Manotok v. Barque, the Lot No. 823, Piedad Estate Ownership Controversy Part I : The December 12, 2005 Decision Last March 6, 2012, the Supreme Court en banc promulgated its resolution in Manotok vs. Barque, G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605, the case involving Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate (a former friar land) located in Quezon City. Voting 9-6, the High Tribunal DENIED WITH FINALITY the motions for reconsideration filed by all parties in this case. It REITERATED its August 24, 2012 decision declaring that the subject lot legally belongs to the national government of the Republic of the Philippines, and denying the respective claims of the opposing parties (the Manotoks as petitioners, the Barques as respondents, and the Manahans as intervenors) over Lot No. 823.
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In this four-part series, I will endeavour to sequentially summarize the series of opinions rendered by the Supreme Court in this case, to wit: Part I (this entry) – The December 12, 2005 decision of the 1stDivision (4-1 vote, YnaresSantiago, J., ponente), which denied the Manotoks’ consolidated petitions and sustained the order for the cancellation of the Manotoks’ title and for the reconstitution of the Barques’ title; Part II – The December 18, 2008 en banc resolution (8-6-1 vote, Tinga, J., ponente), which reversed the decision of the 1 stDivision and remanded the petitions to the CA for further proceedings; Part III – The August 24, 2010 en banc decision (9-51 vote,Villarama, J., ponente), which denied the Manotoks’ consolidated petitions and declared their title null and void, but also denied the petition for reconstitution of the Barques and declared that the subject lot legally belongs to the national government of the Republic of the Philippines; Part IV – The March 6, 2012 en banc resolution (9-6 vote,Villarama, J., ponente) denying with finality the motions for reconsideration of the parties.
What went before : The facts The Barques filed a petition for administrative reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 issued in the name of their predecessor, Homer L. Barque, which was allegedly destroyed in the fire that gutted the Quezon City Hall, including the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, sometime in 1988. The Manotoks filed their opposition to the Barques’ petition, claiming that the lot covered by the title sought to be reconstituted by the latter forms part of the land covered by the former’s own reconstituted title, TCT No. RT-22481, and alleging that TCT No. 210177 in the name of Homer L. Barque is spurious. On June 30, 1997, the reconstituting officer denied the reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 on grounds that the two lots covered by the Barques’ title appear to duplicate the lot covered by the Manotoks’ own reconstituted title; and that the Barques’ plan, Fls-3168-D, is a spurious document. On appeal by the Barques, the LRA reversed the reconstituting officer and ordered that reconstitution of the Barques’ title be given due course, but only after the Manotoks’ own title has been cancelled upon order of a court of competent jurisdiction. The parties separately appealed to the CA. The two divisions of the CA where the cases landed similarly modified the LRA decision, ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel the Manotoks’ title without a direct proceeding with the RTC, and directing the LRA to reconstitute the Barques' title. Thus, the Manotoks filed these petitions to the SC. The December 12, 2005 decision of the SC 1st Division
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The consolidated petitions were DENIED by the Supreme Court 1stDivision, which AFFIRMED the appealed CA resolutions. Justice Ynares-Santiago, wrote the opinion for the 1st Division, reasoning that “[t]he LRA properly ruled that the reconstituting officer should have confined himself to the owner's duplicate certificate of title prior to the reconstitution.” She went on to state: The factual finding of the LRA that [the Barques’] title is authentic, genuine, valid, and existing, while [the Manotoks’] title is sham and spurious, as affirmed by the two divisions of the Court of Appeals, is conclusive before this Court. It should remain undisturbed since only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. xxx
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There is no basis in the allegation that petitioners were deprived of “their property” without due process of law when the Court of Appeals ordered the cancellation of their Torrens title, even without a direct proceeding in the RTC . . .[T]here is no need to remand the case to the RTC for a re-determination on the validity of the titles of [the Barques] and [the Manotoks] as the same has been squarely passed upon by the LRA and affirmed by the appellate court. By opposing the petition for reconstitution and submitting their administratively reconstituted title, petitioners acquiesced to the authority and jurisdiction of the reconstituting officer, the LRA and the Court of Appeals, and recognized their authority to pass judgment on their title. All the evidence presented was duly considered by these tribunals. There is thus no basis to petitioners' claim that they were deprived of their right to be heard and present evidence, which is the essence of due process. xxx
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The reconstitution would not constitute a collateral attack on petitioners' title which was irregularly and illegally issued in the first place. xxx.
Only Chief Justice Davide fully concurred with Justice Ynares-Santiago. Justices Quisumbing
and Azcuna wrote separate opinions concurring in the result. The fifth member of the 1st Division, Justice Carpio, dissented and voted to REVERSE the appealed CA resolutions. He summarized his opinion thus: [T]he Heirs of Barque filed before the Register of Deeds an administrative petition to reconstitute their allegedly destroyed TCT. The Register of Deeds, as reconstituting officer, denied the petition of the Heirs of Barque because, based on official records, the property involved is already registered under the Torrens system in the name of Manotok, et al. The LRA affirmed the Register of Deeds, stating that only the proper trial court could cancel the TCT of Manotok, et al. although the LRA believed that the TCT of Manotok, et al. was a sham. The LRA recognized that in an administrative reconstitution, the decision of the reconstituting body is either to deny or approve the reconstitution of the applicant's title, never to cancel the Torrens title of a third party. However, on appeal, the Court of Appeals declared the TCT of Manotok, et al. void and the TCT of the Heirs of Barque valid. Clearly, the Court of Appeals deprived Manotok, et al. of their property without due process of law. The Court of Appeals blatantly disregarded Section 48 of PD 1529 and Section 19 of BP Blg. 129 which confer on the proper trial court exclusive original jurisdiction to cancel a Torrens title in an action directly attacking the validity of the Torrens title. The Court should not countenance this gross injustice and patent violation of the law.
Manotok v. Barque, Part II : The December 18, 2008 En Banc Resolution Part I of this four-part series is a summary of the December 12, 2005decision of the Supreme Court 1st Division denying the Manotoks’ consolidated petitions and sustaining the order for the cancellation of the their title without a direct proceeding before the RTC and for the reconstitution of the Barques’ title. In this entry, we look into the December 18, 2008 en banc resolutionthat reversed the decision of
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the 1st Division and remanded the petitions to the CA for further proceedings.
entry of judgment had already been made by the 1st Division in favor of the Barques.
The intervening facts
The Court justified its pro hac vice reevaluation of the petitions based on the constitutional principle that “no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the [C]ourt in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.” This, according to the Court, is necessitated by the argument “that the 2005 Decision of the First Division is inconsistent with precedents of the Court, and leaving that decision alone without the imprimatur of the Court en banc would lead to undue confusion . . . over whether the earlier ruling of the Division constitutes the current standard with respect to administrative reconstitution of titles.”
After the promulgation of the December 12, 2005 decision, the Manotoks filed several motions for reconsideration with the 1st Division but these were all DENIED by the Court. On May 2, 2006, the decision of the 1st Division was entered in the Book of Entries of Judgment. But when the Barques moved for the execution of the decision, the Manotoks sought the referral of the motion to the Court en banc, which the Court en banc accepted on July 26, 2006. On September 7, 2006, the Manahans sought to intervene in the case, alleging that their predecessor-in-interest, Vicente Manahan, was issued Sales Certificate No. 511 covering the subject lot. On December 18, 2008, the Court promulgated an en banc that SET ASIDE the decision and resolutions of the 1st Division and RECALLED the entry of judgment. Voting 8-6 with 1 abstention, the Court REVERSED the decisions and resolutions of the CA and the LRA, and REMANDED the cases to the CA for further proceedings. How the court en banc voted The Court en banc decided to accept the cases from the 1st Division “on a pro hac vice basis to lend much needed jurisprudential clarity as only the Court en banc can constitutionally provide.” J. Tinga wrote the opinion for the Court. He was joined by CJ Puno, and JJ. Austria-Martinez, Velasco and Brion. Concurring with their respective separate opinions were J. Carpio, with whom J. Carpio-Morales joined, and J. Corona. J. Ynares-Santiago, the ponente of the 1st Division decision and resolutions, wrote a dissenting opinion. She was joined by JJ. Quisumbing, Azcuna, Chico-Nazario, Reyes, and Leonardo-De Castro. J. Nachura did not take part. Issue: Can the Court en banc validly re-evaluate the decision of the 1stDivision? The Court first grappled with what it called “procedural unorthodoxies” involved in the reevaluation of the Manotoks’ petitions even after an
Issue: Did the LRA and the CA have jurisdiction to annul the Manotoks’ title? The Court held that the LRA and the CA had no jurisdiction to direct the annulment of the Manotoks’ title. It reasoned: Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 . . . provides that “[a] certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack [...and] cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.” Clearly,the cancellation of the Manotok title cannot arise incidentally from the administrative proceeding for reconstitution of the Barque title even if the evidence from that proceeding revealed the Manotok title as fake. Nor could it have emerged incidentally in the appellate review of the LRA's administrative proceeding. There is no doubt that the Court of Appeals does not have original jurisdiction to annul Torrens titles or to otherwise adjudicate questions over ownership of property. Its exclusive original jurisdiction is determined by law, particularly by Batas Pambansa (B.P. 129). Section 9 of that law restricts the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to special civil actions and to actions for annulment of judgments of the regional trial court. Still, the Court of Appeals did acquire jurisdiction over the Barques’ and the Manotoks’ petitions, albeit in the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the ruling of the LRA, also pursuant to Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. Thus, for the appellate court to be able to direct the cancellation of a Torrens title in the course of reviewing a decision of the LRA, the LRA itself must have statutory authority to cancel a Torrens title in the first place. xxx the
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Nowhere in [Section 6 of P.D. No. 1529 where general functions of the Land Registration
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Commissioner are enumerated] is it stated that the LRA has the power to cancel titles. Indeed, the Barques are unable to point to any basis in law that confirms the power of the LRA to effect such cancellation, even under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 26 as amended by Rep. Act No. 6732, which authorizes the administrative reconstitution of titles in limited cases. In fact . . . such laws take great care to ensure that a petition for administrative reconstitution of title will not disturb existing Torrens titles.
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 26 as amended by Rep. Act No. 6732, which authorizes the administrative reconstitution of titles in limited cases. In fact . . . such laws take great care to ensure that a petition for administrative reconstitution of title will not disturb existing Torrens titles.
It is thus clear that neither the Court of Appeals nor the LRA had jurisdiction to cancel the Manotok title.
Issue: Should the Supreme Court, after dismissing the Barques’ petition for administrative reconstitution, act further on the apparent problems of the Manotoks’ title?
Issue: Did the LRA and the CA have jurisdiction to annul the Manotoks’ title? The Court held that the LRA and the CA had no jurisdiction to direct the annulment of the Manotoks’ title. It reasoned: Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 . . . provides that “[a] certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack [...and] cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.” Clearly, the cancellation of the Manotok title cannot arise incidentally from the administrative proceeding for reconstitution of the Barque title even if the evidence from that proceeding revealed the Manotok title as fake. Nor could it have emerged incidentally in the appellate review of the LRA's administrative proceeding. There is no doubt that the Court of Appeals does not have original jurisdiction to annul Torrens titles or to otherwise adjudicate questions over ownership of property. Its exclusive original jurisdiction is determined by law, particularly by Batas Pambansa (B.P. 129). Section 9 of that law restricts the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to special civil actions and to actions for annulment of judgments of the regional trial court. Still, the Court of Appeals did acquire jurisdiction over the Barques’ and the Manotoks’ petitions, albeit in the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the ruling of the LRA, also pursuant to Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. Thus, for the appellate court to be able to direct the cancellation of a Torrens title in the course of reviewing a decision of the LRA, the LRA itself must have statutory authority to cancel a Torrens title in the first place. xxx
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Nowhere in [Section 6 of P.D. No. 1529 where the general functions of the Land Registration Commissioner are enumerated] is it stated that the LRA has the power to cancel titles. Indeed, the Barques are unable to point to any basis in law that confirms the power of the LRA to effect such cancellation, even under
It is thus clear that neither the Court of Appeals nor the LRA had jurisdiction to cancel the Manotok title.
After noting the apparent flaws in the Manotoks’ claim, which it described as “considerable and disturbing enough,” the Court decided to remand the case to the CA for reception of evidence on the validity of the Manotoks’ title. It explained this extraordinary step in the following wise: It must be borne in mind that the disputed property is part of the “Friar Lands” over which the Government holds title and are not public lands but private or patrimonial property of the Government and can be alienated only upon proper compliance with the requirements of Act No. 1120 or the Friar Lands Act. xxx
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The Alonso [v. Country Club] approach [of declaring that a former friar land still legally belongs to the national government for failure of the private claimant to establish a clear title thereto] especially appeals to us because, as in this case, the subject property therein was a Friar Land which under the Friar Lands Law (Act No. 1120) may be disposed of by the Government only under that law. Thus, there is greater concern on the part of this Court to secure its proper transmission to private hands, if at all. At the same time, the Court recognizes that there is not yet any sufficient evidence for us to warrant the annulment of the Manotok title. All that the record indicates thus far is evidence not yet refuted by clear and convincing proof that the Manotoks’ claim to title is flawed. To arrive at an ultimate determination, the formal reception of evidence is in order. This Court is not a trier of fact or otherwise structurally capacitated to receive and evaluate evidence de novo. However, the Court of Appeals is sufficiently able to undertake such function.
The Separate Concurring Opinion of Justice Carpio
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Like the majority, J. Carpio holds that the the re-evaluation of the consolidated petitions is proper even after entry of the 1st Division’s decision. He does not however join the majority in remanding the case to the CA. He merely voted to GRANT of the Manotoks’ motion for reconsideration,REVERSE the 1st Division’s decision and resolution and RECALL its Entry of Judgment, and DENY the petition for administrative reconstitution respondents Heirs of Homer L. Barque, Sr.
a prior title, which was the only “duly issued existing Torrens title” over the property issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.”
J. Carpio argued that the doctrine of immutability is not applicable in this case since “the 12 December 2005 Decision never became final and executory,” thus:
...[R]econstitution, even judicial reconstitution, does not confirm or adjudicate ownership over a property. Reconstitution merely restores a missing certificate of title in the same condition that it was when lost or destroyed, nothing more. If the original title had a legal defect at the time of the loss or destruction, as when the land covered is part of the public forest, the reconstituted title does not cure such defect. xxx.
There are two compelling jurisdictional reasons why the 12 December 2005 Decision of the First Division never became final and executory. First, the First Division has no jurisdiction to overturn a doctrine laid down by the Court en banc or in division [“such as the decision in Sps. Antonio and Genoveva BalanonAnicete, et al. v. Pedro Balanon”]. xxx. xxx
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Second, the doctrine of immutability and unalterability of decisions applies only if the trial court or hearing officer has jurisdiction over the subject matter. A decision rendered by a trial court or hearing officer without jurisdiction over the subject matter is void and cannot become final and executory. Such decision cannot even become res judicata because there can be no conclusiveness of judgment if the trial court or hearing officer has no jurisdiction over the subject matter. In these cases, the LRA has no jurisdiction to reconstitute administratively the title of the Barques because such reconstitution constitutes an indirect or collateral attack on the pre-existing Torrens title of the Manotoks over the same property. Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree states that a “certificate of title shall not be subject to a collateral attack.” The LRA, or even any court for that matter, has no jurisdiction to entertain a collateral attack on a Torrens title. The Manotoks’ prior title must be deemed valid and subsisting as it cannot be assailed through collateral attack in the reconstitution proceedings.
J. Carpio noted “a surfeit of forgeries and badges of fraud” regarding the Barque title. He also distinguished the Manotoks’ and the Barques’ situations, thus: “[A]t the time of the reconstitution of the Manotoks’ title, the Barques had no “duly issued existing Torrens title" from the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. When the Barques filed the reconstitution of their title, the Manotoks already had
On the question of whether the LRA has jurisdiction, in administrative reconstitution proceedings, to rule which between two titles over the same property is valid, or who between two claimants over the same property is the lawful owner, J. Carpio held in the negative, thus:
On the question of whether equity can be used to justify the collateral attack on the Manotoks’ title at the LRA level, he reasoned: “no court can extend equity jurisdiction to the LRA where the law has expressly reserved exclusive original jurisdiction to the Regional Trial Court. No court, invoking equity jurisdiction, can also allow a collateral attack on a Torrens title, either before the LRA or before itself, in gross violation of Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree expressly prohibiting collateral attacks on Torrens titles.” The Separate Opinion of Justice Corona J. Corona’s joined the majority in reversing the 1st Division and in remanding the case to the CA for further proceedings. According to him, “the First Division . . . enlarged the scope of the authority of the [LRA] in administrative reconstitution proceedings when it recognized the authority of the LRA to rule that petitioners’ certificate of title was a sham, spurious and not duly issued” since “under PD 1529, the LRA has no authority to rule on the authenticity and validity of a certificate of title.” The referral of the case to the CA for the “complete determination of contentious factual issues” is necessitated because “the investigation and appreciation of facts is beyond the province of [the Supreme Court] as it is neither a trier of fact nor capacitated to appreciate evidence at the first instance. On the other hand, the [CA] has the competence to perform that task.” The dissenting Santiago
opinion
of
Justice
Ynares-
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J. Ynares-Santiago found no compelling reason to further require the referral of these cases to the RTC or the CA for a re-litigation of the issues already raised and resolved by the two divisions of the CA and affirmed by the Court's 1st Division in its final and executory decision dated December 12, 2005. She reasoned that the doctrine of immutability of final and executory decisions precludes the Court from taking this unprecedented action. Particularly, the lady justice found “no justifiable basis to disturb the LRA finding that [the Barques’] Plan FLS-3168-D indeed exists in the official files of LMB, DENR;” thus, she held that “[the Barques’] title, TCT No. 210177, which describes Lot 823 as subdivided into Lots 823-A and 823-B in accordance with Fls-3168-D, [is] in order.” She would also sustain the LRA finding that the Manotoks’ reconstituted title is “spurious, considering petitioners' failure to prove facts contrary to the LRA findings.” She concluded that “since the property covered by [the Manotoks’] reconstituted title is not the property in Matandang Balara that they are occupying as clearly shown by their own documentary evidence, it necessarily follows that they are not the owners of such property.” On the issue of the jurisdiction of the CA to order the cancellation of the Manotoks’ title and the reconstitution of the Barques’ title, she held: The Court of Appeals . . . has the corresponding authority and jurisdiction to decide the appealed case on the basis of the uncontroverted facts and admissions contained in the petition, comment, reply, rejoinder, and memoranda, filed by the parties, and to apply the law applicable in administrative reconstitution proceeding which is Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6732. Section 10, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court specifically mandates that “the findings of fact of the court or agency concerned, when supported by substantial evidence, shall be binding on the Court of Appeals.” Since petitioners were not able to show that the LRA findings of fact were unsupported by evidence, the Court of Appeals committed no error of jurisdiction when it confirmed such findings. Moreover, Section 11 of R.A. No. 6732 provides that: SEC. 11. A reconstituted title obtained by means of fraud, deceit or other machination is void ab initio as against the party obtaining the same and all persons having knowledge thereof.
Thus, the Court of Appeals had the authority to order the cancellation of petitioners’ reconstituted TCT No. RT-22481 after it affirmed the findings of the LRA that petitioners’ TCT No. RT-22481 is spurious and void ab initio. Having also affirmed the LRA finding that respondents’ title, TCT No. 210177, is genuine, valid and existing, the Court of Appeals likewise had the authority to order its reconstitution since this was the final step in the administrative reconstitution process.
On the issue of whether the LRA has jurisdiction to administratively reconstitute the Barques’ title despite the Manotoks’ previously reconstituted title, J. Ynares-Santiago held in the affirmative. She cited the fact that it appears from the records that the location and technical description of the properties described in the parties’ respective titles are not the same. Thus, “[i]t is . . . misleading and baseless for [the Manotoks] to assert that their previously reconstituted title . . . covers the same property as that identified and described in [the Barques’ title] so as to deprive the LRA of jurisdiction over [the Barques’] petition for reconstitution.” However, even assuming that both parties’ respective titles cover the same property, the LRA would still have jurisdiction over respondents' petition for reconstitution, thus: As [the Manotoks] themselves admit, they caused the administrative reconstitution of their TCT No. RT 22481 in 1991 under R.A. No. 6732. On the other hand, [the Barques’] TCT No. 210177 shows that it was issued on September 24, 1975 by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. Its existence was likewise confirmed by the LRA in its Resolution of June 24, 1998 based on the logbook of the Register of Deeds, which contains the list of titles lost during the fire that destroyed its records in 1988. [The Barques’] TCT No. 210177 was, therefore, in existence at the time [the Manotoks] filed their petition for reconstitution. In Alipoon v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that: [I]nasmuch as TCT No. T-17224 has been in existence as early as March 16, 1933, the issuance in 1989 of a reconstituted original certificate of title bearing the number OCT No. RO 12890 (N.A.) over Lot No. 663 in the name of petitioners' parents Fausto Alipoon and Silveria Duria is rendered legally doubtful, and the reconstituted title is void. It, therefore, follows that [the Manotoks’] reconstituted title, even assuming the same to have been duly reconstituted, was deemed nullified by the mere existence of [the Barques’] title at the time of the administrative reconstitution of [the Manotoks’] title. xxx.
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On whether the LRA has jurisdiction to adjudicate the validity of the Manotoks’ title in the administrative reconstitution proceedings filed by the Barques, J. Ynares-Santiago held in the affirmative, reasoning that “[s]ince the LRA had the duty to resolve the petition for reconstitution as well as [the Manotoks’] opposition thereto, it necessarily had to examine the title of the parties, using its technical expertise, to determine if the petition for reconstitution should be given due course, or denied as prayed for by the [Manotoks].” On whether the LRA or the CA has jurisdiction to decide the ownership of the disputed property in the administrative reconstitution of title filed by the Manotoks, J. Ynares-Santiago also held in the affirmative:“[S]ince [the Manotoks] themselves laid before the LRA and the Court of Appeals all their evidence to prove the genuineness of their reconstituted title and their ownership of the property in dispute, the Court of Appeals had the corresponding authority and jurisdiction to pass upon these issues.”
Manotok v. Barque, Part III : The August 24, 2010 En Banc Decision Part I of this four-part series is a summary of the December 12, 2005decision of the Supreme Court 1st Division denying the Manotoks’ consolidated petitions and sustaining the order for the cancellation of the their title without a direct proceeding before the RTC and for the reconstitution of the Barques’ title. Part II, on the other hand, is a summary of the December 18, 2008 en banc resolution that reversed the decision of the 1st Division and remanded the petitions to the CA for further proceedings. In this entry, we will look at the summary of the Court’s August 24, 2010 en banc decision that (1) DENIED that the Manotoks’ petitions, the Manahans’ petition-in-intervention, and the Barques’ petition for reconstitution; (2) declared NULL AND VOID TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) in the name of Severino Manotok IV, et al., TCT No. 210177 in the name of Homer L. Barque, and Deed of Conveyance No. V-200022 issued to Felicitas B. Manahan; (3) ordered The Register of Deeds of Caloocan City and/or Quezon City to CANCEL the said titles; and (4) DECLARED that the subject Lot 823 of the Piedad
Estate, Quezon City, legally belongs to the NATIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, without prejudice to the institution of REVERSION proceedings by the State through the Office of the Solicitor General. We will also look at the dissenting opinions of the minority. The intervening facts After the promulgation of the December 12, 2005 decision, the Manotoks filed several motions for reconsideration with the 1st Division but these were all DENIED by the Court. The decision of the 1st Division was later entered in the Book of Entries of Judgment. But when the Barques moved for the execution of the decision, the Manotoks sought the referral of the motion to the Court en banc, which the Court en banc accepted on July 26, 2006. Meanwhile, the Manahans sought to intervene in the case, alleging that their predecessor-in-interest, Vicente Manahan, was issued Sales Certificate No. 511 covering the subject lot. On December 18, 2008, the Court promulgated an en bancresolution that SET ASIDE the decision and resolutions of the 1 st Division and RECALLED the entry of judgment. Voting 8-6 with 1 abstention, the Court REVERSED the decisions and resolutions of the CA and the LRA, andREMANDED the cases to the CA for further proceedings to determine the validity of the Manotoks’ title. In due time, the CA received evidence with primary focus on whether the Manotoks can trace their claim of title to a valid alienation by the Government of Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate, which was a Friar Land. The Barques and Manahans were likewise allowed to present evidence on their respective claims that may have an impact on the correct determination of the status of the Manotok title. The CA then submitted to the SC a Commissioner’s Report that served as basis for Court’s August 24, 2010 en banc decision. How the court en banc voted The Court voted 9-5 with 1 abstention. Justice Villarama, Jr. wrote theopinion for the Court. Concurring with him were Chief Justice Corona, andJustices Leonardo-De Castro,
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Peralta, Bersamin, Abad, Perez, and Mendoza.
Del
Castillo,
Justice Carpio, with whom Justices Velasco, Jr., and Brion concurred, wrote a dissenting opinion. Justice Carpio Morales wrote a concurring and dissenting opinion. Justice Sereno likewise dissented and reserved the right to issue a separate opinion. Justice Nachura did not take part. The issue The “core issue” identified and resolved by the Court was: Does the absence of approval of the Secretary of the Interior/Agriculture and Natural Resources in Sale Certificate No. 1054 and Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 in favor of the Manotoks warrant the annulment of their title? The Court’s ruling The Court ruled in the AFFIRMATIVE and held that the absence of approval of the Secretary of the Interior/Agriculture and Natural Resources in Sale Certificate No. 1054 and Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 in favor of the Manotoks’ predecessor-ininterest warrants the annulment of the Manotok title. The ponencia of Justice Villarama Justice Villarama cited as the central legal basis of the Court’s rulingSection 18 of Act No. 1120, which provides: “SECTION 18. No lease or sale made by Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands under the provisions of this Act shall be valid until approved by the Secretary of the Interior.” He then explained: It is clear from the foregoing provision that the sale of friar lands shall be valid only if approved by the Secretary of the Interior (later the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce). . . [T]he approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce is indispensable for the validity of the sale of friar lands. xxx. xxx
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[T]he absence of approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce in the sale certificate and assignment of sale certificate made the sale null and void ab initio. Necessarily, there can be no valid titles issued on the basis of such sale or assignment. The Manotoks’ reliance on the presumption of regularity in the statutorily prescribed transmittal by the Bureau of Lands to the Register of Deeds of their deed of conveyance is untenable. In our Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners in Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc., we underscored the mandatory requirement in Section 18, as follows:
Section 18 of Act No. 1120 or the Friar Lands Act unequivocally provides: “No lease or sale made by the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands (now the Director of Lands) under the provisions of this Act shall be valid until approved by the Secretary of the Interior (now, the Secretary of Natural Resources).” Thus, petitioners’ claim of ownership must fail in the absence of positive evidence showing the approval of the Secretary of Interior. Approval of the Secretary of the Interior cannot simply be presumed or inferred from certain acts since the law is explicit in its mandate. This is the settled rule as enunciated in Solid State MultiProducts Corporation vs. Court of Appeals and reiterated in Liao vs. Court of Appeals. Petitioners have not offered any cogent reason that would justify a deviation from this rule. xxx
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In the light of the foregoing, we hold that the Manotoks could not have acquired ownership of the subject lot as they had no valid certificate of sale issued to them by the Government in the first place. Sale Certificate No. 1054 dated March 10, 1919 (Exh. 10) purportedly on file with the DENR-LMB, conspicuously lacks the signature of the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. In fact, Exh. 10 was not included among those official documents submitted by the OSG to the CA. We underscore anew that friar lands can be alienated only upon proper compliance with the requirements of Sections 11, 12 and 18 of Act No. 1120. It was thus primordial for the Manotoks to prove their acquisition of its title by clear and convincing evidence. This they failed to do. Accordingly, this Court has no alternative but to declare the Manotok title null and void ab initio, and Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate as still part of the Government's patrimonial property, as recommended by the CA. The decades-long occupation by the Manotoks of Lot 823, their payment of real property taxes and construction of buildings, are of no moment. It must be noted that the Manotoks miserably failed to prove the existence of the title allegedly issued in the name of Severino Manotok after the latter had paid in full the purchase price. The Manotoks did not offer any explanation as to why the only copy of TCT No. 22813 was torn in half and no record of documents leading to its issuance can be found in the registry of deeds. As to the certification issued by the Register of Deeds of Caloocan, it simply described the copy presented (Exh. 5-A) as “DILAPIDATED” without stating if the original copy of TCT No. 22813 actually existed in their records, nor any information on the year of issuance and name of registered owner. While TCT No. 22813 was mentioned in certain documents such as the deed of donation executed in 1946 by Severino Manotok in favor of his children and the first tax declaration (Exh. 26), these do not stand as secondary evidence of an alleged transfer
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from OCT No. 614. This hiatus in the evidence of the Manotoks further cast doubts on the veracity of their claim. As we stressed in Alonso: Neither may the rewards of prescription be successfully invoked by respondent, as it is an ironclad dictum that prescription can never lie against the Government. Since respondent failed to present the paper trail of the property's conversion to private property, the lengthy possession and occupation of the disputed land by respondent cannot be counted in its favor, as the subject property being a friar land, remained part of the patrimonial property of the Government. Possession of patrimonial property of the Government, whether spanning decades or centuries, can not ipso facto ripen into ownership. Moreover, the rule that statutes of limitation do not run against the State, unless therein expressly provided, is founded on the “the great principle of public policy, applicable to all governments alike, which forbids that the public interests should be prejudiced by the negligence of the officers or agents to whose care they are confided.” (Emphasis supplied.) xxx
xxx
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Considering that none of the parties has established a valid acquisition under the provisions of Act No. 1120, as amended, we therefore adopt the recommendation of the CA declaring the Manotok title as null and void ab initio, and Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate as still part of the patrimonial property of the Government.
The dissent of Justice Carpio Justice Carpio dissented from the majority opinion insofar as it declared that the absence of approval by the Secretary of the Interior/Agriculture and Natural Resources of Sale Certificate No. 1054 and Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 warrants the annulment of the Manotoks’ title. On the majority’s reliance on §18 of Act No. 1120, which provides that “[n]o lease or sale made by Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands under the provisions of this Act shall be valid until approved by the Secretary of the Interior,” Justice Carpio noted: Under Section 18, any sale of friar land by the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands (now Director of Lands) shall not be valid until approved by the Secretary. This means that the Secretary, under Section 18, approves the sale and thus signs the Deed of Conveyance upon full payment of the purchase price. However, under Section 12 of Act No. 1120, the Director of Lands signs the Sales Certificate upon payment of the first instalment. xxx.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Under Section 12, it is only the Director of Land who signs the Sales Certificate. The Sales Certificate operates as a contract to sell which, under the law, the Director of Lands is authorized to sign and thus bind the Government as seller of the friar land. This transaction is a sale of private property because friar lands are patrimonial properties of the Government. In short, the law expressly authorizes the Director of Lands to sell private or patrimonial property of Government under a contract to sell. On the other hand, under Section 18, the Secretary signs the Deed of Conveyance because the Secretary must approve the sale made initially by the Director of Lands. The Deed of Conveyanceoperates as a deed of absolute sale which the Secretary signs upon full payment of the purchase price. The Deed of Conveyance, when presented, is authority for the Register of Deeds to issue a new title to the buyer as provided in Section 122 of the Land Registration Act.
On the citation by the majority of the ruling in Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc. and other cases, which held that the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce is indispensable for the validity of the sale of friar lands, Justice Carpio disagreed and held: T]he ruling in Alonso was superseded with the issuance by then Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary Michael T. Defensor of DENR Memorandum Order No. 16-05, which provides: WHEREAS, it appears that there are uncertainties in the title of the land disposed by the Government under Act 1120 or the Friar Lands Act due to the lack of the signature of the Secretary on the Deeds of Conveyance; WHEREAS, said Deeds of Conveyance were only issued by the then Bureau of Lands (now the Land Management Bureau) after full payment had been made by the applicants thereon subject to the approval of the Secretary of the then Department of Interior, then Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources and presently, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, in accordance with Act 1120; WHEREAS, some of these Deeds of Conveyance on record in the field offices of the Department and the Land Management Bureau do not bear the signature of the Secretary despite full payment by the friar land applicant as can be gleaned in the Friar Lands Registry Book;
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WHEREAS, it is only a ministerial duty on the part of the Secretary to sign the Deed of Conveyance once the applicant had already made full payment on the purchase price of the land; WHEREFORE, for and in consideration of the above premises, and in order to remove all clouds of doubt regarding the validity of these instruments, it is hereby declared that all Deeds of Conveyance that do not bear the signature of the Secretary are deemed signed or otherwise ratified by this Memorandum Order provided, however, that full payment of the purchase price of the land and compliance with all the other requirements for the issuance of the Deed of Conveyance under Act 1120 have been accomplished by the applicant; This Memorandum Order, however, does not modify, alter or otherwise affect any subsequent assignments, transfers and/or transactions made by the applicant or his successors-in-interest or any rights arising therefrom after the issuance of a Transfer Certificate of Title by the concerned Registry of Deeds. (Italicization and boldfacing supplied) Despite the issuance of DENR Memorandum Order No. 16-05, the majority still hold that the memorandum order does not apply to the Manotoks' title. The majority assert that the Manotoks could not benefit from DENR Memorandum Order No. 16-05 because the memorandum order refers only to deeds of conveyance on file with the records of DENR “field offices.” I find the majority's limited application of DENR Memorandum Order No. 16-05 erroneous. While the third WHEREAS clause of DENR Memorandum Order No. 16-05 refers to Deeds of Conveyance on record in the “field offices” of the DENR, the dispositive portion categorically states that “all Deeds of Conveyance that do not bear the signature of the Secretary are deemed signed or otherwise ratified” by the Memorandum Order. The word “all” means everything, without exception. DENR Memorandum Order No. 16-05 should apply to all Deeds of Conveyance, as declared in its dispositive portion, and should not be limited to those on file in DENR “field offices.” Clearly, as expressly stated in Section 20 of Executive Order No. 192, all DENR Regional Offices, including the Regional Office in NCR, are “field offices” of the DENR. Quezon City, where the land in question is situated, is under DENR's NCR “field office.” In 1919, when the Government sold the subject friar land to the Manotoks' predecessors-in-interest, the land was part of the province of Rizal, which also has a “field
office.” Indisputably, DENR Memorandum Order No. 16-05 applies to all Deeds of Conveyance of friar lands anywhere in the Philippines without exception. Thus, conveyances of land within the NCR, including the conveyance to the Manotoks, are covered by DENR Memorandum Order No. 16-05. The first WHEREAS clause clearly states that what DENR Memorandum Order No. 16-05 seeks to cure are the “uncertainties in the title of the land disposed by the Government under Act 1120 or the Friar Lands Act due to the lack of signature of the Secretary on the Deeds of Conveyance.” If we apply DENR Memorandum Order No. 16-05 only to Deeds of Conveyance on record in the “field offices” outside of NCR, the purpose of the issuance of DENR Memorandum Order No. 16-05 will not be fully accomplished. xxx
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The total area of friar lands in NCR, specifically in Muntinlupa, Piedad, San Francisco de Malabon, Santa Cruz de Malabon, and Tala is 86,567.50 acres or 35,032.624 hectares. If DENR Memorandum Order No. 16-05 will not be applied to these areas, the Court will be disquieting the titles held by generations of landowners since the passage in 1904 of Act No. 1120. Thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of landowners could be dispossessed of their lands in these areas.
Justice Carpio held that Manotoks became owners of the subject land upon their full payment of the purchase price to the Government on 7 December 1932. Upon such full payment, the Manotoks had the right to demand conveyance of the land and issuance of the corresponding title to them. He continued: Thus, the Court has held that in cases of sale of friar lands, the only recognized resolutory condition is non-payment of the full purchase price. Pursuant to Section 12 of Act No. 1120, “upon payment of the last installment together with all accrued interest[,] the Government will convey to [the] settler and occupant the said land so held by him by proper instrument of conveyance, which shall be issued and become effective in the manner provided in section one hundred and twenty-two of the Land Registration Act.” Once it is shown that the full purchase price had been paid, the issuance of the proper certificate of conveyance necessarily follows. There is nothing more that is required to be done as the title already passes to the purchaser. The Court has ruled that equitable and beneficial title to the friar land passes to the purchaser from the time the first installment is paid and a certificate of sale
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is issued. When the purchaser finally pays the final installment on the purchase price and is given a deed of conveyance and a certificate of title, the title, at least in equity, retroacts to the time he first occupied the land, paid the first installment and was issued the corresponding certificate of sale. The sequence then is that a certificate of sale is issued upon payment of the first installment. Upon payment of the final installment, the deed of conveyance is issued. It is the Deed of Conveyance that must bear the signature of the Secretary of Interior/Agriculture because it is only when the final installment is paid that the Secretary can approve the sale, the purchase price having been fully paid. This is why DENR Memorandum Order No. 16-05 refers only to the Deed of Conveyance, and not to the Sale Certificate, as the document that is “deemed signed” by the Secretary. In short,Section 18 of Act No. 1120 which states that “(n)o xxx sale xxx shall be valid until approved by the Secretary of Interior” refers to the approval by the Secretary of the Deed of Conveyance. DENR Memorandum Order No. 16-05 expressly acknowledges that “it is only a ministerial duty on the part of the Secretary to sign the Deed of Conveyance once the applicant had already made full payment on the purchase price of the land.” The majority expressly admit in their Reply to the Dissenting Opinion that Memorandum Order No. 16-05: x x x correctly stated that it is only a ministerial duty on the part of the Secretary to sign the Deed of Conveyance once the applicant had made full payment on the purchase price of the land. Jurisprudence teaches us that notwithstanding the failure of the government to issue the proper instrument of conveyance when the purchaser finally pays the final installment of the purchase price, the purchaser of friar land still acquired ownership over the subject land. (Italicization supplied) xxx
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To repeat, Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 expressly and unequivocally acknowledged that Severino Manotok had fully paid the purchase price to the Government. Since the majority expressly admit that upon full payment of the purchase price it becomes the ministerial duty of the Secretary to approve the sale, then the majority must also necessarily admit that the approval of the Secretary is a mere formality that has been complied with by the issuance of Memorandum Order No. 1605. Since the majority further expressly admit that upon full payment of the purchase price ownership of the friar land passes to the purchaser, despite the failure of the Secretary to sign the Deed of Conveyance, then the majority must also necessarily
admit that the Manotoks became the absolute owners of the land upon their full payment of the purchase price on 7 December 1932. xxx
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Indisputably, upon full payment of the purchase price, full and absolute ownership passes to the purchaser of friar land. In the case of the Manotoks’ title, the Deed of Conveyance was issued except that it lacked the signature of the Secretary which the majority erroneously hold is still indispensable pursuant to Alonso. However, Alonso should not be applied to the Manotoks' title because DENR Memorandum Order No. 16-05 was not yet issued when the Court decided Alonso. The absence of the Secretary’s signature in the Deed of Conveyance in Alonso was never cured and hence the Court in Alonso voided the Deed of Conveyance. Besides, in Alonso the corresponding Torrens title was never issued even after a lapse of 66 years from the date of the Deed of Conveyance. In sharp contrast, here the lack of the Secretary’s signature in the Manotoks’ Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 was cured by the issuance of DENR Memorandum Order No. 16-05, which expressly states that “all Deeds of Conveyance that do not bear the signature of the Secretary are deemed signed or ratified x x x.” Moreover, the Manotoks have been issued their torrens title way back in 1933. Section 122 of Act No. 496 states that “[i]t shall be the duty of the official issuing the instrument of alienation, grant, or conveyance in behalf of the Government to cause such instrument, before its delivery to the grantee, to be filed with the register of deeds for the province where the land lies and to be there registered like other deeds and conveyances, whereupon a certificate shall be entered as in other cases of registered land, and an owner's duplicate certificate issued to the grantee.” TCT No. 22813 would not have been issued in the name of Severino Manotok if Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 had not been delivered to the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal to which the land covered by the Manotoks’ title then belonged. The Manotoks should not be punished if the documents leading to the issuance of TCT No. 22813 could no longer be found in the files of the government office, considering that these were pre-war documents and considering further the lack of proper preservation of documents in some government agencies. The fact remains that the Manotoks were able to present a certified true copy of Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 secured from the National Archives which is the official repository of government and public documents. This Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 was signed by the Director of Lands and lacked only the signature of the Secretary of Interior/Agriculture. Memorandum Order No. 1605 speaks of “all Deeds of Conveyance that do not
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bear the signature of the Secretary” and thus includes Deed of Conveyance No. 29204. Under Memorandum Order No. 16-05, such Deeds of Conveyance “are deemed signed” by the Secretary. Clearly, Memorandum Order No. 16-05 applies squarely to the Manotoks’ title for two reasons. First, Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 was signed by the Director of Lands but lacked only the signature of the Secretary. Second, the purchase price for the land subject of Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 had been fully paid on 7 December 1932, more than 77 years ago.
The concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Carpio Morales Justice Carpio Morales held that the absence of the signature of the Secretary of the Interior/Agriculture and Natural Resources in the Manotoks’ Sale Certificate No. 1054 and Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 issued in 1919 and 1932, respectively, does not warrant the annulment of their title. She advanced the thesis the “[t]here is no absence of approval to speak of, since [the Manotoks’] Deed of Conveyance is, pursuant to Order 16-05, deemed signed by the Department Secretary, and there is no legal basis for requiring another signature of the Department Secretary on the Sale Certificate.” She continued: “Contrary to the ponencia's position, Order 16-05 does not contravene Act No. 1120. Order 16-05 did not dispense with the requirement of the Department Secretary’s approval. It recognizes that the approval of the Secretary is still required, the grant or ratification of which is made subject only to certain conditions, precisely “to remove all clouds of doubt regarding the validity of these instruments” which do not bear his signature. The fulfillment of the conditions must be proven to be extant in every case.” Justice Carpio Morales likewise submitted the proposition that “there is no statutory basis for the requirement of the Department Secretary's signature on the Certificate of Sale, apart from a strained deduction of Section 18.” On the majority’s general proposition that a claim of ownership must fail in the absence of positive evidence showing the Department Secretary’s approval, which cannot simply be presumed or inferred from certain acts, Justice Carpio Morales countered: “Jurisprudential review is gainful only insofar as settling that the “approval” by the Department Secretary is indispensable to the validity of the sale. Case law does notcategorically state that the required “approval” must be in the form of a signature on the Certificate of Sale.”
On what constitutes the positive evidence of “approval” to lend validity to the sale of friar lands, Justice Carpio Morales held: The ponencia concludes, as a matter of course on the strength of Sections 11, 12 and 15, that the certificate of sale must be signed by the Department Secretary for the sale to be valid. As discussed earlier, these three Sections neither support the theory that such signing is required in the sale certificate nor shed light to the specifics of approval. I submit that the Department Secretary’s signature on the certificate of sale is not one of the “requirements for the issuance of the Deed of Conveyance under Act No. 1120.” To require another signature of the Department Secretary on the Certificate of Sale, on top of that deemed placed by Order 16-05 on the Deed of Conveyance, is to impose a redundant requirement and render irrelevant the spirit of said Order. IN FINE, petitioners having complied with the conditions for the applicability of Order 16-05, their Deed of Conveyance is “deemed signed or otherwise ratified” by said Order. It bears emphasis that Order 16-05 is a positive act on the part of the Department Secretary to remedy the situation where, all other conditions having been established by competent evidence, the signature of the Department Secretary is lacking. The Order aims to rectify a previous governmental inaction on an otherwise legally valid claim, or affirm an earlier approval shown to be apparent and consistent by a credible paper trail. Obviously, the incumbent Department Secretary can no longer probe into the deep recesses of his deceased predecessors, or unearth irretrievably tattered documents at a time when the country and its records had long been torn by war, just to satisfy himself with an explanation in the withholding of the signature. The meat of Order 16-05 contemplates such bone of contention as in the present case. The cloud of doubt regarding the validity of the conveyance to petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest having been removed by Order No. 16-05, petitioners’ title over Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate is, I submit, valid.
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Man otok v. Barque | GR 162335 & 162605 | March 6, 2012 | J.Villarama, Jr.
Land Titles and Deeds Case Digests FACTS:
The surviving heirs of the late Homer Barque, filed a petition with the LRA for administrative reconstitution of the original copyof TCT No. 210177 issued in the name of Homer L. Barque, which wasdestroyed in the fire that gutted the Quezon City Hall, including the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, sometime in 1988. Insupport of the petition, petitioners submitted the owner’s duplica te copy of TCT No. 210177, real estate tax receipts, tax declarations and the Plan FLS 3168 D covering the property. The Manotoks filed their opposition to the Barques’ petition, claiming that the lot covered by the title sought to be reconstituted by the latter forms part of the land covered by the former’s own reconstituted title, TCT No. RT-22481, and alleging that TCT No. 210177 in the name of Homer L. Barque is spurious. The reconstitution was denied on grounds that the two lots covered by the Barques’ title appear to duplicate the lot covered by the Manotoks’ own reconstituted title; and that the Barques’ plan, Fls-3168-D, is a spurious document. On appeal, the LRA reversed the reconstituting officer and ordered that reconstitution of the Barques’ title be given due course, but only after the Manotoks’ own title has been cancelled upon order of a court of competent jurisdiction. The CA ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel the Manotoks’ title. The latter filed these petitions to the SC.
ISSUE
Who is the legal owner of the Piedad Estate in Quezon City? HELD
The national government of The Republic of the Philippines is the legal owner of the subject property. The Supreme Court denied with finality all the motions for reconsideration filed by all parties in this case.
A valid certificate of sale issued to Severino the official document denominated as “Sale Certificate” clearly required both the signatures of the Director of Lands who issued such sale certificate to an applicant settler/occupant and the Secretary of the Interior/Agriculture and Natural Resources indicating his approval of the sale. These forms had been prepared and issued by the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands under the supervision of the Secretary of the Interior, consistent with Act No. 1120. Manotok’s assignors cannot simply be presumed from the execution of assignment documents in his favor. Neither can it be deduced from the alleged issuance of the halftorn TCT, itself a doubtful document as its authenticity was not established, much less the veracity of its recitals because the name of the registered owner and date of issuance do not appear at all. No Register of Deeds had testified and attested to the fact that the original of TCT No. 22813 wasnot under his/her custody, nor that said certificate of title in the name of Severino Manotok existed in the files of the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan or Quezon City. The claim of the Barques who, just like the Manahans, were unable to produce an authentic and genuine sale certificate, must likewise fail. The Decision discussed extensively the findings of the CA that th eBarques’ documentary evidence were either spurious or irregula rlyprocured, which even buttressed the earlier findings mentioned in the December 18, 2008 Resolution.On the other hand, the belatedly submitted copy of Sale Certificate No.511 by the Manahans was not among those official documents which the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) offered as evidence, as in fact no copy thereof can be found in the records of either the DENR-NCR or LMB. Moreover, the sudden emergence of this unauthenticateddocument is suspicious, considering that Celzo w ho testified, aswitness for both the OSG and the Manahans, categorically admitted that she never actually saw the application to purchase and alleged Sale Certificate No. 511 of the Manahans.
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