People v. Dy, 395 SCRA 256 Jan 16, 2003 Doctrine: SC DIVISION and EN BANC Emergency Recit: Dy and Bernardino were both found guilty of rape and acts of lasciviousness. They both separately filed motions for reconsideration, in which motion Dy argued that SC’s decision should have been merely recommendatory, because it was not decided en banc, in view of the provision of Article VIII, Section 5 (2) of the Constitution which provides that the Supreme Court sitting en banc has jurisdiction over all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher. The contention was misleading, Under Article VIII, Section 4(1) of the Constitution, the Supreme Court may sit en banc or, in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven members. At present, it is made up of three divisions. However, the divisions of the Supreme Court are not to be considered as separate and distinct courts. Facts:
This was a Resolution made by the Supreme Court, following the decision that found both Dy and Bernardino guilty of rape and acts of lasciviousness. Accused-appellant Dy and Bernardino filed separate motions for reconsideration of the SC’s Decision which affirmed the judgment of the RTC Baguio finding them guilty of rape and acts of lasciviousness. In his motion, Dy argued that SC’s decision should have been merely recommendatory, in view of the provision of Article VIII, Section 5 (2) of the Constitution which provides that the Supreme Court sitting en banc has jurisdiction over all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher He contends that Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89 which provides that death penalty cases shall be within the jurisdiction of the Court en banc is incongruous and incompatible with the aforementioned constitutional provision. On the other hand, Barnardino contended that they were not accorded their right to fair and unbiased resolution. He contended that they were not arraigned properly and that such right cannot be simply waived by estoppel. Also, the erroneous decision of the trial judge to hold an expedited trial effectively deprived them of proper preparation for and presentation of an adequate defense.
Issue: WON accused-appellant’s contention is correct. Held: NO. The contention is misleading. Motions for reconsideration are denied Under Article VIII, Section 4(1) of the Constitution, the Supreme Court may sit en banc or, in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven members. At present, it is made up of three divisions. However, the divisions of the Supreme Court are not to be considered as separate and distinct courts. Actions considered in any of these divisions and decisions rendered therein are, in effect, by the same Tribunal. The divisions are not to be considered as separate and distinct courts, but as divisions of one and the same court.. On the contention of Bernardino’s motion, the court reiterated it’s decision over the case “the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation may not be waived. Indeed, the defense may waive their right to enter a plea and let the court enter a plea of not guilty in their behalf. However, it becomes altogether a different matter if the accused themselves refuse to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them. The defense can not hold hostage the court by their refusal to the reading of the complaint or information.” On the part of expediting the decision, While the proceedings might have been of short duration than usual, they were nevertheless conducted with due regard to the right of each party to due process. The trial court should even be commended for conducting a speedy trial, which should be the rule, rather than the exception. What is of prime consideration is not the speed by which the trial was conducted but the manner by which the procedural and substantial requirements were complied with. The records show that these requirements were adequately met.
KILOSBAYAN V. COMELEC Oct 16, 1997 Doctrine: Emergency Recit: Facts:
A complaint was filed against private respondents, alleging that Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) were use for electioneering purposes. Kilosbayan alleges that DILG-NCR collaborated with Philippine Youth Health and Sports Development Foundation, Inc. (PYHSDFI), the former approving allotment to the latter 70M allegedly use to buy medical and sports equipment that was distributed few days before election and stopped at the day of election. Comelec investigators submitted the dismissal of the complaint for lack of evidence to prove probable cause. Kilosbayan provided news clippings, regarding alleged use of funds resulting from the said transaction of DILGNCR and PYHSDFI and arguments to support its claims. The new paper clippings was regarded as hearsay. Kilosbayan filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that they are not responsible for the production of evidence by using public funds, it is the COMELEC who should search the evidence by using public funds and with the help of other agencies of the government as the constitution gave them the responsibility to prosecute election offenses. The motion was denied, thus this petition to compel COMELEC to prosecute the private respondents
Issue: WON the COMELEC can be compelled to produce evidence despite the complainants failure to prove probable cause. Held: NO, Insofar as the prosecution of election offenses is concerned, therefore, the COMELEC is the "public prosecutor with the exclusive authority to conduct the preliminary investigation and the prosecution of election offenses punishable under the [Omnibus Election] Code before the competent court." The determination of probable cause in any criminal prosecution, is made indispensable by the Bill of Rights which enshrines every citizen's right to due process, the presumption that he is presumed innocent. Petitioner KILOSBAYAN must have necessarily tendered evidence, independent of and in support of the allegations in its letter-complaint, to prove probable cause. It certainly demands more than "bare suspicion" and can never be "left to presupposition, conjecture, or even convincing logic" The task of the COMELEC as investigator and prosecutor, acting upon any election offense complaint, is not the physical searching and gathering of proof in support of a complaint for an alleged commission of an election offense. A complainant, who in effect accuses another person of having committed an act constituting an election offense, has the burden, as it is his responsibility, to follow through his accusation and prove his complainant.
