Foundlings are Natural-Born Filipino Citizens (Grace Poe vs COMELEC, 2016) Grace Poe vs COMELEC (Case Digest: GR 221697, GR 221698-700 March 8, 2016) Facts:
In her COC for presidency for the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-born citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted from 24 May 2005. May 24, 2005 was the day she came to the Philippines after deciding to stay in the PH for good. Before that however, and even afterwards, she has been going to and fro between US and Philippines.
She was born in 1968, found as newborn infant in Iloilo, and was legally
adopted. She immigrated to the US in 1991 and was naturalized as as American citizen in 2001. On July 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine passport. In 2010, before assuming her post as an appointed chairperson of the MTRCB, she renounced her American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirement . From then on, she stopped using her American passport. Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground particularly, among others, that she cannot be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen since she cannot prove that her biological parents or either of them were Filipinos.
The COMELEC
en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that she is in want of citizenship and residence requirements, requirements, and that she committed material misrepresentations misrepresentations in her COC. On certiorari, the SC reversed the ruling and held (9-6 votes) that Poe is qualified as a candidate for Presidency.
Three justices, however, abstained to vote on the natural-born
citizenship issue.
Issue 1: W/N the COMELEC has jurisdiction to rule on the issue of qualifications of candidates (Read Dissent) Held:
No. Article IX-C, Sec 2 of the Constitution provides for the powers and functions of the COMELEC, and deciding on the qualifications or lack thereof of a candidate is not one among them.
In contrast, the
Constitution provides that only the SET and HRET tribunals have sole
jurisdiction over the election contests, returns, and qualifications of their respective members, whereas over the President and Vice President, only the SC en banc has sole jurisdiction. As for the qualifications of candidates for such positions, the Constitution is silent. There is simply no authorized proceeding in determining the ineligibility of candidates before elections. Such lack of provision cannot be supplied by a mere rule, and for the COMELEC to assimilate grounds for ineligibility into grounds for disqualification in Rule 25 in its rules of procedures would be contrary to the intent of the Constitution. Hence, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it decided on the qualifica;tion issue of Grace as a candidate in the same case for cancellation of her COC.
DISSENT
COMELEC’s Broad Quasi-Judicial Power Includes the Determination of a Candidate’s Eligibility (Grace Poe vs COMELEC, 2016 Brion DISSENT) Grace Poe vs COMELEC Brion Dissent: GR 221697 March 8, 2016 Summary On COMELEC’s Jurisdiction COMELEC’s quasi-judicial power in resolving a Section 78 proceeding includes the determination of whether a candidate has made a false material representation in his CoC, and the determination of whether the eligibility he represented in his CoC is true. 1. In Tecson v. COMELEC, the Court has recognized the COMELEC’s jurisdiction in a Section 78 proceeding over a presidential candidate. 2. The Court’s conclusion in this case would wreak havoc on existing jurisprudence recognizing the COMELEC’s jurisdiction to determine a candidate’s eligibility in the course of deciding a Section 78 proceeding before it. The ponencia disregarded the cases involving Section 78 since the year 2012 (when 2012 COMELEC Rules was published) where it recognized the COMELEC’s jurisdiction to determine eligibility as part of determining false material representation in a candidate’s CoC. • In Ongsiako-Reyes v. COMELEC, the Court a # rmed the COMELEC’s cancellation of Ongsiako-Reyes’ CoC and a# rmed its determination that Ongsiako-Reyes is neither a Philippine citizen nor a resident of Marinduque. • The Court even a# rmed the COMELEC’s capability to liberally construe its own rules of procedure in response to Ongsiako-Reyes’ allegation that the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in admitting newly-discovered evidence that had not been testified on, o $ ered and admitted in evidence. • In Cerafica, the Court held that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in holding that Kimberly Cerafica (a candidate for councilor) did not file a valid CoC and subsequently cannot be substituted by Olivia Cerafica.
Kimberly’s CoC is considered valid unless the contents
therein (including her eligibility) is impugned through a Section 78 proceeding. 2. The ponencia’s reliance on Fermin’s is out of context. Fermin clarified that Section 78 of the OEC is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public o# ce.
If the candidate
subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such certificate. A proceeding under Section 78 is likened to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a “Section 78” petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate. 3.
Rules 23 of the 2012 COMELEC Rules of Procedure does not limit the COMELEC’s
jurisdiction in determining the eligibility of a candidate in the course of ruling on a Section 78 proceeding. • The second paragraph in Rule 23 delineates the distinction between a Section 78 cancellation proceeding and a Section 68 disqualification proceeding; to avoid the muddling or mixing of the grounds for each remedy, the COMELEC opted to provide that petitions that combine or substitute one remedy for the other shall be dismissed summarily.
Naturally, the text of this
second paragraph also appears in Rule 25, which provides for the grounds for a petition for disqualification. • The only di $erence between the two proceedings is that, under section 78, the qualifications for elective o# ce are misrepresented in the certificate of candidacy and the proceedings must be initiated before the elections, whereas a petition for quo warranto under section 253 may be brought on the basis of two grounds – (1) ineligibility or (2) disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines, and must be initiated within 10 days after the proclamation of the election results. • Under section 253, a candidate is ineligible if he is disqualified to be elected to o # ce, and he is disqualified if he lacks any of the qualifications for elective o# ce. 4. If we were to follow the ponencia’s limitation on the COMELEC’s function to determine Poe’s eligibility to become President in a Section 78 proceeding, the logical result would be that even
this Court itself cannot rule on Poe’s citizenship and residence eligibilities in the course of reviewing a Section 78 COMELEC ruling; any declaration regarding these issues would be obiter dictum. • The e$ ect would be that any pronouncements outside the COMELEC’s limited jurisdiction in Section 78 would only be expressions of the COMELEC’s opinion and would have no e $ ect in the determination of the merits of the Section 78 case before it. Findings of ineligibility outside of the limits do not need to be resolved or even be touched by this Court. Thus, in the present case, Poe can simply be a candidate for the presidency, with her eligibilities open to postelection questions, if still necessary at that point. On the Citizenship of Foundlings It was never the intent of the framers of 1935 Constitution to presume that foundlings are natural born citizens. 1. Ironically, the ponencia ‘s citation of Jose M. Aruego’s recounting of the deliberations even reinforces the position that the framers never intended to include foundlings within the terms of the 1935 Constitution’s parentage provisions. • Aruego said that the Rafols amendment “was defeated primarily because the Convention believed that the cases, being too few to warrant the inclusion of a provision in the Constitution to apply to them, should be governed by statutory legislation.” 2. The ponencia’s ruling thus does not only disregard the distinction of citizenship based on the father or the mother under the 1935 Constitution; it also misreads what the records signify and thereby unfairly treats the children of Filipino mothers under the 1935 Constitution who, although able to trace their Filipino parentage, must yield to the higher categorization accorded to foundlings who .do not enjoy similar roots. On Burden of Proof Procedural Aspect of the Burden of Proof 1. The original petitioners before the COMELEC (the respondents in the present petitions) – from the perspective of procedure – carried the burden under its Section 78 cancellation of CoC petition, to prove that Poe made false material representations. 2.
Since Poe could not factually show that either of her parents is a Philippine citizen, the
COMELEC concluded that the original petitioners are correct in their position that they have discharged their original burden to prove that Poe is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. To arrive at its conclusion, the COMELEC considered and relied on the terms of the 1935 Constitution.
3. With this original burden discharged, the burden of evidence then shifted to Poe to prove that despite her admission that she is a foundling, she is in fact a natural-born Filipino, either by evidence (not necessarily or solely DNA in character) and by legal arguments supporting the view that a foundling found in the Philippines is a natural-born citizen. Substantive Aspect: Citizenship Cannot be Presumed 4. From the substantive perspective, too, a sovereign State has the right to determine who its citizens are. 5. The list of Filipino citizens under the Constitution must be read as exclusive and exhaustive. • In Paa v. Chan, this Court categorically ruled that it is incumbent upon the person who claims Philippine citizenship, to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he is really a Filipino. This should be true particularly after proof that the claimant has not proven (and even admits the lack of proven) Filipino parentage. 6. No presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the State. 7. The exercise by a person of the rights and/or privileges that are granted to Philippine citizens is not conclusive proof that he or she is a Philippine citizen. 8.
Based on these considerations, the Court majority’s ruling on burden of proof at the
COMELEC level appears to be misplaced. On both counts, procedural and substantive (based on settled jurisprudence), the COMELEC closely hewed to the legal requirements. Thus, the Court majority’s positions on where and how the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion are truly puzzling. With no grave abuse at the COMELEC level, the present petitioner’s own burden of proof in the present certiorari proceedings before this Court must necessarily fail. ##
Issue 2: W/N Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen (Read Dissent) Held:
Yes, Grace Poe might be and is considerably a natural-born Filipino. For that, she satisfies one of the constitutional requirements that only natural-born Filipinos may run for presidency. First, there is a high probability that Grace Poe’s parents are Filipinos.
Her physical features
are typical of Filipinos. The fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a municipality where the population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than 99% chance that a child born in such province is a Filipino is also a circumstantial evidence of her parents’ nationality. That probability and the evidence on which it is based are
admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the virtually impossible, as the norm. Second, by votes of 7-5, the SC pronounced that foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens.
This is based on the finding that the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional
Convention show that the framers intended foundlings to be covered by the enumeration. While the 1935 Constitution’s enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to foundlings, the SC felt the need to examine the intent of the framers. Third, that foundlings are automatically conferred with natural-born citizenship is supported by treaties and the general principles of international law.
Although the Philippines is not a
signatory to some of these treaties, it adheres to the customary rule to presume foundlings as having born of the country in which the foundling is found. DISSENT
Foundlings are Deemed Naturalized Filipino Citizens (Grace Poe vs Comelec, 2016 Carpio DISSENT)
Grace Poe vs COMELEC (Summary) Carpio Dissent: GR 221697 March 8, 2016 Emotional pleas invoking the sad plight of foundlings conveniently forgets the express language of the Constitution reserving those high positions, particularly the Presidency, exclusively to natural-born Filipino citizens. Even naturalized Filipino citizens, whose numbers are far more than foundlings, are not qualified to run for President. The natural-born citizenship requirement under the Constitution to qualify as a candidate for President must be complied with strictly. To rule otherwise amounts to a patent violation of the Constitution. A Mockery of National Election Process There is no majority of the Supreme Court that holds Grace Poe is a natural-born Filipino citizen since 7 – 5 justices voted that Grace Poe is a natural-born, while the three others withheld their opinion. 1
Allowing a presidential candidate with uncertain citizenship status to be
potentially elected to the O# ce of the President, an o # ce expressly reserved by the Constitution exclusively for natural-born Filipino citizens, will lead to absurd results.
2
This ruling implies that the majority of this Court wants to resolve the citizenship
status of petitioner after the elections, and only if petitioner wins the elections, despite petitioner having already presented before the COMELEC all the evidence she wanted to present to prove her citizenship status. 3
If petitioner wins the elections but is later disqualified by this Court (acting as
PET) for not possessing a basic qualification for the O# ce of the President – that of being a natural-born Filipino citizen – those who voted for petitioner would have utterly wasted their votes. On Comelec’s All-Encompassing Jurisdiction The initial determination of who are qualified to file COC with the Comelec clearly falls within the all-encompassing constitutional mandate of the Comelec to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election. 1
The Constitution also empower the Comelec to decide, except those involving
the right to vote, all questions a $ ecting elections. The power to decide “all questions a$ ecting elections” necessarily includes the power to decide whether a candidate possesses the qualifications required by law for election to public o # ce. This broad constitutional power and function vested in the Comelec is designed precisely to avoid any situation where a dispute a$ ecting elections is left without any legal remedy. –
If one who is obviously not a natural-born Philippine citizen, like Arnold Schwarzenneger,
runs for President, the Comelec is certainly not powerless to cancel the certificate of candidacy of such candidate. There is no need to wait until after the elections before such candidate may be disqualified. 2
In fact, the COMELEC is empowered to motu proprio cancel COCs of nuisance
candidates. – It cannot be disputed that a person, not a natural-born Filipino citizen, who files a certificate of candidacy for President puts the election process in mockery and is therefore a nuisance candidate.
Such person’s certificate of candidacy can motu proprio be cancelled by the
COMELEC under Section 69 of the OEC, which empowers the COMELEC to cancel motu proprio the COC if it has been filed to put the election process in mockery. (Timbol vs Comelec, 2015) Who are Natural-Born Filipino Citizens
The following are deemed natural-born Filipino citizens: (1) those whose fathers or mothers are Filipino citizens, and (2) those whose mothers are Filipino citizens and were born before 17 January 1973 and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. 1
The 1987 constitutional provision treating as natural-born Filipino citizens those
born before 17 January 1973 of Filipino mothers and alien fathers, and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, has a retroactive e$ ect. (Co vs HRET, 1991) – The Court declared that this constitutional provision was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. Under earlier laws, if one so elected, he was not conferred the status of a natural-born. 2
Those whose fathers or mothers are neither Filipino citizens are not natural-born
Filipino citizens.
If they are not natural-born Filipino citizens, they can acquire Philippine
citizenship only under Article IV, Sec 1 (5) of the 1935 Constitution which refers to Filipino citizens who are naturalized in accordance with law. Intent of the Framers of 1935 Constitution There is no “silence of the Constitution” on foundlings because the majority of the delegates to the 1934 Constitutional Convention expressly rejected the proposed amendment of Delegate Rafols to classify children of unknown parentage as Filipino citizens. 1. Three delegates voiced their objections to Rafols’s amendment, namely Delegates Buslon, Montinola, and Roxas. Delegate Teofilo Buslon suggested that the subject matter be left in the hands of the legislature, which meant that Congress would decide whether to categorize as Filipinos ( 1) natural or illegitimate children of Filipino mothers and alien fathers who do not recognize them; and (2) children of unknown parentage / foundlings. – If that were the case, foundlings were not and could not validly be considered as natural-born Filipino citizens as defined in the Constitution since Congress would then provide the enabling law for them to be regarded as Filipino citizens. –
Foundlings would be naturalized citizens since they acquire Filipino citizenship “in
accordance with law” under paragraph (5), Section 1 of Article IV of the 193 5 Constitution. –
Significantly, petitioner and the Solicitor General, conveniently left out Delegate Buslon’s
opinion. 2. None of the framers of the 1935 Constitution mentioned the term “natural-born” in relation to the citizenship of foundlings. Again, under the 1935 Constitution, only those whose fathers
were Filipino citizens were considered natural-born Filipino citizens. Those who were born of Filipino mothers and alien fathers were still required to elect Philippine citizenship, preventing them from being natural-born Filipino citizens. –
If the framers intended that foundlings be considered natural-born Filipino citizens, this
would have created an absurd situation where a child with unknown parentage would be placed in a better position than a child whose mother is actually known to be a Filipino citizen. The framers of the 1935 Constitution could not have intended to create such an absurdity. 3. Delegate Rafols’s amendment, when put to a vote, was clearly rejected by the majority of the delegates to the 1934 Constitutional Convention. – The rejection of the Rafols amendment not only meant the non-inclusion in the text of the Constitution of a provision that children with unknown parentage are Filipino citizens, but also signified the rejection by the delegates of the idea or proposition that foundlings are Filipino citizens at birth just like natural-born citizens.
While the framers discussed the matter of
foundlings because of Delegate Rafols’s amendment, they not only rejected the Rafols proposal but also clearly manifested that foundlings could not be citizens of the Philippines at birth like children of Filipino fathers. 4. Only the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, which articulated the presumption on the place of birth of foundlings, existed during the deliberations on the 1935 Constitution. The 1930 Hague Convention does not guarantee a nationality to a foundling at birth. Therefore, there was no prevailing customary international law at that time, as there is still none today, conferring automatically a nationality to foundlings at birth. International Laws Applicable to Foundlings 1
There is no conventional or customary international law automatically conferring
nationality to foundlings at birth 2
There are only two general principles of international law applicable to
foundlings. – First is that a foundling is deemed domiciled in the country where the foundling is found. A foundling is merely considered to have a domicile at birth, not a nationality at birth. Stated otherwise, a foundling receives at birth a domicile of origin which is the country in which the foundling is found.
– Second, in the absence of proof to the contrary, a foundling is deemed born in the country where the foundling is found. These two general principles of international law have nothing to do with conferment of nationality. 3
There is a di $erence between citizenship at birth because of jus soli, and
citizenship at birth because of jus sanguinis. The former may be granted to foundlings under Philippine statutory law pursuant to Art IV, Sec 1 (5) of the 1935 Constitution but the Philippine citizenship thus granted is not that of a natural-born citizen but that of a naturalized citizen. Only those citizens at birth because of jus sanguinis, which requires blood relation to a parent, are natural-born Filipino citizens under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. 4
Any treaty, customary international law, or generally accepted international law
principle has the status of municipal statutory law. As such, it must conform to our Constitution in order to be valid in the Philippines. Foundlings are Deemed Naturalized Filipino Citizens If a child’s parents are neither Filipino citizens, the only way that the child may be considered a Filipino citizen is through the process of naturalization in accordance with statutory law under Art IV, Sec 1 (5) of the 193 5 Constitution. – If a child’s parents are unknown, as in the case of a foundling, there is no basis to consider the child as a natural-born Filipino citizen since there is no proof that either the child’s father or mother is a Filipino citizen. Thus, the only way that a foundling can be considered a Filipino citizen under the 1935 Constitution, as well a s under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is for the foundling to be naturalized in accordance with law. On the Ruling that Grace Poe Might be a Filipino Citizen There is no law or jurisprudence which supports the contention that natural-born citizenship can be conferred on a foundling based alone on statistical probability. On Adoption Laws Philippine laws and jurisprudence on adoption is simply not determinative of natural-born citizenship. On Burden of Proof Since the Constitution requires that the President of the Philippines shall be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, it is imperative that petitioner prove that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen, despite the fact that she is a foundling. The burden of evidence shifted to her when she admitted her status as a foundling with no known biological parents. became her duty to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
At that moment, it
Grace Poe is NOT a Natural-born Filipino Citizen 1. There is no Philippine law automatically conferring Philippine citizenship to a foundling at birth. Even if there were, such a law would only result in the foundling being a naturalized Filipino citizen, not a natural-born Filipino citizen. 2. Second, there is no legal presumption in favor of Philippine citizenship, whether natural-born or naturalized. Citizenship must be established as a matter of fact and any doubt is resolved against the person claiming Philippine citizenship. 3. Third, the letter and intent of the 1935 Constitution clearly excluded foundlings from being considered natural-born Filipino citizens. The Constitution adopts the jus sanguinis principle, and identifies natural-born Filipino citizens as only those whose fathers or mothers are Filipino citizens. Petitioner failed to prove that either her father or mother is a Filipino citizen. 4. Fourth, there is no treaty, customary international law or a general principle of international law granting automatically Philippine citizenship to a foundling at birth. Petitioner failed to prove that there is such a customary international law. At best, there exists a presumption that a foundling is domiciled, and born, in the country where the foundling is found. 5. Fifth, even assuming that there is a customary international law presuming that a foundling is a citizen of the country where the foundling is found, or is born to parents possessing the nationality of that country, such presumption cannot prevail over our Constitution since customary international law has the status merely of municipal statutory law. This means that customary international law is inferior to the Constitution, and must yield to the Constitution in case of conflict. Since the Constitution adopts the jus sanguinis principle, and identifies natural born Filipino citizens as only those whose fathers or mothers are Filipino citizens, then petitioner must prove that either her father or mother is a Filipino citizen for her to be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen. Any international law which contravenes the jus sanguinis principle in the Constitution must of course be rejected. 6. Sixth, petitioner failed to discharge her burden to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. Being a foundling, she admitted that she does not know her biological parents, and therefore she cannot trace blood relation to a Filipino father or mother. Without credible and convincing evidence that petitioner’s biological father or mother is a Filipino citizen, petitioner cannot be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen. 7. Seventh, a foundling has to perform an act, that is, prove his or her status as a foundling, to acquire Philippine citizenship. This being so, a foundling can only be deemed a naturalized Filipino citizen because the foundling has to perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship.
Since there is no Philippine law specifically governing the citizenship of foundlings, their citizenship is addressed by customary international law, namely: the right of every human being to a nationality, and the State’s obligations to avoid statelessness and to facilitate the naturalization of foundlings. ##
Issue 3: W/N Grace Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement Held:
Yes. Grace Poe satisfied the requirements of animus manendi coupled with animus revertendi in acquiring a new domicile. Grace Poe’s domicile had been timely changed as of May 24, 2005, and not on July 18, 2006 when her application under RA 9225 was approved by the BI. COMELEC’s reliance on cases which decree that an alien’s stay in the country cannot be counted unless she acquires a permanent resident visa or reacquires her Filipino citizenship is without merit. Such cases are di#erent from the circumstances in this case, in which Grace Poe presented an overwhelming evidence of her actual stay and intent to abandon permanently her domicile in the US. Coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and h er family’s actual continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is clear that when Grace Poe returned on May 24, 2005, it was for good. Issue 4: W/N the Grace Poe’s candidacy should be denied or cancelled for committing material misrepresentations in her COC Held:
No. The COMELEC cannot cancel her COC on the ground that she misrepresented facts as to her citizenship and residency because such facts refer to grounds for ineligibility in which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to decide upon. Only when there is a prior authority finding that a candidate is su #ering from a disqualification provided by law or the Constitution that the COMELEC may deny due course or cancel her candidacy on ground of false representations regarding her qualifications. In this case, by authority of the Supreme Court Grace Poe is now pronounced qualified as a candidate for the presidency.
Hence, there cannot be any false representations in her COC
regarding her citizenship and residency. ##
