CIVIL LAW DEL CARMEN vs. BACOY G.R. NO. 17738770, April 25, 2012 DOCTRINE: The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur allows the mere existence of an injury to justify a presumption of negligence on the part of the person who controls the instrument causing the injury. FACTS: Spouses Monsalud and their daughter died from being run over by a jeepney driven by a certain Allan Maglasang. The jeepney was owned by Oscar del Carmen Jr. Allan was declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt in a criminal case while the father of the late Mrs. Monsalud, Geronimo Bacou filed an independent civil action againt the former in behalf of the minor children left by the Monsalud spouses. Del Carmen Jr. claimed he was a victim as well as Allan stole the jeep and was not hired as a driver by the former; he was a conductor (and had been released from employment lately) and it was the brother of Allan, Rodrigo who was hired as a driver. Del Carmen Jr. filed a carnapping case against Allan but was dismissed by the court for insufficient evidence. RTC held del Carmen Jr. subsidiary liable and held the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The CA adjudged Oscar Jr. liable to the heirs of the victims based on the principle that the registered owner of a vehicle is directly and primarily responsible for the injuries or death of third parties caused by the operation of such vehicle. It disbelieved Oscar Jr.’s defense that the jeep was stolen not only because the carnapping case filed against Allan and his companions was dismissed but also because, given the circumstances, Oscar Jr. is deemed to have given Allan the implied permission to use the subject vehicle because the brothers were assigned to said jeep. After a day’s work, the jeepney would be parked beside the brothers’ house and not returned to del Carmen’s residence; the jeep could easily be started even without the use of an ignition key; the said parking area was not fenced or secured to prevent the unauthorized use of the vehicle which can be started even without the ignition key. ISSUE: Whether or not the owner of vehicle is directly and primarily liable for injuries caused by the operation of such? HELD: Yes. Del Carmen Jr. was held to be primarily liable and not merely subsidiary liable. Del Carmen Jr.’s own evidence cast doubt that Allan stole the jeepney. Given the dismissal of the carnapping case filed by del Carmen Jr. against Allan, the former also
admitted to such dismissal in the SC. Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, “where the thing that caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants; and the accident, in the ordinary course of things, would not happen if those who had management or control used proper care, it affords reasonable evidence – in the absence of a sufficient, reasonable and logical explanation by defendant – that the accident arose from or was caused by the defendant’s want of care. All three are present in the case at bar.
CIVIL LAW GOLDLOOP PROPERTIES, INC. vs. GSIS G.R. NO.171076, April 1, 2012 DOCTRINE: It is basic that a contract is the law between the parties, and the stipulations therein – provided that they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy – shall be binding as between the parties. In contractual relations, the law allows the parties much leeway and considers their agreement to be the law between them. FACTS: The petitioner Goldloop Properties executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) undertaking the construction of a condominium on the parcel of land and the renovation of the façade of Philcomcen Building atits own expense, which both was owned by the GSIS. Under the terms of their agreement, the petitioner will pay GSIS for the land in eight installments. Also, the parties will share for the profits of every condominium sold with a certain percent. Goldloop then performed the preparatory works, such as selling the condominiums but was not able to proceed because the building permits was not yet been approved and there were still accrued real property taxes that were unpaid. Later on, Goldloop received a letter from GSIS to rescind the MOA and Goldloop replied that the work stoppage was caused of the pendingapproval of the building permits. Still, GSIS sent a notice of rescission because Goldloop stillhave pending obligations under their MOA.Goldloop filed a complaint with the RTC contending that it had begun with the preparatory works and such MOA should not be rescinded, which RTC granted in fa vor of Goldloop. Upon the decision, GSIS appealed with the CA that it had the right to rescind the contract for failure of Goldloop to comply with the obligation as stated in the MOA, which the CA granted in favor of the GSIS. Thus, the petitioner appealed with the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the Memorandum of Agreement may be rescinded? HELD:
Yes, the Court ruled that GSIS have every right to rescind the contract under the terms of the MOA. The parties may validly stipulate the unilateral rescission of their contract. Under Section 2.4 of the MOA, if Goldloop fail to start construction Should Goldloop fail to start the construction works within the thirty (30) working days from date all relevant permits and licenses from concerned agencies are obtained, or within six (6) months from the date of the execution of this Agreement, whichever is earlier, or at any given time abandon the same or otherwise commit any breach of their obligations and commitments under this Agreement, this agreement shall be deemed terminated and cancelled without need of judicial action by giving thirty (30) days written notice to that effect to Goldloop who hereby agrees to abide by the decision of the GSIS. It is the duty of both parties to surrender whatever amount received or property to part with. Goldloop should return to GSIS the possession and control of the property subject of their agreements while GSIS should reimburse Goldloop whatever amount it had received from the latter by reason of the MOA and the Addendum. The Court also held that rescission constitute a mutual restitution of the things pursuant toArticle 1191 of the Civil Code. In case both parties have committed a breach of the obligation, the liability of the first infractor shall be equitably tempered by the courts. If it cannot be determined which of the parties first violated the contract, the same shall be deemed extinguished, and each shall bear his own damages. The first infractor cannot be determined in this case but it cannot be conclusively presumed who is the first infractor, thus both parties shall bear the damages. Thus, it was direct by the Court for Goldloop to surrender possession of the land to the GSIS and that Goldloop should be reimbursed for the amount of expenses plus the return of the machineries, equipment and materials in the premises of the lot.
LABOR LAW JARL CONSTRUCTION vs. ATENCIO G.R. NO. 175969, April 1, 2012 DOCTRINE: In dismissing an employee from service, the employer has the burden of proving its observance of the two-notice requirement and its accordance to the employee of a real opportunity to be heard. FACTS: JARL, through Tejada, hired Atencio as its chief operating manager, whose primary function was to direct and manage JARL’s construction projects in accordance with its company policies and contracts. Further, as chief operating manager, he is the recommending authority with respect to the award of subcontracts and purchase orders. During Atencio’s tenure as chief operating manager, his employer JARL had an existing contract with Caltex. The contract with Caltex prohibited JARL from subcontracting the project. According to Atencio, he discovered during his employment that JARL did not have the proper facilities, personnel, and equipment to undertake the Caltex project. Further, Tejada allegedly gave Atencio full authority as JARL’s chief operating manager to hire other subcontractors if necessary. Pursuant to his blanket authority, Atencio hired DDK Steel Construction and Building Multi-Technology (DDK Steel) for the electrical installations of the Caltex project. Tejada informed Atencio and Safemark that JARL was terminating Atencio’s management and supervision works for the Caltex project. JARL assured Atencio and Safemark that it will pay for the rendered services. Atencio construed such as a termination of the subcontract between his company and JARL. Thus, he threatened JARL and Tejadathat he will report their unethical conduct with the Philippine Accreditation Board for possible sanctions. Believing, however, that his employment as JARL’s chief operating manager was separate from their subcontracting agreement, Atencio allegedly continued reporting for work to the Caltex project site until, sometime in June 1999, he was barred from entering the said premises. Atencio filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, nonpayment of salaries, and 13th month pay with the NLRC against JARL and Tejada. The Labor Arbiter found just cause for Atencio’s Removal but found the dismissal ineffectual because of petitioners’ failure to observe the twin requirements of due process. The NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter’s Decision. The NLRC gave emphasis to two letters adduced in evidence. The first is Atencio’s letter to JARL wherein Atencio acknowledges his mistakes and apologizes for them and JARL’s earlier letter which clearly informed Atencio of its decision to terminate his employment as its chief operating manager.
The CA held that Atencio’s dismissal was ineffectual for the employer’s failure to observe the procedural requirements for a proper termination of employment. CA also reversed the NLRC with respect to the issue of the unpaid salaries and 13th month pay. ISSUE: 1. Whether petitioners were able to prove their substantial compliance with the procedural due process requirements 2. Whether the receipts issued by Safemark evidencing JARL’s payment for "Professional Services" suffice as proof of payment of salaries and 13th month pay HELD: No.The Court agrees with the shared conclusions of the Labor Arbiter and the appellate court that petitioners’ evidence fails to prove their contention that they afforded Atencio with due process. The letter, which allegedly proves Atencio’s knowledge of the charges against him, and which allegedly constitutes Atencio’s explanation, clearly discusses an entirely different topic – which is the removal of his construction company from the Caltex project. In the letter, Atencio states that he was wrong for assuming that there was a subcontracting agreement between his firm and JARL. He took responsibility for the misunderstanding between them and apologized. Nowhere in the said letter does Atencio refer to the charges, which JARL mentioned before the Labor Arbiter as the causes for his dismissal. Logically, he did not also explain himself as regards the said charges. As for the letter which allegedly constitutes the notice of termination of Atencio’s employment as JARL’s chief operating manager, the Court agrees with the CA’s appreciation that the said letter involves the termination of the subcontracting agreement between JARL and Atencio’s company, and not the termination of Atencio’s employment. With respect to the issue of unpaid salaries and 13 th month pay, the Court agrees with the appellate court that petitioners’ evidence does not support their contention of payment. Since JARL admits that the said company actually rendered services for JARL on its Caltex project, the payment can only be assumed as covering for the said services. There is nothing on the face of the receipts to support the conclusion that Atencio (and not his company) received it as payment for his service as a JARL employee
