MEDIA LAW
K. A. Abbas v. Union of India: A case study What happened in K. A. Abbas v. Union of India?
K.A. Abbas was a very famous film maker who is also famous for having directed Amitabh Bachan’s debut film, Saat Hindustani (A remake of Akira Kurosawa’s Seven Samurai). Abbas
saw himself as a very "realistic" filmmaker who wanted to use cinema for social transformation. He was also a member of the Khosla Committee on Film Censorship that was set up by the Government of India (which we shall discuss later). In the course of its working, Abbas got into a quarrel with another member who ridiculed filmmakers in India saying that none of the films they made could even qualify for political censorship. Abbas then made a film A Tale of Four Cities with the express intention of challenging the constitutional validity of pre-censorship of cinema in India. The film attempted to portray the contrast between the life of the rich and the poor in the four principal cities of the- country. The Th e film included certain shots of the red light district in Bombay. Although Abbas applied to the Board of Film Censors for a `U' Certificate for unrestricted exhibition of the film, he was granted a certificate only for exhibition restricted to adults. On an appeal made to it by the petitioner, the Central Government issued a direction on July 3, 1969 that a `U'
Certificate Certificate may be granted provided certain specified cuts were made in the film.
Abbas thereafter filed a petition seeking a declaration that the provisions of Section 11 of the Cinematograph Act, 1952, together with the rules prescribed by the Central Government on February 6, 1960 in the exercise of its powers under s. 5-B of the Act were un-constitutional and void; he further prayed prayed that the direction direction dated July 3, 1969 should be quashed. He claimed that his fundamental right of free speech and expression was denied by the order of the Central Government and that he was entitled to a 'U' Certificate for the film as of right.
At the hearing of the petition the Central Government indicated it had decided to grant a 'U' Certificate to the film without the cuts previously ordered. Abbas then applied for amendment of the petition so as to enable him to challenge pre-censorship as offensive to freedom of speech and expression and alternatively the provisions of the Act and the Rules, orders and directions under the Act as vague, arbitrary and indefinite. The Court allowed the amendment holding that Abbas was right in contending that a person who invest capital in promoting or producing a film must have clear guidance in advance in the matter of censorship of films even if the law of pre-censorship be not violative of the fundamental right. It was contended inter alia on behalf of Abbas (a) that pre-censorship itself violated the right to freedom of speech and expression; and (b) That even if it were a legitimate restraint on the freedom, it must be exercised on very definite principles which leave no room for arbitrary action. In the Abbas judgement, Justice Hidayatullah stated: “Further it has been almost universally recognized that the treatment of motion pictures must be
different from that of other forms of art and expression. This arises from the instant appeal of the motion picture, its versatility, realism (often surrealism), and its co-ordination of the visual and aural senses. The art of the cameraman, with trick photography, vista vision and threedimensional representation thrown in, has made the cinema picture more true to life than even the theatre or indeed any other form of representative art. The motion picture is able to stir up emotions more deeply than any other product of art. Its effect particularly on children and adolescents is very great since their immaturity makes them more willingly suspend their disbelief than mature men and women. They also remember the action in the picture and try to emulate or imitate what they have seen. Therefore classification of films into two categories of "U" films and "A" films is a reasonable classification. It is also for this reason that motion pictures must be regarded differently from other forms of speech and expression. A person reading a book or other writing nor hearing a speech or viewing a painting or sculpture is not so deeply stirred as by seeing a motion picture. Therefore the treatment of the latter on a different footing is also a valid classification”
2
Hidayatullah's paragraph has more or less become the cornerstone for the way in which the law deals with cinema, and is quoted in almost every successive case related to the Cinematograph Act of India of course it did not help Abbas’s case that he himself had written in a similar way on
the nature of cinema, and the court in this case gleefully quoted Abbas himself to buttress their argument. They cited Abbas’s argument “even if we believe that a novelist or a painter or a
musician should be free to write, paint and compose music without the interference of the State machinery, I doubt if anyone will advocate the same freedom to be extended to the commercial exploitation of a powerful medium of expression and entertainment like the cinema. One can imagine the results if an unbridled commercial cinema is allowed to cater to the lowest common denominator of popular taste, especially in a country which, after two centuries of political and cultural domination, is still suffering from a confusion and debasement of cultural values. Freedom of expression cannot, and should not, be interpreted as a license for the cinemagnates to make money by pandering to, and thereby propagating, shoddy and vulgar taste." Tracing the evolution of film censorship, the Chief Justice noted that the Indian film industry lacked a professional self-regulatory body like the Motion Picture Association of America. Therefore, if the content of films were to be regulated, only the government could do so. As a matter of practice, the Chief Justice noted, censorship existed all over the world in some form or the other. Although motion pictures in the United States generally enjoyed a significant degree of First Amendment protection, they were not completely free from restrictions. Restrictions could also be imposed on films in England. Censorship, the Chief Justice concluded, is a valid exercise of power in the interests of public morality and decency. It is in socie ty’s interest and does not violate freedom of speech and expression. The Court examined the rule regarding the consideration of whether a law is vague and arbitrary. It stated that: A law cannot be declared void because it is opposed to the spirit supposed to pervade the Constitution but not expressed in words. However it cannot be said as an absolute principle that no law will be considered bad for sheer vagueness. The real rule is that if a law is vague or appears to be so, the court must try to construe it, as far as may be, and language permitting, the construction sought to be placed on it, must be in accordance with the intention of the legislature. Thus if the law is open to diverse construction, that construction which accords best with the intention of the legislature and advances the purpose of legislation, is to be preferred. Where however the law admits of no such construction and the persons applying it are 3
in a boundless sea of uncertainty and the law prima facie takes away a guaranteed freedom, the law must be held to offend the Constitution, This is not application of the doctrine of due process. The invalidity arises from the probability of the misuse of the law to the detriment of the individual. If possible, the Court instead of striking down the law may itself draw the line of demarcation where possible but this effort should be sparingly made and only in the clearest of cases. With respect to the law in this particular case, the Court said: Judging the directions, 'rules and regulations from this angle, it must be held that there are general principles regarding the films as a whole and specific instances of what may be considered as offending the public interest as disclosed in the clause that follows the enunciation of the freedoms in Art. 19(1) (a). The general principles which are stated in the directions given under s. 5-B(2) seek to do no more than restate the permissible restrictions as stated in cl. (2) of Art. 19 and s. 5-B (1) of the Act. They cannot be said to be vague at all. Similarly, the principles in s. IV of the directions in relation to children and young persons are quite specific and also salutary and no exception can be taken. It is only the instances which are given in Section I Clauses A to D which need to be considered. Read individually they give ample direction as to what ma y not be included. The Decision
The decision of the Court in Abbas is welcome. It has clarified the law on pre-censorship and obscenity. It has firmly established the right of creative writers and producers to be free from arbitrary exercise of censor's scissors. Thanks to Abbas, those who advocate censorship must now remember that, while safe-guarding of the community as a continuing entity by protecting the young is important, censorship should not reduce literary standards to a level appropriate for adolescents only. It is hoped that in Abbas the Supreme Court has driven the last nail into Hicklin's coffin.
4
