Romualdez v. Marcelo July 28, 2006 FACTS: Petitioner is being charged with violations of Section 7 of RA No. 3019 for failure to file his Statements of Assets and Liabilities for the period 1967-1985 during his tenure as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and for the period 1963-1966 1963-1966 during his tenure as Technical Assistant in the Department of Foreign Affairs. The said offenses were said to be discovered by SolGen Francisco Chavez on May 8, 1987, the date when he filed a complaint against the petitioner with the PCGG. The preliminary investigations conducted by the PCGG over the 24 offenses ascribed to Romualdez (of failure to file annual statements of assets and liabilities) were held invalid by the court court for lack of jurisdiction jurisdiction of said offenses. offenses. The nullity of the proceedings initiated by then Solicitor General Chavez in 1987 with the PCGG and by the PCGG with the Sandiganbayan in 1989 was judicially settled. The only proceeding that could interrupt the running of prescription of the 1987 case is that which is filed or initiated by the offended party before the appropriate body or office. o The complaint was filed with the wrong body, the PCGG. Thus, the same could not have interrupted the running of the prescriptive periods. On March 3, 2004, Office of the Special Prosecutor initiated the preliminary investigation of Crim Case Nos. 13406-
13429 by requiring the petitioner to submit his counteraffidavit. ISSUE:
Whether the filing of the complaint with the PCGG in 1987 as well as the filing of the information with the Sandiganbayan to initiate Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 in 1989 interrupted the running of the prescriptive period such that when the Ombudsman directed petitioner to file his counter-affidavit on March 3, 2004, the offenses have already prescribed. HELD: YES.
Section 11 of RA No. 3019 provides that all offenses punishable therein shall prescribe in 15 years. However, prior to the amendment of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 by B.P. Blg. 195 which was approved on March 16, 1982, the prescriptive period for offenses punishable under the said statute was only ten (10) years. For offenses allegedly committed by the petitioner from 1962 up to March 15, 1982, the same shall prescribe in 10 years. On the other hand, for offenses allegedly committed by the petitioner during the period from March 16, 1982 until 1985, the same shall prescribe in 15 years. BUT Since the petitioners were absent in the Philippines from 1986 to April 27, 2000, the respondents were saying that the charge could not have prescribed citing Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "[t]he " [t]he term of prescription should not run when the offender is absent from
the Philippine Archipelago."
the prescriptive period. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
This was supported by the dissent of Justice Carpio. He stated that Article 10 of the same Code makes Article 91 "x x x supplementary to [special laws], unless the latter should x x x provide the contrary." Nothing in RA 3019 prohibits the supplementary application of Article 91 to that law. Hence, applying Article 91, the prescriptive period in Section 11 of RA 3019, before and after its amendment, should run only after petitioner returned to this jurisdiction on 27 April 2000. There is no gap in the law. Where the special law is silent, Article 10 of the RPC applies suppletorily.
In view of the foregoing, the applicable 10-and-15-year prescriptive periods in the instant case, were not interrupted by any event from the time they began to run on May 8, 1987. The offenses committed by the petitioner for the years 1963-1982 prescribed 10 years from May 8, 1987 or on May 8, 1997. On the other hand, the alleged offenses committed by the petitioner for the years 1983-1985 prescribed 15 years from May 8, 1987 or on May 8, 2002.
HOWEVER, Court ruled that the law on prescription of offenses is found in Articles 90 and 91 of the Revised Penal Code for offenses punishable thereunder. For those penalized under special laws, Act No. 3326 applies. Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides that the prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The running of the prescriptive period shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy. Clearly, Section 2 of Act No. 3326 did not provide that the absence of the accused from the Philippines prevents the running of the prescriptive period. Thus, the only inference that can be gathered from the foregoing is that the legislature, in enacting Act No. 3326, did not consider the absence of the accused from the Philippines as a hindrance to the running of
Also, when the Office of the Special Prosecutor initiated the preliminary investigation of Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 on March 3, 2004 by requiring the petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit, the alleged offenses subject therein have already prescribed.
