national patrimony.docx

BAYLOSIS, FERNANDEZ, FRANCISCO, ORO, TRINIDAD

ARTICLE XII

Section 2. REGALIAN DOCTRINE

NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY Sec. 1. GOALS OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY ECONOMY Q: What is the three-fold goal of the national economy: (Sec.1 Par.1)

The goals of national economy are: 

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More equitable distribution of opportunities, opportunities, income and wealth; Sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and Expanding productivity, as the key to raising the quality of life for all, especially the underpriviledged. underpriviledged.

Q: What is the national policy on industrialization and agricultural development?

A: What is envisioned is not necessarily agriculturally related industrialization but rather industrialization that is a result of releasing through agrarian reform capital locked up in land. This therefore is necessarily related to the article on social justice. Moreover, this does not mean a hardbound rule that agricultural development must have priority over industrialization. What is envisioned is a flexible and rational relationship between the two as dictated by the common good.

(Sec.2. Par. 1)

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All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources

are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands , all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, activities, -

or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens.

Such agreements may be (Sec.1 Par.2) The State shall industrialization and full employment. 

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promote

based on sound agricultural development and agrarian reform; through industries that make full and efficient use of human and natural resources which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices.

(Sec.1. Par.3) In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the country shall be given optimum opportunity to develop. (Role of Private Enterprises) Private enterprises, including corporations, cooperatives, and similar collective organizations, shall be encouraged to broaden the base of their ownership

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for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law.

In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant. (Sec.2. Par. 2) The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.

(Sec.2. Par. 3) The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish- workers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.


(Sec.2 Par. 4) The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country.

In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources.

A: Any person claiming ownership of a portion of the public domain must be able to show title from the state according to any of the recognized modes of acquisition of title. 2. Limits imposed on jura regalia Q: What are the limits imposed by jura regalia.

A: The following are the limits imposed by Sec. 2: 

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(Sec.2 Par. 5)

The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its execution. 

1. THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE Q: What is the regalian doctrine? A: In public law, the distinction is made between imperium and dominium. Imperium

Dominium

Government authority possessed by the State which is appropriately embraced in sovereignty.

The capacity of the State to own and acquire property. Also refers to lands held by the government in a proprietary character: can provide for the exploitation and use of lands and other natural resources.

Dominium is the foundation of the early Spanish decrees embracing the feudal theory of jura regalia that all lands were held from the Crown and the foundation of the first paragraph of Sec. 2 as well.

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Only agricultural lands of the public domain may be alienated; Exploration, development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the state either by directly undertaking such EDU or through co-production, joint venture or production sharing agreements; All agreements with qualified private sector may be for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for another 25 years; The use and enjoyment of the marine wealth of the archipelagic waters, territorial sea, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone shall be reserved for Filipino citizens; and Utilization of natural resources in rivers, lakes, bays and lagoons may be allowed on a ―small scale‖ to Filipino Fili pino citizens or cooperatives.

Q: What is the nature of reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands? A: They are lands of the public domain and, unless classified as alienable, may not be disposed of.

THE IPRA CASE – CRUZ V. SEC. OF DENR, et al. G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2006

As adopted in a republican system, however, the medieval concept of jura regalia has been stripped of regalia overtones: ownership in the vested state, not in the head of the State – be he President or Prime minister.

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus, assailing constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997. And its Implementing Rules and Regulations.

Q: What is the consequence c onsequence of the regalia doctrine of Section 2?

Some provisions of the IPRA amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State‘s ownersip over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the


regalia doctrine embodies in Sec 2, Article XII of the Constitution: 1. Section 3(a) – defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, Section 3(b) defines ancestral lands 2. Section 5, Ancestral domains, inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral domains are private but community property of the indigenous peoples 3. Section 6 defines composition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands 4. Section 7 rights of IPs over ancestral domains 5. Section 8 rights of IPs over ancestral lands 6. Section 57 which provides for priority rights of IPs in benefits over natural resources within the areas they claim, right to enter into agreements with non-IPs for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years 7. Section 58 which gives IPs responsibility over the area they claim Petitioner also contends that all encompassing definition of “ancestral domains” and “ancestral lands” violate rights of private landowners Petitioners question provision of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause. -

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Section 51-53, 59, process of delineation and recognition of AD, vest on NCIP the sole authority to delineate AD and AL Section 52 Upon certification from NCIP that a particular area is an AD, the jurisdiction of other officials over said land terminates Section 63, customary law shall be applied first, in case of doubt / ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of the IPs Customary law shall be used Section 66 NCIP has jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of the IPs

Petitioners assail validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP administrative order #1, series of 1998, which provides that the administrative relation of the NCIP to the office of the president is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination. After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the court voted, the votes were equally divided 7 to 7, the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. After redeliberation, voting remained the same. Pursuant to Tule 56, Section 7, of the rules of civil procedure, the petition is DISMISSED. PUNO – provisions of the IPRA do not contravene the constitution Ancestral domains refer to all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein held under a claim of ownership through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial Ancestral lands refers to lands occupied, possessed and utilized by individuals, families and clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by themselves or through their predecessor-in-interest, under claims of individual or traditional group ownership, continuously to the present Native title refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains which, as far bak as memory reaches, have been held under a claim of private ownership by ICCs/IPs, have never been public lands Carino v. Insular government – Carino was awarded his land. The decision largely rested on the North American constitutionalist‘s concept of ―due process‖ as well as the pronounced policy to ―do justice to the natives‖, Carino is the only case that specifically and categorically recognizes native title In light of the Carino case, AL and AD are not part of the lands of public domain, they are private Public domain: agricultural, forest timber, mineral lands and national parks

or


Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domains

exclusive property by a judgment of the CFI. Also, that they already had a vested right over its mining claims even before PD1214

ICCs/IPs are merely granted the right to ―manage and conserve‖ them for future generations, ―benefit and share‖ the profits from their allocation utilization, and ―negotiate the terms and conditions for their exploration‖ for the purpose of ―ensuring ecological environmental protection and conservation measures‖ – stewardship

Respondents claim that petitioner did not exhaust all administrative remedies. They also cited the pendency of petitioner‘s appeal with the office of the president, of the ruling of the respondent secretary of natural resources which stated that 44 of the mining claims were void for lack of valid ―tie points‖ as required under the Philippine Bill of 1902, and that all the mining claims have been abandoned and cancelled for petitioner‘s non compliance.

4. Filipinization and Utilization of Natural Resources Q: Who are qualified to take part in the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources? A: Filipino citizens, and corporations or associations at least sixty per cent of whose capital is owned by Filipino citizens are qualified to take part in exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources. (Note: however, that as to marine wealth only Filipino citizens is qualified. This is also true of natural resources in rivers, bays, lakes, and lagoons, but with allowance for cooperatives.) But subject to the strict limitations in the last two paragraphs of Section 2 the State may enter into service with foreign owned corporations.

Alienation of Natural Resources

1. General Rule: All natural resources CANNOT be alienated 2. Exception: Agricultural lands SANTA ROSA MINING CO. V. LEIDO, JR. G.R. No. L-49109 December 1, 1987

Petitioner, Santa Rosa Mining Co. assails validity of Presidential Decree No 1214 which requires holders of subsisting and valid patentable mining claims located under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 to file a mining lease application within one year from the approval of the decree. Petitioner accordingly filed a application, but ―under protest‖

mining

lease

Petitioner contends that its 50 mining claims had already been declared as its own private and

ISSUE: W/N property right is absolute

Decision: Property right is not absolute but is merely a possessory right. Petitioner‘s claims are still unpatented. They can be lost through abandonment of forfeiture or they may be revoked for valid legal grounds. W/N PD1214 is unconstitutional

Decision: PD1214 is constitutional. It is a valid exercise of the sovereign power of the state, as owner, over lands of public domain of which petitioner‘s mining claims still form a part, and over the patrimony of the nation, which mineral deposits are a valuable asset. Mere location does not mean absolute ownership over the land / mining claim, to rule otherwise would imply that location is all that is needed to acquire and maintain rights over a located mining claim. The locator should faithfully and consistently comply with the requirements for annual work and improvements in the located mining claim. SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION V. COURT APPEALS G.R. NO. 57667, May 28, 1990

Petitioner San Miguel Corporation who purchased Lot 684 from Silverio Perez, seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals denying its application for registration of the said land in view of its failure to show entitlement thereto. The Solicitor General opposed and appealed the application contending that the land in question is part of public domain and that petitioner being a private corporation is disqualified from holding alienable lands of the public domain. In this case,


petitioner claims that its predecessor-in-interest had open, exclusive and undisputed possession of the land in question based on documentary evidence of tax declarations and receipts, and testimonial evidence of vendor Silverio Perez. Issue: Whether or not the evidence presented by the petitioner is sufficient to warrant a ruling that petitioner and/or its predecessor-in-interest has a registrable right over Lot 684. SC: No, a prescription can only transform public land into private land if it is alienable land. Open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period of 30 years ceases to be public land and becomes private property. However, it must be CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHED. This quantum of proof is necessary to avoid erroneous validation of actually fictitious claims of possession over the property in dispute. Perez‘s documentary evidence of tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or right of possession over a piece of land but mere indicia of a claim of ownership. They only become strong evidence of ownership of land acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession. Also, the testimony of vendor Silverio Perez as proof of actual possession is weak and was not corroborated by other witnesses. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (G.R. No. 133250, November 11, 2003)

FACTS: This petition asked the Court to legitimize a government contract that conveyed to a private entity 157.84 hectares of reclaimed public lands along Roxas Boulevard in Metro Manila at the negotiated price of P1,200 per square meter. However, published reports place the market price of land near that area at that time at a high of P90,000 per square meter. The difference in price is a staggering P140.16 billion, equivalent to the budget of the entire Judiciary for seventeen years and more than three times the Marcos Swiss

deposits that this Court forfeited in favor of the government. Public Estates Authority (PEA), under the JVA, obligated itself to convey title and possession over the Property, consisting of approximately One Million Five Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Four Hundred Forty One (1,578,441) Square Meters for a total consideration of One Billion Eight Hundred Ninety Four Million One Hundred Twenty Nine Thousand Two Hundred (P1,894,129,200.00) Pesos, or a price of One Thousand Two Hundred (P1,200.00) Pesos per square meter. ISSUE: Whether or not stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands, reclaimed or to be reclaimed on portions of Manila Bay, violate the Constitution? RULING: Submerged lands, like the waters (sea or bay) above them, are part of the State‘s inalienable natural resources. Submerged lands are property of public dominion, absolutely inalienable and outside the commerce of man. This is also true with respect to foreshore lands. Any sale of submerged or foreshore lands is void being contrary to the Constitution as it violates Section 2, Article XII. In the instant case, the bulk of the lands subject of the Amended JVA are still submerged lands even to this very day, and therefore inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Of the 750 hectares subject of the Amended JVA, 592.15 hectares or 78% of the total area are still submerged, permanently under the waters of Manila Bay. Under the Amended JVA, the PEA conveyed to Amari the submerged lands even before their actual reclamation, although the documentation of the deed of transfer and issuance of the certificates of title would be made only after actual reclamation. This Resolution does not prejudice any innocent third party purchaser of the reclaimed lands covered by the Amended JVA. Neither the PEA nor Amari has sold any portion of the reclaimed lands to third parties. Title to the reclaimed lands remains with the PEA. As held in the 9 July 2002 Decision, the Amended JVA "violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution."


Applying the Regalian Doctrine

The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas is rooted in the Regalian doctrine which holds that the State owns all lands and waters of the public domain. Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all ―lands, territories and possessions‖ in the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown. The King, as the sovereign ruler and representative of the people, acquired and owned all lands and territories in the Philippines except those he disposed of by grant or sale to private individuals. After the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, government reclaimed and marshy disposable lands of the public domain continued to be only leased and not sold to private parties. These lands remained sui generis, as the only alienable or disposable lands of the public domain the government could not sell to private parties. Until now, the only way the government can sell to private parties government reclaimed and marshy disposable lands of the public domain is for the legislature to pass a law authorizing such sale. One reason for the congressional authority before lands under Section 59 of CA No. 141 previously transferred to government units or entities could be sold to private parties is that Section 60 of CA No. 141 exempted government units and entities from the maximum area of public lands that could be acquired from the State. In order for PEA to sell its reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public domain, there must be legislative authority empowering PEA to sell these lands, though any legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain would be subject to the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain, such legislative authority could only benefit private individuals. The rationale behind the constitutional ban on corporations from acquiring, except through lease, alienable lands of the public domain is not well understood; In actual practice, the constitutional ban strengthens the constitutional limitation on individuals from acquiring more than the allowed area of alienable lands of the public domain; The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is to transfer ownership of

only a limited area of alienable land of the public domain to a qualified individual. The mere reclamation of certain areas by PEA does not convert these inalienable natural resources of the State into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain—there must be a law or presidential proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and open to disposition or concession. PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino‘s actual issuance of a special patent covering the Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an official proclamation classifying the Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, open to disposition or concession to qualified parties. Spanish Law of Waters of 1866; Under the Spanish Law of Waters, a private person reclaiming from the sea without permission from the State could not acquire ownership of the reclaimed land which would remain property of public dominion like the sea it replaced. Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters must be read together with laws subsequently enacted on the disposition of public lands. There is no legislative or Presidential act classifying the additional 592.15 hectares submerged areas under the Amended JVA as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain open to disposition—these areas form part of the public domain, and in their present state are inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Under EO No. 525, in relation to PD No. 3A and PD No. 1084, PEA became the primary implementing agency of the National Government to reclaim foreshore and submerged lands of the public domain. Section 3 of EO No. 525, by declaring that all lands reclaimed by PEA ―shall belong to or be owned by PEA could not automatically operate to classify inalienable lands into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. As manager, conservator and overseer of the natural resources of the State, DENR exercises ―supervision and control over alienable and disposable public lands.‖ PEA needs authorization from DENR before PEA can undertake reclamation in Manila Bay, or in any part of the country; DENR is vested with the power to authorize the


reclamation of areas under water, while PEA is vested with the power to undertake the physical reclamation of areas under water, whether directly or through private contractors.

Registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership but is merely evidence of ownership previously conferred by any of the recognized modes of acquiring ownership.

Absent two official acts—a classification that these lands are alienable or disposable and open to disposition and a declaration that these lands are not needed for public service, lands reclaimed by PEA remain inalienable lands of the public domain.

Jurisprudence holding that upon the grant of the patent or issuance of the certificate of title the alienable land of the public domain automatically becomes private land cannot apply to government units and entities like PEA.

The constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain does not apply to the sale of PEA‘s patrimonial lands; While PEA may sell its alienable or disposable lands of the public domain to private individuals, it cannot sell any of its alienable or disposable lands of the public domain to private corporations.

The grant of legislative authority to sell public lands in accordance with Section 60 of CA No. 141 does not automatically convert alienable lands of the public domain into private or patrimonial lands—the alienable lands of the public domain must be transferred to qualified private parties, or to government entities not tasked to dispose of public lands, before these lands can become private or patrimonial lands.

The provision in PD No. 1085 stating that portions of the reclaimed lands could be transferred by PEA to the ―contractor or his assignees‖ would not apply to private corporations but only to individuals because of the constitutional ban.-

As the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide, with authority to sell reclaimed lands, PEA took the place of DENR as the government agency charged with leasing or selling reclaimed lands of the public domain.

EO No. 654, which authorized PEA ―to determine the kind and manner of payment for the transfer‖ of its assets and properties, does not exempt PEA from the requirement of public auction, but merely authorizes PEA to decide the mode of payment, whether in kind or in installment, but does not authorize PEA to dispense with public auction.

The mere fact that alienable lands of the public domain are transferred to PEA and issued land patents or certificates of title in PEA‘s name does not automatically make such lands private — to allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.-

At the public auction sale, only Philippine citizens are qualified to bid for PEA‘s reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public domain.The failure of an earlier public bidding involving only 407.84 hectares, is not a valid justification for a subsequent negotiated sale of 750 hectares, almost double the area publicly auctioned. Under either the BOT Law or the Local Government Code, the contractor or developer, if a corporate entity, can only be paid with lease-holds on portions of the reclaimed land, and if the contractor or developer is an individual, portions of the reclaimed land, not exceeding 12 hectares of non-agricultural lands, may be conveyed to him in ownership.

Whether the Amended JVA is a sale or a joint venture, the fact remains that the Amended JVA required PEA to ―cause the issuance and delivery of the certificates of title conveying AMARI‘s Land Share in the name of AMARI,‖ a stipulation contravening Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution—the transfer of title and ownership to AMARI clearly means that AMARI will ―hold‖ the reclaimed lands other than by lease, and the transfer of title and ownership is a ―disposition‖ of the reclaimed lands, a transaction considered a sale or alienation under CA No. 141, the Government Auditing Code, and Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Historically, lands reclaimed by the government are sui generis, not available for sale to private parties unlike other alienable public


lands—reclaimed lands retain their inherent potential as areas for public use or public service.

LAUREL V GARCIA G.R. NOS. 9203 & 9247, JULY 25, 1990

In question in this case are four properties located in Japan given by the Japanese government to the Philippine government, under the Reparations Agreement, as part of the indemnification for the lives and property loss during World War II. These are the Nampeidai property housing the current Philippine embassy, the Kobe commercial property used as a warehouse, the Kobe residential property left vacant and Roponggi property. Under RA 1789, the Reparations Law, these properties shall only be made available to private sector by sale to Filipino citizens or to 10 % Filipino owned companies. President Aquino issued Order No. 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of the four properties. Petitions for prohibition seeking to enjoin respondents from proceeding with the bidding of the Roponggi property Respondents aver that the subject property is not under our laws but under Japanese laws, that Roponggi has ceased to become property of public dominion, that is has become patrimonial property and that the intention to convert it to private use has been manifested by overt acts such as the transfer of embassy to Nampeidai, issuance of AOs for the alienation of Japanese properties, issuance of EO296, Enactment of CARP, holding of public bidding, acknowledgement of the senate of government‘s intention to remove Roponggi from public purpose, the court‘s dismissal of petition in Ojeda v. Bidding Committee Issues: o

o

o

o

Can the Roponggi property and others of its kinds be alienated by the Philippine govt? Does the CE, etc. have the authority and jurisdiction to sell Roponggi property? Authority of the government to alienate the Roponggi property and make it available for the sale to non-Filipino citizens and entities Bidding procedures being discriminatory against Filipino citizens by denying them right to be informed

RULING: 1. Roponggi is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the property has become patrimonial. The respondents failed to do this. 2. Roponggi property outside the commerce of man

3. The fact that the Roponggi property has not been used for a long time does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property There is no formal declaration from government to withdraw it from being such

the

Abandonment cannot be inferred from non-use alone, it must be a certain and positive act based on correct legal premises Lex situs rule is misplaced. The opinion does not tackle the alienablity of the real properties procured through reparations nor the existence in what body of the authority to sell them Petition granted The Roponggi property is classified as property belonging to the State and intended for some public use. The president cannot convey valuable real property of the government on her own will. Considering the properties‘ importance and values, the laws on conversion and disposition of property must be applied. Disposition: The petition for prohibition enjoining the government from selling the properties is granted and the temporary restraining order delaying the sale is made temporary. Q: Section 2 speaks of co-production, joint venture, or production sharing agreements” as modes of exploration, development, and utilization of inalienable lands. Does this effectively exclude the lease system?

A: Yes, with respect to mineral and forest lands. Agricultural lands may be subject of Lease. See Section 3.

MINERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FACTORAN G.R NO. 98332, January 16, 1995

FACTS:


Former President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order Nos. 211 and 279 as par to her interim legislative powers. Executive Order No. 211 prescribes the interim procedures in the processing and approval of applications for the exploration, development and utilization of minerals pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Executive Order No. 279 authorizes the Department of Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary to negotiate and conclude joint venture, co-production or production-sharing agreements for the exploration, development, and utilization of mineral resources. Petitioner is an organization composed of mining prospectors and claimowners or claimholders questions the constitutionality of the two administrative orders (DAO) issued by then Secretary of DENR Fulgencio Factoran Jr. pursuant to the abovementioned executive issuances. Department Administrative Order No. 57 declares ―all existing mining lease or agreements which are granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution…shall be converted into production sharing agreements within one (1) year from the effectivity of these guidelines.‖ In relation to this, DAO No. 82 provides that a failure to submit Letter of Intent (LOI) and Mineral Production-Sharing Agreement (MPSA) within from the effectivity of Department Administrative Order No. 57 shall cause the abandonment of mining, quarry, and sand and gravel claims.

1. Did the DENR Secretary act with grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the two DAOs? 2. Are the two Department Administrative Orders valid? RULING: 1. It cannot be established that the Secretary went beyond what is prescribed by the EO 279. Section 6 of the said issuance specifically authorizes him to promulgate such supplementary rules and regulations as may be necessary to effectively implement the provisions thereof. Also, the DAOs and the EOs are related in order to carry out the mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. 2. The two are reasonably directed to the accomplishment of the purposes of the law under which they were issued and were intended to secure the paramount interest of the public, their economic growth and welfare. Their constitutionality must be sustained and their force and effect upheld for they were part of the legitimate exercise of the police power of the State. The non-impairment clause guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution should not prevail over the legitimate exercise of police power since it has been ruled by the Court that such power is not absolute. Thus, it is a valid exercise.

Furthermore, it claims that the DAOs are issued in excess of jurisdiction and are inconsistent with the executive orders. Also, DAO No. 57 violates the non-impairment clause of the 1987 Constitution for the unduly pre-termination of the existing mining leases and other mining agreements and automatic conversion of said agreements into production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from its effectivity.

Disposition

The Court, acting on petitioner's urgent exparte petition for issuance of a restraining order/preliminary injunction, issued a Temporary Restraining Order, upon posting of a P500, 000.00 bond, enjoining the enforcement and implementation of DENR Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82, as amended, Series of 1989 and 1990, respectively.

President Aquino signed EO 279 authorizing the DENR secretary to negotiate and conclude joint venture, co-production and production sharing agreement for the exploration, development and utilization of mineral resources and prescribing the guidelines for those agreements involving technical and financial assistance by foreign-owned corporations for large scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals pursuant to Sec2 of Article XII.

ISSUES:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on July 2, 1991 is hereby LIFTED. This is about a petition to seek the validity of two administrative orders issued by the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources to carry the provisions of an executive order.


The DENR secretary issued Administrative Order 57, the ―Guidelines of Mineral Product Sharing Agreement under Executive Order 279‖ and Administrative Order 82, laying the ―Procedural Guidelines on the Award of Mineral Product Sharing Agreement through Negotiation.‖ The miners filed the complaint saying that the secretary was practicing in excess of the powers given to him. Admin Order 57 effectively transforms lease agreements into mineral product sharing agreements which imply negotiations. The negotiations negate the miners‘ contention that the order mandates compulsion or automatic conversion. The petition is dismissed and the temporary restraining order issued against the DENR orders is lifted. Both orders are valid and constitutional. Q: May aliens lease lands of the public domain?

A: No, because that would involve enjoyment of the natural resources of the public domain REPUBLIC VS ROSEMOOR

have been omitted by Section 2 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 embodies the new constitutional mandate. It has repealed or amended all laws, executive orders, presidential decrees, rules and regulations -- or parts thereof -- that are inconsistent with any of its provisions. It is relevant to state, however, that Section 2 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution does not apply retroactively to a ―license, concession or lease‖ granted by the government under the 1973 Constitution or before the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution on February 2, 1987. As noted in Miners Association of the Philippines v. Factoran Jr. , the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission emphasized the intent to apply the said constitutional provision prospectively. While RA 7942 has expressly repealed provisions of mining laws that are inconsistent with its own, it nonetheless respects previously issued valid and existing licenses LA BUGAL B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOC. VS. RAMOS

FACTS:

Facts:

Rosemoor Mining and Development Corp. through its 4 stockholders were granted permission to look for marble deposits in the mountains of Biak na Bato. After they succeeded in discovering marble deposits they acquired the corresponding license to exploit the said marble deposits through the Bureau of Mines (License No. 33). However on September 6,1986 Ernesto Maceda, then DENR minister cancelled the said license. License was issued in 1982 under PD463, which was later repealed by RA7942.

On July 25, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 2796 authorizing the DENR Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate recommendation of the Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent.

Issue: Whether or not provisions of Article XII Section 2 may apply to mining licenses issued before its promulgation. Ruling: No. PD 463, as amended, pertained to the old system of exploration, development and utilization of natural resources through licenses, concessions or leases. While these arrangements were provided under the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions, they

On March 3, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act), which took effect on April 9, 1995. On March 30, 1995, before the effectivity of RA 7942, the President signed a Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with WMCP, covering close to 100,000 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato. On August 15, 1995, the Environment Secretary Victor Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order 95-23, which was later repealed by DENR Administrative Order 96-40, adopted on December 20, 1996.


Petitioners prayed that RA 7942 and its implementing rules as well as the FTAA between the government and WCMP be declared unconstitutional. In accordance with the text of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, FTAAs should be limited to ―technical or financial assistance‖ only. Contrary to the language of the Constitution, the WMCP FTAA allows WMCP, a fully foreign-owned mining corporation, to extend more than mere financial or technical assistance to the State, for it permits WMCP to manage and operate every aspect of the mining activity identical to a service contract. Issue: Whether or not RA7942 and the FTAA between the Government and WCMP unconstitutional. Ruling: Yes. Respondents insist that ―agreements involving technical or financial assistance‖ is just another term for service contracts. They contend that the proceedings of the CONCOM indicate ―that although the terminology ‗service contract‘ was avoided [by the Constitution], the concept it represented was not.‖ They add that ―[t]he concept is embodied in the phrase ‗agreements involving financial or technical assistance.‘‖ The phrase ―service contracts‖ has been deleted in the 1987 Constitution‘s Article on National Economy and Patrimony. If the CONCOM intended to retain the concept of service contracts under the 1973 Constitution, it could have simply adopted the old terminology (―service contracts‖) instead of employing new and unfamiliar terms (―agreements . . . involving either technical or financial assistance‖). Such a difference between the language of a provision in a revised constitution and that of a similar provision in the preceding constitution is viewed as indicative of a difference in purpose. If, as respondents suggest, the concept of ―technical or financial assistance‖ agreements is identical to that of ―service contracts,‖ the CONCOM would not have bothered to fit the same dog with a new collar. To uphold respondents‘ theory would reduce the first to a mere euphemism for the second and render the change in phraseology meaningless. In any case, the constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs with

foreign-owned corporations is an exception to the rule that participation in the nation‘s natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly, such provision must be construed strictly against their enjoyment by nonFilipinos. As Commissioner Villegas emphasized, the provision is ―very restrictive.‖ Commissioner Nolledo also remarked that ―entering into service contracts is an exception to the rule on protection of natural resources for the interest of the nation and, therefore, being an exception, it should be subject, whenever possible, to stringent rules.‖ Indeed, exceptions should be strictly but reasonably construed; they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provision rather than the exception. With the foregoing discussion in mind, this Court finds that R.A. No. 7942 is invalid insofar as said Act authorizes service contracts. Although the statute employs the phrase ―financial and technical agreements‖ in accordance with the 1987 Constitution, it actually treats these agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial ownership to foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental law. Section 33, which is found under Chapter VI (Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement) of R.A. No. 7942 states: SEC. 33. Eligibility.—Any qualified person with technical and financial capability to undertake large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of mineral resources in the Philippines may enter into a financial or technical assistance agreement directly with the Government through the Department. [Emphasis supplied.] ―Exploration,‖ as defined by R.A. No. 7942, means the searching or prospecting for mineral resources by geological, geochemical or geophysical surveys, remote sensing, test pitting, trending, drilling, shaft sinking, tunneling or any other means for the purpose of determining the existence, extent, quantity and quality thereof and the feasibility of mining them for profit. A legally organized foreign-owned corporation may be granted an exploration permit, which vests it with the right to conduct exploration for all minerals in specified areas, i.e., to enter, occupy and explore the same. Eventually, the foreign-


owned corporation, as such permittee, may apply for a financial and technical assistance agreement. “Development” is the work undertaken to explore and prepare an ore body or a mineral deposit for mining, including the construction of necessary infrastructure and related facilities.

Finally, under the Act, an FTAA contractor warrants that it ―has or has access to all the financing, managerial, and technical expertise. . . .‖ This suggests that an FTAA contractor is bound to provide some management assistance – a form of assistance that has been eliminated and, therefore, proscribed by the present Charter.

―Utilization‖ ―means the extraction or disposition of minerals.‖ A stipulation that the proponent shall dispose of the minerals and byproducts produced at the highest price and more advantageous terms and conditions as provided for under the implementing rules and regulations is required to be incorporated in every FTAA.

By allowing foreign contractors to manage or operate all the aspects of the mining operation, the above-cited provisions of R.A. No. 7942 have in effect conveyed beneficial ownership over the nation‘s mineral resources to these contractors, leaving the State with nothing but bare title thereto.

A foreign-owned/-controlled corporation may likewise be granted a mineral processing permit. ―Mineral processing‖ is the milling, beneficiation or upgrading of ores or minerals and rocks or by similar means to convert the same into marketable products.

Moreover, the same provisions, whether by design or inadvertence, permit a circumvention of the constitutionally ordained 60%-40% capitalization requirement for corporations or associations engaged in the exploitation, development and utilization of Philippine natural resources.

An FTAA contractor makes a warranty that the mining operations shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 7942 and its implementing rules and for work programs and minimum expenditures and commitments. And it obliges itself to furnish the Government records of geologic, accounting, and other relevant data for its mining operation. ―Mining operation,‖ as the law defines it, activities involving exploration, means mining feasibility, development, utilization , and processing . The underlying assumption in all these provisions is that the foreign contractor manages the mineral resources, just like the foreign contractor in a service contract. Furthermore, Chapter XII of the Act grants foreign contractors in FTAAs the same auxiliary mining rights that it grants contractors in mineral agreements (MPSA, CA and JV). Parenthetically, Sections 72 to 75 use the term ―contractor,‖ without distinguishing between FTAA and mineral agreement contractors. And so does ―holders of mining rights‖ in Section 76. A foreign contractor may even convert its FTAA into a mineral agreement if the economic viability of the contract area is found to be inadequate to justify large-scale mining operations, provided that it reduces its equity in the corporation, partnership, association or cooperative to forty percent (40%).

In sum, the Court finds the following provisions of R.A. No. 7942 to be violative of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution: (1) The proviso in Section 3 (aq), which defines ―qualified person,‖ to wit: Provided, That a legally organized foreign-owned corporation shall be deemed a qualified person for purposes of granting an exploration permit, financial or technical assistance agreement or mineral processing permit.

(2) Section 23, which specifies the rights and obligations of an exploration permittee, insofar as said section applies to a financial or technical assistance agreement, (3) Section 33, which prescribes the eligibility of a contractor in a financial or technical assistance agreement; (4) Section 35, which enumerates the terms and conditions for every financial or technical assistance agreement; (5) Section 39, which allows the contractor in a financial and technical assistance agreement to convert the same into a mineral production-sharing agreement; (6) Section 56, which authorizes the issuance of a mineral processing permit to a contractor in a financial and technical assistance agreement;


The following provisions of the same Act are likewise void as they are dependent on the foregoing provisions and cannot stand on their own: (1) Section 3 (g), which defines the term ―contractor,‖ insofar as it applies to a financial or technical assistance agreement. Section 34, which prescribes the maximum contract area in a financial or technical assistance agreements; Section 36, which allows negotiations for financial or technical assistance agreements; Section 37, which prescribes the procedure for filing and evaluation of financial or technical assistance agreement proposals; Section 38, which limits the term of financial or technical assistance agreements; Section 40, which allows the assignment or transfer of financial or technical assistance agreements; Section 41, which allows the withdrawal of the contractor in an FTAA; The second and third paragraphs of Section 81, which provide for the Government‘s share in a financial and technical assistance agreement; and Section 90, which provides for incentives to contractors in FTAAs insofar as it applies to said contractors; When the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and that if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue independently, then, if some parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus dependent, conditional, or connected, must fall with them. LA BUGAL-B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION, INC. V. VICTOR RAMOS GR No. 127882 December 01, 2004

FACTS This case is in continuation of the petition already decided by the Court last January 27, 2004. The established facts are already mentioned in the

first case. But since the Court found new issues, there is a need to reiterate the said facts. The Court decided that RA 7942, DAO 9640, and the WMCP FTAA as unconstitutional on the ground that service contracts are prohibited in the 1987 Constitution (Section 2, Article XII) in favor of the rights of the Filipinos to enjoy the national patrimony. Subsequently, the respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. After which petitioners were required to comment on the matter and then the oral argument was set. Hence, new issues were found out by the Court after hearing the arguments of the parties involved. ISSUES 1. The constitutionality of RA 7942, DAO 96-40, and the WMCP FTAA 2. Has the case been rendered moot by the sale of WMC shares in WMCP to Sagittarius (60 percent of Sagittarius‘ equity is owned by Filipinos and/or Filipino-owned corporations while 40 percent is owned by Indophil Resources NL, an Australian company) and by the subsequent transfer and registration of the FTAA from WMCP to Sagittarius? 3. Assuming that the case has been rendered moot, would it still be proper to resolve the constitutionality of the assailed provisions of the Mining Law, DAO 96-40 and the WMCP FTAA? 4. What is the proper interpretation of the phrase Agreements Involving Either Technical or Financial Assistance contained in paragraph 4 of Section 2 of the Article XII of the 1987 Constitution? RULING 1. In sum, there is a complete reversal of the previous decision of the Court. To uphold the unconstitutionality of RA 7942, DAO 96-40, and the WMCP FTAA would lead to a stagnant and underdevelop mineral, petroleum, and other resources of the State. If there large scale exploration, development, and utilization run by foreign corporations, there would be immediate and tangible benefit for the Filipino people. Foreign corporations or enterprises would contribute to the economic development and general welfare of the


country, conserve the environment, and uplift the well-being of the affected local communities. Though the State permits the foreign contractor sufficient and reasonable management authority over the enterprise it invested, in order to ensure that it is operating efficiently and profitably, to protect its investments and to enable it to succeed, still the former has control over the latter for the Constitution laid down the safeguards as stated in Section 2, Article XII. Nowhere does it require the government to hold all exploration permits and similar authorizations. In fact, there is no prohibition at all against foreign or local corporations or contractors holding exploration permits. Pursuant to Section 20 of RA 7942, an exploration permit merely grants to a qualified person the right to conduct exploration for all minerals in specified areas. Such a permit does not amount to an authorization to extract and carry off the mineral resources that may be discovered. This phase involves nothing but expenditures for exploring the contract area and locating the mineral bodies. As no extraction is involved, there are no revenues or incomes to speak of. In short, the exploration permit is an authorization for the grantee to spend its own funds on exploration programs that are pre-approved by the government, without any right to recover anything should no minerals in commercial quantities be discovered. The State risks nothing and loses nothing by granting these permits to local or foreign firms; in fact, it stands to gain in the form of data generated by the exploration activities. The exploration permit serves a practical and legitimate purpose in that it protects the interests and preserves the rights of the exploration permit grantee (the would-be contractor) -- foreign or local -- during the period of time that it is spending heavily on exploration works, without yet being able to earn revenues to recoup any of its investments and expenditures. Minus this permit and the protection it affords, the exploration works and expenditures may end up benefiting only claim-jumpers. Such a possibility tends to discourage investors and contractors. Thus, Section 3(aq) of RA 7942 may not be deemed unconstitutional. A careful perusal of the statute itself and its implementing rules reveals that neither RA 7942 nor DAO 99-56 can be said to convey beneficial ownership of any mineral resource or product to any foreign FTAA contractor. WMCP FTAA uncovers no indication

that it confers upon WMCP ownership, beneficial or otherwise, of the mining property it is to develop, the minerals to be produced, or the proceeds of their sale, which can be legally asserted and enforced as against the State. 2. No. The basis for declaring the FTAA void still has to be revisited, reexamined, and reconsidered. It not per se defective or unconstitutional. It was questioned only because it had been issued to an allegedly non-qualified, foreign-owned corporation. The decision has yet to become final, to all intents and purposes, the FTAA must be deemed valid and constitutional. 3. The Court must recognize the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest involved, as well as the necessity for a ruling to put an end to the uncertainties plaguing the mining industry and the affected communities as a result of future FTAAs, and the need to avert a multiplicity of suits. Strong reasons of public policy demand that the constitutionality issue be resolved now. 4. The provision in question was intended to refer to agreements other than those for mere financial or technical assistance. It should be interpreted as allowing foreign corporations to do large-scale exploration within the State, for the former is in reality not capable of doing it given the lump sum of money needed and the risk of the undertaking. It is given that even the basic services naturally shouldered by the State are not adequately provided to the people. The inclusion of ―technical or financial assistance‖ recognizes the fact that foreign business entities and multinational corporations are the ones with the resources and know-how to provide technical and/or financial assistance of the magnitude and type required for large-scale exploration, development and utilization (EDU) of these resources. The drafters agreed that these agreements include management authority with respect to the day-to-day operations of the enterprise and measures for the protection of the interests of the foreign corporation, provided that Philippine sovereignty over natural resources and full control over the enterprise undertaking the exploration, development and utilization activities remain firmly in the State. In relation to this, the Court agreed that the framers were going to permit service contracts with foreign corporations as contractors, but with safety measures to prevent abuses, as an exception to the general norm


established in paragraph 1, Section 2, Article XII. This provision reserves or limits to Filipino citizens—and corporations at least sixty (60) percent of which is owned by such citizens—the EDU of natural resources. This prompted by the insufficiency of Filipino capital and the felt need for foreign investments in the EDU of natural resources. This new service contracts, the foreign contractors provide capital, technology and technical know-how, and managerial expertise in the creation and operation of large-scale mining/extractive enterprises; and the government, through its agencies (DENR, MGB), actively exercises control and supervision over the entire operation. Also, may be entered into only with respect to minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils. Disposition

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT the respondents' and the intervenors' Motions for Reconsideration; to REVERSE and SET ASIDE this Court's January 27, 2004 Decision; to DISMISS the Petition; and to issue this new judgment declaring CONSTITUTIONAL (1) Republic Act No. 7942 (the Philippine Mining Law), (2) its Implementing Rules and Regulations contained in DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 9640 -- insofar as they relate to financial and technical assistance agreements referred to in paragraph 4 of Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution; and (3) the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) dated March 30, 1995 executed by the government and Western Mining Corporation Philippines Inc. (WMCP), except Sections 7.8 and 7.9 of the subject FTAA which are hereby INVALIDATED for being contrary to public policy and for being grossly disadvantageous to the government Q: May the State enter into service contracts with foreign owned corporations? A: Yes, but subject to the strict limitations in the last two paragraphs of Section 2. Financial and technical agreements are a form of service contracts. Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils.

The grant of such service contracts is subject to several safeguards, among them:

(1) that the service contract be crafted in accordance with a general law setting standard or uniform terms, conditions, and requirements; (2) the President be the signatory for the government; and (3) the President report the executed agreement to Congress within thirty days. Q: May such financial and technical assistance agreements include management?

A: Yes, to the extent that management is incidental to such agreements. Section 3. LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN ARE CLASSIFIED INTO

LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN ARE CLASSIFIED INTO AGRICULTURAL , FOREST OR TIMBER, MINERAL LANDS AND NATIONAL PARKS. AGRICULTURAL LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN MAY BE FURTHER CLASSIFIED BY LAW ACCORDING TO THE USES TO WHICH THEY MAY BE DEVOTED. ALIENABLE LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN SHALL BE LIMITED TO AGRICULTURAL LANDS. PRIVATE CORPORATIONS OR ASSOCIATIONS MAY NOT HOLD SUCH ALIENABLE LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN EXCEPT BY LEASE , FOR A PERIOD NOT EXCEEDING TWENTY-FIVE YEARS, RENEWABLE FOR NOT MORE THAN TWENTY -FIVE YEARS, AND NOT TO EXCEED ONE THOUSAND HECTARES IN AREA . CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES MAY LEASE NOT MORE THAN FIVE HUNDRED HECTARES , OR ACQUIRE NOT MORE THAN TWELVE HECTARES THEREOF, BY PURCHASE, HOMESTEAD, OR GRANT.

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE REQUIREMENTS OF CONSERVATION , ECOLOGY, AND DEVELOPMENT, AND SUBJECT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF AGRARIAN REFORM, THE CONGRESS SHALL DETERMINE, BY LAW, THE SIZE OF LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN WHICH MAY BE ACQUIRED, DEVELOPED, HELD, OR LEASED AND THE CONDITIONS THEREFOR .

Q: How are lands of the public classified? A: 1. Agricultural

2. Forest/timber 3. Mineral lands & 4. National Parks


Q: Who classifies public lands? A: In Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689 (June 22, 1984), the Court said: ―The Classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department (through the Office of the President, upon recommendation by the DENR) and not of the Courts. In the absence of such classification, the land remains unclassified until it is released therefrom and rendered upon open disposition. This should be honored Constitutional precepts. This is also in consonance with the Regalian doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in the land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony.‖

Note: The power of the executive is delegated power by virtue of C.A. No. 141. Q: Who may change the classification of public lands, e.g., from inalienable to alienable, and how is the classification done? A: The classification of public lands is the exclusive prerogative of the President upon the recommendation of the pertinent department head. (C.A. No. 141) Q: Does the classification of land change automatically when the nature of the land changes? A: No. A positive act of the executive is needed. Anyone who claims that classification has been changed must be able to show the positive act of the President indicating such positive act. The classification is descriptive of the legal nature of the land and NOT what it looks like. Hence, for instance, that a former forest has been denuded does not by the fact mean it has ceased to be forest land. Director of Lands v. Judge Aquino, G.R. No. 31688, December 17, 1990 Alienable lands of public domain

1. Only agricultural lands are alienable.

2. Agricultural lands may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted. Limitations regarding Alienable Lands of the Public Domain 1. For private corporations or associations

A. They can only hold alienable lands of the public domain BY LEASE B. Period: Cannot exceed 25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years C. Area: Lease cannot exceed 1,000 hectares Note: A corporation sole is treated like other private corporations for the purpose of acquiring public lands. 2. For Filipino citizens

A. Can lease up to 500 hectares B. Can ACQUIRE not more than 12 hectares by purchase, homestead or grant. Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology and development, and subject to the requirements of agrarian reform, Congress shall determine by law the size of the lands of the public domain which may be acquired, developed, held or lease and the conditions therefore. Q: What are the means by which lands of the public domain become private land?

1. Acquired from government by purchase or grant; 2. Uninterrupted possession by the occupant and his predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial; and 3. Open, exclusive, and undisputed possession of ALIENABLE (agricultural) public land for a period of 30 years. Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 146 SCRA 508 (1986). A. Upon completion of the requisite period, the land becomes private property ipso jure without need of any judicial or other sanction. B. Here, in possession since time immemorial, presumption is that the land was never part of public domain.


C. In computing 30 years, start from when land was converted to alienable land, not when it was still forest land D. Presumption is that land belongs to the State.

SECTION 4.

THE CONGRESS SHALL, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, DETERMINE , BY LAW, THE SPECIFIC LIMITS OF FOREST LANDS AND NATIONAL PARKS, MARKING CLEARLY THEIR BOUNDARIES ON THE GROUND. THEREAFTER, SUCH FOREST LANDS AND NATIONAL PARKS SHALL BE CONSERVED AND MAY NOT BE INCREASED NOR DIMINISHED , EXCEPT BY LAW . THE CONGRESS SHALL PROVIDE FOR SUCH PERIOD AS IT MAY DETERMINE , MEASURES TO PROHIBIT LOGGING IN ENDANGERED FORESTS AND WATERSHED AREAS.

Forest and parks

Forest deals with two classes of public land:  

forest and parks.

Once forest lands are converted into parks, logging may no longer be permitted in the area. Reclaimed land is public land. Before it can be registered as private property it must be classified as alienable

whether alienable or not, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water and other natural resources. They include lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by indigenous cultural communities but to which they have traditionally had access for their subsistence and traditional activities. Ancestral land – is a narrower concept. It refers to those held under the same conditions as ancestral domain but limited to lands that are not merely occupied and possessed but also utilized by cultural communities under the claim of individual or traditional group ownership. These include but are not limited to residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forest, farms and tree lots. (Section 3[a] and [b], R.A. No. 8371)

The ancestral land referred to in Section 5 of the Constitution include both those outside and those inside autonomous regions. For the purpose of protecting indigenous cultural communities, the provision in effect authorizes Congress to prescribe how priorities are to be determined in the case of conflict between law & customary law. Protection of Indigenous Cultural Communities

1. The State protects the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands 

Section 5. ANCESTRAL LANDS

THE STATE, SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THIS CONSTITUTION AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICIES AND PROGRAMS , SHALL PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES TO THEIR ANCESTRAL LANDS TO ENSURE THEIR ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL WELL-BEING.



Subject to Constitutional provisions Subject to national development policies and programs

2. In determining ownership and extent of ancestral domain, Congress may use customary laws on property rights and relations.

OF CUSTOMARY LAWS GOVERNING PROPERTY RIGHTS OR RELATIONS IN DETERMINING THE OWNERSHIP AND EXTENT OF ANCESTRAL DOMAIN.

Q: R.A. No. 8371, the Indigenous People Rights Act, is assailed as unconstitutional on the ground that it deprives the State of its ownership over lands of the public domain and the natural resources in them. Comment.

Q: What is the difference between “ancestral lands” and “ancestral domain”?

A: The vote of the Supreme Court on the subject was equally divided, 7-7. Cruz. V. Secretary, G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000.

THE CONGRESS MAY PROVIDE FOR THE APPLICABILITY

A: Ancestral domain – is an all-embracing concept and natural resources therein and includes ancestral lands, forest, pasture, residential, agricultural and other lands individually owned

The opinion defending constitutionality held the following:


(1) Ancestral domain and ancestral lands are not part of lands of the public domain. They are private and belong to indigenous people. Cariño v. Insular Government, 212 U.S. 449 recognized native title held by Filipinos from time immemorial and excluded from the concept of jura regalia. (2) The right of ownership granted does not include natural resources. The right to negotiate terms and conditions and conditions over natural resources covers only exploration to ensure to environmental protection. It is not a grant of exploration rights. (3) The limited right of management refers to utilization as expressly allowed in Section2, Article XII. (4) What is given is priority right, not exclusive right. It does not preclude the State from entering into co-production, joint venture, or production sharing agreements with entities. The opinion assailing the constitutionality of the law held the following:

Court observed that Article XII, Section 6 of the Constitution says that cooperatives are subject to the duty of the State to intervene when the common good demands. La Union Electric Cooperative v. Judge Yaranon, G.R. No. 87001, December 4, 1989. Section 6 embodies guidelines which are applicable not only to the utilization of land but to everything which, in an agrarian economy has special relevance to land. The section in general is a rejection of laissez faire and adopts the principles of solidarity. Thus, where needed for common good, the state may intervene in the operation. Section 7. PRIVATE LANDS

SAVE IN CASES OF HEREDITARY SUCCESSION , NO

(1) the law amounts to an abdication of the authority over a significant are of the country‘s patrimony;

PRIVATE LANDS SHALL BE TRANSFERRED OR CONVEYED EXCEPT TO INDIVIDUALS , CORPORATIONS, OR ASSOCIATIONS QUALIFIED TO ACQUIRE OR HOLD LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN .

(2) it relinquishes full control of natural resources in favor of indigenous people;

Q: What does “private lands” mean?

(3) the law contravenes the provision which says that all natural resources belong to the state. Section 6. THE USE OF PROPERTY BEARS A SOCIAL FUNCTION, AND ALL ECONOMIC AGENTS SHALL CONTRIBUTE TO THE COMMON GOOD . INDIVIDUALS AND PRIVATE GROUPS, INCLUDING CORPORATIONS, COOPERATIVES , AND SIMILAR COLLECTIVE ORGANIZATIONS , SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT TO OWN , ESTABLISH, AND OPERATE ECONOMIC ENTERPRISES , SUBJECT TO THE DUTY OF THE STATE TO PROMOTE DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND TO INTERVENE WHEN THE COMMON GOOD SO DEMANDS .

Q: May the National Electrification Authority, a government agency empowered by law to supervise and control electric cooperatives and borrowers, override the decisions of cooperative board?

A: In the facts of this case the Court saw no proof of direct injury to petitioner. Hence it did not want to rule directly on the constitutionality of the law authorizing NEA to override a board. However, the

A: Private land means any land of private ownership. This includes both land owned by private individuals and lands which are patrimonial property of the States or of Municipal Corporation. Q: Who may acquire private land? A: On the basis of their capacity ―to acquire or hold lands of the public domain,‖ General rule: Private lands transferred or conveyed to:

CAN

only

be

A. Filipino citizens B. Corporations or associations incorporated in the Philippines, at least 60% of whose capital is owned by Filipino citizens Exceptions:

A. In intestate succession, where an alien heir of a Filipino is the transferee of private land. B. A natural born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a


transferee of PRIVATE LAND, subject to limitation provided by law. Hence, land can be used only for residential purposes. In this case, he only acquires derivative title. C. Foreign states may acquire land but only for embassy and staff residence purposes. Q: Can a Filipino corporation acquire land? A: Filipino citizens can both ―acquire‖ or otherwise ―hold‖ lands of the public domain; Filipino corporations cannot acquire lands of the public domain but they can ―hold‖ such lands by modes other than acquisition, such as lease.

―…the purpose and spirit of the 1935 Constitution ‗demands that in the absence of a capital stock, the controlling membership should be composed of Filipino citizens.‖ Bermudo v. Court of Appeals, 155 SCRA 8, 17 (1987), citing Register of Deeds v. Ung Siu Si Temple, 97 Phil. 58, 61. Filipino citizenship is only required at the time the land is acquired. Thus, loss of citizenship after acquiring the land does not deprive ownership. Restriction against aliens only acquisition of ownership. Therefore:

applies

to

A. Aliens may be lessees or usufructuaries of private lands B. Aliens may be mortgages of land, as long as they do not obtain possession thereof and do not bid in the foreclosure sale. Land tenure is not indispensable to the free exercise of religious profession and worship. A religious corporation controlled by non-Filipinos cannot acquire and own land, even for religious purposes. Remedies to recover disqualified aliens:

private

lands

from

B. Alien still has the title (didn‘t pass it on to one who is qualified) 1. A foreigner may own a unit in a condominium because the prohibition on aliens is only from acquiring land. The land on which the condominium stands is owned by the condominium corporation. 2. May a Filipino citizen recover private land invalidly sold to a disqualified alien? NO. In cases where: -

The alien vendee has become a Filipino citizen, recovery is barred. The alien vendee has sold it to a Filipino, recovery by the original owner is likewise barred.

FRENZEL V. CATITO GR NO. 143958, July 11, 2003 FACT:

Alfred Fritz Frenzel is an Australian citizen of German descent. He worked as a pilot with the New Guinea Airlines. He arrived in the Philippines in 1974, started engaging in business in the country two years thereafter, and married Teresita Santos, a Filipino citizen. In 1981, Alfred and Teresita separated from bed and board without obtaining a divorce. In 1983, he met Ederlina Catito, a Filipina and a native of Davao City, who is working as Australia in a massage parlor and without his knowledge that Ederlina Catito was married to Klaus Muller, a German national. Ederlina stop working and went home to Philippine where Alfred joined her. Alfred told Ederlina that he was married but he was eager to divorce his wife. Various properties was purchased in Ederlina‘s name using the personal funds of Alfred.

3. An action by the former Filipino owner to recover the land

The relation was become soured after Alfred discovered that she had been married. Ederlina had not been able to secure a divorce from his husband. To avoid complication, Alfred decided to live separately from Ederlina and cut off all contacts with her.

A. The former pari delicto principle has been abandoned

Alfredo files a complaint against her for recovery of real and personal properties invoking Article 22 of

1. Escheat proceedings 2. Action for reversion under the Public Land Act


the New Civil Code – unjust enrichment. Ederlina denied his accusation and insisting that she acquired the said properties with her personal funds, and as such, Alfred had no right. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of Ederlina. The Court of Appeal rendered a decision affirming the decision of RTC. ISSUE:

Whether or not Alfred may recover the properties that was brought using his personal fund so he can enable to sell the same at the public auction? RULING:

No. Section 7, Article XII provides: Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.

Aliens, whether individual or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence, they have also been disqualified from acquiring private lands. Article 22 of New Civil Code:

Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.

Art. 1416 of New Civil Code: When the agreement is not illegal per se but is merely prohibited, and the prohibition by the law is designated for the protection of the plaintiff, he may, if public policy is thereby enhanced, recover what he has paid or delivered.

A contract that violates the Constitution and the law is null and void and vest no rights and creates no obligation. It produces no legal effect at all. The petitioner, being a party to an illegal contract, cannot come into court of law and ask to have his illegal objective carried out. One who loses his money or property by knowingly engaging in a contract or transaction which involves moral turpitude may not maintain an action for his losses. To claim equity they must come with clean hand.

RAMIREZ V VDA DE RAMIREZ 111 SCRA 704, 712 (1982) FACT:

Jose Eugenio Ramirez, Filipino National, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with only his widow as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of Manila Branch X on July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa Palacio was appointed administratrix of the estate. In the time she submitted an inventory of the estate as follows: On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of the partition as follows: The property of the deceased is to be divided into two parts. One part shall go to the widow “en pleno dominio‖ in satisfaction of her legitime; the other part or ―free portion‖ shall go to the nephews Jorge and Roberto Ramirez ― en nuda propriedad‖. Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the portion is charged with widow‘s usufruct and the remaining two thirds (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of Wanda de Wrobleski (companion of the deceased). Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the ground that ….(c) that the grant of a usufruct over real property in the Philippines in favor of Wanda, who is an alien violates Section 5, Article II of the Philippine Constitution. ISSUE:

Whether or not an alien may acquire private land in the Philippines? RULING:

The court upheld the validity of the usufruct given to Wanda on the ground that the Constitution cover not only succession by operation of law but also testamentary succession. Section 7 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution: Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.

Section 7 contains an exception: aliens may acquire private land ―in cases of hereditary succession.‖


RAMIREZ V VDA DE RAMIREZ GR NO. 108998, August 24, 1994 FACT:

On June 17, 1978, respondent spouses bought lots 347 and 348 as their residence with a total area of 91.77 sq.m. situated in San Pablo City, from one Cristeta Dazo Belen. At the time of the purchase, respondent spouses where then natural-born Filipino citizen. On February 5, 1987, the spouse files an application for registration of the title of the two (2) parcels of land before the RTC of San Pablo City. This time, however, they were no longer Filipino citizens and have opted to embrace Canadian citizenship through naturalization. ISSUE:

Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over parcel of land which he acquired by purchase while he is still a citizen of the Philippines, from the vendor who has complied with the requirements for registration under the Public Land Act (CA 141)? RULING:

For the purpose of transfer and/or acquisition of a parcel of residence land, it is not significant whether the private respondent are no longer Filipino citizens at the time they purchased or registered the parcels of land in question. What is important is that they were formerly natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and a transferees of a private land, they could apply for registration in accordance with the mandate of Section 8, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Batas Pambansa Blg. 185. Sec. 2. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship and who has the legal capacity to enter into a contract under Philippine laws may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of one thousand (1,000) square meters , in the case of urban land, or one hectare in the case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence. In the case of married couples, one of them may avail of the privilege herein granted; provided, that if both shall avail of the same, the total area acquired shall not exceed the maximum herein fixed.

In case the transferee already owns urban or rural lands for residential purposes, he shall still be entitled to be a transferee of additional urban or rural lands for residential purposes which, when added to those already owned by him, shall not exceed the maximum areas herein authorized. CRUZ, J., dissenting

The important point is that the respondent spouses are no longer citizens of the Philippines but naturalized Canadians. It does not follow that because they were citizens of the Philippines when they acquired the land, they can register it in their name now even if they are no longer Filipino. Strict compliance is necessary because of the special privilege granted to former Filipinos who have become foreigners by their own choice. If we can be so strict with our citizens, I see no reason why we should be less so with those who have renounced our country. Additional Notes: RA 8179. FOREIGN INVESTMENT ACT SEC. 10. Other Rights of Natural Born Citizen Pursuant to the Provisions of Article XII, Section 8 of the Constitution. - Any natural born citizen who has lost his Philippine citizenship and who has the legal capacity to enter into a contract under Philippine laws may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of five thousand (5,000) square meters in the case of urban land or three (3) hectares in the case of rural land to be used by him for business or other purposes. In the case of married couples, one of them may avail of the privilege herein granted: Provided, That if both shall avail of the same, the total area acquired shall not exceed the maximum herein fixed.

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