Latasa vs. Comelec
Facts:
Petitioner Latasa, was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in the elections of 199, 199!, and 199". #n $e%ruary &&1, he filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor for the &&1 elections. 'e stated therein that he is eligi%le therefor, and li(ewise disclosed that he had already served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos and is now running for the first time for the position of city mayor.
Sunga, also a candidate for city mayor in the said elections, filed %efore the C)M*L*C a petition to deny petitioner+s candidacy since the latter had already %een elected and served for three thre e cons consecut ecutive ive terms. Petitioner Petitioner countered countered that this fact doe does s not %ar him from filin filing g a certificate of candidacy for the &&1 elections since this will %e the first time that he will %e running for the post of city mayor.
he Comelec-s $irst Division denied petitioner+s certificate of candidacy. 'owever, his motion for reconsideration was not acted upon %y the Comelec en %anc %efore election day and he was proclaimed winner. winner. )nly after the proclamation did the Comelec en %anc issue a resolution that declared him disualified from running for mayor of Digos City, and ordered that all votes cast in his favor should not %e counted.
Petitioner appealed, contending that when Digos was converted from a municipality to a city, it attained a different /uridical personality separate from the municipality of Digos. So when he filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor, it should not %e construed as vying for the same local government post.
Issue:
#s petitioner Latasa eligi%le to run as candidate for the position of mayor of the newly0created City of Digos immediately after he served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos
Held:
2s a rule, in a representative democracy, the people should %e allowed freely to choose those who will govern them. 2rticle 3, Section " of the Constitution is an e4ception to this rule, in that it limits the range of choice of the people. Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. 2n elective local official, therefore, is not %arred from running again in for same local government post, unless two conditions concur5 1.6 that the official concerned has %een elected for three consecutive terms to the same local government post, and .6 that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
rue, the new city acuired a new corporate e4istence separate and distinct from that of the municipality. his does not mean, however, that for the purpose of applying the su%/ect Constitutional provision, the office of the municipal mayor would now %e construed as a different local government post as that of the office of the city mayor. 2s stated earlier, the territorial /urisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as that of the municipality. Conseuently, the inha%itants of the municipality are the same as those in the city. hese inha%itants are the same group of voters who elected petitioner Latasa to %e their municipal mayor for three consecutive terms. hese are also the same inha%itants over whom he held power and authority as their chief e4ecutive for nine years.
he framers of the Constitution specifically included an e4ception to the peoples freedom to choose those who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating e4cessive power over a particular territorial /urisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office. o allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after having served for three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would o%viously defeat the very intent of the framers when they wrote this e4ception. Should he %e allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would then %e possi%ly holding office as chief e4ecutive over the same territorial /urisdiction and inha%itants for a total of eighteen consecutive years. his is the very scenario sought to %e avoided %y the Constitution, if not a%horred %y it. (Latasa vs. omelec, !.". #o. $%&8', $) *ecember '))+
Note:
7 #t cannot %e denied that the Court has previously held in Mam%a0Pere8 v. C)M*L*C that after an elective official has %een proclaimed as winner of the elections, the C)M*L*C has no /urisdiction to pass upon his ualifications. 2n opposing party+s remedies after proclamation would %e to file a petition for uo warranto within ten days after the proclamation. ime and again, this Court has held that rules of procedure are only tools designed to facilitate the attainment of /ustice, such that when rigid application of the rules tend to frustrate rather than promote su%stantial /ustice, this Court is empowered to suspend their operation. e will not hesitate to set aside technicalities in favor of what is fair and /ust.
