JURISDICTION
CIVIL PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Judge Mike Asuncion
OUTLINE OF JURISDICTION SUPREME COURT
I.
Original Jurisdiction A. Exclusive 1. Petitions for certiorari , prohibition and mandamus against the following: a. Court of Appeals - R.A. No. 296 (Judiciary (Judiciary Act of 1948), Sec. 17 i b. Sandiganbayan - PD 1606 (amending Sandiganbayan Law), Law), Sec. 7 ii as amended by R.A. No. 8249, Sec. 5 c.
Court of Tax Appeals en banc - R.A. No. 1125, Sec. 19 as amended by R.A. No. 9282, Sec. 12 iii
d. Commission on Elections en banc - Constitution, Art. IX-A, Sec. 7; iv Aratuc v. Comelec, G.R. No. 49705-09, February 8, 1979 e. Commission on Audit - Constitution, Constitution, Art. Art. IX-A, IX-A, Sec. 7 v f. Ombudsman in criminal criminal and non-administrative disciplinary cases - Fabian v. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742, September 16, 1998 2. Sitting en banc, it shall be the sole judge j udge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications qua lifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose. - Constitution, Article VII, Sec. 4 3. Review, in an appropriate proceeding proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. Constitution, Article VII, Sec. 18 B. Concurrent 1. with the Court of Appeals a. Petitions for certiorari , prohibition and mandamus against the Civil Service Commission - R.A. No 7902 (Act Expanding Jurisdiction of the CA by amending Sec. 9 of BP 129) vi b. Petitions for certiorari , prohibition and mandamus against the National Labor Relations Commission under the Labor Code - B.P. 129, Sec. 9, as amended by R.A. No. 7902; vii St. Martin ’ s Funeral Homes v. NLRC, G.R. No. 130866, September 16, 1998 c.
Petitions for writ of kalikasan - A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, Part III, Rule 7, Sec. 3 viii
2. with the Court of Appeals Appeals and Regional Trial Courts a. Petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto - R.A. 7902 (amending Sec. 9 of BP 129) and R.A. 5440 (amending R.A. 296) b. Actions brought to prevent and restrain restrain violations of laws concerning monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade - R.A. No. 296, Sec. 17 as amended by R.A. No. 5440 ix c. Petition for writ of continuing mandamus on environmental cases - A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, Part III, Rule 8, Sec. 2 x 3. with the the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan and Regional Trial Courts a. Petitions for certiorari , prohibition and mandamus relating to an act or omission of a MTC or of a corporation, a board, an officer, or person - Constitution, Article VIII, Sec. 5(1) and (2); xi Rule 65 as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC dated December 12, 2007 xii b. Petitions for issuance of writ writ of amparo - Sec. 3, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC (The Rule on the Writ of xiii Amparo) c. Petitions for issuance of writ of habeas data - Sec. 3, A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC (The Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data)xiv 4. with the Regional Trial Courts a. Actions affecting ambassadors and other public ministers and consuls - Constitution, Art. Art. VIII, Sec. xv xvi 5(1); B..P. Blg. 129, Sec. 21(2) II. Appellate Jurisdiction xvii meikimouse
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JURISDICTION
CIVIL PROCEDURE
- No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence - Constitution, Article VI, Section 30 A. Ordinary Appeal by Notice of Appeal From the Court of Appeals in all criminal cases involving offences for which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment; or a lesser penalty is imposed for offenses committed on the same occasion or which arose out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more severe offenses for which the penalty of death is imposed - Sec. 13(c), Rule 124 as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC; Sec. 13(b), Rule 124; xviii People v. Mateo, G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004 B. By Petition for Review on Certiorari 1. Appeals from the Court of Appeals - R.A. No. 296, Sec. 17 as amended by R.A. R.A. No. 5440; Constitution, Constitution, Article VIII, Sec. 5(2); Rule 45 2. Appeals from the Sandiganbayan on pure questions questions of law, except where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death - P.D. No. 1606, Sec. 7 (supra) as amended by R.A. No. 8249 (supra); Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 50581-50617, January 20, 1982; Rule 45 3. Appeals from judgments judgments or final orders of the RTCs exercising original original jurisdiction in the following: a. All cases in which which the constitutionality constitutionality or validity of of any treaty, treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question b. All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll or any penalty imposed in relation thereto c.
All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue
d. All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved - Constitution, Article VIII, Sec. 5(2-a, b, c, e); R.A. No. 296, Sec. 17 as amended; B.P. Blg. 129, Sec. 9(3); Rule 45; Rule 41, Sec. 2(c); Rule 122, Sec. 3(e) e. Appeals from decisions or final resolutions of the Court of Tax Appeals en banc - Rule 16, Sec. 1, A.M. No. 05-11-07-CTA or The Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals; xix Sec. 1, Rule 45 as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC dated December 12, 2007; R.A. No. 9282 C. By Special Civil Action of Certiorari (Rule 64) against the following: 1. Commission on Elections - Constitution, Article IX-A, Sec. 7; Aratuc v. Comelec, G.R. No. 49705-09, February 8, 1979 2. Commission on Audit - ibid . COURT OF APPEALS
I.
Original Jurisdiction A. Exclusive 1. Actions for annulment of judgment of Regional Trial Court - B.P. Blg. 129, Sec. 9(2); Rule 47 2. Petitions for certiorari , prohibition and mandamus involving an act or omission of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law - Rule 65, Sec. 4 as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC dated December 12, 2007 B. Concurrent 1. with the Supreme Court a. Petitions for certiorari , prohibition and mandamus against the Civil Service Commission - R.A. No 7902 b. Petitions for certiorari , prohibition and mandamus against the National Labor Relations Commission under the Labor Code - B.P. 129, Sec. 9, as amended by R.A. No. 7902; St. Martin ’ s Funeral Homes v. NLRC, G.R. No. 130866, September 16, 1998 c.
Petitions for writ of kalikasan - A.M. A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC dated dated
2. with the Supreme Court Court and Regional Trial Courts a. Petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto b. Actions brought to prevent and restrain restrain violations of laws concerning monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade - R.A. No. 296, Sec. 17 as amended by R.A. No. 5440 c.
Petition for writ of continuing mandamus on environmental environmental cases - A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC
3. with the the Supreme Court, Sandiganbayan and Regional Trial Courts
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JURISDICTION
CIVIL PROCEDURE
- No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence - Constitution, Article VI, Section 30 A. Ordinary Appeal by Notice of Appeal From the Court of Appeals in all criminal cases involving offences for which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment; or a lesser penalty is imposed for offenses committed on the same occasion or which arose out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more severe offenses for which the penalty of death is imposed - Sec. 13(c), Rule 124 as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC; Sec. 13(b), Rule 124; xviii People v. Mateo, G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004 B. By Petition for Review on Certiorari 1. Appeals from the Court of Appeals - R.A. No. 296, Sec. 17 as amended by R.A. R.A. No. 5440; Constitution, Constitution, Article VIII, Sec. 5(2); Rule 45 2. Appeals from the Sandiganbayan on pure questions questions of law, except where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death - P.D. No. 1606, Sec. 7 (supra) as amended by R.A. No. 8249 (supra); Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 50581-50617, January 20, 1982; Rule 45 3. Appeals from judgments judgments or final orders of the RTCs exercising original original jurisdiction in the following: a. All cases in which which the constitutionality constitutionality or validity of of any treaty, treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question b. All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll or any penalty imposed in relation thereto c.
All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue
d. All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved - Constitution, Article VIII, Sec. 5(2-a, b, c, e); R.A. No. 296, Sec. 17 as amended; B.P. Blg. 129, Sec. 9(3); Rule 45; Rule 41, Sec. 2(c); Rule 122, Sec. 3(e) e. Appeals from decisions or final resolutions of the Court of Tax Appeals en banc - Rule 16, Sec. 1, A.M. No. 05-11-07-CTA or The Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals; xix Sec. 1, Rule 45 as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC dated December 12, 2007; R.A. No. 9282 C. By Special Civil Action of Certiorari (Rule 64) against the following: 1. Commission on Elections - Constitution, Article IX-A, Sec. 7; Aratuc v. Comelec, G.R. No. 49705-09, February 8, 1979 2. Commission on Audit - ibid . COURT OF APPEALS
I.
Original Jurisdiction A. Exclusive 1. Actions for annulment of judgment of Regional Trial Court - B.P. Blg. 129, Sec. 9(2); Rule 47 2. Petitions for certiorari , prohibition and mandamus involving an act or omission of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law - Rule 65, Sec. 4 as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC dated December 12, 2007 B. Concurrent 1. with the Supreme Court a. Petitions for certiorari , prohibition and mandamus against the Civil Service Commission - R.A. No 7902 b. Petitions for certiorari , prohibition and mandamus against the National Labor Relations Commission under the Labor Code - B.P. 129, Sec. 9, as amended by R.A. No. 7902; St. Martin ’ s Funeral Homes v. NLRC, G.R. No. 130866, September 16, 1998 c.
Petitions for writ of kalikasan - A.M. A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC dated dated
2. with the Supreme Court Court and Regional Trial Courts a. Petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto b. Actions brought to prevent and restrain restrain violations of laws concerning monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade - R.A. No. 296, Sec. 17 as amended by R.A. No. 5440 c.
Petition for writ of continuing mandamus on environmental environmental cases - A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC
3. with the the Supreme Court, Sandiganbayan and Regional Trial Courts
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JURISDICTION
CIVIL PROCEDURE
a. Petitions for certiorari , prohibition and mandamus relating to an act or omission of a MTC or of a corporation, a board, an officer, or person - Constitution, Article VIII, Sec. 5(1) and (2); A.M. No. 077-12-SC dated December 12, 2007 b. Petitions for issuance of writ writ of amparo - Sec. 3, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC (The Rule on the Writ of Amparo) c.
Petitions for issuance of writ of habeas data - Sec. 3, A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC
II. Appellate Jurisdiction A. Ordinary Appeal by Notice of Appeal or with Record on Appeal 1. Appeals from the Regional Trial Courts except those appealable to the Supreme Court and Sandiganbayan 2. Appeals from the Regional Trial Courts on constitutional, tax, jurisdictional questions involving questions questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law or or which should be appealed first to the CA - R.A. No. 296, Sec. 17, par. 4.4, as amended 3. Appeals from the the decisions and and final orders orders of the the Family Courts Courts - R.A. R.A. No. 8369, Sec. 14 4. Appeals from the Regional Trial Courts where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment or where a lesser penalty is imposed but for offenses committed on the same occasion or which arose out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed - Rule 122, Sec. 3(c) as amended by A.M. No. 005-03-SC; People v. Mateo, G.R. Nos. 147678-8, July 7, 2004 5. Direct appeal from land registration and cadastral cases decided by MTCs, MTCCs and MCTCs based on their delegated jurisdiction - B.P. Blg. 129, Sec. 34 as amended by R.A. No. 7691 B. Special civil action of certiorari certiorari (Rule 65) against decisions and and final resolutions of the NLRC - A.M. No. 99-201-SC; St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC, G.R. No. 13086, September 16, 1998; Torres v. Specialized Packaging Dev. Corp., G.R. No. 149634, July 6, 2004 C. Automatic review in cases where the Regional Trial Courts impose the death penalty - Secs. 3(d) and 10, Rule 122 as amended by b y A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC; People v. Mateo, G.R. Nos. 147678-8, July 7, 2004 D. Petition for Review 1. Appeals from the Civil Service Commission - R.A. No. 7902; Rule 43 2. Appeals from the Regional Trial Courts in cases appealed from the the MTCs, MTCCs MTCCs and MCTCs which are not a matter of right - B.P. Blg. 129, Sec. 22; Rule 42; Rule 122, Sec. 3(b) 3. Appeals from awards, awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of, or authorised by, quasi-judicial quasi-judicial agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial functions, among which are: a. Securities and Exchange Commission b. Office of the President c. Land Registration Authority d. Social Security Commission e. Civil Aeronautics Board f. Intellectual Property Office g. National Electrification Administration h. Energy Regulatory Board i. National Telecommunications Commission j. Department of Agrarian Reform Reform under R.A. No. 6657 k. Government Service Insurance System l. Employees Compensation Commission m. Agricultural Inventions Board n. Insurance Commission o. Philippine Atomic Energy Commission p. Board of Investments q. Construction Industry Arbitration Commission r. Voluntary arbitrators authorised by law s. Decisions of Special Agrarian Courts 4. Appeals from the the National Commission Commission on Indigenous Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) (NCIP) - R.A. No. 8371, Sec. 67 5. Appeals from the Office of the the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases cases - A.M. No. 99-2-01-SC; Fabian v. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742, September 16, 1998
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JURISDICTION
CIVIL PROCEDURE
SANDIGANBAYAN - P.D. No. 1606, Sec. 4 as amended by R.A. 8249, Sec. 4
I.
Original Jurisdiction A. Exclusive 1. Violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; R.A. No. 1379; and Chapter II, Sec. 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code (Bribery), where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: a. Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade “27” and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (R.A. No. 6758), specifically including: i.
Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and other provincial department heads
ii.
City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers and other city department heads iii. Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher iv. Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank v.
Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher
vi. City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor vii. Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or -controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations b. Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade “27” and up under R.A. No. 6758 c.
Members of the Judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution
d. Chairmen and Members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution e. All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under R.A. No. 6758 2. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in no. 1 above in relation to their office 3. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, 14-A (Sequestration Cases) - R.A. No. 7975, Sec. 2 as amended by R.A. No. 8249 In case none of the accused is occupying the above positions, the original jurisdiction shall be vested in the proper RTC or MTC, etc., as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in B.P. Blg. 129, as amended - R.A. No. 7975, Sec. 2 as amended by R.A. No. 8249 In case there is no specific allegation of facts showing that the offense was committed in relation to the public office of the accused, the original jurisdiction shall also be vested in the proper RTC or MTC, etc., as the case may be - Lacson v. Executive Secretary , G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999 4. Violation of R.A. No. 9160 (Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001) as amended by R.A. No. 9194, when committed by public officers and private persons who are in conspiracy with such public officers B. Concurrent with the Supreme Court Petitions for issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, habeas corpus, injunction and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, including quo warranto arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A - Ibid, as amended by R.A. No. 8249 C. Concurrent with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Courts 1. Petitions for writ of amparo and writ of habeas data when action concerns public data files of government offices - Sec. 3, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC (The Rule on the Writ of Amparo); Sec. 3, A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC 2. Petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus relating to an act or omission of a Municipal Trial Court, corporation, board, officer or person - Sec. 4, Rule 65 as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC II. Exclusive Appellate Jurisdiction Final judgments, resolutions or orders of RTCs whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction under P.D. No. 1606, as amended - R.A. No. 8249, Sec. 5 COURT OF TAX APPEALS - R.A. No. 9282, Section 7, amending Section 1 of R.A. No. 1125 I.
Exclusive Appellate Jurisdiction to Review by Appeal meikimouse
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JURISDICTION
CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue B. Inaction by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relations thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, where the National Internal Revenue Code provides a specific period of action, in which case the inaction shall be deemed a denial C. Decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction D. Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs 1. in cases involving liability for customs duties, fees or other money charges, seizure, detention or release of property affected, fines, forfeitures or other penalties in relation thereto, or 2. other matters arising under the Customs Law or other laws administered by the Bureau of Customs E. Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the assessment and taxation of real property originally decided by the provincial or city board of assessment appeals F. Decisions of the Secretary of Finance on customs cases elevated to him automatically for review from decisions of the Commissioner of Customs which are adverse to the Government under Section 2315 of the Tariff and Customs Code; G. Decisions of the Secretary of Trade and Industry, in the case of nonagricultural product, commodity or article, and the Secretary of Agriculture in the case of agricultural product, commodity or article, involving dumping and countervailing duties under Section 301 and 302, respectively, of the Tariff and Customs Code, and safeguard measures under Republic Act No. 8800, where either party may appeal the decision to impose or not to impose said duties II. Exclusive Original Jurisdiction A. All criminal offenses arising from violations of the National Internal Revenue Code or Tariff and Customs Code and other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue or the Bureau of Customs: Provided, however, That offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the principal amount o taxes and fees, exclusive of charges and penalties, claimed is less than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) or where there is no specified amount claimed shall be tried by the regular Courts and the jurisdiction of the CTA shall be appellate. B. In tax collection cases involving final and executory assessments for taxes, fees, charges and penalties: Provided, however, That collection cases where the principal amount of taxes and fees, exclusive of charges and penalties, claimed is less than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) shall be tried by the proper Municipal Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court and Regional Trial Court. III. Exclusive Appellate Jurisdiction A. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in tax cases originally decided by them, in their respected territorial jurisdiction B. Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over tax cases originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective jurisdiction. C. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in tax collection cases originally decided by them, in their respective territorial jurisdiction D. Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the Exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over tax collection cases originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, in their respective jurisdiction REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS I.
Original Jurisdiction A. Civil 1. Exclusive a. Subject of the action is not capable of pecuniary estimation b. Actions involving title or possession of real property or interest therein where the assessed value exceeds Php20,000.00 or in Metro Manila Php50,000.00, except for forcible entry and unlawful detainer meikimouse
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JURISDICTION
c.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where demand or claim exceeds Php300,000.00 or in Metro Manila Php400,000.00
d. Matters of probate, testate or intestate, where gross value of estate exceeds Php300,000.00 or in Metro Manila Php400,000.00 e. Cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function f.
Other cases where the demand, exclusive of interest, damages, attorney ’s fees, litigation expenses and costs, or value of property in controversy exceeds Php300,000.00 or in Metro Manila Php400,000.00 (B.P. Blg. 129, Sec. 19 as amended by R.A. No. 7691). However, if the claim for damages is the main cause of the action, the amount thereof shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court (Administrative Circular No. 09-94 dated June 14, 1994)
g. Additional original jurisdiction transferred under Sec. 5.2 of the Securities Regulation Code: i.
Devices or schemes employed by, or any acts of, the board of directors, business associates, its officers or partnership, amounting to fraud and misrepresentation
ii.
Controversies arising out or intra-corporate partnership relations
iii. Controversies in the election or appointment of directors, trustees, officers, or managers of such corporation, partnership, or association iv. Petitions of corporations, partnerships or associations to be declared in a state of suspension of payments - R.A. No. 8799 h. Application for issuance of writ of search and seizure in civil actions for infringement of intellectual property rights - Sec. 3, A.M. No. 02-1-06-SC i.
Violations of R.A. No. 9160 (Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001) as amended by R.A. No. 9194
2. Concurrent a. with the Supreme Court Actions affecting ambassadors and other public ministers and consuls - B.P. Blg. 129, Sec. 21(1) b. with the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals i. Petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto ii. c.
Petition for writ of continuing mandamus on environmental cases - A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC
with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and Sandiganbayan i.
Petitions for writ of amparo and writ of habeas data - Sec. 3, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC; Sec. 3, A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC
ii.
Petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus if they relate to an act or omission of a municipal trial court, corporation, board, officer or person - Sec. 4, Rule 65 as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC
d. with the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts Application for Protection Order under R.A. No. 9282, Sec. 10, unless there is a Family Court in the residence of petitioner e. with the Insurance Commission Claims not exceeding Php100,000.00 - Insurance Code, Sec. 416; P.D. No. 612; Applicable if subject of the action is not capable of pecuniary estimation, otherwise, jurisdiction is concurrent with MTC, etc. B. Criminal 1. Exclusive Criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, or body - B.P. Blg. 129, Sec. 20; These include criminal cases where the penalty provided by law exceeds six (6) years imprisonment irrespective of the fine - R.A. No. 7691 These also include criminal cases not falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 and higher - R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249 But in cases where the only penalty provided by law is a fine, the RTCs have jurisdiction if the amount of the fine exceeds Php4,000.00 - R.A. No 7691 as clarified by Administrative Circular No. 09-94 dated June 14, 1994
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JURISDICTION
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Jurisdiction over the whole complex crime is lodged with the trial court having jurisdiction to impose the maximum and most serious penalty imposable for an offence forming part of the complex crime - Cuyos v. Garcia, G.R. No. 46934, April 15, 1998 II. Appellate All cases decided by lower courts (MTCs, etc.) in their respective territorial jurisdictions - B.P. Blg. 129, Sec. 22 FAMILY COURTS
I.
Exclusive and Original Jurisdiction A. Criminal cases where one or more of the accused is below eighteen (18) years of age but not less than nine (9) years of age, when one or more of the victims is a minor at the time of the commission of the crime: Provided, That if the minor is found guilty, the court shall promulgate sentence and ascertain any civil liability which the accused may have incurred. The sentence, however, shall be suspended without need of application, pursuant to P.D. No. 1903 (The Child and Youth Welfare Code) B. Petitions for guardianship, custody of children, and habeas corpus in relation to the latter - Sec. 3, A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC; Sec. 3, A.M. No. 03-02-05-SC C. Petitions for adoption of children and the revocation thereof (Sec. A.20 and B.28, A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC; also, R.A. No. 9523 - An Act Requiring Certification of the DSWD to Declare a Child ‘Legally Available for Adoption’ as a Prerequisite for Adoption Proceedings, Amending Certain Provisions of R.A. No. 8552, otherwise known as The Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, R.A. No. 8043, otherwise known as The InterCountry Adoption Act of 1995, P.D. No. 603, otherwise known as The Child and Youth Welfare Code, and for Other Purposes) D. Complaints for annulment of marriage, declaration of nullity of marriage, and those relating to marital status and property relations of husband and wife or those living together under different status and agreements, and petitions for dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains - Sec. 2, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC E. Petitions for involuntary commitment of a child, for removal of custody against child-placement or child-caring agency or individual, and for commitment of disabled child - Secs. 4(b), 5(a)(ii), 6(b), A.M. No. 02-1-19 F. Petitions for support and/or acknowledgment G. Summary judicial proceedings brought under the provisions of Executive Order No. 209 otherwise known as The Family Code of the Philippines H. Petitions for declaration of status of children as abandoned, dependent or neglected children, petitions for voluntary or involuntary commitment of children, the suspension, termination or restoration of parental authority and other cases cognizable under P.D. No. 603, Executive Order No. 56, series of 1986 and other related laws I.
Petitions for constitution of family home - repealed by Executive Order No. 209
J.
Cases against minors cognizable under R.A. No. 9165 or “The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002; A.M. No. 07-8-2-SC
K. Violation of R.A. No. 7610, otherwise known as the “Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act” as amended by R.A. No. 7658 and as further amended by R.A. No. 9231 L. Violation of R.A. No. 9775 otherwise known as the “Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009 M. Cases of domestic violence against: 1. Women which are acts of gender-based violence that result or are likely to result in physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women; and other forms of physical abuse such as battering or threats and coercion which violate a woman ’s personhood, integrity and freedom of movement; and 2. Children which include the commission of all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, violence, and discrimination and all other conditions prejudicial to their development N. Cases of violence against women and their children under R.A. No. 9262 otherwise known as “Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004 including applications for Protection Order under the same Act O. Criminal cases involving juveniles if no preliminary investigation is required under Sec. 1, Rule 112 - Sec. 1, A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC
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JURISDICTION
CIVIL PROCEDURE
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS
I.
Original Jurisdiction A. Civil 1. Exclusive a. Actions involving personal property valued at not more than Php300,000.00 or in Metro Manila Php400,000.00 b. Actions demanding sums of money not exceeding Php300,000.00 or in Metro Manila Php400,000.00; in both cases, exclusive of interest, damages, attorney ’s fees, litigation expenses and costs, the amount of which must be specifically alleged, but the filing fees thereon shall be paid. These included admiralty and maritime cases. c.
Actions involving title or possession of real property where the assessed value does not exceed Php20,000.00 or in Metro Manila Php50,000.00
d
Provisional remedies in principal actions within their jurisdiction and in proper cases, such as preliminary attachment, preliminary injunction, appointment of receiver and delivery of personal property - Rules 57, 58, 59 and 60
e. Forcible entry and unlawful detainer, with jurisdiction to resolve issue of ownership to determine issue of possession f.
Probate proceedings, testate or intestate, where gross value of estate does not exceed Php300,000.00 or in Metro Manila Php400,000.00 - B.P. Blg. 129, Sec. 33 as amended by R.A. No. 7691
g. Inclusion and exclusion of voters - Sec. 38, B.P. Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code) 2. Delegated Cadastral and land registration cases assigned by the SC where there is no controversy or opposition and in contested lots valued at more than Php100,000.00 - B.P. Blg. 129, Sec. 34 as amended by R.A. No. 7691 3. Special Petition for habeas corpus in the absence of all RTC judges - B.P. Blg. 129, Sec. 35 B. Criminal 1. Exclusive a. All violations of city or municipal ordinances committed within their respective territorial jurisdictions b. All offenses punishable with imprisonment of not more than six (6) years irrespective of the fine and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties and the civil liability arising therefrom; provided, however, that in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction - B.P. Blg. 129, Sec. 32 as amended b y R.A. No. 7691 c.
All offenses committed not falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan where none of the accused is occupying a position corresponding to salary grade 27 and higher - as amended by R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249
d. In cases where the only penalty provided by law is a fine not exceeding Php4,000.00, the MTCs, etc. have jurisdiction - Administrative Circular No. 09-94 dated June 14, 1994 2. Special Applications for bail in the absence of all RTC judges - B.P. Blg. 129, Sec. 35 SHARIAH COURTS
I.
Exclusive Jurisdiction A. All cases involving custody, guardianship, legitimacy, paternity and filiation arising under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws B. All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of estate of deceased Muslims, probate of wills, issuance of letters of administration or appointment of administrators or executors, regardless of the nature or aggregate value of the property C. Petitions for the declaration of absence and death or for the cancellation and correction of entries in the Muslim Registries D. All actions arising from the customary contracts in which the parties are Muslims, if they have not specified which law shall govern their relations meikimouse
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E. All petitions for mandamus, prohibition, injunction, certiorari, habeas corpus and all other auxiliary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction II. Concurrent Jurisdiction A. Petitions of Muslims for the constitution of the family home, change of name and commitment of an insane person to an asylum B. All other personal and legal actions not mentioned in paragraph 1 (d) wherein the parties involved are Muslims except those for forcible entry and unlawful detainer which shall fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC C. All special civil actions for interpleader or declaratory relief wherein the parties are Muslims or the property involved belongs exclusively to Muslims SMALL CLAIMS CASES, RULES ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE and BARANGAY CONCILIATION
I.
Small Claims - A.M. 08-8-7-SC, Sec. 2 A. MTCs, MeTCs and MCTCs shall have jurisdiction over actions for payment of money where the value of the claim does not exceed Php100,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs B. Actions covered: 1. purely civil in nature where the claim or relief prayed for by the plaintiff is solely for payment or reimbursement of sum of money 2. the civil aspect of criminal actions, either filed before the institution of the criminal action, or reserved upon the filing of the criminal action in court 3. the enforcement of a barangay amicable settlement or an arbitration award involving a money claim Sec. 417, R.A. 7160 (Local Government Code)
II. Rules on Summary Procedure A. Civil Cases 1. All cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, irrespective of the amount of damages or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered 2. All other cases, except probate proceedings, where the total amount of the plaintiff ’s claim does not exceed Php100,000.00 or outside Metro Manila Php200,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs B. Criminal Cases 1. Violations of traffic law, rules and regulations 2. Violation of the rental law 3. All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed is imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or fine not exceeding Php1,000.00, or both, irrespective of other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability arising therefrom, provided, that in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, RSP shall govern where the imposable fine does not exceed Php10,000.00 III. Barangay Conciliation A. The Lupon of each barangay shall have the authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same municipality or city for amicable settlement of all disputes except: 1. where one party is the government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof 2. where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the performance of his official functions 3. offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one year or a fine exceeding Php5,000.00 4. offenses where there is no private offended party 5. where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities or municipalities unless the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupin 6. Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupin 7. such other classes of disputes which the President may determine in the interest of justice or upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice 8. any complaint by or against corporations, partnerships, or juridical entities 9. disputes where urgent legal action is necessary to prevent injustice from being committed or further continued, specifically: a. a criminal case where the accused is under police custody or detention meikimouse
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b. a petition for habeas corpus by a person illegally detained or deprived deprived of his liberty or one acting in his behalf c.
actions coupled with with provisional remedies, such as preliminary injunction, attachment, replevin and support pendente lite
d. where the action may be barred by statute of limitations limitations 10. labor disputes or controversies arising from employer-employee relationship 11. where the dispute arises from the the CARL 12. actions to annul judgment upon a compromise which can be directly filed in court
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Week of July 22-26, 2014 - Case Assignment Jurisdiction of Courts
Supreme Court
1. 2. 3. 4.
Cruz v. Mijares, G.R. No. 154464, September 11, 2008 First Lepanto Ceramics v. CA, G.R. No. 110571, October 7, 1994 Aratuc v. Comelec, G.R. No. 49705-09, February 8, 1979 Fabian v. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742, September 16, 1998
Court of Appeals
1. Aragon v. CA, G.R. No. 124333, March 26, 1997 2. St. Martin Funeral Home v. NLRC, G.R. No. 130866, September 16, 1998 3. Torres v. Specialized Packaging, G.R. No. 149634, July 6, 2004 Regional Trial Courts
1. 2. 3. 4.
Katon v. Palanca, G.R. No. 151149, September 7, 2004 Encarnacion v. Amigo, G.R. No. 169793, September 15, 2006 RCPI v. CA, G.R.No. 136109, August 1, 2002 Bokingo v. CA, G.R. No. 161739, May 4, 2006
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
Reyes v. Sta. Maria, G.R. No. L-33213, June 29, 1979 Ortigas & Co. v. J. Herrera, G.R. No. L-36098, January 21, 1983 Ortigas & Co. CA, G.R. No. 52488, July 25, 1981 Villostas v. CA, CA, G.R. G.R. No. 96271, June 26, 1992 Vda. de Barrera v. Heirs of Vicente Legaspi, G.R. No. 174346, September 12, 2008
Family Courts
1. Madriñañ v. Madriñañ, G.R. No. 159374, July 12, 2007 Commercial Courts
1. Reyes v. RTC of Makati, G.R. No. 165744, August 11, 2008 Katarungang Pambarangay
1. Blardony v. Coscolluela, G.R. No. 70261, February 28, 1990 2. Wee v. De Castro, G.R. No. 176405, August 20, 2008 3. Aquino v. Aure, G.R. No. 153567, February 18, 2008
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i
Section 17. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. - The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls; and original and exclusive jurisdiction in petitions for the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the Court of Appeals. In the following cases, the Supreme Court shall exercise original and concurrent jurisdiction with Court of First Instance: 1. In petitions for the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus; 2. In actions between the Roman Catholic Church and the municipalities or towns, or the Filipino Independent Church for controversy as to title to, or ownership, administration or possession of hospitals, convents, cemeteries or other properties used in connection therewith; 3. In actions brought by the Government of the Philippines against the Roman Catholic Church or vice versa for the title to, or ownership of, hospitals, asylums, charitable institutions, or any other k ind of property; and 4. In actions brought to prevent and restrain violations of law concerning monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade. The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal, certiorari or writ of error, as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgment and decrees of inferior courts as herein provided, in (1) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question; (2) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto; (3) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue; (4) All criminal cases involving offenses for which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment; and those involving other offenses which, although not so punished, arose out of the same occurrence or which may have been committed by the accused on the same occasion, as that giving rise to the more serious offense, regardless of whether the accused are charged as principals, accomplices, or accessories, or whether they have been tried jointly or separately; (5) All civil cases in which the value in controversy exceeds fifty thousand pesos, exclusive of interests and costs, or in which the title or possession of real estate exceeding in value the sum of fifty thousand pesos to be ascertained by the oath of a party to the cause or by other competent evidence, is involved or brought in question. The Supreme Court shall likewise have exclusive jurisdiction over all appeals in civil cases, even though the value in controversy, exclusive of interests and costs, is fifty thousand pesos or less, when the evidence involved in said cases is the same as the evidence submitted in an appealed civil case within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided herein; (6) All other cases in which only errors or questions of law are involved. Section 4. Jurisdiction. Except as herein provided, the Sandiganbayan shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to try and decide: ii
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade '27' and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and other provincial department heads; (b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors engineers and other city department heads; (c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher; (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; (e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher; (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or -controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations; (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Classification Act of 1989;
Grade’ 27'
and up under the Compensation and Position
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and (5) All other national and local officials classified as Classification Act of 1989.
Grade’ 27'
and higher under the Compensation and Position
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office. meikimouse
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c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade '27' or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military or PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court ' as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders or regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided. The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1,2,14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court. The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed in govemment-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them. Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized: Provided, however, That where the civil action had therefore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall b e deemed abandoned." iii
Sec. 19. Review by Certiorari. - A party adversely affected by a decision or ruling of the CTA en banc may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. iv Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members, any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty d ays from receipt of a copy thereof. v
Ibid.
vi
Sec. 9. Jurisdiction.
— The
Court of Appeals shall exercise :
(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or no t in aid of its appellate jurisdiction; (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgment of Regional Trial Courts; and (3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the Sec urities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings. Trials or hearings in the Court of Appeals must be continuous and must be completed within three (3) months, unless extended by the Chief Justice. vii
Ibid.
viii
Sec. 3. Where to file.—The petition shall be filed with the Supreme Court or with any of the stations of the Court of
Appeals. ix
Sec. 17. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls; and original and exclusive jurisdiction in petitions for the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the Court of Appeals. In the following cases, the Supreme Court shall exercise original and concurrent jurisdiction with Courts of First Instance: 1. In petition for the issuance of writs o f certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus; and 2. In actions brought to prevent and restrain violations of law concerning monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade. meikimouse
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The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal, as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts as herein provided, in (1) All criminal cases involving offenses for which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment; and those involving other offenses which, although not so punished, arose out of the same occurrence or which may have been committed by the accused on the same occasion, as that giving rise to the more serious offense, regardless of whether the accused are charged as principals, accomplices or accessories, or whether they have been tried jointly or separately; (2) All cases involving petitions for naturalization or denaturalization; and (3) All decisions of the Auditor General, if the appellant is a private person or entity. The Supreme Court shall further have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on certiorari as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees o f inferior courts as herein provided, in (1) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question; (2) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment or toil, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto; (3) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue; (4) All other cases in which only errors or questions of law are involved: Provided, however, That if, in addition to constitutional, tax or jurisdictional questions, the cases mentioned in the three next preceding paragraphs also involve questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law, the aggrieved party shall appeal to the Court of Appeals; and the final judgment or decision of the latter may be reviewed, revised, reversed, modified or affirmed by the Supreme Court on writ of certiorari; and (5) Final awards, judgments, decisions, or orders of the Commission on Elections, Court of Tax Appeals, Court of Industrial Relations, the Public Service Commission and the Workmen's Compensation Commission. x
Sec. 2. Where to file the petition.—The petition shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territory where the actionable neglect or omission occurred or with the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. xi
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over c ases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and c onsuls, and over petitions for certiorari , prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. (2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari , as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in: (a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. (b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto. (c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue. (d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher. (e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved. xii
Sec. 4. When and where to file the petition. The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days counted from the notice of the denial of the motion. If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a municipal trial court or of a corporation, a board, an officer or a person, it shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed with the Court of Appeals or with the Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same is in aid of the courts appellate jurisdiction. If the petition involves an act or an omission of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed with and be cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the petition shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. xiii Sec. 3. Where to File. – The petition may be filed on any day and at any time with the Regional Trial Court of the place where the threat, act or omission was committed or any of its elements occurred, or with the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court, or any justice of such courts. The writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. When issued by a Regional Trial Court or any judge thereof, the writ shall be returnable before such court or judge. When issued by the Sandiganbayan or the Court of Appeals or any of their justices, it may be returnable before such court or any justice thereof, or to any Regional Trial Court of the place where the threat, act or omission was committed or any of its elements occurred. When issued by the Supreme Cour t or any of its justices, it m ay be returnable before such Court or any justice thereof, or before the Sandiganbayan or the Court of Appeals or any of their justices, or to any Regional Trial Court of the place where the threat, act or omission was committed or any of its elements occurred. xiv
SEC. 3. Where to File. —The petition may be filed with the Regional Trial Court where the petitioner or respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place where the data or information is gathered, collected or stored, at the option of the petitioner. The petition may also be filed with the Sup reme Court or the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan when the action concerns public data files of government offices. xv Supra. meikimouse
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xvi
Sec. 3. Where to File. —The petition may be filed with the Regional Trial Court where the petitioner or respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place where the data or information is gathered, collected or stored, at the option of the petitioner. The petition may also be filed with the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan when the action concerns public data files of government offices. xvii
Article VI, Sec. 30 of the Constitution provides: “No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence.” xviii
Sec. 13. Certification or appeal of case to the Supreme Court. —(a) Whenever the Court of Appeals finds that the penalty of death should be imposed, the court shall render judgment but refrain from making an entry of judgment and forthwith certify the case and elevate its entire record to the Supreme Court for review. (b) Where the judgment also imposes a lesser penalty for offenses committed on the same occasion or which arose out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more severe offense for which the penalty of death is imposed, and the accused appeals, the appeal shall be included in the case certified for review to, the Supreme Court. (c) In cases where the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or a lesser penalty, it shall render and enter judgment imposing such penalty. The judgment may be appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal filed with the Court of Appeals. xix
Section 1. Appeal to Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari. – A party adversely affected by a decision or ruling of the Court en banc may appeal therefrom by filing with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari within fifteen days from receipt of a copy of the decision or resolution, as provided in Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. If such party has filed a motion for reconsideration or for new trial, the period herein fixed shall run from the party ’s receipt of a copy of the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration or for new trial.
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aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for the purpose, or with the aid an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his
CRUZ vs MIJARES
litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance
G.R. No. 154464, September 11, 2008
must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
Facts:
Rule 138-A
Ferdinand A. Cruz was the plaintiff in a civil case for
Law Student Practice Rule
Abatement of Nuisance pending in the sala of respondent judge. He sought permission to enter his appearance for and on his behalf.
Section 1. Conditions for student practice. — A law student who has
Claim anchored on Sec. 34, Rule 138: a non- lawyer may appear
successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular four-year
before any court and conduct his litigation personally.
prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law
During the pre-trial, Judge Mijares required petitioner to
school's clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme
secure written permission from the Court Administrator before he
Court, may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or
could be allowed to appear as counsel for himself. Counsel for the
administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer,
defendant filed a motion to dismiss. Petitioner objected, alleging
to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law
that an motion to dismiss is not allowed after the Answer has been
school.
filed. Respondent judge remarked, “Hay naku, masama yung
Section 2. Appearance. — The appearance of the law student
marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok? ” Petitioner filed a manifestation and
authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision and
motion to inhibit: there was partiality on the part of respondent
control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly
judge as can be seen from her contumacious remarks. Motion
accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs,
denied. Motion for reconsideration denied.
memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the
Cruz’s appearance was also denied as he failed to submit
supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.
the document required by Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court. Motion for reconsideration: basis of his appearance was Rule 138, Sec. 34,
Court agrees with petitioner that the basis of his
not Rule 138-A. 138 – applicable to any non-lawyer; 138-A –
appearance is Rule 138, not 138-A. As plaintiff, he can
specifically for law students.
personally conduct the litigation of the case.
Motion for reconsideration denied, still invoking Rule 138-
A. Hence, this petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.
He would be acting not as counsel or lawyer, but as a party exercising his right to represent himself.
Issue:
The fact that petition is a law student does not mean that the applicable rule is always 138-A. Again, he seeks to
Whether or not SC have jurisdiction to entertain the petition.
represent himself.
TC’s conclusion that 138-A superseded 138 is incorrect. It is an addendum to the instances when a non-lawyer may
Held:
appear in courts. Yes. SC has concurrent jurisdiction with RTC and CA to
issue writs of certiorari , prohibition, mandamus, and injunction. This concurrence does not mean that the petitioner has absolute
Should respondent judge inhibit herself? NO.
freedom to choose where the petition will be filed. Still has to give due regard to the judicial hierarchy. Thus, petitions for the issuance
Her “hay naku” statement is not enough to show arbitrariness and prejudice.
In fact, petitioner’s administrative case against respondent
of extraordinary writs against RTCs should be filed with the CA. Only
judge for violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics was
in exceptional cases and for compelling reasons may the SC take
dismissed for lack of merit.
cognizance of petitions directly filed before it. SC assumes jurisdiction over this petition as it concerns the interpretation of Sec.
Presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties applies.
34, Rule 138 and Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court. Petitioner is cautioned not to continue his practice of filing directly with the SC.
DISPOSITION: Petition partially granted.
******* What rule applies in the case of petitioner, Rule 138 or 138-A? Rule 138. Rule 138 Attorneys and Admission to Bar Section 34. By whom litigation conducted . — In the court of a justice
of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the meikimouse
CASES: JURISDICTION
CIVIL PROCEDURE
FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS vs CA
ARATUC vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 110571, October 7, 1994
G.R. No. 49705-09, February 8, 1979
Facts:
Facts:
Petitioner assailed the conflicting provisions of B.P. 129, EO 226 (Art. 82) and a circular, 1-91 issued by the Supreme Court
On April 7, 1978, election for the position o f Representative to the B atasangPambansa were held throughout the Philippines. The cases
which deals with the jurisdiction of courts for appeal of cases
at bar concern only the results of the elections in Region XII which
decided by quasi-judicial agencies such as the Board of Investments
comprises
(BOI).
,Maguindanao, North Cotabato and Sultan Kudarat, and the cities of
the provinces
of Lanao
Del
Sur, Lanao
Del
Norte
BOI granted petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s
Marawi, Iligan andCotabato. Tomatic Aratuc sought the suspension
application to amend its BOI certificate of registration by changing
of the canvass then being undertaken byRegional Board of
the scope of its registered product from "glazed floor tiles" to
canvassers in Cotabato City and in which, the returns in 1,966 out of
"ceramic
4,107voting centers in the whole region had already been canvassed
tiles." Oppositor
Mariwasa
filed
a
motion
for
reconsideration of the said BOI decision while oppositor Fil-Hispano
showing
partial
results.
Ceramics, Inc. did not move to reconsider the same nor appeal
ASupervening Panel headed by Commissioner of Election Hon. Vena
therefrom. Soon rebuffed in its bid for reconsideration, Mariwasa
ncio S. Duque hadconducted the hearings of the complaints of the
filed a petition for review with CA.
petitioners therein of the alleged irregularities inthe election records
CA temporarily restrained the BOI from implementing its
of the mentioned provinces. On July 11, 1978, the Regional Board
decision. The TRO lapsed by its own terms twenty (20) days after its
of Canvassers issued a resolution, over the objection of the
issuance,
Konsensiya ng Bayan candidates,declaring all the eight Kilusan ng
without respondent court issuing any preliminary
injunction.
Bagong Lipunan candidates elected. Appeal was taken by theKB
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and to lift the
candidates to the Comelec. On January 13, 1979, the Comelec issued
restraining order contending that CA does not have jurisdiction over
its questionedresolution declaring seven KBL candidates and one KB
the BOI case, since the same is exclusively vested with the Supreme
candidate
Court pursuant to Article 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of
firsteight places, and ordering the Regional Board of Canvassers to p
1987.
roclaim the winningcandidates. The KB candidates interposed the Petitioner argued that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
as
having
obtained
the
present petition.
1980 or B.P. 129 and Circular 1-91, "Prescribing the Rules Governing Appeals to the Court of Appeals from a Final Order or Decision of the
Issue:
Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies" cannot be the
Whether or not respondent Comelec has committed grave abuse of
basis of Mariwasa's appeal to respondent court because the
discretion,amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
procedure for appeal laid down therein runs contrary to Article 82 of E.O. 226, which provides that appeals from decisions or orders of
Held:
the BOI shall be filed directly with the Supreme Court.
“As the Superior administrative body having control over boards of
While Mariwasa maintains that whatever inconsistency
canvassers, theComelec may review the actuations of the Regional
there may have been between B.P. 129 and Article 82 of E.O. 226 on
Board of Canvassers, such as by extendingits inquiry beyond the
the question of venue for appeal, has already been resolved by
election records of the voting centers in questions.”“The authority
Circular 1-91 of the Supreme Court, which was promulgated on
of the Commission is in reviewing such actuations does not spring
February 27, 1991 or four (4) years after E.O. 226 was enacted.
from anyappellant jurisdiction conferred by any provisions of the law,
Issue:
for
there
is
none
such
provisionanywhere in the election Code, but from the plenary prero Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over
the case.
gative of direct control andsupervision
endowed
to
it
by
the
provisions in Section 168. And in administrative law, it is a toowell settled postulate to need any supporting citation here, that a
Held:
superior body or office havingsupervision and control over another
YES. Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of
may do directly what the latter is supposed to do or oughtto have
E.O. 226 insofar as the manner and method of enforcing the right to
done.
appeal from decisions of the BOI are concerned. Appeals from decisions of the BOI, which by statute was previously allowed to be filed directly with the Supreme Court, should now be brought to the Court of Appeals.
meikimouse
CASES: JURISDICTION
CIVIL PROCEDURE
FABIAN vs DESIERTO
Gr. No. 129742, September 16, 1998 Facts:
Petitioner Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and President of PROMAT Construction Development Corporation which was engaged in the construction business. Private respondent Nestor Agustin was the District Engineer of the First Metro Manila Engineering District. PROMAT participated in the bidding for government
construction
projects,
and
private
respondent,
reportedly taking advantage of his official position, inveigled petitioner into an amorous relationship. Their affair lasted for some time, in the course of which, private respondent gifted PROMAT with public works contracts and interceded for it in problems concerning the same in his office. When petitioner tried to terminate their relationship, private respondent refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment,
intimidation
and
threats.
Petitioner
filed
an
guilty
of
administrative complaint against private respondent. Ombudsman
found
private
respondent
misconduct and meted out the penalty of suspension without pay for 1 year. After private respondent moved for reconsideration, the Ombudsman discovered that the private respondent’s new counsel had been his classmate and close associate, hence, he inhibited himself.
The
Ombudsman
case who
was
transferred
exonerated
private
to
respondent
respondent
Deputy
from
the
administrative charges. Petitioner appealed to the SC by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Issue:
Whether or not Section 27 of RA 6770 which provides for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the SC in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is valid Held:
The revised Rules of Civil Procedure preclude appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the SC via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a petition for review on certiorari but only from judgments and final orders of the courts enumerated in Sec. 1 thereof. Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be brought to the CA on a verified petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies. Section 27 of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to the SC from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Sec. 30, Art. VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of the SC.
meikimouse
CASES: JURISDICTION
CIVIL PROCEDURE
COURT OF APPEALS
1. No. What was on appeal before the Court of Appeals was the decision rendered in Civil Case No. Q-91-10200 (Delivery of Title and
ARAGON vs CA
Damages) where the parties are petitioner herein and respondent
G.R. No. 124333, March 26, 1997
MBC. However, the said court, in deciding the issues raised in the aforesaid case, took cognizance of Civil Case No. Q-89-1797 (Specific
Facts:
Performance and Damages) where the parties were different i.e. MARENIR executed a real estate mortgage over its 5
petitioner and MARENIR. Furthermore, said case was not appealed
subdivision lots to cover the P4M loan it obtained from the private
before the Court of Appeals nor was there any action commenced to
respondent. The mortgage was annotated in all the TCTs, and
annul the judgment of the court a quo. quo. Hence, the decision over that
subsequently, increased its mortgage loan to P4,560,000.00. In
case became final and executory. Respondent court clearly
1982, it sold one of the lots to the petitioner on installment. After
committed an error when it declared as null and void the
the full payment of the purchase price, MARENIR was unable to
proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-89-1797 as it was not the case
transfer the TCT to the petitioner. Petitioner then filed a complaint
appealed before it. Even if MARENIR itself, the losing party to the
for Specific Performance and Damages against MARENIR with the
aforementioned case decides now to appeal the decision or to file
RTC.
any other proceeding seeking its nullification, it cannot at this very The RTC rendered a decision ordering MARENIR to execute
late stage do so. This is in consonance with the legal tenet that
a deed of absolute sale in favor of the petitioner and to deliver the
failure to perfect an appeal renders the trial court's judgment final
TCT and the actual physical possession thereof to petitioner. Since
and executory and it can no longer be subject to review. As such,
no appeal was filed by MARENIR, petitioner filed a Motion to Direct
any modification of that judgment by the appellate court cannot be
Branch Clerk of Court or Deputy Sheriff to Execute Absolute Deed of
upheld.
Sale, which was granted by the RTC. Subsequently, the branch clerk of court executed for and in behalf of MARENIR, a Deed of Absolute
2. Yes. Yes. The SC cited the case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy where they
Sale in favor of the petitioner.
ruled that even if they found that the trial court had no jurisdiction
However, the RD refused to register the deed unless the ODC of TCT is presented, which was in the possession of the Manila
over the case, they still ruled that the proceedings conducted therein was valid based on the doctrine of laches.
Banking Corp. (MBC). The MBC agreed to release the TCT to the
In that case, the SC defined laches as failure or neglect for
petitioner upon payment of its corresponding value in the amount
an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which,
of P185,020.52, which the petitioner refused to pay.
by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier.
Petitioner left no other recourse but to file a complaint for
It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable
Delivery of Title and Damages against MBC with RTC. RTC rendered
time, warranting presumption that the party entitled to assert it has
judgment in favor of the petitio ner. MBC appealed to the CA which
abandoned it or declined to assert it.
reversed the RTC decision and orders the dismissal of the complaint.
Although we agree with private respondent's contention
The CA ratiocinated that: The Specific Performance and Damages
that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case may be
filed by the petitioner against MARENIR should have been filed with
objected to at any stage of the proceeding even on appeal, this
the HLURB, the RTC had no jurisdiction to hear and decide the
particular rule, however, means that jurisdictional issues in a case
complaint. Declaring as null and void the decision rendered by the
can be raised only during the proceedings in said case and during
judge for having been rendered without jurisdiction -
a void
the appeal of said case. It certainly does not mean that lack of
judgment cannot acquire finality; it is non-existent; it is in legal
jurisdiction of a court in a case may be raised during the proceedi ngs
effect no judgment or order at all; and so was the order to the
of another case, in another court and even by anybody at
branch clerk to execute the deed of absolute sale; it follows that the
all. Certainly, we cannot countenance this procedure as this will lead
deed of absolute sale executed by the branch of clerk was also null
to absurdity and is against the basic principle of jurisdiction.
and void
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Court of There being no decision upon which the challenged
Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the decision of the
decision is based, no deed of absolute sale in favor of the petitioner,
Regional Trial Court dated January 31, 1994 is REINSTATED, with
hence, no cause of action against MBC
costs against private respondents.
There is no obligation on the part of MBC to respect or not to violate such right Hence, the present petition. Issues: 1. Whether or not CA acquire appellate jurisdiction over any case not properly brought to it by the parties concerned 2. Whether or not estoppel by laches is applicable Held:
meikimouse
CASES: JURISDICTION
CIVIL PROCEDURE
ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME vs. NLRC
Held:
G.R. No. 130866, September 16, 1998
The Court is of the considered opinion that ever since appeals from the NLRC to the SC were eliminated, the legislative
Facts:
intendment was that the special civil action for certiorari was and The present petition for certiorari stemmed from a
still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the NLRC.
complaint for illegal dismissal filed by herein private respondent
The use of the word “appeal” in relation thereto and in the instances
before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional
we have noted could have been a lapsus plumae because appeals by
Arbitration Branch No. III, in San Fernando, Pampanga. Private
certiorari and the original action for certiorari are both modes of
respondent alleges that he started working as Operations Manager
judicial review addressed to the appellate courts. The important
of petitioner St. Martin Funeral Home on February 6, 1995.
distinction between them, however, and with which the Court is
However, there was no contract of employment executed between
particularly concerned here is that the special civil action for
him and petitioner nor was his name included in the semi-monthly
certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of this Court
payroll. On January 22, 1996, he was dismissed from his
and the Court of Appeals; whereas to indulge in the assumption that
employment for allegedly misappropriating P38,000.00 which was
appeals by certiorari to the SC are allowed would not subserve, but
intended for payment by petitioner of its value added tax (VAT) to
would subvert, the intention of the Congress as expressed in the
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR).
sponsorship speech on Senate Bill No. 1495.
Petitioner on the other hand claims that private
Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P
respondent was not its employee but only the uncle of Amelita
No. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court
Malabed, the owner of petitioner St. Martin’s Funeral Home.
are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions
Sometime in 1995, private respondent, who was formerly working
for certiorari under Rule65. Consequently, all such petitions should
as an overseas contract worker, asked for financial assistance from
henceforth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict
the mother of Amelita. Since then, as an indication of gratitude,
observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the
private respondent voluntarily helped the mother of Amelita in
appropriate forum for the relief desired.
overseeing the business. In January 1996, the mother of Amelita passed away, so the latter she took over the management of the business. She then discovered that there were arrears in the payment of taxes and other government fees, although the records purported to show that the same were already paid. Amelita then made some changes in the business operation and private respondent and his wife were
TORRES vs. SPECIALIZED PACKAGING
no longer allowed to participate in the management thereof. As a
G.R. No. 149634, July 6, 2004
consequence, the latter filed a complaint charging that petitioner Facts:
had illegally terminated his employment. Based on the position papers of the parties, the labor
Petitioners claim to be employees of the Specialized
arbiter rendered a decision in favor of petitioner on October 25,
Packaging Development Corporation (SPDC), a business entity
1996 declaring that no employer-employee relationship existed
engaged in the repackaging of cosmetic products. In three separate
between the parties and, therefore, his office had no jurisdiction
Complaints, they charged SPDC and alleged labor recruiters Eusebio
over the case.
Camacho General Services (ECGS) and MPL Services with illegal
Not satisfied with the said decision, private respondent appealed to the NLRC contending that the labor arbiter erred (1) in
dismissal; and with nonpayment of overtime, premium and th
13 month pays, and night differential.
not giving credence to the evidence submitted by him; (2) in holding
The cases were later consolidated and assigned to Labor
that he worked as a "volunteer" and not as an employee of St.
Arbiter (LA) Salimathar Nambi. On June 30, 1995, the LA issued his
Martin Funeral Home from February 6, 1995 to January 23, 1996, or
Decision in favor of petitioners, because SPDC and MPL Services had
a period of about one year; and (3) in ruling that there was no
failed to submit their position papers on or before the deadline.
employer-employee relationship between him and petitioner.
SPDC was ordered to reinstate all petitioners to their former
On June 13, 1997, the NLRC rendered a resolution setting aside the questioned decision and remanding the case to the labor [5]
arbiter for immediate appropriate proceedings.
positions and to pay them back wages, premium pay for holidays th
and rest days, service incentive leave pay and 13 month pay.
Petitioner then
The LA's Decision was appealed by SPDC to the National
filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC in
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which set aside the ruling and
[6]
its resolution dated August 18, 1997 for lack of merit, hence the present petition alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of [7]
discretion.
ordered the case remanded to LA Nambi for further proceedings. The case was then set again for hearings. Respondents SPDC and ECGS submitted their position papers five months after the case had been considered submitted for decision.
Issue:
On December 14, 1999, LA Nambi issued a second Whether or not the decision of the NLRC are appealable to
Decision finding petitioners' employment to have been illegally
the Court of Appeals. meikimouse
CASES: JURISDICTION
CIVIL PROCEDURE
terminated by SPDC. The NLRC, however, again reversed and set aside this new Decision on June 9, 2000. On January 29, 2001, petitioners appealed to the CA, which dismissed their petition, finding that the verification and the certification against forum shopping to be either defective or insufficient. (signed by only two petitioners out of 25 petitioners) Denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, the appellate court pointed out that disregarding the rules could not be rationalized by invoking a liberal construction thereof. Furthermore, it found no satisfactory explanation why the 25 principal petitioners, who resided in different provinces, had not executed a special power of attorney in favor of either of the two petitioners or their counsel. Hence, this Petition. Issue: Whether or not decisions and final resolutions of the NLRC may be reviewed by a civil action for certiorari. Held: Yes. The proper procedure for seeking a review of the final dispositions of the NLRC was laid down in 1998 in St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC . That case heralded two very important rules: 1) decisions and final resolutions of the NLRC may be reviewed only via a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; and 2) such petition must be filed with the CA in strict observance of the doctrine of the hierarchy of courts. Thus, after St. Martin became final, special civil actions challenging NLRC rulings have been referred by this Court to the CA for proper disposition. Exceptions to this rule were those instances when -- prior to the finality of St. Martin -- both parties had already filed their respective memoranda with this Court, and it then opted to take final cognizance of the case. Under AM No. 99-2-01-SC, however, all new cases erroneously filed with this Court after June 1, 1999, were dismissed forthwith. X
x
x
x
Indeed, rules of procedure are established to secure substantial justice. Being instruments for the speedy and efficient administration of justice, they must be used to achieve such end, not to derail it. Technical requirements may thus be dispensed with in meritorious appeals. It has been our consistent holding that the ends of justice are better served when cases are determined on the merits -- after all parties are given full opportunity to ventilate their causes and defenses -- rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections. Consequently, the case should be remanded to the CA for a proper determination of the substantive issues. Time-honored is the principle that when the law entrusts the review of factual and substantive issues to a lower court or to a quasi-judicial tribunal, that court or agency must be given the opportunity to pass upon those issues. Only thereafter may the parties resort to this Court. WHEREFORE,
this
Petition
is GRANTED. The
assailed
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE, and the case is remanded to the CA for a proper determination of the substantive issues. No costs. meikimouse
CASES: JURISDICTION
CIVIL PROCEDURE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS
2.
Is the Court of Appeals correct in invoking its alleged residual prerogative under Section 1, Rule 9 of the
KATON vs. PALANCA
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in resolving the Petition
G.R. No. 151149, September 7, 2004
on an issue not raised in the Petition?
Where prescription, lack of jurisdiction or failure to state a cause of action clearly appear from the complaint filed with the trial
Held: Propriety of Ruling on the Merits.
court, the action may be dismissed motu proprio by the Court of
1. Yes. This is not the first time that petitioner has taken
Appeals, even if the case has been elevated for review on different
issue with the propriety of the CA’s ruling on the merits. He raised it
grounds. Verily, the dismissal of such cases appropriately ends
with the appellate court when he moved for reconsideration of its
useless litigations.
December 8, 2000 Decision. The CA even corrected itself in its November 20, 2001 Resolution, as follows:
Facts:
"Upon another review of the case, the Court concedes that On August 2, 1963, a parcel of land located in Sombrero
it may indeed have lost its way and been waylaid by the variety,
Island, Puerto Princessa, Palawan was reclassified from forest to
complexity and seeming importance of the interests and issues
agricultural
above-named
involved in the case below, the apparent reluctance of the judges,
petitioner. The names of Felicisimo Corpuz, Clemente Magdayao and
five in all, to hear the case, and the volume of the conflicting, often
Jesus
confusing, submissions bearing on incidental matters. We stand
land
Gapilango
upon and
the
Juan
request Fresnillo
by were
the
included
in
the
endorsement as co-applicants of the petitioner.
corrected.
Respondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. was issued Homestead
That explanation should have been enough to settle the
Patent No. 145927 and OCT No. G-7089 on March 3, 1977 with an
issue. The CA’s Resolution on this point has rendered petitioner’s
area of 6.84 hectares of Sombrero Island.
issue moot. Hence, there is no need to discuss it further. Suffice it to
Petitioner assails the validity of the homestead patents
say that the appellate court indeed acted ultra jurisdiction in ruling
and original certificates of title covering certain portions of
on the merits of the case when the only issue that could have been,
Sombrero Island issued in favor of Manuel Palanca and the other
and was in fact, raised was the alleged grave abuse of discretion
respondents on the ground that the same were obtained through
committed by the trial court in denying petitioner’s Motion for
fraud.
Reconsideration. Settled is the doctrine that the sole office of a writ Petitioner prays for the reconveyance of the whole island
in his favor.
of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction. Such writ does not include a review of the evidence, more so when no
On the other hand, Palanca said that petitioner never filed any homestead application for the island and insisted that they
determination of the merits has yet been made by the trial court, as in this case.
already had their respective occupancy and improvements on the island. Respondents aver that they are all bona fide and lawful
Dismissal for Prescription and Lack of Jurisdiction
possessors of their respective portions and have declared said
2. No. The "residual jurisdiction" of trial courts is available
portions for taxation purposes and that they have been faithfully
at a stage in which the court is normally deemed to have lost
paying taxes thereon for twenty years.
jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved in the
Respondents contend that the petitioner has no legal
appeal. This stage is reached upon the perfection of the appeals by
capacity to sue insofar as the island is concerned because an action
the parties or upon the approval of the records on appeal, but prior
for reconveyance can only be brought by the owner and not a mere
to the transmittal of the original records or the records on appeal. In
homestead applicant and that petitioner is guilty of estoppel by
either instance, the trial court still retains its so-called residual
laches for his failure to assert his right over the land for an
jurisdiction to issue protective orders, approve co mpromises, permit
unreasonable and unexplained period of time.
appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal, and
In the instant case, petitioner claims that he has the
allow the withdrawal of the appeal.
exclusive right to file an application for homestead patent over the
The CA’s motu proprio dismissal of petitioner’s Complaint
whole island since it was he who requested for its conversion from
could not have been based, therefore, on residual jurisdiction under
forest land to agricultural land.
Rule 41. Undeniably, such order of dismissal was not one for the
The assailed Resolution by the CA, denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner. It affirmed the RTC’s dismissal of
protection and preservation of the rights of the parties, pending the disposition of the case on appeal.
his Complaint in Civil Case No. 3231, not on the grounds relied upon
What the CA referred to as residual prerogatives were the
by the trial court, but because of prescription and lack of
general residual powers of the courts to dismiss an action motu
jurisdiction.
proprio upon the grounds mentioned in Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court and under authority of Section 2 of Rule 1 of the same
Issues:
rules. 1.
Is the Court of Appeals correct in resolving the
To be sure, the CA had the excepted instances in mind
Petition for Certiorari based on an issue not raised
when it dismissed the Complaint motu proprio "on more
(the merits of the case) in the Petition?
fundamental grounds directly bearing on the lower court’s lack of meikimouse
CASES: JURISDICTION
CIVIL PROCEDURE
jurisdiction" and for prescription of the action. Indeed, when a court
complaint for ejectment, damages with injunction and prayer for
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only power it has is
restraining order with the MTC in Cities of Isabela. In her Answer,
to dismiss the action.
she alleged that she has been in possession of a portion of the
Nonetheless, In Aldovino v. Alunan, the Court has held that when the plaintiff’s own complaint shows clearly that the actio n
subject property since 1968 and that the issuance of Free Patent, and titles in the name of petitioner was tainted with irregularities.
has prescribed, such action may be dismissed even if the defense of
The MTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner. On
prescription has not been invoked by the defendant. In Gicano v.
appeal to the RTC, the RTC ruled to dismiss the case on the ground
Gegato,we also explained thus:
that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the case, the RTC acquired no
"x x x Trial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss
appellate jurisdiction thereof. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed a
an action on the ground of prescription when the parties' pleadings
petition for review under Rule 42 before the CA which ruled to
or other facts on record show it to be indeed time-barred; (Francisco
remand the case to the RTC for further proceedings. Hence, the
v. Robles, Feb. 15, 1954; Sison v. McQuaid, 50 O.G. 97; Bambao v.
present petition.
Lednicky, Jan. 28, 1961; Cordova v. Cordova, Jan. 14, 1958; Convets, Inc. v. NDC, Feb. 28, 1958; 32 SCRA 529; Sinaon v. Sorongan, 136 SCRA 408); and it may do so on the basis of a motion to dismiss (Sec.
Issue:
1,f, Rule 16, Rules of Court), or an answer which sets up such ground
Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the proper
as an affirmative defense (Sec. 5, Rule 16), or even if the ground is
action is accion publiciana and not unlawful detainer as determined
alleged after judgment on the merits, as in a motion for
by the allegations in the complaint filed by the petitioner.
reconsideration (Ferrer v. Ericta, 84 SCRA 705); or even if the defense has not been asserted at all, as where no statement thereof is found in the pleadings (Garcia v. Mathis, 100 SCRA 250; PNB v.
Held:
Pacific Commission House, 27 SCRA 766; Chua Lamco v. Dioso, et al.,
Yes. After a careful evaluation of the evidence on record of
97 Phil. 821); or where a defendant has been declared in default
this case, we find that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible
(PNB v. Perez, 16 SCRA 270). What is essential only, to repeat, is t hat
error in holding that the proper action in this case is accion
the facts demonstrating the lapse of the prescriptive period be
publiciana; and in ordering the remand of the case to the Regional
otherwise sufficiently and satisfactorily apparent on the record;
Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, for further proceedings.
either in the averments of the plaintiff's complaint, or otherwise established by the evidence."45 (Italics supplied)
Well settled is the rule that jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action is determined by the allegations of
Clearly then, the CA did not err in dismissing the present
the complaint at the time of its filing, irrespective of whether or not
case. After all, if and when they are able to do so, courts must
the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims
endeavor to settle entire controversies before them to prevent
asserted therein. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is
future litigations.
the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and the character of the relief
Petition DENIED; assailed Resolution AFFIRMED; dismissal of
sought are the ones to be consulted. On its face, the complaint must
complaint SUSTAINED on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, failure
show enough ground for the court to assume jurisdiction without
to state a cause of action and prescription.
resort to parol testimony. From the allegations in the complaint, it appears that the petitioner became the owner of the property on April 11, 1995 by virtue of the waiver of rights executed by his mother-in-law. He filed the complaint for ejectment on March 2, 2001 after his February 1, 2001 letter to the respondent demanding that the latter vacate the
ENCARNACION vs. AMIGO
premises remained unheeded. While it is true that the demand
G.R. No. 169793, September 15, 2006
letter was received by the respondent on February 12, 2001, thereby making the filing of the complaint for ejectment fall within
Facts:
the requisite one year from last demand for complaints for unlawful Petitioner is the registered owner of 2 parcels of land
detainer, it is also equally true that petitioner became the owner of
formerly owned by his mother-in-law who signed a waiver of right in
the subject lot in 1995 and has been since that time deprived
his favor when his father-in-law, Victoriano Magpantay, died. The
possession of a portion thereof. From the date of the petitioner's
latter acquired the said property through sale from Mallapitan who
dispossession in 1995 up to his filing of his complaint for ejectment
acquire the same from Valiente.
Respondent Amigo allegedly
in 2001, almost 6 years have elapsed. The length of time that the
entered the premises and took possession of a portion of the
petitioner was dispossessed of his property made his cause of action
property without the permission of the then owner, Magpantay,
beyond the ambit of an accion interdictal and effectively made it
which continued even after the issuance of the TCTs to the
one for accion publiciana.
petitioner. Consequently, the petitioner, through his lawyer, sent a
After the lapse of the one-year period, the suit must be
letter to the respondent demanding her to vacate the subject
commenced
in
the
Regional
Trial
Court
via
an accion
property which the latter refused. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a
publiciana which is a suit for recovery of the right to possess. It is meikimouse
CASES: JURISDICTION
CIVIL PROCEDURE
an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of
Moreover, the RTC shall no longer try the case on the merits, but
possession of realty independently of title. It also refers to an
shall decide the case on the basis of the evidence presented in the
ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the
lower court, without prejudice to the admission of the amended
accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of
pleadings and additional evidence in the interest of justice.
possession of the realty. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 30, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 73857 ordering the remand of Civil Case No. Br. 20-1194 to the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, for further proceedings, is AFFIRMED.
RCPI vs. CA
NOTE:
G.R.No. 136109, August 1, 2002
The three kinds of actions for the recovery of possession of real Facts:
property are:
Private respondent Dulawon filed with the RTC a 1.
2.
Accion interdictal , or an ejectment proceeding which
complaint for breach of contract of lease with damages against
may be either that for forcible entry (detentacion) or
Radio Communications of the Phils, Inc. (RCPI). Petitioner filed a
unlawful detainer (desahucio), which is a summary
motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction contending
action for recovery of physical possession where the
that it is the MTC which has jurisdiction as the complaint is basically
dispossession has not lasted for more than one year,
one for collection of unpaid rentals in the amount of P84,000.00,
and should be brought in the proper inferior court;
which does not exceed the jurisdictional amount of P100,000.00 for
Accion publiciana or the plenary action for the
RTCs. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss as well as the MR.
recovery of the real right of possession, which should
Hence, petitioner went to CA on petition for certiorari, which
be brought in the proper Regional Trial Court when
dismissed the petition. MR having been denied, hence, this petition
the dispossession has lasted for more than one year;
for review.
and 3.
Accion reinvindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion,
Issue:
which is an action for the recovery of ownership which must be brought in the proper Regional Trial
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint filed by Dulawon.
Court Held: Yes. Pertinent portion of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
Hence, we agree with the Court of Appeals when it declared that:
amended by Republic Act No. 7691, provides: SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in
The respondent's actual entry on the land of the petitioner was in
civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
1985 but it was only on March 2, 2001 or sixteen years after, when
jurisdiction: In all civil actions in which the subject of t he litigation is
petitioner filed his ejectment case. The respondent should have filed
incapable of pecuniary estimation;
an accion publiciana case which is under the jurisdiction of the RTC.
x
However, the RTC should have not dismissed the case.
x
x
xxx
x x x (8) In
all
other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of
Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court provides: SECTION 8. Appeal
whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the
from orders dismissing case without trial; lack of jurisdiction. — If an
value of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand
appeal is taken from an order of the lower court dismissing the case
pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where
without a trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court may affirm or
the demand, exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds Two
reverse it, as the case may be. In case of affirmance and the ground
hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00).
of dismissal is lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, the
Corollary thereto, Administrative Circular No. 09-94,
Regional Trial Court, if it has jurisdiction thereover, shall try the case
states:x x x
x x x
x x x
on the merits as if the case was originally filed with it. In case of
2.The exclusion of the term “damages of whatever kind” in
reversal, the case shall be remanded for further proceedings.
determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and
If the case was tried on the merits by the lower court
Section 33 (1) of B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to
without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the Regional Trial Court
cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence
on appeal shall not dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction
of the main cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for
thereof, but shall decide the case in accordance with the preceding
damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action,
section, without prejudice to the admission of amended pleadings
the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the
and additional evidence in the interest of justice.
jurisdiction
The RTC should have taken cognizance of the case. If the case is tried on the merits by the Municipal Court without
x
of
the
court.
x
x
x
x
x
x x x. [8]
In Russell, et al., v. Vestil, et al.,
the Court held that in
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the RTC on appeal may no
determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is
longer dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction thereof.
not capable of pecuniary estimation, the nature of the principal meikimouse
CASES: JURISDICTION
CIVIL PROCEDURE
action or remedy sought must first be ascertained. If it is primarily
BOKINGO vs. CA
for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable
G.R. No. 161739, May 4, 2006
of pecuniary estimation, and jurisdiction over the action will depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is
Background of the case:
something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where
Petitioner filed an application for titling of a parcel of land
the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
before the DENR. Upon learning of the application, the private
principal relief sought, the action is one where the subject of the
respondents filed a Protest against the petitioner contending that
litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, which is
the subject parcel of land was inherited by the private respondents
cognizable exclusively by Regional Trial Courts.
from their father, Celestino Busa. The Provincial Environmental and
It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a
Natural Resources Officer (PENRO) resolved the Protest in favor of
case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the
the private respondents, and a certification stating that said Order
complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of
has become final and executory. A survey Authority was issued by
whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted
CENRO authorizing Campos (one of the private respondents) to
therein.
survey the subject land. However, the petitioner stopped the survey. In the case at bar, the allegations in the complaint plainly
Private respondents availed of the Brgy. Justice System to resolve
show that private respondent’s cause of action is breach o f contract.
the controversy but to no avail, thus, a Certificate to File Action was
It is settled that a breach of contract is a cause of action either
for
specific
performance
or
rescission
of
issued. Hence, the filing of the instant complaint.
contracts.
In Manufacturer’s Distributors, Inc. v. Siu Liong, the Court held that
Facts:
actions for specific performance are incapable of pecuniary
Petitioner is one of the defendants in the complaint for
estimation and therefore fall under the jurisdiction of the Regional
injunction and damages filed by Ernesto Campos et al. with the RTC.
Trial Court. Here, the averments in the complaint reveal that the
He filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the latter has no
suit filed by private respondent was primarily one for specific
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim. Specifically, he
performance as it was aimed to enforce their three-year lease
contended that it could be gleaned from the complaint that the
contract which would incidentally entitle him to monetary awards if
issue between the parties involved the possession of the land. As
the court should find that the subject contract of lease was
such, the assessed value of the land was crucial to determine the
breached. As alleged therein, petitioner’s failure to pay rentals due
court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter in accordance with either
for the period from January to March 1997, constituted a violation
Section 19(2) or Section 33(3) of BP 129 as amended by RA 7691. He
of their contract which had the effect of accelerating the payment of
pointed out that the assessed value of the subject property was not
monthly rentals for the years 1997 and 1998. The same complaint
indicated.
likewise implied a premature and unilateral termination of the term
The RTC ruled to deny the motion to dismiss holding that
of the lease with the closure of and removal all communication
the relief being sought in the complaint is injunction in order that
equipment in the leased premises.
[14]
Under the circumstances, the
the respondent’s right to survey the subject land would not be
court has to scrutinize the facts and the applicable laws in order to
defeated. It also held that it had jurisdiction over the subject matter
determine whether there was indeed a violation of their lease
of the claim under Section 2 Rule 58 of the Rules of Court which
agreement
provides in part that “preliminary injunction may be granted by the
that
would
justify
the
award
of
rentals
and
damages. The prayer, therefore, for the payment of unpaid rentals
court where the action or proceeding is pending.”
in the amount of P84,000.00 plus damages consequent to the
Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari alleging
breach is merely incidental to the main action for specific
grave abuse of discretion. The CA dismissed the petition for lack of
performance.
merit. It ruled that the remedy of certiorari is unavailing to the
Clearly,
the
action
for
specific
performance
case,
petitioner because “an order denying a motion to dismiss is
irrespective of the amount of rentals and damages sought to be
interlocutory and cannot be the subject of the extraordinary petition
recovered, is incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence cognizable
for certiorari or mandamus.” Hence, the filing of the instant petition
exclusively by the Regional Trial Court. The trial court, therefore, did
for review seeking the reversal of the said CA decision.
not err in denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss. WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is DENIED and the assailed
Issue:
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 45987 is
Whether or not the contention of CA is correct.
AFFIRMED. Held: Yes. It is axiomatic that the nature of the action and which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the same is determined by the material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff, and the law in effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the claims asserted therein.
The caption of the
complaint is not determinative of the nature of the action. Nor does meikimouse
CASES: JURISDICTION
CIVIL PROCEDURE
the jurisdiction of the court depend upon the answer of the defendant or agreement of the parties, or to the waiver or acquiescence of the parties. In this connection, it is well to note that the Court had the occasion to explain that "in determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, the nature of the principal action, or remedy sought must first be ascertained. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and jurisdiction over the action will depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, the action is one where the subject of litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, which is cognizable exclusively by Regional Trial Courts." As gleaned from the complaint, the principal relief sought by the respondents in their complaint is for the court a quo to issue an injunction against petitioner Bokingo and his representatives to permanently enjoin them from preventing the survey of the subject land. Significantly, the respondents’ complaint has not sought t o recover the possession or ownership of the subject land. Rather, it is principally an action to enjoin petitioner Bokingo and his representatives from committing acts that would tend to prevent the survey of the subject land. It cannot be said therefore that it is one of a possessory action. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision dated December 17, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 71510 is AFFIRMED in toto.
meikimouse
CASES: JURISDICTION
MTC CASE DIGEST
CIVIL PROCEDURE
ORTIGAS & Co. vs J. HERRERA Gr. No. L-36098, January 21, 1983
REYES vs STA. MARIA Gr. No. L-33213, June 29, 1979
Facts: Petitioner and private respondent entered into an
Facts:
agreement with a consideration, the former agreed to sell to the Artemio and Hilarion Reyes(Reyes) FILED: action termed as
latter a parcel of land with a special condition that should private
one to quiet title against private respondents Hilaria Santos De
respondent as purchaser complete the construction including the
Lopez and Pilar Santos (Santos) @ CFI Bulacan. They alleged that:
painting of his residential house on said lot. Upon failure of
They are owners of a lot in Barrio San Sebastian, Hagonoy, Bulacan.
petitioner to pay his obligation, private respondent filed a complaint
Through their tolerance and goodwill they let Maximo Santos(Father
for sum of money and damages with the City Court of Manila,
of defendants occupy the same on the condition that (1)Instead of
against petitioner
rental Santos will pay the real estate taxes, (2)Santos would leave
A reconsideration of the said order having been denied,
anytime Reyes’s demanded them to do so. Feb 1986 – Reyes
petitioner filed with the CFI Manila, a special civil action for
verbally demanded Santos to vacate. The latter unreasonably
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction. A motion to
refused at the same time claiming ownership thourgh purchase of
dismiss was filed by private respondent, the petition was dismissed
the land from a certain Pablo Aguinaldo.
on the ground that the claim of private respondent in his complaint,
They prayed that they be declared as owners, possession be given to them, P50 as rental/damages, and atty’s fees. Santos
being less than P10,000.00, is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the city court.
FILED: Motion to Dismiss – on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. That
Petitioner thus filed the present petition and argues
the case is actually one for ejectment or unlawful detainer which
among others that: (a) as determined from the allegations of the
falls in the exclusive jurisdiction of the inferior or municipal court
complaint, the action is for specific performance of contract; and (b)
not the CFI.
actions in which the subject of litigation is not capable of pecuniary
CFI: Granted motion. Case DISMISSED. The allegation that it was an action was instituted “in order to quiet title” is not
estimation such as complaints for specific performance of contract are exclusively cognizable by the Court of First Instance.
sufficient by itself to consider this case as that action under CC476(Property)
Issue: Whether or not the City Court of Manila has jurisdiction
Issue:
over the complaint.
Whether or not the action is that of unlawful detainer cognizable only by the MTC/ accion publiciana in which case CFI has jurisdiction.
Held:
No. The action involved in this case is one for
specific performance and not for a sum of money and wherefore
Held:
incapable of pecuniary estimation because what private respondent
The action is that of accion publiciana, since it was to recover
seeks is the performance of petitioner's obligation under a written
possession de jure (if not one of accion reindivicatoria) falling within
contract to make a refund but under certain specific conditions still
the jurisdiction of the CFI and not a mere action for detainer to
to be proven or established. In a case for the recovery of a sum of
recover physical possession that would fall within the jurisdiction of
money, as the collection of a debt, the claim is considered capable
the MTC. (Recall Santos claimed they owned the land)
of pecuniary estimation because the obligation to pay the debt is
Recall three types for recovery of possession and/ ownership.
not conditioned upon any specific fact or matter. But when a party
Accion interdictal, Accion publiciana, Accion reindivicatoria. In
to a contract has agreed to refund to the other party a sum of
accion interdictal/forcible entry/unlawful detainer cases it is the
money upon compliance by the latter of certain conditions and only
physical possession and not the possession de jure which is in
upon compliance therewith may what is legally due him under the
question. HERE the lower court was in error, since it was clear in the
written contract be demanded, the action is one not capable of
complaint that Santos refused to deliver possession due to adverse
pecuniary estimation. The payment of a sum of money is only
claim of ownership. Clearly the present case is one for recovery of
incidental which can only be ordered after a determination of
the right to possess and falls within the jurisdiction of the CFI.
certain acts the performance of which being the more basic issue to
Reyes correctly filed their accion publiciana. ACCORDINGLY LC judgment set aside, REMANDED to continue proceedings.
be inquired into. Although private respondent's complaint in the court a quo is designated as one for a sum of money and damages, an
analysis of all the factual allegations of the complaint patently shows that what private respondent seeks is the performance of petitioner's obligation under the written contract to make the refund of the rate of P10.00 per square meter or in the total amount of P4,820.00, but only after proof of having himself fulfilled the conditions that will give rise to petitioner's obligation, a matter clearly incapable of pecuniary estimation. meikimouse
CASES: JURISDICTION
CIVIL PROCEDURE
ORTIGAS & CO vs CA Gr. No. 52488, July 25, 1981
Without prejudice to the right of Ortigas to file the proper action in the proper court, the decisions of the CA, CFI and MC of San Juan Rizal are set aside.
Facts: Petition for review of the decision of the CA. In 1974, Ortigas and Co. filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Maximo Belmonte in the Municipal Court of San Juan Rizal, praying that judgment be rendered 1.) ordering the defendant his successors-in-interest to vacate and surrender the lot to plaintiff; 2.) declaring the residential building constructed on the lot by defendant as forfeited in favor of plaintiff; 3.0 condeming defendant
VILLOTAS vs CA
to pay monthly rent of 5,000 from July 18, 1971 up to the time he
Gr. No. 96271, June 26, 1992
vacates, together with attorney's fees and exemplary damages. The Ruled in favor of plaintiff and granted the relieves prayed for.
Facts:
Belmonte filed a motion to dismiss in the Cfi based on lack
Private respondent's Electrolux sales agents were making
of jurisdiction on the part of the MC. CFI denied motion and
door to door selling of its products in the subdivision. Petitioner
affirmed in totot the MC judgment. The said court also issued a writ
Villostas placed an order for 1 unit of said water purifier for an
of execution. Belmonte filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
installment basis. After 2 times of complaint against the respondents
with preliminsry injunction in the CA, assiling the 1.) the jurisdiction
of the impurities and bad odor of the unit, petitioner sent a letter to
of the CFI andf MC; 2.) the propriety of the judgment on the
the private respondent's branch manager stating that she decided to
pleadings rendered by the MC; and 3.) the propriety of the issuance
return the unit and demand a refund for the amount paid.
of the writ of execution issued by the CFI. The Ca ruled in favor of
Electrolux's branch manager offered to change the water purifier
Belmonte, holding that the MC has no jurisdiction. Hence the
with another brand of any of its appliance of the unit in her favor.
present petition.
Petitioner did not accept it as she was disappointed with the original unit which did not perform as warranted and did not pay any more
Issues:
the subsequent installments in the amount of P14,540.00 exclusive
1. Whether or not the CA has appellate jurisdiction over this case
of interests.
2. Whether or not the MC had jurisdiction to resolve the issues in the original complaint
Respondent Electrolux Marketing, Inc. filed a complaint against petitioner Villostas with the MTC of Makati for the recovery of the sum of P14,540.00 representing the unpaid balance of the
Held:
purchase price of one (1) Electrolux Water Purifier plus interest 1. NO.
After analyzing the issues raised by Belmonte
thereon at the rate of 42% per annum in accordance with the Sales
before the CA, namely 1.) the jurisdiction of the CFI andf MC; 2.) the
Contract with Reservation of Title. Petitioner Villostas asserted that
propriety of the judgment on the pleadings rendered by the MC; and
by reason of private respondent's breach of warranty she was
3.) the propriety of the issuance of the writ of execution issued by
availing of the remedy of rescission of the contract of sale and
the CFI, the SC held that the same are purely legal in nature. Since
offered to return the water purifier to the seller as in fact, it was
appellate jurisdiction over cases involving purely legal questions is
already being offered for return, aside from claiming for the refund
exclusively vested in the SC by Sec. 17 of the Judiciary Act (RA 296),
of her payments. Petitioner prayed that the contract of sale be
it is apparent that the decision under review rendered by the CA
declared rescinded and the payments refunded to her together with
without jurisdiction should be set aside.
the full grant of the claims asserted in her counterclaims.
2. NO. Where a subdivision owner seeks not just to eject
MTC rendered decision in favor of respondent. The
the lot buyer who defaulted in his payments but also prays that the
petitioner, thereafter, filed a notice of appeal from the judgment of
residential building constructed by the buyer be forfeited in
said lower court. The Regional Trial Court of Makati rendered its
plaintiff's favor, jurisdiction over the case belongs to the CFI not the
judgment
MC in an ejectment case. The issues raised before the inferior court
reconsideration having been denied, petitioner elevated the case to
did not only involved the possession of the lot but also rights and
the Court of Appeals and was given an inextendible period of 15
obligations of the parties to the residential building which under Art.
days to file a petition for review. Anticipating that she would fail to
45 of the CC is real property. Aslo, plaintiff's claim to the bldg raises
comply with the deadline, herein petitioner filed a second extension
question of ownership.
to file a petition for review which, however, was denied.
affirming
the
disputed
decision.
A
motion
for
A CFI cannot assume jurisdiction in a case appealed to it
Before the CA, petitioner contended that the RTC erred
under SECII Rule 40 where one of the parties objected to its
when it ruled that its claim for rescission had prescribed inasmuch as
jurisdiction. Since t he origi nal c ase was decided by th e MC without
she had formally notified the seller within a reasonable time, that is,
jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof, the CFI should have
2 months and 26 days, from the delivery of water purifier on
dismissed the cases when it was brought before it on appeal.
September 13, 1986 of her election to rescind. Private respondent countered that the petitioner was not entitled to rescission vis-a-vis alleged violation of the warranty for meikimouse
CASES: JURISDICTION
CIVIL PROCEDURE
hidden defects for the reason that rescission of contract sought by
1935. However, after a subdivision survey conducted in November
petitioner was beyond the jurisdictional competence of the trial
30, 1976, it was found out that the land formed part of the titled
court. It adds that petitioner could no longer avail of rescission
property of Andrea Lacson but despite this discovery, they never
because said legal recourse was time barred judging from delivery of
filed any action to recover ownership since they were left
the water purifier on September 13, 1986 pursuant to Art. 1571 of
undisturbed in their possession until the present issue.
the New Civil Code.
Petitioners raised the issue of ownership as a special affirmative defense and also questioned the jurisdiction of the RTC
Issue:
over the subject matter of the complaint, the assessed value of the Whether or not the MTC has a jurisdictional competence
land being only P11,160, as reflected in Tax Declaration No. 7565.
to order rescission of the herein contract.
On November 27, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the respondents ordering the petitioners to return the
Held:
possession of the land in question to the respondents and to desist Yes.
Anent
the
jurisdictional
competence
of
the
from further depriving and disturbing the latter’s peaceful
Metropolitan Trial Court to order rescission of contract, suffice it to
possession thereof, unless there be another court judgment to the
say that the action was initiated by herein private respondent
contrary.
Electrolux when it filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money
On the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter, the
worth P14,540.00, against petitioner Villostas. Said amount is
trial court held that what determines the nature of the action as well
indubitably within the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court
as the jurisdiction of the court are the facts alleged in the complaint
since it does not exceed P20,000.00 exclusive of interest and costs
and not those alleged in the answer of the defendants. In the
but inclusive of damages of whatever. Moreover, the jurisdiction of
plaintiff’s complaint, the present estimated value of the land being
the court over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of
50,000.
the complaint irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled
Petitioners thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals
to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. When
which affirmed the trial court's disposition of the issue of jurisdiction
the petitioner, therefore, raised rescission of contract in her answer,
over the subject matter and the merits finding that appellees,
the court is not divested of its jurisdiction over the case on account
through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in peaceful,
of defenses raised by the answer. The court is then merely
continuous, public and actual possession of the property in dispute
authorized to receive evidence thereon. Clearly, the jurisdiction of
even before the year 1930. The appellate court emphasized that in
the court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in
an accion publiciana , the only issue involved is the determination of
the answer or upon the motion to dismiss. Otherwise, the question
possession de jure.
of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely upon the defendant
Issue: Whether the rtc has jurisdiction over the subject matter based on the present estimated value/fair market value.
Held: Section 33(3) of BP 129 as amended by Republic Act No.
VDA. DE BARRERA vs HEIRS OF VICENTE LEGASPI
7691 provides for the jurisdiction of metropolitan trial courts,
Gr. No. 174346, September 12, 2008
municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts wherein these courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions which
Facts:
involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest This is a petition for review of the Decision of the CA which
therein where the assessed value of the real property does not
affirmed that of the RTC Branch 16, of Tangub City, ordering the
exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000) or, in Metro Manila where
defendants-petitioners herein, Fernanda Geonzon vda. de Barrera
it does not not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000). Accordingly,
and Johnny Oco. Jr. to return possession of the subject property to
the jurisdictional element is the assessed value of the property.
the plaintiffs-herein respondents, Heirs of Vicente Legaspi.
The subject land has an assessed value of P11,160 as
On October 1, 1996, petitioner Johnny Oco Jr. forced his
reflected in Tax Declaration No. 7565, a common exhibit of the
way into respondents' 0.9504-hectare irrigated farmland located at
parties. The case, therefore, falls within the exclusive original
Liloan,
dispossessing
jurisdiction of the municipal trial court. It was error then for the RTC
respondents of the property, Oco and company used a tractor to
to take cognizance of the complaint based on the allegation that
destroy the planted crops, took possession of the land, and had
"the present estimated value [of the land is] P50,000," which
since tended it.
allegation is, oddly, handwritten on the printed pleading. The
Bonifacio,
Misamis
Occidental.
After
On February 7, 1997, respondents filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Tangub City for Reconveyance of
estimated value, commonly referred to as fair market value, is entirely different from the assessed value of the property.
Possession with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and Damages
Furthermore, respondents' cause of action - accion
against petitioners. They alleged that the land was occupied,
publiciana is a wrong mode. The dispossession took place on
possessed and cultivated by their predecesseor-in-interest since
October 1, 1996 and the complaint was filed four months thereafter meikimouse
CASES: JURISDICTION
CIVIL PROCEDURE
or on February 7, 1997. Respondents' exclusion from the property had thus not lasted for more than one year to call for the remedy of accion publiciana.
In fine, since the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint filed by respondents, all the proceedings therein as well as the Decision of November 27, 1998, are null and void. The complaint should perforce be dismissed. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED whereby the decision of the CA is SET ASIDE and the decision of Branch 16 of the RTC is declared NULL and VOID for lack o f jurisdiction.
meikimouse
CASES: JURISDICTION
FAMILY COURTS
CIVIL PROCEDURE
must be read in harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 – that family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody
MADRIÑAN vs MADRIÑAN Gr. No. 159374, July 12, 2007
of minors is at issue. The rule therefore is: when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other
Facts:
means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such Petitioner Felipe N. Madriñan and respondent Francisca R.
court or officer. Once a court acquires jurisdiction over the subject
Madriñan were married with three sons and a daughter. After a
matter of a case, it does so to the exclusion of all other courts,
bitter quarrel petitioner left their home and took their three sons
including related incidents and ancillary matters. Petition is denied.
with him to Albay and subsequently to Laguna. Thus respondent wife filed a petition for habeas corpus of their 3 sons in the CA. Petitioner husband filed a memorandum alleging that the wife is unfit and he also questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals claiming that under Section 5(b) of RA 8369 (otherwise known as the "Family Courts Act of 1997") family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition for habeas corpus filed by respondent wife.
The CA rendered a decision asserting its authority to take cognizance of the petition and ruling that, under Article 213 of the Family Code, respondent wife was entitled to the custody of 2 minor sons who were at that time aged six and four, subject to the visitation rights of husband. With respect to Ronnick (the eldest) who was then eight years old, the court ruled that his custody should be determined by the proper family court in a special proceeding on custody of minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.
Issue: Whether or not CA has a jurisdiction over the case.
Held: The Supreme Court ruled in a previous jurisprudence that the Court of Appeals should have cognizance of this case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors. RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the custody of minors. Court of Appeals and Supreme Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the family courts of Habeas Corpus involving custody of minors. The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors. SC ruled therefore that RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the custody of minors. The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors. Further, it cannot be said that the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092 [An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals] and BP 129 [The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980] are absolutely incompatible since RA 8369 does not prohibit the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court from issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases involving the custody of minors. Thus, the provisions of RA 8369 meikimouse
CASES: JURISDICTION
COMMERCIAL COURTS
CIVIL PROCEDURE
While the complaint contained allegations of fraud purportedly committed by him, these allegations are not particular enough to bring the controversy within the special commercial court’s
REYES vs RTC OF MAKATI
jurisdiction; they are not statements of ultimate facts, but are mere
Gr. No. 165744, August 11, 2008
conclusions of law: how and why the alleged appropriation of shares can be characterized as "illegal and fraudulent" were not explained
Facts:
nor elaborated on.
Zenith Insurance Corp. and Rodrigo Reyes filed a derivative suit
Not every allegation of fraud done in a corporate setting
against his brother Oscar to obtain an accounting of the funds and
or perpetrated by corporate officers will bring the case within the
assets of the corporation that were arbitrarily and fraudulently
special commercial court’s jurisdiction. To fall within this jurisdiction,
appropriated by Oscar for himself.
there must be sufficient nexus showing that the corporation’s
Oscar moved to declare the complaint as a nuisance and
nature, structure, or powers were used to facilitate the fraudulent
harassment suit and should be dismissed according to the Interim
device or scheme. Contrary to this concept, the complaint presented
Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies.
a reverse situation. No corporate power or office was alleged to
RTC of Makati, designated as a special commercial court:
have facilitated the transfer of the shares; rather, Oscar, as an
denied the motion and declared that the complaint is a proper
individual and without reference to his corporate personality, was
derivative suit. Oscar went to the CA on a petition for certiorari,
alleged to have transferred the shares of Anastacia to his name,
prohibition, and mandamus and prayed that the RTC Order be
allowing him to become the majority and controlling stockholder of
annulled and set aside and that the trial court be prohibited from
Zenith, and eventually, the corporation’s President.
continuing with the proceedings.
In ordinary cases, the failure to specifically allege the
CA: affirmed the RTC Order and denied the petition. Oscar now
fraudulent acts does not constitute a ground for dismissal since such
comes before the SC on appeal through a petition for review on
defect can be cured by a bill of particulars. In cases governed by the
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Interim Rules of Procedure on Intra-Corporate Controversies, however, a bill of particulars is a prohibited pleading. It is essential,
Issue:
therefore, for the complaint to show on its face what are claimed to Whether the trial court, sitting as a special commercial
court, has jurisdiction over the subject matter.
be the fraudulent corporate acts if the complainant wishes to invoke the court’s special commercial jurisdiction. We note that twice in the course of this case, Rodrigo had
Held:
been given the opportunity to study the propriety of amending or The SC ruled that that jurisdiction over the subject matter
withdrawing the complaint, but he consistently refused. The court’s
of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations of
function in resolving issues of jurisdiction is limited to the review of
the complaint, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all
the allegations of the complaint and, on the basis of these
or some of the claims asserted therein. P.D. No. 902-A enumerates
allegations, to the determination of whether they are of such nature
the cases over which the SEC (now the RTC acting as a special
and subject that they fall within the terms of the law defining the
commercial court) exercises exclusive jurisdiction: SECTION 5. In
court’s jurisdiction. Regretfully, we cannot read into the complaint
addition to the regulatory and adjudicative functions of the
any specifically alleged corporate fraud that will call for the exercise
Securities and Exchange Commission over corporations, partnership,
of the court’s special commercial jurisdiction. Thus, we cannot
and other forms of associations registered with it as expressly
affirm the RTC’s assumption of jurisdiction over Rodrigo’s complaint
granted under existing laws and decrees, it shall have original and
on the basis of Section 5(a) of P.D. No. 902-A
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving: a) Devices or schemes employed by or any acts of the board of directors, business associates, its officers or partners, amounting to fraud and misrepresentation which may be detrimental to the interest of the public and/or of the stockholders, partners, members of associations or organizations registered with the Commission. b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations, between and among stockholders, members, or associates; between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership or association of which they are stockholders, members, or associates, respectively; and between such corporation, partnership or association and the State insofar as it concerns their individual franchise or right to exist as such entity; and c) Controversies in the election or appointment of directors, trustees, officers, or managers of such corporations, partnerships, or associations. The Court ruled that the charges of fraud against Oscar were not properly supported by the required factual allegations. meikimouse
CASES: JURISDICTION
CIVIL PROCEDURE
KATARUNGANG PAMBARANGAY
by filing an answer and seeking affirmative relief from it. ... . Upon this premise, petitioners cannot be allowed belatedly to adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction of the court to
BLARDONY vs COSCULLUELA
which they had submitted themselves voluntarily.
Gr. No. 70261, February 28, 1990
Furthermore, under Section 6 of P.D. 1508, the complaint may be filed directly in a competent court without passing the
Facts:
Lupon Tagapayapa in the following cases: SECTION 6. Conciliation,
The petitioner and the private respondent were spouses but due to
pre-condition to filing of complaint . — No complaint, petition, action
irreconcilable
or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon
differences,
petitioner
and private
respondent
separated in March, 1981.
as provided in Section 2 hereof, shall be filed or instituted in court or
The wife filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal
any other government office for adjudication unless there has been
Partnership and Partition of Conjugal Partnership Properties in the
a confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the
Court of First Instance of Rizal.
Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement has been reached as
The husband filed a motion to dismiss the petition on
certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary, attested
jurisdictional grounds, claiming that it should have been filed first in
by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has
the Lupon Tagapamayapa as provided in P.D. 1508, because both
been repudiated. However, the parties may go directly to court in
are residents of the same Municipality of Makati.
the following cases: xxx xxx xxx (3) Actions coupled with provisional
Mrs. Blardony opposed the motion to dismiss. Judge Segundo Soza dismissed her petition for her failure, as plaintiff, to
remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment,delivery of personal properly and support pendente lite;
comply with Section 6 of P.D. 1508. Mrs. Blardony filed a motion for reconsideration. In the meantime, the courts were reorganized and the case was transferred to Branch CXLVI (146) of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, presided over by Judge Jose Coscolluela, Jr. Judge Coscolluela set aside Judge Soza's order of dismissal and required the defendant to submit an accounting of his salaries,
WEE vs DE CASTRO
allowances, bonuses, and commissions. The latter's motion for
Gr. No. 176405, August 20, 2008
reconsideration of that order was denied by the court. Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with a
Facts:
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction on the grounds that
Respondents alleged that they were the registered owners
respondent Judge exceeded his jurisdiction in assuming jurisdiction
of the subject property, a two-storey building erected on a parcel of
over the case without prior referral to the Lupon Tagapamayapa as
land registered under Transfer Certificate of Title and rented out
required by P.D. 1508.
the subject property to petitioner on a month to month. Both parties agreed the rental payment shall be increased.
Issue:
Petitioner, however, failed or refused to pay the corresponding Whether or not the respondent Judge exceeded his
increase on rent when his rental obligation for the month of
jurisdiction in assuming jurisdiction over the case without prior
October became due. The rental dispute was brought to the Lupon
referral to the Lupon Tagapamayapa as required by P.D. 1508.
Tagapagpamayapa of Poblacion, Alaminos, Pangasinan, in an
attempt to amicably settle the matter but the parties failed to reach
Held:
an agreement, resulting in the issuance by the Barangay Lupon of a No. The petition has no merit. Our jurisprudence is replete
Certification to file action in court.
with decisions of this Court to the effect that while the referral of a
Respondent George de Castro sent a letter to petitioner
case to the Lupon Tagapayapa is a condition precedent for filing a
terminating their lease agreement and demanding that the latter
complaint in court, it is not a jurisdictional requirement, "its non-
vacate and turn over the subject property to respondents. Since
compliance cannot affect the jurisdiction which the court has
petitioner stubbornly refused to comply with said demand letter,
already acquired over the subject matter or over the person of the
respondent George de Castro, together with his siblings and co-
defendant." (Fernandez vs. Militante, May 31, 1988; Gonzales vs.
respondents filed the Complaint for ejectment before the MTC.
Court of Appeals, 151 SCRA 287; Royales vs. Intermediate Appellate
Petitioner then argued that respondents failed to comply
Court, 127 SCRA 470). Petitioner waived the pre-litigation
with the jurisdictional requirement of conciliation before the
conciliation procedure prescribed in P.D. No. 1508 when he did not
Barangay Lupon prior to the filing of Civil Case. No. 1990, meriting
file a motion to dismiss the complaint on that score, but filed his
the dismissal of their Complaint therein. The Certification to file
answer thereto wherein he prayed the court to make an equitable
action issued by the Barangay Lupon appended to the respondents'
partition of the conjugal properties.
Complaint merely referred to the issue of rental increase and not
While petitioners could have prevented the trial court
the matter of ejectment. Petitioner asserted further that the MTC
from exercising jurisdiction over the case by seasonably taking
lacked jurisdiction over the ejectment suit, since respondents'
exception thereto, they instead invoked the very same jurisdiction meikimouse
CASES: JURISDICTION
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Complaint was devoid of any allegation that there was an "unlawful
AQUINO vs AURE
withholding" of the subject property by the petitioner. MTC dismissed the respondents' Complaint in Civil Case
Gr. No. 153567, February 18, 2008
No. 1990 for failure to comply with the prior conciliation
Facts:
requirement before the Barangay Lupon. RTC then declared that respondents' failure to refer the
Aure Lending filed a Complaint for ejectment against
matter to the Barangay court for conciliation process barred the
Aquino. In their Complaint, Aure and Aure Lending alleged that they
ejectment case, conciliation before the Lupon being a condition sine
acquired the subject property from a Deed of Sale. Aquino
qua non in the filing of ejectment suits.
countered that the Complaint lacks cause of action for Aure and
Respondents filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with
Aure Lending do not have any legal right o ver the subject property.
the CA. Respondents further claimed that the MTC was not divested
MeTC rendered in favor of Aquino and dismissed the
of jurisdiction over their Complaint for ejectment because of the
Complaint for ejectment of Aure and Aure Lending for non-
mere absence therein of the term "unlawful withholding" of their
compliance with the barangay conciliation process, among other
subject property, considering that they had sufficiently alleged the
grounds. Te MeTC observed that Aure and Aquino are residents of
same in their Complaint, albeit worded differently.
the same barangay but there is no showing that any attempt has
Court of Appeals rendered a Decision granting the respondents' petition.
been made to settle the case amicably at the barangay level. RTC affirmed. CA reversed the MeTC and RTC Decisions and remanding
Issue:
the case to the MeTC for further proceedings and final Whether or not the Certification dated January 2002
determination of the substantive rights of the parties.
issued by the Barangay Lupon stating that no settlement was reached by the parties on the matter of rental increase sufficient to comply
with
the
prior
conciliation
requirement
Issue:
under
Whether or not non-compliance with the barangay
the Katarungang Pambarangay Law to authorize the respondents to
conciliation proceedings is a jurisdictional defect that warrants the
institute the ejectment suit against petitioner.
dismissal of the complaint.
Held:
Held: Yes. While it is true that the Certification to file action
NO. There is no dispute herein that the present case was
dated 18 January 2002 of the Barangay Lupon refers only to rental
never referred to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation before Aure
increase and not to the ejectment of petitioner from the subject
and Aure Lending instituted Civil Case No. 17450. In fact, no
property, the submission of the same for conciliation before
allegation of such barangay conciliation proceedings was made in
the Barangay Lupon constitutes sufficient compliance with the
Aure and Aure Lending’s Complaint before the MeTC.
provisions
of
the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law.
Given
the
It is true that the precise technical effect of failure to
particular circumstances of the case at bar, the conciliation
comply with the requirement of Section 412 of the Local
proceedings for the amount of monthly rental should logically and
Government Code on barangay conciliation (previously contained in
reasonably include also the matter of the possession of the property
Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1508) is much the same effect
subject of the rental, the lease agreement, and the violation of the
produced by non-exhaustion of administrative remedies -- the
terms thereof.
complaint becomes afflicted with the vice of pre-maturity; and the
The barangay justice system was established primarily as a means of easing up the congestion of cases in the judicial courts. This
could
be
accomplished
through
a
proceeding
before
controversy there alleged is not ripe for judicial determination. The complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss. Nevertheless,
the
conciliation
process
is
not
a
the barangay courts which, according to the one who conceived of
jurisdictional requirement, so that non-compliance therewith cannot
the system, the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, is essentially
affect the jurisdiction which the court has otherwise acquired over
arbitration in character; and to make it truly effective, it should also
the subject matter or over the person of the defendant.
be compulsory. With this primary objective of the barangay justice
As enunciated in the landmark case of Royales v.
system in mind, it would be wholly in keeping with the underlying
Intermediate Appellate Court: Ordinarily, non-compliance with the
philosophy
(Katarungang
condition precedent prescribed by P.D. 1508 could affect the
Pambarangay Law), which would be better served if an out-of-court
sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of action and make his complaint
settlement of the case is reached voluntarily by the parties. To
vulnerable to dismissal on ground of lack of cause of action or
ensure this objective, Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1508
prematurity; but the same would not prevent a court of competent
requires the parties to undergo a conciliation process before
jurisdiction from exercising its power of adjudication over the case
the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo as a
before it, where the defendants, as in this case, failed to object to
precondition to filing a complaint in court subject to certain
such exercise of jurisdiction in their answer and even during the
exceptions. The said section has been declared compulsory in
entire proceedings a quo.
nature.
of
Presidential
Decree
No.
1508
While petitioners could have prevented the trial court from exercising jurisdiction over the case by seasonably taking meikimouse
CASES: JURISDICTION
CIVIL PROCEDURE
exception thereto, they instead invoked the very same jurisdiction by filing an answer and seeking affirmative relief from it. What is more, they participated in the trial of the case by cross-examining respondent Planas. Upon this premise, petitioners cannot now be allowed belatedly to adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction of the court to which they had submitted themselves voluntarily. x x x (Emphasis supplied.) Jurisdiction in ejectment cases is determined by the allegations pleaded in the complaint. As long as these allegations demonstrate a cause of action either for forcible entry or for unlawful detainer, the court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter. This principle holds, even if the facts proved during the trial do not support the cause of action thus alleged, in which instance the court -- after acquiring jurisdiction -- may resolve to dismiss the action for insufficiency of evidence. x x x. The law, as revised, now provides instead that when the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession. On its face, the new Rule on Summary Procedure was extended to include within the jurisdiction of the inferior courts ejectment cases which likewise involve the issue of ownership. This does not mean, however, that blanket authority to adjudicate the issue of ownership in ejectment suits has been thus conferred on the inferior courts. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 17 October 2001 and its Resolution dated 8 May 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 63733 are hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs
against
the
petitioner.
meikimouse
CASES: JURISDICTION
SUPREME COURT (Full Text) Ferdinand Cruz vs JUDGE PRISCILLA MIJARES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City, Metro Manila, Public Respondent. BENJAMIN MINA, JR, Private Respondent. G.R. No. 154464, September 11, 2008
CIVIL PROCEDURE
it was said even prior to the start of pre-trial. Petitioner filed 7 a motion for reconsideration of the said order. On May 10, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion with 8 finality. In the same Order, the trial court held that for the failure of petitioner Cruz to submit the promised document and jurisprudence, and for his failure to satisfy the requirements or conditions under Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, his appearance was denied. 9
DECISION NACHURA, J.: This is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It was directly filed with this Court assailing the Resolutions dated May 10, 1 2 2002 and July 31, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 108, Pasay City, which denied the appearance of the plaintiff Ferdinand A. Cruz, herein petitioner, as party litigant, and the refusal of the public respondent, Judge Priscilla Mijares, to voluntarily inhibit herself from trying the case. No writ of preliminary injunction was issued by this Court. The antecedents: On March 5, 2002, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) sought permission to enter his appearance for and on his behalf, before the RTC, Branch 108, Pasay City, as the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 01-0410, for Abatement of Nuisance. Petitioner, a fourth year law student, anchors his claim on Section 34 of 3 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court that a non-lawyer may appear before any court and conduct his litigation personally. During the pre-trial, Judge Priscilla Mijares required the petitioner to secure a written permission from the Court Administrator before he could be allowed to appear as counsel for himself, a party-litigant. Atty. Stanley Cabrera, counsel for Benjamin Mina, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss instead of a pre-trial brief to which petitioner Cruz vehemently objected alleging that a Motion to Dismiss is not allowed after the Answer had been filed. Judge Mijares then remarked, "Hay naku, masama ‘yung marunong pa sa Huwes.
Ok?" and proceeded to hear the pending Motion to Dismiss and calendared the next hearing on May 2, 2002. On March 6, 2002, petitioner Cruz filed a Manifestation and 4 Motion to Inhibit, praying for the voluntary inhibition of Judge Mijares. The Motion alleged that expected partiality on the part of the respondent judge in the conduct of the trial could be inferred from the contumacious remarks of Judge Mijares during the pre-trial. It asserts that the judge, in uttering an uncalled for remark, reflects a negative frame of mind, which engenders the belief that justice will not be 5 served. 6
In an Order dated April 19, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion for inhibition stating that throwing tenuous allegations of partiality based on the said remark is not enough to warrant her voluntary inhibition, considering that
In a motion for reconsideration, petitioner reiterated that the basis of his appearance was not Rule 138-A, but Section 34 of Rule 138. He contended that the two Rules were distinct and are applicable to different circumstances, but the respondent judge denied the same, still invoking Rule 138-A, in an Order10 dated July 31, 2002. On August 16, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant petition and assigns the following errors: I. THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THE APPEARANCE OF THE PETITIONER, FOR AND IN THE LATTER’S
BEHALF, IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-0401 [sic] CONTRARY TO RULE 138, SECTION 34 OF THE RULES OF COURT, PROVIDING FOR THE APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS AS A PARTY LITIGANT; II. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DID NOT VOLUNTARILY INHIBIT DESPITE THE ADVENT OF JURISPRUDENCE [sic] THAT SUCH AN I NHIBITION IS PROPER TO PRESERVE THE PEOPLE’S FAITH AND CONFIDENCE TO THE COURTS. The core issues raised before the Court are: (1) whether the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court may issue; and (2) whether the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied the appearance of the petitioner as party litigant and when the judge refused to inhibit herself from trying the case. This Court’s jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction is not exclusive; it has concurrent jurisdiction with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as an absolute, unrestrained freedom to choose the 11 court where the application therefor will be directed. A becoming regard of the judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against the RTCs should be filed with the Court of 12 Appeals. The hierarchy of courts is determinative of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs; and only in exceptional cases and for compelling reasons, or if warranted by the nature of the issues reviewed, may this 13 Court take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it.
meikimouse
CASES: JURISDICTION
Considering, however, that this case involves the interpretation of Section 34, Rule 138 and Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, the Court takes cognizance of herein petition. Nonetheless, the petitioner is cautioned not to continue his practice of filing directly before this Court petitions under Rule 65 when the issue raised can be resolved with dispatch by the Court of Appeals. We will not tolerate litigants who make a mockery of the judicial hierarchy as it necessarily delays more important concerns before us. In resolving the second issue, a comparative reading of Rule 138, Section 34 and Rule 138-A is necessary. Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides: RULE 138-A LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. – A law student who has successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school. Sec. 2. Appearance. – The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic. The respondent court held that the petitioner could not appear for himself and on his behalf because of his failure to comply with Rule 138- A. In denying petitioner’s appearance, the court a quo tersely finds refuge in the fact that, on December 18, 1986, this Court issued Circular No. 19, which eventually became Rule 138-A, and the failure of Cruz to prove on record that he is enrolled in a recognized school’s clinical legal education program and is under supervision of an attorney duly accredited by the law school. However, the petitioner insisted that the basis of his appearance was Section 34 of Rule 138, which provides:
CIVIL PROCEDURE
have to be conceded that the contention of the petitioner has merit. It recognizes the right of an individual to represent himself in any case to which he is a party. The Rules state that a party may conduct his litigation personally or with the aid of an attorney, and that his appearance must either be personal or by a duly authorized member of the Bar. The individual litigant may personally do everything in the course of proceedings from commencement to the termination of 14 the litigation. Considering that a party personally conducting his litigation is restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure as those qualified to practice 15 law, petitioner, not being a lawyer himself, runs the risk of falling into the snares and hazards of his own ignorance. Therefore, Cruz as plaintiff, at his own instance, can personally conduct the litigation of Civil Case No. 01-0410. He would then be acting not as a counsel or lawyer, but as a party exercising his right to represent himself. The trial court must have been misled by the fact that the petitioner is a law student and must, therefore, be subject to the conditions of the Law Student Practice Rule. It erred in applying Rule 138-A, when the basis of the petitioner’s claim is Section 34 of Rule 138. The former rule provides for conditions when a law student may appear in courts, while the latter rule allows the appearance of a non-lawyer as a party representing himself. The conclusion of the trial court that Rule 138-A superseded Rule 138 by virtue of Circular No. 19 is misplaced. The Court never intended to repeal Rule 138 when it released the guidelines for limited law student practice. In fact, it was intended as an addendum to the instances when a nonlawyer may appear in courts and was incorporated to the Rules of Court through Rule 138-A. It may be relevant to recall that, in respect to the constitutional right of an accused to be heard by himself and 16 counsel, this Court has held that during the trial, the right to 17 counsel cannot be waived. The rationale for this ruling was 18 articulated in People v. Holgado, where we declared that "even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence." The case at bar involves a civil case, with the petitioner as plaintiff therein. The solicitous concern that the Constitution accords the accused in a criminal prosecution obviously does not obtain in a civil case. Thus, a party litigant in a civil case, who insists that he can, without a lawyer’s assistance,
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar. and is a rule distinct from Rule 138-A. From the clear language of this provision of the Rules, it will
effectively undertake the successful pursuit of his claim, may be given the chance to do so. In this case, petitioner alleges that he is a law student and impliedly asserts that he has the competence to litigate the case himself. Evidently, he is aware of the perils incident to this decision. In addition, it was subsequently clarified in Bar Matter 730, that by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without need of the supervision of a lawyer, before inferior courts. Here, we have a law student who, as party litigant, wishes to meikimouse
CASES: JURISDICTION
CIVIL PROCEDURE
represent himself in court. We should grant his wish.
G.R. No. 110571 October 7, 1994
Additionally, however, petitioner contends that the respondent judge committed manifest bias and partiality by ruling that there is no valid ground for her voluntary inhibition despite her alleged negative demeanor during the pre-trial when she said: "Hay naku, masama ‘yung maruno ng pa sa Huwes. Ok?" Petitioner avers that by denying his motion, the respondent judge already manifested conduct
FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS, INC., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and MARIWASA MANUFACTURING, INC., respondents.
indicative of arbitrariness and prejudice, causing petitioner’s and his co-plaintiff’s loss of faith and confidence in the respondent’s impartiality.
We do not agree. It must be noted that because of this incident, the petitioner 19 filed an administrative case against the respondent for violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which we dismissed for lack of merit on September 15, 2002. We now adopt the Court’s findings of fact in the administrative case and rule
that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Mijares when she did not inhibit herself from the trial of the case. In a Motion for Inhibition, the movant must prove the ground for bias and prejudice by clear and convincing evidence to 20 disqualify a judge from participating in a particular trial, as voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and addressed to the sound discretion of the judge. The decision on whether she should inhibit herself must be based on her rational and logical assessment of the circumstances 21 prevailing in the case before her. Absent clear and convincing proof of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the judge, this Court will rule in favor of the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed. WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City are MODIFIED. Regional Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of petitioner in Civil Case No. 01-0410 as a party litigant. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
Castillo, Laman. Tan & Pantaleon for petitioner. De Borja, Medi, Aldea, Ata, Bello, Guevarra & Serapio for private respondent.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.: This is a motion for the reconsideration of the decision of the 1 Second Division sustaining the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over appeals from the decisions of the Board of Investments and, consequently, dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. Because of the importance of the question raised, the Court en banc agreed to accept the matter for consideration. Petitioner's contention is that Circular No. 1-91 cannot be deemed to have superseded art. 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 226) because the Code, which President Aquino promulgated in the exercise of legislative authority, is in the nature of a substantive act of Congress defining the jurisdiction of courts pursuant to Art. VIII, § 2 of the Constitution, while the circular is a rule of procedure which this Court promulgated pursuant to its rule-making power under Art. VIII § 5(5). Petitioner questions the holding of the Second Division that although the right to appeal granted by art. 82 of the Code is a substantive right which cannot be modified by a rule of procedure, nonetheless, questions concerning where and in what manner the appeal can be brought are only matters of procedure which this Court has the power to regulate. Even assuming that there is merit in petitioner's contention, however, the result reached in the main decision is nonetheless, correct from another point of view. Judicial review of the decisions and final orders of the BOI was originally provided for in the Omnibus Investments Code of 1981 2 (P.D. No. 1789), Art. 78 of which stated: Art. 78. Judicial Relief . — All orders or decisions of the Board in cases involving the provisions of this Code shall immediately be executory. No appeal from the order or decision of the Board by the party adversely affected shall stay such order or decision: Provided , That all appeals shall be filed directly with the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from receipt of the order or decision. Art. 78 was thereafter amended by B.P. Blg. 129, 3 by granting in § 9 thereof exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the then Intermediate Appellate Court (now the Court of Appeals) over the decisions and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies. When the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 226) was promulgated on July 17, 1987, the right to appeal from the decisions and final orders of
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CIVIL PROCEDURE
the BOI to the Supreme Court was again granted. Thus, the present Code provides: Art. 82. Judicial Relief . — All orders or decisions of the Board in cases involving the provisions of this Code shall immediately be executory. No appeal from the order or decision of the Board by the party adversely affected shall stay such order or decision: Provided , That all appeals shall be filed directly with the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from receipt of the order or decision. 4
By then, however, the present Constitution had taken effect. The Constitution now provides in Art. VI, § 30 that "No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence." This provision is intended to give the Supreme Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. For the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction can unnecessarily burden the Court and thereby undermine its essential function of expounding the law in its most profound national aspects. Now, art. 82 of the 1987 Omnibus Investments Code, by providing for direct appeals to the Supreme Court from the decisions and final orders of the BOI, increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. Since it was enacted without the advice and concurrence of this Court, this provision never became effective, with the result that it can never be deemed to have amended BP Blg. 129, § 9. Consequently, the authority of the Court of Appeals to decide cases appealed to it from the BOI must be deemed to have been conferred by B.P. Blg. 129, § 9, to be exercised by it in accordance with the procedure prescribed by Circular No. 1-91. Indeed, there is no reason why decisions and final orders of the BOI must be directly appealed to this Court. As already noted in the main decision in this case, the purpose of § 9 of B.P. Blg. 129 is to provide uniform appeals to the Court of Appeals from the decisions and final orders of all quasi-judicial agencies, with the exception only of those issued under the Labor Code and those rendered by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals. It is, therefore, regrettable that in the adoption of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court, as required by the Constitution, had not been obtained in providing for the appeal of the decisions and final orders of the BOI directly to the Supreme Court. WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 110571 March 10, 1994 FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS, INC., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and MARIWASA MANUFACTURING, INC., respondents. Castillo, Laman, Tan & Pantaleon for petitioner. De Borja, Medialdea, Ata, Bello, Guevarra & Serapio for private respondent.
NOCON, J.: Brought to fore in this petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for preliminary injunction is the novel question of where and in what manner appeals from decisions of the Board of Investments (BOI) should be filed. A thorough scrutiny of the conflicting provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980," Executive Order No. 226, also known as the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 and Supreme Court Circular No. 1-91 is, thus, called for. Briefly, this question of law arose when BOI, in its decision dated December 10, 1992 in BOI Case No. 92-005 granted petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s application to amend its BOI certificate of registration by changing the scope of its registered product from "glazed floor tiles" to "ceramic tiles." Eventually, oppositor Mariwasa filed a motion for reconsideration of the said BOI decision while oppositor Fil-Hispano Ceramics, Inc. did not move to reconsider the same nor appeal therefrom. Soon rebuffed in its bid for reconsideration, Mariwasa filed a petition for review with respondent Court of Appeals pursuant to Circular 1-91. Acting on the petition, respondent court required the BOI and petitioner to comment on Mariwasa's petition and to show cause why no injunction should issue. On February 17, 1993, respondent court temporarily restrained the BOI from implementing its decision. This temporary restraining order lapsed by its own terms on March 9, 1993, twenty (20) days after its issuance, without respondent court issuing any preliminary injunction. On February 24, 1993, petitioner filed a "Motion to Dismiss Petition and to Lift Restraining Order" on the ground that respondent court has no appellate jurisdiction over BOI Case No. 92-005, the same being exclusively vested with the Supreme Court pursuant to Article 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987. On May 25, 1993, respondent court denied petitioner's motion to dismiss, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE, private respondent's motion to dismiss the petition is hereby DENIED, for lack of merit. Private respondent is hereby given an inextendible period of ten (10) days from receipt hereof within 1 which to file its comment to the petition. Upon receipt of a copy of the above resolution on June 4, 1993, petitioner decided not to file any motion for reconsideration as the question involved is essentially legal in nature and immediately filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before this Court. meikimouse
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Petitioner posits the view that respondent court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing the questioned resolution of May 25, 1993, for the following reasons: I. Respondent court has no jurisdiction to entertain Mariwasa's appeal from the BOI's decision in BOI Case No. 92-005, which has become final. II. The appellate jurisdiction conferred by statute upon this Honorable Court cannot be amended or superseded by Circular No. 2 1-91. Petitioner then concludes that: III. Mariwasa has lost it right to appeal . . . in this case. 3 Petitioner argues that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 or Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 and Circular 1-91, "Prescribing the Rules Governing Appeals to the Court of Appeals from a Final Order or Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies" cannot be the basis of Mariwasa's appeal to respondent court because the procedure for appeal laid down therein runs contrary to Article 82 of E.O. 226, which provides that appeals from decisions or orders of the BOI shall be filed directly with this Court, to wit: Judicial relief. — All orders or decisions of the Board (of Investments) in cases involving the provisions of this Code shall immediately be executory. No appeal from the order or decision of the Board by the party adversely affected shall stay such an order or decision; Provided , that all appeals shall be filed directly with the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from receipt of the order or decision. On the other hand, Mariwasa maintains that whatever "obvious inconsistency" or "irreconcilable repugnancy" there may have been between B.P. 129 and Article 82 of E.O. 226 on the question of venue for appeal has already been resolved by Circular 1-91 of the Supreme Court, which was promulgated on February 27, 1991 or four (4) years after E.O. 226 was enacted. Sections 1, 2 and 3 of Circular 1-9 1, is herein quoted below: 1. Scope. — These rules shall apply to appeals from final orders or decisions of the Court of Tax Appeals. They shall also apply to appeals from final orders or decisions of any quasi-judicial agency from which an appeal is now allowed by statute to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. Among these agencies are the Securities and Exchange Commission, Land Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications Commission, Secretary of Agrarian Reform and Special Agrarian Courts under RA 6657, Government Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance Commission and Philippine Atomic Energy Commission. 2. Cases not covered. — These rules shall not apply to decisions and interlocutory orders of the National Labor Relations Commission or the Secretary of Labor and Employment under the Labor Code of the Philippines, the Central Board of Assessment Appeals, and other
CIVIL PROCEDURE
quasi-judicial agencies from which no appeal to the courts is prescribed or allowed by statute. 3. Who may appeal and where to appeal. — The appeal of a party affected by a final order, decision, or judgment of the Court of Tax Appeals or of a quasi-judicial agency shall be taken to the Court of Appeals within the period and in the manner herein provided, whether the appeal involves questions of fact or of law or mixed questions of fact and law. From final judgments or decisions of the Court of Appeals, the aggrieved party may appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court as provided in Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It may be called that Section 9(3) of B.P. 129 vests appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of quasi-judicial agencies on the Court of Appeals, to wit: (3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. The Intermediate Appellate Court shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings. These provisions shall not apply to decisions and interlocutory orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines and by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals. Clearly evident in the aforequoted provision of B.P. 129 is the laudable objective of providing a uniform procedure of appeal from decisions of all quasi-judicial agencies for the benefit of the bench and the bar. Equally laudable is the twin objective of B.P. 129 of unclogging the docket of this Court to enable it to attend to more important tasks, which in the words of Dean Vicente G. Sinco, as 4 quoted in our decision in Conde v . Intermediate Appellate Court is "less concerned with the decisions of cases that begin and end with the transient rights and obligations of particular individuals but is more intertwined with the direction of national policies, momentous economic and social problems, the delimitation of governmental authority and its impact upon fundamental rights. 5
In Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, this Court noted that B.P. 129 did not deal only with "changes in the rules on procedures" and that not only was the Court of Appeals reorganized, but its jurisdiction and powers were also broadened by Section 9 thereof. Explaining the changes, this Court said: . . . Its original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari and habeas corpus, which theretofore could be exercised only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, was expanded by (1) extending it so as to include the writ of quo warranto, and also (2) empowering it to issue all said extraordinary writs "whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction." Its appellate jurisdiction was also extended to cover not only final judgments of Regional Trial Courts, but also "all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of . . . quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or meikimouse
CASES: JURISDICTION
commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of sub-paragraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948," it being noteworthy in this connection that the text of the law is broad and comprehensive, and the explicitly stated exceptions have no reference whatever to the Court of Tax Appeals. Indeed, the intention to expand the original and appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards, or commissions, is further stressed by the last paragraph of Section 9 which excludes from its provisions, only the "decisions and interlocutory orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines and by the Central Board of 6 Assessment Appeals." However, it cannot be denied that the lawmaking system of the country is far from perfect. During the transitional period after the country emerged from the Marcos regime, the lawmaking power was lodged on the Executive Department. The obvious lack of deliberation in the drafting of our laws could perhaps explain the deviation of some of our laws from the goal of uniform procedure which B.P. 129 sought to promote. In exempli gratia, Executive Order No. 226 or the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 provides that all appeals shall be filed directly with the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from receipt of the order or decision. Noteworthy is the fact that presently, the Supreme Court entertains ordinary appeals only from decisions of the Regional Trial Courts in criminal cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher. Judgments of regional trial courts may be appealed to the Supreme Court only by petition for review on certiorari within fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, this being the clear intendment of the provision of the Interim Rules that "(a)ppeals to the Supreme Court shall be taken by petition for certiorari which shall be governed by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court." Thus, the right of appeal provided in E.O. 226 within thirty (30) days from receipt of the order or decision is clearly not in consonance with the present procedure before this Court. Only decisions, orders or rulings of a Constitutional Commission (Civil Service Commission, Commission on Elections or Commission on Audit), may be brought to the Supreme Court on original petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 by the aggrieved party within 7 thirty (30) days form receipt of a copy thereof. Under this contextual backdrop, this Court, pursuant to its Constitutional power under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and by way of implementation of B.P. 129, issued Circular 1-91 prescribing the rules governing appeals to the Court of Appeals from final orders or decisions of the Court of Tax Appeals and quasi-judicial agencies to eliminate unnecessary contradictions and confusing rules of procedure. Contrary to petitioner's contention, although a circular is not strictly a statute or law, it has, however, the force and effect of law 8 9 according to settled jurisprudence. In Inciong v . de Guia, a circular of this Court was treated as law. In adopting the recommendation of the Investigating Judge to impose a sanction on a judge who violated Circular No. 7 of this Court dated September 23, 1974, as amended by Circular No. 3 dated April 24,
CIVIL PROCEDURE
1975 and Circular No. 20 dated October 4, 1979, requiring raffling of cases, this Court quoted the ratiocination of the Investigating Judge, brushing aside the contention of respondent judge that assigning cases instead of raffling is a common practice and holding that respondent could not go against the circular of this Court until it is repealed or otherwise modified, as "(L)aws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be 10 excused by disuse, or customs or practice to the contrary." The argument that Article 82 of E.O. 226 cannot be validly repealed by Circular 1-91 because the former grants a substantive right which, under the Constitution cannot be modified, diminished or increased by this Court in the exercise of its rule-making powers is not entirely defensible as it seems. Respondent correctly argued that Article 82 of E.O. 226 grants the right of appeal from decisions or final orders of the BOI and in granting such right, it also provided where and in what manner such appeal can be brought. These latter portions simply deal with procedural aspects which this Court has the power to regulate by virtue of its constitutional rule-making powers. 11
The case of Bustos v . Lucero distinguished between rights created by a substantive law and those arising from procedural law: Substantive law creates substantive rights . . . . Substantive rights is a term which includes those rights which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations (60 C.J., 980). Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates rights and duties which give rise to a cause of action, as oppossed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains a redress for 12 their invasion. Indeed, the question of where and in what manner appeals from decisions of the BOI should be brought pertains only to procedure or the method of enforcing the substantive right to appeal granted by E.O. 226. In other words, the right to appeal from decisions or final orders of the BOI under E.O. 226 remains and continues to be respected. Circular 1-91 simply transferred the venue of appeals from decisions of this agency to respondent Court of Appeals and provided a different period of appeal, i.e., fifteen (15) days from notice. It did not make an incursion into the substantive right to appeal. The fact that BOI is not expressly included in the list of quasi-judicial agencies found in the third sentence of Section 1 of Circular 1-91 does not mean that said circular does not apply to appeals from final orders or decision of the BOI. The second sentence of Section 1 thereof expressly states that "(T)hey shall also apply to appeals from final orders or decisions of any quasi-judicial agency from which an appeal is now allowed by statute to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court." E.O. 266 is one such statute. Besides, the enumeration is preceded by the words "(A)mong these agencies are . . . ," strongly implying that there are other quasi-judicial agencies which are covered by the Circular but which have not been expressly listed therein. More importantly, BOI does not fall within the purview of the exclusions listed in Section 2 of the circular. Only the following final decisions and interlocutory orders are expressly excluded from the circular, namely, those of: (1) the National Labor Relations Commission; (2) the Secretary of Labor and Employment; (3) the Central Board of Assessment Appeals and (4) other quasi judicial agencies from which no appeal to the courts is prescribed or 13 allowed by statute. Since in DBP v . CA we upheld the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the Court of Tax Appeals meikimouse
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despite the fact that the same is not among the agencies reorganized by B.P. 129, on the ground that B.P. 129 is broad and comprehensive, there is no reason why BOI should be excluded from Circular 1-91, which is but implementary of said law. Clearly, Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as the manner and method of enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are concerned. Appeals from decisions of the BOI, which by statute was previously allowed to be filed directly with the Supreme Court, should now be brought to the Court of Appeals. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing reasons, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on July 19, 1993 is hereby LIFTED. SO ORDERED.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
G.R. No. L-49705-09 February 8, 1979 TOMATIC ARATUC, SERGIO TOCAO, CISCOLARIO DIAZ, FRED TAMULA, MANGONTAWAR GURO and BONIFACIO LEGASPI, petitioners, vs. The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, REGIONAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS for Region XII (Central Mindanao), ABDULLAH DIMAPORO, JESUS AMPARO, ANACLETO BADOY, et al., respondents. Nos. L-49717-21 February 8,1979. LINANG MANDANGAN, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE REGIONAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS for Region XII, and ERNESTO ROLDAN, respondents. L-49705-09 — Lino M. Patajo for petitioners. Estanislao A. Fernandez for private respondents. L-49717-21 — Estanislao A. Fernandez for petitioner. Lino M. Patajo for private respondent. Office of the Solicitor General, for Public respondents.
BARREDO, J.: Petition in G. R. Nos. L-49705-09 for certiorari with restraining order and preliminary injunction filed by six (6) independent candidates for representatives to tile Interim Batasang Pambansa who had joined together under the banner of the Kunsensiya ng Bayan which, however, was not registered as a political party or group under the 1976 Election Code, P.D. No. 1296, namely Tomatic Aratuc, Sorgio Tocao, Ciscolario Diaz, Fred Tamula, Mangontawar Guro and Bonifacio Legaspi her referred to as petitioners, to review the decision of the respondent Commission on Election (Comelec) resolving their appeal from the Of the respondent Regional Board of Canvasses for Region XII regarding the canvass of the results of the election in said region for representatives to the I.B.P. held on April 7, 1978. Similar petition in G.R. Nos. L49717-21, for certiorari with restraining order and preliminary injunction filed by Linang Mandangan, abo a candidate for representative in the same election in that region, to review the decision of the Comelec declaring respondent Ernesto Roldan as entitled to be proclaimed as one of the eight winners in said election. The instant proceedings are sequels of Our decision in G.R. No. L48097, wherein Tomatic Aratuc et al. sought the suspension of the canvass then being undertaken by respondent dent Board in Cotabato city and in which canvass, the returns in 1966 out of a total of 4,107 voting centers in the whole region had already been canvassed showing partial results as follows: NAMES CANDIDATES
OF
NO. OF VOTES meikimouse
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CIVIL PROCEDURE
Magpet, Matalam Midsayap, Pigcawayan, Pikit, Pres. Roxas and Tulonan, and eleven (11) towns in Sultan Kudarat, namely, Bagumbayan, Columbia Don Mariano Marcos, Esperanza, Isulan, Kalamansig, Lebak, Lutayan, Palimbang, President Quirino and Tacurong, by reason for which, petitioners had asked that the returns from said voting centers be excluded from the canvass. Before the start of the hearings, the canvass was suspended but after the supervisory panel presented its report, on May 15, 1978, the Comelec lifted its order of suspension and directed the resumption of the canvass to be done in Manila. This order was the one assailed in this Court. We issued a restraining order.
1. Roldan, Ernesto (KB)
225,674
2. Valdez, Estanislao (KBL)
217,789
3. Dimporo, Abdullah (KBL)
199,244
4. Tocao, (KB)
Sergio
199,062
5. Badoy, Anacleto (KBL)
198,966
After hearing the parties, the Court allowed the resumption of the canvass but issued the following guidelines to be observed thereat:
6. Amparo, Jesus (KBL)
184,764
7. Pangandaman, Sambolayan (KBL)
183,646
1. That the resumption of said canvass shall be held in the Comelec main office in Manila starting not later than June 1, 1978;
8. Sinsuat, Blah (KBL)
Datu
182,457
Tomas
171,656
10. Aratuc, Tomatic (KB)
165,795
11. Mandangan, Linang(KB)
165,032
12. Diaz, Ciscolario (KB)
159,977
13. Tamalu, Fred (KB)
153,734
14. Legaspi Bonifacio (KB)
148,200
15. Guro, Mangontawar (KB)
139,386
16. Loma, Nemesio (KB)
107,455
17. Macapeges, Malamama (Independent)
101,350
9. Baga, (KBL)
(Votes Of the independent candidates who actually were not in contention omitted)" (Page 6, Record, L-49705-09.) A supervening panel headed by Commissioner of Elections, HonVenancio S. Duque, had conducted of the complaints of the petitioners therein of alleged irregularities in the election records in all the voting centers in the whole province of Lanao del Sur, the whole City of Marawi, eight (8) towns of Lanao del Norte, namely, Baloi, Karomatan, Matungao, Munai, Nunungan, Pantao Ragat, Tagoloan and Tangcal, seven (7) towns in Maguindanao, namely, Barrira, Datu Piang, Dinaig, Matanog Parang, South Upi and Upi, ten (10) towns in North Cotabato, namely, Carmen, Kabacan, Kidapwan,
2. That in preparation therefor, respondent Commission on Elections shall see to it that all the material election paragraph corresponding to all the voting center involved in Election Nos. 78-8, 78-9, 78-10, 78-11 and 78-12 are taken to its main office in Manila, more particularly, the ballot boxes, with the contents, used during the said elections, the books of voters or records of voting and the lists or records of registered voters, on or before May 31, 1978; 3. That as soon as the corresponding records are available, petitioners and their counsel shall be allowed to examine the same under such security measures as the respondent Board may determine, except the contents of the ballot boxes which shall be opened only upon orders of either the respondent Board or respondent Commission, after the need therefor has become evident, the purpose of such examination being to enable petitioners, and their counsel to expeditiously determine which of them they would wish to be scrutinized and passed upon by the Board as supporting their charges of election frauds and anomalies, petitioners and their counsel being admonished in this connection, that no dilatory tactics should be in by them and that only such records substantial objections should be offered by them for the scrutiny by the Board; 4. That none of the election returns reffered to in the petition herein shall be canvassed without first giving the herein petitioners ample opportunity to make their specific objections thereto, if they have any, and to show sufficient basis for the rejection of any of the returns, and, in this connection, the respondent Regional Board of Canvassers should give due consideration to the points raised in the memorandum filed by said petitioners with the Commission on Election in the above cases dated April 26, 1978;
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5. That should it appear to the board upon summary scrutiny of the records to be offered by petitioners indication that in the voting center actually held and/or that election returns were prepared either before the day of the election returns or at any other time, without regard thereto or that there has been massive substitution of voters, or that ballots and/or returns were prepared by the same groups of persons or individuals or outside of the voting centers, the Board should exclude the corresponding returns from the canvass; 6. That appeals to the commission on Election of the Board may be made only after all the returns in question in all the above, the above five cases shall have been passed upon by the Board and, accordingly, no proclamation made until after the Commission shall have finally resolved the appeal without prejudice to recourse to this court, if warranted as provided by the Code and the Constitution, giving the parties reasonable time therefor; 7. That the copies of the election returns found in the corresponding ballot boxes shall be the one used in the canvass; 8. That the canvass shall be conducted with utmost dispatch, to the end that a proclamation, if feasible, may be made not later than June 10, 1978; thus, the canvass may be terminated as soon as it is evident that the possible number of votes in the still uncanvassed returns with no longer affect the general results of the elections here in controversy; 9. That respondent Commission shall promulgate such other directive not inconsistent with this resolution y necessary to expedite the proceedings herein contemplated and to accomplish the purposes herein intended. (Pp. 89, Record. On June 1, 1978, upon proper motion, said guidelines were modified: ... in the sense that the ballot boxes for the voting centers just referred to need not be taken to Manila, EXCEPT those of the particular voting centers as to which the petitioners have t he right to demand that the corresponding ballot boxes be opened in order that the votes therein may be counted because said ballots unlike the election returns, have not been tampered with or substituted, which instances the results of the counting shall be specified and made known by petitioners to the Regional Board of Canvassers not later than June 3, 1978; it being understood, that for the purposes of the canvass, the petitioners shall not be allowed to invoke any objection not already alleged in or comprehend
CIVIL PROCEDURE
within the allegations in their complaint in the election cases above- mentioned. (Page 8, Id.) Thus respondent Board proceeded with the canvass, with the herein petitioners presenting objections, most of them supported by the report of handwriting and finger print experts who had examined the voting records and lists of voters in 878 voting centers, out of 2,700 which they specified in their complaints or petitions in Election Cases 78-8, 78-9, 78-10, 78-11 and 7812 in the Comelec. In regard to 501 voting centers, the records cf. which, consisting of the voters lists and voting records were not available- and could not be brought to Manila, petitions asked that the results therein be completely excluded from the canvass. On July 11, 1978, respondent Board terminated its canvass and declared the result of the voting to be as follows: NAME CANDIDATE
OF
VOTES OBTAIN
VALDEZ, Estanislao
436,069
DIMAPORO, Abdullah
429,351
PANGANDAMAN, Sambolayan
406,106
SINSUAT, Blah
403,445
AMPARO, Jesus
399,997
MANDANGAN, Linang
387,025
BAGA, Tomas
386,393
BADOY,Anacleto
374,933
ROLDAN, Ernesto
275,141
TOCAO, Sergio
239,914
ARATUC, Tomatic
205,829
GURO, Mangontawar
190,489
DIAZ, Ciscolario
190,077
TAMULA, Fred
180,280
LEGASPI, Bonifacio
174,396
MACAPEGES, Malamana
160,271
(Pp. Record.)
11-12,
Without loss of time, the petitioners brought the resolution of respondent Board to the Comelec. Hearing was held on April 25, meikimouse
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1978, after which , the case was declared submitted for decision. However, on August 30,1978, the Comelec issued a resolution stating inter alia that : In order to enable the Commission to decide the appeal properly : a. It will have to go deeper into the examination of the voting records and registration records and in the case of voting centers whose voting and registration records which have not yet been submitted for the Commission to decide to open the ballot boxes; and b. To interview and get statements under oath of impartial and disinterested persons from the area to determine whether actual voting took place on April 7, 1978, as well as those of the military authorities in the areas affects (Page 12). Record, L-49705-09 .) On December 11, 1978, the Comelec required the parties "to file their respective written comments on the reports they shall periodically receive from the NBI-Comelec team of finger-print and signature experts within the inextendible period of seven (7) days from their receipt thereof". According to counsel for Aratuc, et al., "Petitioners submitted their various comments on the report 4, the principal gist of which was that it would appear uniformly in all the reports submitted by the Comelec-NBI experts that the registered voters were not the ones who voted as shown by the fact that the thumbprints appearing in Form 1 were different from the thumbprints of the voters in Form 5. " But the Comelec denied a motion of petitioners asking that the ballot boxes corresponding to the voting centers the record of which are not available be opened and that a date be set when the statements of witnesses referred to in the August 30, 1978 resolution would be taken, on the ground that in its opinion, it was no longer necessary to proceed with such opening of ballot boxes and taking of statements. For his part, counsel for petitioner M in G.R. No. L-49717-21 filed with Comelec on December 19,1978 a Memorandum. To quote from the petition: On December 19, 1978, the KBL, through counsel, filed a Memorandum for the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) Candidates on the Comelec's Resolution of December 11, 1978, a xerox copy of which is attached hereto and made a part hereof as Annex 2, wherein they discussed the following topics: (I) Brief History of the President Case; (II) Summary of Our Position and Submission Before the Honorable commission; and (III) KBL's Appeal Ad Cau telam. And the fourth topic, because of its relevance to the case now before this Honorable Court, we hereby quote for ready reference: IV OUR POSITION WITH RESPECT TO THE
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COMMISSION OF DECEMBER 11, 1978 We respectfully submit that the Resolution of this case by this Honorable Commission should be limited to the precincts and municipalities involved in the KB'S Petitions in Cases Nos. 78-8 to 78-12, on which evidence had been submitted by the parties, and on which the KB submitted the reports of their handwriting-print. Furthermore, it should be limited by the appeal of the KB. For under the Supreme Court Resolution of May 23, 1978, original jurisdiction was given to the Board, with appeal to this Honorable Commission-Considerations of other matters beyond these would be, in our humble opinion, without jurisdiction. For the present, we beg to inform this Honorable Commission that we stand by the reports and findings of the COMELEC/NBI experts as submitted by them to the Regional Board of Canvassers and as confirmed by the said Regional Board of Canvassers in its Resolution of July 11, 1978, giving the 8 KBL candidates the majorities we have already above mentioned. The Board did more than make a summary scrutiny of the records' required by the Supreme Court Resolution, Guideline No. 5, of May 23, 1978. Hence, if for lack of material time we cannot file any Memorandum within the nonextendible period of seven (7) days, we would just stand by said COMELEC/NBI experts' reports to the Regional Board, as confirmed by the Board (subject to our appeal ad cautelam). The COMELEC sent to the parties copies of the reports of the NBI-COMELEC experts. For lack of material time due to the voluminous reports and number of voting centers involved, the Christmas holidays, and our impression that the COMELEC will exercise only its appellate jurisdiction, specially as per resolution of this Honorable Court of May 23, 1978 (in G.R. No. L48097), we, the KBL, did not comment any more on said reports. (Pp. 5-6, Record, L-49717-21.) On January 13, 1979, the Comelec rendered its resolution being assailed in these cases, declaring the final result of the canvass to be as follows: CANDIDATES
VOTES
VALDEZ, Estanislao
319,514
DIMAPORO, Abdullah
289.751
AMPARO, Jesus
286,180
BADOY, Anacleto
285,985
ESOLUTION OF THE HONORABLE meikimouse
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BAGA, Tomas
271,473
PANGANDAMAN, Sambolayan
271,393
SINSUAT, Blah
269,905
ROLDAN, Ernesto
268,287
MANDANGAN, Linang
251,226
TACAO, Sergio
229,124
DIAZ, Ciscolario
187,986
ARATUC, Tomatic
183,316
LEGASPI, Bonifacio
178,564
TAMULA, Fred
177,270
GURO, Mangontawar
163,449
LOMA, Nemesio
129,450
(Page 14, Record, L-49705-09.) It is alleged in the Aratuc petition that: The Comelec committee grave abuse dicretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction:
5. In not Identifying the ballot boxes that had no padlocks and especially those that were found to be empty while they were shipped to Manila pursuant to the directive of the Commission in compliance with the guidelines of this Honorable Court; 6. In not excluding from the canvass returns where the results of examination of the voting records and registration records show that the thumbprints of the voters in CE Form 5 did not correspond to those of the registered voters as shown in CE Form 1; 7. In giving more credence to the affidavits of chairmen and members of the voting centers, municipal treasurers and other election officials in the voting centers where irregularities had been committed and not giving credence to the affidavits of watchers of petitioners; 8. In not including among those questioned before the Board by petitioners those included among the returns questioned by them in their Memorandum filed with the Commission on April 26, 1978, which Memorandum was attached as Annex 'I' to their petition filed with this Honorable Court G.R. No. L-48097 and which the Supreme Court said in its Guidelines should be considered by the Board in the course of the canvass (Guidelines No. 4). (Pp. 15-16, Record, Id.)
of
On the other hand, the Mandangan petition submits that the Comelec comitted the following errors:
1. In not pursuing further the examination of the registration records and voting records from the other voting centers questioned by petitioners after it found proof of massive substitute voting in all of the voting records and registration records examined by Comelec and NBI experts;
1. In erroneously applying the earlier case of Diaz vs. Commission on Elections (November 29, 1971; 42 SCRA 426), and particularly the highly restrictive criterion that when the votes obtained by the candidates with the highest number of votes exceed the total number of highest possible valid votes, the COMELEC ruled to exclude from the canvass the election return reflecting such rests, under which the COMELEC excluded 1,004 election returns, involving around 100,000 votes, 95 % of which are for KBL candidates, particularly the petitioner Linang Mandangan, and which rule is so patently unfair, unjust and oppressive.
2. In including in the canvass returns from the voting centers whose book of voters and voting records could not be recovered by the Commission in spite of its repeated efforts to retrieve said records; 3. In not excluding from the canvass returns from voting centers showing a very high percentage of voting and in not considering that high percentage of voting, coupled with massive substitution of voters is proof of manufacturing of election returns; 4. In denying petitioners' petition for the opening of the ballot boxes from voting centers whose records are not available for examination to determine whether or not there had been voting in said voting centers;
2. In not holding that the real doctrine in the Diaz Case is not the total exclusion of election returns simply because the total number of votes exceed the total number of highest possible valid votes, but 'even if all the votes cast by persons Identified as registered voters were added to the votes cast by persons who can not be definitely ascertained as registered or not, and granting, ad arguendo, that all of them voted for respondent Daoas, still the resulting total is much below the number of votes credited to the latter in returns for Sagada, 'and meikimouse
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that 'of the 2,188 ballots cast in Sagada, nearly one-half (1,012) were cast by persons definitely Identified as not registered therein or still more
than 40 % of substitute voting which was the rule followed in the later case of Bashier/Basman (Diaz Case, November 19,1971,42 SCRA 426,432). 3. In not applying the rule and formula in the later case of Bashier and Basman vs. Commission on Election(February 24, 1972, 43 SCRA 238) which was the one followed by the Regional Board of Canvassers, to wit: In Basman vs Comelec (L33728, Feb. 24, 1972) the Supreme Court upheld the Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the Commission setting the standard of 40 % excess votes to justify the exclusion of election returns. In line with the above ruling, the Board of Canvassers may likewise set aside election returns with 40 % substitute votes. Likewise, where excess voting occured and the excess was such as to destroy the presumption of innocent mistake, the returns was excluded. (COMELEC'S Resolution, Annex I hereof, p. 22), which this Honorable Court must have meant when its Resolution of May 23, 1978 (G.R. No. 7), it referred to "massive substitution of voters. 4. In examining, through the NBI/COMELEC experts, the records in more than 878 voting centers examined by the KB experts and passed upon by the Regional Board of Canvassers which was all that was within its appellate jurisdiction is examination of more election records to make a total of 1,085 voting centers (COMELEC'S Resolution, Annex 1 hereof, p. 100), being beyond its jurisdiction and a denial of due process as far as the KBL, particularly the petitioner Mandangan, were concerned because they were informed of it only on December, 1978, long after the case has been submitted for decision in September, 1978; and the statement that the KBL acquiesced to the same is absolutely without foundation. 5. In excluding election returns from areas where the conditions of peace and order were allegedly unsettled or where there was a military operation going on immediately before and during election and where the voter turn out was high (90 % to 100 %), and where the people had been asked to evacuate, as a ruling without jurisdiction and in violation of due process
because no evidence was at all submitted by the parties before the Regional Board of Canvasssers. (Pp. 23-25, Record, L- 47917-21.) Now before discussing the merits of the foregoing contentions, it is necessary to clarify first the nature and extent of the Supreme Court's power of review in the premises. The Aratuc petition is expressly predicated on the ground that respondent Comelec "committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction" in eight specifications. On the other hand, the Mandangan petition raises pure questions of law and jurisdiction. In other words, both petitions invoked the Court's certiorari jurisdiction, not its appellate authority of review. This is as it should be. While under the Constitution of 1935, "the decisions, orders and rulings of the Commission shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court" (Sec. 2, first paragraph, Article X) and pursuant to the Rules of Court, the petition for "certiorari or review" shall be on the ground that the Commission "has decided a question of substance not theretofore determined by the Supreme Court, or has decided it in a way not in accord with law or the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court" (Sec. 3. Rule 43), and such provisions refer not only to election contests but even to preproclamation proceedings, the 1973 Constitution provides somewhat differently thus: "Any decision, order or ruling of the Commissionmay be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof" (Section 11, Article XII c), even as it ordains that the Commission shall "be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all members of the National Assembly and elective provincial and city official" (Section 2(2).) Correspondingly, the ElectionCode of 1978, which is the first legislative constructionof the pertinent constitutional provisions, makes the Commission also the "sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies" and further provides that "any of its decisions, orders or rulings (in such contoversies) shall be final and executory", just as in election contests, "the decision of the Commission shall be final, and executory and inappealable." (Section 193) It is at once evident from these constitutional and statutory modifications that there is a definite tendency to enhance and invigorate the role of the Commission on Elections as the independent constitutinal body charged with the safeguarding of free, peaceful and honest elections. The framers of the new Constitution must be presumed ot have definite knowledge of what it means to make the decisions, orders and rulings of the Commission "subject to review by the Supreme Court". And since instead of maintaining that provision intact, it ordained that the Commission's actuations be instead "brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari ", We cannot insist that there was no intent to change the nature of the remedy, considering that the limited scope of certiorari, compared to a review, is well known in remedial law. Withal, as already stated, the legislative construction of the modified peritinent constitutional provision is to the effect that the actuations of the Commission are final, executory and even inappealable. While such construction does not exclude the general certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court which inheres in it as the final guardian of the Constitution, particularly, of its imperious due process mandate, it correspondingly narrows down the scope and extent of the inquiry the Court is supposed to undertake to what is strictly the office of certiorari as distinguished from review. We are meikimouse
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of the considered opinion that the statutory modifications are consistent with the apparent new constitional intent. Indeed, it is obvious that to say that actuations of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari technically connotes something less than saying that the same "shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court", when it comes to the measure of the Court's reviewing authority or prerogative in the premises. A review includes digging into the merits and unearthing errors of judgment, while certiorari deals exclusively with grave abuse of discretion, which may not exist even when the decision is otherwise erroneous. certiorari implies an indifferent disregard of the law, arbitrariness and caprice, an omission to weight pertinent considerations, a decision arrived at without rational deliberation. While the effecdts of an error of judgment may not differ from that of an indiscretion, as a matter of policy, there are matters taht by their nature ought to be left for final determination to the sound discretion of certain officers or entities, reserving it to the Supreme Court to insure the faithful observance of due process only in cases of patent arbitrariness. Such, to Our mind, is the constitutional scheme relative to the Commission on Elections. Conceived by the charter as the effective instrument to preserve the sanctity of popular suffrage, endowed with independence and all the needed concommittant powers, it is but proper that the Court should accord the greatest measure of presumption of regularity to its course of action and choice of means in performing its duties, to the end that it may achieve its designed place in the democratic fabric of our government. Ideally, its members should be free from all suspicions of partisan inclinations, but the fact that actually some of them have had stints in the arena of politics should not, unless the contrary is shown, serve as basis for denying to its actuations the respect and consideration that the Constitution contemplates should be accorded to it, in the same manner that the Supreme Court itself which from time to time may have members drawn from the political ranks or even from military is at all times deemed insulated from every degree or form of external pressure and influence as well as improper internal motivations that could arise from such background or orientation. We hold, therefore that under the existing constitution and statutory provisions, the certiorari jurisdiction of the Court over orders, and decisions of the Comelec is not as broad as it used to be and should be confined to instances of grave abuse of discretion amounting to patent and substantial denial of due process. Accordingly, it is in this light that We the opposing contentions of the parties in this cases. THE MANDANGAN CASE Being more simple in Our view, We shall deal with the petition in G.R. No. L-49717-21 first. The errors assigned in this petition boil down to two main propositions, namely, (1) that it was an error of law on the part of respondent Comelec to have applied to the extant circumstances hereof the ruling of this Court in Diaz vs. Comelec 42 SCRA 426 instead of that of Bashier vs. Comelec 43 SCRA 238; and (2) that respondent Comelec exceeded its jurisdiction and denied due process to petitioner Mandangan in extending its inquiry beyond the election records of "the 878 voting centers examined by the KB experts and passed upon by the Regional Board of Canvassers" and
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in excluding from the canvass the returns showing 90 to 100 % voting, from voting centers where military operations were by the Army to be going on, to the extent that said voting centers had to be transferred to the poblaciones the same being by evidence. Anent the first proposition, it must be made clear that the Diaz and Bashier rulings are not mutually exclusive of each other, each being an outgrowth of the basic rationale of statistical improbability laid down in Lagumbay vs. Comelec and , 16 SCRA 175. Whether they be apply together or separately or which of them be applied depends on the situation on hand. In the factual milieu of the instant case as found by the Comelec, We see no cogent reason, and petitioner has not shown any, why returns in voting centers showing that the votes of the candidate obtaining highest number of votes of the candidate obtaining the highest number of votes exceeds the highest possible number of valid votes cast therein should not be deemed as spurious and manufactured just because the total number of excess votes in said voting centers were not more than 40 %. Surely, this is not the occasion, consider the historical antecedents relative to the highly questionable manner in which elections have been bad in the past in the provinces herein involved, of which the Court has judicial notice as attested by its numerous decisions in cases involving practically every such election, of the Court to move a whit back from the standards it has enunciated in those decisions. In regard to the jurisdictional and due process points raised by herein petitioner, it is of decisive importance to bear in mind that under Section 168 of the Revised Election Code of 1978, "the Commission (on Elections) shall have direct control and supervision on over the board of canvassers" and that relatedly, Section 175 of the same Code provides that it "shall be the sole judge of all preproclamation controversies." While nominally, the procedure of bringing to the Commission objections to the actuations of boards of canvassers has been quite loosely referred to in certain quarters, even by the Commission and by this Court, such as in the guidelines of May 23,1978 quoted earlier in this opinion, as an appeal, the fact of the matter is that the authority of the Commission in reviewing such actuations does not spring from any appellate jurisdiction conferred by any specific provision of law, for there is none such provision anywhere in the Election Code, but from the plenary prerogative of direct control and supervision endowed to it by the above-quoted provisions of Section 168. And in administrative law, it is a too well settled postulate to need any supporting citation here, that a superior body or office having supervision and control over another may do directly what the latter is supposed to do or ought to have done. Consequently, anything said in Lucman vs. Dimaporo, 33 SCRA 387, cited by petitioner, to the contrary notwithstanding, We cannot fault respondent Comelec for its having extended its inquiry beyond that undertaken by the Board of Canvass On the contrary, it must be stated that Comelec correctly and commendably asserted its statutory authority born of its envisaged constitutional duties vis-avis the preservation of the purity of elections and electoral processes and p in doing what petitioner it should not have done. Incidentally, it cannot be said that Comelec went further than even what Aratuc et al. have asked, since said complaints had impugned from the outset not only the returns from the 878 voting centers examined by their experts but all those mentioned in their complaints in the election cases filed originally with the Comelec enumerated in the opening statements hereof, hence respondent Comelec had that much field to work on.
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The same principle should apply in respect to the ruling of the Commission regarding the voting centers affected by military operations. It took cognizance of the fact, not considered by the board of canvass, that said voting centers had been transferred to the poblaciones. And, if only for purposes of pre-proclamation proceedings, We are persuaded it did not constitute a denial of due process for the Commission to have taken into account, without the need or presentation of evidence by the parties, a matter so publicly notorious as the unsettled situation of peace and order in localities in the provinces herein involved that their may perhaps be taken judicial notice of, the same being capable of unquestionable demonstration. (See 1, Rule 129) In this connection, We may as well perhaps, say here as later that regrettably We cannot, however, go along with the view, expressed in the dissent of our respected Chief Justice, that from the fact that some of the voting centers had been transferred to the poblaciones there is already sufficient basis for Us to rule that the Commission should have also subjected all the returns from the other voting centers of the some municipalities, if not provinces, to the same degree of scrutiny as in the former. The majority of the Court feels that had the Commission done so, it would have fallen into the error by petitioner Mandangan about denial of due process, for it is relatively unsafe to draw adverse conclusions as to the exact conditions of peace and order in those other voting centers without at list some prima facie evidence to rely on considering that there is no allegation, much less any showing at all that the voting centers in question are so close to those excluded by the Comelec on as to warrant the inescapable conclusion that the relevant circumstances by the Comelec as obtaining in the latter were Identical to those in the former. Premises considered the petition in G.R. Nos. L-49717-21 is hereby dismiss for lack of merit. THE ARATUC ET AL. PETITION Of the eight errors assigned by herein petitioners earlier adverted to, the seventh and the sight do not require any extended disquisition. As to the issue of whether the elections in the voting centers concerned were held on April 7, 1978, the date designated by law, or earlier, to which the seventh alleged error is addressed, We note that apparently petitioners are not seriously pressing on it anymore, as evidenced by the complete absence of any reference thereto during the oral argument of their counsel and the practically cavalier discussion thereof in the petition. In any event, We are satisfied from a careful review of the analysis by the Comelec in its resolution now before Us that it took pains to consider as meticulously as the nature of the evidence presented by both parties would permit all the contentions of petitioners relative to the weight that should be given to such evidence. The detailed discussion of said evidence is contained in not less than nineteen pages (pp. 70-89) of the resolution. In these premises, We are not prepared to hold that Comelec acted wantonly and arbitrarily in drawing its conclusions adverse to petitioners' position. If errors there are in any of those conclusions, they are errors of judgment which are not reviewable in certiorari, so long as they are founded on substantial evidence.
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of canvassers in this regard, Comelec gravely abused its discretion, if only because in the guidelines set by this Court, what appears to have been referred to is, rightly or wrongly, the resumption only of the canvass, which does not necessarily include t he setting aside and repetition of the canvass already made in Cotabato City. The second and fourth assignments of error concern the voting centers the corresponding voters' record (C.E. Form 1) and record of voting, (C.E. Form 5) of which have never been brought to Manila because they, were not available The is not clear as to how many are these voting centers. According to petitioners they are 501, but in the Comelec resolution in question, the number mentioned is only 408, and this number is directly challenged in the petition. Under the second assignment, it is contended that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in including in the canvass the election returns from these voting centers and, somewhat alternatively, it is alleged as fourth assignment that the petitioners motion for the opening of the ballot boxes pertaining to said voting centers was arbitraly denied by respondent Comelec. The resolution under scrutiny explains the situation that confronted the Commission in regard to the 408 voting centers reffered to as follows : The Commission had the option of excluding from the canvass the election returns under category. By deciding to exclude, the Commission would be summarily disenfranchising the voters registered in the voting centers affected without any basis. The Commission could also order the inclusion in the canvass of these elections returns under the injunction of the Supreme Court that extremes caution must be exercised in rejecting returns unless these are palpably irregular. The Commission chose to give prima facie validity to the election returns mentioned and uphold the votes cast by the voters in those areas. The Commission held the view that the failure of some election officials to comply with Commission orders(to submit the records) should not parties to such official disobedience. In the case of Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, 39 Phil. 208, the Supreme Court ruled that when voters have honestly cast their ballots, the same should not be nullified because the officers appointed under the law to direct the election and guard the purity of the ballot have not complied with their duty. (cited in Laurel on E lections, p. 24) On page 14 of the comment of the Solicitor General, however, it is stated that: At all events, the returns corresponding to these voting centers were examined by the Comelec and 141 of such returns were excluded, as follows:
As to eighth assigned error. the thrust of respondents, comment is that the results in the voting centers mentioned in this assignment of error had already been canvassed at the regional canvass center in Cotabato City. Again, We cannot say that in sustaining the board meikimouse
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Considering R that Comelec, if it had wished to do so, had the facilities to Identify Y on its own the voting centers without CE Forms I and 5, thereby precluding the need for the petitioners having to specify them, and under the circumstances the need for opening the ballot PROVINCE TOTAL EXCLUDED INCLUDED boxes in question should have appeared to it to be quite apparent, it may be contended that Comelec would have done greater service to Lanao del Norte 30 30 the public interest had it proceeded to order such opening, as it had — announced it had thoughts of doing in its resolution of August 30, Lanao del Sur 342 137 205 1978. On the other hand, We cannot really blame the Commission too much, since the exacting tenor of the guidelines issued by Us left Maguindanao 21 1 20 it with very little elbow room, so to speak, to use its own discretion independently of what We had ordered. What could have saved North Cotabato 7 1 6 matters altogether would have been a timely move on the part of petitioners on or before June 3, 1978, as contemplated in Our Sultan Kudarat 12 2 10 resolution. After all come to think of it, that the possible outcome of the opening of the ballot boxes would favor the petitioners was not totals ----412 141 271 a certainty — the contents them could conceivably boomerang against them, such as, for example, if the ballots therein had been found to be regular and preponderantly for their opponents. Having (Page 301, Record.) in mind that significantly, petitioners filed their motion for only on January 9, 1979, practically on the eve of the promulgation of the This assertion has not been denied by petitioners. resolution, We hold that by having adhered to Our guidelines of June 1, 1978, Comelec certainly cannot be held to be guilty of having Thus, it appears that precisely use of the absence or unavailability of gravely abused its discretion, in examining and passing on the the CE Forms 1 and 5 corresponding to the more than 400 voting returns from the voting centers reffered to in the second and fourth centers concerned in our present discussion the Comelec examined assignments of error in the canvass or in denying petitioners' motion the returns from said voting centers to determine their for the of the ballot boxes concerned. trustworthiness by scrutinizing the purported relevant data appearing on their faces, believing that such was the next best thing The first, third and sixth assignment of involve related matters and that could be done to avoid total disenfranchisement of the voters maybe discussed together. They all deal with the inclusion in or in all of them On the Other hand, Petitioners' insist that the right exclusion from the canvass of returns on the basis of the percentage thing to do was to order the opening of the ballot boxes involved. of voting in specified voting centers and the corresponding findings of the Comelec on the extent of substitute voting therein as In connection with such opposing contentions, Comelec's indicated by the result of either the technical examination by explanation in its resolution is: experts of the signatures and thumb-prints of the voters threat. ... The commission had it seen fit to so order, could have directed the opening of the ballot boxes. But the Commission did not see the necessity of going to such length in a that was in nature and decided that there was sufficient bases for the revolution of the appeal. That the Commission has discretion to determine when the ballot boxes should be opened is implicit in the guidelines set by the Supreme Court which states that '. . . the ballot bones [which] shall be opened only upon orders of either the respondent Board or respondent Commission, after the need therefor has become evident ... ' (guideline No. 3; emphasissupplied). Furthermore, the Court on June 1, 1978, amended the guidelines that the " ballot boxes for the voting centers ... need not be taken to Manila EXCEPT those of the centers as to which
the petitioners have the right to demand that the corresponding ballot boxes be opened ... provided that the voting centers concerned shall be specified and made known by petitioners to the Regional Board of Canvassers not later than June 3,1978 ... ' (Emphasis supplied). The
KB, candidates did not take advantage of the option granted them under these guidelines.( Pp 106-107, Record.)
To begin with, petitioners' complaint that the Comelec did not examine and study 1,694 of the records in an the 2,775 voting centers questioned by them is hardly accurate. To be more exact, the Commission excluded a total of 1,267 returns coming under four categories namely: 1,001 under the Diaz, supra, ruling, 79 because of 90-100 % turnout of voters despite military operations, 105 palpably manufactured owe and 82 returns excluded by the board of canvass on other grounds. Thus, 45.45 % of the of the petitioners were sustained by the Comelec. In contrast, in the board of canvassers, only 453 returns were excluded. The board was reversed as to 6 of these, and 821 returns were excluded by Comelec over and above those excluded by the board. In other words, the Comelec almost doubled the exclusions by the board. Petitioners would give the impression by their third assignment of error that Comelec refused to consider high percentage of voting, coupled with mass substitute voting, as proof that the pertinent returns had been manufactured. That such was not the case is already shown in the above specifications. To add more, it can be gleaned from the resolution that in t to the 1,065 voting centers in Lanao del Sur and Marawi City where a high percentage of voting appeared, the returns from the 867 voting centers were excluded by the Comelec and only 198 were included a ratio of roughly 78 % to 22 %. The following tabulation drawn from the figures in the resolution shows how the Comelec went over those returns center by center and acted on them individually:
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90% — 100% VOTING MARAWI CITY AND LANAO DEL SUR
Pagayawan
15
13
9
Piagapo
39
39
3
44
44
4
23
20
2
32
2
31
3
PoonaNO. OF V/C THAT V/C WITH Bayabao 90% to 100% MUNICIPALITIES PualasVOTING FUNCTIONED Saguiaran No. of Sultan V/CGumander
36 Excluded
Included 35
wi City
151
112Tamparan
107
24
5
21
1
od e
28
28 Taraka
27
31
1
31
3
19
1
1,065
8
Tubaran agan
23
53
53
49
4
ong
22
TOTALS: 22 Marawi &
15
7
g
29
20 Lanao del Sur
13
yan
37
33
iposo n
41
10
ng
24
23
29 4 We are convinced, apart from presuming regularity in the performance of its duties, that 10 0 there is enough showing in the record that it did examine and study the returns and pertinent records corresponding to all the 2775 voting centers subject of petitioners' complaints below. 2In one part of its resolution the 21 Comelec states:
aran
21 (All excluded)
1,218
7
The Commission as earlier stated examined on its own the Books of Voters (Comelec Form No. 1 1) and the Voters Rewards Comelec Form No. 5) to determine for itself which of these elections 0 further examination by the form needed COMELEC-NBI experts. The Commission, aware 1 of the nature of this pre-proclamation controversy, believes that it can decide, using common sense and perception, whether the 15 in controversy needed further election forms examination by the experts based on the 16 absence of patent signs of presence or irregularity. (Pp. 137-138, Record.)
35
33
32
ogas
23
21
21
nin
42
39
38
ssi
39
38
23
a ao
64
63
47
atan
30
28
ayanague
37
33
lum
14
13
mba
20
20
ing
57
55
ang
59
47
ntao
79
63
gong
37
35
27
26
17 11 In the face of this categorical assertion of fact of the Commission, the 28 bare charge of petitioners 5that the records pertaining to the 1,694 voting centers assailed by them should not create any ripple of 6 serious doubt. As We view this 7 point under discussion, what is more factually accurate is that those records complained of were not 5 examined with the aid of experts 15 and that Comelec passed upon the returns concerned "using common sense and perception only." And 53 there is nothing basically 2objectionable in this. The defunct Presidential Senate and House Electoral Tribunals examine passed upon and voided millions of 42 votes in several national elections 5 without the assistance of experts and "using" only common sense and 41 perception". No one ever22raised any eyebrows about such procedure. Withal, what we discern from the resolution is that 32 3 records and whatever it could not Comelec preliminary screened the properly pass upon by "using common sense and perception" it left 24the experts to work on. We might 2 to disagree with he Comelec as to which voting center should be excluded or included, were We to go meikimouse
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over the same records Ourselves, but still a case of grave abuse of discretion would not come out, considering that Comelec cannot be said to have acted whimsically or capriciously or without any rational basis, particularly if it is considered that in many respects and from the very nature of our respective functions, becoming candor would dictate to Us to concede that the Commission is in a better position to appreciate and assess the vital circumstances closely and accurately. By and large, therefore, the first, third and sixth assignments of error of the petitioners are not well taken. The fifth assignment of error is in Our view moot and academic. The Identification of the ballot boxes in defective condition, in some instances open and allegedly empty, is at best of secondary import because, as already discussed, the records related thereto were after all examined, studied and passed upon. If at all, deeper inquiry into this point would be of real value in an electoral protest. CONCLUSION Before closing, it may not be amiss to state here that the Court had initially agreed to dispose of the cases in a minute resolution, without prejudice to an extended or reasoned out opinion later, so that the Court's decision may be known earlier. Considering, however, that no less than the Honorable Chief Justice has expressed misgivings as to the propriety of yielding to the conclusions of respondent Commission because in his view there are strong considerations warranting farther meticulous inquiry of what he deems to be earmarks of seemingly traditional faults in the manner elections are held in the municipalities and provinces herein involved, and he is joined in this pose by two other distinguished colleagues of Ours, the majority opted to ask for more time to put down at least some of the important considerations that impelled Us to see the matters in dispute the other way, just as the minority bidded for the opportunity to record their points of view. In this manner, all concerned will perhaps have ample basis to place their respective reactions in proper perspective.
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examination of the voting and registration records hatactual voting and election by the registered voters had taken place in the questioned voting centers, the election returns cannot be disregarded and excluded with the resting disenfranchisement of the voters, but must be accorded prima facie status as bona fide reports of the results o f the voting for canvassing and registration purposes. Where the grievances relied upon is the commission of irregularities and violation of the Election Law the proper remedy is election protest. (Anni vs. Isquierdo et al. Supra). (P. 69, Record, L-49705-09). The writer of this opinion has taken care to personally check on the citations to be doubly sure they were not taken out of context, considering that most, if not all of them arose from similar situations in the very venues of the actual milieu of the instant cases, and We are satisfied they do fit our chosen posture. More importantly, they actually came from the pens of different members of the Court, already retired or still with Us, distinguished by their perspicacity and their perceptive prowess. In the context of the constitutional and legislative intent expounded at the outset of this opinion and evident in the modifications of the duties and responsibilities of the Commission on Elections vis-a-vis the matters that have concerned Us herein, particularly the elevation of the Commission as the "sole judge of pre-proclamation controversies" as well as of all electoral contests, We find the afore-quoted doctrines compelling as they reveal through the clouds of existing jurisprudence the pole star by which the future should be guided in delineating and circumscribing separate spheres of action of the Commission as it functions in its equally important dual role just indicated bearing as they do on the purity and sanctity of elections in this country. In conclusion, the Court finds insufficient merit in the petition to warrant its being given due course. Petition dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs. Justices Fernando, Antonio and Guerrero who are presently on official missions abroad voted for such dismissal.
In this connection, the majority feels it is but meet to advert to the following portion of the ratiocination of respondent Board of Canvassers adopted by respondent Commission with approval in its resolution under question: First of all this Board was guided by the legal doctrine that canvassing boards must exercise "extreme caution" in rejecting returns and they may do so only when the returns are palpably irregular. A conclusion that an election return is obviously manufactured or false and consequently should be disregarded in the canvass must be approached with extreme caution, and only upon the most convincing proof. Any plausible explanation one which is acceptable to a reasonable man in the light of experience and of the probabilities of the situation, should suffice to avoid outright nullification, with the resulting t of those who exercised their right of suffrage. (Anni vs. Isquierdo et at L-35918, Jude 28,1974; Villavon v. Comelec L-32008, August 31,1970; Tagoranao v. Comelec 22 SCRA 978). In the absence of strong evidence establishing the spuriousness of the return, the basis rule of their being accorded prima facie status as bona fide reports of the results of the count of the votes for canvassing and proclamation purposes must be applied, without prejudice to the question being tried on the merits with the presentation of evidence, testimonial and real in the corresponding electoral protest. (Bashier vs. Comelec L-33692, 33699, 33728, 43 SCRA 238, February 24, 1972). The decisive factor is that where it has been duly de ed after investigation and meikimouse
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G.R. No. 129742 September 16, 1998 TERESITA G. FABIAN, petitioner, vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman; HON. JESUS F. GUERRERO, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon; and NESTOR V. AGUSTIN, respondents.
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Herein respondent Ombudsman, in an Order dated February 26, 1996, approved the aforesaid resolution with modifications, by finding private respondent guilty of misconduct and meting out the penalty of suspension without pay for one year. After private respondent moved for reconsideration, respondent Ombudsman discovered that the former's new counsel had been his "classmate and close associate" hence he inhibited himself. The case was transferred to respondent Deputy Ombudsman Jesus F. Guerrero who, in the now challenged Joint Order of June 18, 1997, set aside the February 26, 1997 Order of respondent Ombudsman and exonerated private respondent from the administrative charges.
REGALADO, J.: II Petitioner has appealed to us by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the "Joint Order" issued by public respondents on June 18, 1997 in OMB-Adm. Case No. 0-95-0411 which granted the motion for reconsideration of and absolved private respondent from administrative charges for inter alia grave misconduct committed by him as then Assistant Regional Director, Region IV-A, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH). I It appears from the statement and counter-statement of facts of the parties that petitioner Teresita G. Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction Development Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction business. Private respondent Nestor V. Agustin was the incumbent District Engineer of the First Metro Manila Engineering District (FMED) when he allegedly committed the offenses for which he was administratively charged in the Office of the Ombudsman. PROMAT participated in the bidding for government construction projects including those under the FMED, and private respondent, reportedly taking advantage of his official position, inveigled petitioner into an amorous relationship. Their affair lasted for some time, in the course of which private respondent gifted PROMAT with public works contracts and interceded for it in problems concerning the same in his office. Later, misunderstandings and unpleasant incidents developed between the parties and when petitioner tried to terminate their relationship, private respondent refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. She eventually filed the aforementioned administrative case against him in a letter-complaint dated July 24, 1995. The said complaint sought the dismissal of private respondent for violation of Section 19, Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) and Section 36 of Presidential Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Decree), with an ancillary prayer for his preventive suspension. For purposes of this case, the charges referred to may be subsumed under the category of oppression, misconduct, and disgraceful or immoral conduct. On January 31, 1996, Graft Investigator Eduardo R. Benitez issued a resolution finding private respondent guilty of grave misconduct and ordering his dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all benefits under the law. His resolution bore the approval of Director Napoleon Baldrias and Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo Aportadera of their office.
In the present appeal, petitioner argues that Section 27 of Republic 1 Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) pertinently provides that — In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Emphasis supplied) However, she points out that under Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the 2 Ombudsman), when a respondent is absolved of the charges in an administrative proceeding the decision of the Ombudsman is final and unappealable. She accordingly submits that the Office of the Ombudsman has no authority under the law to restrict, in the manner provided in its aforesaid Rules, the right of appeal allowed by Republic Act No. 6770, nor to limit the power of review of this Court. Because of the aforecited provision in those Rules of Procedure, she claims that she found it "necessary to take an alternative recourse under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, because of the doubt it creates on the availability of appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Respondents filed their respective comments and rejoined that the Office of the Ombudsman is empowered by the Constitution and the law to promulgate its own rules of procedure. Section 13(8), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides, among others, that the Office of the Ombudsman can "(p)romulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law." Republic Act No. 6770 duly implements the Constitutional mandate with these relevant provisions: Sec. 14. Restrictions. — . . . No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman except the Supreme Court on pure questions of law. xxx xxx xxx Sec. 18. Rules of Procedure. — (1) The Office of the Ombudsman shall promulgate its own rules of procedure for the effective exercise or performance of its powers, functions, and duties. meikimouse
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xxx xxx xxx
Ultimately, they also attempt to review and rationalize the decisions of this Court applying Section 27 of Republic Act. No. 6770 vis-avis Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07. As correctly pointed out by public respondent, Ocampo IV vs. Ombudsman, et 3 4 al . and Young vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al . were original actions for certiorari under Rule 65. Yabut vs. Office of the 5 Ombudsman, et al . was commenced by a petition for review oncertiorari under Rule 45. Then came Cruz, Jr. vs. People, et 6 7 al ., Olivas vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al ., Olivarez vs. 8 9 Sandiganbayan, et al ., and Jao, et al. vs. Vasquez, which were for certiorari , prohibition and/or mandamus under Rule 65. Alba vs. 10 Nitorreda, et al . was initiated by a pleading unlikely denominated as an "Appeal/Petition for Certiorari and/or Prohibition," with a prayer for ancillary remedies, and ultimately followed 11 by Constantino vs. Hon. Ombudsman Aniano Desierto, et al . which was a special civil action for certiorari .
Sec. 23. Formal Investigation. — (1) Administrative investigations by the Office of the Ombudsman shall be in accordance with its rules of procedure and consistent with due process. . . .. xxx xxx xxx Sec. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. — All previsionary orders at the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory. A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and shall be entertained only on any of the following grounds: xxx xxx xxx Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month salary shall be final and unappealable. In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the Ombudsman as the interest of justice may require. Respondents consequently contend that, on the foregoing constitutional and statutory authority, petitioner cannot assail the validity of the rules of procedure formulated by the Office of the Ombudsman governing the conduct of proceedings before it, including those rules with respect to the availability or nonavailability of appeal in administrative cases, such as Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07. Respondents also question the propriety of petitioner's proposition that, although she definitely prefaced her petition by categorizing the same as "an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court," she makes the aforequoted ambivalent statement which in effect asks that, should the remedy under Rule 45 be unavailable, her petition be treated in the alternative as an original action for certiorari under Rule 65. The parties thereafter engage in a discussion of the differences between a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65.
Considering, however, the view that this Court now takes of the case at bar and the issues therein which will shortly be explained, it refrains from preemptively resolving the controverted points raised by the parties on the nature and propriety of application of the writ of certiorari when used as a mode of appeal or as the basis of a special original action, and whether or not they may be resorted to concurrently or alternatively, obvious though the answers thereto appear to be. Besides, some seemingly obiter statements in Yabut and Alba could bear reexamination and clarification. Hence, we will merely observe and lay down the rule at this juncture that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is involved only whenever an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 is taken from a decision in an administrative disciplinary action. It cannot be taken into account where an original action forcertiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to as a remedy for judicial review, such as from an incident in a criminal action. III After respondents' separate comments had been filed, the Court was intrigued by the fact, which does not appear to have been seriously considered before, that the administrative liability of a public official could fall under the jurisdiction of both the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the Ombudsman. Thus, the offenses imputed to herein private respondent were based on both Section 19 of Republic Act No. 6770 and Section 36 of Presidential Decree No. 807. Yet, pursuant to the amendment of Section 9, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 by Republic Act No. 7902, all adjudications by the Civil Service Commission in administrative disciplinary cases were made appealable to the Court of Appeals effective March 18, 1995, while those of the Office of the Ombudsman are appealable to this Court. It could thus be possible that in the same administrative case involving two respondents, the proceedings against one could eventually have been elevated to the Court of Appeals, while the other may have found its way to the Ombudsman from which it is sought to be brought to this Court. Yet systematic and efficient case management would dictate the consolidation of those cases in the Court of Appeals, both for expediency and to avoid possible conflicting decisions. Then there is the consideration that Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that "(n)o law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and consent," and that Republic Act meikimouse
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No. 6770, with its challenged Section 27, took effect on November 17, 1989, obviously in spite of that constitutional prohibition. The conventional rule, however, is that a challenge on constitutional grounds must be raised by a party to the case, neither of whom did so in this case, but that is not an inflexible rule, as we shall explain.
The Court notes, however, that neither the petition nor the two comments thereon took into account or discussed the validity of the aforestated Section 27 of R.A. No. 8770 in light of the provisions of Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that "(n)o law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and consent."
Since the constitution is intended for the observance of the judiciary and other departments of the government and the judges are sworn to support its provisions; the courts are not at liberty to overlook or disregard its commands or countenance evasions thereof. When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in a legislative body, it is the duty of the courts to declare that the constitution, and not the statute, governs in a case before them for 12 judgment.
The Court also invites the attention of the parties to its relevant ruling in First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. 110571, October 7, 1994, 237 SCRA
519) and the provisions of its former Circular No. 1-91 and Revised Administrative Circular No. 195, as now substantially reproduced in Rule 43 of the 1997 revision of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Thus, while courts will not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions which are not raised in the pleadings, 13 the rule has been recognized to admit of certain exceptions. It does not preclude a court from inquiring into its own jurisdiction or compel it to enter a judgment that it lacks jurisdiction to enter. If a statute on which a court's jurisdiction in a proceeding depends is unconstitutional, the court has no jurisdiction in the proceeding, and since it may determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, it necessarily follows 14 that it may inquire into the constitutionality of the statute.
In view of the fact that the appellate jurisdiction of the Court is invoked and involved in this case, and the foregoing legal considerations appear to impugn the constitutionality and validity of the grant of said appellate jurisdiction to it, the Court deems it necessary that the parties be heard thereon and the issue be first resolved before conducting further proceedings in this appellate review.
Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial are ordinarily rejected unless the jurisdiction of the court below or that of the appellate court is involved in which case it may be raised at any time or on the court's own 15 motion. The Court ex mero motu may take cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at any point in the case where that fact is 16 developed. The court has a clearly recognized right to determine 17 its own jurisdiction in any proceeding. The foregoing authorities notwithstanding, the Court believed that the parties hereto should be further heard on this constitutional question. Correspondingly, the following resolution was issued on May 14, 1998, the material parts stating as follows: The Court observes that the present petition, from the very allegations thereof, is "an appeal bycertiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the "Joint Order (Re: Motion for Reconsideration)" issued in OMB-Adm. Case No. 0-95-0411, entitled "Teresita G. Fabian vs. Engr. Nestor V. Agustin, Asst. Regional Director, Region IV-A, EDSA, Quezon City," which absolved the latter from the administrative charges for grave misconduct, among others. It is further averred therein that the present appeal to this Court is allowed under Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act of 1987 (R.A. No. 6770) and, pursuant thereto, the Office of the Ombudsman issued its Rules of Procedure, Section 7 whereof is assailed by petitioner in this proceeding. It will be recalled that R.A. No. 6770 was enacted on November 17, 1989, with Section 27 thereof pertinently providing that all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to this Court in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to require the parties to SUBMIT their position and arguments on the matter subject of this resolution by filing their corresponding pleadings within ten (10) days from notice hereof. IV The records do not show that the Office of the Solicitor General has complied with such requirement, hence the Court dispenses with any submission it should have presented. On the other hand, petitioner espouses the theory that the provision in Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 which authorizes an appeal by certiorari to this Court of the aforementioned adjudications of the Office of the Ombudsman is not violative of Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution. She claims that what is proscribed is the passage of a law "increasing" the appellate jurisdiction of this Court "as provided in this Constitution," and such appellate jurisdiction includes "all cases in which only an error or question of law is involved." Since Section 5(2)(e), Article VIII of the Constitution authorizes this Court to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari the aforesaid final judgment or orders "as the law or the Rules of Court may provide," said Section 27 does not increase this Court's appellate jurisdiction since, by providing that the mode of appeal shall be by petition for certiorari under Rule 45, then what may be raised therein are only questions of law of which this Court already has jurisdiction. We are not impressed by this discourse. It overlooks the fact that by jurisprudential developments over the years, this Court has allowed appeals by certiorari under Rule 45 in a substantial number of cases and instances even if questions of fact are directly involved and have 18 to be resolved by the appellate court. Also, the very provision cited by petitioner specifies that the appellate jurisdiction of this meikimouse
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Court contemplated therein is to be exercised over "final judgments and orders of lower courts," that is, the courts composing the integrated judicial system. It does not include the quasi-judicial bodies or agencies, hence whenever the legislature intends that the decisions or resolutions of the quasi-judicial agency shall be reviewable by the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, a specific provision to that effect is included in the law creating that quasi judicial agency and, for that matter, any special statutory court. No such provision on appellate procedure is required for the regular courts of the integrated judicial system because they are what are referred to and already provided for, in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution. Apropos to the foregoing, and as correctly observed by private respondent, the revised Rules of Civil Procedure19 preclude appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. In the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Section 1 of Rule 45, on "Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court," explicitly states: Sec. 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court . — A person desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law , may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari .
The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. (Emphasis ours). This differs from the former Rule 45 of the 1964 Rules of Court which made mention only of the Court of Appeals, and had to be adopted in statutes creating and providing for appeals from certain administrative or quasi-judicial agencies, whenever the purpose was to restrict the scope of the appeal to questions of law. That intended limitation on appellate review, as we have just discussed, was not fully subserved by recourse to the former Rule 45 but, then, at that time there was no uniform rule on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies. Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a petition for review on certiorari but only from judgments and final orders of the courts enumerated in Section 1 thereof. Appeals from 20 judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule 21 of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies. It is suggested, however, that the provisions of Rule 43 should apply only to "ordinary" quasi-judicial agencies, but not to the Office of the Ombudsman which is a "high constitutional body." We see no reason for this distinction for, if hierarchical rank should be a criterion, that proposition thereby disregards the fact that Rule 43 even includes the Office of the President and the Civil Service Commission, although the latter is even an independent constitutional commission, unlike the Office of the Ombudsman which is a constitutionally-mandated but statutorily created body. Regarding the misgiving that the review of the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman by the Court of Appeals would cover questions of law, of fact or of both, we do not perceive that as an
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objectionable feature. After all, factual controversies are usually involved in administrative disciplinary actions, just like those coming from the Civil Service Commission, and the Court of Appeals as a trier of fact is better prepared than this Court to resolve the same. On the other hand, we cannot have this situation covered by Rule 45 since it now applies only to appeals from the regular courts. Neither can we place it under Rule 65 since the review therein is limited to jurisdictional questions. * The submission that because this Court has taken cognizance of cases involving Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770, that fact may be viewed as "acquiescence" or "acceptance" by it of the appellate jurisdiction contemplated in said Section 27, is unfortunately too tenuous. The jurisdiction of a court is not a question of acquiescence as a matter of fact but an issue of conferment as a matter of law. Besides, we have already discussed the cases referred to, including the inaccuracies of some statements therein, and we have pointed out the instances when Rule 45 is involved, hence covered by Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 now under discussion, and when that provision would not apply if it is a judicial review under Rule 65. Private respondent invokes the rule that courts generally avoid having to decide a constitutional question, especially when the case can be decided on other grounds. As a general proposition that is correct. Here, however, there is an actual case susceptible of judicial determination. Also, the constitutional question, at the instance of this Court, was raised by the proper parties, although there was even no need for that because the Court can rule on the matter sua sponte when its appellate jurisdiction is involved. The constitutional question was timely raised, although it could even be raised any time likewise by reason of the jurisdictional issue confronting the Court. Finally, the resolution of the constitutional issue here is obviously necessary for the resolution of the present case. 22 It is, however, suggested that this case could also be decided on other grounds, short of passing upon the constitutional question. We appreciate the ratiocination of private respondent but regret that we must reject the same. That private respondent could be absolved of the charge because the decision exonerating him is final and unappealable assumes that Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 is valid, but that is precisely one of the issues here. The prevailing rule that the Court should not interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint is not applicable in this administrative case, as earlier explained. That two decisions rendered by this Court supposedly imply the validity of the aforementioned Section 7 of Rule III is precisely under review here because of some statements therein somewhat at odds with settled rules and the decisions of this Court on the same issues, hence to invoke the same would be to beg the question. V Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their true legal roles and effects, therefore, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument has been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition which, as correctly explained inFirst Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, et meikimouse
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23
al. was intended to give this Court a measure of control over cases
placed under its appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court. 24 We perforce have to likewise reject the supposed inconsistency of the ruling in First Lepanto Ceramics and some statements in Yabut and Alba, not only because of the difference in the factual settings, but also because those isolated cryptic statements in Yabut and Alba should best be clarified in the adjudication on the merits of this case. By way of anticipation, that will have to be undertaken by the proper court of competent jurisdiction. Furthermore, in addition to our preceding discussion on whether Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 expanded the jurisdiction of this Court without its advice and consent, private respondent's position paper correctly yields the legislative background of Republic Act No. 6770. On September 26, 1989, the Conference Committee Report on S.B. No. 453 and H.B. No. 13646, setting forth the new version of what would later be Republic Act No. 6770, was approved on second 25 reading by the House of Representatives. The Senate was informed of the approval of the final version of the Act on October 26 2, 1989 and the same was thereafter enacted into law by President Aquino on November 17, 1989. Submitted with said position paper is an excerpt showing that the Senate, in the deliberations on the procedure for appeal from the Office of the Ombudsman to this Court, was aware of the provisions of Section 30, Article III of the Constitution. It also reveals that Senator Edgardo Angara, as a co-author and the principal sponsor of S.B. No. 543 admitted that the said provision will expand this Court's jurisdiction, and that the Committee on Justice and Human Rights had not consulted this Court on the matter, thus: INTERPELLATION OF SENATOR SHAHANI xxx xxx xxx Thereafter, with reference to Section 22(4) which provides that the decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court, in reply to Senator Shahani's query whether the Supreme Court would agree to such provision in the light of Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution which requires its advice and concurrence in laws increasing its appellate jurisdiction, Senator Angara informed that the Committee has not yet consulted the Supreme Court regarding the matter. He agreed that the provision will expand the Supreme Court's jurisdiction by allowing appeals through petitions for review, adding that they should be 27 appeals on certiorari . There is no showing that even up to its enactment, Republic Act No. 6770 was ever referred to this Court for 28 its advice and consent. VI As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 should be struck down as unconstitutional, and in line
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with the regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43. There is an intimation in the pleadings, however, that said Section 27 refers to appellate jurisdiction which, being substantive in nature, cannot be disregarded by this Court under its rule-making power, especially if it results in a diminution, increase or modification of substantive rights. Obviously, however, where the law is procedural in essence and purpose, the foregoing consideration would not pose a proscriptive issue against the exercise of the rule-making power of this Court. This brings to fore the question of whether Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is substantive or procedural. It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn between those rules or statutes which are procedural, hence within the scope of this Court's rule-making power, and those which are substantive. In fact, a particular rule may be procedural in one context and 29 substantive in another. It is admitted that what is procedural and what is substantive is frequently a question of great 30 difficulty. It is not, however, an insurmountable problem if a rational and pragmatic approach is taken within the context of our own procedural and jurisdictional system. In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering 31 remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is no; procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an 32 existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure. In the situation under consideration, a transfer by the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, of pending cases involving a review of decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary actions to the Court of Appeals which shall now be vested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction thereover, relates to procedure only. 33 This is so because it is not the right to appeal of an aggrieved party which is affected by the law. That right has been preserved. Only the procedure by which the appeal is to be made or decided has been changed. The rationale for this is that no litigant has a vested right in a particular remedy, which may be changed by substitution without impairing vested rights, hence he can have none in rules of procedure which relate to 34 the remedy. Furthermore, it cannot be said that the transfer of appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals in this case is an act of creating a new right of appeal because such power of the Supreme Court to transfer appeals to subordinate appellate courts is purely a procedural and not a substantive power. Neither can we consider such transfer as impairing a vested right because the parties have still a remedy and still a competent tribunal to administer that 35 remedy. Thus, it has been generally held that rules or statutes involving a transfer of cases from one court to another, are procedural and remedial merely and that, as such, they are applicable to actions meikimouse
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36
pending at the time the statute went into effect or, in the case at bar, when its invalidity was declared. Accordingly, even from the standpoint of jurisdiction ex hypothesi , the validity of the transfer of appeals in said cases to the Court of Appeals can be sustained. WHEREFORE, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989), together with Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman), and any other provision of law or issuance implementing the aforesaid Act and insofar as they provide for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the Supreme Court, are hereby declared INVALID and of no further force and effect. The instant petition is hereby referred and transferred to the Court of Appeals for final disposition, with said petition to be considered by the Court of Appeals pro hoc vice as a petition for review under Rule 43, without prejudice to its requiring the parties to submit such amended or supplemental pleadings and additional documents or records as it may deem necessary and proper. SO ORDERED.
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CIVIL PROCEDURE
COURT OF APPEALS (Full Text) G.R. No. 124333 March 26, 1997 NATIVIDAD P. ARAGON, as represented by her Attorney-in-fact, MODESTO O. ARAGON, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and the MANILA BANKING CORPORATION, respondents.
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.: Petitioner seeks to set aside the decision of the respondent Court of 1 Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 46691 which reversed the Decision dated January 31, 1994 rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch CIII, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-91-10200. The antecedent facts are undisputed: The MARENIR Development Corporation (MARENIR for brevity) obtained a P4,000,000.00 loan from the Manila Banking Corporation (MBC for brevity) and executed in the latter's favor a real estate mortgage over its subdivision lots with Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 271128, 271129, 271130, 271131 and 271132. The real estate mortgage was annotated in all the aforementioned titles. Subsequently, MARENIR's mortgage loan was increased to P4,560,000.00. On April 27, 1982, MARENIR sold to petitioner the lot covered by TCT No. 271131, denominated as Lot 23, Blk. 5, with an area of 368 sq. meters and situated in Bo. Bagbag, Quezon City. The agreed purchase price is P132,480.00 with P20,000.00 as downpayment and the P112,480.00 balance to be paid on a monthly installment of P1,745.00. Petitioner, later on, was able to complete the payment of the purchase price to MARENIR but the latter was unable to transfer TCT No. 271131 in petitioner's name. On February 14, 1989, petitioner filed a complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against MARENIR in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 99, Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-891797. In that complaint, petitioner prayed that a judgment be rendered ordering MARENIR to execute a deed of absolute sale in her favor and for MARENIR to redeem the property free from encumbrances from MBC. 2
On September 21, 1989, the court a quo rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE, . . . judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant to execute a deed of absolute sale in favor of plaintiff covering the property in question and to deliver the owner's copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 271131 of the land records of Quezon City and actual physical possession thereof to plaintiff, and to pay plaintiff the sum of P10,000.00 as and for 3 attorney's fees . . . .
There being no appeal on the part of MARENIR, petitioner on July 25, 1990, filed a "Motion to Direct Branch Clerk of Court or Deputy Sheriff to Execute Absolute Deed of Sale" which was granted by the trial court. Subsequently, the branch clerk of court executed for and in behalf of MARENIR, a Deed of Absolute Sale, in favor of petitioner. 4 However, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, refused to register the deed unless the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 271131 is presented. Since the owner's duplicate of title was in the possession of MBC, petitioner requested the former to release the said TCT. MBC, through its statutory receiver agreed to release the TCT provided petitioner will pay it the corresponding value in the amount of P185,020.52. Petitioner refused to pay the said amount for the following reasons, viz: (a) that she had paid the total purchase price plus interest in the amount of P59,686.84, or a total of P192,166.22; and (b) that to require her to pay another P185,020.52 would be making her pay for the lot the second tim e. When the statutory receiver still refused to release the TCT, petitioner was left with no other recourse but to file a complaint for Delivery of Title and Damages against MBC before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-91-10200. 5
On January 31, 1994, the aforementioned court rendered a decision the dispositive portion of which, reads as follows: ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff Natividad G. Aragon represented by her Attorney-in-fact Modesto O. Aragon as follows: 1. Ordering the defendant Manila Banking Corporation and/or whoever its present conservator/liquidator . . . , to physically and actually deliver the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 271131, or if said title had been cancelled, to deliver the present owner's duplicate copy covering the lot involved in this case . . . to the plaintiff Natividad G. Aragon and/or her attorney-in-fact Modesto O. Aragon, within five (5) days from finality of this decision; 2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to transfer TCT No. 271131 in the name of Marenir Development Corporation, . . . , in the name of herein plaintiff Natividad G. Aragon, . . . without having to require the surrender of the owner's duplicate copy of TCT 271131 or its successor title should Manila Bank Corporation and/or its Central Bank conservator/liquidator refuse or fail to voluntarily surrender the title in question; xxx xxx xxx
6
Aggrieved with the decision of the said court in Civil Case No. 0-9110200, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of respondent by reversing the decision of the court a quo and ordering the dismissal of the complaint. It ratiocinated that: The complaint of appellee ARAGON for Specific Performance and 7 Damages against MARENIR should have been filed with the HLURB [Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board]. The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City was without jurisdiction to hear and decide the complaint. xxx xxx xxx meikimouse
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. . . , the decision penned by Judge De Guzman was null and void, having been rendered without jurisdiction and may be struck down anytime even on appeal to the Supreme Court. A void judgment cannot acquire finality; it is non-existent. It is in legal effect no judgment or order at all. And so was its Order to t he Branch Clerk of Court to execute the deed of absolute sale in favor of ARAGON. It follows that the deed of absolute sale executed by the Branch Clerk of Court was also null and void. There being no decision upon which the challenged decision is based, no deed of absolute sale in favor of ARAGON, the latter has no cause of action against appellant BANK. xxx xxx xxx There being no established right of ARAGON because of nullity of the decision of Judge De Guzman, there is no obligation on the part of the BANK to respect or not to violate such right; and the refusal of the BANK to release TCT No. 271131 is not an act or omission 8 violative of ARAGON's right. Hence, this petition. Petitioner assigns the following as errors of the Court of Appeals: I IT WAS THE RESPONDENT COURT WHICH HAD NO JURISDICTION TO DECLARE THE NULLITY OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q89-1797 II ASSUMING THE RESPONDENT COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO NULLIFY THE PROCEEDINGS OF A CASE WHICH WAS NOT BEFORE IT ON APPEAL, ESTOPPEL BY LACHES BARRED THE ATTACK ON THE 9 TRIAL COURT'S JURISDICTION IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q-89-1797. The petition is meritorious. Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, vests in the Court of Appeals exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final decisions and orders of the Regional Trial Court. 10However, the aforestated provision of the said law only refers to cases appealed to it from the Regional Trial Court from which the case originated. Like any other court, it is necessary that the Court of Appeals must have jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties, the issues and the res before it can 11 validly decide any case submitted to it. Hence, it cannot acquire appellate jurisdiction over any case not properly brought to it by the parties concerned. This is what happened in the case at bench. What was on appeal before the Court of Appeals was the decision rendered in Civil Case No. Q-91-10200 where the parties are petitioner herein and respondent MBC. However, the said court, in deciding the issues raised in the aforesaid case, took cognizance of Civil Case No. Q-891797 where the parties were different i .e. petitioner and MARENIR. Furthermore, said case was not appealed before the Court of Appeals nor was there any action commenced to annul the judgment of the court a quo. Hence, the decision over that case
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became final and executory. Respondent court clearly committed an error when it declared as null and void the proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-89-1797 as it was not the case appealed before it. Even if MARENIR itself, the losing party to the aforementioned case decides now to appeal the decision or to file any other proceeding seeking its nullification, it cannot at this very late stage do so. This is in consonance with the legal tenet that failure to perfect an appeal renders the trial court's judgment final and executory and it can no longer be subject to review. As such, any modification of that 12 judgment by the appellate court cannot be upheld. Anent the second assigned error, we agree with petitioner's asseveration that assuming that the respondent court had jurisdiction to nullify the proceedings of a case which was not before it on appeal, estoppel by laches barred the attack on the court a quo's jurisdiction in Civil Case No. Q-89-1797. As correctly pointed 13 out by petitioner in her petition, MARENIR in Civil Case No. Q-891797 never questioned the jurisdiction of the trial court. Not even in its answer to the complaint, nor in any subsequent pleading. 14
In the case of Tijam v . Sibonghanoy , respondent Surety company did question the jurisdiction of the trial court but it did so late on appeal. Even if we found that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case, we still ruled that the proceedings conducted therein was valid based on the doctrine of laches. We also defined laches as "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting presumption that the party 15 entitled to assert it has abandoned it or declined to assert it." We also ruled that: The facts of this case that from the time the Surety became a quasiparty on July 31, 1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on its part. We would in effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolving. Indeed, the reason for the doctrine in Tijam and the cases subsequent to it is ratiocinated by this Court as: . . . the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but because such a practice cannot 16 be tolerated for reasons for public policy.
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Although we agree with private respondent's contention that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case may be objected to at any stage of the proceeding even on appeal , this particular rule, however, means that jurisdictional issues in a case can be raised only during the proceedings in said case and during the appeal of said case. It certainly does not mean that lack of jurisdiction of a
CIVIL PROCEDURE
G.R. No. 130866 September 16, 1998 ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and BIENVENIDO ARICAYOS, respondents.
court in a case may be raised during the proceedings ofanother case, in another court and even by anybody at all . Certainly, we cannot
countenance this procedure as this will lead to absurdity and is against the basic principle of jurisdiction. WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the decision of the Regional Trial Court dated January 31, 1994 is REINSTATED, with costs against private respondents. SO ORDERED.
REGALADO, J.: The present petition for certiorari stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal filed by herein private respondent before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch No. III, in San Fernando, Pampanga. Private respondent alleges that he started working as Operations Manager of petitioner St. Martin Funeral Home on February 6, 1995. However, there was no contract of employment executed between him and petitioner nor was his name included in the semi-monthly payroll. On January 22, 1996, he was dismissed from his employment for allegedly misappropriating P38,000.00 which was intended for payment by petitioner of its value added tax (VAT) to the Bureau of Internal 1 Revenue (BIR). Petitioner on the other hand claims that private respondent was not its employee but only the uncle of Amelita Malabed, the owner of petitioner St. Martin's Funeral Home. Sometime in 1995, private respondent, who was formerly working as an overseas contract worker, asked for financial assistance from the mother of Amelita. Since then, as an indication of gratitude, private respondent voluntarily helped the mother of Amelita in overseeing the business. In January 1996, the mother of Amelita passed away, so the latter then took over the management of the business. She then discovered that there were arrears in the payment of taxes and other government fees, although the records purported to show that the same were already paid. Amelita then made some changes in the business operation and private respondent and his wife were no longer allowed to participate in the management thereof. As a consequence, the latter filed a complaint charging that petitioner 2 had illegally terminated his employment. Based on the position papers of the parties, the labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of petitioner on October 25, 1996 declaring that no employer-employee relationship existed between the parties and, therefore, his office had no jurisdiction over the 3 case. Not satisfied with the said decision, private respondent appealed to the NLRC contending that the labor arbiter erred (1) in not giving credence to the evidence submitted by him; (2) in holding that he worked as a "volunteer" and not as an employee of St. Martin Funeral Home from February 6, 1995 to January 23, 1996, or a period of about one year; and (3) in ruling that there was no 4 employer-employee relationship between him and petitioner. On June 13, 1997, the NLRC rendered a resolution setting aside the questioned decision and remanding the case to the labor arbiter for 5 immediate appropriate proceedings. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC in its resolution 6 dated August 18, 1997 for lack of merit, hence the present petition alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion. 7 meikimouse
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Before proceeding further into the merits of the case at bar, the Court feels that it is now exigent and opportune to reexamine the functional validity and systemic practicability of the mode of judicial review it has long adopted and still follows with respect to decisions of the NLRC. The increasing number of labor disputes that find their way to this Court and the legislative changes introduced over the years into the provisions of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 442 (The Labor Code of the Philippines and Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P. No.) 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980) now stridently call for and warrant a reassessment of that procedural aspect. We prefatorily delve into the legal history of the NLRC. It was first established in the Department of Labor by P.D. No. 21 on October 14, 1972, and its decisions were expressly declared to be appealable to the Secretary of Labor and, ultimately, to the President of the Philippines. On May 1, 1974, P.D. No. 442 enacted the Labor Code of the Philippines, the same to take effect six months after its promulgation. 8 Created and regulated therein is the present NLRC which was attached to the Department of Labor and Employment 9 for program and policy coordination only. Initially, Article 302 (now, Article 223) thereof also granted an aggrieved party the remedy of appeal from the decision of the NLRC to the Secretary of Labor, but P.D. No. 1391 subsequently amended said provision and abolished such appeals. No appellate review has since then been provided for. Thus, to repeat, under the present state of the law, there is no 10 provision for appeals from the decision of the NLRC. The present Section 223, as last amended by Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715, instead merely provides that the Commission shall decide all cases within twenty days from receipt of the answer of the appellee, and that such decision shall be final and executory after ten calendar days from receipt thereof by the parties. When the issue was raised in an early case on the argument that this Court has no jurisdiction to review the decisions of the NLRC, and formerly of the Secretary of Labor, since there is no legal provision for appellate review thereof, the Court nevertheless rejected that thesis. It held that there is an underlying power of the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction ev en though no right of review is given by statute; that the purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect the substantial rights of the parties; and that it is that part of the checks and balances which restricts the separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications. 11 Pursuant to such ruling, and as sanctioned by subsequent decisions of this Court, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to timely file a motion for reconsideration as a precondition for any further or 12 subsequent remedy, and then seasonably avail of the special civil 13 action of certiorari under Rule 65, for which said Rule has now fixed the reglementary period of sixty days from notice of the decision. Curiously, although the 10-day period for finality of the decision of the NLRC may already have lapsed as contemplated in Section 223 of the Labor Code, it has been held that this Court may still take cognizance of the petition for certiorari on jurisdictional and due process considerations if filed within the reglementary 14 period under Rule 65.
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Turning now to the matter of judicial review of NLRC decisions, B.P. No. 129 originally provided as follows: Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. — The Intermediate Appellate Court shall exercise: (1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari , habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction; (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts; and (3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards, or commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. The Intermediate Appellate Court shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings. These provisions shall not apply to decisions and interlocutory orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines and by the 15 Central Board of Assessment Appeals. Subsequently, and as it presently reads, this provision was amended by R.A. No. 7902 effective March 18, 1995, to wit: Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. — The Court of Appeals shall exercise: (1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari , habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction; (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts; and (3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to meikimouse
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resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings. Trials or hearings in the Court of Appeals must be continuous and must be completed within, three (3) months, unless extended by the Chief Justice. It will readily be observed that, aside from the change in the name of the lower appellate court, 16 the following amendments of the original provisions of Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 were effected by R.A. No. 7902, viz.: 1. The last paragraph which excluded its application to the Labor Code of the Philippines and the Central Board of Assessment Appeals was deleted and replaced by a new paragraph granting the Court of Appeals limited powers to conduct trials and hearings in cases within its jurisdiction. 2. The reference to the Labor Code in that last paragraph was transposed to paragraph (3) of the section, such that the original exclusionary clause therein now provides "except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended , the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the t hird paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948." (Emphasis supplied). 3. Contrarily, however, specifically added to and included among the quasi-judicial agencies over which the Court of Appeals shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction are the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission. This, then, brings us to a somewhat perplexing impassè, both in point of purpose and terminology. As earlier explained, our mode of judicial review over decisions of the NLRC has for some time now been understood to be by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This is, of course, a special original action limited to the resolution of jurisdictional issues, that is, lack or excess of jurisdiction and, in almost all cases that have been brought to us, grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. It will, however, be noted that paragraph (3), Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 now grants exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals over all final adjudications of the Regional Trial Courts and the quasi-judicial agencies generally or specifically referred to therein except, among others, "those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with . . . the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, . . . ." This would necessarily contradict what has been ruled and said all along that appeal does not lie from decisions 17 of the NLRC. Yet, under such excepting clause literally construed, the appeal from the NLRC cannot be brought to the Court of Appeals, but to this Court by necessary implication. The same exceptive clause further confuses the situation by declaring that the Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction over decisions falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of B.P. No. 129, and those specified cases in Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of
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1948. These cases can, of course, be properly excluded from the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. However, because of the aforementioned amendment by transposition, also supposedly excluded are cases falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Labor Code. This is illogical and impracticable, and Congress could not have intended that procedural gaffe, since there are no cases in the Labor Code the decisions, resolutions, orders or awards wherein are within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or of any other court for that matter. A review of the legislative records on the antecedents of R.A. No. 7902 persuades us that there may have been an oversight in the course of the deliberations on the said Act or an imprecision in the terminology used therein. In fine, Congress did intend to provide for judicial review of the adjudications of the NLRC in labor cases by the Supreme Court, but there was an inaccuracy in the term used for the intended mode of review. This conclusion which we have reluctantly but prudently arrived at has been drawn from the considerations extant in the records of Congress, more particularly on Senate Bill No. 1495 and the Reference Committee Report on S. No. 1495/H. 18 No. 10452. In sponsoring Senate Bill No. 1495, Senator Raul S. Roco delivered 19 his sponsorship speech from which we reproduce the following excerpts: The Judiciary Reorganization Act, Mr. President, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, reorganized the Court of Appeals and at the same time expanded its jurisdiction and powers. Among others, its appellate jurisdiction was expanded to cover not only final judgment of Regional Trial Courts, but also all final judgment(s), decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards and commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of BP Blg. 129 and of subparagraph 1 of the third paragraph and subparagraph 4 of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. Mr. President, the purpose of the law is to ease the workload of the Supreme Court by the transfer of some of its burden of review of factual issues to the Court of Appeals. However, whatever benefits that can be derived from the expansion of the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals was cut short by the last paragraph of Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 which excludes from its coverage the "decisions and interlocutory orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines and by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals.
Among the highest number of cases that are brought up to the Supreme Court are labor cases. Hence, Senate Bill No. 1495 seeks to eliminate the exceptions enumerated in Section 9 and, additionally, extends the coverage of appellate review of the Court of Appeals in the decision(s) of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, and the Employees Compensation Commission to reduce the number of cases elevated to the Supreme Court. (Emphases and corrections ours) xxx xxx xxx Senate Bill No. 1495 authored by our distinguished Colleague from Laguna provides the ideal situation of drastically reducing the meikimouse
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workload of the Supreme Court without depriving the litigants of the privilege of review by an appellate tribunal. In closing, allow me to quote the observations of former Chief Justice Teehankee in 1986 in the Annual Report of the Supreme Court: . . . Amendatory legislation is suggested so as to relieve the Supreme Court of the burden of reviewing these cases which present no important issues involved beyond the particular fact and the parties involved, so that the Supreme Court may wholly devote its time to cases of public interest in the discharge of its mandated task as the guardian of the Constitution and the guarantor of the people's basic rights and additional task expressly vested on it now "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. We used to have 500,000 cases pending all over the land, Mr. President. It has been cut down to 300,000 cases some five years ago. I understand we are now back to 400,000 cases. Unless we distribute the work of the appellate courts, we shall continue to mount and add to the number of c ases pending. In view of the foregoing, Mr. President, and by virtue of all the reasons we have submitted, the Committee on Justice and Human Rights requests the support and collegial approval of our Chamber. xxx xxx xxx Surprisingly, however, in a subsequent session, the following Committee Amendment was introduced by the said sponsor and the following proceedings transpired: 20 Senator Roco. On page 2, line 5, after the line "Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution," add the phrase "THE LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES UNDER P.D. 442, AS AMENDED." So that it becomes clear, Mr. President, that issues arising from the Labor Code will still be appealable to the Supreme Court. The President. Is there any objection? ( Silence) Hearing none, the amendment is approved. Senator Roco. On the same page, we move that lines 25 to 30 be deleted. This was also discussed with our Colleagues in the House of Representatives and as we understand it, as approved in the House, this was also deleted, Mr. President. The President. Is there any objection? ( Silence) Hearing none, the amendment is approved. Senator Roco. There are no further Committee amendments, Mr. President. Senator Romulo. Mr. President, I move that we close the period of Committee amendments.
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The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the amendment is approved. (Emphasis supplied). xxx xxx xxx Thereafter, since there were no individual amendments, Senate Bill No. 1495 was passed on second reading and being a certified bill, its 21 unanimous approval on third reading followed. The Conference Committee Report on Senate Bill No. 1495 and House Bill No. 10452, having theretofore been approved by the House of Representatives, the same was likewise approved by the Senate on February 20, 1995, 22 inclusive of the dubious formulation on appeals to the Supreme Court earlier discussed. The Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that ever since appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative intendment was that the special civil action of certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the NLRC. The use of the word "appeal" in relation thereto and in the instances we have noted could have been a lapsus plumae because appeals by certiorari and the original action for certiorari are both modes of judicial review addressed to the appellate courts. The important distinction between them, however, and with which the Court is particularly concerned here is that the special civil action of certiorari is within the concurrent original 23 jurisdiction of this Court and the Court of Appeals; whereas to indulge in the assumption that appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court are allowed would not subserve, but would subvert, the intention of Congress as expressed in the sponsorship speech on Senate Bill No. 1495. Incidentally, it was noted by the sponsor therein that some quarters were of the opinion that recourse from the NLRC to the Court of Appeals as an initial step in the process of judicial review would be circuitous and would prolong the proceedings. On the contrary, as he commendably and realistically emphasized, that procedure would be advantageous to the aggrieved party on this reasoning: On the other hand, Mr. President, to allow these cases to be appealed to the Court of Appeals would give litigants the advantage to have all the evidence on record be reexamined and reweighed after which the findings of facts and conclusions of said bodies are correspondingly affirmed, modified or reversed. Under such guarantee, the Supreme Court can then apply strictly the axiom that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final and may not be reversed on appeal to the Supreme Court. A perusal of the records will reveal appeals which are factual in nature and may, therefore, be 24 dismissed outright by minute resolutions. While we do not wish to intrude into the Congressional sphere on the matter of the wisdom of a law, on this score we add the further observations that there is a growing number of labor cases being elevated to this Court which, not being a trier of fact, has at times been constrained to remand the case to the NLRC for resolution of unclear or ambiguous factual findings; that the Court of Appeals is procedurally equipped for that purpose, aside from the increased meikimouse
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number of its component divisions; and that there is undeniably an imperative need for expeditious action on labor cases as a major aspect of constitutional protection to labor. Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should hence forth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired. Apropos to this directive that resort to the higher courts should be made in accordance with their hierarchical order, this 25 pronouncement in Santiago vs. Vasquez, et al . should be taken into account: One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may be said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses before us, to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this Court despite the fact that the same is available in the lower courts in the exercise of their original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated by law to be sought therein. This practice must be stopped, not only because of the imposition upon the precious time of this Court but also because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction. WHEREFORE, under the foregoing premises, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby REMANDED, and all pertinent records thereof ordered to be FORWARDED, to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition consistent with the views and ruling herein set forth, without pronouncement as to costs.
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G.R. No. 149634
July 6, 2004
LORETA TORRES, MARILYN TANGTANG, ARMELA FIGURACION, RAQUEL BERNARTE, ESTRELLA TITO, RHEA ELLORDA, ROSITA FUENTES, ANITA LAPORRE, JOCELYN RIN, MATODIA DEREPAS, FELICISIMA ALEGRE, LEA MARTILLANA, EVANGELINE RAFON, ALICIA EMPILLO, AMY TORRES, EDNA JIMENEZ, EVELYN DOLOM, HAMILI UYVICO, CRISELINA ANQUILO, NILDA ALCAIDE, ROSARIO MABANA, ESTELA MANGUBAT, ROSIE BALDOVE, CARMELITA RUIZ and LUCILA JUSTARES, petitioners, vs. SPECIALIZED PACKAGING DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and/or ALFREDO GAO (President) and PETER CHUA (General Manager); EUSEBIO CAMACHO GENERAL SERVICES and/or EUSEBIO CAMACHO (President/General Manager); MPL SERVICES and/or MIGUELITO LAURIANO (President/General Manager), respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.: The Court may give due course to a petition, even if the accompanying certificate against forum shopping has not been signed by all the petitioners, provided it is shown that, as in this case, there is a justifiable cause for such failure; and the outright dismissal of the petition would seriously impair the orderly administration of justice. In the interest of substantial justice, strict observance of procedural rules may be dispensed with for compelling reasons.
The Case 1
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of 2 Court, seeking to nullify the January 15, 2001 and the August 28, 3 2001 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 62530. The first Resolution disposed as follows:
SO ORDERED. "ACCORDINGLY, and to strictly enforce the aforesaid circulars to attain their objectives (Carrara Marble Phil., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127059, January 22, 1997; Far Eastern Shipping Co. vs. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 30), the Court [r]esolved to DISMISS the petition for a defective or insufficient verification and certification 4 thereof." The second assailed Resolution, on the other hand, denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
The Antecedents Petitioners claim to be employees of the Specialized Packaging Development Corporation (SPDC), a business entity engaged in the repackaging of cosmetic products. In three separate Complaints, they charged SPDC and alleged labor recruiters Eusebio Camacho General Services (ECGS) and MPL Services with illegal dismissal; and
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with nonpayment of overtime, premium and 13 month pays, and night differential.
resided in different provinces, had not executed a special power of attorney in favor of either of the two petitioners or their counsel.
The cases were later consolidated and assigned to Labor Arbiter (LA) Salimathar Nambi. On June 30, 1995, the LA issued his Decision in favor of petitioners, because SPDC and MPL Services had failed to submit their position papers on or before the deadline. SPDC was ordered to reinstate all petitioners to their former positions and to pay them back wages, premium pay for holidays and rest days, th service incentive leave pay and 13 month pay.
Hence, this Petition.
6
Issues Petitioners submit the following issues for our consideration: "A.
The LA's Decision was appealed by SPDC to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which set aside the ruling and ordered the case remanded to LA Nambi for further proceedings. The case was then set again for hearings. Respondents SPDC and ECGS submitted their position papers five months after the case had been considered submitted for decision. On December 14, 1999, LA Nambi issued a second Decision finding petitioners' employment to have been illegally terminated by SPDC. The NLRC, however, again reversed and set aside this new Decision on June 9, 2000. On January 29, 2001, petitioners appealed to the CA.
Whether or not petitioners are employees of the Respondent Specialized Packaging Development Corporation (SPDC). "B. Whether or not petitioners were illegally dismissed by Respondent SPDC. "C. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to their money 7 claims."
Ruling of the CA
The Court's Ruling
The Petition was dismissed by the CA, which found the verification and the certification against forum shopping to be either defective or insufficient. It justified its ruling thus:
The Petition is meritorious.
Preliminary
Issue:
Propriety of the Petition
"x x x [I]t appears that there are twenty-five (25) principal parties-petitioners who were former workers of private respondent Corporation and complainants in NLRC NCR Case Nos. 00-04-03325-94, 00-05-03727-94 and 00-0503971-94 as a result of their being laid-off from employment. Perusing the verification and certification[,] however, it also appears that it was executed and signed by only two (2) petitioners, namely, Evelyn Dolom and Criselina Anquilo, among the said twenty-five (25) principal petitioners. The duty to verify and certify under oath is strictly addressed to all the twenty-five (25) principal petitioners. To allow only two (2) of them to execute the required verification and certification, without the proper authorization of the others, would render Revised Circular No. 28-91 and Administrative Circular No. 04-94 (now Sec. 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) inutile in avoiding the practice of non-forum shopping because the other principal petitioners, who did not execute and sign the same, much less execute the proper power of attorney, would not be bound by the certification executed by only two (2) of them. Any one of the twenty-three (23) remaining principal petitioners may just obtain the services of another lawyer to institute 5 practically the same case in a different for[um]."
At the outset we note that the present Petition is anchored on Rule 45, and that it assails the two CA Resolutions dismissing petitioners' earlier Petition for Certiorari. In accordance with Section 1 of Rule 8 45, the herein Petition alleges reversible errors based on the supposedly defective verification and certification against forum shopping. The above-quoted issues raised in the Memorandum of petitioners, however, were not the same ones raised in the Petition. Because these three substantive issues were sprung by the former only in their own Memorandum, respondents were not able to traverse 9 10 these directly in their Comment or Memorandum. Hence, save for perfunctory references to the NLRC Decision, the latter were not given the opportunity to defend themselves on these questions. Elementary due process -- which means giving the opposite party the opportunity to be heard, and the assailed court to consider 11 every argument presented -- bars this Court from taking up these three issues in this Decision, even if doing so would speed up the final resolution of the case. Basic is the rule that issues not 12 presented below cannot for the first time be taken up on appeal. Review of NLRC Decisions
Denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, the appellate court pointed out that disregarding the rules could not be rationalized by invoking a liberal construction thereof. Furthermore, it found no satisfactory explanation why the 25 principal petitioners, who
The proper procedure for seeking a review of the final dispositions of the NLRC was laid down in 1998 in St. Martin Funeral Homes v. 13 NLRC . That case heralded two very important rules: 1) decisions and final resolutions of the NLRC may be reviewed only via a special meikimouse
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civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; and 2) such petition must be filed with the CA in strict observance of the doctrine of the hierarchy of courts.
faith or are true and correct, not merely speculative. The requirement of verification has thus been substantially complied with.
Thus, after St. Martin became final, special civil actions challenging NLRC rulings have been referred by this Court to the CA for proper disposition. Exceptions to this rule were those instances when -prior to the finality of St. Martin -- both parties had already filed their respective memoranda with this Court, and it then opted to 14 take final cognizance of the case. Under AM No. 99-2-01-SC, however, all new cases erroneously filed with this Court after June 1, 1999, were dismissed forthwith.
Certification Against Substantially Complied With
Main
Issue:
Propriety of the CA's Dismissal of the Petition
In their present Petition, petitioners plead a liberal construction of the rules. They argue that the verification and the certification against forum shopping executed by only two of the 25 petitioners 15 have already satisfied the requirements under Sections 4 and 16 5 of Rule 7. On the other hand, the CA ruled that all 25 petitioners should have signed the verification and the certification of nonforum shopping. We clarify. Actually, two separate rules are involved in the present controversy – one, on verification; and the other, on the certification against
forum shopping. Two Signatures Sufficient for Verification
The verification requirement is provided under Section 4 of Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, as follows: "SEC. 4. Verification. – Except when otherwise specifically 17 required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit. "A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his knowledge and belief.
"A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on 'information and belief,' or upon 'knowledge, information and belief,' or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading." (Italics supplied) The purpose of requiring a verification is to secure an assurance that the allegations of the petition have been made in good faith; or are 18 true and correct, not merely speculative. This requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of pleadings, and noncompliance therewith does not necessarily render it fatally 19 defective. Indeed, verification is only a formal, not a jurisdictional, 20 requirement. In the present case, the problem is not the lack of a verification, but the adequacy of one executed by only two of the 25 petitioners. These two signatories are unquestionably real parties in interest, who undoubtedly have sufficient knowledge and belief to swear to the truth of the allegations in the Petition. This verification is enough assurance that the matters alleged therein have been made in good
Forum
Shopping
For petitions for certiorari, on the other hand, a certification against 21 forum shopping is required under Section 3 of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, as follows: "SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of noncompliance with requirements. - x x x xxx
xxx
xxx
"The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a sworn certification that he has not theretofore commenced any other action involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he must state the status of the same; and if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) days therefrom. xxx
xxx
xxx
"The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition." The certification requirement is rooted in the principle that a partylitigant shall not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in different fora, as this practice is detrimental to an orderly judicial 22 procedure. The lack of a certification against forum shopping, unlike that of verification, is generally not cured by its submission 23 after the filing of the petition. The submission of a certificate against forum shopping is thus 24 deemed obligatory, though not jurisdictional. (Jurisdiction over the subject or nature of the action is conferred by law.) Not being jurisdictional, the requirement has been relaxed under justifiable 25 circumstances under the rule of substantial compliance. In fact, the Court has allowed the belated filing of the certification 26 against forum shopping because of compelling reasons. In Uy v. 27 Land Bank , it even reinstated a petition it had already dismissed for lack of verification and certification against forum shopping, after petitioner had justified the reinstatement. Similarly, in Roadway 28 Express v. CA, the Court considered as substantial compliance the filing of the certification 14 days prior to the dismissal of the petition. The rule of substantial compliance has likewise been availed of with 29 respect to the contents of the certification. Gabionza v. Court of Appeals accepted, as sufficient compliance therewith, petitioner's meikimouse
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certification to the effect that "there is no similar petition [with] the same subject matter previously filed, pending, withdrawn or dismissed in the Supreme Court, in this Honorable Court [of Appeals] 30 or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency." It 31 stressed that while Circular 28-91 required strict compliance, it did not thereby prevent substantial compliance under justifiable 32 circumstances. In the present case, petitioners aver that the signatures of only two of them suffice as substantial compliance with the attestation requirement for a certificate against forum shopping. In effect, they 33 are asking this Court to disregard a defect in their Petition. In previous rulings, we have held that a certificate against forum shopping should be signed by all the petitioners, because a lone signatory cannot be presumed to have personal knowledge of the 34 matters required to be stated in the attestation. The ruling is not without exception, however. In Spouses Ortiz v. Court of 35 Appeal s and similar rulings, the following has always been pointed out: "x x x. The attestation contained in the certification on non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the party who executed the same. To merit the Court's
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Indeed, rules of procedure are established to secure substantial 38 justice. Being instruments for the speedy and efficient administration of justice, they must be used to achieve such end, 39 not to derail it. Technical requirements may thus be dispensed 40 with in meritorious appeals. It has been our consistent holding that the ends of justice are better served when cases are determined on the merits -- after all parties are given full opportunity to ventilate their causes and defenses -41 rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections. Consequently, the case should be remanded to the CA for a proper determination of the substantive issues. Time-honored is the principle that when the law entrusts the review of factual and substantive issues to a lower court or to a quasi-judicial tribunal, that court or agency must be given the opportunity to pass upon 42 43 those issues. Only thereafter may the parties resort to this Court.
WHEREFORE, this Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE, and the case is remanded to the CA for a proper determination of the substantive issues. No costs. SO ORDERED.
consideration, petitioners here must show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the certification. The petitioners must convince the court that the outright dismissal of the petition would defeat the administration of justice. x x x" (Italics supplied)
Petitioners need only show, therefore, that there was reasonable cause for the failure of some of them to sign the certification against forum shopping, and that the outright dismissal of the Petition would defeat the administration of justice. We find their reasons meritorious. First , as pointed out in the Motion for Reconsideration filed with the CA, the case dragged for an undeniably long time, because its remand to the labor arbiter forced many of the petitioners to go back to the provinces to await the final outcome, while those who remained in Metro Manila were forced out of temporary quarters every so often.36 Under these circumstances, it was extremely difficult to secure all the required signatures. Second , it is safe to assume that the matters alleged in the
certificate against forum shopping have been complied with by the non-signing petitioners. Twenty-one of the petitioners executed in favor of their counsel, a "Natatanging Gawad ng 37 Kapangyarihan," which gives him authority to represent them in all matters connected with the case. As it has not been revoked or superseded, the possibility of any of them filing another action or claim through another counsel is effectively foreclosed. Third , the apparent merits of the substantive aspects of the case, as in Uy, should be deemed as a "special circumstance" or "compelling
reason" for allowing the Petition. Pertinent thereto, the Court notes that the conflicting findings of the NLRC and of the labor arbiter -who ruled twice in favor of petitioners -- provide ample justification for the CA's review of the merits. The outright dismissal of the Petition was therefore prejudicial to the substantial rights of the parties.
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REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS (Full Text)
"Thereafter, the Bureau of Forestry District Office, Puerto Princesa, Palawan, ordered the inspection, investigation and survey of the
G.R. No. 151149
land subject of the petitioner’s request for eventual conversion or
September 7, 2004
GEORGE KATON, petitioner, vs. MANUEL PALANCA JR., LORENZO AGUSTIN, JESUS GAPILANGO and JUAN FRESNILLO, respondents. DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.: Where prescription, lack of jurisdiction or failure to state a cause of action clearly appear from the complaint filed with the trial court, the action may be dismissed motu proprio by the Court of Appeals, even if the case has been elevated for review on different grounds. Verily, the dismissal of such cases appropriately ends useless litigations.
The Case
re-classification from forest to agricultural land, and thereafter for George Katon to apply for a homestead patent. "Gabriel Mandocdoc (now retired Land Classification Investigator) undertook the investigation, inspection and survey of the area in the presence of the petitioner, his brother Rodolfo Katon (deceased) and his cousin, [R]espondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. During said survey, there were no actual occupants on the island but there were some coconut trees claimed to have been planted by petitioner and [R]espondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. (alleged overseer of petitioner) who went to the island from time to time to undertake development work, like planting of additional coconut trees. "The application for conversion of the whole Sombrero Island was favorably endorsed by the Forestry District Office of Puerto Princesa to its main office in Manila for appropriate action. The names of Felicisimo Corpuz, Clemente Magdayao and Jesus Gapilango and Juan Fresnillo were included in the endorsement as co-applicants of the petitioner.
1
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of 2 Court, assailing the December 8, 2000 Decision and the November 3 20, 2001 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 57496. The assailed Decision disposed as follows: "Assuming that petitioner is correct in saying that he has the exclusive right in applying for the patent over the land in question, it appears that his action is already barred by laches because he slept on his alleged right for almost 23 years from the time the original certificate of title has been issued to respondent Manuel Palanca, Jr., or after 35 years from the time the land was certified as agricultural land. In addition, the proper party in the annulment of patents or titles acquired through fraud is the State; thus, the petitioner’s action is deemed misplaced as he really does not have
any right to assert or protect. What he had during the time he requested for the re-classification of the land was the privilege of applying for the patent over the same upon the land’s conversion
from forest to agricultural. "WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. No 4 pronouncement as to cost." The assailed Resolution, on the other hand, denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner. It affirmed the RTC’s dismissal of
his Complaint in Civil Case No. 3231, not on the grounds relied upon by the trial court, but because of prescription and lack of jurisdiction.
The Antecedent Facts
"In a letter dated September 23, 1965, then Asst. Director of Forestry R.J.L. Utleg informed the Director of Lands, Manila, that since the subject land was no longer needed for forest purposes, the same is therefore certified and released as agricultural land for disposition under the Public Land Act. "Petitioner contends that the whole area known as Sombrero Island had been classified from forest land to agricultural land and certified available for disposition upon his request and at his instance. However, Mr. Lucio Valera, then [l]and investigator of the District Land Office, Puerto Princesa, Palawan, favorably endorsed the request of [R]espondents Manuel Palanca Jr. and Lorenzo Agustin, for authority to survey on November 15, 1965. On November 22, a second endorsement was issued by Palawan District Officer Diomedes De Guzman with specific instruction to survey vacant portions of Sombrero Island for the respondents consisting of five (5) hectares each. On December 10, 1965, Survey Authority No. R III342-65 was issued authorizing Deputy Public Land Surveyor Eduardo Salvador to survey ten (10) hectares of Sombrero Island for the respondents. On December 23, 1990, [R]espondent Lorenzo Agustin filed a homestead patent application for a portion of the subject island consisting of an area of 4.3 hectares. "Records show that on November 8, 1996, [R]espondent Juan Fresnillo filed a homestead patent application for a portion of the island comprising 8.5 hectares. Records also reveal that [R]espondent Jesus Gapilango filed a homestead application on June 8, 1972. Respondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. was issued Homestead 5 Patent No. 145927 and OCT No. G-7089 on March 3, 1977 with an area of 6.84 hectares of Sombrero Island.
The CA narrates the antecedent facts as follows: "On August 2, 1963, herein [P]etitioner [George Katon] filed a request with the District Office of the Bureau of Forestry in Puerto Princesa, Palawan, for the re-classification of a piece of real property known as Sombrero Island, located in Tagpait, Aborlan, Palawan, which consists of approximately 18 hectares. Said property is within Timberland Block of LC Project No. 10-C of Aborlan, Palawan, per BF Map LC No. 1582.
"Petitioner assails the validity of the homestead patents and original certificates of title covering certain portions of Sombrero Island issued in favor of respondents on the ground that the same were obtained through fraud. Petitioner prays for the reconveyance of the whole island in his favor. "On the other hand, [R]espondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. claims that he himself requested for the reclassification of the island in dispute and meikimouse
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that on or about the time of such request, [R]espondents Fresnillo, Palanca and Gapilango already occupied their respective areas and introduced numerous improvements. In addition, Palanca said that petitioner never filed any homestead application for the island. Respondents deny that Gabriel Mandocdoc undertook the inspection and survey of the island. "According to Mandocdoc, the island was uninhabited but the respondents insist that they already had their respective occupancy and improvements on the island. Palanca denies that he is a mere overseer of the petitioner because he said he was acting for himself in developing his own area and not as anybody’s caret aker. "Respondents aver that they are all bona fide and lawful possessors of their respective portions and have declared said portions for taxation purposes and that they have been faithfully paying taxes thereon for twenty years. "Respondents contend that the petitioner has no legal capacity to sue insofar as the island is concerned because an action for reconveyance can only be brought by the owner and not a mere homestead applicant and that petitioner is guilty of estoppel by laches for his failure to assert his right over the land for an unreasonable and unexplained period of time.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Finally, granting arguendo that petitioner had the exclusive right to apply for a patent to the land in question, he was already barred by laches for having slept on his right for almost 23 years from the time Respondent Palanca’s title had been issued.
In the Assailed Resolution, the CA acknowledged that it had erred when it ruled on the merits of the case. It agreed with petitioner that the trial court had acted without jurisdiction in perfunctorily dismissing his September 10, 1999 Motion for Reconsideration, on the erroneous ground that it was a third and prohibited motion when it was actually only his first motion. Nonetheless, the Complaint was dismissed motu proprio by the challenged Resolution of the CA Special Division of five members – with two justices dissenting – pursuant to its "residual prerogative" under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court. From the allegations of the Complaint, the appellate court opined that petitioner clearly had no standing to seek reconveyance of the disputed land, because he neither held title to it nor even applied for a homestead patent. It reiterated that only the State could sue for cancellation of the title issued upon a homestead patent, and for reversion of the land to the public domain. Finally, it ruled that prescription had already barred the action for
"In the instant case, petitioner seeks to nullify the homestead patents and original certificates of title issued in favor of the respondents covering certain portions of the Sombrero Island as well as the reconveyance of the whole island in his favor. The petitioner claims that he has the exclusive right to file an application for homestead patent over the whole island since it was he who 6 requested for its conversion from forest land to agricultural land." Respondents filed their Answer with Special and/or Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim in due time. On June 30, 1999, they also filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of the alleged defiance by petitioner of the trial court’s Order to amend his Complaint so he could thus effect a substitution by the legal heirs of the deceased, Respondent Gapilango. The Motion to Dismiss was granted by the RTC in its Order dated July 29, 1999. Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of the July 29, 1999 Order
was denied by the trial court in its Resolution dated December 17, 1999, for being a third and prohibited motion. In his Petition for Certiorari before the CA, petitioner charged the trial court with grave abuse of discretion on the ground that the denied Motion was his first and only Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals Instead of limiting itself to the allegation of grave abuse of discretion, the CA ruled on the merits. It held that while petitioner had caused the reclassification of Sombrero Island from forest to agricultural land, he never applied for a homestead patent under the Public Land Act. Hence, he never acquired title to that land. The CA added that the annulment and cancellation of a homestead patent and the reversion of the property to the State were matters between the latter and the homestead grantee. Unless and until the
reconveyance. First, petitioner’s action was brought 24 years after the issuance of Palanca’s homestead patent. Under the Public Land
Act, such action should have been taken within ten years from the issuance of the homestead certificate of title. Second, it appears from the submission (Annex "F" of the Complaint) of petitioner himself that Respondents Fresnillo and Palanca had been occupying six hectares of the island since 1965, or 33 years before he took legal steps to assert his right to the property. His action was filed beyond the 30-year prescriptive period under Articles 1141 and 1137 of the Civil Code. 7
Hence, this Petition.
Issues In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues: "1. Is the Court of Appeals correct in resolving the Petition for Certiorari based on an issue not raised (the merits of the case) in the Petition? "2. Is the Court of Appeals correct in invoking its alleged ‘residual prerogative’ under Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure in resolving the Petition on an 8 issue not raised in the Petition?" The Court’s Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First Issue: Propriety of Ruling on the Merits
government takes steps to annul the grant, the homesteader’s right
thereto stands.
This is not the first time that petitioner has taken issue with the propriety of the CA’s ruling on the merits. He raised it with the meikimouse
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appellate court when he moved for reconsideration of its December 8, 2000 Decision. The CA even corrected itself in its November 20, 2001 Resolution, as follows: "Upon another review of the case, the Court concedes that it may indeed have lost its way and been waylaid by the variety, complexity and seeming importance of the interests and issues involved in the case below, the apparent reluctance of the judges, five in all, to hear the case, and the volume of the conflicting, often confusing, 9 submissions bearing on incidental matters. We stand corrected."
jurisdiction over the subject matter; when t here is another cause of action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or where the action is barred by a prior 12 judgment or by statute of limitations. x x x." (Italics supplied) On the other hand, "residual jurisdiction" is embodied in Section 9 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, as follows: "SEC. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. – A party’s appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time.
That explanation should have been enough to settle the issue. The CA’s Resolution on this point has rendered petitioner’s issue moot.
Hence, there is no need to discuss it further. Suffice it to say that the appellate court indeed acted ultra jurisdictio in ruling on the merits of the case when the only issue that could have been, and was in fact, raised was the alleged grave abuse of discretion committed by the trial court in denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. Settled is the doctrine that the sole office of a writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction. Such writ does not include a 10 review of the evidence, more so when no determination of the merits has yet been made by the trial court, as in this case.
"A party’s appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected
as to him with respect to the subject matter thereof upon the approval of the record on appeal filed in due time. "In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties. "In appeals by record on appeal, the court loses jurisdiction only over the subject matter thereof upon the approval of the records on appeal filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
Second Issue: Dismissal for Prescription and Lack of Jurisdiction
Petitioner next submits that the CA erroneously invoked its "residual prerogatives" under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court when it motu proprio dismissed the Petition for lack of jurisdiction and prescription. According to him, residual prerogative refers to the power that the trial court, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, may still validly exercise even after perfection of an appeal. It follows that such powers are not possessed by an appellate court. Petitioner has confused what the CA adverted to as its "residual prerogatives" under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court with the "residual jurisdiction" of trial courts over cases appealed to the CA. Under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, except when (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) litis pendentia, (3) res judicata and (4) prescription are evident from the pleadings or the evidence on record. In the four excepted instances, the court shall motu proprio 11 dismiss the claim or action. In Gumabon v. Larin we explained thus:
"In either case, prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal, the court may issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal." (Italics supplied) The "residual jurisdiction" of trial courts is available at a stage in which the court is normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved in the appeal. This stage is reached upon the perfection of the appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the records on appeal, but prior to the transmittal of 13 the original records or the records on appeal. In either instance, the trial court still retains its so-called residual jurisdiction to issue protective orders, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal, and allow the withdrawal of the appeal. The CA’s motu proprio dismissal of petitioner’s Complaint could not
"x x x [T]he motu proprio dismissal of a case was traditionally limited to instances when the court clearly had no jurisdiction over the subject matter and when the plaintiff did not appear during trial, failed to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time or neglected to comply with the rules or with any order of the court. Outside of these instances, any motu proprio dismissal would amount to a violation of the right of the plaintiff to be heard. Except for qualifying and expanding Section 2, Rule 9, and Section 3, Rule 17, of the Revised Rules of Court, the amendatory 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure brought about no radical change. Under the new rules, a court may motu proprio dismiss a claim when it appears from the pleadings or evidence on record that it has no
have been based, therefore, on residual jurisdiction under Rule 41. Undeniably, such order of dismissal was not one for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties, pending the disposition of the case on appeal. What the CA referred to as residual prerogatives were the general residual powers of the courts to dismiss an action motu proprio upon the grounds mentioned in Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court and under authority of 14 Section 2 of Rule 1 of the same rules. To be sure, the CA had the excepted instances in mind when it dismissed the Complaint motu proprio "on more fundamental grounds
directly 15
bearing
on
the
lower
court’s
lack
of
jurisdiction" and for prescript ion of the action. Indeed, when a meikimouse
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court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only power it 16 has is to dismiss the action. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of 17 the relief sought. In his Complaint for "Nullification of Applications for Homestead and Original Certificate of Title No. G-7089 and for 18 Reconveyance of Title," petitioner averred: "2. That on November 10, 1965, without the knowledge of [petitioner, Respondent] Manuel Palanca Jr., [petitioner’s] cousin, in
connivance with his co-[respondent], Lorenzo Agustin, x x x fraudulently and in bad faith: 2.1. x x x made the request for authority to survey as a pre-requisite to the filing of an application for homestead patent in his name and that of his Co-[Respondent] Agustin, [despite being] fully aware that [Petitioner] KATON had previously applied or requested for reclassification and certification of the same land from forest land to agricultural land which request was favorably acted upon and approved as mentioned earlier; a clear case of intrinsic fraud and misrepresentation; xxx
xxx
xxx
2.3. In stating in his application for homestead patent that he was applying for the VACANT PORTION of Sombrero Island where there was none, the same constituted another clear case of fraud and misrepresentation; "3. That the issuance of Homestead Patent No. 145927 and OCT No. G-7089 in the name of [Respondent] Manuel Palanca Jr. and the filing of Homestead Patent Applications in the names of [respondents], Lorenzo Agustin, Jesus Gapilango and Juan Fresnillo[,] having been done fraudulently and in bad faith, are ipso facto null 19 and void and of no effect whatsoever." xxx
xxx
xxx
"x x x. By a wrongful act or a willful omission and intending the effects with natural necessity arise knowing from such act or omission, [Respondent Palanca] on account of his blood relation, first degree cousins, trust, interdependence and intimacy is guilty of 20 intrinsic fraud [sic]. x x x." Thereupon, petitioner prayed, among others, for a judgment (1) nullifying the homestead patent applications of Respondents Agustin, Fresnillo and Gapilango as well as Homestead Patent No. 145927 and OCT No. G-7089 in the name of Respondent Palanca; and (2) ordering the director of the Land Management Bureau to 21 reconvey the Sombrero Island to petitioner. The question is, did the Complaint sufficiently allege an action for declaration of nullity of the free patent and certificate of title or, alternatively, for reconveyance? Or did it plead merely for reversion? The Complaint did not sufficiently make a case for any of such actions, over which the trial court could have exercised jurisdiction.
In an action for nullification of title or declaration of its nullity, the complaint must contain the following allegations: 1) that the contested land was privately owned by the plaintiff prior to the issuance of the assailed certificate of title to the defendant; and 2) that the defendant perpetuated a fraud or committed a mistake in obtaining a document of title over the parcel of land claimed by the 22 plaintiff. In these cases, the nullity arises not from fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the director of the Land Management Bureau had no jurisdiction to bestow title; hence, the issued patent or 23 certificate of title was void ab initio. In an alternative action for reconveyance, the certificate of title is also respected as incontrovertible, but the transfer of the property or title thereto is sought to be nullified on the ground that it was 24 wrongfully or erroneously registered in the defendant’s name. As with an annulment of title, a complaint must allege two facts that, if admitted, would entitle the plaintiff to recover title to the disputed land: (1) that the plaintiff was the owner of the land, and (2) that the defendant illegally dispossessed the plaintiff of the 25 property. Therefore, the defendant who acquired the property through mistake or fraud is bound to hold and reconvey to the 26 plaintiff the property or the title thereto. In the present case, nowhere in the Complaint did petitioner allege that he had previously held title to the land in question. On the contrary, he acknowledged that the disputed island was public 27 land, that it had never been privately titled in his name, and that he had not applied for a homestead under the provisions of the 28 Public Land Act. This Court has held that a complaint by a private party who alleges that a homestead patent was obtained by fraudulent means, and who consequently prays for its annulment, does not state a cause of action; hence, such complaint must be 29 dismissed. Neither can petitioner’s case be one for reversion. Section 101 of
the Public Land Act categorically declares that only the solicitor 30 general or the officer in his stead may institute such an action. A private person may not bring an action for reversion or any other action that would have the effect of canceling a free patent and its derivative title, with the result that the land thereby covered would 31 again form part of the public domain. Thus, when the plaintiff admits in the complaint that the disputed land will revert to the public domain even if the title is canceled or amended, the action is for reversion; and the proper party who may bring action is the government, to which the property will revert. 32 A mere homestead applicant, not being the real party in interest, has 33 no cause of action in a suit for reconveyance. As it is, vested rights over the land applied for under a homestead may be validly claimed only by the applicant, after approval by the director of the Land Management Bureau of the former’s final proof of homestead 34
patent.
Consequently, the dismissal of the Complaint is proper not only because of lack of jurisdiction, but also because of the utter absence 35 of a cause of action, a defense raised by respondents in their 36 37 Answer. Section 2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court ordains that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest, who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit. Indeed, one who has no right or interest to protect has no cause of action by which to invoke, as a party38 plaintiff, the jurisdiction of the court.
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Finally, assuming that petitioner is the proper party to bring the action for annulment of title or its reconveyance, the case should 39 still be dismissed for being time-barred. It is not disputed that a homestead patent and an Original Certificate of Title was issued to 40 Palanca on February 21, 1977, while the Complaint was filed only on October 6, 1998. Clearly, the suit was brought way past ten years from the date of the issuance of the Certificate, the prescriptive 41 period for reconveyance of fraudulently registered real property.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
G.R. No. 169793
September 15, 2006
VICTORIANO M. vs. NIEVES AMIGO, respondent. DECISIO N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J .:
It must likewise be stressed that Palanca’s title -- which attained the
status of indefeasibility one year from the issuance of the patent and the Certificate of Title in February 1977 -- is no longer open to review on the ground of actual fraud. Ybanez v. Intermediate 42 Appellate Court ruled that a certificate of title, issued under an administrative proceeding pursuant to a homestead patent, is as indefeasible as one issued under a judicial registration proceeding one year from its issuance; provided, however, that the land covered by it is disposable public land, as in this case. In Aldovino v. Alunan,43 the Court has held that when the plaintiff’s own complaint shows clearly that the action has prescribed, such action may be dismissed even if the defense of prescription has not 44 been invoked by the defendant. In Gicano v. Gegato, we also explained thus: "x x x [T]rial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss an action on the ground of prescription when the parties' pleadings or other facts on record show it to be indeed time-barred; (Francisco v. Robles, Feb. 15, 1954; Sison v. McQuaid, 50 O.G. 97; Bambao v. Lednicky, Jan. 28, 1961; Cordova v. Cordova, Jan. 14, 1958; Convets, Inc. v. NDC, Feb. 28, 1958; 32 SCRA 529; Sinaon v. Sorongan, 136 SCRA 408); and it may do so on the basis of a motion to dismiss (Sec. 1,f, Rule 16, Rules of Court), or an answer which sets up such ground as an affirmative defense (Sec. 5, Rule 16), or even if the ground is alleged after judgment on the merits, as in a motion for reconsideration (Ferrer v. Ericta, 84 SCRA 705); or even if the def ense has not been asserted at all, as where no statement thereof is found in the pleadings (Garcia v. Mathis, 100 SCRA 250; PNB v. Pacific Commission House, 27 SCRA 766; Chua Lamco v. Dioso, et al., 97 Phil. 821); or where a defendant has been declared in default (PNB v. Perez, 16 SCRA 270). What is essential only, to repeat, is that the facts demonstrating the lapse of the prescriptive period be otherwise sufficiently and satisfactorily apparent on the record; either in the averments of the plaintiff's complaint, or otherwise 45 established by the evidence." (Italics supplied) Clearly then, the CA did not err in dismissing the present case. After all, if and when they are able to do so, courts must endeavor to settle entire controversies before them to prevent future 46 litigations.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Resolution AFFIRMED. The dismissal of the Complaint in Civil Case No. 3231 is SUSTAINED on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, failure to state a cause of action and prescription. Costs against petitioner.
ENCARNACION, petitioner,
1
This petition for review assails the June 30, 2005 Decisio n of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73857, ordering the remand of Civil Case No. Br. 20-1194 to the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, for further proceedings. The antecedent facts are as follows: Petitioner Victoriano M. Encarnacion is the registered owner of Lot No. 2121-B-1, consisting of 100 square meters and covered by TCT No. T-256650; and Lot No. 2121-B-2 consisting of 607 square meters with TCT No. T-256651, located at District 1, National Hi-way, Cauayan, Isabela. Said two lots originally form part of Lot No. 2121, a single 707 square meter track of land owned by Rogelio Valiente who sold the same to Nicasio Mallapitan on January 18, 1982. On March 21, 1985, Mallapitan sold the land to Victoriano Magpantay. After the death of the latter in 1992, his widow, Anita N. Magpantay 2 executed an Affidavit of Waiver on April 11, 1995 waving her right over the property in favor of her son-in-law, herein petitioner, Victoriano Encarnacion. Thereafter, the latter caused the subdivision 3 of the land into two lots and the issuance of titles in his name on 4 July 18, 1996. Respondent Nieves Amigo allegedly entered the premises and took possession of a portion of the property sometime in 1985 without the permission of the then owner, Victoriano Magpantay. Said occupation by respondent continued even after TCT Nos. T-256650 and T-256651 were issue to petitioner. Consequently, petitioner, through his lawyer sent a letter 5 dated Febuary 1, 2001 demanding that the respondent vacate the subject property. As evidenced by the registry return receipt, the demand letter was delivered by registered mail to the respondent on February 12, 2001. Notwithstanding receipt of the demand letter, respondent still refused to vacate the subject property. Thereafter, 6 on March 2, 2001, petitioner filed a complaint for ejectment, damages with injunction and prayer for restraining order with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Isabela which was docketed as CV01-030. In his Answer, respondent alleged that he has been in actual possession and occupation of a portion of the subject land since 1968 and that the issuance of Free Patent and titles in the name of 7 petitioner was tainted with irregularities. On October 24, 2001, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities rendered judgment, which reads: WHERE[FO]RE, there being a preponderance of evidence, a JUDGMENT is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff VICTORIANO M. ENCARNACION and against the defendant NIEVES AMIGOE (sic) as follows:
SO ORDERED. a) ORDERING the defendant to vacate the portion of the parcels of land described in Transfer Certificates of Title meikimouse
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Nos. T-256650 and T-256651 he is now occupying and surrender it to the plaintiff;
the proper Regional Trial Court when the dispossession has lasted for more than one year; and
b) ORDERING the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000) as attorney's fees, and
3. Accion reinvindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion, which is an action for the recovery of ownership which 13 must be brought in the proper Regional Trial Court.
c) ORDERING the defendant to pay rentals equivalent [to] P500.00 per month from February, 2001 until the portion of the land occupied by him is surrendered to the plaintiff. COSTS against the defendant. SO ORDERED.
8
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, ruled as follows: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the case on the ground that as the Municipal Court had no jurisdiction over the case, this Court acquired no appellate jurisdiction thereof. Costs against plaintiff-appellee. SO ORDERED.
9
10
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court before the Court of Appeals which promulgated the assailed Decision remanding the case to the Regional Trial Court. The dispositive portion thereof reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, this case is hereby REMANDED to Branch 20, Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela for further proceedings. No costs. SO ORDERED.
11
Hence the present petition raising the sole issue: [WHETHER] THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PROPER ACTION IN THIS CASE IS ACCION PUBLICIANA AND NOT UNLAWFUL DETAINER AS DETERMINED BY THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT FILED BY PETITIONER.12 The petition lacks merit. In this jurisdiction, the three kinds of actions for the recovery of possession of real property are: 1. Accion interdictal , or an ejectment proceeding which may be either that for forcible entry (detentacion) or unlawful detainer (desahucio), which is a summary action for recovery of physical possession where the dispossession has not lasted for more than one year, and should be brought in the proper inferior court; 2. Accion publiciana or the plenary action for the recovery of the real right of possession, which should be brought in
Based on the foregoing distinctions, the material element that determines the proper action to be filed for the recovery of the possession of the property in this case is the length of time of dispossession. Under the Rules of Court, the remedies of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are granted to a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person. These remedies afford the person deprived of the possession to file at any time within one year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together 14 with damages and costs. Thus, if the dispossession has not lasted for more than one year, an ejectment proceeding is proper and the inferior court acquires jurisdiction. On the other hand, if the dispossession lasted for more than one year, the proper action to be filed is an accion publiciana which should be brought to the proper Regional Trial Court. After a careful evaluation of the evidence on record of this case, we find that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in holding that the proper action in this case is accion publiciana; and in ordering the remand of the case to the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, for further proceedings. Well settled is the rule that jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action is determined by the allegations of the complaint at the time of its filing, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and the character of the relief 15 sought are the ones to be consulted. On its face, the complaint must show enough ground for the court to assume jurisdiction 16 without resort to parol testimony. From the allegations in the complaint, it appears that the petitioner became the owner of the property on April 11, 1995 by virtue of the waiver of rights executed by his mother-in-law. He filed the complaint for ejectment on March 2, 2001 after his February 1, 2001 letter to the respondent demanding that the latter vacate the premises remained unheeded. While it is true that the demand letter was received by the respondent on February 12, 2001, thereby making the filing of the complaint for ejectment fall within the requisite one year from last demand for complaints for unlawful detainer, it is also equally true that petitioner became the owner of the subject lot in 1995 and has been since that time deprived possession of a portion thereof. From the date of the petitioner's dispossession in 1995 up to his filing of his complaint for ejectment in 2001, almost 6 years have elapsed. The length of time that the petitioner was dispossessed of his property made his cause of action meikimouse
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beyond the ambit of an accion interdictal and effectively made it one for accion publiciana. After the lapse of the one-year period, the suit must be commenced in the Regional Trial Court via an accion publiciana which is a suit for recovery of the right to possess. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. It also refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the 17 realty.
The RTC should have taken cognizance of the case. If the case is tried on the merits by the Municipal Court without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the RTC on appeal may no longer dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction thereof. Moreover, the RTC shall no longer try the case on the merits, but shall decide the case on the basis of the evidence presented in the lower court, without prejudice to the admission of the amended pleadings and additional 19 evidence in the interest of justice.
Previously, we have held that if the owner of the land knew that another person was occupying his property way back in 1977 but the said owner only filed the complaint for ejectment in 1995, the proper action would be one for accion publiciana and not one under the summary procedure on ejectment. As explained by t he Court:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 30, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 73857 ordering the remand of Civil Case No. Br. 20-1194 to the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, for further proceedings, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that if petitioners are indeed the owners of the subject lot and were unlawfully deprived of their right of possession, they should present their claim before the regional trial court in an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, and not before the metropolitan trial court in a summary proceeding for unlawful detainer or forcible entry. For even if one is the owner of the property, the possession thereof cannot be wrested from another who had been in physical or material possession of the same for more than one year by 18 resorting to a summary action for ejectment.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, we agree with the Court of Appeals when it declared that: The respondent's actual entry on the land of the petitioner was in 1985 but it was only on March 2, 2001 or sixteen years after, when petitioner filed his ejectment case. The respondent should have filed an accion publiciana case which is under the jurisdiction of the RTC. However, the RTC should have not dismissed t he case. Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court provides: SECTION 8. Appeal from orders dismissing case without trial; lack of jurisdiction. — If an appeal is taken from an order of the lower court dismissing the case without a trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court may affirm or reverse it, as the case may be. In case o f affirmance and the ground of dismissal is lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, the Regional Trial Court, if it has jurisdiction thereover, shall try the case on the merits as if the case was originally filed with it. In case of reversal, the case shall be remanded for further proceedings. If the case was tried on the merits by the lower court without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the Regional Trial Court on appeal shall not dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction thereof, but shall decide the case in accordance with the preceding section, without prejudice to the admission of amended pleadings and additional evidence in the interest of justice.
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G.R. No. 136109
August 1, 2002
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MANUEL DULAWON, respondents. DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of 1 2 Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 45987 dated April 30, 1998 and its 3 resolution dated October 15, 1998 denying the motion for reconsideration. On June 18, 1997, private respondent Manuel Dulawon filed with the Regional Trial Court of Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch 25, a complaint for breach of contract of lease with damages against petitioner Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI). Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction contending that it is the Municipal Trial Court which has jurisdiction as the complaint is basically one for collection of unpaid rentals in the sum of P84,000.00, which does not exceed the jurisdictional amount of P100,000.00 for Regional Trial Courts. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss,4 as well as petitioner’s motion for 5 reconsideration. Hence, petitioner went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari. On April 30, 1998, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. The dispositive portion thereof reads: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
xxx
xxx
2. The exclusion of the term "damages of whatever kind" in determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court. xxx
xxx
xxx 8
In Russell, et al., v. Vestil, et al., the Court held that in determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, the nature of the principal action or remedy sought must first be ascertained. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and jurisdiction over the action will depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, the action is one where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, which is cognizable exclusively by Regional Trial Courts. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted 9 therein.
private respondent’s cause of action is breach of contract. The
The issue for resolution in this petition is whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the complaint filed by private respondent. Pertinent portion of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, provides: SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: (1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation; xxx
xxx
In the case at bar, the allegations in the complaint plainly show that
6
The motion for reconsideration of the foregoing decision was denied on October 15, 1998. Hence, this petition.
xxx
CIVIL PROCEDURE
xxx
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and
costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the abovementioned 7 items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00).
pertinent portion of the complaint recites: xxx
xxx
xxx
2. That sometime during the end of the year 1995, defendant through its appropriate officials negotiated with plaintiff the lease of a portion of the latter’s building x x x
3. That the lease contract was effective for a period of three (3) years of from January 1, 1996 to January 1, 1998 with advance payment for the year 1996. The advance was not however given in lump sum but on installment. One check that was given in payment of one month’s rental for
1996 was even stale and had to be changed only after demand; 4. That as per contract the monthly rental for 1997 was P3,300.00 while for 1998, it is P3,700.00; 5. That the defendant surreptitiously removed its equipments and other personalities from the leased premises and failed to pay rentals due for the months of January to March 1997 to the damage and prejudice of plaintiff; that this failure and refusal on the part of plaintiff accelerated the payment of all rentals for each month for the years 1997 and 1998;
Corollary thereto, Administrative Circular No. 09-94, states: meikimouse
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6. That the acts of defendant amounts to a breach of contract which is unlawful and malicious, as in fact, it caused plaintiff serious anxiety, emotional stress, and sleepless nights for which he is entitled to moral damages; 7. That plaintiff conveyed his feelings to Mr. Ronald C. Manalastas as evidenced by a letter dated January 7, 1997 a copy of which is hereto attached to form part hereof as
CIVIL PROCEDURE
payment can not be awarded. Hence, the amounts sought do not represent the value of the subject of litigation. "Subject matter over which jurisdiction can not be conferred by consent, has reference, not to the res or property involved in the litigation nor to a particular case, but to the class of cases, the purported subject of litigation, the nature of the action and of the relief sought (Appeal of Maclain, 176 NW. 817)."
Annex "B". This was later followed by a letter of plaintiff’s
counsel a machine copy of which is hereto attached to form part hereof and marked as Annex "C". Both these letters landed on deaf ears thereby aggravating the worries/anxieties of plaintiff; 8. That the period agreed is for the benefit of both parties and any unilateral termination constitutes breach of contract; 9. That defendant actually used the leased premises during the year 1996; that had it not been for the contract, plaintiff could have leased the premises to other persons for business purposes; that this unlawful and malicious breach of contract cannot be lawfully countenanced hence defendant must be taught a lesson by being ordered to pay exemplary damages; x x x x x x x x x.
10
It is settled that a breach of contract is a cause of action either for 11 specific performance or rescission of contracts. In Manufacturer’s 12 Distributors, Inc. v. Siu Liong, the Court held that actions for specific performance are incapable of pecuniary estimation and therefore fall under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial 13 Court. Here, the averments in the complaint reveal that the suit filed by private respondent was primarily one for specific performance as it was aimed to enforce their three-year lease contract which would incidentally entitle him to monetary awards if the court should find that the subject contract of lease was
Specifically, it has been held that: "The Court has no jurisdiction of a suit for specific performance of a contract, although the damages alleged for its breach, if permitted, are within the amount of which that court has jurisdiction." (Mebane Cotton Breeding Station. vs. Sides, 257 SW. 302; 21 C.J.S. 59, note). xxx
xxx
xxx
Clearly, the action for specific performance case, irrespective of the amount of rentals and damages sought to be recovered, is incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence cognizable exclusively by the Regional Trial Court. The trial court, therefore, did not err in denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 45987 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
breached. As alleged therein, petitioner’s failure to pay rentals due
for the period from January to March 1997, constituted a violation of their contract which had the effect of accelerating the payment of monthly rentals for the years 1997 and 1998. The same complaint likewise implied a premature and unilateral termination of the term of the lease with the closure of and removal all communication 14 equipment in the leased premises. Under the circumstances, the court has to scrutinize the facts and the applicable laws in order to determine whether there was indeed a violation of their lease agreement that would justify the award of rentals and damages. The prayer, therefore, for the payment of unpaid rentals in the amount of P84,000.00 plus damages consequent to the breach is merely incidental to the main action for specific performance. Similarly, 15 in Manufacturer’s Distributor’s Inc., the Court explained – xxx
xxx
xxx
That plaintiff’s complaint also sought the payment by the defendant of P3,376.00, plus interest and att orney’s fees, does not give a
pecuniary estimation to the litigation, for the payment of such amounts can only be ordered as a consequence of the specific performance primarily sought. In other words, such payment would be but an incident or consequence of defendant's liability for specific performance. If no such liability is judicially declared, the meikimouse
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G.R. No. 161739
May 4, 2006
CIVIL PROCEDURE
8. When plaintiffs knew of defendants’ application, plaintiffs filed a protest against defendants’ application on
February 5, 1996. Attached as Annex A is the Protest;
ALFREDO BOKINGO, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, the HEIRS OF CELESTINO BUSA, represented by FELICIDAD BUSA-PANAL and ERNESTO M. CAMPOS, Respondents. DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.: Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari filed by 1 Alfredo Bokingo seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision dated December 17, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 71510 which dismissed his petition for certiorari filed therewith.
9. On November 24, 1998, the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer, HUGO I. BAÑOSIA, resolved the Protest in favor of Plaintiffs-the protestant in the DENR case. Attached as Annex B is the order; 10. On January 6, 1999, the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer, HUGO T. BAÑOSIA, issued a certification stating that the order dated November 24, 1998 has become final and executory. Attached as Annex C is the machine copy of the Certification; 11. On September 9, 1999, the same DENR Officer HUGO T. BAÑOSIA issued an Order of Execution which states that:
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows: Petitioner Alfredo Bokingo is one of the defendants in the complaint for injunction and damages filed by Ernesto Campos, the Heirs of 2 3 Celestino Busa, the Heirs of Felicidad Busa-Panal and the Heirs of 4 Concordia Busa. The complaint was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Butuan City, Branch 3 thereof, and docketed as Civil Case No. 1003. The complaint alleged as follows:
In complying herewith, the Land Management Officer III concerned should be instructed to set forth the whole proceeding in writing signed by the parties and witnesses, if possible, submit and return to this Office within sixty (60) days from receipt hereof, to be used as evidence should it be necessary to institute any action, criminal or otherwise, against any party who may refuse to obey th e same. SO ORDERED, Butuan City, September 9, 1999.
CAUSE OF ACTION 3. Plaintiffs [herein respondents] are co-owners of the land subject matter. By virtue of the right of representation, the heirs of FELICIDAD BUSA-PANAL and CONCORDIA S. BUSA and REYNALDO S. BUSA, respectively; 4. Defendants in this case are heirs of MIGUEL BOKINGO; 5. Defendants ALFREDO BOKINGO [herein petitioner], WENCESLAO B. AMBRAY, JR., ROSA B. AMBRAY, CELIA A. ALMORA and JOSELITO B. AMBRAY, filed an application for titling of a parcel of land before the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Office of the CENRO, Ochoa Avenue, Butuan City; 6. The land subject matter of the application of defendants is a parcel of land located at Baan (Buhangin), Butuan City, containing an area of 2.1600 hectares, more or less; 7. The land subject matter of the application for titling of defendants is a parcel of land inherited by plaintiffs from their father, the late CELESTINO BUSA. This parcel of land is described particularly as:
12. Plaintiffs requested on June 23, 1999, for a Survey Authority to survey the land subject matter of this case before the CENRO Office of Butuan City. Attached as Annex D is the Survey Application; 13. On July 30, 1999, A Survey Authority was issued by the CENRO of Butuan City, authorizing plaintiff ENGR. ERNESTO M. CAMPOS, JR., to survey the land subject matter of the DENR case and the case at bar. Attached as Annex E is the Survey Authority; 14. On November 18, 1999 at 11:00 A.M., FELICIDAD BUSA-PANAL, MILAGROS BUSA SIMOGAN, TERESITA BUSA LINAO, JIMMY BUSA-PANAL, son of Felicidad Busa-Panal, ALFREDO BUSA-PANAL, son-in-law of Concordia S. Busa, personnel of the Butuan PNP and the personnel of ENGR. ERNESTO M. CAMPOS went to the area subject matter of this case to survey the land. Unfortunately, Defendant SPO3 FERDINAND B. DACILLO and Defendant ALFREDO BOKINGO, representatives of defendants, told the survey group to stop and not to enter the area subject matter of this case. Attached as Annex F is the report of CENRO Officer who [was] present during the November 18, 1999 survey which was stopped by SPO3 FERDINAND B. DACILLO and ALFREDO BOKINGO;
TAX DECLARATION NO. GR.-10-002-0189-A "A parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. GR-10002-0189-A, situated in Buhangin, Butuan City, containing an area of 2.1600 HAS., more or less. Bounded on the North – Elisa Busa, South - Pastor Ago, East – Ho. Miguel Bokingo and on the West – Baan River."
15. Plaintiff[s] availed of the Barangay Justice System to resolve the controversy regarding the survey but to no avail, defendants still refused to allow plaintiffs to survey the area. Thus, a Certificate to File Action was issued by the Lupong Tagapamayapa. Copy of the same is hereto attached as Annex G;
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16. The defendants did not exercise honesty and good faith in their acts which is a violation of Article 19 of the New Civil Code, and which entitles the plaintiffs for damages;
Officer (PENRO) and the respondents were declared to have a better right to file a public land application covering the same. Further, the relief being sought in the complaint is injunction in order that the respondents’ right to survey the subject land would not be defeated.
17. The acts of defendants constrained the plaintiff[s] to
Based on these allegations, the court a quo held that it had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim under Section 2 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court which provides in part that "[a] preliminary injunction may be granted by the court where the action
litigate and to incur attorney’s fees in the amount of
PhP10,000.00 plus litigation expenses estimated at PhP10,000.00.
or proceeding is pending." It accordingly denied petitioner Bokingo’s motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.1avvphil.net
PRAYER Wherefore, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that after hearing, this Honorable Court: 1) Enjoin permanently the illegal acts of defendants of preventing the survey of the land subject matter of this case by ENGR. ERNESTO M. CAMPOS; 2) Order defendants to pay plaintiffs the sum of P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees, P10,000.00 as litigation expenses; 3) Order defendants to pay damages to plaintiff; 4) Such other reliefs just and reasonable under the 5 circumstances. Petitioner Bokingo, as one of the defendants in the above complaint, filed with the court a quo a motion to dismiss alleging that the latter has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim. Specifically, petitioner Bokingo contended that it could be gleaned from the complaint that the issue between the parties involved the possession of the land. As such, the assessed value of the land was crucial to determine the court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter 6
7
in accordance with either Section 19(2) or Section 33(3) of 8 Batasang Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended by Republic Act No. 7691. If the assessed value t hereof is P20,000.00 or less, then the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) has jurisdiction over the subject matter. Otherwise, jurisdiction is with the RTC. Petitioner Bokingo pointed out in his Motion to Dismiss that the assessed value of the land subject matter of the complaint was not indicated. Nonetheless, he proffered that based on his father’s tax
declaration covering the subject land, its assessed value was only P14,410.00. Consequently, it was allegedly clear that the court a quo, a Regional Trial Court, had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint filed by the respondents. Rather, in view of the assessed value of the subject land which was allegedly less than the P15,000.00, jurisdiction properly belonged to the MTC.
Petitioner Bokingo forthwith filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the court a quo in denying his motion to dismiss. On December 17, 2003, the CA rendered the assailed Decision dismissing the said petition for lack of merit, in fact and in law. It ruled that the remedy of certiorari is unavailing to petitioner Bokingo because "an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and cannot be the subject of the extraordinary petition 9 for certiorari or mandamus." It was noted that the records fail to disclose that petitioner Bokingo filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of the court a quo. According to the CA, such omission warranted the outright dismissal of the petition for certiorari. Finally, it was not shown or even alleged in the petition that the court a quo, in issuing the assailed order, acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The issue raised by petitioner Bo kingo, the CA held, was proper for an appeal but not a petition for certiorari. Aggrieved, petitioner Bokingo now comes to the Court seeking the reversal of the said decision of the CA which dismissed his petition for certiorari filed therewith. He insists that the complaint filed by the respondents with the court a quo is a possessory action. To determine which court, the RTC or MTC, has primary jurisdiction, petitioner Bokingo theorizes that it is necessary that the assessed value of the land be alleged in the initiatory complaint. Absent such allegation, the court where the case was filed should allegedly preliminarily determine the assessed value of the subject property to determine whether or not it has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim. In the present case, according to petitioner Bokingo, the assessed value of the subject land is only P14,410.00; hence, jurisdiction thereof properly belongs to the MTC in accordance with Section 19(2) or 33(3) of BP Blg. 129 as amended by RA 7691. The petition is bereft of merit. Preliminarily, the Court finds no reversible error in the dismissal by the CA of petitioner Bokingo’s petition for certiorari filed therewith.
Petitioner Bokingo thus urged the court a quo to dismiss the complaint filed by the respondents for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof. Acting thereon, the court a quo issued the Order dated March 13, 2002 denying the motion to dismiss. It pointed out that the complaint’s allegation is that the respondents, as plaintiffs, are entitled to have the subject land surveyed after petitioner Bokingo’s and his co-claimants’ application for the titling of the subject land
As correctly held by the CA, the mere fact that he failed to move for the reconsideration of the court a quo’s order denying his motion to dismiss was sufficient cause for the outright dismissal of the said petition. Certiorari as a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is first filed before the respondent court to allow 10 it an opportunity to correct its errors, if any. Petitioner Bokingo did not proffer any compelling reason to warrant deviation by the CA from this salutary rule. As further observed by the CA, petitioner Bokingo failed to even allege grave abuse of discretion on the part of
was dismissed by the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources meikimouse
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the court a quo in rendering the order denying his motion to dismiss. In any case, the present petition lacks substantive merit. It is axiomatic that the nature of the action and which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the same is determined by the material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff, and the law in effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of 11 the claims asserted therein. The caption of the complaint is not determinative of the nature of the action. Nor does the jurisdiction of the court depend upon the answer of the defendant or agreement of the parties, or to the waiver or acquiescence of the 12 parties. A careful perusal of the respondents’ complaint, quoted earlier,
shows that it alleges that per the Order dated November 24, 1998 of PENRO of Butuan City, petitioner Bokingo’s and his co-claimants’ application for titling of the subject land was rejected. On the other hand, in the same order it was declared that the respondents, if qualified, may file an appropriate public land application covering the same land. It was further alleged that the said order became final and executory, and in connection therewith, the respondents were authorized by the City Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) of Butuan City to conduct a survey on the subject land. However, petitioner Bokingo, through his representatives, unjustly prevented the conduct of the said survey. Even when the matter regarding the survey was submitted to the Lupong Tagapamayapa, petitioner Bokingo still allegedly refused to allow the respondents to survey the subject land. Hence, the Complaint for Injunction filed by the respondents where the principal relief sought is to enjoin permanently the illegal acts of the defendants therein, including petitioner Bokingo, of preventing the survey of the land subject matter of the case. In this connection, it is well to note that the Court had the occasion to explain that "in determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, the nature of the principal action, or remedy sought must first be ascertained. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and jurisdiction over the action will depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, the action is one where the subject of litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, 13 which is cognizable exclusively by Regional Trial Courts." As gleaned from the complaint, the principal relief sought by the respondents in their complaint is for the court a quo to issue an injunction against petitioner Bokingo and his representatives to permanently enjoin them from preventing the survey of the subject land. For clarity, the prayer of the complaint reads: Wherefore, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that after hearing, this Honorable Court: 1) Enjoin permanently the illegal acts of defendants of preventing the survey of the land subject matter of this case by ENGR. ERNESTO M. CAMPOS;
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2) Order defendants to pay plaintiffs the sum of P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees, P10,000.00 as litigation expenses; 3) Order defendants to pay damages to plaintiff; 4) Such other reliefs just and reasonable under the 14 circumstances. Contrary to the view posited by petitioner Bokingo, the cause of action of the respondents’ complaint is not, as yet, to recover the
possession of the subject land. There are three kinds of actions to judicially recover possession of real property and these are distinguished in this wise: What really distinguishes an action for unlawful detainer from a possessory action (accion publiciana) and from a reinvindicatory action (accion reinvindicatoria) is that the first is limited to the question of possession de facto. An unlawful detainer suit (accion interdictal) together with forcible entry are the two forms of an ejectment suit that may be filed to recover possession of real property. Aside from the summary action of ejectment, accion publiciana or the plenary action to recover the right of possession and accion reinvindicatoria or the action to recover ownership which includes recovery of possession, make up the three kinds of actions 15 to judicially recover possession. Significantly, the respondents’ complaint has not sought to recover
the possession or ownership of the subject land. Rather, it is principally an action to enjoin petitioner Bokingo and his representatives from committing acts that would tend to prevent the survey of the subject land. It cannot be said therefore that it is one of a possessory action. The respondents, as plaintiffs in the court a quo, to be entitled to the injunctive relief sought, need to establish the following requirements: (1) the existence of a right to be protected; and (2) that the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of the said right. As such, the subject matter of litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation and properly cognizable exclusively by the court a quo, a Regional Trial Court under Section 19 (1) of BP Blg. 129, as amended by RA 7691: SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: (1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation; xxx Hence, the court a quo did not err in denying petitioner Bokingo’s
motion to dismiss. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision dated December 17, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 71510 is AFFIRMED in toto. SO ORDERED.
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METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS (Full Text)
G.R. No. L-33213 June 29, 1979 ARTEMIO C. REYES and HILARION C. REYES, petitioners, vs. HON. ANDRES STA. MARIA, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch II, HILARIA SANTOS VDA. DE LOPEZ and PILAR SANTOS, respondents. E. M. Reyes for petitioner. Ruben T. Reyes for respondents.
TEEHANKEE, J.: The Court sets aside the lower court's Order which dismissed petitioners-plaintiffs' complaint filed before it for recovery of the property in the possession of respondents-defendants and for declaration of ownership thereof as against said respondents' contrary claim of ownership on the ground of alleged lack of jurisdiction. Such action was clearly an accion publiciana for the recovery of the right to possess (possesion de jure) (if not an accion reivindicatoria) falling within the lower court's jurisdiction and not a mere action for detainer to recover physical possession (possession de facto) which would fall within the jurisdiction of the municipal court (if filed within one year after unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession) as erroneously held by the lower court in its dismissal order. Petitioners as plaintiffs in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan had filed on April 1, 1968 an action which they termed as one to quiet title to a certain residential lot in Barrio San Sebastian, Hagonoy, Bulacan with an area of 368.5 square meters and to recover the 1 possession thereof from respondents as defendants, wherein they made the following averments: 2. That plaintiffs are owners pro-indiviso of a certain residential lot situated in the Barrio of San Sebastian, Hagonoy, Bulacan, and more particularly bounded and described as follows: (Description omitted) 3. That through the tolerance and goodwill of plaintiffs, thru the intervention and entreaty of one Maximo Santos, father of the defendants, the latter used and occupied said land free of charge, under the following conditions, to wit: (a) that instead of paying rentals on the premises defendants undertook to pay the corresponding real estate taxes on the land; and (b) that said defendants will leave and vacate the premises anytime the plaintiffs so demand; 4. That sometime in February, 1968, plaintiffs verbally notified defendants that said plaintiffs
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were in need of the land, hence, said defendants should vacate and leave the same, but said defendants unreasonably refused at the same time claiming ownership of the property, and alleging further that they bought the same from a certain Pablo Aguinaldo;
5. That in order to quiet the title of ownership over this land , the plaintiffs have been compelled to institute the present action and, as a consequence, she suffered damages in the sum of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00), Philippine Currency, as attorney's fees; 6. That the defendants thru their acts stated above have therefore maliciously and unlawfully detained the land of plaintiffs since February, 1968; and 7. That for the unlawful occupation of the land, an estimate of Fifty (P50.00) Pesos monthly rental is hereby claimed as reasonable damages 2 suffered by plaintiffs since February, 1968. Petitioners accordingly prayed in their complaint for judgment (a) "declaring [them] to be the owners of the property described ... "; (b) "ordering the defendants to vacate the premises and return the possession of the same to plaintiffs;" (c) "ordering the defendants to pay plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the sum of Fifty Pesos (P50.00), Philippine Currency, rental or damages every month effective the first day of February, 1968, until the possession of the premises is finally restored in favor of plaintiffs;" and further ordering defendants to pay them (d) P1,000.00 attorney's fees and (e) costs of suit. Upon respondents' motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that "the court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action or suit" and that the action embodied in petitioners' complaint "is actually one for ejectment or unlawful detainer. Consequently, the case falls within the original exclusive jurisdiction of the inferior court or municipal court" as against petitioners? opposition that "plaintiffs' complaint is principally one to quiet title to property, the question of possession being merely reduced to an incidental issue," the lower court issued its appealed order of August 15, 1968, finding the motion to dismiss to be "well founded" and dismissing the case "for lack of jurisdiction".The lower court reasoned that: A perusal of the actual averments of facts in the complaint do not reveal any allegation of ultimate facts which could sufficiently support an action to quiet title. Upon the other hand, it is plain that the allegations of facts are only constitutive of an action for unlawful detainer. The allegation in paragraph 5 of said complaint 'that in order to quiet the title of ownership over this land, the plaintiffs have been compelled to institute the present action ... is not sufficient by itself to consider this case as an action for quieting title under Article 476 of the New Civil Code. Neither does the prayer of said complaint asking that the plaintiffs be declared the owners of the property in question constitute a cause of action. meikimouse
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Hence, the present petition for review and setting aside of the dismissal order, which the Court finds to be meritorious. The lower court was clearly in error in issuing its dismissal order on its mistaken notion "that the allegations of facts are only constitutive of an action for unlawful detainer" since the complaint shows on its face that respondents' refusal to deliver the possession of the property was due to their adverse claim of ownership of the same property and their counter-allegation that they had bought the same from a certain Pablo Aguinaldo, and, therefore, petitioners' action was clearly one for recovery of their right to possess the property (possessionde jure) as well as to be declared the owners thereof as against the contrary claim of respondents.
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filed a summary action for illegal detainer instead in the municipal court, respondents would then have contended, contrary to their present claim, that the municipal court is without jurisdiction over the detainer case by virtue of their contrary claim of ownership of 6 the property. ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered, setting aside the lower court's dismissal order of August 15, 1968 and the case is remanded to respondent Court of First Instance with instructions to expedite the proceedings and trial and determination thereof on the merits. With costs against respondents. This decision is immediately executory.
As restated by the late Chief Justice Moran: "There are three kinds of actions for the recovery of possession of real pro. property, namely, (1) the summary action for forcible entry or detainer (denominated accion interdictal under the former law of procedure, Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil ) which seeks the recovery of physical possession only and is brought within one year in the justice of the peace court; (2) the accion publiciana which is for the recovery of the right to possess and is a plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding in a Court of First Instance; and (3) accion de reivindicacion which seeks the recovery of ownership (which of course includes the jus utendi and the jus fruendi also brought in the Court of First Instance. 3 It has been said that "(T)he only issue in forcible entry and detainer cases is the physical possession of real property possession de facto and not possession de jure If plaintiff can prove a prior possession in himself, he may recover such possession even from the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority of time, he has the security that entitles him to stay on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by either accion publiciana or accion 4 reivindicatoria. Petitioners' action was not merely for recovery of possession de facto. Their action was clearly one of accion publiciana for recovery of possession de jure if not one of accion reivindicatoria for declaration of their ownership of the land. As reaffirmed by the Court in the analogous case of Aguilon vs. 5 Bohol petitioners action is at least "an accion publiciana, which action 'correspondent al que tiene derecho a la possession, contra el que posee sin derecho o' con titulo menos firme para que se ponga la cosa en poder del actor con todas las accesiones, frutos ets' (I Enciclopedia Juridica Espanola 450)," and such accion publiciana or the plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better and legal right to possess (independently of title) clearly falls within the jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance and not of the Municipal Courts. The Court further underscored therein "that an action for recovery of possession is an urgent matter which must be decided promptly to forestall breaches of peace, violence or even loss of life and, therefore, the court should act swiftly and expeditiously in cases of that nature. Petitioners, therefore, correctly filed their accion publiciana before the lower court as against respondents! claim that they should instead have filed a summary action for detainer in the municipal court. Having been fully apprised of respondents' refusal to surrender possession and their contrary claim of ownership of the same property, petitioners properly filed their accion publiciana with the Court of First Instance to avoid getting enmeshed in what would certainly have been another jurisdictional dispute, since they could reasonably foresee that if indeed they had meikimouse
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CIVIL PROCEDURE
G.R. No. L-36098 January 21, 1983 ORTIGAS & COMPANY, LIMITED vs. JUDGE JOSE B. HERRERA, respondent.
PARTNERSHIP, petitioner,
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM: G.R. No. L-36098 (Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership vs. Judge Jose B. Herrera, City Court of Manila, Branch II, and Emiliano Samson). – On August 14, 1969, petitioner and private respondent entered into an agreement thereby for and in consideration of P55,430.00, the former agreed to sell to the latter a parcel of land with a special condition that should private respondent as purchaser complete the construction including the painting of his residential house on said lot within two (2) years from August 14, 1969, petitioner, as owner, has agreed to refund to private respondent the amount of P10.00 per square meter. When the aforesaid special condition was fulfilled, private respondent, on May 17, 1971 accordingly notified in writing the petitioner of the same and requested for his refund amounting to P4,820.00.
pecuniary estimation (Lapitan vs. Scandia Inc., 24 SCRA 479) because the obligation to pay the debt is not conditioned upon any specific fact or matter. But when a party to a contract has agreed to refund to the other party a sum of money upon compliance by the latter of certain conditions and only upon compliance therewith may what is legally due him under the written contract be demanded, the action is one not capable of pecuniary estimation. The payment of a sum of money is only incidental which can only be ordered after a determination of certain acts the performance of which being the more basic issue to be inquired into. Although private respondent's complaint in the court a quo is designated as one for a sum of money and damages, an analysis of all the factual allegations of the complaint patently shows that what private respondent seeks is the performance of petitioner's obligation under the written contract to make the refund of the rate of P10.00 per square meter or in the total amount of P4,820.00, but only after proof of having himself fulfilled the conditions that will give rise to petitioner's obligation, a matter clearly incapable of pecuniary estimation. In view of the foregoing, the Court RESOLVED to reverse the order appealed from and the complaint filed with the City Court of Manila, Branch II, docketed as Civil Case No. 211673 is hereby ordered dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Upon failure of petitioner to pay his obligation, private respondent on May 6, 1972 filed a complaint for sum of money and damages with the City Court of Manila, Branch II, against petitioner docketed as Civil Case No. 211673. A motion to dismiss was filed by petitioner on grounds of lack of jurisdiction, failure of the complaint to state a cause of action and improper avenue. City Court Judge Jose B. Herrera in his order dated June 27, 1972 held in abeyance the resolution on the motion until after the trial of the case on the merits. A reconsideration of the said order having been denied, petitioner on October 12, 1972 filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila Branch XXVII, a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction docketed as Civil Case No. 88510. A motion to dismiss was filed by private respondent, and on November 17, 1972, the petition was dismissed on the ground that the claim of private respondent in his complaint, being less than P10,000.00, is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the city court. Petitioner thus filed the present petition and argues among others that: (a) as determined from the allegations of the complaint, the action is for specific performance of contract; and (b) actions in which the subject of litigation is not capable of pecuniary estimation such as complaints for specific performance of contract are exclusively cognizable by the Court of First Instance. Hence, the decisive question to be resolved in this present petition is whether or not the City Court of Manila, Branch II, has jurisdiction over the complaint. The action involved in this case is one for specific performance and not for a sum of money and wherefore incapable of pecuniary estimation because what private respondent seeks is the performance of petitioner's obligation under a written contract to make a refund but under certain specific conditions still to be proven or established. In a case for the recovery of a sum of money, as the collection of a debt, the claim is considered capable of meikimouse
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[G.R. No. 52488 : July 25, 1981.] ORTIGAS & COMPANY, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP , Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MAXIMO F. BELMONTE , Respondents.
DECISION
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 12, 1979, in CA-G.R. No. 08609-SP, which set aside the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dated September 22, 1978, in Civil Case No. 28389, which had affirmed in toto the judgment on the pleadings rendered by the Municipal Court of San Juan, Rizal, dated December 19, 1976, in Civil Case No. 3773. On March 25, 1974, Ortigas and Company, Limited Partnership, hereinafter referred to as Ortigas, filed with the Municipal Court of San Juan, Rizal, a complaint for unlawful detainer against Maximo F. Belmonte, praying that after hearing, judgment be rendered — cranad(1) ordering the defendant, his heirs, assigns or successorsin-interests to vacate the subject lot and surrender full control thereof to the plaintiff; cranad(2) declaring the residential building constructed on the lot by the defendant as forfeited in plaintiff's favor; and cranad(3) condemning the defendant to pay a monthly rent of P5,000.00 from July 18, 1971, up to the time he vacates the premises; attorney's fees in the amount of P7,000.00; exemplary damages in such amount as the court may fix; and the costs. The complaint was docketed as Civil C ase No. 3773. After the defendant had filed his answer, the Municipal Court of San Juan, upon motion of the plaintiff, rendered a judgment on the pleadings dated December 19, 1976, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: "WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby grants plaintiff-partnership's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings dated January 31, 1975, as follows: (1) Ordering the defendant and all persons claiming right under him to vacate the premises designated as Lot 6, Block 31, Psd-66759 with an area of 840 square meters, more or less, situated at Greenhills Subdivision 4, San Juan, Rizal and surrender possession of the same to the plaintiff-partnership; (2) Declaring all the improvements constructed in the said premises forfeited in favor of the plaintiffpartnership; (3) Ordering the defendant to pay the monthly rental of P2,500.00 a month starting from July 18, 1971 up to the time defendant actually vacates said premises; and (4) Ordering the defendant to pay attorney's fees in the amount of P5,000.00 and to pay the costs of suit. "SO ORDERED." After a motion for reconsideration was denied, Belmonte appealed to the Court of First Instance of Rizal which docketed the same as Civil Case No. 28389. Instead of filing a memorandum in support of
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his appeal, Belmonte filed on February 13, 1978, a motion to dismiss under Sec. 11, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court which provides: "SECTION 11. Lack of Jurisdiction. — A case tried by an inferior court without jurisdiction over the subject matter shall be dismissed on appeal by the Court of First Instance. But instead of dismissing the case, the Court of First Instance in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, may try the case on the merits if the parties therein file their pleadings and go to the trial without any objection to such jurisdiction." Alleging lack of jurisdiction of the Municipal Court of San Juan and manifesting his objection to the exercise by the Court of First Instance of Rizal of its original jurisdiction, Belmonte sought the dismissal of Civil Case No. 3773. The Court of First Instance of Rizal, however, denied the motion to dismiss and subsequently rendered a decision dated September 22, 1978, affirming in toto the judgment of the Municipal Court of San Juan. Said Court of First Instance of Rizal likewise issued a writ of execution dated November 7, 1978. On December 1, 1978, Belmonte simultaneously filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal a notice of appeal and with the Court of Appeals a motion to extend time to file petition for review. In a resolution dated December 7, 1978, the Court of Appeals granted Belmonte an extension of twenty cranad(20) days from December 4, 1978, within which to file a petition for review. On December 20, 1978, Belmonte filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for Certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary injunction, assailing: cranad(a) the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court of San Juan and the Court of First Instance of Rizal; cranad(b) the propriety or validity of the judgment on the pleadings rendered by the Municipal Court of San Juan; and cranad(c) the propriety or validity of the Writ of Execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Docketed as CA-G.R. No. 08609-SP, the petition was given due course by the Court of Appeals which subsequently rendered a decision dated October 12, 1979, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: "PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the municipal court of San Juan, Metro Manila, as well as the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal aforesaid, are hereby SET ASIDE. No costs." The Court of Appeals held that the Municipal Court of San Juan had no jurisdiction over the case nor the power to resolve controverted issues on the pleadings. A motion for reconsideration was filed by Ortigas but the same was denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated January 15, 1980. Hence, Ortigas filed with this Court the present petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals. After analyzing the issues raised by Belmonte before the Court of Appeals and resolved by said court in the decision under review, namely: cranad(a) the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court of San Juan and of the Court of First Instance of Rizal; cranad(b) the propriety or validity of the judgment on the pleadings rendered by the Municipal Court of Rizal; and cranad(c) the propriety or validity of the Writ of Execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, We find that the same are purely legal in nature. Since appellate jurisdiction over cases involving purely legal questions is exclusively vested in this Court by Sec. 17 of the Judiciary Act cranad(R.A. No. 296), it is readily apparent that the decision under review was rendered by the Court of Appeals without jurisdiction and should, therefore, be set aside. It is for this reason that We resolved on June 8, 1981, to give
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due course to the petition for review and to consider the same as submitted for decision. But as We set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 12, 1979, for having been rendered without jurisdiction, We proceed with the review of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dated September 22, 1978, and the judgment of the Municipal Court of San Juan dated December 19, 1976, which said decision affirmed in toto, considering that the appeal therefrom was perfected on time, albeit erroneously brought to the Court of Appeals. This is in consonance with the spirit of Sec. 31 of the Judiciary Act cranad(R.A. No. 296, as amended) which provides that "(a)ll cases which may be erroneously brought to the Supreme Court or to the Court of Appeals shall be sent to the proper court which shall hear the same as if it has originally been brought before it." In support of his contention that the Municipal Court of San Juan, Rizal, did not have jurisdiction over the case filed by Ortigas, Maximo F. Belmonte cited in his comment to Ortigas' petition for review cranad(which We considered as his answer to the petition) the case of FUENTES AND GO TEK vs. HON. MUÑOZ PALMA, ETC., AND AYALA SECURITIES, INC. cranad(G.R. No. L-15074, May 31, 1960, 108 Phil. 640). We have reviewed Our decision in said case and We find the material facts thereof to be almost identical to those of the case at bar, namely: cranad(1) both cases involved complaints for unlawful detainer filed against defendants who acquired possession of the subject lots by virtue of agreements whereby the plaintiffs had contracted to sell the subject lots and the defendants had in turn bound themselves to pay the downpayments and the subsequent monthly installments on the purchase prices of said lots; cranad(2) the agreements in both cases allowed the purchasers to take possession of the subject lots and to construct thereon buildings and/or other permanent improvements but specified that before full payment of the purchase prices, the purchasers would be considered as mere tenants or lessees of the subject lots; cranad(3) the agreements in both cases further provided that should the purchasers fail to pay any of the monthly installments within ninety cranad(90) days from its due date, the contracts shall automatically be cancelled and all sums of money paid under the same shall be considered as rentals on the property and the purchasers may be ejected therefrom by the means provided for by law for trespassers or unlawful detainers; cranad(4) in both cases, the purchasers took possession of the subject lots after having made the downpayment and constructed thereon buildings and/or other permanent improvements; cranad(5) in both cases, the purchasers failed to pay the monthly installments which became due, prompting the plaintiffs to file the complaints for unlawful detainer which sought to eject the purchasers-defendants from the subject lots; and cranad(6) the complaints for unlawful detainer in both cases contained prayers affecting the property rights of the parties in the permanent improvements constructed on the subject lots — in the cited case, Ayala Securities, Inc. prayed for the removal of the warehouses, garages and other permanent improvements constructed by defendant Fuentes on the subject lots while in the case at bar, Ortigas prayed that the residential building constructed by defendant Belmonte on the subject lot be declared forfeited in its favor. After noting that "(a)n action for unlawful detainer, which is a summary proceeding to wrest possession from one who has no right thereto, is applicable only when the issue is that of possession; but rights of property in the land created by the Agreements, especially the relative rights and obligations of the parties to the improvements are directly involved", this Court held in the cited case that the Justice of the Peace Court cranad(now Municipal Court) of Makati did not have jurisdiction over the action filed by
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Ayala Securities, Inc., as the same involved rights over the real property, other than mere right of possession. Thus, this Court declared null and void the proceedings in the court below and dismissed the unlawful detainer case filed by Ayala Securities, Inc. We find the above ruling applicable to the case at bar. As stated, the complaint for unlawful detainer filed with the Municipal Court of San Juan sought not only the ejectment of the defendant from the subject lot, but likewise prayed that the residential building constructed by him on the same lot be declared forfeited in plaintiff's favor. Clearly, the issues raised before said inferior court did not only involve possession of the lot but also the rights and obligations of the parties to the residential building which under Art. 415(1) of the Civil Code is considered real property. Plaintiff's prayer that said building be declared forfeited in its favor directly puts in issue the ownership of said real property. Since the issues raised by Ortigas before the Municipal Court of San Juan in Civil Case No. 3773 exceeded the allowable scope of an unlawful detainer suit which should be limited to the issue of possession of real property, the case could not qualify as an exception to the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance under Sec. 44(b) of the Judiciary Act which provides: "SECTION 44. Original Jurisdiction. — Courts of First Instance shall have original jurisdiction: xxx (b) In all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of real property, or any interest therein, or the legality of any tax, impost or assessment, except actions of forcible entry into and detainer on lands or buildings, original jurisdiction of which is conferred by this Act upon city and municipal courts;" Consequently, the Municipal Court of San Juan, Rizal, did not have jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 3773. Its judgment dated December 19, 1976, should therefore be set aside. Since Civil Case No. 3773 was decided by the Municipal Court of San Juan without jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof, said case should have been dismissed by the Court of First Instance of Rizal when the same was brought before it on appeal. Section 11, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court, which We have heretofore quoted, provides for an instance when the Court of First Instance of Rizal cranad(to which original jurisdiction over the case filed by Ortigas properly belonged) could have validly assumed original jurisdiction over the case. But that provision is inapplicable to the case at bar since Belmonte expressly objected to assumption of jurisdiction by the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of First Instance dated September 22, 1978, should likewise be set aside for lack of jurisdiction. WHEREFORE, without prejudice to the right of Ortigas to file the proper action with the proper court, the following are hereby set aside for lack of jurisdiction: cranad(1) the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 12, 1979, in CA-G.R. No. 08609-SP;cranad(2) the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dated September 22, 1978, in Civil Case No. 28389; and cranad(3) the judgment on the pleadings rendered by the Municipal Court of San Juan, Rizal in Civil Case No. 3773. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
meikimouse
CASES: JURISDICTION
G.R. No. 96271 June 26, 1992
CIVIL PROCEDURE
After the filter was replaced, petitioner paid the amount of Pl,650.00 on November 18, 1986 which included the first amortization of P700.00 (Ibid.).
NATIVIDAD VILLOSTAS, petitioner, vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SECOND DIVISION, THE HON. SALVADOR S. TENSUAN as Presiding Judge of RTC, Makati, Branch 146 and ELECTROLUX MARKETING, INCORPORATED, respondents.
PARAS, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the annulment of 1 the resolution of the respondent Court of Appeals, dated November 16, 1990, in CA-G.R. Sp. No. 23178 denying the petitioner's appeal which in effect affirms the decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 90-1420 sustaining the 3 decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 64, Makati, Metro Manila, dated November 15, 1989 ordering herein petitioner to pay private respondent, among others, the amount of P14,540.00. The established facts of the case are as follows: Desiring to have safe drinking water at home, herein petitioner Villostas and her husband decided to buy a water purifier. At about this time, private respondent's Electrolux sales agents were making door to door selling of its products in the subdivision where petitioner has her residence. Because private respondent's sales agents had assured petitioner of the very special features of their brand of water purifier, petitioner Villostas placed an order for one (1) unit of said water purifier. On September 13, 1986, an Electrolux Aqua Guard water purifier was delivered and installed at petitioner's residence (Rollo, p. 38; 49). Consequently, petitioner signed the Sales Order (Annex "B", p. 31) and the Contract of Sale with Reservation of Title (Annex "A", p. 31) in October 1986 ( Rollo, p. 38, 22). A warranty certificate, Exhibit "l", was issued by private respondent which provides that: ELECTROLUX MARKETING, INCORPORATED WARRANTS THIS QUALITY ELECTROLUX PRODUCT TO PERFORM EFFICIENTLY FOR ONE FULL YEAR FROM DATE OF ORIGINAL PURCHASE. (Rollo, p. 49) The purchase of said unit was on installment basis under which petitioner would pay the amount of P16,190.00 in 20 monthly installments of P635.00 a month. After two (2) weeks, petitioner verbally complained for the first time about the impurities, dirtiness and bad odor coming out of the unit (Rollo, p. 22). On October 21, 1986, private respondent Electrolux sent its service technician to examine and test the water purifier. The water which came out was dirty so the unit was shut off automatically (Ibid.).The technician changed the filter of the unit on said date without charge with an instruction that the filter should be changed every 6 months otherwise the unit will not last long as the water in the area was dirty ( Ibid.).
Petitioner complained for the second and third time when dirty water still came out of the water purifier after the replacement of the filter. It was on the third complaint of petitioner Villostas when the service technician gave advise that the filter should be changed every six (6) months costing about P300.00 which was considered to be uneconomical by the former ( Rollo, pp. 22-23). On December 9, 1986, petitioner sent a letter to the private respondent's branch manager stating therein her complaint that the actual performance of the carbon filter was only for a month instead of the private respondent's claim that the replacement of such filter will be only once every six (6) months. The petitioner, citing the above incident as uneconomical, decided to return the unit and demand a refund for the amount paid ( Rollo, p. 76), Electrolux's branch manager offered to change the water purifier with another brand of any of its appliance of the unit in her favor. Petitioner did not accept it as she was disappointed with the original unit which did not perform as warranted. Consequently, petitioner did not pay any more the subsequent installments in the amount of P14,540.00 exclusive of interests (Rollo, p. 23, 120). What transpired next was an exchange of demand letter and reply between petitioner and private respondent. Ultimately, respondent Electrolux Marketing, Inc. filed a complaint against petitioner Villostas with the MTC of Makati for the recovery of the sum of P14,540.00 representing the unpaid balance of the purchase price of one (1) Electrolux Water Purifier plus interest thereon at the rate of 42% per annum in accordance with the Sales Contract with Reservation of Title (Rollo, pp. 28-30). In her amended answer, petitioner Villostas asserted that by reason of private respondent's breach of warranty she was availing of the remedy of rescission of the contract of sale and offered to return the water purifier to the seller as in fact, it was already being offered for return as early as December 9, 1986, aside from claiming for the refund of her payments. Petitioner prayed that the contract of sale be declared rescinded and the payments refunded to her together with the full grant of the claims asserted in her counterclaims ( Rollo, pp. 35-36). After trial on the merits. the MTC of Makati rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff as follows: 1) the amount of P14,540.00 representing the unpaid outstanding balance of the aforesaid unit, plus interest thereon at the rate of P42% per annum until fully paid; 2) the amount of P1,000.00 as attorney's fees and 3) dismissing the counterclaim of defendant. meikimouse
CASES: JURISDICTION
SO ORDERED. ( Rollo, pp. 38-44) The petitioner, thereafter, filed a notice of appeal from the judgment of said lower court. The Regional Trial Court of Makati rendered its judgment affirming the disputed decision (Rollo, pp. 2124). A motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals and was given an inextendible period of 15 days to file a petition for review. Anticipating that she would fail to comply with the deadline, herein petitioner filed a second extension to file a petition for review which, however, was denied. Herein, petitioner comes to this Court via petition for review on certiorari . Petitioner assigns the following errors: I WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION MADE BY THE PETITIONER TO THE SUPREME COURT IS PROPER AND RIPE FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW. II WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO RESCIND THE CONTRACT IN VIOLATION OF THE WARRANTY FOR HIDDEN DEFECT OF THE ARTICLE DELIVERED BY THE RESPONDENT. III
CIVIL PROCEDURE
because said legal recourse was time barred judging from delivery of the water purifier on September 13, 1986 pursuant to Art. 1571 of the New Civil Code. The petition is impressed with merit. Anent the jurisdictional competence of the Metropolitan Trial Court to order rescission of contract, suffice it to say that the action was initiated by herein private respondent Electrolux when it filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money worth P14,540.00, against petitioner Villostas. Said amount is indubitably within the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court since it does not exceed P20,000.00 exclusive of interest and costs but inclusive of damages of whatever (Maceda v. CA, G.R. No. 83545, 176 SCRA 440 [1989]). Moreover, the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein (Caparros v. CA, G.R. No. 56803, 170 SCRA 758 [1989]). When the petitioner, therefore, raised rescission of contract in her answer, the court is not divested of its jurisdiction over the case on account of defenses raised by the answer. The court is then merely authorized to receive evidence thereon (Dela Cruz v. Bautista, G.R. No. 39692, 186 SCRA 517, [1990]). Clearly, the jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss. Otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely upon the defendant (Caparros v. CA, supra.). As regards the contention that the action for rescission is barred by prescription under Art. 1571 of the Civil Code, the same is bereft of merit. It must be pointed out that at the time the Electrolux Aqua Guard water purifier was delivered and installed at petitioner Villostas' residence a Warranty Certificate was issued by private respondent Electrolux which reads: ELECTROLUX MARKETING, INCORPORATED WARRANTS THIS QUALITY ELECTROLUX PRODUCT TO PERFORM EFFICIENTLY FOR ONE FULL YEAR FROM DATE OF ORIGINAL PURCHASE.
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS BOUND TO PAY RESPONDENT HER REMAINING BALANCE OF P14,540.00 PLUS INTEREST THEREON PURSUANT TO THE CONTRACT OF SALE. IV WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS LIABLE TO PAY RESPONDENT ATTORNEY'S FEES PURSUANT TO THE CONTRACT PLUS COSTS OF SUIT. The main issue in the instant case is whether or not the petitioner is entitled to rescind the contract on the basis of a violation of the warranty of the article delivered by the respondent. Petitioner contends that the Regional Trial Court erred when it ruled that its claim for rescission had prescribed inasmuch as she had formally notified the seller within a reasonable time, that is, 2 months and 26 days, from the delivery of water purifier on September 13, 1986 of her election to rescind. Private respondent counters that the petitioner is not entitled to rescission vis-a-vis alleged violat ion of the warranty for hidden defects for the reason that rescission of contract sought by petitioner was beyond the jurisdictional competence of the trial court. It adds that petitioner could no longer avail of rescission
The foregoing is clearly an express warranty regarding the efficiency of the water purifier. On this regard the court said that while it is true that Article 1571 of the Civil Code provides for a prescriptive period of six months for a redhibitory action, a cursory reading of the ten preceding articles to which it refers will reveal that said rule may be applied only in case of implied warranties. The present case involves one with an express warranty. Consequently, the general rule on rescission of contract, which is four years (Article 1389, Civil Coded) shall apply (Moles v. IAC, G.R. No. 73913, 169 SCRA 777 [1989]). Inasmuch as the instant case involves an express warranty, the filing of petitioner's amended answer on September 30, 1988 is well within the four-year prescriptive period for rescission of contract from September 13, 1986, which was the delivery date of the unit. PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the complaint of private respondent is DISMISSED. The sale of the water purifier is hereby RE SCINDED. SO ORDERED.
meikimouse
CASES: JURISDICTION
CIVIL PROCEDURE
7
DA GEONZON VDA. DE BARRERA AND JOHNNY OCO, G.R. No. 174346 Present: ers, QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO MORALES, OF VICENTE LEGASPI, REPRESENTED BY PEDRO I, TINGA, dents.
VELASCO, JR., and BRION, JJ. Promulgated:
possession, until October 1, 1996 when petitioners forced their way into it. Petitioners raised the issue of ownership as a special affirmative 8 defense. In their Memorandum, however, they questioned the jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter of the complaint, 9 the assessed value of the land being only P11,160 , as reflected in 10 Tax Declaration No. 7565. By Decision of November 27, 1998, the trial court found for respondents, disposing as follows: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs [herein respondents] and against the defendants [-herein petitioners]: 1. Ordering the latter to return the possession of the land in question to the plaintiffs and
September 12, 2008 2. Ordering the latter to desist from further depriving and disturbing plaintiffs’ peaceful possession thereof, unless there be another court
x--------------------------------------------------x
judgment to the contrary.
DECISION
SO ORDERED.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
On the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter, the trial court, maintaining that it had, held:
Under review before this Court is the July 31, 2006 Decision of the 1 Court of Appeals, which affirmed that of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, of Tangub City in Civil Case No. TC-97-001, ordering the defendants-petitioners herein, Fernanda Geonzon vda. de Barrera and Johnny Oco. Jr. to return possession of the subject property to the plaintiffs-herein respondents, Heirs of Vicente Legaspi. On October 1, 1996, petitioner Johnny Oco Jr. (Oco), said to be a "peace officer connected with the PNP," accompanied by "unidentified CAFGU members," forced his way into respondents’
0.9504-hectare irrigated farmland located at Liloan, Bonifacio, Misamis Occidental. After dispossessing respondents of the property, Oco and company used a tractor to destroy the planted 2 crops, took possession of the land, and had since tended it. Respondents thus filed on February 7, 1997 a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Tangub City for Reconveyance of Possession 3 with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and Damages against petitioners. In their Answer, petitioners claimed that the subject land forms part of a three-hectare property described in OCT No. P-447 issued on February 10, 1956 in the name of Andrea Lacson who sold a 2hectare portion thereof to Eleuterio Geonzon who, in turn, sold 1.1148 thereof to his sister petitioner Fernanda Geonzon vda. de 4 Barrera (Fernanda). Respondents, on the other hand, asserted that the land was occupied, possessed and cultivated by their predecessor-in-interest 5 Vicente Legaspi and his wife Lorenza since 1935; after a subdivision survey was conducted in November 30, 1976, it was found out that 6 the land formed part of the titled property of Andrea Lacson; and despite this discovery, they never filed any action to recover ownership thereof since they were left undisturbed in their
The Court is not persuaded by [the defendants’] arguments. What
determines the nature of the action as well as the jurisdiction of the [c]ourt are the facts alleged in the complaint and not those alleged in the answer of the defendants. xxxx In [p]ar. 2 of plaintiffs’ complaint, the land in question was described
as a riceland "situated at Liloan, Bonifacio, Misamis Occ. and declared under [T]ax [D]eclaration No. 7564 in the name of Vicente Legaspi and bounded on the north by a creek, on the east Sec. 12, on the south Lot No. 007 and on the west also by Lot No. 007 which tax declaration cancels former [T]ax [D]eclaration No. 12933 under the name of Lorenza Bacul Legaspi which likewise cancels [T]ax [D]eclaration No. 5454 covering the bigger portion of the land under which the land described under [T]ax [D]eclaration No. 7565 is part and parcel thereof [sic]; the present estimated value being 11 P50,000." (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Petitioners thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court’s disposition of the issue of jurisdiction over
the subject matter. On the merits, the appellate court affirmed too the trial court’s
decision, finding that "both testimonial and documentary evidence on record established that appellees, through their predecessors-ininterest, have been in peaceful, continuous, public and actual 12 possession of the property in dispute even before the year 1930." The appellate court emphasized that in an accion publiciana, the 13 only issue involved is the determination of possession de jure.
meikimouse
CASES: JURISDICTION
Hence, the present petition for review which raises the following issues: I. . . . WHETHER OWNERSHIP AND TITLE CANNOT BE AN ISSUE TO DETERMINE WHO HAS A BETTER RIGHT [TO] THE PORTION LITIGATED; AND II. WHETHER . . . THE NATURE OF THE ACTION AS WELL AS THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT DEPEND ON THE FACTS AS ALLEGED IN 14 THE COMPLAINT. For obvious reasons, the issue of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter shall be first considered. Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, (the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), as amended by Republic Act No. 7691 provides for the jurisdiction of metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts, to wit: xxxx
CIVIL PROCEDURE
property. Lack of jurisdiction is one of those excepted grounds where the court may dismiss a claim or a case at any time when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that any of those grounds exists, even if they were not raised in the answer or in a motion to 18 dismiss. That the issue of lack of jurisdiction was raised by petitioners only in their Memorandum filed before the trial court did not thus render them in estoppel. En passant, the Court notes that respondents’ cause of action –
accion publiciana is a wrong mode. The dispossession took place on October 1, 1996 and the complaint was filed four months thereafter or on February 7, 1997. Respondents’ exclusion from the property
had thus not lasted for more than one year to call for the remedy of accion publiciana. In fine, since the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint filed by respondents, all the proceedings therein as well as the Decision of November 27, 1998, are null and void. The complaint should perforce be dismissed. This leaves it unnecessary to still dwell on the first issue.
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged July 31, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE. The decision of Branch 16 of the Regional Trial Court of Tangub City in Civil Case No. TC-97-001 is declared NULL and VOID for lack of jurisdiction.
attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases
SO ORDERED.
of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots. (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied) Before the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 7691, the plenary action of accion publiciana was to be brought before the 15 regional trial court. With the modifications introduced by R.A. No. 7691 in 1994, the jurisdiction of the first level courts has been expanded to include jurisdiction over other real actions where the assessed value does not exceed P20,000, P50,000 where the action is filed in Metro Manila. The first level courts thus have exclusive original jurisdiction over accion publiciana and accion reivindicatoria where the assessed value of the real property does not exceed the aforestated amounts. Accordingly, the jurisdictional element is the assessed value of the property. Assessed value is understood to be "the worth or value of property established by taxing authorities on the basis of which the tax rate is applied. Commonly, however, it does not represent the true or 16 market value of the property." The subject land has an assessed value of P11,160 as reflected in Tax Declaration No. 7565, a common exhibit of the parties. The bare claim of respondents that it has a value of P50,000 thus fails. The case, therefore, falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the municipal trial court. It was error then for the RTC to take cognizance of the complaint based on the allegation that "the present estimated value [of the land is] P50,000," which allegation is, oddly, handwritten on the printed pleading. The estimated value, commonly referred to as fair 17 market value, is entirely different from the assessed value of the meikimouse
CASES: JURISDICTION
CIVIL PROCEDURE
FAMILY COURTS (Full Text) G.R. No. 159374
to hear and decide the petition for habeas corpus filed by 3 respondent.
July 12, 2007
FELIPE N. vs. FRANCISCA R. MADRIÑAN, Respondent.
MADRIÑAN, Petitioner,
For her part, respondent averred that she did not leave their home on May 18, 2002 but was driven out by p etitioner. She alleged that it was petitioner who was an alcoholic, gambler and drug addict. Petitioner’s alcoholism and drug addiction impaired his mental
faculties, causing him to commit acts of violence against her and their children. The situation was aggravated by the fact that their home was adjacent to that of her in-laws who frequently meddled in 4 their personal problems.
DECISION
CORONA, J .: 5
When a family breaks up, the children are always the victims. The ensuing battle for custody of the minor children is not only a thorny issue but also a highly sensitive and heart-rending affair. Such is the case here. Even the usually technical subject of jurisdiction became emotionally charged. Petitioner Felipe N. Madriñan and respondent Francisca R. Madriñan were married on July 7, 1993 in Parañaque City. They resided in San Agustin Village, Brgy. Moonwalk, Parañaque City. Their union was blessed with three sons and a daughter: Ronnick, born on January 30, 1994; Phillip, born on November 19, 1996; Francis Angelo, born on May 12, 1998 and Krizia Ann, born on December 12, 2000. After a bitter quarrel on May 18, 2002, petitioner allegedly left their conjugal abode and took their three sons with him to Ligao City, Albay and subsequently to Sta. Rosa, Laguna. Respondent sought the help of her parents and parents-in-law to patch things up between her and petitioner to no avail. She then brought the matter to theLupong Tagapamayapa in their barangay but this too proved futile. Thus respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus of Ronnick, Phillip and Francis Angelo in the Court of Appeals, alleging that petitioner’s
act of leaving the conjugal dwelling and going to Albay and then to Laguna disrupted the education of their children and deprived them of their mother’s care. She prayed that petitioner be ordered to
On October 21, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered a 6 decision asserting its authority to take cognizance of the petition and ruling that, under Article 213 of the Family Code, respondent was entitled to the custody of Phillip and Francis Angelo who were at that time aged six and four, respectively, subject to the visitation rights of petitioner. With respect to Ronnick who was then eight years old, the court ruled that his custody should be determined by the proper family court in a special proceeding on custody of minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision but it was denied. Hence, this recourse. Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the petition for habeas corpus and insists that jurisdiction over the case is lodged in the family courts under RA 8369. He invokes Section 5(b) of RA 8369: Section 5. Jurisdiction of Family Courts. – The Family Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases: xxx
xxx
xxx
b) Petitions for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to the latter; xxx
xxx
xxx
appear and produce their sons before the court and to explain why they should not be returned to her custody.
Petitioner is wrong.
Petitioner and respondent appeared at the hearing on September 17, 2002. They initially agreed that petitioner would return the custody of their three sons to respondent. Petitioner, however, had 1 a change of heart and decided to file a memorandum.
In Thornton v. Thornton, this Court resolved the issue of the Court of Appeals’ jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors in the light of the provision in RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over such petitions:
7
2
On September 3, 2002, petitioner filed his memorandum alleging that respondent was unfit to take custody of their three sons because she was habitually drunk, frequently went home late at night or in the wee hours of the morning, spent much of her time at a beer house and neglected her duties as a mother. He claimed that, after their squabble on May 18, 2002, it was respondent who left, taking their daughter with her. It was only then that he went to Sta. Rosa, Laguna where he worked as a tricycle driver. He submitted a certification from the principal of the Dila Elementary School in Sta. Rosa, Laguna that Ronnick and Phillip were enrolled there. He also questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals claiming that under Section 5(b) of RA 8369 (otherwise known as the "Family Courts Act of 1997") family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction
The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors . xxx
xxx
xxx
We rule therefore that RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the custody of minors . xxx
xxx
xxx meikimouse
CASES: JURISDICTION
The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors. Further, it cannot be said that the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092 [An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals] and BP 129 [The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980] are absolutely incompatible since RA 8369 does not prohibit the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court from issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases involving the custody of minors. Thus, the provisions of RA 8369 must be read in harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 – that family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of minors is 8 at issue. (emphases supplied) The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over petitions for habeas corpus was further affirmed by A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC (April 22, 2004) in Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors: In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled with the adoption of A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. Section 20 of the rule provides that: Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. – A verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable within its judicial region to which the Family Court belongs. xxx
xxx
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Moreover, a careful reading of Section 5(b) of RA 8369 reveals that family courts are vested with original exclusive jurisdiction in custody cases, not in habeas corpus cases. Writs of habeas corpus which may be issued exclusively by family courts under Section 5(b) of RA 8369 pertain to the ancillary remedy that may be availed of in conjunction with a petition for custody of minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. In other words, the issuance of the writ is merely ancillary to the custody case pending before the family court. The writ must be issued by the same court to avoid splitting of jurisdiction, conflicting decisions, interference by a co-equal court and judicial instability. The rule therefore is: when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such 11 court or officer. Once a court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, it does so to the exclusion of all other courts, including related incidents and ancillary matters. Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
xxx
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines . The writ may be made returnable to a Family Court or to any regular court within the region where the petitioner resides or where the minor may be found for hearing and decision on the merits. From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court have concurrent jurisdiction with family courts in habeas corpus cases where the custody of minors is 9 involved. (emphases supplied)1avvphi1 We note that after petitioner moved out of their Parañaque residence on May 18, 2002, he twice transferred his sons to provinces covered by different judicial regions. This situation is what the Thornton interpretation of RA 8369’s provision on ju risdiction precisely addressed: [The reasoning that by giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases, the lawmakers intended them to be the sole courts which can issue writs of habeas corpus] will result in an iniquitous situation, leaving individuals like [respondent] without legal recourse in obtaining custody of their children. Individuals who do not know the whereabouts of minors they are looking for would be helpless since they cannot seek redress from family courts whose writs are enforceable only in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being transferred from one place to another, which seems to be the case here, the petitioner in ahabeas corpus case will be left without legal remedy. This lack of recourse could not have been the intention of the lawmakers when 10 they passed [RA 8369] . meikimouse
CASES: JURISDICTION
CIVIL PROCEDURE
COMMERCIAL COURTS (Full Text) G.R. No. 165744
August 11, 2008
OSCAR C. REYES, petitioner, vs. HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI, Branch 142, ZENITH INSURANCE CORPORATION, and RODRIGO C. REYES, respondents. DECISION BRION, J.: This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals 1 (CA) promulgated on May 26, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 74970. The CA Decision affirmed the Order of the Regional Trial Court ( RTC ), Branch 2 142, Makati City dated November 29, 2002 in Civil Case No. 001553 (entitled "Accounting of All Corporate Funds and Assets, and Damages") which denied petitioner Oscar C. Reyes’ (Oscar) Motion to Declare Complaint as Nuisance or Harassment Suit.
BACKGROUND FACTS Oscar and private respondent Rodrigo C. Reyes (Rodrigo) are two of the four children of the spouses Pedro and Anastacia Reyes. Pedro, Anastacia, Oscar, and Rodrigo each owned shares of stock of Zenith Insurance Corporation (Zenith), a domestic corporation established by their family. Pedro died in 1964, while Anastacia died in 1993. Although Pedro’s estate was judicially partitioned among his heirs sometime in the 1970s, no similar settlement and partition appear to have been made with Anastacia’s estate, which included her
shareholdings in Zenith. As of June 30, 1990, Anastacia owned 136,598 shares of Zenith; Oscar and Rodrigo owned 8,715,637 and 3 4,250 shares, respectively. On May 9, 2000, Zenith and Rodrigo filed a complaint4 with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against Oscar, docketed as SEC Case No. 05-00-6615. The complaint stated that it is "a derivative suit initiated and filed by the complainant Rodrigo C. Reyes to obtain an accounting of the funds and assets of ZENITH INSURANCE CORPORATION which a re now or formerly in the control, custody, and/or possession of respondent [herein petitioner Oscar] and to determine the shares of stock of deceased spouses Pedro and Anastacia Reyes that were arbitrarily and fraudulently appropriated [by Oscar] for himself [and] which were not collated and taken into account in the partition, distribution, and/or settlement of the estate of the deceased spouses, for which he should be ordered to account for all the income from the time he took these shares of stock, and should now deliver to his brothers 5 and sisters their just and respective shares." [Emphasis supplied.] 6
In his Answer with Counterclaim, Oscar denied the charge that he illegally acquired the shares of Anastacia Reyes. He asserted, as a defense, that he purchased the subject shares with his own funds from the unissued stocks of Zenith, and that the suit is not a bona fide derivative suit because the requisites therefor have not been
7
When Republic Act ( R.A.) No. 8799 took effect, the SEC’s exclusive and original jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 902-A was transferred to the RTC 8 designated as a special commercial court. The records of Rodrigo’s SEC case were thus turned over to the RTC, Branch 142, Makati, and docketed as Civil Case No. 00-1553. On October 22, 2002, Oscar filed a Motion to Declare Complaint as 9 Nuisance or Harassment Suit. He claimed that the complaint is a mere nuisance or harassment suit and should, according to the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies, be dismissed; and that it is not a bona fidederivative suit as it partakes of the nature of a petition for the settlement of estate of the deceased Anastacia that is outside the jurisdiction of a special commercial court. The RTC, in its Order dated November 29, 2002 (RTC Order ), denied the motion in part and declared: A close reading of the Complaint disclosed the presence of two (2) causes of action, namely: a) a derivative suit for accounting of the funds and assets of the corporation which are in the control, custody, and/or possession of the respondent [herein petitioner Oscar] with prayer to appoint a management committee; and b) an action for determination of the shares of stock of deceased spouses Pedro and Anastacia Reyes allegedly taken by respondent, its accounting and the corresponding delivery of these shares to the parties’ brothers and sisters. The latter is not
a derivative suit and should properly be threshed out in a petition for settlement of estate. Accordingly, the motion is denied. However, only the derivative suit consisting of the first cause of action will be 10 taken cognizance of by this Court. Oscar thereupon went to the CA on a petition for certiorari , 11 prohibition, and mandamus and prayed that the RTC Order be annulled and set aside and that the trial court be prohibited from continuing with the proceedings. The appellate court affirmed the RTC Order and denied the petition in its Decision dated May 26, 2004. It likewise denied Oscar’s motion for reconsideration in a
Resolution dated October 21, 2004. Petitioner now comes before us on appeal through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS Petitioner Oscar presents the following points as conclusions the CA should have made: 1. that the complaint is a mere nuisance or harassment suit that should be dismissed under the Interim Rules of Procedure of IntraCorporate Controversies; and 2. that the complaint is not a bona fide derivative suit but is in fact in the nature of a petition for settlement of estate; hence, it is outside the jurisdiction of the RTC acting as a special commercial court.
complied with. He thus questioned the SEC’s jurisdiction to entertain
the complaint because it pertains to the settlement of the estate of Anastacia Reyes.
Accordingly, he prays for the setting aside and annulment of the CA decision and resolution, and the dismissal of Rodrigo’s complaint
before the RTC. meikimouse
CASES: JURISDICTION
CIVIL PROCEDURE 14
stated with particularity . These rules find specific application to Section 5(a) of P.D. No. 902-A which speaks of corporate devices or schemes that amount to fraud or misrepresentation detrimental to the public and/or to the stockholders.
THE COURT’S RULING
We find the petition meritorious. The core question for our determination is whether the trial court, sitting as a special commercial court, has jurisdiction over the subject matter of Rodrigo’s complaint. To resolve it, we rely on the judicial principle that "jurisdictio n over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or 12 some of the claims asserted therein."
JURISDICTION OF SPECIAL COMMERCIAL COURTS P.D. No. 902-A enumerates the cases over which the SEC (now the RTC acting as a special commercial court) exercises exclusive jurisdiction: SECTION 5. In addition to the regulatory and adjudicative functions of the Securities and Exchange Commission over corporations, partnership, and other forms of associations registered with it as expressly granted under existing laws and decrees, it shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving:
In an attempt to hold Oscar responsible for corporate fraud, Rodrigo alleged in the complaint the following: 3. This is a complaint …to determine the shares of stock of the deceased spouses Pedro and Anastacia Reyes that were arbitrarily and fraudulently appropriated for himself [herein petitioner Oscar] which were not collated and taken into account in the partition, distribution, and/or settlement of the estate of the deceased Spouses Pedro and Anastacia Reyes, for which he should be ordered to account for all the income from the time he took these shares of stock, and should now deliver to his brothers and sisters their just and respective shares with the corresponding equivalent amount of P7,099,934.82 plus interest thereon from 1978 representing his obligations to the Associated Citizens’ Bank that was paid
for his account by his late mother, Anastacia C. Reyes. This amount was not collated or taken into account in the partition or distribution of the estate of their late mother, Anastacia C. Reyes.
a) Devices or schemes employed by or any acts of the board of directors, business associates, its officers or partners, amounting to fraud and misrepresentation which may be detrimental to the interest of the public and/or of the stockholders, partners, members of associations or organizations registered with the Commission.
3.1. Respondent Oscar C. Reyes, through other schemes of fraud including misrepresentation, unilaterally, and for his own benefit, capriciously transferred and took possession and control of the management of Zenith Insurance Corporation which is considered as a family corporation, and other properties and businesses belonging to Spouses Pedro and Anastacia Reyes.
b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations, between and among stockholders, members, or associates; between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership or association of which they are stockholders, members, or associates, respectively; and between such corporation, partnership or association and the State insofar as it concerns their individual franchise or right to exist as such entity; and
xxxx
c) Controversies in the election or appointment of directors, trustees, officers, or managers of such corporations, partnerships, or associations. The allegations set forth in Rodrigo’s complaint principally invoke Section 5, paragraphs (a) and (b) above as basis for the exercise of the RTC’s special court jurisdiction. Our focus in examining the
allegations of the complaint shall therefore be on these two provisions. Fraudulent Devices and Schemes
4.1. During the increase of capitalization of Zenith Insurance Corporation, sometime in 1968, the property covered by TCT No. 225324 was illegally and fraudulently used by respondent as a collateral. xxxx 5. The complainant Rodrigo C. Reyes discovered that by some manipulative scheme, the shareholdings of their deceased mother, Doña Anastacia C. Reyes, shares of stocks and [sic] valued in the corporate books at P7,699,934.28, more or less , excluding interest and/or dividends, had been transferred solely in the name of respondent. By such fraudulent manipulations and misrepresentation, the shareholdings of said respondent Oscar C. Reyes abruptly increased to P8,715,637.00 [sic] and becomes [sic] the majority stockholder of Zenith Insurance Corporation, which portion of said shares must be distributed equally amongst the brothers and sisters of the respondent Oscar C. Reyes including the complainant herein.
The rule is that a complaint must contain a plain, concise, and direct statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of 13
action and must specify the relief sought. Section 5, Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that in all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must be
xxxx 9.1 The shareholdings of deceased Spouses Pedro Reyes and Anastacia C. Reyes valued at P7,099,934.28 were meikimouse
CASES: JURISDICTION
illegally and fraudulently transferred solely to the respondent’s [herein petitioner Oscar] na me and installed himself as a majority stockholder of Zenith Insurance Corporation [and] thereby deprived his brothers and sisters of their respective equal shares thereof including complainant hereto. xxxx 10.1 By refusal of the respondent to account of his [sic] shareholdings in the company, he illegally and fraudulently transferred solely in his name wherein [sic] the shares of stock of the deceased Anastacia C. Reyes [which] must be properly collated and/or distributed equally amongst the children, including the complainant Rodrigo C. Reyes herein, to their damage and prejudice. xxxx 11.1 By continuous refusal of the respondent to account of his [sic] shareholding with Zenith Insurance Corporation[,] particularly the number of shares of stocks illegally and fraudulently transferred to him from their deceased parents Sps. Pedro and Anastacia Reyes[,] which are all subject for collation and/or partition in equal shares among their children. [Emphasis supplied.] Allegations of deceit, machination, false pretenses, misrepresentation, and threats are largely conclusions of law that, without supporting statements of the facts to which the allegations of fraud refer, do not sufficiently state an effective cause of 15 action. The late Justice Jose Feria, a noted authority in Remedial Law, declared that fraud and mistake are required to be averred with particularity in order to enable the opposing party to controvert the particular facts allegedly constituting such fraud or 16 mistake. Tested against these standards, we find that the charges of fraud against Oscar were not properly supported by the required factual allegations. While the complaint contained allegations of fraud purportedly committed by him, these allegations are not particular enough to bring the controversy within the special commercial court’s jurisdiction; they are not statements of ultimate facts, but are mere conclusions of law: how and why the alleged appropriation of shares can be characterized as "illegal and fraudulent" were not explained nor elaborated on.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
5. The complainant Rodrigo C. Reyes discovered that by some manipulative scheme, the shareholdings of their deceased mother, Doña Anastacia C. Reyes, shares of stocks and [sic] valued in the corporate books at P7,699,934.28, more or less, excluding interest and/or dividends, had been transferred solely in the name of respondent. By such fraudulent manipulations and misrepresentation, the shareholdings of said respondent Oscar C. Reyes abruptly increased to P8,715,637.00 [sic] and becomes [sic] the majority stockholder of Zenith Insurance Corporation , which portion of said shares must be distributed equally amongst the brothers and sisters of the respondent Oscar C. Reyes including the complainant herein. xxxx 9.1 The shareholdings of deceased Spouses Pedro Reyes and Anastacia C. Reyes valued at P7,099,934.28 were illegally and fraudulently transferred solely to the respondent’s
[herein
petitioner
special commercial court’s jurisdiction. To fall within this jurisdiction, there must be sufficient nexus showing that the corporation’s
nature, structure, or powers were used to facilitate the fraudulent device or scheme. Contrary to this concept, the complaint presented a reverse situation. No corporate power or office was alleged to have facilitated the transfer of the shares; rather, Oscar, as an individual and without reference to his corporate personality, was alleged to have transferred the shares of Anastacia to his name, allowing him to become the majority and controlling stockholder of Zenith, and eventually, the corporation’s President. This is the
essence of the complaint read as a whole and is particularly demonstrated under the following allegations:
name
and
installed himself as a majority stockholder of Zenith Insurance Corporation [and] thereby deprived his brothers and sisters of their respective equal shares thereof including complainant hereto. [Emphasis supplied.] In ordinary cases, the failure to specifically allege the fraudulent acts does not constitute a ground for dismissal since such defect can be cured by a bill of particulars. In cases governed by the Interim Rules of Procedure on Intra-Corporate Controversies, however, a bill of 17 particulars is a prohibited pleading. It is essential, therefore, for the complaint to show on its face what are claimed to be the fraudulent corporate acts if the complainant wishes to invoke the court’s special commercial jurisdiction.
We note that twice in the course of this case, Rodrigo had been given the opportunity to study the propriety of amending or withdrawing the complaint, but he consistently refused. The court’s
function in resolving issues of jurisdiction is limited to the review of the allegations of the complaint and, on the basis of these allegations, to the determination of whether they are of such nature and subject that they fall within the terms of the law defining the court’s jurisdiction. Regretfully, we cannot read into the complaint
any specifically alleged corporate fraud that will call for the exercise of the court’s special commercial jurisdiction. Thus, we cannot affirm the RTC’s assumption of jurisdiction over Rodrigo’s complaint
on the basis of Section 5(a) of P.D. No. 902-A . Not every allegation of fraud done in a corporate setting or perpetrated by corporate officers will bring the case within the
Oscar]
18
Intra-Corporate Controversy
A review of relevant jurisprudence shows a development in the Court’s approach in classifying what constitutes an intra -corporate controversy. Initially, the main consideration in determining whether a dispute constitutes an intra-corporate controversy was limited to a consideration of the intra-corporate relationship existing 19 between or among the parties. The types of relationships embraced under Section 5(b), as declared in the case of Union Glass 20 & Container Corp. v. SEC , were as follows: a) between the corporation, partnership, or association and the public; meikimouse
CASES: JURISDICTION
b) between the corporation, partnership, or association and its stockholders, partners, members, or officers; c) between the corporation, partnership, or association and the State as far as its franchise, permit or license to operate is concerned; and d) among the stockholders, partners, or associates themselves. [Emphasis supplied.] The existence of any of the above intra-corporate relations was sufficient to confer jurisdiction to the SEC, regardless of the subject matter of the dispute. This came to be known as the relationship test. However, in the 1984 case of DMRC Enterprises v. Esta del Sol 21 Mountain Reserve, Inc., the Court introduced the nature of the controversy test . We declared in this case that it is not the mere existence of an intra-corporate relationship that gives rise to an intra-corporate controversy; to rely on the relationship test alone will divest the regular courts of their jurisdiction for the sole reason that the dispute involves a corporation, its directors, officers, or stockholders. We saw that there is no legal sense in disregarding or minimizing the value of the nature of the transactions which gives rise to the dispute. Under the nature of the controversy test, the incidents of that relationship must also be considered for the purpose of ascertaining 22 whether the controversy itself is intra-corporate. The controversy must not only be rooted in the existence of an intra-corporate relationship, but must as well pertain to the enforcement of the parties’ correlative rights and obligations under the Corporation
Code and the internal and intra-corporate regulatory rules of the corporation. If the relationship and its incidents are merely incidental to the controversy or if there will still be conflict even if the relationship does not exist, then no intra-corporate controversy exists. The Court then combined the two tests and declared that jurisdiction should be determined by considering not only the status or relationship of the parties, but also the nature of the question 23 under controversy. This two-tier test was adopted in the recent 24 case of Speed Distribution, Inc. v. Court of Appeals: To determine whether a case involves an intra-corporate controversy, and is to be heard and decided by the branches of the RTC specifically designated by the Court to try and decide such cases, two elements must concur: (a) the status or relationship of the parties; and (2) the nature of the question that is the subject of their controversy. The first element requires that the controversy must arise out of intra-corporate or partnership relations between any or all of the parties and the corporation, partnership, or association of which they are stockholders, members or associates; between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership, or association of which they are stockholders, members, or associates, respectively; and between such corporation, partnership, or association and the State insofar as it concerns their individual franchises. The second element requires that the dispute among the parties be intrinsically connected with the regulation of
CIVIL PROCEDURE
the corporation. If the nature of the controversy involves matters that are purely civil in character, necessarily, the case does not involve an intra-corporate controversy. Given these standards, we now tackle the question posed for our determination under the specific circumstances of this case: Application of the Relationship Test
Is there an intra-corporate relationship between the parties that would characterize the case as an intra-corporate dispute? We point out at the outset that while Rodrigo holds shares of stock in Zenith, he holds them in two capacities: in his own right with respect to the 4,250 shares registered in his name, and as one of the heirs of Anastacia Reyes with respect to the 136,598 shares registered in her name. What is material in resolving the issues of this case under the allegations of the complaint is Rodrigo’s interest as an heir since the subject matter of the present controversy
centers on the shares of stocks belonging to Anastacia, not on Rodrigo’s personally-owned shares nor on his personality as shareholder owning these shares. In this light, all reference to shares of stocks in this case shall pertain to the shareholdings of the deceased Anastacia and the parties’ interest therein as her heirs.
Article 777 of the Civil Code declares that the successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent. Accordingly, upon Anastacia’s death, her children acquired legal title to her estate (which title includes her shareholdings in Zenith), and they are, prior to the estate’s partition, deemed co -owners 25 thereof . This status as co-owners, however, does not immediately and necessarily make them stockholders of the corporation. Unless and until there is compliance with Section 63 of the Corporation Code on the manner of transferring shares, the heirs do not become registered stockholders of the corporation. Section 63 provides: Section 63. Certificate of stock and transfer of shares. – The capital stock of stock corporations shall be divided into shares for which certificates signed by the president or vice-president, countersigned by the secretary or assistant secretary, and sealed with the seal of the corporation shall be issued in accordance with the by-laws. Shares of stock so issued are personal property and may be transferred by delivery of the certificate or certificates indorsed by the owner or his attorney-in-fact or other person legally authorized to make the transfer. No transfer, however, shall be valid, except as between the parties, until the transfer is recorded in the books of the corporation so as to show the names of the parties to the transaction, the date of the transfer, the number of the certificate or certificates, and the number of shares transferred. [Emphasis supplied.] No shares of stock against which the corporation holds any unpaid claim shall be transferable in the books of the corporation. Simply stated, the transfer of title by means of succession, though effective and valid between the parties involved (i.e., between the decedent’s estate and her heir s), does not bind the corporation and third parties. The transfer must be registered in the books of the
meikimouse
CASES: JURISDICTION
corporation to make the transferee-heir a stockholder entitled to 26 recognition as such both by the co rporation and by third parties. We note, in relation with the above statement, that in Abejo v. Dela 27 28 Cruz and TCL Sales Corporation v. Court of Appeal s we did not require the registration of the transfer before considering the transferee a stockholder of the corporation (in effect upholding the existence of an intra-corporate relation between the parties and bringing the case within the jurisdiction of the SEC as an intracorporate controversy). A marked difference, however, exists between these cases and the present one. In Abejo and TCL Sales, the transferees held definite and uncontested titles to a specific number of shares of the corporation; after the transferee had established prima facie ownership over the shares of stocks in question, registration became a mere formality in confirming their status as stockholders. In the present case, each of Anastacia’s heirs holds only an
undivided interest in the shares. This interest, at this point, is still inchoate and subject to the outcome of a settlement proceeding; the right of the heirs to specific, distributive shares of inheritance will not be determined until all the debts of the estate of the decedent are paid. In short, the heirs are only entitled to what 29 remains after payment of the decedent’s debts; whether there will be residue remains to be seen. Justice Jurado aptly puts it as follows: No succession shall be declared unless and until a liquidation of the assets and debts left by the decedent shall have been made and all his creditors are fully paid. Until a final liquidation is made and all the debts are paid, the right of the heirs to inherit remains inchoate. This is so because under our rules of procedure, liquidation is necessary in order to determine whether or not the decedent has left any liquid assets which may be 30 transmitted to his heirs . [Emphasis supplied.]
CIVIL PROCEDURE
The body rather than the title of the complaint determines the 31 nature of an action. Our examination of the complaint yields the conclusion that, more than anything else, the complaint is about the protection and enforcement of successional rights. The controversy it presents is purely civil rather than corporate, although it is denominated as a "complaint for accounting of all corporate funds and assets." Contrary to the findings of both the trial and appellate courts, we read only one cause of action alleged in the complaint. The "derivative suit for accounting of the funds and assets of the corporation which are in the control, custody, and/or possession of the respondent [herein petitioner Oscar]" does not constitute a separate cause of action but is, as correctly claimed by Oscar, only an incident to the "action for determination of the shares of stock of deceased spouses Pedro and Anastacia Reyes allegedly taken by respondent, its accounting and the corresponding delivery of these shares to the parties’ brothers and sisters." There can be no mistake
of the relationship between the "accounting" mentioned in the complaint and the objective of partition and distribution when Rodrigo claimed in paragraph 10.1 of the co mplaint that: 10.1 By refusal of the respondent to account of [sic] his shareholdings in the company, he illegally and fraudulently transferred solely in his name wherein [sic] the shares of stock of the deceased Anastacia C. Reyes [which] must be properly collated and/or distributed equally amongst the children including the complainant Rodrigo C. Reyes herein to their damage and prejudice. We particularly note that the complaint contained no sufficient allegation that justified the need for an accounting other than to determine the extent of Anastacia’s shareholdings for purposes of
distribution. Another significant indicator that points us to the real nature of the
Rodrigo must, therefore, hurdle two obstacles before he can be considered a stockholder of Zenith with respect to the shareholdings originally belonging to Anastacia. First , he must prove that there are shareholdings that will be left to him and his co-heirs, and this can be determined only in a settlement of the decedent’s estate. No such proceeding has been commenced to date. Second , he must
register the transfer of the shares allotted to him to make it binding against the corporation. He cannot demand that this be done unless and until he has established his specific allotment (and prima facie ownership) of the shares. Without the settlement of Anastacia’s estate, there can be no definite partition and
distribution of the estate to the heirs. Without the partition and distribution, there can be no registration of the transfer. And without the registration, we cannot consider the transferee-heir a stockholder who may invoke the existence of an intra-corporate relationship as premise for an intra-corporate controversy within the jurisdiction of a special commercial court. In sum, we find that – insofar as the subject shares of stock ( i.e., Anastacia’s shares) are concerned – Rodrigo cannot be considered a stockholder of Zenith. Consequently, we cannot declare that an intra-corporate relationship exists that would serve as basis to bring this case within the special commercial court’s jurisdiction under Section 5(b) of PD 902- A, as amended. Rodrigo’s complaint,
therefore, fails the relationship test.
complaint are Rodrigo’s repeated claims of illegal and fraudulent transfers of Anastacia’s shares by Oscar to the prejudice of the other
heirs of the decedent; he cited these allegedly fraudulent acts as basis for his demand for the collation and distribution of Anastacia’s shares to the heirs. These claims tell us unequivocally that the present controversy arose from the parties’ relationship as heirs of Anastacia and not as shareholders of Zenith. Rodrigo, in filing the
complaint, is enforcing his rights as a co-heir and not as a stockholder of Zenith. The injury he seeks to remedy is one suffered by an heir (for the impairment of his successional rights) and not by the corporation nor by Rodrigo as a shareholder on record. More than the matters of injury and redress, what Rodrigo clearly aims to accomplish through his allegations of illegal acquisition by Oscar is the distribution of Anastacia’s shareholdings without a prior settlement of her estate – an objective that, by law and established
jurisprudence, cannot be done. The RTC of Makati, acting as a special commercial court, has no jurisdiction to settle, partition, and distribute the estate of a deceased. A relevant provision – Section 2 of Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court – that contemplates properties of the decedent held by one of the heirs declares:
Questions as to advancement made or alleged to have been made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall
Application of the Nature of Controversy Test meikimouse
CASES: JURISDICTION
be binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir. [Emphasis supplied.]
CIVIL PROCEDURE
beyond the jurisdiction of the special commercial court to resolve. In short, Rodrigo’s complaint also fails the nature of the controversy
test. Worth noting are this Court’s statements in the case of Natcher v. 32 Court of Appeals:
Matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction. xxxx It is clear that trial courts trying an ordinary action cannot resolve to perform acts pertaining to a special proceeding because it is subject to specific prescribed rules. [Emphasis supplied.] That an accounting of the funds and assets of Zenith to determine the extent and value of Anastacia’s shareholdings will be undertaken by a probate court and not by a special commercial court is completely consistent with the probate court’s limited jurisdiction. It
has the power to enforce an accounting as a necessary means to its authority to determine the properties included in the inventory of the estate to be administered, divided up, and distributed. Beyond this, the determination of title or ownership over the subject shares (whether belonging to Anastacia or Oscar) may be conclusively settled by the probate court as a question of collation or advancement. We had occasion to recognize the court’s authority to
act on questions of title or ownership in a collation or advancement 33 situation in Coca v. Pangilinan where we ruled: It should be clarified that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Court of First Instance in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited probate jurisdiction is in reality not a jurisdictional question. In essence, it is a procedural question involving a mode of practice "which may be waived." As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not be passed upon in the testate or intestate proceeding. That question should be ventilated in a separate action. That general rule has qualifications or exceptions justified by expediency and convenience. Thus, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action.
Although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, the probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership. [Citations omitted. Emphasis supplied.] In sum, we hold that the nature of the present controversy is not one which may be classified as an intra-corporate dispute and is
DERIVATIVE SUIT Rodrigo’s bare claim that the complaint is a derivative suit will not
suffice to confer jurisdiction on the RTC (as a special commercial court) if he cannot comply with the requisites for the existence of a derivative suit. These requisites are: a. the party bringing suit should be a shareholder during the time of the act or transaction complained of, the number of shares not being material; b. the party has tried to exhaust intra-corporate remedies, i.e., has made a demand on the board of directors for the appropriate relief, but the latter has failed or refused to heed his plea; and c. the cause of action actually devolves on the corporation; the wrongdoing or harm having been or being caused to the corporation and not to the particular stockholder 34 bringing the suit. Based on these standards, we hold that the allegations of the present complaint do not amount to a derivative suit. First , as already discussed above, Rodrigo is not a shareholder with
respect to the shareholdings originally belonging to Anastacia; he only stands as a transferee-heir whose rights to the share are inchoate and unrecorded. With respect to his own individually-held shareholdings, Rodrigo has not alleged any individual cause or basis as a shareholder on record to proceed against Oscar. Second , in order that a stockholder may show a right to sue on
behalf of the corporation, he must allege with some particularity in his complaint that he has exhausted his remedies within the corporation by making a sufficient demand upon the directors or other officers for appropriate relief with the expressed intent to sue 35 if relief is denied. Paragraph 8 of the complaint hardly satisfies this requirement since what the rule contemplates is the exhaustion of remedies within the corporate setting: 8. As members of the same family, complainant Rodrigo C. Reyes has resorted [to] and exhausted all legal means of resolving the dispute with the end view of amicably settling the case, but the dispute between them ensued. Lastly , we find no injury, actual or threatened, alleged to have been done to the corporation due to Oscar’s acts. If indeed he illegally and fraudulently transferred Anastacia’s shares in his own name, then
the damage is not to the corporation but to his co-heirs; the wrongful transfer did not affect the capital stock or the assets of Zenith. As already mentioned, neither has Rodrigo alleged any particular cause or wrongdoing against the corporation that he can 36 champion in his capacity as a shareholder on record . In summary, whether as an individual or as a derivative suit, the RTC – sitting as special commercial court – has no jurisdiction to hear Rodrigo’s complaint since what is involved is the determination and meikimouse
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distribution of successional rights to the shareholdings of Anastacia Reyes. Rodrigo’s proper remedy, under the circumstances, is to
institute a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Anastacia Reyes, a move that is not foreclosed by the dismissal of his present complaint.
WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition and REVERSE the decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 26, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 74970. The complaint before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 142, Makati, docketed as Civil Case No. 00-1553, is ordered DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. SO ORDERED.
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CASES: JURISDICTION
KATARUNGANG PAMBARANGAY (Full Text) G.R. No. 70261 February 28, 1990 MAURO BLARDONY, JR., petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE L. COSCOLLUELA, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CXLVI, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION, MAKATI, METRO MANILA and MA. ROSARIO ARANETA BLARDONY,respondents. Recto Law Offices for petitioner. Araneta, Mendoza & Papa for private respondent.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.: The petitioner seeks a review of the orders dated August 9, 1983, and February 20, 1985, of respondent Judge Jose Coscolluela, Jr., of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch CXLVI, amending the order of his predecessor, Judge Segundo Soza, (which dismissed private respondent's petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership and partition of conjugal properties) by requiring petitioner to submit an accounting of his salaries, allowances, bonuses and commissions. The petitioner and the private respondent are spouses. They were married on April 30, 1975. During their marriage, they begot one child named Patricia Araneta Blardony, who was born on November 10, 1975. Due to irreconcilable differences, petitioner and private respondent separated in March, 1981. On different dates, the spouses executed the following agreements: (a) Memorandum of Agreement dated July 1981 for the support of their child, Patricia; (b) Receipt dated January 11, 1982, evidencing the Compromise of Settlement of Advances claimed by private respondent from petitioner; (c) The Deed of Conveyance of a property situated in Alabang, Muntinlupa; and (d) The Confirmation of the waiver by private respondent in favor of petitioner over a property situated in Calatagan, Batangas. (p. 25, Rollo.) On May 3, 1982, the wife filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership and Partition of Conjugal Partnership Properties in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXVI, in Makati, where it was docketed as Sp. No. 9711. The husband, in his answer, admitted that he had abandoned the conjugal home since March 1981; that before the filing of the petition, he and his wife, assisted by their respective counsel, tried to file a joint petition for the dissolution of their conjugal partnership but their attempt failed due to their inability to agree
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upon the equitable partition of their conjugal partnership properties and he prayed the court to order "a fair and equitable dissolution of their conjugal partnership in accordance with law." (p. 74, Rollo.) On October 8, 1982, the husband filed a motion to dismiss the petition on jurisdictional grounds, claiming that it should have been filed first in the Lupon Tagapamayapa as provided in P.D. 1508, because both are residents of the same Municipality of Makati. Mrs. Blardony opposed the motion to dismiss. Nevertheless, Judge Segundo Soza dismissed her petition on October 8, 1982 for her failure, as plaintiff, to comply with Section 6 of P.D. 1508. Mrs. Blardony filed a motion for reconsideration. In the meantime, the courts were reorganized and the case was transferred to Branch CXLVI (146) of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, presided over by Judge Jose Coscolluela, Jr. On August 9, 1983, Judge Coscolluela set aside Judge Soza's order of dismissal and required the defendant to submit an accounting of his salaries, allowances, bonuses, and commissions. The latter's motion for reconsideration of that order was denied by the court on February 20, 1985. Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction on the grounds that respondent Judge exceeded his jurisdiction: 1. in assuming jurisdiction over the case without prior referral to the Lupon Tagapamayapa as required by P.D. 1508; and 2. in declaring that the issues of support pendente lite and delivery of personal property belonging to the conjugal partnership of the parties are essentially involved in the petition, hence, the parties could go directly to court without passing through the Lupon Tagapamayapa, as provided in Section 6 of P.D. 1508. The petition has no merit. Our jurisprudence is replete with decisions of this Court to the effect that while the referral of a case to the Lupon Tagapayapa is a condition precedent for filing a complaint in court, it is not a jurisdictional requirement, "its noncompliance cannot affect the jurisdiction which the court has already acquired over the subject matter or over the person of the defendant." (Fernandez vs. Militante, May 31, 1988; Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals, 151 SCRA 287; Royales vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 127 SCRA 470). Petitioner waived the pre-litigation conciliation procedure prescribed in P.D. No. 1508 when he did not file a motion to dismiss the complaint on that score, but filed his answer thereto wherein he prayed the court to make an equitable partition of the conjugal properties. While petitioners could have prevented the trial court from exercising jurisdiction over the case by seasonably taking exception thereto, they instead invoked the very same jurisdiction by filing an answer and seeking affirmative relief from it. ... . Upon this premise, petitioners cannot be allowed belatedly to adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction meikimouse
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of the court to which they had submitted themselves voluntarily. (Royales vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 127 SCRA 470.) Furthermore, under Section 6 of P.D. 1508, the complaint may be filed directly in a competent court without passing the Lupon Tagapayapa in the following cases: SECTION 6. Conciliation, pre-condition to filing of complaint . — No complaint, petition, action or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof, shall be filed or instituted in court or any other government office for adjudication unless there has been a confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary, attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has been repudiated. However, the parties may go directly to court in the following cases: xxx xxx xxx (3) Actions coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment,delivery of personal properly and support pendente lite; and
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied.) Respondent Judge correctly observed that: ... the issues of support pendente lite and delivery of personal properties belonging to the conjugal partnership, although not coupled in the strict sense of the word with the instant petition, are essentially involved in this petition because of the minority of the daughter, Patricia Araneta Blardony who, as of this date, is not yet 8 years old, and because the resolution or decision of this court on the pending petition would be incomplete without a clear cut disposition on the partition of the personal and real properties of the conjugal partnership and consequent delivery thereof to the proper parties. (p. 20, Rollo.) WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the orders complained of, the petition for certiorari is denied for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner. This decision is immediately executory. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 176405
August 20, 2008
LEO WEE, petitioner, vs. GEORGE DE CASTRO (on his behalf and as attorney-in-fact of ANNIE DE CASTRO and FELOMINA UBAN) and MARTINIANA DE CASTRO, respondents. DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: 1
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorar i under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court filed by petitioner Leo Wee, seeking 2 the reversal and setting aside of the Decision dated 19 September 3 2006 and the Resolution dated 25 January 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90906. The appellate court, in its assailed Decision, reversed the dismissal of Civil Case. No. 1990, an action for ejectment instituted by respondent George de Castro, on his own behalf and on behalf of Annie de Castro, Felomina de Castro Uban 4 and Jesus de Castro against petitioner, by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Alaminos City, which was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 54, Alaminos City, Pangasinan; and, ruling in favor of the respondents, ordered the petitioner to vacate the subject property. In its assailed Resolution dated 25 January 2007, the Court of Appeals refused to reconsider its earlier Decision of 19 September 2006. 5
In their Complaint filed on 1 July 2002 with the MTC of Alaminos City, docketed as Civil Case No. 1990, respondents alleged that they are the registered owners of the subject property, a two-storey building erected on a parcel of land registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 16193 in the Registry of Deeds of Pangasinan, described and bounded as follows: A parcel of land (Lot 13033-D-2, Psd-01550-022319, being a portion of Lot 13033-D, Psd-018529, LRC Rec. No. ____) situated in Pob., Alaminos City; bounded on the NW. along line 1-2 by Lot 13035-D-1 of the subdivision plan; on the NE. along line 2-3 by Vericiano St.; on the SE. along line 3-4 by Lot 13033-D-2 of the subdivision plan; on the SW. along line 4-1 by Lot 575, Numeriano Rabago. It is coverd by TCT No. 16193 of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan (Alaminos City) and declared for taxation purposes per 6 T.D. No. 2075, and assessed in the sum ofP93,400.00 . Respondents rented out the subject property to petitioner on a 7 month to month basis for P9,000.00 per month. Both parties agreed that effective 1 October 2001, the rental payment shall be increased fromP9,000.00 to P15,000.00. Petitioner, however, failed or refused to pay the corresponding increase on rent when his rental obligation for the month of 1 October 2001 became due. The rental dispute was brought to the Lupon Tagapagpamayapa of Poblacion, Alaminos, Pangasinan, in an attempt to amicably settle the matter but the parties failed to reach an agreement, resulting in the issuance by theBarangay Lupon of a Certification to file action in court on 18 January 2002. On 10 June 2002, respondent George de Castro sent a letter to petitioner terminating their lease agreement and demanding that the latter vacate and turn over the subject property to respondents. Since petitioner stubbornly refused to comply with said demand letter, respondent George de Castro, together with his siblings and co-respondents, Annie de Castro, meikimouse
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Felomina de Castro Uban and Jesus de Castro, filed the Complaint for ejectment before the MTC. It must be noted, at this point, that although the Complaint stated that it was being filed by all of the respondents, the Verification and the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping were signed by respondent George de Castro alone. He would subsequently attach to his position paper filed before the MTC on 28 October 2002 the Special Powers of Attorney (SPAs) executed by his sisters Annie de Castro and Felomina de Castro Uban dated 7 February 2002 and 14 March 2002 respectively, authorizing him to institute the ejectment case against petitioner. Petitioner, on the other hand, countered that there was no agreement between the parties to increase the monthly rentals and respondents' demand for an increase was exorbitant. The agreed monthly rental was only for the amount of P9,000.00 and he was religiously paying the same every month. Petitioner then argued that respondents failed to comply with the jurisdictional requirement of conciliation before theBarangay Lupon prior to the filing of Civil Case. No. 1990, meriting the dismissal of their Complaint therein. The Certification to file action issued by the Barangay Lupon appended to the respondents' Complaint merely referred to the issue of rental increase and not the matter of ejectment. Petitioner asserted further that the MTC lacked jurisdiction over the ejectment suit, since respondents' Complaint was devoid of any allegation that there was an "unlawful 8 withholding" of the subject property by the petitioner. 9
During the Pre-Trial Conference held before the MTC, the parties stipulated that in May 2002, petitioner tendered to respondents the sum of P9,000.00 as rental payment for the month of January 2002; petitioner paid rentals for the months of October 2001 to January 2002 but only in the amount ofP9,000.00 per month; respondents, thru counsel, sent a letter to petitioner on 10 June 2002 terminating their lease agreement which petitioner ignored; and the Barangay Lupon did issue a Certification to file action after the parties failed to reach an agreement before it. After the submission of the parties of their respective Position Papers, the MTC, on 21 November 2002, rendered a 10 Decision dismissing respondents' Complaint in Civil Case No. 1990 for failure to comply with the prior conciliation requirement before the Barangay Lupon. The decretal portion of the MTC Decision reads: WHEREFORE, premised considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the dismissal of this case. Costs against the [herein respondents]. On appeal, docketed as Civil Case No. A-2835, the RTC of Alaminos, 11 Pangasinan, Branch 54, promulgated its Decision dated 27 June 2005 affirming the dismissal of respondents' Complaint for ejectment after finding that the appealed MTC Decision was based on facts and law on the matter. The RTC declared that since the original agreement entered into by the parties was for petitioner to pay only the sum of P9.000.00 per month for the rent of the subject property, and no concession was reached by the parties to increase such amount to P15.000.00, petitioner cannot be faulted for paying only the originally agreed upon monthly rentals. Adopting petitioner's position, the RTC declared that respondents' failure to refer the matter to the Barangay court for conciliation process barred the ejectment case, conciliation before the Lupon being a
condition sine qua non in the filing of ejectment suits. The RTC likewise agreed with petitioner in ruling that the allegation in the Complaint was flawed, since respondents failed to allege that there was an "unlawful withholding" of possession of the subject property, taking out Civil Case No. 1990 from the purview of an action for unlawful detainer. Finally, the RTC decreed that respondents' Complaint failed to comply with the rule that a co-owner could not maintain an action without joining all the other co-owners. Thus, according to the dispositive portion of the RTC Decision: WHEREFORE the appellate Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the court a quo. The Decision dated November 21, 2002 appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED IN 12 TOTO. Undaunted, respondents filed a Petition for Review 13 on Certiorar i with the Court of Appeals where it was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 90906. Respondents argued in their Petition that the RTC gravely erred in ruling that their failure to comply with the conciliation process was fatal to their Complaint, since it is only respondent George de Castro who resides in Alaminos City, Pangasinan, while respondent Annie de Castro resides in Pennsylvania, United States of America (USA); respondent Felomina de Castro Uban, in California, USA; and respondent Jesus de Castro, now substituted by his wife, Martiniana, resides in Manila. Respondents further claimed that the MTC was not divested of jurisdiction over their Complaint for ejectment because of the mere absence therein of the term "unlawful withholding" of their subject property, considering that they had sufficiently alleged the same in their Complaint, albeit worded differently. Finally, respondents posited that the fact that only respondent George de Castro signed the Verification and the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping attached to the Complaint was irrelevant since the other respondents already executed Special Powers of Attorney (SPAs) authorizing him to act as their attorney-in-fact in the institution of the ejectment suit against the petitioner. On 19 September 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision granting the respondents' Petition and ordering petitioner to vacate the subject property and turn over the same to respondents. The Court of Appeals decreed: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated June 27, 2005 issued by the RTC of Alaminos City, Pangasinan, Branch 54, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is hereby rendered ordering [herein petitioner] Leo Wee to SURRENDER and VACATE the leased premises in question as well as to pay the sum of P15,000.00 per month reckoned from March, 2002 until he shall have actually turned over the possession thereof to petitioners plus the rental arrearages of P30,000.00 representing unpaid increase in rent for the period from October, 2001 to February, 2002, with legal interest at 6% per annum to be computed from June 7, 2002 until finality of this decision and 12% thereafter until full payment thereof. Respondent is likewise hereby ordered to pay petitioners the amount ofP20,000.00 as and for attorney's fees and the costs of 14 suit. In a Resolution dated 25 January 2007, the appellate court denied the Motion for Reconsideration interposed by petitioner for lack of merit. meikimouse
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Petitioner is now before this Court via the Petition at bar, making the following assignment of errors: I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT CONCILIATION PROCESS IS NOT A JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENT THAT NON-COMPLIANCE THEREWITH DOES NOT AFFECT THE JURISDICTION IN EJECTMENT CASE; II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT FOR EJECTMENT DESPITE THE WANT OF ALLEGATION OF "UNLAWFUL WITHOLDING PREMISES" (sic) QUESTIONED BY PETITIONER; III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT OF RESPONDENT GEORGE DE CASTRO WITHOUT JOINING ALL HIS OTHER CO-OWNERS OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS PROPER; IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT APPLYING SUPREME COURT CIRCULAR NO. 10 WHICH DIRECTS A PLEADER TO INDICATE IN HIS PLEADINGS HIS OFFICIAL RECEIPT OF HIS PAYMENT OF HIS IBP DUES. 15 Petitioner avers that respondents failed to go through the conciliation process before the Barangay Lupon, a jurisdictional defect that bars the legal action for ejectment. The Certification to file action dated 18 January 2002 issued by the Barangay Lupon, appended by the respondents to their Complaint in Civil Case No. 1990, is of no moment, for it attested only that there was confrontation between the parties on the matter of rental increase but not on unlawful detainer of the subject property by the petitioner. If it was the intention of the respondents from the very beginning to eject petitioner from the subject property, they should have brought up the alleged unlawful stay of the petitioner on the subject property for conciliation before the Barangay Lupon. The barangay justice system was established primarily as a means of easing up the congestion of cases in the judicial courts. This could be accomplished through a proceeding before the barangay courts which, according to the one who conceived of the system, the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, is essentially arbitration in character; and to make it truly effective, it should also be compulsory. With this primary objective of the barangay justice system in mind, it would be wholly in keeping with the underlying philosophy of Presidential Decree No. 1508 (Katarungang Pambarangay Law), which would be better served if an out-of-court settlement of the case is reached 16 voluntarily by the parties. To ensure this objective, Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1508 requires the parties to undergo a conciliation process before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo as a precondition to filing a complaint in court
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subject to certain exceptions. The said section has been declared 17 compulsory in nature. Presidential Decree No. 1508 is now incorporated in Republic Act No. 7160 (The Local Government Code), which took effect on 1 January 1992. The pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code making conciliation a precondition to the filing of complaints in court are reproduced below: SEC. 412. Conciliation.- (a) Pre-condition to filing of complaint in court . - No complaint, petition, action, or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in court or any other government office for adjudication, unless there has been a confrontation between the parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon secretary or pangkat secretary as attested to by the lupon or pangkat chairman or unless the settlement has been repudiated by the parties thereto. (b) Where parties may go directly to court . - The parties may go directly to court in the following instances: (1) Where the accused is under detention; (2) Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling for habeas corpus proceedings; (3) Where actions are coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property, and support pendente lite; and (4) Where the action may otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations. (c) Conciliation among members of indigenous cultural communities. - The customs and traditions of indigenous cultural communities shall be applied in settling disputes between members of the cultural communities. SEC. 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception Thereto. - The lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except: (a) Where one party is the government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof; (b) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the performance of his official functions; (c) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or a fine exceeding Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00); meikimouse
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(d) Offenses where there is no private offended party; (e) Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities or municipalities unless the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon; (f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon; (g) Such other classes of disputes which the President may determine in the interest of justice or upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice. There is no question that the parties to this case appeared before the Barangay Lupon for conciliation proceedings. There is also no dispute that the only matter referred to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation was the rental increase, and not the ejectment of petitioner from the subject property. This is apparent from a perusal of the Certification to file action in court issued by the Barangay Lupon on 18 January 2002, to wit:
CIVIL PROCEDURE
The contract of lease between the parties did not stipulate a fixed period. Hence, the parties agreed to the payment of rentals on a monthly basis. On this score, Article 1687 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 1687. If the period for the lease has not been fixed , it is understood to be from year to year, if the rent agreed upon is annual; from month to month, if it is monthly ; from week to week, if the rent is weekly; and from day to day, if the rent is to be paid daily. However, even though a monthly rent is paid, and no period for the lease has been set, the courts may fix a longer term for the lease after the lessee has occupied the premises for over one year. If the rent is weekly, the courts may likewise determine a longer period after the lessee has been in possession for over six months. In case of daily rent, the courts may also fix a longer period after the lessee has stayed in the place for over one month. (Emphasis supplied.) The rentals being paid monthly, the period of such lease is deemed terminated at the end of each month. Thus, respondents have every right to demand the ejectment of petitioners at the end of each month, the contract having expired by operation of law. Without a lease contract, petitioner has no right of possession to the subject property and must vacate the same. Respondents, thus, should be allowed to resort to an action for ejectment before the MTC to recover possession of the subject property from petitioner.
CERTIFICATION TO FILE COMPLAINTS This is to certify that: 1. There was personal confrontation between parties before the barangay Lupon regarding rental increase of a commercial building but conciliation failed; 2. Therefore, the corresponding dispute of the aboveentitled case may now be filed in Court/Government 18 Office. (Emphasis ours.) The question now to be resolved by this Court is whether the Certification dated 18 January 2002 issued by the Barangay Lupon stating that no settlement was reached by the parties on the matter of rental increase sufficient to comply with the prior conciliation requirement under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law to authorize the respondents to institute the ejectment suit against petitioner.
Corollarily, petitioner's ejectment, in this case, is only the reasonable consequence of his unrelenting refusal to comply with the respondents' demand for the payment of rental increase agreed upon by both parties. Verily, the lessor's right to rescind the contract of lease for non-payment of the demanded increased rental was 19 recognized by this Court in Chua v. Victori o :
The right of rescission is statutorily recognized in reciprocal obligations, such as contracts of lease. In addition to the general remedy of rescission granted under Article 1191 of the Civil Code, there is an independent provision granting the remedy of rescission for breach of any of the lessor or lessee's statutory obligations. Under Article 1659 of the Civil Code, the aggrieved party may, at his option, ask for (1) the rescission of the contract; (2) rescission and indemnification for damages; or (3) only indemnification for damages, allowing the contract to remain in force.
The Court rules affirmatively. While it is true that the Certification to file action dated 18 January 2002 of the Barangay Lupon refers only to rental increase and not to the ejectment of petitioner from the subject property, the submission of the same for conciliation before the Barangay Lupon constitutes sufficient compliance with the provisions of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law. Given the particular circumstances of the case at bar, the conciliation proceedings for the amount of monthly rental should logically and reasonably include also the matter of the possession of the property subject of the rental, the lease agreement, and the violation of the terms thereof. We now proceed to discuss the meat of the controversy.
Payment of the rent is one of a lessee's statutory obligations, and, upon non-payment by petitioners of the increased rental in September 1994, the lessor acquired the right to avail of any of the three remedies outlined above. (Emphasis supplied.) Petitioner next argues that respondent George de Castro cannot maintain an action for ejectment against petitioner, without joining all his co-owners. Article 487 of the New Civil Code is explicit on this point: ART. 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment. meikimouse
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This article covers all kinds of action for the recovery of possession, i.e., forcible entry and unlawful detainer (accion interdictal), recovery of possession (accion publiciana), and recovery of ownership (accion de reivindicacion). As explained by the 20 renowned civilist, Professor Arturo M. Tolentino :
A co-owner may bring such an action, without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as coplaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all . If the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone, such that he claims possession for himself and not for the co-ownership, the action will not prosper. (Emphasis added.)
21
In the more recent case of Carandang v. Heirs of De Guzman, this Court declared that a co-owner is not even a necessary party to an action for ejectment, for complete relief can be afforded even in his absence, thus: In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest. However, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and the relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any kind of action for the recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners are not indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a complete relief can be afforded in the suit even without their participation, since the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners. Moreover, respondents Annie de Castro and Felomina de Castro Uban each executed a Special Power of Attorney, giving respondent George de Castro the authority to initiate Civil Case No. 1990. A power of attorney is an i nstrument in writing by which one person, as principal, appoints another as his agent and confers upon him the authority to perform certain specified acts or kinds of acts on behalf of the principal. The written authorization itself is the power of attorney, and this is clearly indicated by the fact that it has also been 22 called a "letter of attorney."
pursuant to a Special Power of Attorney, is a party to the ejectment suit. In fact, Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court includes the representative of the owner in an ejectment suit as one of the parties authorized to institute the proceedings. (Emphasis supplied.) Failure by respondent George de Castro to attach the said SPAs to the Complaint is innocuous, since it is undisputed that he was granted by his sisters the authority to file the action for ejectment against petitioner prior to the institution of Civil Case No. 1990. The SPAs in his favor were respectively executed by respondents Annie de Castro and Felomina de Castro Uban on 7 February 2002 and 14 March 2002; while Civil Case No. 1990 was filed by respondent George de Castro on his own behalf and on behalf of his siblings only on 1 July 2002, or way after he was given by his siblings the authority to file said action. The Court quotes with approval the following disquisition of the Court of Appeals: Moreover, records show that [herein respondent] George de Castro was indeed authorized by his sisters Annie de Castro and Felomina de Castro Uban, to prosecute the case in their behalf as shown by the Special Power of Attorney dated February 7, 2002 and March 14, 2002. That these documents were appended only to [respondent George de Castro's] position paper is of no moment considering that the authority conferred therein was given prior to the institution of the complaint in July, 2002. x x 24 x. Respondent deceased Jesus de Castro's failure to sign the Verification and Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping may be excused 25 since he already executed an Affidavit with respondent George de Castro that he had personal knowledge of the filing of Civil Case No. 1990. In Torres v. Specialized Packaging Development 26 Corporation , the Court ruled that the personal signing of the verification requirement was deemed substantially complied with when, as in the instant case, two out of 25 real parties-in-interest, who undoubtedly have sufficient knowledge and belief to swear to the truth of the allegations in the petition, signed the verification attached to it. In the same vein, this Court is not persuaded by petitioner's assertion that respondents' failure to allege the jurisdictional fact that there was "unlawful withholding" of the subject property was fatal to their cause of action.
Even then, the Court views the SPAs as mere surplusage, such that the lack thereof does not in any way affect the validity of the action for ejectment instituted by respondent George de Castro. This also disposes of petitioner's contention that respondent George de Castro lacked the authority to sign the Verification and the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping. As the Court ruled in Mendoza v. 23 Coronel :
It is apodictic that what determines the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought. In an unlawful detainer case, the defendant's possession was originally lawful but ceased to be so upon the expiration of his right to possess. Hence, the phrase "unlawful withholding" has been held to imply possession on the part of defendant, which was legal in the beginning, having no other source than a contract, express or implied, and which later expired as a right and is being withheld by 27 defendant.
We likewise hold that the execution of the certification against forum shopping by the attorney-in-fact in the case at bar is not a violation of the requirement that the parties must personally sign the same. The attorney-infact, who has authority to file, and who actually filed the complaint as the representative of the plaintiff co-owner,
In Barba v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that although the phrase "unlawfully withholding" was not actually used by therein petitioner in her complaint, the Court held that her allegations, nonetheless, amounted to an unlawful withholding of the subject property by therein private respondents, because they continuously refused to vacate the premises even after notice and demand.
28
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In the Petition at bar, respondents alleged in their Complaint that they are the registered owners of the subject property; the subject property was being occupied by the petitioner pursuant to a monthly lease contract; petitioner refused to accede to respondents' demand for rental increase; the respondents sent petitioner a letter terminating the lease agreement and demanding that petitioner vacate and turn over the possession of the subject property to respondents; and despite such demand, petitioner failed to 29 surrender the subject property to respondents. The Complaint sufficiently alleges the unlawful withholding of the subject property by petitioner, constitutive of unlawful detainer, although the exact words "unlawful withholding" were not used. In an action for unlawful detainer, an allegation that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from the plaintiff is deemed sufficient, 30 without necessarily employing the terminology of the law. Petitioner's averment that the Court of Appeals should have dismissed respondents' Petition in light of the failure of their counsel to attach the Official Receipt of his updated payment of Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dues is now moot and academic, since respondents' counsel has already duly complied therewith. It must be stressed that judicial cases do not come and go through the portals of a court of law by the mere mandate of 31 technicalities. Where a rigid application of the rules will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, technicalities should be 32 disregarded in order to resolve the case. Finally, we agree in the ruling of the Court of Appeals that petitioner is liable for the payment of back rentals, attorney's fees and cost of the suit. Respondents must be duly indemnified for the loss of income from the subject property on account of petitioner's refusal to vacate the leased premises.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 19 September 2006 and Resolution dated 25 January 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90906 are hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against petitioner.
G.R. No. 153567
February 18, 2008
LIBRADA M. vs. 1 ERNEST S. AURE , respondent.
AQUINO, petitioner,
DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J .: 2
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorar i under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court filed by petitioner Librada M. Aquino (Aquino), seeking the reversal and the setting aside of the 3 4 Decision dated 17 October 2001 and the Resolutio n dated 8 May 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63733. The appellate court, in its assailed Decision and Resolution, reversed the 5 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 6 88, affirming the Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City, Branch 32, which dismissed respondent Ernesto Aure’s (Aure) complaint for ejectment on the ground, inter alia, of failure to
comply with barangay conciliation proceedings. The subject of the present controversy is a parcel of land situated in Roxas District, Quezon City, with an area of 449 square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 205447 registered 7 with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City (subject property). Aure and E.S. Aure Lending Investors, Inc. (Aure Lending) filed a Complaint for ejectment against Aquino before the MeTC docketed as Civil Case No. 17450. In their Complaint, Aure and Aure Lending alleged that they acquired the subject property from Aquino and her husband Manuel (spouses Aquino) by virtue of a Deed of 8 Sale executed on 4 June 1996. Aure claimed that after the spouses Aquino received substantial consideration for the sale of the subject 9 property, they refused to vacate the same. 10
SO
ORDERED.
In her Answer, Aquino countered that the Complaint in Civil Case No. 17450 lacks cause of action for Aure and Aure Lending do not have any legal right over the subject property. Aquino admitted that there was a sale but such was governed by the Memorandum of 11 Agreement (MOA) signed by Aure. As stated in the MOA, Aure shall secure a loan from a bank or financial institution in his own name using the subject property as collateral and turn over the proceeds thereof to the spouses Aquino. However, even after Aure successfully secured a loan, the spouses Aquino did not receive the proceeds thereon or benefited therefrom. On 20 April 1999, the MeTC rendered a Decision in Civil Case No. 17450 in favor of Aquino and dismissed the Complaint for ejectment of Aure and Aure Lending for non-compliance with the barangay conciliation process, among other grounds. The MeTC observed that Aure and Aquino are residents of the same barangay but there is no showing that any attempt has been made to settle the case amicably at the barangay level. The MeTC further observed that Aure Lending was improperly included as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 17450 for it did not stand to be injured or benefited by the suit. Finally, the MeTC ruled that since the question of ownership was put in issue, the action was converted from a mere detainer suit to one "incapable of pecuniary estimation" which properly rests within the original exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. The dispositive portion of the MeTC Decision reads:
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CASES: JURISDICTION
WHEREFORE, premises considered, let this case be, as it is, hereby ordered DISMISSED. [Aquino’s] counterclaim is
likewise dismissed.
12
On appeal, the RTC affirmed the dismissal of the Complaint on the same ground that the dispute was not brought before the Barangay Council for conciliation before it was filed in court. In a Decision dated 14 December 2000, the RTC stressed that the barangay conciliation process is a conditio sine qua non for the filing of an ejectment complaint involving residents of the same barangay , and failure to comply therewith constitutes sufficient cause for the dismissal of the action. The RTC likewise validated the ruling of the MeTC that the main issue involved in Civil Case No. 17450 is incapable of pecuniary estimation and cognizable by the RTC. Hence, the RTC ruled: WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the appealed 13 judgment, it is hereby affirmed in its entirety. Aure’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the RTC in an 14
Order dated 27 February 2001. Undaunted, Aure appealed the adverse RTC Decision with the Court of Appeals arguing that the lower court erred in dismissing his Complaint for lack of cause of action. Aure asserted that misjoinder of parties was not a proper ground for dismissal of his Complaint and that the MeTC should have only ordered the exclusion of Aure Lending as plaintiff without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings in Civil Case No. 17450 until the final determination thereof. Aure further asseverated that mere allegation of ownership should not divest the MeTC of jurisdiction over the ejectment suit since jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and should not depend on the defenses and objections raised by the parties. Finally, Aure contended that the MeTC erred in dismissing his Complaint with prejudice on the ground of non-compliance with barangay conciliation process. He was not given the opportunity to rectify the procedural defect by going through the barangay mediation proceedings and, thereafter, refile the 15 Complaint. On 17 October 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision, reversing the MeTC and RTC Decisions and remanding the case to the MeTC for further proceedings and final determination of the substantive rights of the parties. The appellate court declared that the failure of Aure to subject the matter to barangay conciliation is
CIVIL PROCEDURE
In a Resolution dated 8 May 2002, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration interposed by Aquino for it was merely a rehash of the arguments set forth in her previous pleadings which were already considered and passed upon by the appellate court in its assailed Decision. Aquino is now before this Court via the Petition at bar raising the following issues: I. WHETHER OR NOT NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE BARANGAY CONCILIATION PROCEEDINGS IS A JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT THAT WARRANTS THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT. II. WHETHER OR NOT ALLEGATION OF OWNERSHIP OUSTS THE MeTC OF ITS JURISDICTION OVER AN EJECTMENT CASE. The barangay justice system was established primarily as a means of easing up the congestion of cases in the judicial courts. This could be accomplished through a proceeding before the barangay courts which, according to the conceptor of the system, the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, is essentially arbitration in character, and to make it truly effective, it should also be compulsory. With this primary objective of the barangay justice system in mind, it would be wholly in keeping with the underlying philosophy of Presidential Decree No. 1508, otherwise known as the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, and the policy behind it would be better served if an out-of-court settlement of the case is reached voluntarily by the 17 parties. The primordial objective of Presidential Decree No. 1508 is to reduce the number of court litigations and prevent the deterioration of the quality of justice which has been brought by the 18 indiscriminate filing of cases in the courts. To ensure this objective, 19 Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1508 requires the parties to undergo a conciliation process before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo as a precondition to filing a complaint in court subject to certain exceptions20 which are inapplicable to this 21 case. The said section has been declared compulsory in nature.
not a jurisdictional flaw and it will not affect the sufficiency of Aure’s
Complaint since Aquino failed to seasonably raise such issue in her Answer. The Court of Appeals further ruled that mere allegation of ownership does not deprive the MeTC of jurisdiction over the ejectment case for jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations advanced by the plaintiff in his complaint. Hence, mere assertion of ownership by the defendant in an ejectment case will not oust the MeTC of its summary jurisdiction over the same. The decretal part of the Court of Appeals Decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the decisions of the trial courts below REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the records be remanded back to the court a quo for further proceedings – for an eventual decision of the substantive rights of 16 the disputants.
Presidential Decree No. 1508 is now incorporated in Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as The Local Government Code, which took effect on 1 January 1992. The pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code making conciliation a precondition to filing of complaints in court, read: SEC. 412. Conciliation.- (a) Pre-condition to filing of complaint in court . – No complaint, petition, action, or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in court or any other government office for adjudication, unless there has been a confrontation between the parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon secretary or pangkat secretary as attested to by the lupon meikimouse
CASES: JURISDICTION
CIVIL PROCEDURE
chairman or pangkat chairman or unless the settlement has been repudiated by the parties thereto.
such barangay conciliation proceedings was made in Aure and Aure
(b) Where parties may go directly to court . – The parties may go directly to court in the following instances:
jurisdictional f law that warrants the dismissal of the ejectment suit filed with the MeTC.
(1) Where the accused is under detention;
Aquino posits that failure to resort to barangay conciliation makes the action for ejectment premature and, hence, dismissible. She likewise avers that this objection was timely raised during the pretrial and even subsequently in her Position Paper submitted to the MeTC.
(2) Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling for habeas corpus proceedings; (3) Where actions are coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property, and support pendente lite; and (4) Where the action may otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations. (c) Conciliation among members of indigenous cultural communities. – The customs and traditions of indigenous cultural communities shall be applied in settling disputes between members of the cultural communities. SEC. 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception Therein. – The lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except: (a) Where one party is the government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof; (b) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the performance of his official functions; (c) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or a fine exceeding Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00); (d) Offenses where there is no private o ffended party; (e) Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities or municipalities unless the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon; (f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon; (g) Such other classes of disputes which the President may determine in the interest of justice or upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice. There is no dispute herein that the present case was never referred to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation before Aure and Aure Lending instituted Civil Case No. 17450. In fact, no allegation of
Lending’s Complaint before the MeTC. The only issue to be resolved is whether non-recourse to the barangay conciliation process is a
We do not agree. It is true that the precise technical effect of failure to comply with the requirement of Section 412 of the Local Government Code on barangay conciliation (previously contained in Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1508) is much the same effect produced by non-exhaustion of administrative remedies -- the complaint becomes afflicted with the vice of pre-maturity; and the controversy there alleged is not ripe for judicial determination. The complaint 22 becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss. Nevertheless, the conciliation process is not a jurisdictional requirement, so that non-compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the court has otherwise acquired over the subject matter or over the 23 person of the defendant . As enunciated in the landmark case of Royales v. Intermediate 24
Appellate Cour t :
Ordinarily, non-compliance with the condition precedent prescribed by P.D. 1508 could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity; but the same would not prevent a court of competent jurisdiction from exercising its power of adjudication over the case before it, where the defendants, as in this case, failed to object to such exercise of jurisdiction in their answer and even during the entire proceedings a quo. While petitioners could have prevented the trial court from exercising jurisdiction over the case by seasonably taking exception thereto, they instead invoked the very same jurisdiction by filing an answer and seeking affirmative relief from it. What is more, they participated in the trial of the case by cross-examining respondent Planas. Upon this premise, petitioners cannot now be allowed belatedly to adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction of the court to which they had submitted themselves voluntarily. x x x (Emphasis supplied.) In the case at bar, we similarly find that Aquino cannot be allowed to attack the jurisdiction of the MeTC over Civil Case No. 17450 after having submitted herself voluntarily thereto. We have scrupulously examined Aquino’s Answer before the MeTC in Civil Case No. 17450
and there is utter lack of any objection on her part to any deficiency in the complaint which could oust the MeTC of its jurisdcition. We thus quote with approval the disquisition of the Court of Appeals: meikimouse
CASES: JURISDICTION
Moreover, the Court takes note that the defendant [Aquino] herself did not raise in defense the aforesaid lack of conciliation proceedings in her answer, which raises the exclusive affirmative defense of simulation. By this acquiescence, defendant [Aquino] is deemed to have waived such objection. As held in a case of similar circumstances, the failure of a defendant [Aquino] in an ejectment suit to specifically allege the fact that there was no compliance with the barangay conciliation procedure 25 constitutes a waiver of that defense. x x x. By Aquino’s failure to seasonably object to the deficiency in the
Complaint, she is deemed to have already acquiesced or waived any defect attendant thereto. Consequently, Aquino cannot thereafter move for the dismissal of the ejectment suit for Aure and Aure Lending’s failure to resort to the barangay conciliation process, since she is already precluded from doing so. The fact that Aquino raised such objection during the pre-trial and in her Position Paper is of no moment, for the issue of non-recourse to barangay mediation proceedings should be impleaded in her Answer. As provided under Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure: Sec. 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded . – Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim. (Emphasis supplied.) While the aforequoted provision applies to a pleading (specifically, an Answer) or a motion to dismiss, a similar or identical rule is provided for all other motions in Section 8 of Rule 15 of the same Rule which states: Sec. 8. Omnibus Motion. - Subject to the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 9, a motion attacking a pleading, order, judgment, or proceeding shall include all objections then available, and all objections not so included shall be deemed waived. The spirit that surrounds the foregoing statutory norm is to require the party filing a pleading or motion to raise all available exceptions for relief during the single opportunity so that single or multiple 26 objections may be avoided. It is clear and categorical in Section 1, Rule 9 of the Revised Rules of Court that failure to raise defenses and objections in a motion to dismiss or in an answer is deemed a waiver thereof; and basic is the rule in statutory construction that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is 27 no room for construction or interpretation. As has been our consistent ruling, where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no occasion for interpretation; there is only room 28 for application. Thus, although Aquino’s defense of non compliance with Presidential Decree No. 1508 is meritorious, procedurally, such defense is no longer available for failure to plead the same in the Answer as required by the omnibus motion rule.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Neither could the MeTC dismiss Civil Case No. 17450 motu proprio. The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide only three instances when the court may motu proprio dismiss the claim, and that is when the pleadings or evidence on the record show that (1) the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) there is another cause of action pending between the same parties for the same cause; or (3) where the action is barred by a prior judgment or by a statute of limitations. Thus, it is clear that a court may not motu proprio dismiss a case on the ground of failure to comply with the requirement for barangay conciliation, this ground not being among those mentioned for the dismissal by the trial court of a case on its own initiative. Aquino further argues that the issue of possession in the instant case cannot be resolved by the MeTC without first adjudicating the question of ownership, since the Deed of Sale vesting Aure with the legal right over the subject property is simulated. Again, we do not agree. Jurisdiction in ejectment cases is determined by the allegations pleaded in the complaint. As long as these allegations demonstrate a cause of action either for forcible entry or for unlawful detainer, the court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter. This principle holds, even if the facts proved during the trial do not support the cause of action thus alleged, in which instance the court -- after acquiring jurisdiction -- may resolve to dismiss the action for insufficiency of evidence. The necessary allegations in a Complaint for ejectment are set forth in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which reads: SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. – Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person may at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs. In the case at bar, the Complaint f iled by Aure and Aure Lending o n 2 April 1997, alleged as follows: 2. [Aure and Aure Lending] became the owners of a house and lot located at No. 37 Salazar Street corner Encarnacion Street, B.F. Homes, Quezon City by virtue of a deed of absolute sale executed by [the spouses Aquino] in favor of [Aure and Aure Lending] although registered in the name of x x x Ernesto S. Aure; title to the said property had already been issued in the name of [Aure] as shown by a transfer Certificate of Title , a copy of which is hereto attached and made an integral part hereof as A nnex A; 3. However, despite the sale thus transferring ownership of the subject premises to [Aure and Aure Lending] as meikimouse
