A PROJECT ON
INTERNAL AIDS TO INTERPRETATION
SUBMITTED TO MR. ABHISHEK TIWARI
SUBMITTED BY ANOOP KUMAR
ROLL NO. 11 UDAI PRATAP SINGH
ROLL NO. 68
DR. RAM MANOHAR LOHIYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY LUCKNOW.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I would like to take this opportunity to express my sincere thanks to Mr. Abhishek Tiwari, Faculty of Law, Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law University, and who gave me an opportunity to write on this topic and also gave his valuable suggestions to complete this project and without him this project would not have reached this shape. I would also like to thank my family, without their love and support this project would not have completed. Last but not the least; I would like to thank my friends who were very helpful throughout the completion of the project.
Date: 7th November, November, 2010
Anoop Kumar Roll no. 11
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CONTENTS.
INTRODUCTION KINDS OF INTERPRETATION INTERNAL AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION CONCLUSION. BIBLIOGRAPHY.
BIBLIOGRAPHY . •
Math Mathur ur,, D. N., N., Interpr Interpreta etati tion on of Statut Statutes, es, 1st Edn. Edn.,, 2006 2006,, Cent Centra rall Law Law Publications, Allahabad.
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Singh, Avtar, Introduction Avtar, Introduction to Interpretation of Statutes, Statutes, 2nd Edition Reprint 2007, Wadhwa and Company, Nagpur.
URLs. •
http://www.itatonline.org/interpretation/interpretation9.php
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http://www.scribd.com/doc/7118910/Interpretation-of-Statutes
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http://sixthformlaw.info/01_modules/mod2/2_2_3_stat_interp/05_internal_aids_.h tm
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INTRODUCTION
The term interpretation means “To give meaning to”. Governmental power has been divi divide ded d into into thre threee wing wingss name namely ly the the legi legisl slat atur ure, e, the the execu executi tive ve and the the judi judici ciar ary. y. Interpretation of statues to render justice is the primary function of the judiciary. It is the duty of the Court to interpret the Act and give meaning to each word of the Statute.
The most common rule of interpretation is that every part of the statute must be understood in a harmonious manner by reading and construing every part of it together. recedendum” means that you must not vary the words The maxim “ A Verbis legis non est recedendum” of the statute while interpreting it. The object of interp interpret retati ation on of statut statutes es is to determ determine ine the intent intention ion of the legislature conveyed expressly or impliedly in the language used. In Santi swarup Sarkar v pradeep kumar sarkar 1 , the Supreme Court held that if two interpretations are possible of the same statute, the one which validates the statute must be preferred.
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AIR 1997 Cal 197
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KINDS OF INTERPRETATION.
Ther Theree are are gene genera rall lly y two two kind kind of inte interp rpre reta tati tion; on; lite litera rall inte interp rpre reta tati tion on and and logi logica call interpretation. Literal interpretation
Giving words their ordinary and natural meaning is known as literal interpretation or litera legis. legis. It is the duty of the court not to modify the language of the Act and if such meaning is clear and unambiguous, effect should be given to the provisions of a statute whatever may be the consequence. The idea behind such a principle is that the legislature, being the supreme law making body must know what it intends in the words of the statute. Literal interpretation has been called the safest rule because the legislature’s intention can be deduced only from the language through which it has expressed itself. The bare words of the Act must be construed to get the meaning of the statute and one need need not not prob probee into into the the inte intent ntio ion n of the the legi legisl slat atur ure. e. The The elem element entar ary y rule rule of construction is that the language must be construed in its grammatical and literal sense and hence it is termed as litera legis or litera script. The Golden Rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordina ordinary ry meanin meaning. g. This This interp interpret retati ation on is suprem supremee and is called called the golden golden rule rule of interpretation. In Ramanjaya In Ramanjaya Singh v Baijnath Singh2 , the Election tribunal set aside the election of the appellant under s 123(7) of the Representation of People’s Act, 1951 on the 2
(1955) 1 SCR 671 : AIR 1954 SC 749.
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grounds that the appellant had employed more persons than prescribed for electioneering purpose. The appellant contended that the excess employees were paid by his father and hence hence were were not empl employ oyed ed by him. him. The The Supr Suprem emee Court Court foll followe owed d the the gram gramma mati tica call interpretation of S 123(7) and termed the excess employees as volunteers. In Maqbool Hussain v State of Bombay3 , the appellant, a citizen of India, on arrival at an airport did not declare that he brought gold with him. Gold, found in his possession during search in violation of government notification, was confiscated under S 167 (8) Sea Customs Act, 1878. He was charged under sec. 8 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947. The appellant pleaded that his trial under the Act was violative of Art 20(2) of the constitution relating to double jeopardy as he was already punished for his act by was of confiscation of the gold. It was held by the Supreme Court that the sea customs authority is not a court or a judicial tribunal and the confiscation is not a penalty. Consequently his trial was valid under the Ac t of 1947. In Madan Mohan v K.Chandrashekara, it was held that when a statute contains strict and stringent provisions, it must be literally and strictly construed to promote the object of the act. 4 Bhavnagar agar Univers University ity v Palita Palitana na Sugar Sugar Mills Mills Pvt Ltd , it was In Bhavn was held held that that
according to the fundamental principles of construction the statute should be read as a whole, then chapter by chapter, section by section and then word by word.
In Municipal Board v State Transport Authority, Rajasthan5 , an application against the change of location of a bus stand could be made within 30 days of receipt of order of regional transport authority according to s 64 A of the Motor vehicles Act, 1939. The application was moved after 30 days on the contention that statute must be read as “30 days from the knowledge of the order” The Suprem Supremee Court Court held held that that litera literall interp interpret retati ation on must must be made made and hence hence rejected the application as invalid.
Exceptions to the rule of literal interpretation 3
[1953] S.C.R. 730. 2002 AIR SCW 4939. 5 [1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 373. 4
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Generally a statute must be interpreted in its grammatical sense but under the following circumstances it is not possible:Logical defects A) ambi ambigu guit ity y B) incon inconsi sist sten ency cy C) incomp incomplet letene eness ss or lacuna lacunaee D) unreas unreasonab onablen leness ess
Logical interpretation
If the words of a statute give rise to two or more construction, then the construction which validates validates the object of the Act must be given effect while interpreti interpreting. ng. It is better to validate a thing than to invalidate it or it is better the Act prevails than perish. The purpose of construction is to ascertain the intention of the parliament.
The mischief rule
The misch mischief ief rule rule of interp interpret retati ation on origin originate ated d in Heydon’ Heydon’ss case. If ther theree are are two two interp interpret retati ations ons possib possible le for the materi material al words words of a statut statute, e, then then for sure and true true interpretation there are certain considerations in the form of questions. The following questions must b considered: 1. What What was the the common common law law before before maki making ng the Act? Act? 2. What What was the mischi mischief ef and defect defect for which which the common common law did not provi provide de a remedy? 3. What is is the remedy remedy resolved resolved by by the parliam parliament ent to cure cure the disease disease of the the common common wealth? 4. The The true true rea reaso son n of the the rem remed edy. y. The judge should always try to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. The mischief rule says that the intent of the legislature behind the enactment should be followed.
Rule of casus omissus
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Generally, the court is bound to harmonize the various provisions of an Act passed by the legislature during interpretation so that repugnancy is avoided. Sometimes certain matters might have been omitted in a statute. In such cases, they cannot be added by construction as it amounts to making of laws or amending which is a function of legislature. A new provision cannot be added in a statute giving it meaning not otherwise found therein. A word omitted from the language of the statute, but within the general scope of the statute, and omitted due to inadvertence is known as Casus Omissus. In Padma In Padma Sundara Rao v State of Tamil Nadu 6 it was held that the cassus omissus cannot be supplied by the court except in the case of a clear necessity and when reason for it is found within the four corners of the statute itself.
Rule of Ejusdem Generis
Ejusdem generis means “of the same kind”. Generally particular words are given their natural meaning provided the context does not require otherwise. If general words follow particular words pertaining to a class, category or genus then it is construed that general words are limited to mean the person or thing of the same general class, category or genus as those particularly exposed. Eg: if the husband asks the wife to buy bread, milk milk and cake and if the wife wife buys jam along with them, it is not invalidated merely because of not specifying it but is valid because it is of the same kind. The basic rule is that if the legislature intended general words to be used in unrestricted sense, then it need not have used particular words at all. This rule is not of universal application. In Devendra In Devendra Surti v State of Gujarat 7 , under s2 (4) of the Bombay shops shops and Establ Establish ishmen ments ts Act, Act, 1948 1948 the term term commer commercia ciall establ establish ishmen mentt means means “an establishments which carries any trade, business or profession”. Here the word profession is associated to business or trade and hence a private doctor’s clinic cannot be included in the above definitions as under the rule of Ejusdem Generis. In Grasim Industries Ltd v Collec Collector tor of Custom Customs, s, Bombay Bombay8 , the the rule rule of Ejus Ejusde dem m Gener Generis is is appl applic icab able le when when particular words pertaining to a class, category or genus are followed by general words. 6
(2002) 3 SCC 533. [1969] 1 SCR 235. 8 AIR 2002 SC 1706. 7
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In such a case the general words are construed as limited to things of the same kind as those specified. Every clause of a statute must be construed with reference to other clauses of the Act.
INTERNAL AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION Long title
A long title of a Legislation may not control, circumscribe or widen the scope of the legislation, if the provisions thereof are otherwise clear and unambiguous, but if the terms of the legislation are capable of both a wider and a narrower construction, that construction which would be in tune with the avowed object manifested in the preamble or declared in the long title, ought to be accepted9. Exemptions
An exemption clause in a taxing statute must be, as far as possible, liberally construed and in favour of the assessee, provided no violence is done to the language used10. “It is true that an exemption provision should be liberally construed, but this does not mean that such liberal construction should be made even by doing violence to the plain meaning of such exemption provision. Liberal construction will be made wherever it is possible to be made without impairing the legislative requirement and the spirit of the provision.”11 Provisos
The normal function of a proviso is to except and deal with a case which would otherw otherwise ise fall within within the genera generall languag languagee of the main enactm enactment, ent, and its its effect effect is confined to that case.
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Urmila Bala Dasi vs. Probodh Chandra Ghosh (1990) 184 ITR 604 (Cal) CIT vs. Dungarmal Tainwala (1991) 191 ITR 445 ( Patna) 11 Petron Engineering Construction Construction Pvt. Ltd. vs. CBDT (1989) 175 ITR 523 (SC) 10
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“The “The main main func functi tion on of a prov provis iso o is to carv carvee out an excep excepti tion on to the the main main enactment. It cannot, normally, be so interpreted as to set at naught the real object of the main enactment.”12. A proviso cannot be held to control the main enactment or to withdraw, by mere impl implic icat atio ion, n, any any part part of what what the the main main prov provis isio ion n has give given. n. But But it canno cannott enabl enablee something to be done which is not to be found in the enacting clause itself, on the ground that otherwise the proviso would be meaningless and senseless. “There may be cases in which the language of the statute may be so clear that a proviso proviso may be construed as a substantiv substantivee clause. clause. But whether whether a proviso proviso is construed construed as restricting the main provision or as a substantive clause, it cannot be divorced from the provision to which it stands as a proviso. It must be construed harmoniously with the main enactment.”13 Explanation
Sometimes an Explanation is added to a section to elaborate upon and explain the meaning of the words appearing in the section. Such an Explanation becomes an integral part of the main enactment. “An Explanation to a statutory provision has to be read with the main provision to which it is added as an Explanation. An Explanation appended to a section or a subsection becomes an integral part of it and has no independent existence apart from it. There is, in the eye of law, only one enactment, of which both the section or sub-section and the Explanation are two inseparable parts. In the absence of anything repugnant in the subject or context, the words and expressions used in the Explanation are to be given the same meaning as given to them in the main provision itself.”14 The purpose of an Explanation is not to limit the scope of the main section. An Explanation is quite different in nature from a proviso; the latter excludes, excepts and restr restrict ictss while while the former former explain explains, s, clarif clarifies ies or subtrac subtracts ts or includ includes es someth something ing by introducing a legal fiction.
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CIT vs. Pyarilal Kasam Manji & Co. 198 ITR 110 (Ori.) CIT vs. Ajax Products Ltd. (1964) 55 ITR 741 (SC)] 14 CIT vs. Reunion Engineering Co. (P) Ltd. (1993) 203 ITR 274 (Bom.) 13
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“An Explanation may be appended to a section to explain the meaning of the words used in the section. There is no presumption that an Explanation which is inserted subsequently introduces something new which was not present in the section before. Ordinarily, an Explanation is inserted to clear up any ambiguity in the section and it should be so read as to harmonise it with the section and to clear up any ambiguity in the main section.”15. “The “The norm normal al prin princi cipl plee in cons constr trui uing ng an Expl Explan anat atio ion n is to unde unders rsta tand nd it as explaining the meaning of the provision to which it is added; the Explanation does not enlarge or limit the provision, unless the Explanation purports to be a definition or a deeming clause; if the intention of the Legislature is not fully conveyed earlier or there has been a misconception about the scope of a provision, the Legislature steps in to explain the purport of the provision; such an Explanation has to be given effect to, as pointing out the real meaning of the provision all along.”16. Non-obstante clauses
“A non-obstante clause is usually used in a provision p rovision to indicate that the provision should prevail despite anything to the contrary in the provision mentioned in such nonobstante clause. In case there is any inconsistency or a departure between the nonobstante clause and another provision, one of the objects of such a clause is to indicate that it is the non-obstante clause which would prevail over the other clause.”17 Marginal notes and headings
“The “The marg margin inal al note note to a sect sectio ion n cann cannot ot be refe referr rred ed to for for the the purp purpos osee of construing the section but it can certainly be relied upon as indicating the drift of the section or to show what the section is dealing with. It cannot control the interpretation of the words of a secti section, on, partic particula ularly rly when the language language of the section section is clear and unambiguous but, being part of the statute, it prima facie furnishes some clue as to the meaning and purpose of the section.”18.
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CIT vs. Voltas Ltd. (1994) 205 ITR 569 (Bom) CIT vs. Mangalore Ganesh Beedi Works 193 ITR 77 (Kar) 17 Parasuramaiah vs. Lakshamma AIR 1965 AP 220. 18 K.P. Varghese vs. ITO 131 ITR 597 (SC) 16
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“Marginal notes are not decisive in interpreting a substantive provision of law, but, in case of doubt, they can be relied upon as one of the aids for construction.” 19 Preamble
The Act Starts with a preamble and is generally small. The main objective and purpose of the Act are found in the Preamble of the Statute. “Preamble is the Act in a nutshell. It is a preparatory statement. It contains the recitals showing the reason for enactment of the Act. If the language of the Act is clear the preamble must be ignored. The preamble is an intrinsic aid in the interpretation of an ambiguous act. In Kashi In Kashi Prasad v State20, the court held that even though the preamble cannot be used to defeat the enacting clauses of a statute, it can be treated as a key for the interpretation of the statute.
Punctuation
“There “There are three three activi activitie tiess serial serially ly set out in that that sub-cl sub-claus ause, e, namely namely,, constru constructi ction, on, manufacture or production. A comma is, therefore, legitimately and as per the rules of gramma grammar, r, requir required ed after after the first first activity activity to separa separate te it from from the second second activi activity ty of manufacture. Since the second activity is followed by the word “or”, no comma is requir required ed after after the second second activi activity ty to separa separate te it from from the third third activi activity ty.. Theref Therefore ore,, punctu punctuati ation on is put as gramma grammatic ticall ally y requir required. ed. It does not disclo disclose se any intent intention ion of providing for a separate kind of business altogether. Punctuation, in any case, is a minor element in the constructio construction n of a statute. statute. Only when a statute statute is carefully carefully punctuated punctuated and there is no doubt about its meaning can weight be given to punctuation. It cannot, howev however er,, be regar regarde ded d as a cont contro roll llin ing g elem elemen entt for for dete determ rmin inin ing g the the meani meaning ng of a statute.”21 Definition clause and undefined words (a) Judicially defined words
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R.B. Shreeram Religious & Charitable Trust vs. CIT (1988) 172 ITR 373 (Bom) 1980 BB CJ 612 21 Hindustan Construction vs. CIT (1994) 208 ITR 291 (Bom) 20
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“It has long been a well-established principle to be applied in the construction of an Act of Parliament that where a word of doubtful meaning has received a clear judicial interpretation, the subsequent statute which incorporates the same word or the same phrase in a similar context, must be construed so that the word or phrase is interpreted according to the meaning that has previously been assigned to it.”22 “Interpretation of a provision in a taxing statute rendered years back and accepted and acted upon by the department should not be easily departed from.”23 (b) Rule of Ejusdem generis
The maxim ejusdem generis serves to restrict the meaning of a general word to thin things gs or matt matter erss of the the same same genus genus as the the prec preced edin ing g parti particu cula larr word words. s. It is well well recognised rule of construction that when two or more words which are susceptible of analogous meaning are coupled together noscitur a sociis, they are understood to be used in their cognate sense. They take their colour from each other that is, the more general is restricted to a sense analogous to the less general. In order to attract the principle of ejusdem generis, it is essential that a distinct genus or category must be discernible in the words under examination. Where the statute imposes restriction on advertisement, publicity and sales p romotion, the expression “sales prom promot otio ion” n” cann cannot ot incl includ udee sell sellin ing g expen expense sess incu incurr rred ed in the the ordi ordina nary ry cour course se of business24. Simil Similarl arly, y, the words words “other “other statio stationar nary y plant” plant” must must be constr construed ued ejusde ejusdem m generis with switchgears and transformers. transformers.25 The rule of ejusdem generis is to be applied “with caution” and “not pushed too far”. It may not be interpreted too narrowly and unnecessarily if broad based genus could be found so as to avoid cutting down words to dwarf size.26 Schedule
The Schedules Schedules appended to a statute form part of it. They are generally generally added to avoid encumbering the statute with matters of excessive details, guidelines to work out 22
Barras vs. Aberdeen Steam Trawling and Fishing Co. Ltd. (1933) AC 402 (HL) CIT vs. Balkrishna Malhotra (1971) 81 ITR 759 (SC) 24 CIT vs. Statesman Ltd. (1992) 198 ITR 582 ( Cal .) Cal .) 25 [CIT vs. Anglo India Jute Mills Co. Ltd. (1993) 202 ITR 104 (Cal.) 26 U.P. State Electricity State Electricity Board vs. Hari Shanker Jain AIR 1979 (SC) 65 23
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the policy of the statute, transitory provisions, rules and forms which need frequent amendment amendment and the like. Much importance importance is not given to the forms forms unless they contain requirements of a mandatory nature.
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CONCLUSION.
Statute generally means the law or the Act of the legislature authority. The general rule of the interpretation is that statutes must prima facie be given this ordinary meaning. If the words words are are clea clear, r, free free from from ambi ambigu guit ity y ther theree is no need need to refe referr to othe otherr mean meanss of interpretation. But if the words are vague and ambiguous then internal aid may be sought for interpretation.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY . •
Math Mathur ur,, D. N., N., Interpr Interpreta etati tion on of Statut Statutes, es, 1st Edn. Edn.,, 2006 2006,, Cent Centra rall Law Law Publications, Allahabad.
•
Singh, Avtar, Introduction Avtar, Introduction to Interpretation of Statutes, Statutes, 2nd Edition Reprint 2007, Wadhwa and Company, Nagpur.
URLs. •
http://www.itatonline.org/interpretation/interpretation9.php
•
http://www.scribd.com/doc/7118910/Interpretation-of-Statutes
•
http://sixthformlaw.info/01_modules/mod2/2_2_3_stat_interp/05_internal_aids_.h tm
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