CD Cariño vs. CHR Editt 0 1 Edi …
T o p i c : C o m m i s s i o n o n H u m a n R i g h t s ( A r t . XI X I I I, S e c t i o n 1 7 )
CARIÑO vs. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS G.R. No. 96681, December 2, 1991 FACTS: Some 800 public school teachers undertook “mass concerted actions” to protest the alleged failure of public authorities to act upon their grievances. Th e “mass actions” consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peacable assemblies, etc. The Secretary of Education served them with an order to return to work within 24 hours or face dismissal. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, eight teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School were administratively charged, preventively suspended for 90 days pursuant to sec. 41, P.D. P .D. 807 and temporarily replaced. An investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the charges. When their motion for suspension was denied b y the Investigating Committee, said teachers staged a walkout signifying their intent to bo ycott the entire proceedings. Eventually, Secretary Carino decreed dismissal from service of Esber and the suspension for 9 months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. In the meantime, a case was filed with RTC, raising the issue of violation of the right of the striking teachers’ to due process of law. The case was eventually ev entually elevated to SC. Also in the meantime, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements to Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacemen t as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to them. While the case was pending with CHR, SC promulgated its resolution over the cases filed with it earlier, upholding the Sec. Carino’s act of issuing the return-to-work return-to-work orders. Despite this, CHR continued hearing its case and held that the “striking teachers” “were denied due du e process of law;…they should not have have been replaced without a chance to reply to the administrative charges;” there had been violation of their civil and political rights which the Commission is empowered to investigate.”
ISSUE: Whether or not CHR has the power p ower to try and decide and determine certain specific cases such as the alleged human rights violation involving civil and political rights.
HELD: The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions fun ctions of the latter. The most that may be conceded co nceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not ad judication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.
Dizon v Eduardo G.R. No. L-59118 March 3, 1988 C. J. Teehankee Facts: Eduardo Dizon, a 30 year old businessman, and Isabel Ramos, 22 years and a former architecture student, disappeared during Martial Law. The two had been arrested with others by the military, detained in the military camp, and then claimed by the military to have been released after nine days. But they were not released to their parents, who had been visiting them, and were never seen or heard from by anyone since then. The application for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus had been filed by petitioners, Juan Dizon and Soledad Ramos, on behalf of their son, Eduardo Dizon and their daughter, Isabel Ramos, respectively, who were arrested by Philippine Con stabulary of the Pampanga PC Command then led by respondent Provincial Commander Col. Teddy Carian at, Sta. Ana, Pampanga without warrant of arrest or Presidential Order of Arrest. They were detained by the respondents at the PC Stockade at San Fernando, Pampanga under the jurisdiction of respondents Brig. Gen. Vicente Eduardo, then Regional Commander of the area, holding office at Camp Olivas, and Col. Teddy Carian for interrogation and investigation without assistance of counsel. The Court issued the writ of habeas corpus on December 29, 1981. In the return of the writ filed on behalf of respondents on January 5,1982, by then Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, and verified by respondent, then Provincial Commander Col. Carian, respondents insisted that the detainees were indeed released on September 24,1981, and submitted the supporting affidavits of the men assigned with respondent Carian's Provincial Headq uarters. Respondents denied petitioners' allegation of falsification of the detainees' signatures on their release papers, claiming that the same were signed in their presence and asked for dismissal of the petition. Jose Diokno, as counsel for the petitioners, invoked the United Nations General Assembly Resolution to stop the practice of enforced disappearances. H e also posed several questions to the Court. Issues: 1. Do petitioners have the burden in law of proving that the detainees are still detained by respondents or does the burden shift to respondents of proving that they did release the detainees? 2. If respondents have the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that they released the detainees, have they in fact discharged that burden in this case? 3. If respondents have not satisfied the Court that they released the detainees, but nevertheless refuse or are unable to produce their bodies, what relief may the Court grant petitioners? Held: respondents, No, reinvestigation by the CHR Case remanded to CHR for further investigation.
Ratio: 1. The general rule in a number of cases that the release of a detained person renders the petition for habeas corpus moot and academic. Respondents make such a plea in line with their return that they had released the desaparecidos after nine days. But their return begs the qu estion. If the release of the detainees is an established fact and not in dispute, they do not continue to be missing persons or desaparecidos. Where, however, there are grounds for grave doubts about the alleged release of the detainees, where the standard and prescribed procedure in effecting the release has not been followed, then the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence the alleged release is shifted to the respondents. Release is an affirmative defense and "each party must prove his own affirmative allegations," just as the burden of proof of self-defense in a killing rests on the accused. Moreover, evidence of release lies particularly within respondents' power. 2. Diokno claimed that signatures of the detainees on their release papers were falsified. He submitted specimens of Dizon’s signatures and compared it to signatures on documents that respondents themselves submitted. He concluded that they were markedly different from the signatures on their supposed release certificates. With respect to Eduardo Dizon , Diokno noted particularly the very poor line quality of Dizon's signature on the release certificate when compared to the speed and freedom of his signature on his voter's application form. The Solicitor General, in turn, disputed Diokno's conclusions about the falsity of the detainees' signatures on the release certificates and questions the reliability of the specimen signatures used, adding that "it is not possible to make any comparison of signatures for the purpose of determining genuineness on the basis of xerox copies.” The Court also noted that the respondents did not follow the prescribed standard procedure for releasing detainees. 1. The respondents did not release the detainees to their parents though the latter had been visiting them and, in fact Dizon's father was in the camp on the very day he was supposedly released. 2. Respondent Carian did not report the supposed releases to the Ministry of Defense or General Eduardo 3. Respondent Carian's command could not readily furnish copies of the detainees' release certificates to their parents when the latter asked for them. 4. Respondent Col. Carian had no authority, inherent or delegated, to release the detainees. Carian also claimed to release them under the pretext that they would act as spies for the military. He knew that the probability of the detai nees' keeping their supposed bargain was remote. Yet, he took no precautions to insure compliance. Worse, when they broke the supposed bargain by failing to report as he says they agreed to, he took no steps to look for them. 3. Court can’t grant petitioners’ relief. Petitioners' charges of falsification of the detainees' alleged signatures on the certificates of release, compounded by the irregularities and failure of respondents to follow the prescribed procedure in effecting the release for purposes of authentication and to produce and furnish the parents upon request copies of the release certificates need thorough investigation. It is not a trier of facts, nor does it have the means and facilities to conduct such investigation of the grave charges at bar as well as of the whereabouts and fate of the desaparecidos. More, the 1987 Constitution which was overwhel mingly ratified on February 2,1987 expressly mandated the creation of the Commission on Human Rights. The Constitution vested the Commission on Human Rights with broader powers than its predecessor committee, such as to
investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. Hence the case was referred here.
EPZA vs. Commission on Human Rights Case Digest
EPZA vs. Commission on Human Rights G.R. No. 101476 April 14, 1992 Facts: EPZA (petitioner) purchase a parcel of land from Filoil Refinery Corporation, and before petitioner could take possession of the area, several individuals had entered the premises and planted agricultural products therein without permission from EPZA or its predecessor, Filoil. EPZA paid a P10,000-financial-assistance to those who accepted the same and signed quitclaims. Among them were private respondents (TERESITA VALLES, LORETO ALEDIA). Ten years later, respondent Teresita, Loreto and Pedro, filed in the respondent Commission on Human Rights (CHR) a joint complaint praying for "justice and other reliefs and remedies". Alleged in their complaint was the information that EPZA bulldozed the area with acts in violation of their human rights. CHR issued an Order of injunction commanding EPZA to desist from committing such acts . Two weeks later, EPZA again bulldozed the area. They allegedly handcuffed private respondent Teresita Valles, pointed their firearms at the other respondents, and fired a shot in the air. CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista issued another injunction Order reiterating her first order and expanded it to include the Secretary of Public Works and Highways, the contractors, and their subordinates. EPZA filed in the CHR a motion to lift the Order of Injunction for lack of authority to issue injunctive writs and temporary restraining orders, but same was denied by the Commission (CHR). Hence, EPZA, filed in SC this special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, alleging that the CHR acted in excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion. A temporary restraining order (TRO) was issued ordering the CHR to cease and desist from enforcing and/or implementing the questioned injunction orders. In its comment on the petition, the CHR asked for the immediate lifting of the restraining order. The CHR contends that it’s principal function under Section 18, Art. 13 of t he 1987 Constitution, "is not limited to mere investigation" because it is mandated, among others to provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the under privileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection.
Issue: WON CHR have jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction or restraining order against supposed violators of human rights, to compel them to cease and desist from continuing the acts complained of.
Held: Petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. The orders of injunction issued by the respondent Commission on Human Right are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the TRO which this Court issued is made PERMANENT. In Hon. Isidro Cariño, et al. vs. Commission on Human Rights, et al., we held that the CHR is not a court of justice nor even a quasi-judicial body. “The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitely, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.”
The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, if that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law". It is never derived by implication. The "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a preliminary writ of injunction) which the CHR may seek from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued "by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. It may also be granted by the judge of a Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] in any action pending in an inferior court within his district." (Sec. 2, Rule 58, Rules of Court). A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending principal action, for the preservation or protection of the rights and interest of a party thereto, and for no other purpose.
CD Simon, Jr. vs. CHR Edit 0 1 Topic: Per sonal Di gni ty and H uman Rights (Sec. 11, 1987 Constitu tion) …
SIMON, JR. vs COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS G.R. No. 100150, January 5, 1994 FACTS:
On July 23, 1990, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) issued and o rder, directing the petitioners " to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending the resolution of the vendors/squatters complaint before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR. On September 10, 1990, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss questioning CHR's jurisdiction and supplemental motion to dismiss was filed on September 18, 1990 stating that Commissioners' authority should be understood as being confined only to the investigation of violations of civil and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated in this case were not civil and political rights, but their privilege to engage in business". On March 1, 1991, the CHR issued and Order denying petitioners' motion and supplemental motion to dismiss. And petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied also in an Order, dated April 25, 1991. The Petitioner filed a a petition for prohibition, praying for a restraining order and preliminary injunction. Petitioner also prayed to prohibit CHR from further hearing and investigating CHR Case No. 90-1580, entitled "Ferno, et.al vs. Quimpo, et.al". ISSUE: Is the issuance of an " order to desist" within the extent of the authority and power of the CRH? HELD: No, the issuance of an "order to desist" is not within the extent of authority and power of the CHR. Article XIII, Section 18(1), provides the power a nd functions of the CHR to " investigate , on its own or on complaint by any part, all forms of human rights violation, involving civil and political rights". The "order to desist" however is not investigatory in character but an adjudicative powe r that the it does not possess. The Constitutional provision directing the CHR to provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue an restraining order or writ of injunction, for it were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued by the Judge in any court in which the action is pending or by a Justice of the CA or of the SC. The writ prayed for the petition is granted. The CHR is hereby prohibited from further proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-1580.
