History IA

What were the key factors which greatly dramatised Japanese militarism between 1931 and 1945?

IB History HL Internal Assessment Candidate name: Cheng Nicholas Gin Foon Candidate number: School: Li Po Chun United World College Exam session: May 2016 Word count: 1,921

Nicholas Cheng Gin Foon

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Section A: Plan of Investigation This paper will evaluate the question: What were the key factors which greatly dramatized Japanese militarism from 1931? To explore this fervor for militarism, the economic, social and political state of Japan must be accounted. The scope of this investigation thus encompasses and explores the Nationalist and Militarist Principles of the Japanese public, Japanese response to Western powers, the rise of ultra-nationalism, and the independence of the military evidenced from 1931 to 1945. For the purpose of this paper, this paper will reference the Manchurian Incident of 1931 as the first major product of militarism in Japan. Hence, events which occur after this incident fall outside the scope of the investigation. This investigation addresses the research question by first exploring secondary sources from 1937. The source is valuable for its ability to capture the perspective many scholars held while Japanese militarism was at its pinnacle. The investigation then focuses on consolidating an understanding of how the topic is currently perceived among historians. The two most applicable and definitive sources are In a Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present by prominent Harvard historian Andrew Gordon and A Social Basis for Prewar Japanese Militarism: The Army and the Rural Community by Richard J. Smethurst of Oxford. By analyzing these sources in combination with journal articles, a comprehensive perspective can be drawn.


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Section B: Summary of Evidence Nationalist and Militarist Principles of the Japanese Public •

The Imperial Rescript on Education (1890) stressed loyalty to the state and the notion 1

that education served the state and society. •

Government-run Shintoism emphasized military glorification and authoritarian rule.

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The military class of daimyo and samurai held dominance in the state for centuries

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prior.3 •

“The daimyo, or feudal lords who supported the shogun, ruled by the sword, and their adherents, the samurai, could kill at will.” 4

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The Japanese public were “Fervently patriotic and nationalistic, and developed deep emotional feelings towards the emperor.”

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The Japanese public held “Soldierly and nationalistic values.”

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The slogan of the nation since the Meiji Era was: “Enrich the Nation and strengthen its arms” ( fukoku kyohei).7

Japanese Response to Western Powers •

The aim of the parliament was to raise military strength to stand equal to the West. 8

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The United States recognized Japan’s interests in Manchuria with the Ishii-Lansing Agreement of 1917. 9

1

Andrew Gordon, In A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 105. 2 Kenneth Colegrove, “Militarism in Japan’s Foreign Policy,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 2015, America and Japan (1941): 8. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. 5 Richard Smethurst. A Social Basis for Prewar Japanese Militarism: The Army and the Rural Community . (Califronia: University of California Press, 1974), xviii. 6 Ibid., xvi 7 Martin Bernd, Japan and Germany in the Modern World (New York: Bergahn Books, 1995), 81. 8 Colegrove, “Japan’s Foreign Policy,” 8. 9 Shinichi Kitaoka, “Diplomacy and the Military in Showa Japan (1990),” Daedalus No. 3, Showa: The Japan of Hirohito (Summer, 1990), Vol. 119: 155.

Nicholas Cheng Gin Foon •

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There was rapid increase in military expenditures after the Triple Intervention (23 April 1895) which signified Japan’s inability to hold its position against Western powers. 10

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Formation of national military organizations such as young men’s associations. 11

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Yamagata Aritomo, considered the father of the modern Japanese army, believed 12

Manchuria was within Japan’s line of sovereignty ( shukensen). •

After the Manchurian Incident (1931), Japan’s imperial elite convinced the public that war was inevitable and set about building a political-economic system that would prepare Japan for war.13

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The war office initiated a series of “army pamphlets” outlining a) Japan’s lack of resources, b) Japan’s divine destiny to expel Western intervention c) the army and navy must be augmented. 14

The rise of ultra-nationalism •

During the Great Depression, western countries enacted trade barriers between them and Japan.15

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The United States Immigration Law (1924) prohibited Japanese from immigrating to the country.

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The Great Depression (1929) caused social uncertainty and rural discontent, which rallied Japanese opinion behind the military’s acts of aggression in Manchuria. 17

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The Washington Naval Conference (1921-22) restricted the amount of battleships between the US, the UK, and Japan to a ratio of 5:5:3.18

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Bill Gordon, “Japan’s March Towards Militarism,” last modified 2000, accessed September 19 2015, 11 Smethurst, “A Social Basis for Prewar Japanese Militarism,” xiv. 12 Gordon, “March Towards Militarism.” 13 Matasaka Kosaka, “The Showa Era (1926-1989),” Daedalus, Vol. 119, No. 3, Showa: The Japan of Hirohito (1990): 35. 14 Colegrove, “Japan’s Foreign Policy,”13. 15 Dorothy Perkins, Japan Goes to War: A Chronology of Japanese Military Expansion (Pennsylvania: Diane Pub Co, 1997), 109. 16 Kosaka, “Showa Era,” 35. 17 Ibid.


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The London Naval Treaty (1930) restricted Japan to 12 heavy cruisers. 19

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Increasing national growth as a means to increase military strength.20

Independence of the military •

The disparity in foreign policy between the Cabinet and the Imperial army known widely by the Japanese as Niju-gwaiko, or dual diplomacy.

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21

Article XI of the 1889 Constitution allowed the military to exist outside the jurisdiction of the Parliament.22

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From 1900, the War Minister mandated to be nominated from an active-serving General.23

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The military had the ability to: terminate a cabinet, form a cabinet, alter cabinet policies; ignore ministerial policies, and execute foreign policies independent of the cabinet.24

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The military had “the privilege of advising the Emperor upon all matters pertaining to the defense of the Japanese Empire regardless of the foreign policy of the Cabinet”.

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The Manchurian Incident (1931) the first major act of aggression by the Japanese Imperial Army was unapproved by the cabinet ,and yet, went unpunished.

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26

“Manchurian Incident as a ‘prelude’ to the military takeover of power in politics.” 27

Kosaka, “Showa Era,” 33. Smethurst, “A Social Basis for Prewar Japanese Militarism,” 164. 21 Colegrove, “Japan’s Foreign Policy,”13. 22 Ibid., 11. 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid., 10. 26 Marjorie Dryburgh, North China and Japanese Expansion 1933-1937: Regional Power and the National Interest (London: Routledge, 2000), 105. 27 Kosaka, “Showa Era,” 35. 20

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Section C: Evaluation of Sources Source: A Social Basis for Prewar Japanese Militarism: The Army and the Rural Community Origin – Book written by Richard Smethurst, a history professor and vice-chancellor at the University of Oxford, and published in 1974 on the social causes of militarism in Japan. Purpose – To provide insight on the social causes of Japanese militarism which are often overlooked. The book analyzes and evaluates historical accounts to assess the impact of military organizations in rural society. Value – Smethurst used an array of sources in his research of military organizations. Outside the conventional references to official government documents and biographies, Smethurst consulted rare first-hand community and local documents and interviewed former leaders of the military organizations he describes in his book. This links to the purpose of the source and allows him to use the subjective insight from personal accounts to assess the impact of the organizations. Limitation – His argumentation of the importance of the social causes of militarism fails to address and recognize the importance of other aspects. The purpose of the source does not allow it to analyze the causes of Japanese militarism in its broader context. Source: Militarism in Japan’s Foreign Policy Origin – Article written by Kenneth Colegrove who was a professor of political science at Northwestern University, and sat on the board of Amerasia, and published in 1941 in a review of American and Asian Affairs.28

28

Northwestern University Library. Guide to the Kenneth W. Colegrove (1886-1975) Papers. Accessed 22 September 2014. http://findingaids.library.northwestern.edu/catalog/inu-ead-nua-archon-1223


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Purpose – To provide analysis on various facets of Japanese militarism, combining his own analysis with that of other scholars. Value – The value of this source lies in its wealth of first-hand sources. Written in 1941, Colegrove references numerous scholars who offer vast and vivid insights to the events which were unfolding before them, giving a first-hand perspective on Japan’s foreign policy. Limitation – The limitations in this source lies in its lack of evidence. Colegrove makes many claims which are not substantiated with reference to other sources. The source is also written in a narrative tone, making it inappropriate for the academic rigor expected of this investigation.


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Section D: Analysis The Manchurian Incident of 1931 was referred to as “a ‘prelude’ to the military takeover of power in politics” by historian Matasaka Kosaka.29 Was Japan’s entrance into the military state solely a result of one event? No, Japan’s passage into militari sm was set long before this first act of aggression. Japan’s entrance into militarism was to a large extent due to the role and independence of its army. A number of legislative decrees enacted by the Meiji government allowed for the independence and freedom of its military to act as it pleased. Article XI of the 1889 Constitution allowed the military to exist outside the jurisdiction of the Parliament.30 The military simultaneously gained “the privilege of advising the Emperor upon all matters pertaining to the defense of the Japanese Empire regardless of the foreign 31

policy of the Cabinet” as a result of Article XI.

In 1900, it was further stipulated that the

serving War Minister on the Cabinet was to be a elected from the military.

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This resulted in

the military gaining vast political influence over the parliament and Emperor. The military gained vast control of the cabinet system, able to establish and dismantle cabinets at will as well as act independently of the cabinet’s foreign policy. 33 This disparity between the cabinet and military (known as niju-gwaiko), resulted in the Manchurian Incident (1931) which cemented the military’s place in foreign affairs.34 The Incident represented the Cabinet’s failures to control the reckless urges of the Japanese military and exemplified its independence and role in instigating Japanese militarism in the 1930s.

29

Kosaka, “Showa Era,” 35. Ibid., 41. 31 Colegrove, “Japan’s Foreign Policy,” 10. 32 Ibid., 11. 33 Ibid. 34 Smethurst, “A Social Basis for Prewar Japanese Militarism,” 164; Marjorie Dryburgh, North China and Japanese Expansion 1933-1937 , 105 30


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The values held by the Japanese public from the Meiji Restoration (1868) was a major factor in causing Japanese militarism. The historian Richard Smethurst argued that the Japanese public was “fervently patriotic and nationalistic, and developed deep emotional 36

feelings towards the emperor” and “held soldierly and nationalistic values.”

37

These

principles of the Japanese public were caused by the traditional belief of the importance of the military class in Japanese society, along with religious and educational reforms. Social Science Professor Kenneth Colegrove argued that the “daimyo, or feudal lords who supported the shogun, ruled by the sword, and their adherents, the samurai, could kill at will.” 38 From this quote, one can see the violent militaristic tendencies of the Japanese feudal military caste and its shift into the modern era. This is substantiated as prior to the Meiji era, the military class of daimyo held supremacy in the centuries prior. 39 The culmination of these factors created a tradition of military admiration and a sense of loyalty to the state and emperor, which played a major social role in dramatically increasing Japan’s militarism in the 1930s. Educational and religious reforms emphasized traditional values of patriotism and military reverence which molded a Japanese public which would not oppose the actions of an . In terms of these reforms, The Imperial Rescript on Education (1890) stressed loyalty to the state and the notion that education served the state and society. 40 State-enforced Shintoism 41

emphasized military glorification and authoritarian rule. In tandem, these factors sowed the seeds for a patriotic Japanese public.

36

Smethurst, “A Social Basis for Prewar Japanese Militarism,” xvii. Ibid, xvi. 38 Colegrove, “Japan’s Foreign Policy,” 8. 39 Ibid. 40 Gordon, In A Modern History of Japan, 105. 41 Colegrove, “Japan’s Foreign Policy,” 8. 37


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In response to western attempts to influence Japanese politics and foreign policy, the Japanese parliament responded with sweeping changes made with great conviction, which directly led to the militarization of Japan. After the Triple Intervention, the Meiji government rapidly increased its military expenditure in an attempt to stand up to western Powers.

42

The

Japanese War office initiated a series of “army pamphlets” outlining Japan’s lack of resources, and the necessity of the army and navy to be elevated to meet its desire to expel Western intervention.43 Yamata Arimoto, viewed as father of the modern Japanese military, believed Manchuria fell within Japan’s line of sovereignty and hence must be claimed and protected 44

for the security of Japan. Directly as a result of this, the United States and Japan signed a diplomatic note, known as the Lansing-Ishii Agreement (2 November 1917) where Japan’s 45

special interests in Manchuria were recognized by the United States.

Japan’s special

interests in Manchuria in conjunction with the military’s independence were short term causes to militarism in the 1930s.

42

Gordon, “March Towards Militarism.” Colegrove, “Japan’s Foreign Policy,”13. 44 Gordon, “March Towards Militarism.” 45 Kitaoka, “Diplomacy and the Military,”155. 43


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Ultra-nationalism was the Japanese public’s response to foreign influence in Japan and directly led to a nationalistic fervor for militarization. International pressures to demilitarize such as the Washington Naval Conference (1921-22) and the London Naval 46

Treaty (1930) restricted Japan’s naval capacity.

Following the Wall Street Crash (1929), 47

western countries enacted trade barriers with Japan. This caused social uncertainty, which 48

rallied Japanese opinion behind the military’s actions in Manchuria. The military restrictions and trade barriers polarized western powers in the eyes of the Japanese public which generated public support of the proceedings in Manchuria which signified the emergence of Japanese militarism in the 1930s.

Section E: Conclusion One of the main factors that magnified Japanese militarism in the 1930s was the role and independence of the military. Legislative failures of the Meiji Constitution and Japanese government allowed the military to garner vast amounts of influence within the cabinet system and the ability to disregard its foreign policy. Public a nd parliamentary response to foreign influences along with Japan’s fervor for militarization set the foundation for the rise of ultra-nationalism in the nation. The influence the military held over the domestic government in tandem with the patriotic and militaristic values held by the Japanese public further created the conditions which allowed Japanese militarism to flourish from 1931 onwards.

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Goldstein and Maurer, The Washington Conference, 38; Kosaka, “Showa Era,” 33 Perkins, “Japan Goes to War,” 109 48 Kosaka, “Showa Era,” 35 47


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Bibliography Bernd, Martin. Japan and Germany in the Modern World (New York: Bergahn Books, 1995) Colegrove, Kenneth. “Militarism in Japan’s Foreign Policy,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 2015, America and Japan (1941): 8. Dryburgh, Marjorie. North China and Japanese Expansion 1933-1937: Regional Power and the National Interest (London: Routledge, 2000). Goldstein, Erik and John Maurer. The Washington Conference, 1921-22: Naval Rivalry, East Asian Stability and the Road to Pearl Harbor (London: Routledge, 2012). Gordon, Bill. “Japan’s March Towards Militarism.” last modified 2000. Accessed September 19 2015. Kitaoka, Shinichi. “Diplomacy and the Military in Showa Japan (1990).” Daedalus No. 3, Showa: The Japan of Hirohito (Summer, 1990), Vol. 119. Kosaka, Matasaka. “The Showa Era (1926-1989).” Daedalus, Vol. 119, No. 3, S howa: The Japan of Hirohito (1990). Northwestern University Library. Guide to the Kenneth W. Colegrove (1886-1975) Papers. Accessed 22 September 2014. Perkins, Dorothy. Japan Goes to War: A Chronology of Japanese Military Expansion (Pennsylvania: Diane Pub Co, 1997). Smethurst, Richard. A Social Basis for Prewar Japanese Militarism: The Army and the Rural Community . (California: University of California Press, 1974).

History IA

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