Ethics Compiled

Page |1 Legal Ethics Case Digest Judge Philip Aguinaldo 3AA, A.Y. 2011-2012

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ATTY. GEORGE C. BRIONES V. ATTY. JACINTO D. JIMENEZ...................1 FERNANDO MARTIN O. PEÑA V. ATTY. LOLITO G. APARICIO................1 GEORGE C. SOLATAN V. ATTYS. OSCAR A. INOCENTES AND JOSE C. CAMANO.........................................................................................2 RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED RESTORING INTEGRITY: A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURT.......3 COURT..... ..3 RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED “RESTORING INTEGRITY: A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURT” ....4 TERESITA D. SANTECO V. ATTY. LUNA B. AVANCE..............................6 ATTY. JOSABETH B. ALONSO AND SHALIMAR P. LAZATIN V. ATTY. IBARO B. RELAMIDA, JR....................................................................7 CARLOS REYES V. ATTY. JEREMIAS R.VITAN.......................................8 LUZVIMINDA R. LUSTESTICA VS. ATTY. SERGIO E. BERNABE...............9 JUAN PABLO P. BONDOC BONDOC V. V. JUDGE JUDGE DIVINA DIVINA LUZ LUZ P. AQUI AQUINO-SI NO-SIMBULA MBULAN N ....................................................................................................10 MANUEL C. YUHICO V. ATTY. FRED L. GUTIERREZ............................13 OFELIA R. SOMOSOT V. ATTY. GERADO F. LARA...............................14 WILSON CHAM V. ATTY. EVA PAITA-MOYA.......................................15 HEIRS OF BOBADILLA V. JAIME CASTILLO........................................16 LETTER OF CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF IBP DUES..................................................................17


RODANTE D. MARCOLETA V. RESURRECCION Z. BORRA AND ROMEO A. BRAWNER.....................................................................................18 ERLINDA R. TAROG V. ATTY. ROMULO L. RICAFORT..........................20 SAN JOSE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION V. ATTY. ROBERTO B. ROMANILLOS................................................................................23 RE: REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL AUDIT OF THE BOOKS OF ATTY. RAQUEL G. KHO.............................................................................25 ATTY. EVELYN J. MAGNO V. ATTY. OLIVIA VELASCO-JACOBA.............25 BENILDA M. MADDELA V. ATTY. ROSALIE DALLONG-GALICINAO........26 XERXES A. ABADIANO V. SPOUSES JESUS AND LOLITA MARTIR.........28


ATTY. GEOR GEORGE GE C. C. BRIONES BRIONES v. ATTY. JACINT JACINTO O D. JIME JIMENEZ NEZ A.C. No. No. 6691, 27 April 2007, THIRD THIRD DIVISION DIVISION (Austri (Austria-Marti a-Martinez, nez, J J .) .) Atty. Briones is the Special Admini Administrator strator of the Estate of Luz J. Henson while Atty. Jacinto D. Jimenez is the counsel counsel for the Heirs of Henson. After the probate proceedings, proceedings, the RTC issued issued an order directing Jimenez to deliver the residue of the estate to the Heirs in proportion to their shares. Atty Briones refused to deliver the estate. Consequently, Atty. Jimenez and the Heirs filed a criminal complaint and executed an affidavit against agai nst Atty Briones Briones for resisting resisting and seriously seriously disobeying disobeying the RTC Order. Atty. Briones Briones filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Jimenez for forum shopping and violation of Canons 19 and 12 of the Code of Professional Professional Responsibility. Responsibility. Respon Respondent dent claims that he acted in good faith and in fact, did not violate Rule Rule 19.01 because because he assisted the Heirs Heirs in filing the criminal criminal complaint complaint against against herein complainan complainantt after the latter ignored the demand letters sent to him; and that a lawyer owes his client the exercise of utmost prudence and capability.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty Jimenez violated Canons 19 and 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility HEL ELD: D: A lawy lawyer er mu must st re repr pres esen entt his his cl clie ient nt wi with th ze zeal al,, how howev ever er,, the the pe perf rfor orma manc nce e of of his his duties towards his clients must be within the bounds of law. The Court agrees with the OBC that respondent is not guilty of forum shopping. Records show that respondent, as counsel for the heirs of the late Luz J. Henson, filed a special civil action docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 70349 assailing the Order of March 12, 2002 appointing the accounting firm of Alba, Romeo and Co. as auditor; and, a regular appeal docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 71488 assailing the Order of April 3, 2002, insofar as it directed the payment of commission to complainant. It is evident that there is identity of parties but different causes of action and reliefs sought. Hence, respondent is not guilty of forum shopping There is sufficient ground in support of complainant’s claim that respondent violated Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional Professional Respon Responsibility. sibility. Considering Considering that complainant did not reply to the demand letters, respondent opted to file said criminal complaint in behalf of his clients for refusal to obey the lawful order of the court. Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins a lawyer to represent his client with zeal. However, the same Canon provides that a lawyer’s performance of his duties towards his client must be within the bounds of the law. Rule 19.01 of the same Canon requires, among others, that a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client. Canon 15, Rule 15.07 also obliges lawyers to impress upon their clients compliance with the laws and the principle of fairness. To permit lawyers to resort to unscrupulous practices for the protection of the supposed rights of their clients is to defeat one of the purposes of the state – the administration of justice. While lawyers owe their entire devotion to the interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of their client’s right, they should not forget that they are, first and foremos foremost, t, officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.

FERNANDO MARTIN O. PEÑA v. ATTY. LOLITO G. APARICIO A.C. No. No. 7298, 25 June 2007, SECOND SECOND DIVISION DIVISION (Velasco (Velasco,, Jr., J Jr., J .) .) Aparicio is legal counsel for Hufana in an illegal dismissal case filed with the NLRC against Pena. Pena is president of MOF company. Aparicio sought the payment of separation pay to his client. Pena rejected the demand and sent notice to Hufana to return to work. Aparicio, in a reply letter to Pena, reiterated the claim of his client. In his letter Apparicio also made threats saying that if the claims were not paid they would file multiple criminal criminal charges for tax evasion, falsification and the cellation of Pena’s business license. Because Because


of this Pena filed the administrative proceeding against Aparicio with the IBP for violation of Canon 19, specifically rule 19.01. IBP dismissed the complaint because Pena failed to file his position paper and certification against forum shopping. Aparicio filed an MR reiterating his claim for damages against Pena (defamation) in the amount of 400M.

ISSUE: 1) Whether or or not the dismissal dismissal of the IBP for foreign foreign shopping shopping constitutes constitutes a bar in the Administrativ Administrativee proceedings 2) Whether or not Atty Aparicio Aparicio violated Canon 19

HEL ELD: D:

A law lawye yerr sha shall ll re repr pres esen entt hi hiss cli clien entt wit with h zea zeall wit withi hin n the the bo boun unds ds of th the e law law..

1) The rule requiring a certification of forum shopping to accompany every initiatory pleading, should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of procedure—which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible. At any rate, complainant's subsequent compliance with the requirement cured the supposed defect in the original complaint. 2) Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within within the bounds bounds of the law," law," reminding reminding legal legal practitioners practitioners that a lawyer's lawyer's duty is is not to his client client but to the administration administration of justice; to that end, his client's success success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be scrupu scrupulously lously observant observant of law and ethics.In particular, Rule 19.01 commands that a "lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means means to attain the lawful objectives objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage advantage in any case or proceeding." Under this Rule, a lawyer should not file or threaten t hreaten to file any unfounded or baseless criminal case or cases against the adversaries of his client designed to secure a leverage to compel the adversaries to yield or withdraw their own cases against the lawyer's client. Blackmail is "the extortion of money from a person by threats of accusation or exposure or opposition in the public prints,…obtaining of value from a person as a condition of refraining from making an accusation against him, or disclosing some secret calculated to operate to his prejudice." In common parlance and in general acceptation, it is equivalent to and synonymous with extortion, the exaction of money either for the performance of a duty, the prevention of an injury, or the exercise of an influence. Not infrequently, it is extorted by threats, or by operating on the fears or the credulity, or by promises to conceal or offers to expose the weaknesses, the follies, or the crime of the victim. Through his letter, he threatened complainant that should the latter fail to pay the amounts they propose as settlement, he would file and claim bigger amounts including moral damages, as well as multiple charges such as tax evasion evasion,, falsification of documents, and cancellation of business license to operate due to violations of laws. The threats are not only unethical for violating Canon 19, but they also amount to blackmail. blackmai l.

GEORGE C. SOLATAN v. ATTYS. OSCAR A. INOCENTES and JOSE C. CAMANO A.C. No. No. 6504, 9 August August 2005, SECOND SECOND DIVISION (Tinga (Tinga,, J .) .) Atty. Jose A. Camano was an associa associate te in the firm of Atty. Oscar Inocen Inocentes. tes. The Oscar Inocentes and Associates Law Office was retained by spouses Genito, owners of an apartment complex when the Genito Apartments were placed under sequestration by the PCGG. They represented the spouses Genito before the PCGG and the Sandiganbayan and in ejectment ejectment cases against non-paying non-paying tenants occupying occupying the Genito Apartments. Solatan’s sister was a tenant of the Genito Apartments. She left the apartment to Solatan and other members of her family. A complaint for ejectment for non-payment of rentals was filed against her and a decision was rendered in a judgment by default ordering her to vacate the premises. Solatan was occupying occupying said apartment when he learned of the judgment. He informed Atty. Inocentes of his desire to arrange the


execution of a new lease contract by virtue of which he would be the new lessee of the apartment. Atty. Inocentes referred him to Atty. Camano, the attorney in charge of ejectment cases against tenants of the Genito Apartments. During the meeting with Atty. Camano, an verbal agreement was made in which complainant agreed to pay the entire judgment debt of his sister, including awarded attorney’s fees and costs of suit. Complainant issued a check in the name of Atty. Camano representing half of the attorney’s fees. Complainant failed to make any other payment. The sheriff in coordination with Atty. Camano enforced the writ of execution and levied the properties found in the subject apartment. Complainant renegotiated renego tiated and Atty. Camano agreed to release the levied properties and allow complainant to remain at the apartment. Acting on Atty. Camano’s advice, complainant presented an affidavit of ownership to the sheriff who released the levied items. However, a gas stove was not returned to the complainant but was kept by Atty. Camano in the unit of the Genito Apartments where he was temporarily staying. Complainant filed the instant administrative case for disbarment against Atty. Camano and Atty. Inocentes. The IBP Board of Governors resolved to suspend Atty. Camano from the practice of law for 1 year and to reprimand Atty. Inocentes for exercising command responsibility.

ISSUE: 1) Whether or not Atty. Camano Camano violated violated the Code Code of Profess Professional ional Respons Responsibility ibility 2) Whether or not Atty. Atty. Inocentes Inocentes violated the Code of Professional Professional Respon Responsibility sibility

HEL ELD D: clients.

Alll lawy Al lawyer erss must must obs obser erve ve loy loyal altty in all all tra trans nsac acti tio ons and and dea deali ling ngss with with th thei eirr

An attorney has no right to act as couns counsel el or legal representa representative tive for a person withou withoutt being retained. No employment relation was offered or accepted in the instant case. Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires all lawyers to observe loyalty in all transactions and dealings with their clients. Unquestionably, an attorney giving legal advice to a party with an interest conflicting with that of his client may be held guilty of disloyalty. However, the advice given by Atty. Camano in the context where the complai complainant nant was the rightful owner of the incorrec incorrectly tly levied properties was in consonance with his duty as an officer of the court. It should not be construed as being in conflict with the interest of the spouses Genito as they have no interest over the properties. The act of informing complainant that his properties would be returned upon showing proof of his ownership may hint at infidelity to his clients but lacks the essence of double dealing and betrayal. 2. Atty. Inocentes’ Inocentes’ failure to exercise exercise certain certain responsibilities responsibilities over over matters under the charge charge of his law firm is a blameworthy shortcoming. As name practitioner of the law office, Atty. Inocentes is tasked with the responsibility responsibility to make reasonable reasonable efforts to ensure that all lawyers in the firm should act in confor conformity mity to the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Inocen Inocentes tes received periodic reports from Atty. Camano on the latter’s dealings with complainant. This is the linchpin of his supervisory capacity over Atty. Camano and liability by virtue thereof. Partners and practitioners who hold supervisory capacities are legally responsible to exert ordinary diligence in apprising themselves of the comings and goings of the cases handled by persons over which they are exercising supervisory authority and in exerting necessary efforts to foreclose violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility by persons under their charge.

RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED RESTORING INTEGRITY: A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURT A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, 10-10-4-SC, June 7, 7, 2011, EN 2011, EN BANC BANC (Leonardo-De (Leonardo-De Castro, J.)


Last Mar Last March ch 8, 2011 on A.M. No. 10-10-410-10-4-SC, SC, the Supreme Supreme Court Court remi reminded nded Univers University ity of the Philippines (UP) law professors Tristan A. Catindig and Carina C. Laforteza and 35 other faculty members of the UP College of Law, as well as admonishing Dean Marvic Leonen for vio, “Restoring Integrity,” a scathing manifes mani festo to call calling ing for SC Asso Associat ciatee Just Justice ice Mar Marian iano o del Cast Castillo illo’s ’s resi resignat gnation ion for the latte latter’s r’s alleg alleged ed plagi pla giari arism sm on hi hiss dec decis isio ion n on the case of Vi Vinu nuya, ya, et al . v. Exec Executi utive ve Sec Secret retary ary (G. (G.R. R. No. 1622 162230) 30) promulgated last April 28, 2010. Consequently, Motion for Reconsideration Reconsideration was filed by Catindig and Laforteza and a manifestation filed by Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen and Prof. Theodore O. Te, relying on the ground that the proceeding, while docketed as an adminis administrative trative matter, is premise premised d on a finding of indirect contempt and that they were not not accorded accorded due process under indirect indirect contem contempt pt proceedings. proceedings.

ISSUE: Whether or not SC erred in finding that the respondents are in breach of their ethical obligations for having issued the restoring integrity statement

HELD: Contumacious speech and/or behaviour directed against the Court on the part of a lawyer may be punishable either as contempt or an ethical violation, or both in the discretion of the Court. The petition was denied for No substantial arguments to warrant a reconsideration of the Decision dated March 8, 2011 nor to justify the grant of the reliefs prayed for in their motion. The Manifestation, apart apa rt fro from m bei being ng an exp expre ress ssio ion n of su suppo pport rt fo forr Pr Prof ofess essor orss Cat Catin indig dig an and d La Lafo forte rteza za’s ’s mo motio tion n fo forr reconsideration, did not raise any new matter nor pray for any affirmative relief, the Court resolves to merely note the same. Contumacious speech or conduct directed against a court or judicial officer, if committed by a member mem ber of the Bar, subject subject the offe offender nder to disc discipli iplinar nary y proc proceedi eedings ngs under the Code of Prof Professi essiona onall Responsibility, which prescribes that lawyers observe and promote due respect for the courts. In such discipli disc iplinary nary case cases, s, the san sanctio ctions ns are not pena penall but admi adminis nistrati trative ve suc such h as, disb disbarme arment, nt, sus suspens pension ion,, reprimand or admonition. Contumacious speech and/or behaviour directed against the Court on the part of a lawyer may be punishable either as contempt or an ethical violation, or both in the discretion of the Court. When the Court Court initiates contempt contempt proceeding proceedingss and/or disciplinary disciplinary proceedin proceedings gs against against lawyers for intemperate and discourteous language and behaviour directed at the courts, the evil sought to be prevented is the same – the degradation of the courts and the loss of trust in the administration of justice. Verily, when the Court chooses to institute an administrative case against a respondent lawyer, the mere citation or discuss disc ussion ion in the orde orders rs or deci decisio sion n in the admi adminis nistrati trative ve case of juri jurispru sprudenc dencee inv involvi olving ng con contemp temptt proceedings does not transform the action from a disciplinary proceeding to one for contempt. Had this Court opted to cite respondents for contempt of court, which is punishable by imprisonment or fine, this Court would have initiated contempt proceedings in accordance with the Rules of Court.

RE: LETTER LETTER OF THE UP UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED “RESTORING INTEGRITY: A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURT” A.M. NO. 10-10-4-SC, 10-10-4-SC, 8 MARCH MARCH 2011, EN 2011, EN BANC BANC (Leonardo-De (Leonardo-De Castro, J Castro, J .) .) SC Justice Mariano Del Castillo rendered a decision in Vinuya, et al . v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230). Counsels Attys. H. Harry L. Roque, Jr. (Atty. Roque) and Romel Regalado Bagares (Atty. Bagares) for Vinuya, et al . (the “ Malaya Lolas”), Lolas”), filed a supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, on the ground that, inter alia, charge of plagiarism as one of the grounds for reconsideration of the Vinuya decision and a twisting of the true intents of the plagiarized sources by the ponen ponencia cia was made to suit the arguments of the assailed Judgment Judgment for denying the Petition. Works allegedly plagiarized plagiarized in the Vinuya decision were namely: (1) Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent’s article “A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens;” (2) Christian


J. Ta Tams ms’’ bo book ok Enforcing Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligati Obligations ons in Intern International ational Law Law;; and (3) Mar Mark k Elli Ellis’ s’ arti article cle “Breaking the Silence: On Rape as an International Crime. Such supplemental motion for reconsideration appeared on internet sites. Thereafter, a statement entitled “Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court” was submitted by Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leone to the Court through Chief Justice Renato C. Corona. The statement basically conveys that the plagiarism committed in the case of Vinuya v Executive Secretary is unacceptable, unethical and in breach of the high standards of moral conduct and judicial and professional competence expected of the Supreme Court. (See attachment for complete text of the statement). The SC Ethics Committee referred this matter to the Court en banc. The high court said the UP law professors’ statement was evidently intended to “discredit” its April 28 decision on the Vinuya et al. v the Executive Secretary et al. case. It claimed that the law faculty wanted to “undermine the court’s honesty, integrity and competence in addressing” the motion for reconsideration of 70 “comfort women.” Accordingly, Accor dingly, the Court directed the 37 UP law faculty-signatories to show cause, within ten (10) days from receipt why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of Canons 1, 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents should be disciplined as Members of the Bar under the Code of Professional Responsibility

HELD: HELD: All lawyer lawyers, s, wheth whether er they are judges, court emplo employees, yees, profess professors ors or privat private e prac pr acti titi tion oner ers, s, ar are e of offi fice cers rs of th the e Co Cour urtt an and d ha have ve vo volu lunt ntar aril ilyy ta take ken n an oa oath th,, as an indispen indi spensab sable le qual qualific ificatio ation n for adm admissi ission on to the Bar Bar,, to con conduc ductt the themse mselve lvess wit with h goo good d fidelity towards the courts. The administrative matter is decided by reminding the Thirty-five UP professors of their duty as officers of the court while Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen was admonished to be more mindful of his duty, as a member of the Bar, an officer of the Court, and a Dean and professor of law, to observe full candor and honesty in his dealings with the Court and warned that the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more more severely. severely. While a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage courage,, such enthus enthusiasm iasm does not justify the use of offensi offensive ve and abusive language. language. Language abounds abounds with countless possibilities possibilities for one to be emphatic emphatic but but respectful, respectful, convincin convincing g but not not derogatory, derogatory, illuminatin illuminating g but not not offensive. offensive. The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates: CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes. RULE 1.02 – A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. CANON 10 – A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court. Rule 10.01 – A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice. Rule 10.02 – A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved. Rule 10.03 – A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedu procedure re and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.. justice CANON 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others. RULE 11.05 A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the proper authorities only. CANON 13 — A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court.


What responde respondent nt seems unawar unawaree of is that freedom of speech and of expressio expression, n, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interest. One of these fundamental public publ ic inte interes rests ts is the main maintena tenance nce of the inte integri grity ty and orde orderly rly fun functio ctionin ning g of the administra administration tion of justice.. There is no antinom justice antinomy y between free expressi expression on and the integrity of the system of adminis administering tering justice.. For the protection and mainten justice maintenance ance of freedom of expressi expression on itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context, in other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general community. The Show Cause Resolution does not interfere with respondents’ academic freedom. Even if the Court was willing to accept respondents’ proposition in the Common Compliance that their issuance of the Statement was in keeping with their duty to “participate in the development of the legal system by initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and in the improvement of the administration of justice”” under Canon justice C anon 4 of the Code of Professi Professional onal Responsibility, Responsibility, we cannot agree that they have fulfilled that same duty in keeping with the demands of Canons 1, 11 and 13 to give due respect to legal processes and the courts, and to avoid conduct conduct that tends to influence the courts. Members of the Bar cannot be selectiv selectivee regarding which canons to abide by given particular situations. With more reason that law professors are not allowed this indulgence, since they are expected to provide their students exemplars of the Code of Professional Responsibility as a whole and not just their preferred portions thereof. The Court finds that there was indeed a lack of observance of fidelity and due respect to the Court, particularly particula rly when respondents knew fully well that the matter of plagiaris plagiarism m in the Vinuya decision and the merits of the Vinuya decision itself, at the time of the Statement’s issuance, were still both sub judice or pending final disposition of the Court.

TERESITA D. SANTECO v. ATTY. LUNA B. AVANCE A.C. 5834, 5834, 22 February February 2011, 2011, EN EN BANC BANC (( Per Curiam) Curiam) An adminis administrative trative complai complaint nt was filed by Teresita D. Santeco agains againstt responde respondent nt Atty. Luna B. Avance for for mishandling mishandling Civil Case No. 97-275, 97-275, which was filed before the RTC RTC of Makati City. The result of such administrative complaint was the suspension of Avance from the practice of law for five years and ordered to return P3,900 to her client after she was found guilty of gross misconduct for abandoning her clien cli entt in bad fa faith ith and per persis sisten tentt ref refus usal al to co compl mply y wit with h law lawfu full or order derss dir direct ected ed at her wi witho thout ut an any y explanation for doing so. However, while still suspended, Avance appeared in three cases as “Atty. Liezl Tanglao” as stated in a letter-report of Judge Consuelo Amog-Bocar, presiding Judge of the RTC of Iba, Zambales. In a resolution, the Court ordered Avance to comment on said letter-report. However, she failed to do so. The Court then reiterated its order. Again, despite receipt of the two resolutions, she still failed to comply. Thus, the Court issued a resolutio resolution n finding Avance guilty of indirect contempt and ordering her to pay a fine amounting to P30,000. It also sternly warned her that a repetition of the same or similar infractions will be dealt with more severely. Despite due notice, she failed to pay the fine.

ISSUE: Whether or not the action or inaction of Atty. Avance is a ground for her disbarment HELD LD:: A law awyyer who who wil willfully diso disobe beyys the the lawful ord order of the the court des deser erve vess the the ultimate penalty of disbarment. It held that “responde “respondent’s nt’s conduct conduct evidently fell short of what is expected of her as an officer of the court as she obviously possesses a habit of defying this Court’s orders. She willfully disobeyed this Court when she continu continued ed her law practice despite the five-yea five-yearr suspens suspension ion order against her and even misrepresented herself to be another person in order to evade said penalty. Thereafter, when she was twice ordered to comment on her continued law practice while still suspended, nothing was heard from her


despite receipt of two Resolutions form this Court. Neither did she pay the P30,000 fine imposed in the Resolution. In repeatedly disobeying this Court’s orders, respondent proved herself unworthy of membership in the Philippine Bar. Worse, she remains indifferent to the need to reform herself. Clearly, she is unfit to discharge the duties of an officer of the court and deserves the ultimate penalty of disbarment.

ATTY.. JOSABETH ATTY JOSABETH B. ALONSO ALONSO and and SHALIMAR SHALIMAR P. LAZATIN LAZATIN v. ATTY. ATTY. IBARO IBARO B. RELAM RELAMIDA, IDA, JR. A.C. No. No. 8481, 3 August August 2010, EN 2010, EN BANC BANC (Peralta, (Peralta, J J .) .) Jennifer Ebanen filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Servier Philippines in the NLRC. The labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Servier, stating that Ebanen voluntarily resigned. Ebanen appealed to the NLRC which only affirmed the appealed decision. Ebanen then filed for reconsideration but was denied. The case eventually reached the Supreme Court. The Court’s Resolution has already become final and executory; thus, a corresponding Entry of Judgment has been issued dismissing the petition and holding that there was no illegal dismissal. However, despite the judgment, Ebanen through Atty. Relamida, Jr. filed a second complaint for illegal dismissal dismissal based on the same cause of action of constructive constructive dismissal against Servier. Thus, Servier, thru counsel, filed a letter-complaint addressed to the then Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr., praying that respondents be disciplinary sanctioned for violation of the rules on forum shopping and res judicata. Respondents admitted the filing of the second complaint against Servier. However, they opined that the dismissall did not amount to res judicata dismissa judicata,, since the decisio decision n was null and void for lack of due process since the motion for the issuance of subpoena duces tecum for the production of vital documents filed by the complainant was ignored by the Labor Arbiter.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is guilty of forum shopping and res judicata thus violating Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

HEL ELD: D: A law lawye yerr owe owess fid fidel elit ityy to to the the ca caus use e of of his his cl clie ient nt,, but but no nott at at the the ex expe pens nse e of of tru truth th and the administration of justice. During the IBP hearing, it was manifested that Ebanen is not a lawyer but the daughter of Atty. Aurelio the senior partner in a law firm where Atty. Relami Relamida da is employe employed d as associa associate te lawyer. The latter then reasoned out that as a courtesy to Atty. Aurelio and Ebanen, he had no choice but to represent the latter. Moreover, he stressed that his client was denied of her right to due process due to the denial of her motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum. He then argued that the decision of the Labor Arbiter was null null and void; void; thus, there there was no res judicata. He maintained maintained that that he did not violate violate the lawyer’s lawyer’s oath oath by serving the interest of his client. The IBP-CBD recommended that Atty. Relamida, Jr. be suspended for 6 months for violating the rules on forum shopping and res judicata. The Supreme Court agrees to this finding. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client, but not at the expense of truth and the administration of justice. The filing of multiple petitions constitutes abuse of the court’s processes and improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade the adminis administration tration of justice and will be punished as contempt of court. Needless to state, the lawyer who files such multiple or repetitious petitions (which obviously delays the execution of a final and executory judgment) subjects himself to disciplinary action for incompetence (for not knowing any better) or for willful violation of his duties as an attorney to act with all good fidelity to the courts, and to maintai maintain n only such actions as appear to him to be just and are consistent with truth and honor.


The filing of another action concerning the same subject matter, in violation of the doctrine of res judicata, runs contrary to Canon 12 of the Code of Professi judicata, Professional onal Responsibility, Responsibility, which requires a lawyer to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. By his actuations, respondent also violated Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04 of the Code, as well as a lawyer’s mandate "to delay no man for money or malice."

CARLOS REYES v. ATTY. JEREMIAS R.VITAN A.C. No. No. 5835, 5835, 18 August August 2010, EN BANC (Nachura, J .) .) Four (4) administrative cases were filed against Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan, in each of which he was found guilty guilty and meted the penalty of suspension suspension from the practice of law. All the four cases against him involved grave issues of dishonesty and deceit. Recidivism or habitual delinquency was patent. The 4 offenses deserved disbarment as a final penalty. Yet, the Court contented itself with mere suspensions. In the first case, A.C. No. 6441, (Violeta R. Tahaw v. Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan), promulgated on October 21, 2004, Atty. Vitan was suspended for six (6)months, effective immediately upon receipt of the Decision. He was further ordered to return the amount of P30,000 to complainant for legal services he did not render. The records disclose that respondent received the Decision on November 12, 2004 and the period of suspension would have ended on May 12, 2005. In A.C. No. 5835, (Carlos B. Reyes v. Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan), promulgated on April 15, 2005, Atty. Vitan was suspended for six (6) months; and ordered to pay complainant complainant P17,000.00 with interest of 12% per annum from the date of the promulgation of the Decision until the full amount shall have been returned. Per records, the Court’s decision was received by him on May 13, 2005, and his suspension would have ended on November 13, 2005. In A.C. No. 6955 (Mar Yuson v. Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan), promulgated on July 27, 2006, respondent was found liable for his failure to pay a just debt in the amount of P100,000. P100,000.00. 00. Upon investi investigation, gation, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) imposed the penalty of Suspension for two (2) years. This was modified by the Court after finding that there was partial payment of the loan, and the penalty was reduced to six (6) months suspension with warning, effective upon receipt of the Decision. In a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension, respondent moved for the reconsideration of the decision, asserting that there was full payment of the loan. The motion was denied in the Resolution dated March 6, 2007. In the decisio decision n in the fourth case, A.C. No. 6051, (Celia Arroyo-Pesidio v. Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan), promulgated on April 2, 2007, respondent was found to have failed to render the legal services sought after he had received the amount of P100,000, and was once again, suspended for one (1) year, with stern warning. warnin g. The Decisio Decision n was received received on on April 18, 18, 2007, so the suspension suspension period should should have have lapsed on on April 18, 2008. In a Re Repor portt dat dated ed Feb Febru ruary ary 23, 201 2010, 0, the OBC no noted ted tha thatt res respon ponden dentt ha hass bee been n rep repea eated tedly ly suspended from the practice of law, for an aggregate period of 30 months or 2 ½ years. Accordingly, respondent should have served the orders of suspension successively pursuant to the Court’s resolution in A.M. No. RTJ-04RTJ-04-1857, 1857, entitled “Gabriel de la Paz v. Judge Santos B. Adion Adiong,” g,” where the Court clearly stated that “in case of two or more suspensions, the same shall be served successively by the erring respondent.” It is, therefore, incumbent upon respondent to show to the Court that he has desisted from the practice of law for a period of at least 2 ½ years.

ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension can be lifted HELD: The Court, in the recent case of Ligaya Maniago v. Atty. Lourdes I. De Dios, issued the guidelines on the lifting of orders of suspension, and has advised strict observance thereof. However, the Court will not


hesitate to withhold the privilege of the practice of law if it is shown that respondent, as an officer of the Court, is still not worthy of the trust and confidence of his clients and of the public. Thus, apply Thus, applying ing the gui guidelin delines es in Man Maniag iago, o, the Cou Court rt Res Resolv olved ed to GRA GRANT NT Res Respon pondent dent’s ’s Peti Petitio tion n for Reinstatement, effective upon his submission to the Court of a Sworn Statement attesting to the fact: 1) that he has completely served the four (4) suspensions imposed on him successively; 2) that he had desisted from the practice of law, and has not appeared as counsel in any court during the periods of suspension, as follows: (a) Six (6) months suspension in A.C. No. 5835 from May 13, 2005 to November 13, 2005; (b) One (1) year suspension in A.C. No. 6051 from April 18, 2007 to April 18, 2008; (c) Six (6) months suspension in A.C. No. 6441 from November 12, 2004 to May 12, 2005; and (d) Six (6) months suspension in A.C. No. 6955 from date of receipt of the Resolution dated March 6, 2007 denying the Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated July 27, 2006. 3) that he has returned the sums of money to the complainants as ordered by the Court in the following cases, attaching proofs thereof: (a) In A.C. No. 5835 – the sum of P17,000 with interest of 12% per annum from the date of promulg promulgation ation of the Decision Decision until the full amount amount shall have been returned; returned; and (b) In A.C. No. 6441 – the amount of P30,000. Atty. Jeremia Jeremiass R. Vitan is further directed to FURNIS FURNISH H copies of the Sworn Statemen Statementt to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and Executive Judge(s), as mandated in Maniago.

LUZVIMINDA R. LUSTESTICA vs. ATTY. SERGIO E. BERNABE A.C. No. No. 6258, 24 August August 2010, 2010, EN BANC BANC (Per (Per Curiam) Atty Bernabe applied for conside consideration ration of the disbarmen disbarmentt complain complaintt filed by Luzvim Luzviminda inda R. Lustestica (complainant (complainant ) against Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe (respondent ( respondent ) for notarizing a falsified or forged Deed of Donation of real property despite the non-appearance of the donors, Benvenuto H. Lustestica (complainant's father) and his first wife, Cornelia P. Rivero, both of whom were already dead at the time of execution of the said document. Atty Bernabe admitted the fact of death of Benvenu Benvenuto to H. Lustes Lustestica tica and Cornelia P. Rivero, considering their death certificates attached considering attached to the complaint. The respondent respondent claimed, however, that he had no knowledge that the real Benvenuto H. Lustestica and Cornelia P. Rivero were already dead at the time he notarized the Deed of Donation. Donation. 2 cralaw cralaw He He also claimed that he exerted efforts to ascertain the identities of the persons who appeared before him and represented themselves as the donors under the Deed of Donation.

ISSUE: Whether or not Respon Respondent dent committe committed d a falsehoo falsehood d in violatio violation n of his oath as a lawyer and his duties as Notary Public

HELD: We cannot overemphasize overemphasize the importan importantt role a notary public performs. In Gonzales v. Ramos, we stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act but one invested with substantive public interest. The notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document, making it admissible in evidence without without further proof of its authenti authenticity. city. A notarize notarized d document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. It is for this reason that a notary public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of his duties; otherwise, the public’s confidence in the integrity of a notarized document would be undermined.

P a g e | 10 Legal Ethics Case Digest Judge Philip Aguinaldo 3AA, A.Y. 2011-2012

The records undeniably show the gross neglig negligence ence exhibited by the respondent in discharging his duties as a notary public. He failed to ascertain the identities of the affiants before him and failed to comply with the most basic function function that a notary public must do, i.e., to require the parties’ presentation presentation of their residencee certificates or any other document to prove their identitie residenc identities. s. Given the responden respondent’s t’s admission in his pleading that the donors were already dead when he notarized the Deed of Donation, we have no doubt that he failed in his duty to ascertain the identities of the persons who appeared before him as donors in the Deed of Donation. Under the circumstances, we find that the respondent should be made liable not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer. He not only violated the Notarial Law (Public Act No. 2103), but also Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 (Old Notarial Law) states: (a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place where the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and that he is the same person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be made under his official seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.

JUAN PABLO P. BONDOC v. JUDGE DIVINA LUZ P. AQUINO-SIMBULAN A.M. No. No. RTJ-09-22 RTJ-09-2204, 04, 26 26 October October 2009 2009 Former representative of Pampanga Juan Pablo P. Bondoc (Bondoc) charged Judge Divina Luz P. Aquino-Simbul Aquino -Simbulan an (Simbu (Simbulan) lan) with partiality, gross ignoran ignorance ce of the law, and gross miscon misconduct duct in the handling of the criminal cases for violation of R.A. 3019 and falsification of public documents against Spouses Salvador and Flordeliz Totaan (accused). Bondoc alleged that Judge Simbulan, after having issued an order suspending the accused pende pendent nt lite, asked the lawyers of the parties “to approach the bench and suggested that the cases be settled because lite, she did not want the accused to be administratively suspended”. That at the continuation of the pre-trial, Judge Simbulan asked asked the accuse accused d to choose a date and promised to accommodate accommodate the accused in order to effect a speedy trial in view of their suspension. suspension. Bondoc also alleged that on the same day, Judge Simbulan directed Atty. Lanee Cui-David (Lanee) to be prepared for the hearing of the cases since accused had been suspended upon motion of Private Prosecutor Stephen David (Stephen), Atty. Lanee’s husband and cocounsel for Bondoc in the criminal cases. It was also averred that Judge Simbulan never carried out the suspens sus pension ion order agai against nst the accu accused sed and that desp despite ite Atty Atty.. Lan Lanee’s ee’s explanatio explanation n that Atty. Militante Militante (Ombudsman Investigator) refused to testify on the ground that the substance of her testimony is covered by official documents, documents, Judge Simbulan issued issued an order requirin requiring g Atty. Militante to explain why she should not be cited in contempt for failure to follow lawful orders of the court. In the supplemental complaint, Bondoc charged Judge Simbulan with conduct unbecoming of a judge for her denial of private prosecutor’s motion foe her inhibition. Judge Simbulan, in her Comment, stated that she did not fast track the resolution of the case but it was her habit to act fast on all all cases before her. her. She also denied denied the charge of partiality partiality for her failure failure to act on the suspension claiming that it was private prosecutor’s duty to file a motion to cite responsible heads of government agencies for indirect contempt for their failure to implement the lawful orders of the court. Judge Simbulan also explained that her persistence in requiring Atty. Militante’s appearance was due to the misunderstanding between Atty. Militante and the private prosecutors, therefore, she wants to find out the truth. In Bondoc’s Opposition to the Comment, it was stated that Judge Simbulan refused to answer the serious charges of partiality, abuse of authori serious authority ty and condu conduct ct unbecoming of a judge. In Judge’s Simbulan’s rejoinder, she requested that Bondoc be made to show cause why he should not be cited in contempt of


court, and Attys. Stephen and Lanee to show cause why they should not be administratively sanctioned as members of the bar and officers of the court. The com complai plaint nt agai against nst Judg Judgee Simb Simbula ulan n was dism dismiss issed, ed, hen hence, ce, OCA reco recomme mmende nded d that Attys Attys.. Stephen and Lanee be cited for indirect contempt since the complaint against Judge Simbulan could not have been filed without the active prodding and instigation of the lawyers and that private prosecutors were the primary sources of the allegations contained therein which Bondoc did not personally witness.

HEL ELD: D:

Lawy La wyer erss hav have e the the du duty ty no nott to to pro promo mote te di dist stru rust st in the the ad admi mini nist stra rati tion on of jus justi tice ce..

Attys. Stephen and Lanee David David crossed the line of accepted and protected conduct conduct as members of the bar and as officer officerss of the court in the filing of the administrative administrative complaint against against the respondent. As the OCA noted, while the complaint was filed in the name of former Representative Juan Pablo P. Bondoc, he never really appeared in court and could not have woven the tale of unfair treatment in the complaint which spoke of intricate intricate courtroom proceedings. proceedings. The complainan complainantt thus relied primarily on the information relayed to him by his lawyers for the particulars of the complaint. More to the point, the two lawyers can reasonably be considered to have authored the allegations in their client’s complaint. Nothing is inherently wrong with the complainant’s dependence on Attys. Stephen and Lanee David for the substance of the complai complaint. nt. Nonetheless, Nonetheless, as officer officerss of the court, counsels are expected to be as truthful and as objectiv objectivee as possible in providing information information to their client regarding developments developments in the courtroom. Needless to say, they owe candor, fairness and good faith to the court. In these regards, Attys. Stephen and Lanee David proved to be wanting. From the pre-trial records quoted below, we find suffici sufficient ent justification for the conclu conclusion sion that the information Attys. Stephen and Lanee David supplied their client was patently misleading and slanted “to cover up their gross shortcomings as lawyers,” as the respondent aptly put it. On four occasions, private prosecutors never appeared before the court prepared. No proof was presented to corroborate the charge that the respondent sought to have the criminal cases settled; neither was there a showing that the respondent fast tracked the cases to favor the accused. The defense of Attys. Stephen and Lanee David that what they did “is just a consequence of their commitment to their client” can hardly exculpate them. A client’s cause does not permit an attorney to cross the line between between liberty liberty and lice license nse.. Law Lawyers yers must must alwa always ys keep in pers perspect pective ive that since since they are administrators of justice, oath-bound servants of society, their first duty is not to their clients, as many suppose, but to the administration of justice. As a lawyer, he is an officer of the court with the duty to uphold its dignity and authority and not promote distrust in the administration of justice.

ALFREDO ALFR EDO B. ROA, ROA, vs. ATTY. JUAN R. MORENO MORENO A.C. No. No. 8382, 21 21 April 2010, 2010, EN EN BANC BANC (Carpio, (Carpio, J J .) .) Atty. Juan R. R. Moreno Moreno sold to Roa Roa a parcel of land land to Alfredo B. Roa and paid Atty. Moreno Moreno P70,000 in cash as full payment for the lot. Atty. Moreno did not issue a deed of sale instead he issued a temporary receipt and a Certifica Certificate te of Land Occupancy. Occupancy. Atty. Moreno assured Roa that he could use the lot from then on. Roa learned that the Certificate of Land Occupancy could not be registered in the Register of Deeds. When Roa went to see Atty. Moreno, the latter admitted that the real owner of the lot was a certain Rubio. Rubio. He also said there was a pending legal controversy over the lot. Thereafter, Roa sent a letter to Atty. Moreno demanding the return of the P70,000 paid for the lot. Roa then filed a criminal case against Atty. Moreno. MTC rendered a decision convicting Atty. Moreno of the crime of other forms of swindling under Article 316, paragraph paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. On appe appeal, al, the RTC, for lack of evi eviden dence ce esta establis blishin hing g Atty. Moreno’s Moreno’s guilt beyo beyond nd reas reasona onable ble dou doubt, bt, acquitted Atty. Moreno.


Roa filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) an Affidavit-Complaint against Atty. Moreno. The IBP found Atty. Moreno guilty of violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended to suspend Atty. Moreno from the practice of law for three months and ordered him to return the amount of P70,000. The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the present case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Moreno should be disciplined and ordered to return the amount of money paid for the sale

HELD: Atty. Moreno’s refusal to return to Roa the money paid for the lot is unbecoming a member of the bar and an officer of the court. By his conduct, Atty. Moreno faile fai led d to liv live e up to th the e st stric rictt sta stand ndar ard d of pr prof ofess ession ionali alism sm re requ quire ired d by th the e Co Code de of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Moreno Moreno’s ’s credibili credibility ty is highly questio questionable. nable. Records show that he even issued a bogus Certificate of Land Occupancy to Roa whose only fault was that he did not know better. The Certificate of Land Occupancy has all the badges of intent to defraud. It purports to be issued by the "Office of the General Overseer." Oversee r." It contai contains ns a verific verification ation by the "Lead, Record Department" Department" that the lot plan "conforms with the record on file." It is even printed on parchment paper strikingly similar to a certificate of title. To the unlettered, unlettere d, it can easily pass off as a document evidencing evidencing title. True enough, Roa actually tried, but failed, to register the Certificate of Land Occupancy in the Register of Deeds. Roa readily parted with P70,000 becausee of the false assurance becaus assurance afforded by the sham sham certificate. certificate. The innocent public who deal in good faith with the likes of Atty. Moreno are not without recourse in law. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states "A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, xxx ." ." Further, Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct." Conduct, as used in the Rule, is not confined to the performance of a lawyer’s professional duties. A lawyer may be discipli disciplined ned for misconduct committed committed either in his professional professional or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. In the present case, Atty. Moreno acted in his private capacity. He misrepresented that he owned the lot he sold to Roa. He refused to return the amount paid by Roa. As a final blow, he denied having any transaction with Roa. It is crystal-clear in the mind of the Court that he fell short of his duty under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The practice of law is not a right but a privilege. It is enjoyed only by those who continue to display unassailable character. Thus, lawyers must conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times, not just in their dealings with their clients but also in their dealings with the public at large, and a violation of the high morall stan mora standards dards of the lega legall prof professi ession on jus justifi tifies es the impo impositi sition on of the appro appropria priate te pena penalty, lty, inc includi luding ng suspension and even disbarment. Atty. Moreno’s refusal refusal to return to Roa the money paid for the lot is unbecoming unbecoming a member of the bar and an officer of the court. By his conduc conduct, t, Atty. Moren Moreno o failed to live up to the strict standard of professionalism required by the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Moreno’s acts violated the trust and respect Roa reposed in him as a member of the Bar and an officer of the court. However, the penalty of three-month suspension recommended by the IBP is insufficient to atone for Atty. Moreno’s misconduct in this case. Supreme Court did not sustain the IBP’s recommendation ordering Atty. Moreno to return the money paid by Roa. In discipli disciplinary nary proceedings proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. The court's only concern is the determination of Atty. Moreno’s administrative liability.


MANUEL C. YUHICO v. ATTY. FRED L. GUTIERREZ A.C. No. No. 8391, 23 November November 2010, 2010, EN EN BANC BANC (Per (Per Curiam) Atty. Fred Gutierr Gutierrez ez asked for a cash loan of P30,000.0 P30,000.00 0 from Manue Manuell Yuhico Yuhico.. Gutier Gutierrez rez then claimed that he needed money to pay for the medical expenses of his mother who was seriously ill. Yuhico immediately handed the money. In turn, Gutierrez promised to pay the loan very soon, since he was expecting to collect his attorney's fees from a Japanese client. Gutierrez again asked Yuhico for a loan, in the amount of P60,000.00, allegedly to pay the medical Gutierrez expenses of his wife who was also hospitalized. Again, Yuhico readily issued to Gutierrez a check amounting to P60,000.00. Again, Gutierrez Gutierrez promised to pay his two loans totalling t otalling to P90,000.00 "within a short time." Yuhico asked Gutierrez Gutierrez to pay his loans. Gutierrez failed failed to pay and in a text messag messagee he asked for an extension of time to pay. Later, thru a text message, Gutierrez Gutierrez attempted to borrow money from Yuhico again. Gutierrez claimed that his daughter needed P70,000.00 to pay the fees required to take the licensure examination in the U.S. Medical Board. Gutierrez assured him that he will pay all his debts within a month. However, this time, Yuhico refused to lend Gutierrez any amount of money. Instead, he demanded from Gutierrez the payment of his debts. Gutierrez then sent another text message to Yuhico and requested him to give him another week to pay his debts. Gutierrez failed to make the payment. Yuhico's counsel sent a demand letter to Gutierrez to pay his debts, but to no avail. Thus, Yuhico filed the instant complaint against Gutierrez before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD). On January 12, 2006, the IBP-CBD directed Gutierrez to submit his Answer on the complaint against him. In a Resolution, IBP-CBD found Gutierrez guilty of non-payment of just debts and ordered him to return the amount of P90,000.00 to Yuhico, with interest until full payment.

ISSUE: Whether or not Gutierr Gutierrez ez guilty of non-pa non-payment yment of just debts and likewis likewisee guilty of gross misconduct

HEL ELD D: Lawy La wyer erss must must,, at all all tim times es,, fait faith hfu full llyy perf perfor orm m thei theirr dut dutie iess to soci societ ety, y, to to the the bar, the the courts courts and to their their clients, clients, which which include promp promptt payment payment of financial financial obligatio obligations ns Deliberate failure to pay just debts constitutes gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice and and vanguards vanguards of our legal system. system. They are are expected to maintain maintain not not only legal proficienc proficiency, y, but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the people’s faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. They must, at all times, faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and to their clients, which include prompt payment of financial obligations. They must conduct themselves in a manner that reflects the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. In the instant case, there is no question as to Gutierrez's guilt. His admission of the loan he contracted and his failure to pay the same leaves no room for interpretation. Neither can he justify his act of non-payment non-pa yment of debt by his dire financial condition. condition. Gutierrez should not have contracte contracted d loans which are beyond his financial financial capacity capacity to pay. Like Li kewi wise se,, it ca can nno nott be ove verl rlo ooke ked d Gu Guti tier erre rez' z'ss pr pro ope pens nsit ity y of em empl plo oyi ying ng de deccei eitt an and d misrepresentations for the purpose of obtaining debts without the intention of paying them. Records show Gutierrez's Gutierr ez's pattern of habitua habitually lly making promises of paying his debts, yet repeatedl repeatedly y failing to deliver. The series of text messages he sent to Yuhico promising to pay his loans, while simultaneously giving excuses withoutt actually making good of his promises withou promises,, is clearly reprehensible. reprehensible. Undoubtedly, his acts demonstrate


lack of moral character to satisfy the responsibilities and duties imposed on lawyers as professionals and as officers of the court. Supreme Court also noted that in Huyss Huyssen en v. Atty. Gutie Gutierrez, rrez, the Court had already disbarred Gutierrez from the practice of law for gross misconduct due to non-payment of just debts and issuance of bouncing bounci ng checks. In view of the foregoin foregoing, g, while the court agrees with the finding findingss of the IBP, it cannot, however, adopt its recommendation to disbar Gutierrez for the second time, considering that Gutierrez had already been previously disbarred. Indeed, as the IBP pointed out, the court does not have double or multiple disbarments in its laws or jurisprudence. Neither do it have a law mandating a minimum 5-year requirement requirem ent for readmis readmission, sion, as cited by the IBP. Thus, while Gutierrez's infraction infraction calls for the penalty of disbarment, court cannot disbar him anew.

OFELIA R. SOMOSOT v. ATTY. GERADO F. LARA A.C. No. No. 7024, 30 January January 2009, SECOND DIVISION (Brion, (Brion, J J .) .) In support of her complaint for disbarment, the complainant alleged that she retained the service servicess of the respondent as her counsel in a collection case filed by Golden Collection Marketing Corporation against her and other co-defendants. Her defense was that it was the corporation who actually owed her P800,000.00. She claimed that she had the evidence to prove this defense at the trial. The respondent agreed to handle the case and duly entered his appearance as counsel after securing his acceptance fee. She alleged, however, that after filing the Answer to the Complaint, the respondent failed to fully inform her of further developments in the case. She only heard about the case when there was already a decision decisio n against her and her co-defendants. co-defendants. She even belatedly learned that the respondent had sought his dischargee as counse discharg counsell without her knowl knowledge edge and consent. Contrary to the respondent's respondent's claim that he could no longer locate her, she claimed that the respondent knew all along where she lived and could have easily contacted her had he been in good faith. Executi Execution on of the court's decision followed, resulting resulting in the sale of her house and lot at public auction despite her efforts to reverse the judgment with the help of another lawyer. Thereafter, a third party to whom her property had been mortgaged sued her. She found the respondent's excuse - that he could not contact her because she had changed her office address - to be unsatisfactory. She accused the respondent of miserably failing to comply with his oath as a lawyer and to discharge his duty of ably representing her. Respon Res pondent dent denied denied that he fail failed ed to exer exercis cisee the diligence diligence required required of him as cou counse nsel. l. The respondent contended that he had good reasons not to continue as the complainant's counsel. He reasoned out that under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer may withdraw from a case upon a good cause such as when the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the lawyer's services, or fails to comply with the terms terms of the retainer retainer agreement, agreement, or when the lawyer is elected elected or appointed appointed to public public office. Two Two of these possible causes applied to his situation; he was appointed legal consultant at the BOI requiring fulltime work and the complainant had failed to pay his legal fees to him amounting to P27,000.00. He filed the formal notice of withdrawal without the conformity of the complainant because he could not locate her. respondentt failed to serve his client client diligently diligently ISSUE: Whether or not responden

HELD: We find that the responden respondentt deserves to be sanctio sanctioned ned for having fallen short of the standards required of him as defense counsel. He violated the basic rule, expressed under Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, that "a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence." While it may be said that the respondent did not completely abandon the case, his handling of the complainant's defense left much to be desired. The complainant was never informed the development of the case and the omission eventually led to the grant of the plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings, which in turn led to the decision against the defendants. The respondent failed to precisely allege in his submissions how he tried to contact the


defendant on or about the time the interrogatories and request for admission were pending. It appears that he really had not; by his own admission, his attempt to contact the complainant came in December 2001 and only to inform her of his government appointment and to collect his billings. It was only after the discovery discove ry of the closure of the defendant's office office did the respondent try to contact the complainant complainant and her husband by cellular phone, but they could not be reached. Assuming Assumi ng the non-payment non-payment to be true, such failure should should not be a reason not to inform the client of an important development, or worse, to withhold vital information from her. The respondent failed to provide details on the developments that led to the adverse rulings on the interrogatories/admissions and the judgment on the pleadings. On the matter of the respondent's withdrawal from the case, the respondent might have had valid reasons to withdraw and terminate his relationship with his client. As the respondent now states, he could withdraw under under paragraphs (e) and (f) of the Code of Professional Professional Responsibility Responsibility - i.e., deliberate failure failure of the client to pay the fees for the services, or failure to comply with the retainer agreement, agreement, or appointment or election to public office. However, he does not appear to have cited these reasons before the trial court. Instead, he merely filed a Notic Noticee of Withd Withdrawal rawal of Appea Appearance rance,, citing his client's unknown location and failure to communicate as reasons for his client's lack of express consent to his withdrawal. It is undisputed that the trial court denied the respondent's notice of withdrawal; thus, he remained as counsel of record burdened with all the responsibili responsibilities ties that his representatio representation n carried. carried. What lightens the t he impact of the responden respondent's t's mishandli mishandling ng of the case is the complain complainant's ant's own failings as a client. The non-payment of fees is a factor that we cannot simply disregard. As a rule, law practi pra ctice ce is no nott a pro bo bono no pro propos positi ition on an and d a law lawyer yer's 's sen sensi sitiv tivity ity an and d co conc ncern ern for un unpai paid d fee feess ar aree understandable; lawyers incur expenses in running their practice and generally depend, too, on their law practice income for their living expenses. Likewise, the respondent's appointment as a consultant should be considered although it is a matter that none of the parties have fully examined. Both the non-payment of fees and the appoint to a public office, however, however, were not reasons properly presented presented before the trial court through a motion that informed the court of all the surrounding circumstances of the desired withdrawal. Instead, another reason was given by way of a mere notice lacking the client's express consent. Thus, the court's denial of the desired withdrawal was not totally unexpected. However,, we cannot also disb However disbar ar the responden respondentt as the complaina complainant nt dema demands nds in ligh lightt of the complainant's own contributory faults. Disbarment is an ultimate remedy in the professional world, no less serious and weighty as the power to impose reclusion perpetua in criminal cases; in both, recovery from the penalty - although not totally impossible - is extremely difficult to attain. Thus, we must at all times act with caution and due consideration, consideration, taking into accou account nt not only the interests of the immedia immediate te parties, but the interest of the public, the bar and the administration of justice as well.

WILSON WILSO N CHAM CHAM v. ATTY. ATTY. EVA EVA PAITA-M PAITA-MOYA OYA A.C. No. No. 7494, 27 June 2008, THIRD THIRD DIVISION DIVISION (Chico(Chico-Nazario Nazario,, J .) .) A disbarment complaint was filed by Wilson Cham against respondent respondent Atty. Eva Paita-Moya, who he alleged committed deceit in occupying a leased apartment unit and, thereafter, vacating the same without payin pay ing g the ren rental talss du due. e. Re Respo sponde ndent nt en enter tered ed in into to a Con Contra tract ct of Le Leas asee wi with th Gre Green envi ville lle Rea Realty lty an and d Development Corp. (GRDC), represented by complainant as its President and General Manager, involving a residential apartment unit owned by GRDC located at No. 61-C Kalayaan Avenue, Quezon City, for a consideration of P8,000.00 per month for a term of one year. Upon the expiration of said lease contract, respondent informed the complainant that she would no longer renew the same but requested an extension of her stay at the apartment unit until 30 June 2000 with a commitment that she would be paying the monthly rental during the extension period. Complainant approved such request but increased the rental rate to P8,650.00 per month. Respondent stayed in said premises for several months without paying any rent and even failing to pay her electric bills. A report reached complainant's complainant's office that responde respondent nt had secretly vacated the apartment unit, bringin bringing g along with


her the door keys. Also, respondent did not heed complainant's repeated written demands for payment of her obligations despite due receipt of the same, compelling complainant to file the present Complaint. Respondent alleged that she had religiously paid her monthly rentals and had not vacated the apartment unit surreptitiously. She also averred that she transferred to another place because she was given notice by the complainant to vacate the premises to give way for the repair and renovation of the same, but which never happened happened until presently. Respondent actually actually wanted to t o ask that complainant to account for her deposit for the apartment unit, but she could not do so since she did not know complainant's address or contact number. For the same reason, she could not turn over to the complainant the door keys to the vacated apartment unit.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent has violated the Code of Professional Responsibility HEL ELD D:

Lawy La wyer erss mus ustt pr prom ompt ptly ly pa payy th thei eirr fi fina nanc ncia iall ob obli lig gat atio ions ns..

A review of the records would reveal that respondent respondent is, indeed, guilty of willful failure to pay just debt. Complainant is able to fully substantiate that respondent has existing obligations that she failed to settle. Respondent did not expressly deny receipt of letters of demand in her Answer to the Complaint. Having failed to rebut the foregoing allegations, she must be deemed to have admitted them. A receipt is a written and signed acknowle acknowledgment dgment that money money or goods have been delivered. delivered. In the instant case, the respondent failed to discharge the burden of proving payment, for she was unable to produce receipts or any other proof of payment. It is thus evident to this Court that respondent willfully failed to pay her just debts. It is thus evident to this Court that respondent willfully failed to pay her just debts. Having incurred just debts, respondent had the moral duty and legal responsibility to settle them when they they became due. Responden Respondentt should should have complied complied with with just contractual contractual obligation obligations, s, and acted fairly and adhered to high ethical standards to preserve the court's integrity, since she is an employee thereof. Indeed, when respondent backtracked on her duty to pay her debts, such act already constituted a ground for administrative sanction. Respondent left the apartment unit without settling her unpaid obligations, and without without the complainant's complainant's knowledge knowledge and consent. consent. Respondent's Respondent's abandonment of the leased premises to avoid her obligations for the rent and electricity bills constitutes deceitful conduct violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Canon I and Rule 1.01 thereof, which explicitly state: "CANON 1- A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes. "Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to their clients. As part of those duties, they must promptly pay their financial obligations. Their conduct must always reflect the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend lawyers for any professional or private misconduct showing them to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor -- or to be unworthy to continue as officers of the Court.

HEIRS OF BOBADILLA v. JAIME CASTILLO G.R. No. 165771, 29 June 2007, SECOND DIVISION (CARPIO MORALES, J .) .) For over 20 years, Antonio Bobadilla, Maria Del Mundo and Ernesto, Danilo, Policarpio, have been leasing portions of a 348 square meter parcel of land located at Gen. Luna Street in Caloocan City on a verbal agreement agreement from owner Virginia Rayo. After August 1991, Rayo offered t o sell the land to Bobadilla. Rayo gave Bobadilla Bobadilla two months to decide whether whether to purchase the land. Having heard heard nothing from Bobadilla after two months, Rayo sold the parcel of land to Jaime Castillo.


Castillo required Bobadilla, Bobadilla, Del Mundo and the Serranos to vacate the land after failing to heed his previous demands to pay a monthly rental of P10 per square meter. Bobadilla instituted a complaint at the previous Caloocan City Regional Trial Court (RTC) to annul the sale between Rayo and Castillo based on fraud and bad faith. Bobadilla asserted the right of first refusal of their predeces predecessor-in sor-in-interes -interestt under Presiden Presidential tial Decree No. 1517, otherwise otherwise known known as the Urban Land Reform Act. As the decree is not self-executing, self-executing, Proclamation No. 1967 was issued identifying 244 specific sites in Metropolitan Manila as Areas for Priority Development (APD) and Urban Land Reform Zones (ULRZ).

HEL ELD: D: pleadings.

Lawy La wyer erss mus mustt exe exerc rcis ise e utm utmos ostt car care e and and co comp mple lete te ca cand ndor or in th the e pre prepa para rati tion on of

This Court observes the perfunctory manner by which Castillo complied with this Courts Resolution requiring him to comment on the petition. In his terse comment incorporated in his Compliance, he pithily averred aver red in one sweeping sweeping paragraph paragraph that the alle allegati gations ons contained contained in the petition petition are all reha rehash sh or reiterations of the issues and arguments already passed upon by the appellate court. With such lackadaisical outlook, Castillo blinded himself with what appeared to be gross misrepresentation foisted by Bobadilla, which would have have otherwise otherwise put him on guard. guard. At this juncture, it is apropos to firmly remind lawyers of their duties, as officers of the court, to exercise utmost care and complete candor in the preparation of pleadings and to lay before the court the pertinen perti nentt fact factss with meth methodi odical cal and meti meticul culous ous atten attention tion,, with withou outt any supp suppres ressio sion, n, obsc obscura uratio tion, n, misrepresentation or distortion thereof.

RE: LETTER OF PRESIDING JUSTICE CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, JR. ON CA-G.R.-SP NO. 103692 [ANTONIO ROSETE, ET AL. V. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, COMMISSION, ET AL.] A.M. No. No. 08-8-11-CA, 08-8-11-CA, 9 Septe September mber 2008, EN BANC ( PER CURIAM )

LETTER OF CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF IBP DUES B.M. 1370, 9 May 2005, EN 2005, EN BANC BANC (Chico-Nazario, (Chico-Nazario, J J .) .) Atty. Cecilio Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Arevalo, Jr. (Arevalo) (Arevalo) sought sought exemption exemption from payment payment of IBP dues dues as alleged alleged unpaid unpaid accountability for the years 1977-2005. He claims that after having been admitted to the bar on 1961 he worked for for the Civil Service Service Commissio Commission n from 1962 to 1986. Subsequen Subsequently, tly, he migrated migrated to the United United States and until his retirement in 2003. He maintains that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for the years that he was working workin g in the t he Philippine Civil Civil Service since the Civil Service law prohibits the practice of one's profession profession while in governmen governmentt service, service, and neither can he be assessed assessed for the years when he was workin working g in the USA. The IBP submitted its comment stating: that membership in the IBP is not based on the actual practice of law; that a lawyer continues to be included in the Roll of Attorneys as long as he continues to be a member of the IBP; that one of the obligations of a member is the payment of annual dues as determined by the IBP Board of Governo Governors rs and duly approved by the Supreme Court as provided for in Sections 9 and 10, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court; that the validity of imposing dues on the IBP members has been upheld as necessary to defray the cost of an Integrated Bar Program; and that the policy of the IBP Board of Governors of no exemption from payment of dues is but an implementation of the Court's directives for all members of the IBP to help in defraying the cost of integration of the bar. It maintained that there is no rule allowing the exemption of payment of annual dues as requested by respondent, that what is allowed is voluntary termination and reinstatement of membership. It asserted that what petitioner could have done was to inform the secretary of the IBP of his intention to stay abroad, so that his membership in the IBP could have been terminated, terminated, thus, his obligatio obligation n to pay dues could could have have been stopped.


In his repl reply, y, Atty. Arevalo Arevalo con contends tends that the Pol Policy icy of Non Non-E -Exemp xemptio tion n wou would ld indu indubita bitably bly be oppressive to him considering that he has been in an inactive status and is without income derived from his law practice. He adds that his removal from nonpayment of annual membership dues would constitute deprivation of property right without due process of law. ISSUE: Whether or not an an inactive inactive member member of the Bar may may be compelled compelled to pay his his IBP dues dues

HELD: Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, one of which is the payment of membership dues - failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such drastic move. An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distingu distinguished ished from bar asso associati ciation on org organi anized zed by indi individu vidual al lawy lawyers ers them themselv selves, es, mem members bership hip in whi which ch is volu voluntar ntary. y. Integration Integrati on of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportun opportunity ity to do his shares in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an Integrated Bar is an official national body of which which all lawyers lawyers are required to be members. members. They They are, therefore, therefore, subject subject to all the rules rules prescribed prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar. The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer population. This requires membership and financial support of every attorney as condition sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not to attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of his annual dues. Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional constitutional power and duty to promulg promulgate ate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and in the integration of the Philippine Bar - which power required members of a privileged privileg ed class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonab reasonable le fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is, indeed, imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the noble objectives and purposes of integration. The compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as one's membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the member is engaged in. IBP in its comment stated that the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of discussing the situation of members under inactive status and the nonpayment of their dues during such inactivity. In the meantime, Atty. Arevalo is duty bound bound to comply with with his obligatio obligation n to pay members membership hip dues dues to the the IBP. Atty. Arevalo also contends that the enforc enforcement ement of the penalty of remova removall would amount to a deprivati depri vation on of prop property erty without without due process and hen hence ce infr infring inges es on one of his con consti stituti tutiona onall righ rights. ts. Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of the penalty of removal would amount to a deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights. As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privileg privilegee burdened with conditions, one of which is the payment of membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such drastic move.

RODANTE D. MARCOLETA v. RESURRECCION Z. BORRA AND ROMEO A. BRAWNER A.C. No. No. 7732, 30 March March 2009, SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales Morales,, J .) .) Atty. Marcoleta filed a complai complaint nt for disbarmen disbarmentt against Comelec Commissioners Commissioners Atty. Borra and Atty. Brawner for violating Canons 1 (1.01, 1.02 and 1.03) and 3 (3.01, 3.02, 3.05 and 3.06) of the Code of Judicial Conduct CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW LAW OF AND AND LEGAL LEGAL PROCESSES. PROCESSES. Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.


Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man's cause. Cano Ca non n 3 - A JU JUDG DGE E SH SHOU OULD LD PE PERF RFOR ORM M OF OFFI FICI CIAL AL DU DUTI TIES ES HO HONE NEST STLY LY,, AN AND D WI WITH TH IMPARTIALITY AND DILIGENCE ADJUDICATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES Rule 3.01.— A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence. Rule 3.02.— In every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable law unswayed by partisan interests, public opinion or fear of criticism. Rule 3.05.– A judge shall dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. Rule 3.06.— While a judge may, to promote justice, justice, prevent waste of time or clear up some obscurity, property intervene intervene in the presentation of evidence during during the trial, it should always be borne in mind that undue interference may prevent the proper presentation of the cause or the ascertainment of truth. and Canons 4, 5, 6 and 17 of the Canons of Judicia Judiciall Ethics. Additionally, complainant complainant charges respondents respondents of violating Republic Act No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. During the 2007 National and Local Elections, the warring factions of complainant and Diogenes S. Osabel (Osabel) each filed a separate list of nominees for the party-list group Alagad. With Alagad winning a seat in the House of Representatives, the two protagonists contested the right to represent the party. By Omnibus Resolution of July 18, 2007, the dispute was resolved by the Comelec’s First Division in favor of Osabel. Commissioner Borra wrote the ponencia while Commissioner Brawner concurred. The dispute was elevated to the Comelec En Banc which, by Resolution of November 6, 2007, reversed the First Division Resolution and reinstated the certificate of nomination of complainant’s group. For failing to muster the required majority voting, however, the Comelec ordered the re-hearing of the controversy. Notwithstanding the conduct of a re-hearing, the necessary majority vote could not still be obtained. The Comelec’s First Division’s Omnibus Resolution was eventually affirmed. Respondent Brawner, in his Answer dated April 2, 2008, asserted in the main that “the remedy of complainant is not to file a complaint for disbarment, but to file an appeal before [the Supreme Court] via [p]etiti [p]e tition on for [c]e [c]ertio rtiorari rari,” ,” and that bein being g memb members ers of a con constitu stitution tional al body enjo enjoying ying presumptio presumption n of regularity regulari ty in the performance of their functions, he and co-res co-respondent pondent Borra “are supposed to be insulated from a disbarment complaint for being impeachable officers.” In his Comment, respondent Borra contended that the Code of Judicial Conduct and Canons of Judicial Ethics could be made to apply to him and his co-respondent, co-respondent, they not being members members of the judiciary; and that since they performe performed d quasi-judicial quasi-judicial functions as well as adminis administrative trative duties, they were bound by the Comelec’s own set of internal rules and procedure over and above a Code of Conduct that prescribed the norm no rmss an and d sta standa ndards rds of beh behav avio iorr to be ob obse serve rved d by the off offic icial ialss an and d em emplo ployee yeess of the Co Comel melec ec,, a constitutional body. Respondent Borra further contended that present complaint was premature as “the validity and legality of the resolutions are still subject to review;” and that the complaint was meant to “harass [him] and punish him for exercising his judgment on the case filed before him.” The Court took t ook notice that respondent Borra had retired from the Comelec on February 2, 2008 while respondent Brawner passed away on May 29, 2008. As regards respondent Brawner then, the present case was already moot.

ISSUE: Whether or not complaint for disbarment is the proper remedy and not appeal HELD: An impeachable off officer who is a member of the Bar cannot be disbarred without witho ut first being impeach impeached. ed. At the outset, the Court, guided by its pronou pronouncemen ncements ts in previous previous cases, has laid down the rule that an impeachable officer who is a member of the Bar cannot be disbarred without first being impeached. As an impeach impeachable able officer who is at the same time a member of the Bar, responde respondent nt Borra must first be


removed from offi removed office ce via the con constit stitutio utional nal route of impe impeach achmen mentt befo before re he may be held to answ answer er administratively for his supposed errant resolutions and actions. The Court thus found respondent Borra’s contention that the grounds-bases of the disbarment complaint, fastened on supposed errors of judgment or grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts, were proper for an appeal, hence, complainant’s remedy was judicial, not administrative. The Court stated that the New Code of Judicia Judiciall Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary Judiciary applied only to courts of law, of whi which ch the Comelec was not, hen hence, ce, sanctions sanctions pertainin pertaining g to vio violatio lations ns ther thereof eof were made exclusively applicable to judges and justices in the judiciary, not to quasi-judicial officers like the Comelec chairman and members, who have their own codes of conduct to steer them. Even if the Court were to gauge the assailed actions of respondent Borra under the Code of Professional Responsibility, no specific incidents and sufficient evidence can be gathered to show that respondent did engage in dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct in his capacity as a lawyer. It bears reiteration that the acts particularized in the complaint pertain to respondent Borra’s duties as a Comelec commissioner. As for the release release of retirement retirement benefits to respondent respondent Borra, there was nothing irregul irregular ar therewith, therewith, thee sa th same me be bein ing g in li line ne wi with th Memor Memorandu andum m Circu Circular lar No. 10 (series of 1995) of the Office of the Ombudsman reading: x x x a person retiring from the government service, whether optional or compulsory, needs only to present a certification from this Office whether or not he has a pending criminal or administrative case with it. In the event the certification presented states that the prospective retiree has a pending case, the responsibility of determining whether to release his retirement benefits, as well as the imposition of necessary safeguards to ensure restitution thereof in the event the retiree is found guilty, rests upon and shall be left to the sound discretion of the head of the department, office or agency concerned.

ERLINDA R. TAROG v. ATTY. ROMULO L. RICAFORT A.C. No. 8253 (Formerly (Formerly CBD Case No. 03-1067), 03-1067), 15 15 March 2011, 2011, EN EN BANC BANC (Per (Per Curiam) The Tarogs engaged the services of Atty. Ricafort as their attorney on accountregarding their bankforeclosed property located in the Bicol Region. Atty. Ricafort required the Tarogs to pay P7,000.00 as filing fee, which they gave to him. He explained the importan importance ce of depositi depositing ng P65,000.00 in court to coun counter ter the P60,000.00 deposited by Antonio Tee, the buyer of the foreclosed property. After some time, the Tarogs visited Atty. Ricafort to verify the status of the consig consignation. nation. Atty. Ricafort informed them that he had not deposited the amount (in check) in court, but in his own account. He promised to return the money, plus interest. Despite several inquiries about when the amount would be returned, however, the Tarogs received mere assurances from Atty. Ricafort that the money was in good hands. The Tarogs furthered delivered P15,000.00 to Atty. Ricafort for making a memorandum, but he did not file the memorandum. When it became apparent to the Tarogs that Atty. Ricafort would not make good his promise of returnin returning g the P65,000. P65,000.00, 00, plus interest, Arnulfo Arnulfo demanded by his letter dated December 3, 2002 that Atty. Ricafort return the P65,000.00 P65,000.00,, plus interest, and the P15,000.00 P15,000.00 paid for the filing of the memorandum. Yet, they did not receive any reply from Atty. Ricafort. In his defense, Atty. Ricafort denied that the P65,000.00 was intended to be deposited in court, insisting that the amount was payment for his legal services under a "package deal.” Findings of the IBP Commissioner: Atty. Commissioner: Atty. Romulo L. Ricafort be DISBARRED and be ordered to return the amount of P65,000 and P15,000 which he got from his client. Commissioner Reyes concluded that Atty. Ricafort violated Canon 15, and Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility by taking advantage of the vulnerability of his clients and by being dishonest in his dealings with them by refusing to return the amount of P65,000.00 to them.


The IBP Board of Governors adopted the Resolution resolving to return the matter to Commissioner Reyes for a clarification of whether or not there was evidence to support the claim that the P65,000.00 had been in payment of attorney's fees and other expenses expenses.. Commis Commissioner sioner Reyes issue issued d a second Report and Recommendation, in which he declared that Atty. Ricafort did not present any retainer agreement or receipt to prove that the amount of P65,000.00 had been part of his attorney's fees; that Atty. Ricafort had willfully ignored the demand of Arnulfo by not replying to the demand letter; that, instead, Atty. Ricafort had insisted that the househelp who had received the demand letter had not given it to him; and that in his (Commissioner Reyes) presence, Atty. Ricafort had also promised to the complainant that he would settle his liability, but Atty. Ricafort did not make good his promise despite several resettings to allow him to settle his obligation. The IBP Boa The Board rd of Go Gove vern rnor orss ado adopte pted d an and d app appro rove ved d the Rep Repor ortt and Re Reco comm mmen endat datio ion n of Commissioner Reyes and recommended the disbarment of Atty. Ricafort and the order for him to return the amounts of P65,000.00 and P15,000.00 to Erlinda. Atty. Ricafo Ricafort rt moved for reconsi reconsideration, deration, maintaining that a retainer agreement was immateri immaterial al because he had affirmed having receive because received d the P65,000.00 P65,000.00 and having having issued issued a receipt receipt for for the amount; amount; that he had not kept the receipt because "the practice of lawyers in most instances is that receipt is issued without without duplicate as it behooves upon the client to demand for a receipt” and considering that the Tarogs had produced a photocopy of the receipt he had issued for the P30,000.00 in connection with their appeal, it followed that a similar receipt for attorney's fees had been made at the time when the case had been about to be filed in the RTC. Acting on Atty. Ricafort's Ricafort's motion for reconsideration, reconsideration , the IBP Board of Governors downgraded the penalty from disbarment to indefinite suspension. Atty. Ricafort filed a second motion for reconsideration, assailing the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors for violating Section 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court requiring the decision of the IBP Board of Governors to be in writing and to clearly and distinctly state the facts and reasons on which the decision was based. Hence, the administrative case is now before the Court for resolution.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Ricafort may be disbarred based on the grounds mentioned HELD: SC affirmed the findings of the Commissioner Reyes, because they were supported by substantial evidence. However, SC imposed the penalty of disbarment instead of the recommended penalty of indefinite suspension considering that Atty. Ricafort committed a very serious offense that was aggravated by his having been previously administratively sanctioned for a similar offense on the occasion of which he was warned agains againstt committing committing a similar similar offense. offense. Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. Atty. Ricafort explained that he had no copies of the receipts for the P65,000.00 and P15,000. P15,000.00 00 issued to the Tarogs because "the practice of lawyers in most instances is that receipt is issued without duplicate as it behooves upon the client to demand for a receipt." But such explanation does not persuade the Court. Ethical and practical considerations made it both natural and imperative for him to issue receipts, even if not demanded, and to keep copies of the receipts for his own records. He was all too aware that he was accoun accountable table for the moneys entrusted to him by the clients, and that his only means of ensurin ensuring g accountability was by issuing by issuing and keeping receipts. Atty. Ricafort's Ricafort's acts and actuations actuations constituted constituted serious serious breach of of his fiduciary fiduciary duties as an attorney. attorney. Undoubtedly, Atty. Ricafort was required to hold in trust any money and property of his clients that came into his possession, and he needed to be always mindful of the trust and confidence his clients reposed in him.Thus, having obtained the funds from the Tarogs in the course of his professional employment, he had the obligation to deliver such funds to his clients ( a) when they became due, or (b ( b) upon demand.


Furthermore, Rule 16.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, imposes on an attorney the positive obligation to keep all funds of his client separate and apart from his own and from those of others kept by him, to wit: Rule 16.02 - A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by him . Atty. Ricafort's plain abuse of the confi confidence dence reposed in him by his clients rendered him liable for violation of Canon 16, particula particularly rly Rule 16.01, supra supra,, an and d Ca Cano non n 17 17,, al alll of th thee Cod Codee of Prof Profess ession ional al Responsibility Respon sibility.. Canon 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. His acts and actuations constituted a gross violation of general morality and of professional ethics that impaired public confidence in the legal profession and deserved punishment.

Conrado G. Fernandez vs. Atty. Maria Angelica P. De Ramos-Villalon A.C. No. No. 7084, Fernandez was the respondent in a Civil case in which Palacios sought to nullify the Deed of donation he purportedly executed in favor of Fernandez. Atty. Villalon was Palacios’ counsel at the early part of that case until she withdrew after her appointment as prosecutor of QC. In that civil case, Palacios alleged that he was the owner of a lot in Brgy. San Lorenzo, Makati City and he became aware that his lot was being eyed by a land-grabbing syndicate syndicate by pretending to be him and filing a Petition for Reconstitution of Lost Owner’s Duplicate Original Copy of his title. Palacios seek the help of Fernandez and they eventually succeeded. Palacios visited the Village administrator of the San Lorenzo Village Association and bumped into Mrs. Lirio who expressed her interest in Palacios’ property. She heard that it was being sold by Fernande Fernandez. z. Palacios was shocked and upon investigation he discovered that Fernandez had falsified a Deed of donation that he (Palacios) purportedly executed in favor of Fernandez. The deed was duly registered and the TCT in Palacios’ name was cancelled and a new TCT was issued in Fernandez’ name. Palacios then employed the services of Atty. Villalon to file a complaint for the declaration of nullity of the Deed of Donation. In his Answer, Fernandez claimed that the transfer of title in his name was proper on account of a Deed of Absolute Sale and it was Palacios who falsified the Deed of Donation to cheat the government in paying lower taxes (donor’s tax instead of capital gains tax) and in order to have a ground for the annulment of the new TCT issued in favor of him and to recover the property. Fernandez filed a complaint for DISBARMENT against Atty. Villalon for violation of Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice. Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or mispresent the contents of a paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved. Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. Rule 1. Rule 1.01, 01, Ru Rule le 7.0 7.03, 3, Ru Rule le 10. 10.01, 01, Ru Rule le 10. 10.02 02 an and d Ru Rule le 10. 10.03 03 if the Can Canon onss of Pr Prof ofess essio iona nall Responsibility in the ff. grounds:


1. suppressed and excluded in the Original and Amended Complaint her knowledge about the existence of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 12, 2005; 2. used the fake and spurious Deed of Donation to deceive the court into trying Civil Case No. 051071, the action for the annulment of TCT No. 220869, despite her knowledge of the existence of the Deed of Absolute Sale; 3. committed misrepresentations as follows: to verify whether the attached Deed of Absolute Sale was properly notarize notarized, d, the responde respondent nt Villalon persona personally lly inquire inquired d before the notarial section of the Regional Trial Court ( RTC ) of Quezon City thru a letter-request, whether a record of the deed existed in the said office; in the letter-request, the respondent misrepresented that there was already a pending case in the RTC of Makati before November 9, 2005; 4. refused to receive the complainant’s Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim so that she could file on behalf of her client an Amended Complaint without leave of court and without presenting the Deed of Absolute Sale; 5. induced her witness Agnes Heredia ( Hered ( Heredia ia)) to sign a false Affidavit by telling her that it would only be for purposes of compelling Fernandez to pay additional sums to her client; however, Atty. Villalon used it as evidence to frame the complainant Fernandez for her own personal gain; 6. only submitted the Deed of Donation for signature examination and certification by the NBI and intentionally failed to submit the Deed of Absolute Sale Thee Cou Th Court rt ref referr erred ed the ca case se to the IBP fo forr in inve vesti stigat gatio ion. n. Com Commi miss ssio ione nerr Fu Funa na of the IBP recommended dismissal recommended dismissal the case stating that Atty.Villa Atty.Villalon lon did not commi committ any act for which she should be disciplined or administratively sanctioned. With regard to the first & second ground, Commissioner Commissioner agrees agrees with Atty. Villalon’s argument argument that only the client’s opeative facts and not other evidentiary facts need to be included in the Complaint. It is correct for the respondent to argue that said Deed of Sale was a matter of defense which defendant can freely point out to the trial judge through his own pleading. It cannot be said that respondent suppressed it when in fact the the existence existence of of the document document is known known to everyone everyone else especially especially the opposin opposing g party. With regard to the third groun ground, d, assuming a misrepres misrepresentatio entation n was commi committed, tted, such act does not attain a degree of materiality or gravity so as to attribute evil malice on the part of the respondent. The intent remains which is to obtain relevant information. Besides a civil complaint was in fact filed the very next day the letter was sent. As to the fourth ground, such has not been factually substantiated. Fernandez filed a Petition for Review in the SC alleging that Commissioner Funa committed a grave abuse of discretion in recommending the dismissal of the disbarment case and in failing to resolve one of the matters regarding the affidavit of Heredia.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Villalon can be disbarred on such grounds HEL ELD D: A lawy lawyer er ha hass th the duty duty to be tru truth thfu full in in all all hi hiss dea deali ling ngs, s, ho howe weve verr, such such du duty ty does not require that a lawyer advance matters of defense on behalf of the client’s opponent. A lawyer, as an officer of the court, has a duty to be truthfu truthfull in all his dealings. However, However, this duty does not require that the lawyer advance matters of defense on behalf of his or her client’s opponent. A lawyer is his or her client’s advocate; advocate; while duty-bound duty-bound to utter no falsehood, an advocate is not obliged to build the case for his his or her client’s client’s opponent. opponent. Assumi Assuming ng arguendo arguendo that the respondent respondent knew knew of the presenc presencee of the Deed of Absolute Sale, its existence, is, indeed a matter of defense for Fernandez.

SAN JOSE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION v . ATTY. ROBERTO B. ROMANILLOS A.C. No. No. 5580, 15 June June 2005, EN 2005, EN BANC BANC (Per (Per Curiam) Atty. Roberto B. Romani Romanillos llos (Romani (Romanillos) llos) represen represented ted San Jose Homeow Homeowners ners Assoc Association, iation, Inc. (SJHAI) before the Human Settlements Regulation Commission (HSRC) in a case against Durano and


Corp., Inc. (DCI). The suit was for violation of the Subdivision and Condominium Buyer’s Protection Act (PD 957). SJHAI alleged that a certain lot was designated as a school site in the subdivision plan that DCI submitted to the Bureau of Lands, but no school was ever built, and in fact, the subject lot was sold by DCI to spouses Ramon and Beatriz Durano. While Atty. Robert B. Romani Romanillos llos (Roman (Romanillos) illos) was still couns counsel el for San Jose Homeow Homeowners ners Association, Associa tion, Inc. (SJHAI) (SJHAI),, he represen represented ted Myrna and Antoni Antonio o Montea Montealegre legre in requesti requesting ng for SJHAI’s conformity to construct a school building in the subject lot, to be purchased from the spouses Durano. This request was denied, and Romanillos applied for clearance before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) in behalf of the Montealegres. It was at this point that SJHAI terminated his services as counsel, and got another lawyer. When Romanillos acted as couns counsel el for Lydia DuranoDurano-Rodrigu Rodriguez ez against SJHAI, the latter filed a disbarment case against him. Upon investigation, it was found and recommended that Romanillos failed to observe candor and fairness in dealing with his clients, representing representing the Monteale Montealegres gres against SJHAI even when he served as Board Member and couns counsel el of the latter, and even served as counse counsell for DCI in a suit against SJHAI. Romanillos got off with an admonition but continued to act as DCI’s counsel in the latter case, which prompted SJHAI to file a second disbarment case, concerning such representation, and adding that Romanillos has been using the title “Judge” in his advertisements.

ISSUE: Whether or not Romanillos is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility HELD:

Lawyers must at all times uphold and respect the law.

It is incon inconsequenti sequential al that t hat petitioner never questio questioned ned the propriety of responde respondent’s nt’s continued continued representation representa tion of Lydia DuranoDurano-Rodrigu Rodriguez. ez. The lack l ack of oppositi opposition on does not mean tacit consent. As long as the lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two (2) or more opposing clients, he is guilty of violating his oath. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility specifically mandates that a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure. Incidentally, it is also misleading for respondent to insist that he was exonerated in A.C. No. 4783. We agree with the IBP that responde respondent’s nt’s continued continued use of the title "Judge" violated Rules 1.01 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in deceitful conduct and from using any misleadin misleading g statement or claim regarding qualifications qualifications or legal services. The quasi-judicial quasi-judicial notice he posted in the billboards referring to himself as a judge is deceiving. It was a clear attempt to mislead the public into believing that the order was issued in his capacity as a judge when he was dishonorably stripped of the privilege. Roomanillos did not honorably retire from the judiciary. He resigned from being a judge during the pendency of Zarate of Zarate v. Judge Roman Romanillos illos,, where he was eventually found guilty of grave and serious misconduct and would have been dismissed from the service had he not resigned. In that case, respondent was found guilty guilty of illegal solicitation solicitation and receipt receipt of P10,000.00 from a party litigant. litigant. The penalty imposed imposed upon him in said case included forfeiture of all leave and retirement benefits and privile privileges ges to which he may be entitled with prejudic prejudicee to reinstate reinstatement ment and/or reemplo reemployment yment in any branch or instrum instrumentality entality of government, including government-owned or controlled agencies or corporations. Certainly, the use of the title ‘Judge’ is one of such privile such privileges. ges. Membership in the legal profession is a special privilege burdened with conditions. It is bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in law, but also known to possess good moral character. Lawyers should act and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the public’s faith in the legal profession. To say that lawyers must at all times uphold and respect the law is to state the obvious, but such statement can never be overemphasized. Considering that, "of all classes and professions, lawyers are most sacredly bound to uphold the law," it is imperative that they live by the law. Accordingly, lawyers who violate their oath and engage in deceitful conduct have no place in the legal profession.


RE: REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL AUDIT OF THE BOOKS OF ATTY. RAQUEL G. KHO A.M. No. No. P-06-2177, P-06-2177, 19 April 2007, 2007, FIRST DIVISION (Corona, (Corona, J J .) .) During an audit of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) of the books of accounts of Atty. Raquel G. Kho (Kho), former clerk of court of the RTC in Eastern Samar, it was found that there was a shortage of money in the General Fund, the Sheriff’s General Fund, the Fiduciary Fund, and the Special Allowance Allowan ce for the Judiciar Judiciary y Fund. Accordin According g to Kho, he he was not not able to deposit deposit the money money immediately immediately with with the Land Bank since there was no branch thereof in their locality. He said that it had been his practice to keep the money in the court’s safety vault. In addition to such shortages, it was found that Kho and his common-law wife had been in the practice of lending out the money the former receives in his capacity as clerk of court. They would then earn interest on the money loaned out. It was also found that some of the money had been kept in the vault for more than year, in clear violation of the OCA Circular in 1993.

ISSUE: Whether or not Kho has violated the Code of Professional Responsibility HELD: Public office is a public trust. Those charged with the dispensation of justice, from the justices and judges to the lowliest lowliest clerks, clerks, should should be circum circumscribed scribed with the heavy burden burden of responsi responsibility. bility. Not Not only must must their conduct at all times be characterized by propriety and decorum but, above all else, it must be beyond suspicion. A clerk of court, aside from being the custodi custodian an of the court’s funds, revenu revenues, es, property and premise prem ises, s, is also entr entrust usted ed wit with h the prim primary ary resp respons onsibil ibility ity of corr correctl ectly y and effe effectiv ctively ely impl impleme ementin nting g regulatio regu lations ns reg regardi arding ng fidu fiduciar ciary y fun funds. ds. Safe Safekee keepin ping g of fun funds ds and col collecti lections ons is ess essenti ential al to an orde orderly rly administration of justice and no protestation of good faith can override the mandatory nature of the circulars designed to promote full accountability for government funds. Clerks of court have always been reminded of their duty to immediately deposit the various funds received by them to the authorized government depositories for they are not supposed to keep funds in their custody. The failure to remit the funds in due time constitutes gross dishonesty and gross misconduct. It diminishes the faith of the people in the Judiciary. Dishonesty, being in the nature of a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service even if committed for the first time. However, Kho showed remorse by immediately restituting the cash shortages and complying with the directives of the audit team. And consideri considering ng that this this is his his first offense, we find find that the penalty penalty of of P10,000 fine is suffici sufficient. ent. Moreover, his misconduct reflects on his fitness as a member of the bar. His malfeasance prima facie contravenes Canon 1, Rule 1.01of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Hence, he should explain why no further disciplin disciplinary ary sanction sanction should should be imposed on him.

ATTY. EVE EVELYN LYN J. MAGN MAGNO O V. ATTY. OLIVIA VELASCO-JACOBA A.C. No. No. 6296, 22 November November 2005, 2005, THIRD THIRD DIVISION DIVISION (Garcia, (Garcia, J J .) .) Atty. Evelyn Magno (Magno (Magno)) had a disagree disagreement ment with her uncle, Lorenzo Inos (inos) over a landscaping contract they had entered into. In order to set things right, Magno addressed a letter, styled “Su “S umbo bon ng” to Bo Bon nifa faci cio o Alccanta Al tara ra (Alc lca anta tara ra)), theeir ba th bara ran ngay capt pta ain. During thee th conciliation/confrontation proceedings, Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba (Jacoba) appeared for Inos, on the strength of a Special Power of Attorney, together with Inos’ son, Lorenzito. When Magno objected to Jacoba’s appearance, the latter said that she was there not as counsel, but only as attorney-in-fact.


However How ever,, Jaco Jacoba, ba, acc accordi ording ng to Mag Magno’ no’ss evi evidenc dence, e, acte acted d as cou counse nsell duri during ng the proc proceedi eedings ngs,, asserting her procedural know-how into every stage thereof, which made the proceedings drag on longer than normal. It was because of these numerous instances that Magno charged Jacoba with willful violation of the Local Government Code and the Code of Professional Responsibility. Whether her or not Atty. Olivia Olivia Vela Velasco sco-Jac -Jacoba oba is gui guilty lty of vio violati lating ng the Code of Pro Profess fession ional al ISSUE: Whet Responsibility

HELD: Jacoba alleged that the administrative complaint was filed with the Office of the Punon Punong g Barangay, Barangay, instead of before the Lupo the Lupong ng Tagapamayapa, Tagapamayapa, and heard by Punong Punong Barangay Bonifacio Alcantara alone, instead of the collegial Lupo collegial Lupon n or a conciliation panel known as pangka pangkat t . Prescinding from this premise, she submits that the prohibition against a lawyer appearing to assist a client in katarungan pambarangay proceedings does not apply. Further, she argued that her appearance was not as a lawyer, but only as an attorney-in-fact. The rationale behind the personal appearance requirement in the LGC is to enable the lupon to secure first hand and direct information about the facts and issues, the exception being in cases where minors or incompetents are parties. There can be no quibbling that laymen of goodwill can easily agree to conciliate and settle their disputes between themselves without what sometimes is the unsettling assistance of lawyers whose presence could sometimes obfuscate and confuse issues. Worse still, the participation of lawyers with their penchant to use their analytical skills and legal knowledge tend to prolong instead of expedite settlement of the case. The prohibition against the presence of a lawyer in a barangay conciliation proceedings was not, to be sure, lost on responden respondent. t. Her defense that the aforequoted Section Section 415 of the LGC does not apply since complainant complain ant addresse addressed d her Sumbo Sumbong ng to the bar baran anga gay y cap captai tain n of Brg Brgy. y. San Pa Pasc scua uall wh who o the therea reafte fterr proceeded proceede d to hear the t he same is specious at best. In this regard, suffice it to state that complainant complainant wrote her Sumbong Sumbo ng with the end in view of availing herself of the benefits of barangay justice. That she addressed her Sumbong Sumbo ng to th thee ba bara rang ngay ay ca capt ptai ain n is re real ally ly of li litt ttle le mo mome ment nt si sinc ncee th thee la latt tter er ch chai airs rs th thee Lupo Lupong ng Tagapamayapa.. Tagapamayapa Given the above perspective, the Supreme Court joins the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline in its determination that respondent transgressed the prohibition prescribed in Section 415 of the LGC. However, its recommended penalty of mere admonition must have to be modified. Doubtless, respondent’s conduct tended to undermine the laudable purpose of the katarungan pambarangay system. What compounded matters matte rs was when resp respond ondent ent repe repeated atedly ly ign ignored ored com complai plainan nant’s t’s prot protesta estatio tion n agai against nst her con continu tinued ed appearance in the barangay conciliation proceedings.

BENILDA M. MADDELA v. ATTY. ROSALIE DALLONG-GALICINAO A.C. No. No. 6491, 6491, 31 January January 2005, FIRST DIVISION DIVISION (Davide, CJ, CJ, J J .) .) A disbarmen disbarmentt case was filed before the Office of the Court Adminis Administrator trator (OCA) by herein complainant Benilda M. Maddela (Maddela) against Atty. Rosalie Dallong-Galicinao (Atty. Galicinao) for “acts unbecoming a public servant and a lawyer, grave misconduct and slander”. Maddela averred that she loaned an amount of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) from Atty. Galicinao. In November 2001, since part of the loan remained unpaid, Atty. Galicinao went to Maddela's office and took the latter’s cash gift check amountin amounting g to Five Thousand Pesos Pesos (P 5,000) in her absence and withoutt her knowle withou knowledge. dge. There, Atty. Galicin Galicinao ao 'uttered unsavory and humilia humiliating ting words' against her. On other occasions, occasions, Atty. Galicin Galicinao ao collected from Maddela an amount equivalent to one-half of the face value of the checks she received as benefit from the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).


On 10 Decembe Decemberr 2002, the respondent went again to the office of the complain complainant ant and demanded one-half of the value of the check representing a cash gift of Five Thousand Pesos (P 5,000). Maddela refused, reasoning that it was a cash gift, not a JDF check and, therefore, not covered by their agreement. Maddela's refusal to part with the amount angered Atty. Galicinao, prompting the latter to raise her voice, utter 'unsavory remarks' against Maddela, and banged her fist on top of the Maddela's table, causing the glass top of the table to break. To further support her bid for the disbarment of Atty. Galiciano, Maddela, through the affidavit of a certain Mr. Rilloraza, alleged that Atty. Galicin Galicinao ao is also guilty of notarizi notarizing ng documents outside outside the area of her commission. Maddela claimed that although Atty. Galicinao was not yet a lawyer, she was issued a notarial commission and even notarized certain documents outside of her commission. Maddela Madd ela likewise likewise alle alleged ged that desp despite ite the deat death h of Atty. Galicinao’ Galicinao’ss hus husband band,, Atty. Galicinao Galicinao continued to receive and encash for at least (3) three months checks corresponding to her husband's salaries as Ex-Offic as Ex-Officio ioSheriff Sheriff of the Office of the Clerk of Court of Nueva Vizcaya. Maddela even pointed out that Atty. Galicinao continued to claim the higher allowable deductions as a married individual despite the death of her husband. Atty. Galiciano Galiciano denied the allegations allegations but with respect to the documents that that she notarized outside of her notarial commission, she reasoned that she did such for her relatives and she did not derive any income from the transactions . In 2004, Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala submitted submitted her report and recommendation. She stated that Atty. Galicinao was able to prove that she was not the creditor of the Maddela and that Atty. Galicinao did not claim her husband's salary and avail herself of the higher allowable tax deductions even after his death. However, she will be suspended for six (6) months for the acts of notarizing outside the area of her notarial commission and obtaining the JDF checks of the complainant from the cash clerk in violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 27-2001. On 16 April 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-227 in CBD No. 0303-106 1060, 0, annu annullin lling g and setti setting ng asi aside de Comm Commiss ission ioner er Maa Maala's la's reco recomme mmendat ndation ion;; dism dismiss issing ing the administrative complaint against Atty. Galicinao with respect to the charge of violating a Supreme Court Circular for collecting a loan for which she acted as a guarantor; and imposing upon the respondent the penalty of reprimand for her act of notarizing documents outside the area where she was commissioned as a notary public. The said ruling was affirmed by the Supreme Court with a modification as to the penalty.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Atty. Galicinao Galicinao should should be discipline disciplined d for having having notarized notarized documents documents outside of her notarial commission

HEL ELD: D: Nota No tari riza zati tion on is inv inves este ted d wit with h sub subst stan anti tive ve pu publ blic ic int inter eres estt suc such h tha thatt onl onlyy tho those se who are are qualified qualified may may act as notaries notaries public. public. We have declared on several occasions, occasions, that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, meaningless, routinar routinary y act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as nota notarie riess publ public. ic. The prote protectio ction n of that interest interest nec necess essari arily ly requ requires ires that thos thosee not qualified qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from imposing upon the public, the courts, and the administrative offices in general. It must be underscored that the notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document, making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of the authenticity thereof ( Nung Nunga a v. Viray Viray, A.C. No. 4758, 366 Phil. 155, 160 [1999]). Thus, we are not satisfied with respondent's explanation that she notarized documents outside of the area of her notarial commission as a favor to her relatives and for free. Whether the respondent derived profit from her act of notarizing outside the area of her authority is of no moment. The fact remains that she notarized outside the area of her commission. Considering, however, that her misconduct as a notary public was committed while she was not yet a lawyer, she could not be discipli disciplinarily narily dealt with as a lawyer. The penalty that should be meted to her should, therefore, therefore, be as a notary public before she was admitted to the Bar. The penalty of fine would be a sufficient sanction.”


XERXES A. ABADIANO v. SPOUSES JESUS AND LOLITA MARTIR G.R. No. 156310, 31 July 2008, THIRD DIVISION (Nachura, J .) .) A parcel of land covered by Certificate Certificate of Title Title (OCT) No. 20461 20461 was issued on November November 19, 1923 in the name of the spouses Inocentes Bañares and Feliciana Villanueva is the subject of the instant case. Before the issuance of OCT No. 20461, Inocentes and the heirs of Feliciana Villanueva (who had predeceased her husband) executed an Agreement of Partition dated June 1, 1922 over said property. The lot was partitioned and distributed to Demetrio Banares, Ramon and David Abadiano and Amando Banares. The partition is embodied in a Deed of Partition executed on June 1, 1922 and notarized the following day by Notary Public Jose Peralta with notarial inscriptions "Reg. No. 64, Pag. 69, Libro III.". OCT No. 20461 was administratively reconstituted on February 15, 1962 and in lieu thereof OCT No. RO-8211 (20461) was issued over the same property, still in the name of Inocentes Bañares and Felicidad Villanueva. On June 14, 1957 Demetrio Bañares sold his share of the lot to his son, Leopoldo. The same was annotated at the back of OCT No. RO-8211 (20461). Subsequently, on February 21, 1962, Leopoldo Bañares filed before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Negros Occidental an ex-parte petition praying for: first, the confirmation of the Agreement of Partition, the Conformity executed by David Abadiano, and the Deed of Sale between him and his father; and second, the cancellation of OCT No. RO-8211 (20461) and, in lieu thereof, the issuance of a new certificate of title over the property. In an Order dated February 22, 1962, the court ordered the cancellation cancellation of OCT No. RO8211 (20461) and the issuance of a new certificate of title in the names of Dr. Leopoldo Bañares, Amando Bañares, and Ramon and David Abadiano. Pursuant thereto, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-31862 was issued issued by the the Register Register of Deeds for for Negros Occiden Occidental. tal. On the other hand, spouses Jesus and Lolita Martir (Spouses Martir) alleged that, prior to the issuance issuan ce of TCT No. T-31862, Ramon Abadiano, Abadiano, for himself and on behalf of David Abadiano, had already sold their rights and interests over the property to Victor Garde. The sale was allegedly evidenced by a document of sale (Compra Y Venta) dated June 3, 1922 and acknowledged before Notary Public Jose Peralta and bearing notarial inscription "Doc. No. 64, Pag. No. 60, Book No. III, series of 1922." The sale was allegedly affirmed by David Abadiano in a document dated September 30, 1939. They further alleged that from the time of the sale, Victor Garde and his heirs were in continuous, public, peaceful, and uninterrupted possession and occupation in the concept of an owner of the property. Thus, Spouses Martir filed the Action to Quiet Title and/or Recovery of Possession with Damages before the then CFI of Negros Negros Occiden Occidental. tal. Herein Herein Petitioners Petitioners denied denied allegations allegations of Spouses Spouses Martir Martir and it was was maintained maintain ed that the property was never never conferred conferred to Victor Garde through through a Compra Y Vente. Xerxes Abadiano intervened intervened in the proceedings proceedings before the trial court alleging alleging likewise that his predecessor predecessor Ramon Abadiano never sold their share of the property to Victor Garde. The trial court ruled in favor of Spouses Martir declaring them as the true and legitimate owners of the property. The Court of Appeals likewise affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the the Deed of Sale is a spurious spurious documen documentt HELD: The Supreme Court, in its decision, discussed the due execution and authenticity of the Compra Y Venta. Rule 130, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court reads: Original document must be produced; exceptions. – When the subject of inquiry is the content con tentss of a docu documen ment, t, no evi evidenc dencee shal shalll be admi admissi ssible ble othe otherr than the orig origina inall document itself, except in the following cases: (a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court withoutt bad faith withou faith on the part of the offeror;


(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence evidence is is offered, and the latter fails fails to produce produce it after after reasonable reasonable notice; notice; (c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole; (d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office. Respondents attached only a photocopy of the Compra Y Venta to their complaint. According to respondent Lolita Martir, the original of said document was in the office of the Register of Deeds. They allegedly tried to obtain a copy from that office but their request was refused. No other evidence but these bare assertions, assertions, however, however, was presented presented to prove prove that the original original is indeed indeed in the custody custody of the Register Register of Deeds or that respondents’ due and diligent search for the same was unsuccessful. The Rule states that when the original document is unavailable, has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated. In the case at bar, respondents failed to establish that the offer in evidence of the document was made in accordance with any of the exceptions allowed under the abovequoted abovequoted rule, and yet, the trial court accepted the document as genuine and proceeded to determine its validity based on such assumption. The trial court likewise brushed aside the apparent defect that the document presented contained the same notarial inscription as the Agreement on Partition. Indeed, the Deed of Partition and the Compra Y Venta, though executed executed on different days, were notarized on the same day, and both docume documents nts contained the signatures of the same witnesses and the same notarial inscription. In this case, while it is true that the error in the t he notarial inscription inscription would not have invalidated the sale – if indeed it took place – the same error would have meant that the document cannot be treated as a notarial document and thus, not entitled to the presumption of regularity. The document would be taken out of the realm of public documents whose genuineness and due execution need not be proved. Accordingly, respondents not having proven the due execution and genuineness of the purported Compra Y Venta, the weightt of evidence weigh evidence preponder preponderates ates in favor of of petitioner. petitioner.

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