CASE DIGEST: LABOR LAW REVIEW Topic: NLRC Jurisdiction
Union Motors Corporation, Benito Cua and Charlotte Cua v. NLRC and Priscilla Go; 1999. (341 SCRA 531) Facts: Benito Cua (Mr. Cua) is the father of Charlotte Cua (Mrs. Cua). They are, respectively, the President and Vice President/Treasurer of petitioner Union Motors. Respndent Priscilla Go (Mrs. Go) was originally a complainant in the case for illegal dismissal filed against petitioners. Union Motors hired Go as its Administrative Personnel and Personnel Manager. On February 13, 1982, she was appointed as Treasurer while concurrently serving as Administrative and Personnel Manager. Seven years later, Union Motors’ Board of Directors effected a top-level corporate revamp. Ms. Cua was appointed Vice President/Treasurer and in turn, Assistant to the President and Administrative and Personnel Manager by the Board. Go accepted the appointment appointment on the condition that she would report solely and directly to the Union Motors President, Mr. Cua. Eventually, Mr. Cua issued an office memorandum assigning Ms. Go under the direct supervision of Ms. Cua. On the course of her employment, tension arose between Ms. Go and Ms. Cua, prompting Ms. Go to write to Mr. Cua regarding her intention to withdraw on the said offer. Ms. Go stopped reporting for work and claimed that she had gone on leave to avoid further clashes between her and Ms. Cua. Mr. Cua designated a substitute to fill up Ms. Go’ duties, which eventually eventua lly lead to Mr. Cua on deciding to accept Ms. Go’s resignation. Insisting that she did not resign, Ms. Go filed a complaint for constructive/ illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter. In their reply however, the petitioners denied that Ms. Go was illegally dismissed. They countered that she had abandoned her job after she expressed her intention to resign on July 1991. This intent was concretized when she stopped reporting for work the following day. Ruling of Labor Arbiter: The LA dismissed Ms. Go’s complaint. Ms. Go then appealed to the NLRC and charged the Labor Arbiter with grave error in (1) failing to hold that she was constructively/illegally dismissed and (2) failing to appreciate the evidence on record. In their reply, the petitioners then argued that she was not dismissed but that she voluntarily resigned. Further, they argued that since Ms. Go is a corporate officer, any issue relating to her removal was therefore an intra-corporate dispute. As such, jurisdiction therefore will not lie with the NLRC but rather with the SEC. Issue: Does the NLRC have jurisdiction?
CASE DIGEST: LABOR LAW REVIEW Topic: NLRC Jurisdiction
Court Ruling: The NLRC does not have jurisdiction. One who is included in the by-laws of an association in its roster of corporate officers is an officer of the said corporation and not a mere employee. In this case, private respondent Ms. Go is an officer of petitioner Union Motors Corporation. The records clearly show that p rivate respondent’s position as Assistant to the President and Personnel & Administrative Manager is a corporate officer under the by-laws of the Union Motors. The Secretary’s Certificate of February 3, 1989 lists the position of Assistant to the Pres ident and Personnel & Administrative Manager as a corporate office. The Court has consistently held that one who is included in the by-laws of an association in its roster of corporate officers is an officer of the said corporation and not a mere employee. It is also settled that if found regular on its face, a Secretary’s Certification is sufficient to rely on, and there is no need to investigate the t he truth of the facts contained cont ained in such certification. No reason has been shown here to doubt the veracity of the said corporate secretary’s certification. Hence, the inescapable conclusion is that private respondent was an officer of petitioner Union Motors. *** On the issue of estoppel with regard to the jurisdiction—private respondents fault petitioners for failing to raise the issue of lack of jurisdiction at the earliest possible time. She contends that since petitioners actively participated in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, they are now estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the NLRC. The Court in this wise noted that Ms. Go’s reliance on the principle of estoppel to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the NLRC over her case is misplaced. The long-established rule is that jurisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by law. Estoppel Es toppel does not no t apply to confer c onfer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over a cause of action. Where it appears that the Court or tribunal has no jurisdiction, then the defense may be interposed at any time, even on appeal or even after final judgment. Moreover, the principle of estoppel cannot be invoked to prevent this Court from taking up question of jurisdiction.
