OSG Reply - Republic v Sereno

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT

Manila

En Banc REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE C. CALIDA,

Petitioner, - versus

-

MARIA LOURDES SERENO,

G.R. NO. 237428 P.A.

Respondent. x------------------------------x

REPLY (to the Comment dated March 16, 2018) Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by Solicitor General Jose C. Calida, in compliance with the Resolution dated March 20, 2018,1 respectfully states: PREFATORY STATEMENT

I shall be telling this with a sigh Somewhere ages and ages hence: Two roads diverged in a wood, and I I took the one less traveled by, And that has made all the difference — The Road Not Taken, Robert Frost

For the first time in the country’s history, the Solicitor General is asking this Honorable Court to remove a Chief Justice from office. That this recourse has not been taken before does not make it wrong. Although the quo warranto 1

The OSG received the Resolution requiring the petitioner to file a Reply on March 23, 2018. 1

Republic represented by Solicitor General Jose C. Calida vs. Sereno G.R. No. 237428 Reply x----------------------------x

petition is unprecedented, the Solicitor General is vested with authority to institute it. Respondent naturally disputes the action taken by the Solicitor General. In her comment, she contends that the Court has no jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the quo

warranto petition her. be Allegedly, a constitutional officeragainst who may removedsheonlyis by impeachment. To be sure, Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that impeachable officers may be removed on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. The same impeachable officers may, however, be ousted from office through quo warranto proceedings pursuant to Section 5(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, which does not exclude such officers from its coverage. The use of quo warranto as a remedy against impeachable officers like the instant case has precedents. In Estrada vs. Macapagal-Arroyo,2 this Honorable Court exercised jurisdiction over a Quo Warranto petition against an impeachable official, no less than the President of the Republic. The ruling made a full determination on the inquiry whether to oust said impeachable official, or find that she was unlawfully holding office in this wise, “In view whereof, the petitions of Joseph Ejercito Esrada challenging the respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as thede jure 14 th President of the Republic are dismissed.”

In an earlier case in 1986, this Honorable Court likewise ruled on the legitimacy of the President’s dominion over her office viz, “ … President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government but is in fact and law a de jure government3.”

2

Estrada vs. Desierto and Estrada vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 146710-15 & G.R. No. 146738 (2 March 2001) 3 Lawyers League for a Better Philippines and/or Oliver A. Lozano vs. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al. [G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986] 2


The inapplicability of statute of limitation on quo warranto as in the instant case has a precedent in Frivaldo vs. Comelec4 where this Honorable Court ruled that dismissal of the quo warranto on the ground of tardiness, as argued by Frivaldo, is not well-taken. Beyond cavil, the riddance of a public officer is the ultimate legal relief sought in both impeachment and quo warranto proceedings. Other than this similarity, the two proceedings diverge like a fork on the road, and the Solicitor General has chosen the path that until now has not been taken, that is to remove the Chief Justice from office. This case stands on terra firma. The Constitution does not include ineligibility to public position as a ground for impeachment. No one can be convicted for ineligibility. The sole purpose of impeachment proceedings is to hold a public officer accountable for wrongdoings committed in office. On the other hand, the quo warranto proceedings instituted by the Solicitor General seeks to oust Respondent because she is ineligible to be the Chief Justice. In other words, the Solicitor General is not asking the Court to remove Respondent for impeachable offenses: it is not the concern of the petition. Instead, the Solicitor General has good reason to believe that Respondent has no authority to occupy the esteemed office of the Chief Justice of the Republic of the Philippines: she had not shown that she possessed proven integrity, an indispensable qualification for appointment to the Judiciary pursuant to Section 7(3), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. Surely, the Solicitor General cannot just sit idly by and allow an unqualified person such as Respondent to continue occupying the highest seat in the highest court of the land: that would be a dereliction of his duty under the Constitution. In the same manner, abdicate its role of applying analysis, the Filipino People possesses proven integrity 4

the Honorable Court cannot the Constitution. In the final deserve a Chief Justice who because that is what the

G.R. No. 87193, 23 June 1989.

3


Constitution—the People’s contract with the Government— demands. It behooves the Honorable Court to enforce that social contract, and in view of Respondent’s failure to establish her integrity, declare the office of the Chief Justice of the Republic of the Philippines vacant.

ARGUMENTS A.

Procedural

1. The Constitution does not exclude quo warranto as a remedy to assail the validity of Respondent’s appointment as

Chief Justice and cause her ouster from office. a. The text of the Constitution allows the ouster of an impeachable official through other modes than impeachment. 2. The Solicitor General, in the exercise of his sound discretion, can institute an action for quo warranto when he has good reason to believe that he has a case against Respondent. 3. This petition for quo warranto against Respondent is not time-barred. a. The prescriptive period one-year under Section 11, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court applies only to a petitioner in a quo warranto proceeding who is claiming a right to the public office and not to the State which has an interest to ensure that only a qualified individual occupies the highest position in the Judiciary.

4


b. Even assuming, arguendo, that a Statequo initiated action of warranto is subject to prescription, the period has not yet tolled against the State. c. Assuming arguendo that the petition for quo warranto is subject to prescription and the one-year period for filing the same had lapsed, it involves a matter of transcendental importance that this Honorable Court is duty-bound to resolve. 4. The direct resort to the Honorable Court is justified. b. Substantive

5. The JBC’s determination of whether Respondent is a person of “proven integrity” during her application for

Chief Justice is not a political question. 6. Respondent is not a person of proven integrity. a.

Respondent

failed

to

prove JBC. her integrity before the b. Religiously complying with the requirement of filing of SALNs is implied from, and not in addition to, the qualification of proven integrity for Members of the Judiciary. c. Respondent failed to religiously file her SALNs

5


casting her integrity in grave doubt.

DISCUSSION a. Procedural Arguments 1. The Constitution does not exclude quo warranto as a remedy to assail the validity of Respondent’s appointment as Chief Justice and cause her ouster from office.

1. In her Comment, Respondent predictably argues that she may be removed from office only through impeachment, to the exclusion of all other remedies like the present petition for quo warranto.5 She claims that the phrase “may be removed from office” in Section 2, Article XI

of the Constitution6 does not signify that members of the Supreme Court may be removed through modes other than impeachment,7 instead, the word “may” qualifies only the penalty imposable after the impeachment trial,i.e., removal from office.8 2. Contrary to Respondent’s stance, quo warranto is the proper remedy to question her eligibility to her current position and cause her removal from office. 3. A petition for quo warranto is a “prerogative writ by which the Government can call upon any person to show by 5 6

Comment, pp. 11-33. Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides: Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.

7 8

Id. at 23. Id. at 26. 6


what warrant he holds a public office or exercises a public franchise.”9 It is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to the use or exercise of a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not wellfounded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege.10 Impeachment, on the other hand, refers to the power of Congress to remove a public official for serious crimes or misconduct, as provided in the Constitution. A mechanism designed to check abuse of power, impeachment has its roots in Athens and was adopted in the United States through the influence of English common law on the framers of the US constitution.11 It is a method of national inquest to protect the State. It does not intend to prosecute; it is not intended for its retributory or restitutory effects. Rather, it is in the nature of an exemplary act by which the State infuses the highest sense of responsibility to public service.12 4. Under Article XI of the Constitution dealing with Accountability of Public Officers, the removal of impeachable officials by means of impeachment relates only to the commission of impeachable offenses, i.e., culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.13 5. There are ways to differentiate these proceedings. 6. As to the grounds, a petitioner in a quo warranto proceeding seeks the ouster of a de facto public officer on the ground of ineligibility or failing to meet the qualifications for such office, while a complainant in impeachment proceedings wants a validly-appointed impeachable officer to be removed from office upon conviction of any of the impeachable offenses. 7.

In

the

present

petition,

what

is

assailed

is

Respondent’s unlawful occupation of the position of Chief

Justice because of her ineligibility. She failed to fulfill the general qualification for members of the judiciary that an 9

Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Hon. Mendez , G.R. No. 103702, December 6, 1994. Velasco v. Belmonte, G.R. No. 211140, January 12, 2016. Corona v. Senate, G.R. No. 200242, July 17, 2012. 12 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 354, July 28, 1986. 13 Id. at Section 2. 10 11

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applicant must be a person of proven integrity. This petition does not involve issues or matters relating to impeachable offenses that Respondent may have committed, nor does it accuse her of committing such offenses, which fall squarely within the ambit of impeachment proceedings pending before the House of Representatives. 8. Another distinction concerns the jurisdiction to hear and decide these proceedings. Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution vests the Congress with the exclusive power to initiate and try impeachment cases against impeachable officials, while Section 5(1), Article VIII thereof grants the Court the power to exercise srcinal jurisdiction over petitions for quo warranto as provided for in Rule 66 of the Rules of Court. They are exclusive and distinct proceedings anchored on different premises. An impeachment case against a Supreme Court Justice for an impeachable offense presupposes a valid appointment of that Justice. In contrast, the quo warranto petition asserts that the appointment of Respondent is void. Since her appointment is void, Respondent may therefore be removed by another legal process, i.e., through a petition for quo warranto initiated by the Solicitor General in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.14 9. To iterate, the removal through impeachment is proper when what is involved is the commission of impeachable offenses by impeachable officers. On the other hand, quo warranto is proper when what is assailed is the public officers’ qualifications or the validity of their appointments. 10. Respondent contends that the word “may” qualifies only the penalty imposable after the impeachment trial. Following Respondent’s proposition, the Senate sitting as an impeachment court can, after finding an official guilty of an impeachable offense, impose a penalty lower than removal from office, like suspension or reprimand. This is absurd.

14

See Sections 1 and 2, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court. 8


11. The penalty which the Senate may impose in an impeachment case shall be limited to removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines.15 Particularly, considering that the grounds for impeachment are serious offenses, the Senate, sitting as an Impeachment Court, in case of conviction, is left with no other option but to order the official’s removal from office

and disqualification to hold any public office. Conversely, if the Senate finds the official not guilty of any of the offenses contained in the Articles of Impeachment, although the acts may comparatively constitute some lesser offenses, it must acquit the official and not impose any lesser penalty. To hold otherwise would result in a situation where the Senate may possibly impose upon an impeached President the penalty of suspension, say, for two years. This could not have been contemplated by the framers of the Constitution because vacancy in the office of the President occurs only in case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the President, in which event the VicePresident shall become the President to serve the unexpired term.16 12. The grounds for impeachment are serious crimes which should be penalized heavily. It is specious to argue that the Senate can provide for a lower penalty than removal and disqualification. It is unthinkable to imagine that culpable violation of the Constitution be punished with suspension; treason with censure; betrayal of the public trust with reprimand. No, a judgment in cases of impeachment compels the Senate to remove the erring official and disqualify such official from public office. 13. Also, Respondent argues that the Honorable Court has no disciplinary power over incumbent members of the Supreme Court.17 She is mistaken. 14. Section 13 of A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC18 dated May 4, 2010 provides for the creation of a permanent Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards (“Ethics Committee”), which 15

Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 2009 ed., p. 1156. 16 See Section 8, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. 17 Comment, p. 16, par. 2.8, pp. 19-20, par. 2.13. 18 The Internal Rules of the Supreme Court. 9


shall have the task of preliminarily investigating against all complaints involving graft and corruption and violations of ethical standards filed against members of the Supreme Court, to wit: Section 13. Ethics Committee. – In addition to the above, a permanent Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards shall be established and chaired by the Chief Justice, with the following membership:

(a)

a working Vice-Chair appointed by the Chief Justice;

(b)

three (3) members chosen among themselves by the en bancby secret vote; and

(c)

a retired Supreme Court Justice chosen by the Chief Justice as a non-voting observer-consultant.

The Vice-Chair, the Members and the retired Supreme Court Justice shall serve for a term of one (1) year, with the election in the case of elected Members to be held at the call of the Chief Justice. The Committee shall have the task of preliminarily investigating all complaints involving graft and corruption and violations of ethical standards, including anonymous complaints, filed against Members of the Court, and of submitting findings and recommendations to the en banc. All proceedings shall be completely confidential. The Committee shall also monitor and report to the Court the progress of the investigation of similar complaints against Supreme Court officials and employees, and handle the annual update

of

the

Court’s

ethical

rules

and

standards for submission to the en banc.

15. In In the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc., against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo,19 the Honorable Court exercised its disciplinary power over its members, when it referred a charge of plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo to the Ethics Committee. Earlier, in In Re: Undated Letter of Mr. Luis 19

A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, October 15, 2010. 10


C. Biraogo,20 the Court investigated Justice Ruben T. Reyes, among other persons, for the leakage of confidential documents from the Court En Banc. Although Justice Reyes already retired from the Supreme Court when its decision finding him liable for the leakage was promulgated, this does not negate the fact that the Court took cognizance of a disciplinary case against one of its members.

a. The text of the Constitution allows the ouster of an impeachable official through modes other than impeachment. 16. Unlike the wordings of Section 1, Article IX of the 1935 Constitution and Section 2 of Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution, which both state, “shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of,” the present phraseology of Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides “may be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of.” The use of the word may in the provision is construed as permissive and operating to confer discretion. It cannot be construed as having mandatory effect.21 Where the words of a statute (or the Constitution, for that matter) are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, they must be given their literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.22 17. Plainly stated, the 1987 Constitution does not state anywhere that impeachment is the sole means of removing an impeachable officer. In determining legislative intent, statutes are, where possible, construed in harmony with statutes existing at the time of enactment, so that each is afforded a field of operation.23 18. Applying the verba legis principle, the Honorable Court can readily opine that Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution does not prohibit other legal means to remove impeachable officers beside impeachment. When such issue 20

A.M. No. 09-2-19-SC, February 24, 2009. Bayan Muna v. Romulo, G.R. No. 159618, February 1, 2011. Melchor v. Gironella, G.R. No. 151138, February 16, 2005. 23 Sullivan v. State Ex. Rel. Atty. General of Alabama, 472 So. 2d 970 (1985). 21 22

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of ineligibility arises of an impeachable public officer, the Court can rule that a quo warranto petition is proper. 19. In fact, in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Commissioner Rodrigo stated that members of the Judiciary may not be removed except by impeachment

or some very difficult process: THE PRESIDENT. recognized.

Commissioner

Rodrigo

is

MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, may I ask a question for clarification? The section says, "The Congress shall establish an independent central monetary authority." My question has reference to the word "independent." How is independence of this authority supported by the Constitution? In the case of the judiciary, the Members are independent because they have a fixed term and they may not be removed except by impeachment or some very difficult process. This applies to the different

constitutional commissions. But in the case of this central monetary authority which we call "independent", how is this independence maintained? 24

20. Nonplussed, to support her claim that she can only be removed by impeachment, Respondent mistakenly invokes Cuenco vs. Fernan,25 In re: Gonzales,26 Jarque vs. Desierto,27 Marcoleta vs. Borra,28 and In re: Vizconde.29 These cases unwittingly give the impression that impeachable officers may only be removed from office through impeachment. Actually, the Court held in these cases that public officers who are required under the Constitution to be members of the Bar and who may be removed from office by impeachment cannot be charged with disbarment during their incumbency. This is because to disbar the public officer would effectively strip off a condition 24

See III Records, Constitutional Commission 611 (22 August 1986), cited in Gonzales III vs. Office of the President, G.R. No. 196231, September 4, 2012 (Concurring Opinion, Mr. Justice Carpio). 25 A.C. No. 3135, February 17, 1988. 26 A.M. No. 88-4-5433, April 15, 1988. 27 A.C. No. 4509, December 5, 1995. 28 A.C. No. 7732, March 30, 2009. 29 A.M. No. 12-8-4-SC, August 10, 2012. 12


precedent and a continuing requirement warranting their appointment and continued assumption in office. 21. In other words, the cases relied upon by Respondent presuppose a valid appointment of an impeachable officer who has purportedly committed an impeachable offense. The cases validity Respondents’ qualifications in the adverted wasofnotthe even at issue. 22. Respondent also places undue reliance on Serafin vs. Cruz.30 She avers that “a public officer who had already entered upon the performance of his duties after he had qualified acquires a vested right in the office and cannot be removed nor dismissed therefrom, except for any of the cause designated and in accordance with the proceedings established by law.”31 She omits mentioning that Serafin referred to “a duly appointed and qualified [public officer], thus: The principal question to decide in the present appeal is not whether or not a provincial board but whether or not a duly appointed and qualified chief of municipal police who has entered upon the performance

of his duties as such, may be dismissed therefrom in order to reinstate another who had been dismissed from such office pursuant to a legal, valid and conclusive decision. ….

In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold that the extraordinary legal remedy of quo does not lie against a duly and warranto legally appointed chief of municipal police who has duly qualified for and has entered upon the performance of his duties, in order to reinstate another who has been legally dismissed from the office in question.32

23. Curiously, Respondent feigns ignorance of instances wherein the Court assumed jurisdiction in cases seeking the ouster of impeachable officers. Estrada v. 30 31 32

G.R. No. L-39224, October 24, 1933. Comment, p. 32, par. 2.21. Emphasis supplied. 13


Desierto,33 is a consolidated petition for prohibition and a petition for quo warranto against then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. The Court gave due course to the quo warranto petition against an impeachable officer in the person of Macapagal-Arroyo and subsequently upheld her assumption of office as President.34 In Lawyers League vs. Aquino, the Supreme Court likewise entertained a Petition questioning the legitimacy of a sitting President.35 There is nothing that should prevent the Court from acting on the present petition.

2. The Solicitor General, in the exercise of his sound discretion, can institute an action for quo warranto when he has good reason to believe that he has a case against Respondent.

24. In her comment, Respondent hints that the Executive Department had a hand in the filing of this petition by asserting that the Office of the Solicitor General is an office attached to the Department of Justice, which in turn is under the control and supervision of the President.36 25. Respondent’s assertion is baseless. The OSG is an independent and autonomous office attached to the DOJ.37 Although it is attached to the DOJ, the OSG is not a constituent unit of the DOJ.38 The DOJ's authority, control, 39 and supervision over the OSG are limited only to budgetary purposes.

26. Certainly, Section 2, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court provides the authority of the Solicitor General to file aquo warranto petition: 33

G.R. No. 146710-15, March 2, 2001. Estrada vs. Arroyo, G.R. 146738, March 2, 2001. 35 G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986. 36 Comment, pp. 22-23. 37 Sec. 1, Executive Order No. 300, July 26, 1987. 38 Sec. 4, Chapter 1, Title III, Book IV, Executive Order No. 292, July 25, 1987. 39 Funa v. Agra, G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013. 34

14


Section 2. When Solicitor General or public prosecutor must commence action. — The Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, when directed by the President of the Philippines, or when upon complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe that any case specified in the preceding section can be established by proof, must commence such action.40

27. The institution of a quo warranto action need not be at the behest of the President, as in the present case. The Solicitor General on his own can institute the proceedings if has good reason to believe that he can establish by proof that (a) a person is usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising a public office, position or franchise, (b) a public officer did an act which, by the provision of law, constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his office, or (c) an association is acting as a corporation within the Philippines without being legally incorporated or without lawful authority so to act. 28. Conversely, the Solicitor General may opt not to prosecute an action for quo warranto where there are justifiable reasons.41 The pronouncement of the Court in the case of Topacio vs. Ong42 is instructive: In the exercise of sound discretion, the Solicitor General may suspend or turn down the institution of an action for quo warranto where there are just and valid reasons. Thus, in Gonzales v. Chavez, the Court ruled: Like the Attorney-General of the United States who has absolute discretion in choosing whether to prosecute or not to prosecute or to abandon a prosecution already started, our own Solicitor General may even dismiss, abandon, discontinue or compromise suits either with or without stipulation with the other party. Abandonment of a case, however, does not mean that the Solicitor General may just drop it without any legal and valid reasons, for the discretion given him is not unlimited. Its exercise must be, not only within the parameters get by law 40

Emphasis supplied. See Topacio v. Ong, G.R. No. 179895, December 18, 2008; Calderon v. Solicitor General, G.R. Nos. 103752-53 November 25, 1992; Amante v. Hilado, G.R. No. 45536. April 14, 1939. 42 G.R. No. 179895, December 18, 2008. 41

15


but with the best interest of the State as the ultimate goal.

Upon receipt of a case certified to him, the Solicitor General exercises his discretion in the management of the case. He may start the prosecution of the case by filing the appropriate action in court or he may opt not to file the case at all. He may do everything within his legal authority but always conformably with the national interest and the policy of the government on the matter at hand. It appears that after studying the case, the Solicitor General saw the folly of relitigating the same issue of Ong’s citizenship in

the quo warranto case simultaneously with the RTC case, not to mention the consequent risk of forum-shopping. In any event, the OSG did not totally write finis to the issue as it merely advised petitioner to await the outcome of the RTC case.

29. Simply put, the Solicitor General can institute the present action for quo warranto, even without being directed by the Executive Department. 3. This petition for quo against warranto Respondent is not timebarred.

30. While there are instances where the State has waived, for thethem benefit of criminal its citizens, its action against (i.e. laws), that prescription does not run against tempus occurrit regi (no time runs against

right to take rule legalis the general the State. Nullum the king).43

31. Prescription of actions is intended to suppress fraudulent and stale claims.44 In Caltex (Philippines),

43

The latin maxim "nullum tempus occurrit regi" and its variant were adverted to in Agcaoili vs. Suguitan, G.R. No. L-24806, February 13, 1926 and in the dissenting opinion of Justice Aquino in Mindanao Development Authority, now the Southern Philippines Development Administration vs. The Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-49087 April 5, 1982. 44 See Caltex (Philippines), Inc., v. Singzon-Aguirre, 787 SCRA 82 (2016). 16


Inc., vs. Singzon-Aguirre,45 the Supreme Court explained the rationale for extinctive prescription in this wise: The rationale behind the prescription of actions is to suppress fraudulent and stale claims from springing up at great distances of time when all the proper vouchers and evidence are lost or the facts have become obscure from the lapse of time or defective memory or death or removal of witnesses.46

32. Article 1108(4), however, in no uncertain terms, provides that extinctive prescription does not run against the State: Art. 1108. Prescription, both acquisitive and extinctive, runs against: xxx (4) Juridical persons, except the State and its subdivisions.

33. Actions by the State to defend or recover its property do not prescribe.47 In Republic vs. Grijaldo,48 the Supreme Court explained: Firstly, it should be considered that the complaint in the present case was brought by the Republic of the Philippines not as a nominal party but in the exercise of its sovereign functions, to protect the interests of the State over a public property. Under

paragraph 4 of Article 1108 of the Civil Code prescription, both acquisitive and extinctive, does not run against the State. This Court has held that the statute of limitations does not run against the right of action of the Government of the Philippines.

45

787 SCRA 82 (2016). Caltex (Philippines), Inc. et al v. Ma. Flor Singzon-Aguirre et al., 787 SCRA 82 (9 March 2016); emphasis supplied. 47 Article 1112, Civil Code of the Philippines. See Philippines vs. Heirs of Alejaga, Sr., G.R. No. 146030, 3 December 2002, where the Supreme Court reiterated the rule that despite a Torrens Title becoming incontrovertible after one year, this rule does not apply to actions for reversion by the State. 48 Republic of the Philippines v. Jose Grijaldo, 15 SCRA 687 (31 December 1965); citation omitted. 46

17


34. There can be no quibble that government funds49 are part of the property of the State. Thus, in Tiro vs. Hontanosas,50 the Honorable Court ruled that a salary of government officer or employee, while still in the hands of the government, is considered government property:

The salary of a government officer or employee suchcheck as a teacher does not belong to him before it is physically delivered to him. Until that time the check belongs to the government….

35. One of the necessary consequences of the granting of a petition for quo warranto initiated by the government is that it stems the further release of salaries and other monetary benefits to a person who is unlawfully holding a public position and, therefore, not entitled to continued receipt of government funds. 36. By filing the present quo warranto petition on behalf of the Republic, the Solicitor General, as the principal legal defender of the Republic, is also seeking to protect the public coffer in line with his sworn duty of seeing to it that the best interest of the government is upheld. 37. Logically, if the right of the State to protect its interests over a public property is imprescriptible, then so must the right of the State to defend itself from usurpers and unlawful holders of office. The State has continuous interest in ensuring that those who partake of its sovereign powers are qualified to do so. 38. The State cannot be deprived of its right in ousting public officials who are not qualified to hold the office in the first place. Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure.51

49

Section 3(2) of P.D. 1445 defines "government funds" as including "public moneys of every sort and other resources pertaining to any agency of the government." 50 G.R. No. L-32312, November 25, 1983. 51 Frivaldo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 87193, 23 June 1989. 18


39. Consistent with this rationale, there is greater reason to give due course to the quo warranto petition considering that evidence is not lost and in fact has just been recently discovered and facts regarding Respondent’s nonfeasance has recently surfaced. a. The one-year prescriptive period under Section 11, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court applies only to a petitioner in a quo warranto proceeding who is claiming a right to the public office and not to the State which has an interest to ensure that only a qualified individual occupies the highest position in the Judiciary. 40. Respondent nevertheless posits that under Section 11 of Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, the one-year prescriptive period accrues from the time a public officer gives cause for ouster from office and not from “discovery” of the disqualification.52 She equates “cause of ouster” with “cause of action,” arguing that Petitioner’s cause of action is

time-barred because Petitioner had only one year reckoned from her appointment as Chief Justice on August 24, 2012 to file an action for quo warranto.53 41. Prescription is an affirmative defense; the burden of proof is upon the party claiming it.54 Respondent failed to discharge this burden. 42. Section 11, Rule 66 provides: 11. Limitations. — Nothing in this Rule shall be construed to an action against a public officer or for his ouster from office unless the commenced within one (1) year

Section

contained authorize employee same be 52

Comment, p. 43, par.2.38. Id. Alfredo Bollozos v. Court of Tax Appeals and Collector of Internal Revenue, 13 SCRA 475 (31 March 1965). 53 54

19


after the cause of such ouster, or the right of the petitioner to hold such office or position, arose, nor to authorize an action for

damages in accordance with the provisions of the next preceding section unless the same be commenced within one (1) year after the entry of the judgment establishing the petitioner's right to the office in question. (emphasis

supplied)

43. On the other hand, Section 16, Rule 68 of the 1940 Rules of Court on the prescriptive period for filingquo warranto provides: Section 16. Limitations. – Nothing contained in this rule shall be construed to authorize an action against a corporation for forfeiture of charter unless the same be commenced within five years after the act complained of was done or committed; nor to authorize an action against an officer for his ouster from office unless the same be commenced within one year after the cause of such ouster, or the right of the

plaintiff to hold office arose; nor to authorize an action for damages in accordance with the provisions of the last preceding section unless the same be commenced within one year after the entry of the judgment establishing the plaintiff’s right to the office in question.

44. This provision was taken from Section 216 of Act No. 190 or the Code of Civil Procedure, which was published in English and Spanish.55 The Spanish version of the provision reads: Ninguna de estas disposiciones facultara la iniciacion de un juicio contra una corporacion por la perdida de sus derechos de concesion, a menos que el juicio se lleve a efecto dento de los cinco años siguente a la comision u omision del hecho objeto de la accion. Tampocose podra iniciar un juicio la persona que ejerza un cargo en una corporaciuon para desposeerla, a menos que se lleve a efecto dentro del año siguente a la fecha de la comision del hecho 55

Agcaoili vs. Suguitan, G.R. No. 24806. February 13, 1926. 20


que dio motivo a su privacion, o que se puso en duda su derecho para ocupar el cargo.56

45. Translated into English, the Spanish version reads: Nothing herein contained shall authorize an action against a corporation for forfeiture of its corporate rights, unless the same be commenced within five years after the commission or omission complained of took place. Neither may an action be brought against an officer to oust him from office, unless the same is commenced within one year after the commission of the act which caused the deprivation thereof, or after the right to hold the office arose.57

46. Thus, in Agcaoili vs. Suguitan,58 the Supreme Court construed “cause of such ouster” as “commission of ” Noteworthy, the whichinterpretation caused the deprivation thereof. the act Court’s contemplates “deprivation” of

office. Recall at this point that an action for quo warranto may be commenced at the instance of two parties only: (1) private individual59 and (2) Solicitor General or public prosecutor.60 When instituted by a private individual in his/her own name, he/she must claim entitlement to public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another for there to be a cause of action.61 These requisites do not apply when the action is commenced by the Solicitor General. Under the Rules of Court, the Solicitor General must commence an action when: (1) directed by the President of the Philippines, or (2) when upon complaint of otherwise he has good reason to believe that any case specified in the preceding section can be established by proof.62

56

Id.. Id.. 58 Supra. 59 Section 5, Rule 66. 60 Sections 3 and 4, Rule 66. 61 Section 5, Rule 66; see also Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon et al v. Hon. Antonio V. Mendez, 239 SCRA 18 (6 December 1994). 62 Section 2, Rule 66. 57

21


47. To establish a cause of action for quo warranto, the Solicitor General is not required to aver that the Republic has been deprived of office—and rightfully so because it is brought by the State to enforce a public right. In fact, the Court ratiocinated:

As general it may civil be stated that ordinary statutesprinciple of limitation, or penal, have no application to quo warranto proceeding brought to enforce a public right. 63

48. It is therefore when quo warranto is instituted by a private individual under Section 5 of Rule 66 that the Rules contemplate “deprivation of office.” Thus, in Castro vs. Solidum,64 the Court said: A private person who claims to have been deprived of a public office in a complaint for quo warranto must prove that he is entitled and has the right to the position which he alleges the respondent usurped or unlawfully holds; and when it does not appear that petitioner has a valid right or title to the public position allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent, he has no cause of action and his petition must be dismissed.

49. When an action is filed by the Solicitor General, the lis mota of the case is not whether there is deprivation of office—for the Solicitor General cannot so assert that the Republic is deprived of office—but rather whether respondent is unlawfully holding, usurping, or intruding into a public office on the ground that, among others, respondent failed to meet all the qualifications therefor. By parity of reasoning, the one-year prescriptive period should only apply when the action is commenced by a private individual and not when instituted by the Solicitor General to enforce a public right. 50. Significantly, Section 216 of Act 190 has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to pertain to two criteria

63

Supra; citation omitted. Democrito M. Castro v. Manuel Solidum, 97 Phil. 281 (30 June 1955) citing Adante v. Dagpin, 96 Phil. 789. 64

22


from which the one-year period of prescription is to be reckoned, viz: The portion of section 216 here material reads as follows: Nor shall an action be brought against an officer to be fromthe hiscause office unless within oneousted year after of such ouster, or the right to hold the office arose.

This provision states two criteria by reference to which we are supposed to discover the date from which the period of prescription is to be reckoned. One is the ouster, or unlawful exclusion, of the right claimant from the office; the other is the right of the lawful claimant to hold the office.”65

51. There is no gainsaying that the second criteria (i.e. the right of the lawful claimant to hold the office) contemplates the existence of a claimant who has a clear right to the contested office. As to the first criteria, eminent author and former Chief Justice Manuel Moran opined: As to ouster from office, the one year begins to run from the date when the petitioner might lawfully have assumed office, and not from the date the incumbent

began to discharge the duties of the office. 66

52. Both

reckoning

points

for

the

one-year

prescriptive period contemplate a private party claiming a right to public office and thus will not apply when the quo warranto proceeding is commenced by the Solicitor General on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. This is consistent with the policy behind the one-year prescriptive period, viz: [I]n actions of quo warranto involving right to an office, the action must be instituted within the period of one year. This has been 65 66

Catalino Bautista v. Paulino Fajardo, 38 Phil. 626 (1918); emphasis supplied. Manuel Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court 178 (2 ND ed. 1947). 23


the law in the island since 1901, the period having been srcinally fixed in Section 216 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190). We find this provision to be an expression of policy on the part of the State that persons claiming a right to an office of which they are illegally dispossessed should immediately take steps to recover said office and that if they do not do so within a period of one year, they shall be considered as having lost their right thereto by abandonment.67

53. The preceding discussion shows that the one-year prescriptive period serves a second purpose: the reckoning point for determining whether the petitioner is deemed to have abandoned the right to the office. The policy behind the prescriptive period, once again, contemplates—and therefore applies only when— quo warranto is commenced by individuals. 54. The rationale behind this policy is explained in this wise: Government must be [T]he immediately informed or advised if any

person who claims to be entitled to an office or a position in the civil service as against another actually holding it, so that the Government may not be faced with the predicament of having to pay two salaries, one, for, the

person actually holding the office, although illegally, and another, for one not actually rendering service although entitled to do so. 68

55. The one-year prescriptive period is, therefore, provided by law for the benefit of the Government. To apply the prescriptive period against the Government, and thus to dismiss the quo warranto petition filed by the Solicitor General on the ground of prescription, is to force the Government to accord benefits to and spend its resources in favor of a person whom it believes is illegally holding the office. This is against the very spirit, purpose, rationale behind the one-year prescriptive period.

67 68

Saturnino LL. Villegas v. Victoriano De La Cruz, 15 SCRA 721 (1965); citations omitted. Saturnino LL. Villegas v. Victoriano De La Cruz, 15 SCRA 722 (1965). 24


56. In fact, in the State of California, questions over title to public office are considered questions of governmental legitimacy. Thus, with one exception, quo warranto proceedings are initiated solely by the State acting through the Attorney General, viz:

An action in may be brought by the attorney-general, the name of the people of this state, upon his own information, or upon a complaint of a private party, against any person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises any public office, civil or military, or any franchise, or against any corporation, either de jure or de facto, which usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises any franchise, within this state. And the

attorney-general must bring the action, whenever he has reason to believe that any such office or franchise has been usurped, intruded into, or unlawfully held or exercised by any governor. person, or when he is directed to do so by the

57. As a remedy, quo warranto is vested in the People with the purpose of ending continuous exercise of authority unlawfully asserted. For this reason, no statute of limitations apply to the action and the Attorney General may file Information in behalf of the State at any time.69 The rationale behind the imprescriptibility of the action was explained in this manner: The law, in thus permitting the attorneygeneral, either upon his own information or upon the information of a private party, to file an information at any time against one who has unlawfully intruded into and is holding a public office, does not place the courts or private parties in much danger of having to deal with stale claims. The action can only be brought with the consent and permission of the attorney-general of the state, and, it is to be assumed, he will not permit the institution of such a suit, if by reason of a great lapse of time the claim has become stale, or for any

69

People v. Bailey 158 P. 1036 (Cal. Ct. App. 1916). 25


other reason the state has ceased to have a present interest in it.70

b. Even assuming, arguendo, that a State-initiated action of

quo warranto is subject to prescription, the period has not yet tolled against the State. 58. Respondent argues that “[e]ven assuming that the one-year prescriptive period may be counted from the petitioner’s ‘discovery’ of the disqualification, the Petition would still be time-barred.”71 She avers that if she failed to file her SALNs for several years, Petitioner “through U.P. which is a State University” would have known about it

already when she was appointed Chief Justice on August 24, 2012.72 Respondent cites Presidential Commission on 73

Good Government vs. Carpio-Morales authorityfrom for the statement that “prescription cannot beascounted discovery of the offense when ‘the necessary information, data, or records based on which the crime could be discovered is readily available to the public.”74

59. Her reliance on PCGG is misplaced. She may have forgotten that the present Petition is one for quo warranto under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court. It is a special civil action and not a criminal action. As she herself admits, PCGG is about “determining the reckoning point for prescription of criminal offenses under Act No. 3326.”75 On that score alone, PCGG obviously does not apply to the present case. 60. Indeed, in PCGG, the Court held: An evaluation jurisprudence on the

of the foregoing matter reveals the

70

Id. Comment, p. 44, par. 2.39. Id. at par. 2.39.2. 73 G.R. No. 206357, November 12, 2014. 74 Id. at 44-45, par. 2.39.3; italics in the srcinal. 75 Id. at 44, par. 2.39.3; emphasis supplied. 71 72

26


following guidelines in the determination of the reckoning point for the period of prescription of violations of RA 3019, viz: 1. As a general rule, prescription begins to run from the date of the commission of the offense. 2. If the date of the commission of the violation is not known, it shall be counted

form the date of discovery thereof. 3. In determining whether it is the general rule or the exception that should apply in a particular case, the availability or suppression of the information relative to the crime should first be determined. If the necessary information, data, or records based on which the crime could be discovered is readily available to the public, the general rule applies. Prescription shall, therefore, run from the date of the commission of the crime. Otherwise, should martial law prevent the filing thereof or should information about the violation be suppressed, possibly through connivance, then the exception applies and the period of prescription shall be reckoned from the date of discovery thereof.76

61. Verily, PCGG applies only to cases which require the determination of the reckoning point for the prescription period of violations of special acts, such as R.A. No. 3019,77 i.e., criminal offenses, pursuant to Section 2 of Act No. 3326.78 62. PCGG was even an occasion for the Court to carve out an exception using the “blameless ignorance” doctrine, viz: Similarly, in the 2011 Desierto case, We ruled that the “blameless ignorance” doctrine

applies considering that the plaintiff therein 76

Presidential Commission on Good Government, supra; emphasis supplied. Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. 78 An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run. Section 2 thereof provides: “Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceeding for its investigation and punishment. xxx.” 77

27


had no reasonable means of knowing the existence of a cause of action. In this particular instance, We pinned the running of the prescriptive period to the completion by the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee of an exhaustive investigation on the loans. We elucidated that the first mode under Section 2 of Act No. 3326 would not apply since during the Marcos regime, no person would have dared to question the legality of these transactions. Prior to the 2011 Desierto case came Our 2006 Resolution in Romualdez v. Marcelo, which involved a violation of Section 7 of RA 3019. In resolving the issue of whether or not the offenses charged in the said cases have already prescribed, We applied the same principle enunciated in Duque and ruled that the prescriptive period for the offenses therein committed began to run from the discovery thereof on the day former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez filed the complaint with the PCGG. This was reiterated in Disini v. Sandiganbayan where We counted the running of the prescriptive period in said case from the date of discovery of the violation after the PCGG’s exhaustive investigation despite the

highly publicized and well-known nature of the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant Project therein involved, recognizing the fact that the discovery of the crime necessitated the prior exhaustive investigation and completion thereof by the PCGG. (citations omitted)

63. To support herofstance, Respondent alsoreasonably contends that petitioner “Republic the Philippines cannot assert that it was only in December 2017 that it discovered that (she) had not submitted her SALNs to the JBC or that she had allegedly failed to file her SALNs when she was a Professor the U.P. College of Law.”79 She reasons that Petitioner could and should be deemed to have known about the matter of her SALNs as early as July 20, 2012 when the JBC En Banc met to deliberate on the applicants to include in the short list for the position of Chief Justice.80 This is 79

Comment, p. 47, par. 2.39.6. Id. at 45-47.

80

28


because, according to her, “[b]oth the JBC and U.P.—to whom the SALNs were to be submitted—are instrumentalities of the 81 Government of the Republic of the Philippines.”

64. Her argument is misleading. While it is true that a quo warranto petition is “brought in the name of the Republic 82

,” of the Philippines the Solicitor General the or action. a public 83 prosecutor is specifically directed to commence

65. Certainly, the Solicitor General is not synonymous with the Republic of the Philippines. Even if the two are considered as one and the same for purposes of the present case, Respondent engages in oversimplification when she argues that knowledge of or notice to the JBC and the UP, they being “instrumentalities of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines,” is tantamount to knowledge of or

notice to Petitioner. 66. Indeed, if the Solicitor General “upon complaint or otherwise…has good reason to believe that any case specified in (Sec. 1) can be established by proof, [he] must commence such action.”84 The law’s use of the word “must” means it is the Solicitor General’s legal duty to commence such action against the unlawful holder of the office if he finds “good reason to believe” that such action “can be established by proof.”85

67. The rule is clear: it refers to the Solicitor General or the public prosecutor and not to any other “instrumentality of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.”

The

matter of case determining whether “he has reason to believe that any specified in [Section 1] good can be established by proof” is addressed to the Solicitor General or the public

prosecutor. It cannot be delegated to any other government instrumentality. 68. In Amante vs. Hidalgo,86 the Court stressed: 81

Id. at 47, par. 2.39.6. Rules of Court, Rule 66, Sec. 1. Id. at Sections 2 and 3. 84 Id. at Sec. 2; italics supplied. 85 Id. 86 G.R. No. L-45536, April 14, 1939; emphasis and underlining supplied. 82 83

29


(T)he duty enjoined upon the SolicitorGeneral to institute quo warranto proceedings involves the exercise of discretion. This is so, because the institution of the action is expressly made to depend upon whether he has good reason to believe that he can establish by proof that the case is one of

those specified in sections 197 and 198 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

69. Truly, under Section 2, Rule 66, the Solicitor General must commence action “when upon complaint or

otherwise he has good reason to believe that any case specified in the preceding section can be established by proof.” The hearings conducted by the House of Representative's Committee on Justice on the impeachment complaint against Respondent only took place in December 2017. 70. Said provision presupposes that the Solicitor General had: (1) actual notice through a complaint or otherwise, and (2) had opportunity to investigate the matter so as to be able to form good reasons to believe that a case must be filed. Thus, the Solicitor General himself (and no other) must have had both factual and legal bases before the period runs. Apropos, knowledge of or notice to the JBC and to UP cannot be equivalent to notice to the Solicitor General. 71. Accordingly, Section 7 of RA 3019 states that: Section 7. Statement of assets and liabilities.Every public officer, within thirty days after the approval of this Act or after assuming office, and within the month of January of every other year thereafter, as well as upon the expiration of his term of office, or upon his resignation or separation from office, shall prepare and file with the office of the corresponding Department Head, or in the case of a Head of Department or chief of an independent office, with the Office of the President, or in the case of members of the Congress 30


and the officials and employees thereof, with the Office of the Secretary of the corresponding House,87 a true detailed and

sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of incomeyear: taxesProvided, paid for That the next preceding calendar public officers assuming office less than two months before the end of the calendar year, may file their statements in the following months of January.

72. Under Section 8 of RA 6713, the SALN must be filed: 1. within thirty days after assumption of office; 2. on or before April 30, of every year thereafter; and 3. within thirty days after separation from the service. ….

The Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth and the Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections shall be filed by: (1) Constitutional and national elective officials, with the national office of the Ombudsman; (2) Senators and Congressmen, with the Secretaries of the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively; Justices, with the Clerkwith of Court of the Supreme Court; Judges, the Court Administrator; and all national executive officials with the Office of the President. (3) Regional and local officials and employees, with the Deputy Ombudsman in their respective regions; (4) Officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, with the Office of the President, and those below said ranks, with the Deputy Ombudsman in their respective regions; and 87

Emphasis supplied. 31


(5) All other public officials and employees, defined in Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, with the Civil Service Commission.

73. The law provides for an exhaustive listing where the SALNs should be submitted. Executive Order 292 or the Administrative Code of 198788 discusses the functions of the OSG and nowhere does it include monitoring of the compliance in SALN submissions of other government agencies. 74. Even if these SALNs are public documents as they are notarized, these SALNs are not published. Hence, there is no feasible way for the OSG to take cognizance of the submission or non-submission of the SALNs. 75. There is no law requiring the Solicitor General to monitor the SALNs of ALL government officials and employees. The Solicitor General, as head of office, is only tasked to monitor the SALNs submitted by the employees of the OSG, not those from other agencies. 76. Appropriately, Section 31 of the Civil Service Resolution No. 060231 states that: Sec. 3. Ministerial Duty of the Head of Office to issue Compliance Order. — Immediately upon receipt of the aforementioned list and recommendation, it shall be the ministerial duty of the Head of Office to issue an order requiring those who have incomplete data in their SALN to correct/supply the desired information and those who did not file/submit their SALNs to comply within a non-extendible period of three (3) days from receipt of said order.

77. Since Respondent is not connected with the OSG, the Solicitor General has no supervisory role in monitoring her deficient SALNs.

88

Dated 25 July 1987. 32


78. In any event, the Solicitor General is tasked to work on the cases and letters actually received and known by his office. Respondent’s non-submission or deficient SALNs was only brought to the attention of the Solicitor General through the hearings conducted by the House of Representatives. c. Assuming arguendo that the petition for quo warranto is subject to prescription and the one-year period for filing the same had lapsed, it involves a matter of transcendental importance that this Honorable Court is duty-bound to resolve. 79. Assuming without conceding that the one-year period under Section 11 of Rule 66 of the Rules of Court is applicable, there are stronger policy considerations in favor of excepting suits initiated by the Republic from its application. The balance of interests militates against applying this period to bar action when it is filed by the government in its sovereign capacity. 80. Consider the foregoing scenario: an impeachable officer such as, for example, the President of the Republic of the Philippines, is elected to his position. Over a year later, it is discovered that the President is not a natural-born Filipino. This fact is established with certainty, and the President had no hand in this mistake. In this scenario, the President cannottobedoimpeached, as there is no ground under the Constitution so.89 81. If Madrigal vs. Lecaroz90 is applied to the theoretical case above, the Philippines would have a President who is not constitutionally qualified and yet cannot be removed from office. It is unimaginable that the framers of the 1987 Constitution did not contemplate the remedy of quo warranto to resolve this anomaly. 89

The grounds for impeachment are culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. Section 2, Article XI, 1987 Constitution. 90 G.R. L-46218, October 23. 1990. 33


82. The situation of Respondent is identical. Assuming that she acted in good faith when she submitted an insufficient number of SALN’s to the JBC, this does not change the fact that she has not proven her integrity. She lacked, at the inception, as she continues to lack now, an 91

indispensable qualification for her position, much so as a President who is not a natural-born Filipino as citizen. 83. The more compelling policy is to allow the removal of the unqualified public officer. Prescription should not be a bar for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of a quo warranto petition in such a situation. The Court had done so in the past. 84. In Frivaldo vs. Comelec,92 a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo’s election and proclamation was filed

with COMELEC by the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter. Frivaldo filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order to keep the COMELEC from conducting a hearing on the petition, partly on the ground that the ten-day period for quo warranto under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code had expired. The Supreme Court ruled: The argument that the petition filed with the Commission on Elections should be dismissed for tardiness is not welltaken. The herein private respondents are

seeking to prevent Frivaldo from continuing to discharge his office of governor because he is disqualified doing office so asarea continuing foreigner. Qualificationsfrom for public requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. If, say, a female legislator were to marry during her term and by

a foreigner her act or

91

“We have ruled that qualifications for public office, whether elective or not, are continuing requi rements. They must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election, or of assumption of office, but during the officer's entire tenure.” Atty. Isidro Q. Lico vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205505, 29 September 2015. 92 G.R. No. 87193, 23 June 1989. 34


omission acquires his nationality, would she have a right to remain in office simply because the challenge to her title may no longer be made within ten days from her proclamation? It has been established, and not even denied, that the evidence of Frivaldo's naturalization was discovered only eight months after his proclamation and his title thereafter.

was

challenged

shortly

This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country .

The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.

85. The Court on numerous occasions eschewed technicality to render just and equitable relief.93 Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits and not on technicalities.94 Thus, in the League of Cities vs. COMELEC95 cases, the Court decided the cases on the merits despite entry of judgment. In Estipona vs. Lobrigo,96 the Court disregarded technical defenses particularly the failure to implead an indispensable party, failure to file a declaratory relief petition in the proper court, 93

League of Cities vs. COMELEC, citing Manotok IV v. Heirs of Barque, G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605, December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 468; Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP), G.R. Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951, and 183962, October 14, 2008, 568 SCRA 402; Manalo v. Calderon, G.R. No. 178920, October 15, 2007, 536 SCRA 290; David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160; and Province of Batangas v. Romulo, G.R. No. 152774, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 736. 94 Heirs of Zaulda vs. Zaulda, G.R. No. 201234, March 17, 2014. 95 G.R. No. 176951, G.R. No. 177499, G.R. No. 178056, 21 December 2009 Resolution. 96 G.R. No. 226679, August 15, 2017. 35


and the collateral attack to the constitutionality of a penal law, and decided the merits of the case in view of the importance of the issues being decided upon. 4. The direct resort to the Honorable Court is justified.

86. Respondent contends that she cannot be ousted via the present quo warranto because such action would have to be filed, at the first instance, with the Regional Trial Court, following the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. She further insists that such case would create an absurd situation wherein a judge of a lower court would have to exercise disciplinary power and administrative supervision over a member of the Supreme Court.97 87. Her contention is untenable. Section 21 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides that Regional Trial Courts can issue writs of quo warranto which may be enforced only in their respective regions. Section 21 provides: Section 21. Original jurisdiction in other cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise srcinal jurisdiction: In the issuance of writs of (1) certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions; and

(2) In actions affecting ambassadors and other public ministers and consuls.

88. The present petition for quo warranto against Respondent should not be filed, in the first instance, before the Regional Trial Court. Otherwise, an absurd situation would be created wherein a writ of quo warranto may be issued by an RTC against the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines but it could only be enforced within the region under such RTC’s jurisdiction.

89. Moreover, Section 7, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for quo warranto may be filed before 97

Comment, p. 19. 36


the Honorable Court, among other venues. Section 7, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court states: Section 7. Venue. — An action under the preceding six sections can be brought only in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or in the Regional Trial Court exercising

jurisdiction over the territorial area where the respondent or any of the respondents resides, but when the Solicitor General commences the action, it may be brought in a Regional Trial Court in the City of Manila, in the Court of Appeals, or in the Supreme Court. (8a)

90. As a general rule, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts precludes direct resort to the Honorable Court as it is a court of last resort.98 The rule, however, admits exceptions under well-defined circumstances. 91. The Diocese of Bacolod vs. Commission on Elections99 explained the necessity of the exceptions to the general rule in this wise: In other words, the Supreme Court's role to interpret the Constitution and act in order to protect constitutional rights when these become exigent should not be emasculated by the doctrine in respect of the hierarchy of courts. That has never been the purpose of such doctrine. Thus, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. This court has "full discretionary power [over] to take cognizance and assume jurisdiction special civil actions for certiorari ... filed directly with it for exceptionally compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues clearly and specifically raised in the petition.

92. The petition at bar involves a matter of transcendental importance and of first impression and therefore falls under the provided exceptions. Still in the Diocese of Bacolod, the Court said: 98 99

Dy v. Bibat-Palamos, G.R. No. 196200, September 11, 2013. G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015. 37


A second exception is when the issues involved are of transcendental importance. In these cases, the imminence and clarity of the threat to fundamental constitutional rights outweigh the necessity for prudence. The doctrine relating to constitutional issues of transcendental importance prevents from the paralysis of procedural niceties courts when clearly faced with the need for substantial protection. ….

Third, cases of first impression warrant a direct resort to this court. In cases of first impression, no jurisprudence yet exists that will guide the lower courts on this matter. In Government of the United States v. Purganan, this court took cognizance of the case as a matter of first impression that may guide the lower courts.

93. The present petition involves a matter of transcendental importance100 because at issue is the constitutionality and legality of Respondent’s appointment as the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the highest position in the Judiciary. It is also of first impression because no jurisprudence is on all fours with the controversy. No court can better resolve the issue than the Honorable Court. 94. The presence of these compelling circumstances warrants that the doctrine of hierarchy of court must be relaxed. Therefore, while the Regional Trial Court, the Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court have concurrent srcinal jurisdiction over petitions for quo warranto, direct resort to the Honorable Court is justified. b. Substantive Arguments

100

Please see Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017; Cruz v. Secretary of Department of Environmental and Natural Resources, G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000; Liga ng mga Barangay National v. City Mayor of Manila, G.R. No. 154599, January 21, 2004; PageTenorio v. Tenorio, G.R. No. 138490, November 24, 2004; Arroyo v. Department of Justice, G.R. Nos. 199082, 199085 & 199118, September 18, 2012. 38


5. The JBC’s determination of whether Respondent is a person of “proven integrity” during her application for Chief Justice is not a political question.

95. Respondent argues that the Court has no jurisdiction over the present quo warranto proceedings which involves political questions beyond the pale of judicial review. 96. Petitioner disagrees. The issues raised before this Honorable Court do not present political but legal questions which are within its province to resolve. 97. The Constitution vested the Supreme Court with judicial powerinvolving - the power and duty to settle actual controversies rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.101 98. The “limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies” carries the assurance that “the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government.”102

99. Considering that Justices of the Supreme Court are not elected by the people, the framers of the Constitution did not see it fit to give the courts dominion over matters of policy. As expressed by Justice Arturo Brion inOcampo vs. Enriquez103, “[w]ith respect to matters of policy, we have no right to substitute our wisdom over that of duly elected political branches. They carry the mandate of the popular will - we do not.” 101

Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. Francisco, Jr. v. Toll Regulatory Board, G.R. Nos. 166910, 169917, 173630, and 183599, October 19, 2010, 633 SCRA 470. 103 Separate Concurring Opinion of Justice Arturo D. Brion in Ocampo et al v. Enriquez et al, G.R. No. 225973. 102

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100. Equally instructive is the discussion Willoughby104 on political questions, to wit:

by

Elsewhere in this treatise the well-known and well-established principle is considered that it is not within the province of the courts to pass judgment upon the policy of legislative or executive action. Where,

therefore, discretionary powers are granted by the Constitution or by statute, the manner in which those powers are exercised is not subject to judicial review. The courts, therefore, concern themselves only with the question as to the existence and extent of these discretionary powers. As distinguished from the judicial, the legislative and executive departments are spoken of as the political departments of government because in very many cases their action is necessarily dictated by considerations of public or political policy. These considerations of public or

political policy of course will not permit the legislature to violate constitutional provisions, or the executive to exercise authority not granted him by the Constitution or by, statute, but, within these limits, they do permit the departments, separately or together, to recognize that a certain set of facts exists or that a given status exists, and these determinations, together with the consequences that flow therefrom, may not be traversed in the courts.105

101. In re McConaughy106 characterizes a political question, viz: . . . What is generally meant, when it is said that a question is political, and not judicial, is that it is a matter which is to be exercised by the people in their primary political capacity, or that it has been specifically delegated to some other department or particular officer of the 104 105 106

Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States, Vol. 3, p. 1326; emphasis supplied. Id. 119 N.W. 408. 40


government, with discretionary power to act.107

102. The political question bar essentially rests on the separation of powers doctrine enshrined in the Constitution.108 As the Court explained in Javellana vs. Executive Secretary:109 One of the principal bases of the nonjusticiability of so-called political questions is the principle of separation of powers — characteristic of the presidential system of government — the functions of which are classified or divided, by reason of their nature, into three (3) categories, namely, 1) those involving the making of laws, which are allocated to the legislative department; 2) those concerning mainly with the enforcement of such laws and of judicial decisions applying and/or interpreting the same, which belong to the executive department; and 3) those dealing with the settlement of disputes, controversies or conflicts involving rights, duties or prerogatives that are legally demandable and enforceable, which are apportioned to courts of justice. Within its own sphere — but only within such sphere — each department is supreme and independent of the others, and each is devoid of authority not only to encroach upon the powers or field of action assigned to any of the other departments, but also to inquire into or pass upon the advisability or wisdom of the acts performed, measures taken or decisions made by the other departments — provided that such acts, measures or decisions are within the area allocated thereto by the Constitution.110

103. In Vera vs. Avelino,111 the Court expounded on when a question is political or justiciable: 107

See State vs. Cunningham , 81 Wis. 497, 51 L. R. A. 561; In Re Gunn, 50 Kan. 155; 32 Pac. 470, 948, 19 L. R. A. 519; Green vs. Mills, 69 Fed. 852, 16, C. C. A. 516, 30 L. R. A. 90; Fletcher vs. Tuttle , 151 Ill. 41, 37 N. E. 683, 25 L. R. A. 143, 42 Am. St. Rep. 220. 108 Garcia v. Executive Secretary, 602 Phil. 64, 73-77 (2009). 109 50 SCRA 30, 84, 87, March 31, 1973. 110 Emphasis supplied. 111 77 Phil. 192, 223 [1946]. 41


It is a well-settled doctrine that political questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal with such questions has been conferred on the courts by express constitutional or statutory provisions. It is not so easy, however, to todefine the what phrase political question, nor determine matters fall within its scope. It is frequently used to designate all questions that is outside the scope of the judicial power. More properly, however, it means those questions which, under the constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government.112

104. In Tañada vs. Cuenco,113 the Court also stated: [T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full has been discretionary authority delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is concerned

with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.114

105. Thus, for a political question to exist, there must be in the Constitution a power vested exclusively in the President or Congress, the exercise of which the court should not examine or prohibit.115 106. Even Respondent herself adheres to this test in determining whether a political question exists. In her 112

Emphasis supplied. 103 Phil 1051 [1957]. Emphasis supplied. 115 Dissenting Opinion of Justice Gutierrez Jr. in Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211 September 15, 1989. 113 114

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Dissenting Opinion in Ocampo vs. Enriquez,116 she argued that the threshold test which must be satisfied is “whether indeed the question is one addressed to purely political exercises internal to the workings of the legislature;117 or whether, on the part of the President, there are no legal standards against which his particular action can be evaluated.118” 107. Interestingly, in the same Dissenting Opinion, Respondent herself even admitted that “[t]here was a time

when this Court hid under the "political question" doctrine and evaded constitutional and moral responsibility for the long period of suppression of the people's basic rights.” 108. This time, however, Respondent argues that the determination of her integrity is a political question. Respondent cannot now be allowed to hide beneath the cloak of the political question doctrine merely because it is convenient for her and her losing cause. 109. The nature of the question for determination is not purely political because it is not incumbent upon the people of the Republic to decide whether the respondent had proven her integrity before the JBC to become the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines. At the same time, the determination of whether Respondent is a person of proven integrity is not left to the discretion of the executive or legislative branch of the government. It is the JBC that is mandated to nominate appointments to the Judiciary, including the post of the Chief Justice. 110. Respondent is patently mistaken in claiming that the issue of whether she is a person of proven integrity had been committed under our Constitution to a coordinate political department – either the executive or legislative department. The JBC is not under the executive or legislative department of the government. The Legislative Department is composed of the Senate and the House of

116

G.R. No. 225973, 8 November 2016. Arroyo v. De Venecia, 343 Phil. 42 (1997). David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 522 Phil. 705 (2006); Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 392 Phil. 618 (2000); llamas v. Orbos, 279 Phil. 920 (1991). 117 118

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Representatives upon which legislative power is vested.119 On the other hand, the executive power is vested in the President of the Philippines.120 111. Additionally, Section 8(1)121 and (5)122 of Article VIII provide that “A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby ated under the of the Supreme Court… cre It may exercise suchsupervision other functions and duties as . the Supreme Court may assign to it.” The JBC is a body subordinate to the Supreme Court although the Chief Justice who is primus inter pares within the Court also heads the JBC as its ex oficio Chair.123

112. Accordingly, it is not factually correct to argue that the JBC is a coordinate political department of the judiciary. The JBC does not concern itself with questions of policy of which a political question constitutes. Instead, it is an independent constitutional body created pursuant to Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution: ARTICLE VIII JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.

113. The creation of the JBC was meant to insulate the 124 appointments in the judiciary against political influence.

119

Section 1, Article VI, 1987 Constitution. Section 1, Article VII, 1987 Constitution. 121 A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector. 122 The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it. 123 Concurring opinion of Justice Arturo D. Brion in Villanueva v. JBC , G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015. 124 Constitutional Commission Deliberations, p. 490, July 14, 1986 120

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As the Court held in Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council et al:125 Long before the naissance of the present Constitution, the annals of history bear witness to the fact that the exercise of appointing members of the Judiciary has always been the exclusive prerogative of the executive and legislative branches of the government. Like their progenitor of American srcins, both the Malolos Constitution and the 1935 Constitution had vested the power to appoint the members of the Judiciary in the President, subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. It was during these times that the country became witness to the deplorable practice of aspirants seeking confirmation of their appointment in the Judiciary to ingratiate themselves with the members of the legislative body. Then, with the fusion of executive and legislative power under the 1973 Constitution, the appointment of judges and justices was no longer subject to the scrutiny of another body. It was absolute, except that the appointees must have all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. Prompted by the clamor to rid the process of appointments to the Judiciary from political pressure and partisan activities, the members of the Constitutional Commission saw the need to create a separate, competent and independent body to recommend nominees to the President. Thus, it conceived of a body representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process and called it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)…

114. The late Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion justified the creation of the JBC in this wise: The Judicial and Bar Council is no doubt an innovation. But, it is an innovation made in response to the public clamor in favor of

125

G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012; citations omitted. 45


eliminating politics from the appointment of judges.126

115. It is evident that the framers of the Constitution intended the JBC to be an innovative solution in response to the public clamor to eliminate politics in the appointment of members of the Judiciary. To ensure judicial independence, they adopted a holistic approach and hoped that, in creating JBC, the private sector and the three branches of government would have an active role and equal voice in the selection of the members of the Judiciary.127 116. The creation, history, and mandate of the JBC indisputably show that it is not a political body. Consequently, the political question doctrine finds no application in the present case. 117. While it is an independent constitutional body, the 128

JBC’s independence not without limits. a The Constitution did and not discretion leave the is matter of nominating

Chief Justice to the sole discretion of the JBC. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to various constitutional limitations which are mandatory in nature, to wit: ARTICLE VIII JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: (1) Exercise srcinal jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus…

Section 7. (3) A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence.

126 127 128

Record, Vol. 2, p. 487 Chavez vs. JBC, et. al., supra. Aguinaldo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 224302, February 21, 2017. 46


Section 8. (1) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.

118. The principal issue – whether Respondent is a person of “proven integrity” when she applied for Chief Justice – in this case may be resolved through a proper

interpretation of the above provisions in the Constitution, Canons of Judicial Ethics, pertinent JBC rules, and other laws. These are enough judicially discoverable and manageable standards which can aid the Honorable Court in resolving the case. 6. Respondent is not a person of proven integrity.

a. Respondent failed to prove her integrity before the JBC. 119. The JBC’s role in recommending appointees to the Judiciary cannot be downplayed, that is the JBC’s principal constitutional mandate. The JBC is the first gatekeeper in assessing an applicant’s compliance with the constitutional

requirements for eligibility. While the requirements in the first two paragraphs of Article VIII, Section 7 are measurable, the third paragraph is couched in general terms, and the JBC, in the exercise of its principal function, can provide for the details and the manner of carrying out Article VIII, Section 7(3) of the 1987 Constitution. 120. Accordingly, when the JBC prescribes rules and regulations that gives shape to the qualification of “proven integrity”, such rules and regulations must be deemed as

having the force and effect of law. This is because the rules of the JBC are actually “rules implementing the constitution.” It therefore follows that failure to comply with the JBC’s

requirement to submit SALNs pursuant to the JBC announcement June 4, 2012 as failure to comply with Section 7(3) of the Constitution.

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121. Respondent argues that the JBC may dispense with the submission of SALNs before it, 129 especially when, according to her, there is sufficient justification for such nonsubmission.130 Finally, she posits that “requiring the submission of SALNs as an absolute requirement would be tantamount to creating a new qualification for the position of Chief Justice.”131 These arguments are bereft of merit. 122. Instead of submitting the SALNs, Respondent wrote the JBC an explanation letter dated July 23, 2012 stating that most of the requested records during her stint with the academe were more than fifteen years old; hence “it is reasonable to consider it infeasible to retrieve all of those files.”132

123. By allowing substantial compliance for several applicants, including herself, Respondent concludes that the JBC exercised its sound discretion in finding her a person of proven integrity, and such discretion should not be interfered with by Petitioner.133 124. Such assertion is clearly delusional. During the hearings before the Committee on Justice of the House of Representatives relative to the impeachment complaint against Respondent, Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta, the JBC Chairman at the time of Respondent’s application for Chief Justice, categorically stated that Respondent’s letter

dated July 23, 2012 was never submitted for consideration during the JBC deliberations and could not have been properly objected to by Justice Peralta,134 to wit: Mr. Peralta:

May I say something, your Honor?

The Chairperson: Yes, Your Honor. Mr. Peralta:

I was not informed because the letter of the Chief Justice and the attachment to that were

129

Id. at p. 68. Id. at p. 70, emphasis omitted. Id. at p. 71, par. 2.71. 132 Id. 133 Id. 134 Annex “I” of the Petition; emphasis supplied. 130 131

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not… never placed in the deliberation, your Honor. I

think I was not the one who asked that question about the … about the nonsubmission of SALN. I believe that the members then

were…

the

one

who

brought this one but I was not fully aware of the issue, Your Honor, because had there been really an issue on the non-submission of the SALN, then I could have objected to. xxx xxx

125. Simply put, the letter dated July 23, 2012 cannot serve as a valid reason to excuse Respondent’s non-

submission of her missing SALNs. Neither can it also be even considered as substantial compliance to the SALN submission. Without having been deliberated upon by the JBC, the letter cannot be considered anything more than a mere scrap of paper. 126. Besides, Respondent committed a gross misrepresentation before the JBC when she explained that, the reason for her non-submission of SALNs was that she could no longer retrieve all her SALNs.135 From Respondent’s explanation, it can be implied that she did file her SALNs. 127. Yet, as shown by the Certifications136 from the UPHRDO and the Ombudsman, Respondent did not actually file her SALNs for the years 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1992, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006. 128. Truth be told, such representation before the JBC is belied by Respondent’s own allegation in her Comment that “she has recovered most of the missing SALNs and will continue to look for the others.”137 Had Respondent exerted

earnest efforts to locate her SALNs during the time that she was required by the JBC to do so in 2012, instead of advancing the reason that these SALNs are no longer 135 136 137

See Respondent’s Letter dated 23 July 2012 attached as Annex “E” of the Petition. See Annex “B,” Petition dated March 2, 2018; See Annex “O”. Comment, p. 6, par. 1.8.1. 49


retrievable, the JBC would not have been misled in exercising its discretion to accept Respondent’s explanation.

129. Aggravating her previous acts of misrepresentation, Respondent stated in her Comment that “a UP Professor would not file his or her SALN with the Office 138

an.” of the of the Ombudsm Yet,Ombudsman. a copy of her 139SALN exists in the records of the Office

130. Respondent’s dishonesty before the JBC is selfevident and seriously discredits any claim of integrity. 131. In Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Estacion,140 the Court held that “it behooves every prospective appointee to the judiciary to apprise the appointing authority of every matter bearing on his fitness for judicial office, including such circumstances as may reflect on his integrity and probity. These are qualifications specifically of Constitution.” appointees to the judiciary by Sec. 7(3), Articlerequired VIII of the 132. In said case, Jose M. Estacion, Jr. was appointed as judge of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City. Prior to his appointment, he was charged with homicide and attempted homicide but he failed to disclose these facts before the JBC. In his defense, Estacion claimed that he had not yet been convicted of the crimes, and thus, had not obligation to disclose the same to the JBC. Unsatisfied with his defense, the Court held that:

The and argument he had notinnocent yet been convicted shouldthat be presumed is beside the point, and so is the contention that the crimes of homicide and attempted homicide do not involve moral turpitude. The important consideration is that he had a duty to inform the appointing authority and this Court of the pending criminal charges against him to enable them to determine on the basis of his record, eligibility for the position he was seeking. He did not

138 139 140

Comment, p. 58, par. 2.53. See Annex “B,” Petition dated March 2, 2018. A.M. No. RTJ-87-104, January 11, 1990. 50


discharge that duty. His record did not contain the important information in question because he deliberately withheld and thus effectively hid it. His lack of candor

is as obvious as his reason for the suppression of such a vital fact, which he knew would have been taken into account against him if it had been disclosed.

133. In the same vein, Respondent had the legal obligation to disclose before the JBC that she failed to file her SALNs eleven times during her tenure as a professor at UP. Had she informed the JBC of this fact, she would not have been included in the shortlist in the first place. Respondent clearly had no reasonable justification for nonsubmission of the SALNs before the JBC, and as such, the JBC could not have made a complete assessment of her integrity as a qualification for the position of Chief Justice. 134. Respondent also brings to the attention of the Honorable Court the alleged non-submission of complete SALNs by other candidates to the Chief Justice position.141 135. Whether the other candidates complied with the submission of SALNs before the JBC is absolutely of no relevance to this case. The fact remains that these other candidates were not appointed to the position of Chief Justice, Respondent was. She must, therefore, rely on the merits of her own defense and show to the satisfaction of the Honorable Court that she indeed proved her integrity before the JBC despite her non-submission of complete SALNs as required by the recommending body. At any rate, it might interest Respondent to know that Acting Chief Justice Antonio Carpio and Associate Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro have made public JBC certifications that they have submitted all their SALNs.142 136. All told, the submission of SALNs before the JBC is crucial in the determination of whether an applicant for a judicial post possesses integrity. Through the submission of complete SALNs for the entire time that she was in 141

Id. at. 68. Annex “N,” JBC Certification dated March 23, 2018; Annex “N -1,” JBC Certification dated March 26, 2018. 142

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government service, the JBC is given the opportunity to examine whether an applicant has faithfully complied with the law. The JBC, through these SALNs, would have been able to determine whether Respondent performed her duty to file SALNs in accordance with the manner and frequency stated in RA 6713, and ultimately, assess whether she possessed the integrity required of members of the Judiciary. 137. Indeed, Respondent’s position that the JBC did not require the submission of SALNs as evidence of an applicant’s integrity is nebulous at best. It begs the question

why the JBC required the submission of these documents to begin with. In fact, even Respondent herself pointed out that the JBC required her to submit complete SALNs as part of her application and, in case of inability to do so, there must be a reason for failing to comply with such requirement, evincing that the submission of SALNs was not an empty and meaningless imposition. As already explained, Respondent’s explanation was a gross misrepresentation

before the JBC and could not have been the basis for her recommendation for appointment by the President. b. Religiously complying with the requirement of filing of SALNs is implied from, and not in addition to, the qualification of proven integrity for Members of the Judiciary. 138. alsoorasserts that to herher failure to file SALNs hasRespondent no bearing on relationship integrity or lack thereof.143 She claims that for her integrity to be properly assailed, there must be an allegation that she had committed graft and corruption by acquiring unexplained wealth.144 139. These arguments are preposterous. Her failure to file her SALNs in accordance with the requirements of the

143 144

Comment, p. 62, par. 2.62. Ibid. 52


Constitution and relevant laws shows that she is not of proven integrity. 140. It is elementary that all parts of a statute, and this should be more so of the Constitution, should be given effect and made to serve its own distinct purpose, as no useless provision or one without any purpose at all could have been intended to be made part of, or incorporated in, the law.145 As such, every word or phrase in the Constitution must be so construed as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions.146The language used in the Constitution, must be taken to have been deliberately chosen for a definite purpose.147 141. Inasmuch as qualifications for the position of Chief Justice and other Members of the Judiciary are fixed by the Constitution itself and cannot be the subject of a waiver, the proper interpretation of the term integrity in Section 7(3), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution must be that which gives full effect to the mandate of the provision. On this point, it is not true, as Respondent alleges, that the term under the Constitution “eludes precise integrity definition.”148

142. The first principle of constitutional construction requires the application of the verba legis rule, that is, that the term must be given its ordinary meaning.149 The Constitution, after all, is not primarily a lawyer’s document,

but is essentially that of the people.150 As such, the interpretation of the term integrity must be one that a layperson can reasonably accept and understand. 143. In its generic sense, the term integrity pertains to a person’s “firm adherence to a code of especially moral or artistic values; incorruptibility.”151 In other words, integrity, in its ordinary conception, speaks of a person’s fulfillment of 145

Malacora v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-51042, September 30, 1982. Chavez v. JBC, G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012. Chavez v. JBC, G.R. No. 202242, April 16, 2013. 148 Comment, p. 62. 149 Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003. 150 Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012. 151 "Integrity." Merriam-Webster.com. Accessed February 27, 2018. webster.com/dictionary/integrity, emphasis supplied. 146 147

https://www.merriam-

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and compliance with appropriate codes of conduct, such as those set forth in the Constitution and statutes passed by Congress. 144. Consistent with the generic definition of integrity, the Solicitor General already pointed out in the Petition that integrity “is closely related to, or if not, approximately equated to an applicant’s good reputation for honesty,

incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards,”152 citing the Court’s ruling in Francis H. Jardeleza vs. Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno.153 Even Respondent herself adopts this definition of integrity in her Comment.154 145. Similarly, under the Canons of Judicial Ethics,155 the provisions of which served as the foundation for the inclusion of the term integrity as a qualification for membership in the Judiciary,156 it is stated that a “judge should be studiously careful to avoid even the slightest infraction of the law, lest it be a demoralizing example to others.” 146. Under these standards, the test by which Respondent may be considered to possess the qualification of integrity is whether she has exhibited faithful adherence to the law. 147. More importantly, the test of integrity laid down above does not require allegation, much less proof, of commission of graft and corruption by acquiring unexplained wealth. 148. Petitioner is aware of the Court’s rulings in cases such as Navarro vs. Ombudsman157 and Ombudsman vs. Racho158 to the effect that “mere misdeclaration of the SALN does not automatically amount to dishonesty. Only when the accumulated wealth becomes manifestly 152

Id., citing JBC-009, Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council, promulgated on September 23, 2002. G.R. No. 213181, August 19, 2014. 154 Comment, p. 66. 155 Administrative Order No. 162 dated August 1, 1946 of the Department of Justice. 156 See IV Record of the Constitutional Commission, p. 440 (July 10, 1986); p. 484 – 485 (July 14, 1986). 157 G.R. No. 210128, August 17, 2016. 158 G.R. No. 185685, January 31, 2011. 153

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disproportionate to the income or other sources of income of the public officer/employee and he fails to properly account or explain his other sources of income, does he become susceptible to dishonesty.”159 Respondent claims that, if at all, the submission of SALNS vis-à-vis the qualification of integrity must be measured against these same standards. 149. These cases, however, involved administrative charges for dishonesty for which the existence of unexplained wealth is indeed relevant. None of these cases attempted to furnish the public with a definition ofintegrity as a qualification for public office. 150. That the qualification of integrity simply demands faithful adherence to the law is likewise more in consonance with our obligations towards the family of nations. As explained by Petitioner, the Judicial Integrity Group that forged the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct affirmed that “scrupulous respect for the law is required”160 of all Members of the Judiciary. The Group was emphatic that “[a] judge is obliged to uphold the law.”161 Expounding on the

concept of integrity, the Group stated in its Commentary on the Bangalore Principles that: Integrity is the attribute of rectitude and righteousness. The components of integrity are honesty and judicial morality. A judge should always, not only in the discharge of official duties, act honourably and in a manner befitting the judicial office, and be free from fraud, deceit and falsehood, and be good and virtuous in behaviour and in character. There are no degrees of integrity as so defined. Integrity is absolute. In the judiciary, integrity is more than a virtue; it is a necessity.

151. In any event, a perusal of Respondent’s submitted SALNs reveals that she did, in fact, commit a litany of falsehoods. Her SALN as of December 31, 1998, which was filed only in 2003, or five years beyond the period required

159

Navarro v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 210128, August 17, 2016 citing Office of the Ombudsman v. Racho, G.R. No. 185685, January 31, 2011. 160 Commentary, p. 76, emphasis and italics in srcinal . 161 Id. 55


by law, uses the prescribed form for later years.162 The 1998 SALN shows that Respondent did not only file it late, she also belatedly accomplished it. This is also true with her 2009 SALN, which was also belatedly filed on June 22, 2012. The 2009 SALN reflects that she was holding the position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, when in fact, she was only appointed on August 16, 2010.163 When Respondent resigned in June 2006 as a UP professor, she should have submitted a SALN as of 2006. Her 2006 SALN, however, bears no stamp receipt from UP, was only signed on July 27, 2010, the same day that she submitted it to the JBC and was not notarized.164 It appears that she fabricated her 2006 SALN in an attempt to submit a SALN to the JBC during her application for Associate Justice in 2010. Her 2011 SALN was not signed by her husband.165 Aside from these facts, her 1990 and 1991 SALNs reveal a discrepancy as to her pieces of jewelry valued at PhP15,000.00.166 In her 1991 SALN, she declared them as personal properties acquired from 1986 to 1991, but her 1990 SALN does not contain any declaration that she has pieces of jewelry. These are perjurious acts that bolster her utter lack of integrity. 152. Respondent undermined the sanctity of the SALN by regarding it as mere formality. Her acts of nondeclaration and misrepresentation in her SALNs evince a disturbing defiance of the constitutional and statutory requirement to submit SALN and demonstrates her lack of integrity and moral fitness to hold the office of the Chief Justice. 153. Above all, defining integrity simply as a person’s faithful adherence to thethe lawfiling obviates Respondent’s difficulty of having to interpret of SALNs as an additional

qualification imposed for the position of Chief Justice. Considering that the SALN requirement is imposed by no less than the Constitution and RA 6713, compliance with such legal obligation is implied from, and is not in addition to, the constitutional qualification of integrity under Section 7(3), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. 162

Annex “C”, Petition dated March 2, 2018. Annex “E”, Petition dated March 2, 2018. See Annex “E” of the Petition dated March 2, 2018. 165 See Annex “E” of the Petition dated March 2, 2018. 166 Annexes “N-2” and “N-3”. 163 164

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154. The nagging question before the Court, then, is this: Did Respondent, prior to her appointment as Chief Justice, exhibit faithful and scrupulous adherence to the law? The answer is no. c. Respondent failed to religiously file her SALNs casting her integrity in grave doubt. 155. The SALN is not a mere formal requirement that Respondent can just choose to lightly brush aside. It is demanded by no less than the 1987 Constitution. 156. Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution reads: Article XI Accountability of Public Officers

SECTION 17. A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his

assets, liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional offices, and officers of the armed forces with general or flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law.

157. Under Section 8(A)(1) of RA 6713,167 all other public employees should file their SALN with the Office of the Civil Service Commission. The Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 6713 issued on April 21, 1989 mandates the filing of the SALN with their respective departments, offices or agencies and the legally designated repositories. For 167

Section 8.Statements and Disclosure. XXX The Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth and the Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections shall be filed by: … (5) All other public officials and employees, defined in Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, with the Civil Service Commission. 57


uniform implementation of the provisions of RA 6713, the CSC issued Memorandum Circular No. 09, Series of 1991 specifying the Office where public officials and employees should file their SALN. This Memorandum Circular directed the employees of state colleges and universities to file their SALNs with the Deputy Ombudsman of their respective region. Thereafter, 24,of 2004, CSC directed issued Memorandum Circular on No. March 07, Series 2004 which public officials and employees to accomplish their SALNs in triplicate and submit the srcinal and duplicate to the Administrative or Personnel Division or Unit in their respective agencies. 158. The requirement of filing a SALN is enshrined in the Constitution to promote transparency in the civil service, and to operate as a deterrent against government officials bent on enriching themselves through unlawful means.168 Consistent with these purposes, Section 8 of RA 6713 or the “Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees” which was enacted on February 20, 1989,

specified the following details, inter alia, who are required to file a SALN; what are the contents of a SALN; when should a SALN be filed; and where should a SALN be filed.By mandate of the law, it behooves every government official or employee to accomplish and submit a sworn statement completely disclosing his or her assets, liabilities, net worth, and financial and business interests, including those of his/her spouse and unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age living in their households, in order to suppress any questionable accumulation of wealth because the latter usually results from non-disclosure of such matters.169 159. The Constitution and the pertinent laws contain the compulsory requirement for public officers to submit a SALN. As a public officer, Respondent cannot ignore this directive. Assumption of public office is impressed with paramount public interest, thus persons involved in the dispensation of justice, from the highest official to the lowest clerk, must live up to the strictest standards of integrity, probity, uprightness, honesty, and diligence in the public 168 169

Casimiro vs. Rigor, G.R. No. 206661, December 10, 2014. Daplas vs. Department of Finance, G.R. No. 221153, April 17, 2017. 58


service.170 It is established that the judges, being visible representations of the law, should set a good example to the bench, bar and students of the law. The standard of integrity imposed on them is – and should be – higher than that of the average person for it is their integrity that gives them the right to judge.171 160. In this case, Respondent refuses to prove that she had filed her SALNs, hiding under the cloak of presumption of regularity. She claims that she must be “presumed

innocent and to have regularly filed her SALNs when she was still a Professor at the UP College of Law.”172 She is mistaken. 161. Public officers are presumed to have regularly performed their official acts of duties. In People vs. De Guzman, the Honorable Court discussed the nature and reasons for the presumption of regularity:173 A disputable presumption has been as a species of evidence that may be accepted and acted on where there is no other evidence to uphold the contention for which it stands, or one which may be overcome by other evidence. One such disputable/rebuttable presumption is that an official act or duty has been regularly performed. Presumption of this nature is indulged by the law for the following fundamental reasons: first, innocence, and not wrong-doing, is to be presumed; second, an official oath will not be violated; and third, a republican form of government cannot survive long unless a limit is placed upon controversies and certain trust and confidence reposed in each governmental department or agent by every other such department or agent, at least to the extent of such presumption. Thus, this presumption evidences a rule of convenient public policy universally applied and without which great distress would spring in the affairs of men.

170

Re: Administrative Case for Dishonesty and Falsification of Official Document: Benjamin R. Katly, A.M. No. 2003-9-SC, March 25, 2004. 171 Samson vs. Caballero, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2138, August 5, 2009. 172 Comment, p. 59, par. 2.56. 173 G.R. No. 106025, February 9, 1994. 59


162. The presumption of regularity attaches only to official acts and not to all acts of officials. Just because a public officer performed the act does not necessarily mean that such act is clothed with the presumption of regularity. “Official acts” are those specified by law as an official duty or

as a function attached to a public position.174 In Reyes vs. Belisario,175 the Court held: As a general rule, "official acts" enjoy the presumption of regularity, and the presumption may be overthrown only by evidence to the contrary. When an act is official, a presumption of regularity exists because of the assumption that the law tells the official what his duties are and that he discharged these duties accordingly. But not all acts of public officers are "official acts," i.e., acts specified by law as an official duty or as a function attached to a public position, and the presumption does not apply when an official’s acts are not within the duties specified by law…

163. The filing of a SALN is neither an official duty nor a function attached to the Respondent’s previous post as a

professor of the UP College of Law. To be sure, the accomplishment and filing of a SALN is a duty required by law. Nevertheless, such duty is not imposed on a specific position to make it an official duty or function of its holder. Rather, it is an obligation of public officers in general. Thus, the presumption cannot attach to the fact of filing a SALN. 164. In any case, assuming arguendo that Respondent may benefit from the presumption of regularity, such presumption is disputable and may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty.176 The Republic has already submitted clear and convincing evidence to show that Respondent failed to file her SALNs as required by law. 165. Based on the UPHRDO Certification dated December 8, 2017 and the Certification from the Ombudsman Central Records Division dated December 4, 174 175 176

Reyes v. Belisario, G.R. No. 154652, August 14, 2009. G.R. No. 154652, August 14, 2009. See People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 106025, February 9, 1994. 60


2017, Respondent failed to file her SALN eleven times from 1986 to 2006. This fact remains unrefuted. The certification issued by Director Angela Escoto of the UP Human Resources Development Office, the value of which is being downplayed by Respondent, clearly shows Respondent’s

failure to submit her SALNs. 166. Also, in a letter dated March 6, 2018, Director Escoto responded to the OSG’s letter dated February 28,

2018,177 attaching copies of the SALNs of Respondent for the years 1985, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, and 2002.178 This corroborates the earlier Certifications secured from the UPHRDO and the Office of the Ombudsman. 167. Unlike Respondent’s mere allegation of her filing of all her SALNs, the Certifications offered by the Solicitor General as proof of her non-filing do enjoy the presumption of regularity. Likewise, the record keeping of Respondent’s

201 file should be presumed to be free from irregularities, meaning all documents submitted are duly preserved. Thus, if upon examination of Respondent’s 201 file, her SALNs for

several years cannot be found, it is presumed that she did not file those SALNs. 168. Respondent categorically states that she is not submitting the issue of non-filing of SALNs to the Court. While she may do as she pleases, her non-submission of copies of all her SALNs certified to be not on record by Director Escoto will result in the disputable presumption of 179 the regularity of such certification to become conclusive. 169. Further, contrary to her position that she complied with SALN laws, Respondent claims that she is exempted from filing SALN during the time she took a leave of absence without pay from UP. She anchored her claim on Section 1, Rule VII of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 6713 exempting those who serve in an “official honorary 177

See Annex “B-1,” OSG’s Letter Request dated February 28, 2018, Petition dated March 2, 2018. Annex “O,” Letter of Director Angela D. Escoto dated March 6, 2018; Annex “O-1,” Respondent’s 1985 SALN; Annex “O-2,” Respondent’s 1990 SALN; Annex “O-3,” Respondent’s 1991 SALN; Annex “O-4,” Respondent’s 1993 SALN; Annex “O-5,” Respondent’s 1994 SALN; Annex “O-6,” Respondent’s 1995 SALN; Annex “O-7,” Respondent’s 1996 SALN; Annex “O-8,” Respondent’s 1997 SALN. 179 Id. 178

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capacity, without service credit or pay, temporary laborers and casual or temporary and contractual workers” from filing their SALN. 170. Respondent’s interpretation is flawed. Section 8(a) of R.A. No. 6713 enumerates the government employees who are exempted from filing SALN, to wit: Section 8….

Statements of Assets and Liabilities and Financial Disclosure. - All public officials and employees, except those who serve in an honorary capacity, laborers and casual or temporary workers, shall file under oath their Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth and a Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections and those of their spouses and unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age living in their households.

171. Under Section 8, the public employees who are not required to file SALN are: (a) those who serve in an honorary capacity; (b) laborers; and (c) casual or temporary workers. In short, under R.A. No. 6713, a government employee who serves without service credit or pay is not among those who are not required to file their SALN. At most, the phrase “without service credit or pay” is a mere description of an employee who serves in an honorary capacity.

172. The the implementing rulesitsand regulations of power a law cannot extend law or expand coverage, as the to amend or repeal a statute is vested in the Legislature. Thus, if a discrepancy occurs between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails, because the law cannot be broadened by a mere administrative issuance — an administrative agency certainly cannot amend an act of Congress.180 The phrase “without service credit or pay” is not included in Section 8.

180

Grande v. Antonio, G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014. 62


173. At any rate, Respondent cannot justify not filing her SALN on the basis that she did not receive any pay from the government because she was only on leave without pay for several months within a year. In her Comment, she stated that she was on leave without pay in UP during the following periods: a) July 1, 1998 to October 16, 1998; b) June 1, 2000 to May 31, 2001; c) June 1, 2001 to May 31, 2002; d) November 1, 2003 to May 31, 2004; e) June 1, 2004 to October 31, 2004; f) February 11, 2005 to October 31, 2005; and g) November 15, 2005 to May 31, 2006.181 Following her logic, she should have filed her SALN during the periods that she was not on leave without pay because it is presumed that she was receiving pay from the government, particularly on: i. ii. iii. iv.

October 17, 1998 to May 31, 2000; June 1, 2002 to October 31, 2003; November 1, 2004 to February 10, 2005; and November 1, 2005 to November 15, 2005.

174. As if the right hand does not know what the left hand is doing, as shown in Director Escoto’s letter dated

March 6, 2018 and attachments,182 Respondent has a SALN for 2002, when she claims to have been on leave without pay on June 1, 2001 to May 31, 2002. 175. All premises considered, Respondent was not able to prove her integrity before the JBC by her non-submission of SALNs. Her failure to file her SALNs in compliance with the Constitution and RA 6713 mars her integrity. Viewed from any perspective, Respondent lacks one of the indispensable qualification for the office of the Chief Justice of the Republic of the Philippines. Her ouster from office should follow as a matter of course.

181 182

Comment dated March 16, 2018, p. 61. See note 178. 63


PRAYER

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines consequently prays that this Honorable Court: (1) DECLARE as void Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno’s appointment on August 24, 2012 Chief Justice of the Supreme of from the Philippines; (2) OUST Maria Lourdes P.A. Court Sereno the positionand of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines.

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OSG Reply - Republic v Sereno

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