heree the pro pro-blem bl em is re reco cogn gniz ized ed as th thee so soul ul’s ’s mi miss ssio ion n of bringin brin gingg bein beings gs int intoo unis unison on with the inte intellec llect, t, whilst whil st the sol solutio ution n is con consti stitut tuted ed of the sou soul’s l’s extension to the instrumental body as that which is contingent to its vitality. It is the nous qua the Idea Id eall th that at po pose sess th thee pr prob oblem lem an and d ins inspi pire ress the solutio sol ution n thr throug ough h an exp explici licitt line of ont ontolo ologic gical al reasoning which leads to the bondage of the soul to the body qua nekrous nekrous.. Therefore, the explicit side si de of ont ntoolo loggic ical al rea easson wh whic ich h ha hass be been en impo im pose sed d by th thee Id Idea eall up upon on th thee co corr rrel elat atio ion n betw be twee een n th thee pr prob oble lem m an and d so solu luti tion on is it itse self lf a form for m of vio violenc lence. e. In ‘‘Co ‘‘Coldne ldness ss and Cru Cruelty elty,’’ ,’’ Dele De leuz uzee id iden enti tifi fies es th thee eq equa uati tion on of re reas ason on-as-v as -vio iolen lence ce wi with th th thee vi viol olenc encee of sa sadis dism m wh wher eree the vector of negation overlaps the explicit line of ontological reasoning.28 This is a violence which must mu st be re repe peat ated ed in th thee fo form rm of reiterative subt su btra ract ctio ion n an and d in th thee ma mann nner er of sa sadi dism sm’s ’s monotony so th that at th thee Id Idea eall ca can n co conn nnec ectt th thee intensive determination of itself to the extensive determination of that which cannot be counted as the Id Idea eal. l. Sin Since ce the nous qua the Id Idea eall mu must st simultaneously dispose of matter and bring lower gene ge nera ra of be bein ings gs in into to un unis ison on wi with th it itse self lf,, th thee dialectic between the soul and the body or the extensive determination of being as such has to abide by the laws of the negative. It means that the body qua belonging must be negated as much as it mu must st be ins instr trum ument ental aliz ized ed to de deve velo lop p the extensive vector of determination, i.e., determinatio nat ion n of bei being ng ag again ainst st tha thatt wh which ich ca canno nnott be distinguished in terms of being and only being. There The refo fore re,, the ne nega gativ tivee det deter ermi mina natio tion n of the

78

negarestani body qu body quaa be belo long nging ing whi which ch is imp impos osed ed by th thee Idea Id eall co corr rres espo pond ndss wi with th th thee ex expl plic icit it li line ne of ontological reasoning which principally indulges in neg negati ation on.. It is the Sadean Sadean re real alm m of cr crue uelty lty where, according to Deleuze, universal negation as an idea of pure and emphatic reason is posited. In the work of Sade, imperatives and descriptions transcend themselves toward the higher function of demonstration: the demonstrative function is based on universal negativity as an active process, and on universal negation as an idea of pure reason [. . .]29


It is the intensive intensive idea of onto ontolog logyy gua guaran rantee teed d by th thee in inte terv rven enti tion on of th thee vo void id th that at br brin ings gs forth metaphysical masochism. For metaphysical masochism, the binding of the void pertains to a co cont ntra ract ctual ual re rela latio tion n wit with h the vo void. id. Th Thee vo void id guar gu aran ante tees es th thee sh shed eddi ding ng of be belo long ngin ings gs an and d contra con tractio ction n whil whilst, st, in ret return urn,, bei being ng sub submit mitss to the primacy of the void in order to remain in or conform to its ontological terms. As an explicit form for m of cru cruelty elty cor corres respon ponding ding to the fas fasteni tening ng of the living to the necrotized other at the order of the Ide Ideal, al, met metaphy aphysica sicall sad sadism ism chai chains ns being to the ins instru trument mental al con conting tingenc encyy of belo belongi nging. ng. Theref The refore ore,, meta metaphy physic sical al sad sadism ism tak takes es for form m by employing a subtractive correlation with belonging so as to convert the negation of belonging (or the nomos of the nekrous nekrous)) into the realization of be being ing-in -in-it -itse self lf (o (orr th thee nous of th thee liv living ing). ). Metaphysical Metaphy sical masochism, however, is the implicit form for m of cru cruelty elty encompass encompassed ed by the inte intensiv nsivee determination of being as such. In order to posit an ont ontolo ologic gical al nece necessi ssity ty for its itself, elf, bein beingg bind bindss cruelty from within in the form of an unconditional submission to th thee vo void id.. Me Meta taph phys ysic ical al masochism is the cruelty of duplicitous determination;; it co nation conf nfla late tess th thee de dete term rmin ined ed st stru rugg ggle le agai ag ains nstt th thee vo void id wi with th th thee su subm bmis issi sion on to th thee resolving resol ving intervention of the void. Determination Determination of being as such intensively employs masochistic reason to find an inner locus for the deployment of the ontological necessity of being. In or orde derr to de dete term rmin inee be bein ingg as su such ch,, th thee exte ex tens nsiv ivee ve vect ctor or of de dete term rmin inati ation on – wh which ich is the neg negativ ativee bind binding ing of belo belongi nging ng imp impose osed d by the Ideal – must be correlated with the intensivee vec siv vector tor of dete determi rminati nation on whic which h enta entails ils the

79

contra cont ract ctua uall bo bond ndag agee to th thee vo void id.. Wh Whil ilst st th thee former for mer cor corres respon ponds ds wit with h met metaph aphysi ysical cal sad sadism ism,, the latt latter er sug sugges gests ts a met metaphy aphysica sicall mas masoch ochism ism.. In thi thiss se sens nse, e, be being ing as su such ch pr prob oblem lemat atica ically lly combiness metaphy combine metaphysical sical sadism with metaph metaphysical ysical masoch mas ochism ism.. Acc Accord ording ing to Dele Deleuze uze,, sado sadomas masoo30 chism chis m is ess essenti entially ally a pro problem blemati aticc ter term, m, yet the sheer problematic nature of such a term or synthetic system of cruelty does not attest to its impos imp ossi sibil bility ity.. Th Thee po poss ssibi ibilit lityy of on onto tolo logi gica call sado sa doma maso soch chis ism m is in inde deed ed th thee im impo port rt of it itss problem pro blematic atical al syn synthes thesis is acco accordin rdingg to whic which h the incomme inco mmensur nsurable able (the pro problem blem)) is sol solved ved (re (renndered commensurable) by and in accordance with that which is exterior to the problem’s Ideal and respective conditions, i.e., by the intervention of the void. On an ontological level, metaphysical sadism and masoch masochism ism are proble problematicall maticallyy corre corre-lated with each other. It is, in fact, determination as such that problem problematically atically distinguishes distinguishes itself thro th roug ugh h th thee pr prob oble lema mati tica call sy synt nthe hesi siss of tw twoo indeterminable systems of cruelty. In doing so, deter det ermi mina natio tion n of be being ing as su such ch br bring ingss abo about ut the po poss ssibi ibilit lityy of sa sado doma maso soch chism ism as a fie field ld of problem pro blematic atic (cr (cruelt uelty). y). Acc Accord ording ingly, ly, sad sadoma omasosochism chi sm do does es no nott ex expr pres esss a co comp mple leme menta ntary ry and dialectical unity between sadism and masochism. In sa sado doma maso soch chism ism as a pr prob oble lema matic tical al fi field eld of cruelty between sadism and masochism, the bond betw be twee een n th thee tw twoo is no nott co comp mple leme ment ntar aryy bu butt subtr su btrac activ tivee and it is dif diffe fere rent ntial ial ra rathe therr tha than n dialectical. In positing its idea, ontology induces a problematic correlation between the two formal syst sy stem emss of cr crue uelty lty and the there reby by es esta tabli blish shes es a prob pr oblem lemati atical cal en entit tityy cal called led sa sado doma maso soch chis ism. m. Being Bei ng qua be being ing is sa sado doma maso sochi chism sm in tha thatt it problematically correlates two incommensurable system sys temss of cru cruelty elty in ord order er to dete determi rmine ne its itself elf in relation to an internal necessity and against the undetermined.

act v: nec necess essit ity y of a ph phiilos losop oph hy of cru rue elt lty y in the the wa wak ke of an interminable cruelty We ar argu gued ed th that at on once ce th thee id idea ea of on onto tolo logy gy is stripped to its basic components, what surfaces is a profoundly meshed system of elaborate cruelty. Howe Ho weve ver, r, in te term rmss of on onto tolo logy gy as the sc scien ience ce



of cruelty qua determination of being, one should never anticipate an end to cruelty. Because when it comes to cruelty, one cruelty always rests upon another in a chain which cannot be broken by force. We shall now have the occasion to argue that fundamental cruelty – which is inherent to ontology – is not simply cruelty in so far as it has its foundation in cruelty but also because to such a metaphysical cruelty no end can be imposed. In other words, determination of being is cruelty in so far as it simultaneously resists and submits to the synthesis of two indeterminable deaths; yet what makes such a determination cruel under any condition whatsoever is that it cannot be resolved or concluded. Therefore, what makes determination tio n of be being ing as su such ch ult ultima imate tely ly cr cruel uel is tha thatt in addition to the inexhaustibility of the sources of cruelty, cruelty cannot be terminated. It is this intermi inte rminabl nablee cru cruelty elty tha thatt mak makes es dete determi rminat nation ion of being, cruelty as such. such. A cruelty that can be concluded or terminated is not a radical cruelty, for it is subjected to the conditional. In regard to a cruelty which is dominated by the conditional, justice is merely the relocation of cruelty. This intermi inte rminabi nability lity of cru cruelty elty ech echoes oes a phil philoso osophy phy of the problematic wherein problems cannot be terminated by their solutions and which Deleuze traces back to Immanuel Kant: Kant ev Kant even en ref refer erss to Id Ideas eas as pr prob oble lems ms ‘‘ ‘‘to to which there is no solution’’. By that he does nott me no mean an th that at Id Idea eass ar aree ne nece cess ssar aril ilyy fa fals lsee prob pr oble lems ms an and d th thus us in inso solu lubl blee bu but, t, on th thee contra con trary, ry, tha thatt tru truee pro problem blemss are Idea Ideas, s, and that these Ideas do not disappear with ‘‘their’’ solu so luti tion ons, s, si sinc ncee th they ey ar aree th thee in indi disp spens ensib ible le condit con dition ion wit withou houtt whi which ch no sol soluti ution on wou would ld 31 ever exist.

In order to demonstrate that cruelty of ontology is interminable or resistant to correlation with any conclusive state or condition exterior to the field of its problematical determination, we must return once again to the Etruscan torture as a metaphysical model. According to the Etruscan metaphysical cruelty, the coupling of the living to the dead not only expresses the movement of the negative vector of subtraction (namely negative tie to the belonging qua dead) but also its positive vector

which is th which thee co cons nser erva vati tion on of th thee so soul ul aft after er it itss 32 descent into the realm of the dead. Without such conservation, the soul qua the living is instantly mortified by the dead. In other words, subtraction does not guarantee the persistence of the remainder, nor does it presuppose the possibility of a remainder remaind er or an initial conser conservation. vation. The possib possibiility of the remainder merely points to a condition in aphairesis bec becaus ausee sub subtra tracti ction on may tot totally ally exhaustt the given magnitu exhaus magnitude de and therefore leaves no re rema main inde der. r. If in su subt btra ract ctio ion n or ne nega gati tive ve mobilization of belongings, remainder – regardless of it itss pe perrsi sist sten ence ce – is no noth thin ingg bu butt a me mere re possibility, then how is it that determination of being as such or the idea of ontolo ontology gy is asser assertively tively constructed upon such a possibility? Only when the possibility of the remainder is taken as an Ideal can the soul contract towards the intellect or being can be intensively determined. The soul can only conserve its correlation with its inner part or the nous if it is itself not subtracted by the negative bond with the body qua belonging. For this rea reason son,, the possibilit possibilityy of a rem remaind ainder er or the possibility of the soul’s survival after being tethered to the body qua dead is merely an ideal or pro problem blematic atical al con conditi dition. on. It is pro problem blematic atical al beca be caus usee su such ch po poss ssib ibil ilit ityy is gr grou ound nded ed as an emphatic ideality. In other words, the possibility of condition (the remainder) is determined against the impossibility of condition (namely the subtractive mobilization of non-belonging by which alll be al belo long ngin ings gs mus ustt be she hed) d).. We ca call ll th this is emphati emp haticc gro groundi unding ng of dete determi rminati nation on of bein beingg on a pro problem blematic atical al pos possib sibilit ility, y, ant anterio eriorr idea ideal; l; because it precedes the second ideal. The second or posterior ideal is the emphasis on the possibility of remaining or the persistence of what has been conserved. The determination of being can only be effec eff ectu tuate ated d be betw tween een th thes esee tw twoo pr prob oble lema matic tical al ideals ide als.. Th Thee an ante terio riorr ide ideal al is th thee po poss ssib ibili ility ty of being conceived from non-belonging or the void; it po posi sits ts the po poss ssibi ibilit lityy of a re rema main inder der in su subbtrac tr acti tion on as an em emph phat atic ic po poss ssib ibil ilit ityy or id idea eall condition. For this reason, the anterior ideal is a problematical life, for it grounds being on the poss po ssibi ibilit lityy of es escap caping ing th thee ne nega gati tive ve po powe werr of the vo void. id. Ac Acco cord rding ingly ly,, it is th thee pr prob oble lema matic tical al life (the possibility of the remainder) that brings

80

negarestani


about death by the problematic. Recall that death by the pro problem blemati aticc sug sugges gests ts the pos possibi sibility lity of cont co ntra ract ctio ion n or pe pers rsis iste tenc ncee of th thee re rema maind inder er according to an inner necessity but this possibility is gu guar aran ante teed ed by vi virt rtue ue of th thee pr prob oblem lemat atiz izing ing intervention interv ention of the void qua non-belonging. non-belonging. Proble Pro blemat matical ical life is the cruellest cruellest of all, for it dir directl ectlyy – albe albeit it pro problem blemati aticall callyy – set setss itse itself lf against the void as that which is alien to being. For the idea of ontology, cruelty of the anterior ideal (namely grounding on the void) demands the cruelty of the posterior ideal or death by the prob pr oble lema matic tic,, wh whils ilstt de deat ath h by th thee pr prob oblem lemat atic ic which coexists with the correlation of being with an inner necessity presupposes the cruelty of the problematical life. Bound from both ends by two realms of the problematic, the cruelty associated with determination of being as such cannot be term te rmin inat ated ed or re ressol olvved ed.. In it itss at atte tem mpt to termin ter minate ate this cruelty cruelty or the pro problem blemati atic, c, the solut so lutio ion n re re-en -enac acts ts cr crue uelty lty and re rein insc scri ribes bes th thee problem pro blematic atic,, beca because use suc such h a con conclus clusive ive line of term te rmin inati ation on ca canno nnott co conf nfro ront nt cr crue uelty lty unl unles esss it passes through its inherent fields of the problematic. Yet we argued that the problematic fields of de deter termin minat atio ion n qu quaa cr crue uelty lty ar aree no nott un unifo iform rm and do not exclusively belong to the Ideals and conditions of determination as such. These fields of the pro problem blematic atic are equ equivo ivocall callyy dete determi rmined ned by the void. In a less technical sense, a solution cannot can not ter termin minate ate a pro problem blem which has alr already eady been implicitly determined or ceased by the void. Sinc Si ncee de dete term rmin inat atio ion n of be bein ingg qu quaa cr crue uelt ltyy is problem pro blematic atically ally bound to the voi void d at two ends (anteriorly and posteriorly), its problems cannot be resolved unless the solution factors in the void. In order to claim what has already descended to the underworld, one must dive into the Tartarus. Yet we know that factoring in the void qua nonbelonging in order to resolve a problem according to its conditions and Ideals makes an inherently problematizing solution. This is another way of saying that in resolving the problems associated with the determination of being qua cruelty, the solution itself becomes an imposition of the void, i.e., the problematic. If pro problem blemss and con conditi ditions ons ass associ ociated ated wit with h the Idea of ontology are implicitly shared by the

81

void, then the conclusion or extirpation of such condi co nditio tions ns fr from om ou outs tside ide is no nott po poss ssibl ible. e. The interminability of ontological cruelty means that such cruelty cannot be correlated to a reflective meta me ta-l -lev evel el.. Th This is me meta ta-l -lev evel el is re requ quir ired ed fo forr exte ex tern rnal al re refle flect ctio ion n on cr crue uelty lty in te term rmss ot other her than those of cruelty itself. Morality insists on correlating cruelty with terms and determinations other than those of cruelty in order to impose an end to it (moral justice) or establi establish sh an overs overseeing eeing level necessary for intervention. Yet, in doing so, morality passively reproduces the tension of the problem pro blematic atic cor correl relatio ation n thr throug ough h whi which ch cru cruelty elty persists. It is the tension within the problematical correl cor relatio ation n of det with th it itss determ ermina inatio tion n as suc such h wi indeterminable backgrounds or sources of cruelty that can neither be fully abandoned nor undone. Deleuze’s philosophy of difference is, first of all, a universal ethics in so far as it demonstrates that difference or determination as such qua cruelty crea cr eate tess a fi fiel eld d of th thee pr prob oble lema mati ticc fo forr wh whic ich h solutions (correlation with the beyond or a metalevel) remobilize the problem rather than terminate it. For this reason, a ratiocinator capable of graspi gra sping ng the pro problem blem thr throug ough h an int interm erminab inable le field of problematical syntheses is required. This ratioc rat iocinat inator or mus mustt be diff differe erentia ntiall so as to gra grasp sp cruelty not as a unitary field of the problematic but as inc incom omme mens nsur urab able le fie fields lds whi which ch ar aree indeterminable by themselves but determinable in regard to each other. The philosophy of cruelty is such a ratiocinator, capable of seeing ontology as a differential or non-unitary field of cruelty pregna pre gnant nt wit with h the pro problem blemati aticc and, the theref refore ore,, capturi capt uring ng ont ontolo ology gy thr throug ough h syn synthes theses es betw between een sadis sa distic tic an and d ma maso sochi chist stic ic re reas ason ons, s, or be betwe tween en being out of the void and being through the void.

act vi: a reca recapi pittul ulat atio ion n in the nam name e of cr crue uelty lty, a conclusi conclusion on in the the name of the vo void id The philosophy of cruelty is a nigrescent underside to the phil philoso osophy phy of diff differe erence nce;; alth althoug ough h theyy pr the proc ocee eed d fr from om th thee sa same me as assu sump mptio tion n (i (i.e. .e.,, deter det ermi mina natio tion n as su such) ch),, th thee tw twist isted ed ou outco tcome mess of the former are at odds with those drawn from the latter. This essay has attempted to



demonstrate the unbinding role of the philoso demonstrate philosophy phy of cruelty for ‘‘being as the problematic’’ of the philoso phil osophy phy of diff differe erence. nce. We hav havee arg argued ued that it is th thee ph phil ilooso soph phyy of cr crue uelt ltyy an and d no nott th thee philosophy of difference that brings the problem of duplicitous determination to the foreground: unilateral distinction of being as such is implicitly determined by the void. This implicit determination is quite different from saying that the void does do es no nott di dist stin ingu guis ish h it itse self lf fr from om th that at wh whic ich h brea br eaks ks fr from om it it;; ra rath ther er,, it su sugg gges ests ts th that at th thee principle of determination as such mobilizes the void as an equivocal problem. In a less technical sense, sen se, bein beingg qua diff differe erencence-in-i in-itse tself lf is a return to the void under new problems and conditions. Thes Th esee pr prob oble lems ms an and d co cond ndit itio ions ns co cons nsti titu tute te the very ground of ontology and its respective Ideals and problems. For this reason, an ethical approach to ontological problems should abandon the pri priori ority ty of a univ univoca ocall ont ontolo ologic gical al nece necessi ssity ty forr be fo being ing and co conf nfro ront nt ‘‘b ‘‘bein eingg as th thee pr prob oble le-matic’’ (Deleuze) without factoring in any such privilege. Wher Wh erea eass fo forr th thee ph philo iloso sophy phy of dif diffe fere renc ncee ‘‘being as difference’’ is cruelty in so far as it rigo ri goro rous usly ly an and d ir irre reve vers rsibl iblyy se sets ts it itse self lf ag agai ains nstt the undetermined, for the philosophy of cruelty ‘‘be ‘‘ bein ingg as di diff ffer eren ence ce’’ ’’ ca can n on only ly re reso solv lvee th thee intensive course of determination by recourse to thee vo th void id and br bring inging ing ab abou outt its int inter erve vent ntio ion. n. Theref The refore ore,, the phil philoso osophy phy of cru cruelt eltyy not onl onlyy conf co nfir irms ms th thee ex expl plic icit it cr crue uelt ltyy of ‘‘ ‘‘be bein ingg as diffe dif fere renc nce’’ e’’ but als alsoo ac accen centu tuate atess th thee im impli plici citt cruelty cru elty emb embedde edded d with within in diff differe erence nce-in-in-its itself elf – that th at is th thee ne nece cess ssit ityy of bi bind ndin ingg th thee vo void id as a guarantor for inttens in nsiv ivee dettermin de inaatio ion n. Acco Ac cord rding ingly ly,, wit within hin th thee on onto tolo logi gica call do doma main, in, the contractual (masochistic) bondage to the void as a constitutional primacy precedes the supposed primacy of the ontological necessity. Hence, in thee lig th light ht of the phi philos losop ophy hy of cr crue uelty lty,, ‘‘b ‘‘bein eingg as difference’’ is a being whose correlation with its ontological necessity is a twist into and out of the void. Ironically, for this reason, being as a diff di ffer eren entia tiall fi fiel eld d of cr crue uelt ltyy is not a dir ireect conc co nclu lusi sion on of th thee ph phil ilos osop ophy hy of di diff ffer eren ence ce;; rather, it is the index of the philosophy of cruelty where whe re the exp explici licitt cru cruelty elty of dete determi rminat nation ion (or unilateral distinction) is wedded to the implicit

and contractual bondage to the void. It is this bein be ing g as a di diff ffere erent ntial ial fi fiel eld d of cr crue uelt ltyy that calls for a speculative ethics of justice which is disillusioned about the precarious position of an ontological necessity and does not situate itself outside of the problematic. Thee unde Th derrly lyin ingg ethic icaal assumptio ion n of Deleuze’s philosophy of difference is that justice should be internal to the problematic qua cruelty. The phil philoso osophy phy of cru cruelt elty, y, how howeve ever, r, take takess this onee st on step ep fu furt rthe herr in or orde derr to un unbi bind nd th thee tr true ue specula spe culative tive opp opport ortunit unities ies of the pro problem blematic atic;; it co conj njoi oins ns th thee es esse sent ntia iall in inte tern rnal alit ityy to th thee problem pro blematic atic wit with h bein being’s g’s equi equivoc vocal al ine inexis xistenc tencee (or the inherent problematicity of being as such). The latter is a line of enlightenment drawn by the philosophy of cruelty and entails the toppling of any ont ontolo ologic gical al or noe noetic tic prio priority rity pre presum sumed ed within and for being. It is through the marriage between problematicity and equivocal inexistence that th at th thee tr true ue sp spec ecul ulat ativ ivee po powe werr of et ethi hics cs is unbo un boun und. d. In th thee wa wake ke of th thee ph phil ilos osop ophy hy of cruelty, ethics can return to the mathesis of the problem once again wherein the problem is not deter det ermi mine ned d by its so solut lutio ion n or co cond nditi ition onss bu butt by its capacity to generate fields of the problematic. mat ic. How Howeve ever, r, for the phil philoso osophy phy of cru cruelty elty,, thiss et thi ethic hical al re retu turn rn to th thee pr prob oble lema matic tic na natu ture re of ontological problems consists in binding of the void vo id and br brea eakin kingg apa apart rt fr from om the co cons nstr train aints ts of th thee pr prio iori rity ty of an on onto tolo logi gica call nec neces essi sity ty fo forr being. Philosophy of cruelty explains ontological determinations in terms of sadistic (imperative) and mas masoch ochist istic ic (co (contr ntractu actual) al) bon bondag dages es to that whi hicch does not bel eloong to be beiing, i. i.ee., th thee prob pr oble lema mati ticc ch chai ains ns to th thee vo void id.. In or orde derr fo forr the et ethic hicss of jus justi tice ce to co confr nfron ontt th thee pr prob oblem lemss and conditions associated with ontological determinations – ourselves and our world – it must tread through such problematical problematical fields which are equi eq uivo voca call llyy de dete term rmin ined ed by th thee vo void id an and d th thee ontological medium. The philosophy of cruelty, in this sen sense, se, inau inaugur gurates ates the opp opport ortunit unities ies of grou gr oundi nding ng et ethic hicss on a ne new w def defini initio tion n of be being ing unshackled from the priority of itss on it onto tolo logi gica call ne nece cess ssit ityy an and d mobi mo biliz lized ed by it itss ch chain ainss to th that at whi hicch is exte terrio iorr to it – the universal.

82

negarestani notes

13 Artaud 85. 85.

Differ ference ence and Repetiti Repetition on 29. 1 Deleuze, Dif

14 Bacon 353. 353.

2 On Tene enebris brism m and the early Renaissance Renaissance philophilosophies of nature and alchemy, see Rzepin ¤ ska 91^ 112 12..

Diffe ference rence and Repetit Repetition ion 172. 15 Deleuze, Dif

Differ ference ence and Repetiti Repetition on 28. 3 Del Deleu euze, ze, Dif

4 Ibid. 29 29..

17 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition 55; emphasis in original.

5 Artaud 101. 6 Ibid Ibid.. 102. 7 Ibid Ibid.. 103 03..


16 On aphairesis as a fu fund ndam ame ent ntal al lo log gic icoosemanti seman ticc conc concept ept in the works works of Ari Aristotl stotle e and neo-Platonists regarding regarding the procedure procedure of nega tion and dete determi rmination nation of the Ideal, Ideal, see Martin.

8 Cice Cicero ro (qtg (qtg from Aristotle) in Hortensius (95M). See also Bos 315^16. Bos argues that the meticulous lo us relat relation ionsh ship ip of th the e sou soull ^ on behal behalff of th the e strictly incorpor incorporeal eal nous ^ wi witth the body qua qua instrument captures the idea of intelligible ontology og y or hum uman an life on ea earth rth as a pu puni nish shme ment nt “ria). (timo “r Thee Aenei Aeneid d, VII 9 See Vi Virg rgil il,, Th VIII: 483^ 88 88.. Se See e al also so Kronen Kr onenberg berg 403 403^3 ^31 1. Kr Kronen onenberg berg ass associates ociates the atro at roci citty of Mez eze ent ntiius wit ith h an Epicu cure rean an// materialist reinterpretation of Aristotle’s idea of intell inte llig igibl ible e ontology and incarnate life.

10 See Brunschwig1 Brunschwig 171^90.

18 Aside from its interrelat interrelations ions with the concept of intensity, the scholastic notion of contraction is a fundamental ontological and noetic concept Differ ference ence and whic wh ich h De Dele leuz uze e re resu surr rrects ects in Dif Repetition by met meticu iculous lously ly prese presenti nting ng it in conj conjunc unc- tion tion wit with h St Stoic oic ph physi ysics cs and cosmo cosmology logy. On the conce con cept pt of co cont ntract ractio ion n in sc scho holast lastic icis ism m, see Catana. And for an alternative Bergsonian/Stoic philosophy of subtraction and contraction in rela tion to Dele Deleuze uze’s ’s philosophy philosophy of imm immanence anence and a nd becoming, bec oming, see Meil Meillas lassoux soux 63 63^1 ^107 07. 19 The There re are arenu nume merou rouss sources sources on th the e cos cosmol mology ogy of put putre refacti faction on and di dimi minu nuttio ion n (de decay cay)) in th the e Middle Mid dle Ages. See, Se e, for f or exam example, ple,Gi Ginzbur nzburg g. Differ ference ence and Repetiti Repetition on 74. 20 Dele Deleuze, uze, Dif

21 Ibi Ibid. d. 76.

11 The Ital Italian ian Ju Jurist rist And Andrea rea Al Alciat ciatii cre created ated a ser series ies of emb mble lems ms based on Virg Virgil il’’s de depi picti ction on of th the e Etruscan torture for his Emblemata (1531) 1),, an influent ntia iall co coll llect ectio ion n of mo moral ral sa say yin ings gs.. Kno nown wn as Nupta Conta Contagi gioso oso or Nupta Cadav Cadaver era a (marriage with wit h the diseased or the dead), dead), thes these e em emble blems ms depict a na nak ked woma man n be bein ing g tie ied d to a ma male le corpse at the order of the king, or a man walking wit ith h a fe fema male le co corp rpse se fast faste ene ned d to his bod body y (cf. Fran Francis cisco co Go Goya ya’s Dis Dispa parate rates, s, pl plate ate no no.. 7, The Matrimon Matrimonial ial).

22 Ib Ibid id.. 286. 286. 23 Fo Forr an elab abo orat rate ely ri rig goro rous us cri rittique of Deleuze’s Deleuze ’s philosophy philosophy of vitalism and an a n alternative analysis of unilateral determination, see Brassier 140 ^ 45 45,, 162^2 62^204. 04. Diffe ference rence and Repetiti Repetition on 36 24 Dele Deleuze, uze, Dif 36..

25 ‘‘[. . .] but Bei Being ng is th the e sam same e fo forr eve veryth rythin ing g about whi which ch it is said.’’ On the univocity univocity of Being, Log gicof Sen Sense se 205^06. see id idem em,, The Lo 26 See id ide em, Masochism 20 20..

12 For it is an in insp spir ired ed say sayin ing g of th the e an ancie cients nts that the soul pays penalties and that we live for the pun punish ishment ment of gr great eat sins. sins. For For,, indeed, indeed, the conjuncti conjunction on of o f the soul with with the body loo ooks ks very much like this is.. Fo Forr as the Etruscans are said often to torture captives by cha chain inin ing g de dead ad bod bodies ies face to face wi with th the the living, fitting part to part, so the soul seems to be extended throughout and affixed to all the the se sens nsit itiive membe bers rs of the bo bod dy. (Iamblichus (Iambl ichus 48. See Se e also Au Augusti gustine) ne)

83

27 Ibi Ibid.18 d.18^1 ^19, 25 ^30 ^30.. 28 Ibid Ibid.. 18 ^1 ^19 9. 29 Ib Ibid id.. 35 35.. 30 Ibid Ibid.. 13 ^1 ^14, 4,1 132^34. Diffe ferenc rencee and Repetiti Repetition on 168. 31 Idem, Dif

32 On the soul’s soul’s mor mor tificatio tification n and katabasis kataba sis with with regard to the Etruscan torture, see Winston and Dillon.

different diffe rential ial crue cruelty lty bibliography heat atre re an and d its Doub Double. Artaud, Ant Artaud, Antoni onin. n. The The Trans rans.. Ma Mary ry C. Ri Richa chard rd.. Ne New w Yor ork: k: Gro rove ve,, 1994. A ugustine ustine ag against ainst Julian. Writings Augustine. Saint Aug of Sai Saint nt Au Augu gustin stine. e. Vol Vol.. 16. Trans. Matt Matthew hew A. Schum Sch umach acher er. Was Washi hingt ngton on,, DC: Cat Cathol holic ic U of America P, 1974 974..

Rzepin ¤ ¤ ska, Maria.‘‘Tenebrism in Baroque Painting Histor toriae iae and its Ideolog Ideological ical Background Background..’’ ’’Artibus et His 7 (1986): 91^112. reatise tisess Winston, Davi David d and a nd John Dil Dillon lon (eds.). (eds.). Two Trea of Ph Phiilo of Al Aleexand ndrria: A Com omme men nta tary ry on De Giga Gi gant ntibu ibuss and Quod Deus Si Sitt Imm Immuta utabi billis. Chico, CA: Scholars,1983.

Oxfor ord d Fran ranci ciss Bacon. VI Bacon, Francis. The Oxf VI.. Ed Ed.. Gra raha ham m Rees an and d Lis isaa Jardine. Ox Oxfford: Clarendon,1996.


Thee Soul S oul and its Instrum Instrumenta entall Body: Bos, Abraham P. Th A Rein Reinterp terpretat retation ion of Ari Aristotle stotle’s ’s Phi Philosophy losophy of Liv Living ing Nature. Lei Leiden den:: Bril Brill, l, 2003. Nihil il Unbound Unbound:: Enli Enlighten ghtenment ment and Bra ssier,, Ray Brassier Ray.. Nih Extinction. Basingstoke Basingstoke:: Palg Palgrave, rave, 2007.

Brunschw Brunsc hwig ig,, Jac Jacqu ques es.. ‘‘Ar Arist istote ote et les pi pirate ratess tyrrhe ¤ni enss (A pr propo oposs de dess fr frag agme ments nts 60 Ro Rose se ¤ nien du Protrep Pro treptique). tique).’’ ’’ Revue philosophique de la France 88 (1963): 171^9 1^90. 0. onccep eptt of Con ontr tra act ctiion in Catana, Catan a, Leo Leo. The Con Giordano Gior dano Bruno Bruno’s ’s Phil Philosophy osophy. Al Alde dershot: rshot: Ash Ashgate gate,, 2005. Diffe ference renceand and Repetiti Repetition on.T Deleuze,Gilles. Dif .Trans. rans. Paul Patton. Pat ton. New NewY York: Columbia UP UP, 1994. Thee Log Logic ic of Sens Sensee. Trans. Mar Deleuze, Gi Gilles. lles. Th Mark k Lester. London London:: Contin Continuum uum,, 200 2004. 4.

Deleuze, Gi Gilles. lles. Masochism. Trans. Jean McN McNei eil. l. New York: Zone, 1991. Chees eesee an and d the Worm rmss: Ginzburg, Ginzbu rg, Carlo Carlo.. The Ch Thee Cos Th Cosmos mos of a Si Sixteen xteenth-Centu th-Century ry Mi Millle lerr. Trans. JohnT John Tedeschi and AnneT AnneTedeschi edeschi.. Baltimo Baltimore: re: Johns Hopkins UP UP,, 198 980. 0.

Iamblichus Protrepticus 8. Ed. L. Pistell Pistelli. i. Leipzi Leipzig: g: Teubner eubner,, 1888 88.. Kronenberg, Kronen berg, Leah. ‘‘M ‘Mezent ezentius ius the Epic Epicurean urean..’’ ’’ Transacti ransactions ons of the t he American Philologi Philological cal Asso Associ ciation ation 135.2 (20 (2005): 05): 403^3 403 ^31 1. hemes mes in Ne Neop opllat aton oniic an and d Martin Mart in,, Jo Joh hn N. The Aristotelian Aristotel ian Logic: Order, Negati Negation, on, and Abstraction. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004.

Meilla lasso ssoux ux,, Que Qu ent ntin in.. ‘‘Subt btra ract ctiion and an d Contraction Cont raction:: Del Deleuz euze, e, Im Immane manence nce,, and Matt Matter er Collapse: lapse: Phil Philosophical osophical Research and and an d Memor Memory y.’’ ’’ Col Development 3.F 3.Falmout almouth: h:Ur Urbanomic, banomic, 2007. 63^1 63^107 07.

Reza Negarestani E-mail: [email protected]

Differential Cruelty: a critique of ontological reason in light of the philosophy of cruelty by Reza Negarestani

Recommend Documents