79. PP V TOMIO (202 SCRA 77) Tatsumi Nagao, a Japanese National, arrived in Manila for a five-day vacation tour and was billeted at the Holiday Inn. While having lunch accused Tomio and Mitamura, both Japanese, approached and joined him and offered themselves to be his tour guides in Manila. They toured him to the sauna bath of the hotel, a department store and ended up at Leo’s Restaurant where one of the accused placed a pack of cigarettes into Nagao’s shirt. Moments later, five plainclothesmen who identified themselves as police, frisked Nagao and found the pack of cigarettes which contained not the latter but marijuana. They brought Nagao to the police station where he was apprised of his alleged criminal act and was demanded 100,000 dollars by the police as bribe money for his release. Nagao returned to his hotel escorted by appellants and a policeman. He was placed under close watch and was not allowed to leave the hotel. They transferred him from hotel to hotel and then went to RCBC to get the money from Nagao where appellants were entrapped by police. Whether or not the facts establish that Nagao was kidnapped? YES. The facts establish that the crime of kidnapping was committed. The evidence for the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that appellants, together with their co-conspirators, co -conspirators, had an elaborate and carefully designed plan to kidnap Mr. Nagao in order to obtain ransom from him. There is no doubt in that during the period from 3 May 1986 until the accused-appellants were arrested on 12 May 1986, complainant was moved from one hotel to another by the appellants, effectively depriving him of his liberty. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, while it may be conceded that complainant had the freedom of locomotion, he "did not have the freedom to leave the hotel premises at will and go wherever he pleased." Their claim that money involved was not ransom money, but rather payment of hotel bills or for reimbursement of the sum they advanced to pay the policemen and for hotel accommodations and additional expenses spent is untenable. Nothing was actually given to the police as advanced payment. However, they succeeded in making it appear to Nagao that t hey have advanced the amount.
80. PP V. MERCADO (131 SCRA 501) Susan Baylon left her home to an unknown place and had not returned ever since. Thevictim, Yvonne Baylon, Susan’s sister, was seen by the accused, Susan’s common-law husband, walking down the road. The accused, believing that it was Yvonne who had instigated Susan to leave, grabbed her all of a sudden, sudden, pointed a knife on her throat and dragged her to his friend’s house. Yvonne learned that accused was angry at her, and demanded her to produce Susan. Accused dragged Yvonne to the roadside where they were met met by Yvonne’s brothers and neighbors who implored him to release Yvonne, but the accused pointed the knife on her breast. They proceeded to a store where the Chief of Police and some policemen talked to him. Accused told them he wanted to see his girlfriend and asked for transportation and money. The situation lasted till 12:00 noon until the barrio captain arrived to give him food and subdued him while Yvonne fainted. Whether or not the accused kidnapped Yvonne. Yes. The accused kidnapped Yvonne.
The records of the case are convincing enough that Mercado forcibly brought Yvonne from place to place so that the latter would reveal the whereabouts of Susan, his common-law-wife. For almost five (5) hours, he held Yvonne in a store before he was subdued. Pictures of the incident clearly showappellant's hand around the neck of complainant, with a knife poked at it. On the other hand, as correctly observed by the trial court, "[i]f it was true that it was the complainant who tried to stab the accused and it was the latter who succeeded in subduing the complainant, the incident would not have lasted several hours and attracted a throng of onlookers and policemen. The argument advanced by the defense that appellant should be convicted of grave coercion only since his purpose was "to force Miss Yvonne Baylon to produce Miss Susan Baylon ” is without merit.The extant evidence on record shows that "the accused held complainant because he wanted her to produce her sister, Susan, who was the common-law wife of the accused."
81. PP V DEL SOCORRO (182 SCRA 359) Four-year old Claire Sanchez went missing during lunchtime while playing with other children outside their home in Kalentong Street, Mandaluyong. Her mother, Evelyn, inquired from her playmates whosaid they last saw Claire forcibly car ried by a woman, whom they thought to be her aunt, against her will and despite her resistance. The two boarded a jeepney and left the place. Several days later, the distraught mother was informed that a doctor from Angono, Rizal, bought a child who fitted the description of her daughter. Together with police,she forthwith went to see Dr. Villamayor who told them that she had given the child to her aunt. The child was brought to the municipal building where she was reunited with her mother. The accused, identified as Letecia Del Socorro, sold and committed Claire to Dr. Villamayor for a sum of P700 to enable her to open a sari-sari store business but Dr. Villamayor only paid her P400 and assured her to pay the balance upon her return. When accused returned, Dr. Villamayor pointed her out to the policemen who there and then arrested and investigated her. Whether or not accused is guilty o f kidnapping. The claim of the defendant-appellant that the child, Claire Sanchez, went voluntarily with her, cannot be given credence. Evelyn Sanchez, the mother of the child, Claire, declared that when she asked her daughter upon their reunion if she went voluntarily with the defendant-appellant, the child answered that she did not. Evelyn further declared that when she asked the children in the neighborhood, with whom her daughter was playing, if Claire had resisted, the children answered that Claire had resisted, so that the accused had to carry her to the jeep. Besides, the defendant-appellant herself testified that when she picked up the child in Mandaluyong, her only thought was to bring the child to Dr. Villamayor in Angono, Rizal. She did not bring the child to her (defendant's) own home in Muzon, Taytay, Rizal even if this place is nearer than Angono, because, according to the defendant, she already has many children of her own and they have no food to eat. 8 But if she really pitied the child whom she described as crying on the sidewalk, why, it can be asked, did she not bring her to the nearest police station in Mandaluyong And, why did she think only of Dr. Villamayor who, according to her, she did not even know personally, but only in name?
Aida Villanueva and her younger sister Avelyn, were on an errand to buy rice in neighboring Masbate. They went to the pier and stayed there to meet their mother whom they thought would arrive by boat from Manila. After seeing a movie at a theater, accused called out to the girls and invited them to her home across the theater. Accused provided them with food and clothing. Avelyn was brought to Cebu by accused’s sister. For days, Aida stayed in accused’s home doing household chores for the latter. The minors’ father Charlito went with a PC sergeant to accused’s home and after the latter i dentified himself, accused released Aida to him. Whether or not Aida was detained by the accused. In the case at bar, after a careful review of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, the same are insufficient to sustain a conviction. The uncorroborated testimony of the alleged kidnapped victim, Aida Villanueva, which was mainly relied upon by the trial court in convicting the appellant, was not clear and convincing enough to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. There is no kidnapping in this case. The two minors voluntarily entered the appellant's residence through the front entrance. The fact of detention which is an essential element in the crime charged, was not clearly established. There was no showing that there was actual confinement or restriction of the person of the offended party. The appellant's residence has a store fronting the street where many customers presumably come and go. The place is busy with a movie house in front. There is no indication that Aida was locked up, physically restrained of her liberty or unable to communicate with anyone.
83. PP V PADICA Padica was given by appellants a fee of 100 pesos to drive them to Superville Subdivision, Sukat, Paranaque. Leopoldo Marajas, Padica’s compadre, boarded the vehicle with minors Eddie Boy Marajas and Francis Banaga. They then proceeded to Calamba, Laguna with Padica still manning the vehicle. They stopped at a sugarcane plantation. Leopoldo, Eddie Boy and Padica forced Banaga to alight from the vehicle and took him to a place within the plantation while Padica remained in the vehicle. Amidst the plantation, Leopoldo killed Banaga and left with Eddie Boy and Padica. Leopoldo phoned Banaga’s father and demanded payment of 500,000 for his son’s release but later pared it to 23,000.00. When Banaga’s father acceded, his relative delivered the money to the accused but the latter was framed up by a policeman, and admitted his killing of Banaga. Whether murder, kidnapping or a complex cr ime was committed by accused. The presence of aggravating circumstances qualified the killing of the v ictim to murder. The essential element in the crime of kidnapping that the victim must have been restrained or deprived of his liberty, or that he was transported away against his will with the primary or original intent to effect that restraint, is absent in this case. The malefactors evidently had only murder in their
hearts when they invited the trusting Francis Banaga to go with them to Laguna, and not to confine or detain him for any length of time or for any other purpose. Where the taking of the victim was incidental to the basic purpose to kill, the crime is only murder, and this is true even if, before the killing but for purposes thereof, the victim was taken from one place to another. Thus, where the evident purpose of taking the victims was to kill them, and from the acts of the accused it cannot be inferred that the latter's purpose was actually to detain or deprive the victims of their liberty, the subsequent killing of the victims constitute the crime of murder, hence the crime of kidnapping does not exist and cannot be considered as a component felony to produce a complex crime of kidnapping with murder . American Pastor Malcolm Bradshaw had witnessed and was himself involved in a kidnapping incident. While sending off his daughter to school, he saw a woman, Alicia, struggling to break away from the arms of accused and looked hysterical. Feeling that she was in deep trouble, he stopped his car. Alicia hopped in the backseat but accused caught up and squeezed himself in. Accused pulled out a gun and told Bradshaw to drive. Upon reaching Katipunan Avenue, Alicia whispered to Bradshaw to tell her family about her ordeal and was dragged out by accused. Atty. Del Rosario, Ali cia’s boss, gathered 200,000 cash as ransom. When the money was delivered, accused, Alicia and a cabbie, Pineda, departed for Norzagaray but rerouted to Bocaue. Pineda became uneasy and suspicious after seeing accused carrying a revolver and strangling Alicia. He sought the help of an armed traffic aide who found Alicia crying and accused hurting her. In a desperate effort, Alicia jumped out of the cab but accused killed her from behind. A shootout then ensued and accused fled on foot. He was arrested by responding elements at a subdivision on the same day. Whether murder, kidnapping or a complex cr ime was committed by accused. Accused committed the special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Murder. Considering the evidence extant on record, the victim was indeed kidnapped for ransom and then murdered by accused-appellant. But the kidnapping for ransom and murder should not be treated as separate crimes for which two (2) death penalties must as a consequence be imposed. Instead, under Art. 267 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA No. 7659, accused-appellant should be convicted of the special complex crime of KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM WITH MURDER and impose upon him the maximum penalty of DEATH. “When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.” Obviously, the instant case falls within the purview of Art. 267, as amended. Although the crime of kidnapping for ransom was already consummated with the mere demand by the accused for ransom even before the ransom was delivered - the deprivation of liberty of the victim persisted and continued to persist until such time that she was killed by accused-appellant while trying to escape. Hence, the death of the victim may be considered "a consequence of the kidnapping for ransom."
Complainant Johanna Sombong brought her ill daughter Arabella to the Sir John Medical and Maternity Clinic owned by accused-appellants for treatment, but she was advised to have the child confined for speedy recovery. When Arabella recuperated, complainant did not take her home. Complainant returned but did not have the money and confided to Dr. Ty that no one would take care of the child at home while she is working so she decided to leave the child to the care of the clinic and from
then on, nothing was heard of complainant. Eventually the hospital staff took turns in taking care of Arabella. Five years later complainant came back to claim the child. Whether or not accused-appellants deliberately failed on their part to restore Arabella back to complainant. NO. The efforts taken by the accused-appellants to help the complainant in finding the child clearly negate the finding that there was a deliberate refusal or failure on their part to restore the child to her mother. Before a conviction for kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code can be had, two elements must concur, namely: (a) the offender has been entrusted with the custody of the minor, and (b) the offender deliberately fails to restore said minor to his parents or guardians. Essentially, the word deliberate as used in the article must imply something more than mere negligence; it must be premeditated, obstinate, headstrong, foolishly daring or intentionally and maliciously wrong. In the case at bar, it is evident that there was no deliberate refusal or failure on the part of the accused-appellants to restore the custody of the complainants child to her. When the accused-appellant learned that complainant wanted her daughter back after five (5) long years of apparent wanton neglect, they tried their best to help herein complainant find the child as the latter was no longer under the clinics care. Accused-appellant Dr. Ty did not have the address of Arabellas guardians but as soon as she obtained it from Dr. Fe Mallonga who was already working abroad, she personally went to the guardians residence and informed them that herein complainant wanted her daughter back. The efforts taken by the accused-appellants to help the complainant in finding the child clearly negate the finding that there was a deliberate refusal or failure on their part to restore the child to her mother. Evidence is simply wanting in this regard. It is worthy to note that accused-appellants conduct from the moment the child was left in the clinics care up to the time the child was given up for guardianship was motivated by nothing more than an earnest desire to help the child and a high regard for her welfare and well-being.
