Schiller, The Aesthetical Essays http://www.gutenberg.net/browse/BIBREC/BR6!".#T$
The %ro&ect 'utenberg EBoo( The Aesthetical Essays o) *re+erich Schiller Title: The Aesthetical Essays Author: *re+erich Schiller Schiller, n the Subli-e
$an is neer oblige+ to say, I -ust00-ust, says the 1ew 2athan 34essing5s play, 2athan the ise, act i. scene 7.8 to the +erish9 an+ this epression is true in a wi+er sense than -an -ight be te-pte+ to suppose. The will is the speci)ic speci)ic character o) -an, an+ reason itsel) itsel) is only the eternal rule o) his will. All nature acts reasonably9 reasonably9 all our prerogatie is to act reasonably, with consciousness an+ with will. All other ob&ects obey necessity9 -an is the being be ing who wills. It is eactly )or this reason that there is nothing -ore inconsistent with the +ignity o) -an than to su))er iolence, )or iolence e))aces hi-. #e who +oes iolence to us +isputes +isputes nothing less than our hu-anity9 he who sub-its in a cowar+ly spirit to the iolence ab+icates his ;uality o) -an. But this pretension to to re-ain absolutely )ree )ro)ro- all that is iolence see-s to i-ply a being in possession o) a )orce su))iciently great to (eep o)) all other )orces. But i) this pretension pretension is )oun+ in a being who, in the or+er o) )orces, cannot clai- the )irst ran(, the result is an un)ortunate contra+iction between his instinct an+ his power. $an is precisely in in this case. Surroun+e+ by nu-berless )orces, which which are all superior to hi- an+ hol+ sway oer hi-, he aspires by his nature not to hae to su))er any in&ury at their han+s. It is true that that by his intelligence he a++s arti)icially to his natural )orces, an+ that up to a certain point he actually succee+s in reigning physically oer eerything that is physical. The proerb says, there is a re-e+y )or eerything ecept +eath9 but this eception, i) it is one in the strictest acceptation o) the ter-, woul+ su))ice to entirely ruin the ery i+ea o) our nature. 2eer will -an be the the cause that wills, i) there is a case, a single case, in which, with or without his consent, he is )orce+ to what he +oes not wish. This single terrible terrible eception, to be or to +o what is necessary an+ not what he wishes, this i+ea will pursue hi- as a phanto-9 an+ as we see in )act a-ong the greater part o) -en, it will gie hi- up a prey to the the blin+ terrors o) i-agination. #is boaste+
liberty is nothing, i) there is a single point where he is un+er constraint an+ boun+. It is e+ucation that -ust -ust gie bac( liberty to -an, an+ help hi- to co-plete co-plete the whole i+ea o) his nature. It ought, there)ore, to -a(e hi- capable o) -a(ing his will preail, )or, I repeat it, -an is the being who wills. It is possible to reach this en+ in two ways: either really, by opposing )orce to )orce, by co--an+ing nature, as nature yoursel)9 or by the i+ea, issuing )ro- nature, an+ by thus +estroying in relation to sel) the ery i+ea o) iolence. All that helps -an really really to hol+ sway oer nature is is what is style+ physical e+ucation. e+ucation. $an cultiates his un+erstan+ing an+ +eelops his physical )orce, either to conert the )orces o) nature, accor+ing to their proper laws, into the instru-ents o) his will, or to secure hi-sel) against their e))ects when he cannot +irect +irect the-. But the )orces o) nature can only be +irecte+ or turne+ asi+e up to a certain point9 beyon+ that point they with+raw )ro- the in)luence o) -an an+ place hi- un+er theirs. Thus beyon+ the point in ;uestion his )ree+o- woul+ be lost, were he only susceptible o) physical e+ucation. e+ucation. But he -ust be -an in in the )ull sense o) the ter-, an+ conse;uently he -ust hae nothing to en+ure, in any case, contrary to his will. Accor+ingly, when he can no longer oppose to the physical )orces any proportional physical )orce, only one resource re-ains to hi- to aoi+ su))ering any iolence: that is, to cause to cease entirely that relation relation which is so )atal )atal to hi-. It is, in short, short, to annihilate as an i+ea the iolence he is oblige+ to su))er in )act. The e+ucation that )its -an )or this is calle+ -oral e+ucation. The -an )ashione+ by -oral e+ucation, e+ucation, an+ he only, is entirely )ree. #e is either superior to nature as a power, or he is in har-ony with her. 2one o) the actions that she brings to bear upon hi- is iolence, )or be)ore reaching hi- it has beco-e an act o) his own will, an+ +yna-ic nature coul+ neer touch hi-, because he spontaneously (eeps away )roall to which she can reach. reach. But to attain to this this state o) -in+, which which -orality +esignates as resignation to necessary things, an+ religion styles absolute sub-ission to the counsels o) %roi+ence, to reach this by an e))ort o) his )ree will an+ with re)lection, re)lection, a certain clearness is re;uire+ in thought, an+ a certain c ertain energy in the will, superior to what -an co--only possesses in in actie li)e. #appily )or hi-, -an )in+s )in+s here not only in his rational nature a -oral aptitu+e that can be +eelope+ by the un+erstan+ing, but also in his reasonable an+ sensible nature00that is, in his hu-an nature00an aesthetic ten+ency which see-s to hae been place+ there epressly: a )aculty awa(ens o) itsel) in the presence o) certain sensuous ob&ects, an+ which, a)ter our )eelings are puri)ie+, can be cultiate+ to such a point as to beco-e a power)ul i+eal +eelop-ent. This aptitu+e, I grant, is i+ealistic in its principle an+ in its essence, but one which een the realist allows to be seen clearly enough
liberty is nothing, i) there is a single point where he is un+er constraint an+ boun+. It is e+ucation that -ust -ust gie bac( liberty to -an, an+ help hi- to co-plete co-plete the whole i+ea o) his nature. It ought, there)ore, to -a(e hi- capable o) -a(ing his will preail, )or, I repeat it, -an is the being who wills. It is possible to reach this en+ in two ways: either really, by opposing )orce to )orce, by co--an+ing nature, as nature yoursel)9 or by the i+ea, issuing )ro- nature, an+ by thus +estroying in relation to sel) the ery i+ea o) iolence. All that helps -an really really to hol+ sway oer nature is is what is style+ physical e+ucation. e+ucation. $an cultiates his un+erstan+ing an+ +eelops his physical )orce, either to conert the )orces o) nature, accor+ing to their proper laws, into the instru-ents o) his will, or to secure hi-sel) against their e))ects when he cannot +irect +irect the-. But the )orces o) nature can only be +irecte+ or turne+ asi+e up to a certain point9 beyon+ that point they with+raw )ro- the in)luence o) -an an+ place hi- un+er theirs. Thus beyon+ the point in ;uestion his )ree+o- woul+ be lost, were he only susceptible o) physical e+ucation. e+ucation. But he -ust be -an in in the )ull sense o) the ter-, an+ conse;uently he -ust hae nothing to en+ure, in any case, contrary to his will. Accor+ingly, when he can no longer oppose to the physical )orces any proportional physical )orce, only one resource re-ains to hi- to aoi+ su))ering any iolence: that is, to cause to cease entirely that relation relation which is so )atal )atal to hi-. It is, in short, short, to annihilate as an i+ea the iolence he is oblige+ to su))er in )act. The e+ucation that )its -an )or this is calle+ -oral e+ucation. The -an )ashione+ by -oral e+ucation, e+ucation, an+ he only, is entirely )ree. #e is either superior to nature as a power, or he is in har-ony with her. 2one o) the actions that she brings to bear upon hi- is iolence, )or be)ore reaching hi- it has beco-e an act o) his own will, an+ +yna-ic nature coul+ neer touch hi-, because he spontaneously (eeps away )roall to which she can reach. reach. But to attain to this this state o) -in+, which which -orality +esignates as resignation to necessary things, an+ religion styles absolute sub-ission to the counsels o) %roi+ence, to reach this by an e))ort o) his )ree will an+ with re)lection, re)lection, a certain clearness is re;uire+ in thought, an+ a certain c ertain energy in the will, superior to what -an co--only possesses in in actie li)e. #appily )or hi-, -an )in+s )in+s here not only in his rational nature a -oral aptitu+e that can be +eelope+ by the un+erstan+ing, but also in his reasonable an+ sensible nature00that is, in his hu-an nature00an aesthetic ten+ency which see-s to hae been place+ there epressly: a )aculty awa(ens o) itsel) in the presence o) certain sensuous ob&ects, an+ which, a)ter our )eelings are puri)ie+, can be cultiate+ to such a point as to beco-e a power)ul i+eal +eelop-ent. This aptitu+e, I grant, is i+ealistic in its principle an+ in its essence, but one which een the realist allows to be seen clearly enough
in his con+uct, though he +oes not ac(nowle+ge this in theory. I a- now about to +iscuss this )aculty. I a+-it that the sense o) the beauti)ul, when it is +eelope+ by culture, su))ices o) itsel) een to -a(e us, in a certain sense, in+epen+ent o) nature as )ar as it is a )orce. A -in+ that has ennoble+ itsel) itsel) su))iciently to be -ore sensible o) the )or- than o) the -atter o) things, contains in itsel) a plenitu+e o) eistence that nothing coul+ -a(e it lose, especially as it +oes not trouble itsel) about the possession o) the things in ;uestion, an+ )in+s a ery liberal pleasure pleasure in the -ere conte-plation conte-plation o) the pheno-enon. As this -in+ has no want to appropriate the ob&ects in the -i+st o) which it lies, it has no )ear o) being +eprie+ o) the-. But it is neertheless necessary that these pheno-ena shoul+ hae a bo+y, through which they -ani)est the-seles9 an+, conse;uently, as long as we )eel the want een only o) )in+ing a beauti)ul appearance or a beauti)ul pheno-enon, this want i-plies that o) the eistence o) certain ob&ects9 an+ it )ollows that our satis)action still +epen+s on nature, consi+ere+ as a )orce, because it is nature who +isposes o) all eistence in a soereign -anner. It is a +i))erent +i))erent thing, in )act, to )eel in yoursel) the want wan t o) ob&ects en+owe+ with beauty an+ goo+ness, or si-ply to re;uire that the ob&ects which surroun+ us are goo+ an+ beauti)ul. This last +esire +esire is co-patible with the the -ost per)ect )ree+o- o) the soul9 but it is not so with with the other. e are entitle+ to re;uire that the ob&ect be)ore us shoul+ be beauti)ul an+ goo+, but we can only wish that the beauti)ul an+ the goo+ shoul+ be reali
worl+. The one, a-iable an+ o) goo+ co-panionship, shortens the troubles o) the &ourney by the gayety o) its plays. It -a(es the chains o) necessity light to us, an+ lea+s us a-i+st &oy an+ laughter, to the -ost perilous spots, where we -ust act as pure spirits an+ strip ourseles o) all that is bo+y, on the (nowle+ge o) the true an+ the practice o) +uty. nce when we are there, it aban+ons us, )or its real- is li-ite+ to the worl+ o) sense9 its earthly wings coul+ not carry it beyon+. But at this -o-ent the other co-panion steps upon the stage, silent an+ grae, an+ with his power)ul ar- carries us beyon+ the precipice that -a+e us gi++y. In the )or-er o) these genii we recogni
o) nature i) we ha+ not in us so-ething that cannot be a prey o) these )orces. e are please+ with the spectacle o) the sensuous in)inite, because we are able to attain by thought what the senses can no longer e-brace an+ what the un+erstan+ing cannot grasp. The sight o) a terrible ob&ect transports us with enthusias-, because we are capable o) willing what the instincts re&ect with horror, an+ o) re&ecting what they +esire. e willingly allow our i-agination to )in+ so-ething in the worl+ o) pheno-ena that passes beyon+ it9 because, a)ter all, it is only one sensuous )orce that triu-phs oer another sensuous )orce, but nature, notwithstan+ing all her in)inity, cannot attain to the absolute g ran+eur which is in ourseles. e sub-it willingly to physical necessity both our well0being an+ our eistence. This is because the ery power re-in+s us that there are in us principles that escape its e-pire. $an is in the han+s o) nature, but the will o) -an is in his own han+s. 2ature hersel) has actually use+ a sensuous -eans to teach us that we are so-ething -ore than -ere sensuous natures. She has een (nown how to -a(e use o) our sensations to put us on the trac( o) this +iscoery00that we are by no -eans sub&ect as slaes to the iolence o) the sensations. An+ this is ;uite a +i))erent e))ect )ro- that which can be pro+uce+ by the beauti)ul9 I -ean the beauti)ul o) the real worl+, )or the subli-e itsel) is surpasse+ by the i+eal. In the presence o) beauty, reason an+ sense are in har-ony, an+ it is only on account o) this har-ony that the beauti)ul has attraction )or us. Conse;uently, beauty alone coul+ neer teach us that our +estination is to act as pure intelligences, an+ that we are capable o) showing ourseles such. In the presence o) the subli-e, on the contrary, reason an+ the sensuous are not in har-ony, an+ it is precisely this contra+iction between the two which -a(es the charo) the subli-e00its irresistible action on our -in+s. #ere the physical -an an+ the -oral -an separate in the -ost -ar(e+ -anner9 )or it is eactly in the presence o) ob&ects that -a(e us )eel at once how li-ite+ the )or-er is that the other -a(es the eperience o) its )orce. The ery thing that lowers one to the earth is precisely that which raises the other to the in)inite. 4et us i-agine a -an en+owe+ with all the irtues o) which the union constitutes a )ine character. 4et us suppose a -an who )in+s his +elight in practising &ustice, bene)icence, -o+eration, constancy, an+ goo+ )aith. All the +uties whose acco-plish-ent is prescribe+ to hi- by circu-stances are only a play to hi-, an+ I a+-it that )ortune )aors hiin such wise that none o) the actions which his goo+ heart -ay +e-an+ o) hi- will be har+ to hi-. ho woul+ not be char-e+ with such a +elight)ul har-ony between the instincts o) nature an+ the prescriptions o) reason= an+ who coul+ help a+-iring such a -an= 2eertheless, though he -ay inspire us with a))ection, are we ;uite sure that he is really irtuous= r in general that he has anything that correspon+s to the i+ea o) irtue= I) this -an ha+ only in iew to obtain agreeable sensations,
unless he were -a+ he coul+ not act in any other possible way9 an+ he woul+ hae to be his own ene-y to wish to be icious. %erhaps the principle o) his actions is pure, but this is a ;uestion to be +iscusse+ between hi-sel) an+ his conscience. *or our part, we see nothing o) it9 we +o not see hi- +o anything -ore than a si-ply cleer -an woul+ +o who ha+ no other go+ than pleasure. Thus all his irtue is a pheno-enon that is eplaine+ by reasons +erie+ )ro- the sensuous or+er, an+ we are by no -eans +rien to see( )or reasons beyon+ the worl+ o) sense. 4et us suppose that this sa-e -an )alls su++enly un+er -is)ortune. #e is +eprie+ o) his possessions9 his reputation is +estroye+9 he is chaine+ to his be+ by sic(ness an+ su))ering9 he is robbe+ by +eath o) all those he loes9 he is )orsa(en in his +istress by all in who- he ha+ truste+. 4et us un+er these circu-stances again see( hi-, an+ +e-an+ the practice o) the sa-e irtues un+er trial as he )or-erly ha+ practise+ +uring the perio+ o) his prosperity. I) he is )oun+ to be absolutely the sa-e as be)ore, i) his poerty has not +eteriorate+ his beneolence, or ingratitu+e his (in+ly o))ices o) goo+0will, or bo+ily su))ering his e;uani-ity, or a+ersity his &oy in the happiness o) others9 i) his change o) )ortune is perceptible in eternals, but not in his habits, in the -atter, but not in the )or- o) his con+uct9 then, +oubtless, his irtue coul+ not be eplaine+ by any reason +rawn )ro- the physical or+er9 the i+ea o) nature00which always necessarily supposes that actual pheno-ena rest upon so-e anterior pheno-enon, as e))ects upon cause00this i+ea no longer su))ices to enable us to co-prehen+ this -an9 because there is nothing -ore contra+ictory than to a+ -it that e))ect can re-ain the sa-e when the cause has change+ to its contrary. e -ust then gie up all natural eplanation or thought o) )in+ing the reason o) his acts in his con+ition9 we -ust o) necessity go bey on+ the physical or+er, an+ see( the principle o) his con+uct in ;uite another worl+, to which the reason can in+ee+ raise itsel) with its i+eas, but which the un+erstan+ing cannot grasp by its conceptions. It is this reelation o) the absolute -oral power which is sub&ecte+ to no con+ition o) nature, it is this which gies to the -elancholy )eeling that sei)or between absolute +epen+ence an+ absolute liberty there is no possible transition?, it is su++enly an+ by a shoc( that the subli-e wrenches our spiritual an+ in+epen+ent nature away )ro- the net which )eeling has spun roun+ us, an+ which enchains the soul the -ore tightly because o) its subtle teture. hateer -ay be the etent to which )eeling has gaine+ a -astery oer -en by the latent in)luence o) a so)tening taste, when een it shoul+ hae succee+e+ in
penetrating into the -ost secret recesses o) -oral &uris+iction un+er the +eceptie enelope o) spiritual beauty, an+ there poisoning the holiness o) principle at its source00one single subli-e e-otion o)ten su))ices to brea( all this tissue o) i-posture, at one blow to gie )ree+o- to the )ettere+ elasticity o) spiritual nature, to reeal its true +estination, an+ to oblige it to conceie, )or one instant at least, the )eeling o) its liberty. Beauty, un+er the shape o) the +iine Calypso, bewitche+ the irtuous son o) @lysses, an+ the power o) her char-s hel+ hi- long a prisoner in her islan+. *or long he beliee+ he was obeying an i--ortal +iinity, whilst he was only the slae o) sense9 but su++enly an i-pression o) the subli-e in the )or- o) $entor sei
per-anent in his own being00than at once the coarse agglo-eration o) nature that surroun+s hi- begins to spea( in another language to his heart, an+ the relatie gran+eur which is without beco-es )or hi- a -irror in which he conte-plates the absolute greatness which is within hi-sel). #e approaches without )ear, an+ with a thrill o) pleasure, those pictures which terri)ie+ his i-agination, an+ intentionally -a(es an appeal to the whole strength o) that )aculty by which we represent the in)inite perceie+ by the senses, in or+er i) she )ails in this atte-pt, to )eel all the -ore ii+ly how -uch these i+eas are superior to all that the highest sensuous )aculty can gie. The sight o) a +istant in)inity00o) heights beyon+ ision, this ast ocean which is at his )eet, that other ocean still -ore ast which stretches aboe his hea+, transport an+ raish his -in+ beyon+ the narrow circle o) the real, beyon+ this narrow an+ oppressie prison o) physical li)e. The si-ple -a&esty o) nature o))ers hi- a less circu-scribe+ -easure )or esti-ating its gran+eur, an+, surroun+e+ by the gran+ outlines which it presents to hi-, he can no longer bear anything -ean in his way o) thin(ing. ho can tell how -any lu-inous i+eas, how -any heroic resolutions, which woul+ neer hae been conceie+ in the +ar( stu+y o) the i-prisone+ -an o) science, nor in the saloons where the people o) society elbow each other, hae been inspire+ on a su++en +uring a wal(, only by the contact an+ the generous struggle o) the soul with the great spirit o) nature= ho (nows i) it is not owing to a less )re;uent intercourse with this subli-e spirit that we -ust partially attribute the narrowness o) -in+ so co--on to the +wellers in towns, always bent un+er the -inutiae which +war) an+ wither their soul, whilst the soul o) the no-a+ re-ains open an+ )ree as the )ir-a-ent beneath which he pitches his tent= But it is not only the uni-aginable or the subli-e in ;uantity, it is also the inco-prehensible, that which escapes the un+erstan+ing an+ that which troubles it, which can sere to gie us an i+ea o) the super0sensuous in)inity. As soon as this ele-ent attains the gran+iose an+ announces itsel) to us as the wor( o) nature >)or otherwise it is only +espicable?, it then ai+s the soul to represent to itsel) the i+eal, an+ i-prints upon it a noble +eelop-ent. ho +oes not loe the elo;uent +isor+er o) natural scenery to the insipi+ regularity o) a * rench gar+en= ho +oes not a+-ire in the plains o) Sicily the -arellous co-bat o) nature with hersel)00o) her creatie )orce an+ her +estructie power= ho +oes not pre)er to )east his eyes upon the wil+ strea-s an+ water)alls o) Scotlan+, upon its -isty -ountains, upon that ro-antic nature )ro- which ssian +rew his inspiration00rather than to grow enthusiastic in this sti)) #ollan+, be)ore the laborious triu-ph o) patience oer the -ost stubborn o) ele-ents= 2o one will +eny that in the rich gra
)ar-0gar+en than in the uncultiate+ beauty o) natural scenery. But -an has re;uire-ents which go beyon+ those o) natural li)e an+ co-)ort or well0being9 he has another +estiny than -erely to co-prehen+ the pheno-ena which surroun+ hi-. In the sa-e -anner as )or the obserant traeller, the strange wil+ness o) nature is so attractie in physical nature00thus, an+ )or the sa-e reason, eery soul capable o) enthusias- )in+s een in the regrettable anarchy )oun+ in the -oral worl+ a source o) singular pleasure. ithout +oubt he who sees the gran+ econo-y o) nature only )ro- the i-poerishe+ light o) the un+erstan+ing9 he who has neer any other thought than to re)or- its +e)iant +isor+er an+ to substitute har-ony, such a one coul+ not )in+ pleasure in a worl+ which see-s gien up to the caprice o) chance rather than goerne+ accor+ing to a wise or+ination, an+ where -erit an+ )ortune are )or the -ost part in opposition. #e +esires that the whole worl+ throughout its ast space shoul+ b e rule+ li(e a house well regulate+9 an+ when this -uch0+esire+ regularity is not )oun+, he has no other resource than to +e)er to a )uture li)e, an+ to another an+ better nature, the satis)action which is his +ue, but which neither the present nor the past a))or+ hi-. n the contrary, he renounces willingly the pretension o) restoring this chaos o) pheno-ena to one single notion9 he regains on another si+e, an+ with interest, what he loses on this si+e. 1ust this want o) connection, this anarchy, in the pheno-ena, -a(ing the- useless to the un+erstan+ing, is what -a(es the- aluable to reason. The -ore they are +isor+erly the -ore they represent the )ree+oo) nature. In a sense, i) you suppress all connection, you hae in+epen+ence. Thus, un+er the i+ea o) liberty, reason brings bac( to unity o) thought that which the un+erstan+ing coul+ not bring to unity o) notion. It thus shows its superiority oer the un+erstan+ing, as a )aculty sub&ect to the con+itions o) a sensuous or+er. hen we consi+er o) what alue it is to a rational being to be in+epen+ent o) natural laws, we see how -uch -an )in+s in the liberty o) subli-e ob&ects as a set0o)) against the chec(s o) his cognitie )aculty. 4iberty, with all its +rawbac(s, is eerywhere astly -ore attractie to a noble soul than goo+ social or+er without it00than society li(e a )loc( o) sheep, or a -achine wor(ing li(e a watch. This -echanis- -a(es o) -an only a pro+uct9 liberty -a(es hi- the citi
But i) we gie up eplanation it is +i))erent. 2ature, in being capricious an+ +e)ying logic, in pulling +own great an+ little, in crushing the noblest wor(s o) -an, ta(ing centuries to )or-00nature, by +eiating )ro- intellectual laws, proes that you cannot e plain nature by nature5s laws the-seles, an+ this sight +ries the -in+ to the worl+ o) i+eas, to the absolute. But though nature as a sensuous actiity +ries us to the i+eal, it throws us still -ore into the worl+ o) i+eas by the terrible. ur highest aspiration is to be in goo+ relations with physical nature, without iolating -orality. But it is not always conenient to sere two -asters9 an+ though +uty an+ the appetites shoul+ neer be at stri)e, physical necessity is pere-ptory, an+ nothing can sae -en )ro- eil +estiny. #appy is he who learns to bear what he cannot change There are cases where )ate oerpowers all ra-parts, an+ where the only resistance is, li(e a pure spirit, to throw )reely o)) all interest o) sense, an+ strip yoursel) o) your bo+y. 2ow this )orce co-es )rosubli-e e-otions, an+ a )re;uent co--erce with +estructie nature. %athos is a sort o) arti)icial -is)ortune, an+ brings us to the spiritual law that co--an+s our soul. Real -is)ortune +oes not always choose its ti-e opportunely, while pathos )in+s us ar-e+ at all points. By )re;uently renewing this eercise o) its own actiity the -in+ controls the sensuous, so that when real -is)ortune co-es, it can treat it as an arti)icial su))ering, an+ -a(e it a subli-e e-otion. Thus pathos ta(es away so-e o) the -alignity o) +estiny, an+ war+s o)) its blows. Away then with that )alse theory which supposes )alsely a har-ony bin+ing well being an+ well +oing. 4et eil +estiny show its )ace. ur sa)ety is not in blin+ness, but in )acing our +angers. hat can +o so better than )a-iliarity with the splen+i+ an+ terrible eolution o) eents, or than pictures showing -an in con)lict with chance9 eil triu-phant, security +eceie+00pictures shown us throughout history, an+ place+ be)ore us by trage+y= hoeer passes in reiew the terrible )ate o) $ithri+ates, o) Syracuse, an+ Carthage, cannot help (eeping his appetite in chec(, at least )or a ti-e, an+, seeing the anity o) things, strie a)ter that which is per-anent. The capacity o) the subli-e is one o) the noblest aptitu+es o) -an. Beauty is use)ul, but +oes not go beyon+ -an. The subli-e applies to the pure spirit. The subli-e -ust be &oine+ to the beauti)ul to co-plete the aesthetic e+ucation, an+ to enlarge -an5s heart beyon+ the sensuous worl+. ithout the beauti)ul there woul+ be an eternal stri)e between our natural an+ rational +estiny. I) we only thought o) our ocation as spirits we shoul+ be strangers to this sphere o) li)e. ithout the subli-e, beauty woul+ -a(e us )orget our +ignity. Enerate+00we++e+ to this transient state, we shoul+ lose sight o) our true country. e are
only per)ect citi
T#E %AT#ETIC.
The +epicting o) su))ering, in the shape o) si-ple su))ering, is neer the en+ o) art, but it is o) the greatest i-portance as a -eans o) attaining its en+. The highest ai- o) art is to represent the super0sensuous, an+ this is e))ecte+ in particular by tragic art, because it represents by sensible -ar(s the -oral -an, -aintaining hi-sel) in a state o) passion, in+epen+ently o) the laws o) nature. The principle o) )ree+o- in -an beco-es conscious o) itsel) only by the resistance it o))ers to the iolence o) the )eelings. 2ow the resistance can only be -easure+ by the strength o) the attac(. In or+er, there)ore, that the intelligence -ay reeal itsel) in -an as a )orce in+epen+ent o) nature, it is necessary that nature shoul+ hae )irst +isplaye+ all her power be)ore our eyes. The sensuous being -ust be pro)oun+ly an+ strongly a))ecte+, passion -ust be in play, that the reasonable being -ay be able to testi)y his in+epen+ence an+ -ani)est hi-sel) in action. It is i-possible to (now i) the e-pire which -an h as oer his a))ections is the e))ect o) a -oral )orce, till we hae ac;uire+ the certainty that it is not an e))ect o) insensibility. There is no -erit in -astering the )eelings which only lightly an+ transitorily s(i- oer the sur)ace o) the soul. But to resist a te-pest which stirs up the whole o) sensuous nature, an+ to presere in it the )ree+o- o) the soul, a )aculty o) resistance is re;uire+ in)initely superior to the act o) natural )orce. Accor+ingly it will not be possible to represent -oral )ree+o-, ecept by epressing passion, or su))ering nature, with the greatest ii+ness9 an+
the hero o) trage+y -ust )irst hae &usti)ie+ his clai- to be a sensuous being be)ore aspiring to our ho-age as a reasonable being, an+ -a(ing us beliee in his strength o) -in+. There)ore the pathetic is the )irst con+ition re;uire+ -ost strictly in a tragic author, an+ he is allowe+ to carry his +escription o) su))ering as )ar as possible, without pre&u+ice to the highest en+ o) his art, that is, without -oral )ree+o- being oppresse+ by it. #e -ust gie in so-e sort to his hero, as to his rea+er, their )ull loa+ o) su))ering, without which the ;uestion will always be put whether the resistance oppose+ to su))ering is an act o) the soul, so-ething positie, or whether it is not rather a purely negatie thing, a si-ple +e)iciency. The latter case is o))ere+ in the purer *rench trage+y, where it is ery rare, or perhaps unea-ple+, )or the author to place be)ore the rea+er su))ering nature, an+ where generally, on the contrary, it is only the poet who war-s up an+ +eclai-s, or the co-e+ian who struts about on stilts. The icy tone o) +ecla-ation etinguishes all nature here, an+ the *rench trage+ians, with their superstitious worship o) +ecoru-, -a(e it ;uite i-possible )or the- to paint hu-an nature truly. ecoru-, whereer it is, een in its proper place, always )alsi)ies the epression o) nature, an+ yet this epression is rigorously re;uire+ by art. In a *rench trage+y, it is +i))icult )or us to beliee that the hero eer su))ers, )or he eplains the state o) his soul, as the coolest -an woul+ +o, an+ always thin(ing o) the e))ect he is -a(ing on others, he neer lets nature pour )orth )reely. The (ings, the princesses, an+ the heroes o) Corneille or oltaire neer )orget their ran( een in the -ost iolent ecess o) passion9 an+ they part with their hu-anity -uch sooner than with their +ignity. They are li(e those (ings an+ e-perors o) our ol+ picture0boo(s, who go to be+ with their crowns on. hat a +i))erence )ro- the 'ree(s an+ those o) the -o+erns who hae been inspire+ with their spirit in poetry 2eer +oes the 'ree( poet blush at nature9 he leaes to the sensuous all its rights, an+ yet he is ;uite certain neer to be sub+ue+ by it. #e has too -uch +epth an+ too -uch rectitu+e in his -in+ not to +istinguish the acci+ental, which is the principal point with )alse taste, )ro- the really necessary9 but all that is not hu-anity itsel) is acci+ental in -an. The 'ree( artist who has to represent a 4aocoon, a 2iobe, an+ a %hiloctetes, +oes not care )or the (ing, the princess, or the (ing5s son9 he (eeps to the -an. Accor+ingly the s(il)ul statuary sets asi+e the +rapery, an+ shows us nu+e )igures, though he (nows ;uite well it is not so in real li)e. This is because +rapery is to hi- an acci+ental thing, an+ because the necessary ought neer to be sacri)ice+ to the acci+ental. It is also because, i) +ecency an+ physical necessities hae their laws, these laws are not those o) art. The statuary ought to show us, an+ wishes to show us, the -an hi-sel)9 +rapery conceals hi-, there)ore he sets that asi+e, an+ with
reason. The 'ree( sculptor re&ects +rapery as a useless an+ e-barrassing loa+, to -a(e way )or hu-an nature9 an+ in li(e -anner the 'ree( poet e-ancipates the hu-an personages he brings )orwar+ )ro- the e;ually useless constraint o) +ecoru-, an+ all those icy laws o) propriety, which put nothing but what is arti)icial in -an, an+ conceal nature in it. Ta(e #o-er an+ the trage+ians9 su))ering nature spea(s the languag e o) truth an+ ingenuousness in their pages, an+ in a way to penetrate to the +epths o) our hearts. All the passions play their part )reely, nor +o the rules o) propriety co-press any )eeling with the 'ree(s. The heroes are &ust as -uch un+er the in)luence o) su))ering as other -en, an+ what -a(es the- heroes is the ery )act that they )eel su))ering strongly an+ +eeply, without su))ering oerco-ing the-. They loe li)e as ar+ently as others9 but they are not so rule+ by this )eeling as to be unable to gie up li)e when the +uties o) honor or hu-anity call on the- to +o so. %hiloctetes )ille+ the 'ree( stage with his la-entations9 #ercules hi-sel), when in )ury, +oes not (eep un+er his grie). Iphigenia, on the point o) being sacri)ice+, con)esses with a touching ingenuousness that she griees to part with the light o) the sun. 2eer +oes the 'ree( place his glory in being insensible or in+i))erent to su))ering, but rather in supporting it, though )eeling it in its )ulness. The ery go+s o) the 'ree(s -ust pay their tribute to nature, when the poet wishes to -a(e the- approi-ate to hu-anity. $ars, when woun+e+, roars li(e ten thousan+ -en together, an+ enus, scratche+ by an iron lance, -ounts again to ly-pus, weeping, an+ cursing all battles. This liely susceptibility on the score o) su))ering, this war-, ingenuous nature, showing itsel) uncoere+ an+ in all truth in the -onu-ents o) 'ree( art, an+ )illing us with such + eep an+ liely e-otions00this is a -o+el presente+ )or the i-itation o) all artists9 it is a law which 'ree( genius has lai+ +own )or the )ine arts. It is always an+ eternally nature which has the )irst rights oer -an9 she ought neer to be )ettere+, because -an, be)ore being anything else, is a sensuous creature. A)ter the rights o) nature co-e those o) reason, because -an is a rational, sensuous being, a -oral person, an+ because it is a +uty )or this person not to let hi-sel) be rule+ by nature, but to rule her. It is only a)ter satis)action has been gien in the )irst place to nature, an+ a)ter reason in the secon+ place has -a+e its rights ac(nowle+ge+, that it is per-itte+ )or +ecoru- in the thir+ place to -a(e goo+ its clai-s, to i-pose on -an, in the epression o) his -oral )eelings an+ o) his sensations, consi+erations towar+s society, an+ to show in it the social being, the ciili
a))ection, consi+ere+ in itsel), woul+ be without any aesthetic alue9 )or, I repeat it, nothing that only interests sensuous nature is worthy o) being represente+ by art. Thus not only the a))ections that +o nothing but enerate an+ so)ten -an, but in general all a))ections, een those that are ealte+, ecstatic, whateer -ay be their nature, are beneath the +ignity o) tragic art. The so)t e-otions, only pro+ucing ten+erness, are o) the nature o) the agreeable, with which the )ine arts are not concerne+. They only caress the senses, while relaing an+ creating langui+ness, an+ only relate to eternal nature, not at all to the inner nature o) -an. A goo+ nu-ber o) our ro-ances an+ o) our trage+ies, particularly those that bear the na-e o) +ra-as00a sort o) co-pro-ise between trage+y an+ co -e+y00a goo+ nu-ber also o) those highly0appreciate+ )a-ily portraits, belong to this class. The only e))ect o) these wor(s is to e-pty the lachry-al +uct, an+ soothe the oer)lowing )eelings9 but the -in+ co-es bac( )ro- the- e-pty, an+ the -oral being, the noblest part o) our nature, gathers no new strength whateer )ro- the-. It is thus, says Dant, that -any persons )eel the-seles e+i)ie+ by a ser-on that has nothing e+i)ying in it. It see-s also that -o+ern -usic only ai-s at interesting the sensuous, an+ in this it )latters the taste o) the +ay, which see(s to be agreeably tic(le+, but not to be startle+, nor strongly -oe+ an+ eleate+. Accor+ingly we see -usic pre)er all that is ten+er9 an+ whateer be the noise in a concert0roo-, silence is i--e+iately restore+, an+ eery one is all ears +irectly a senti-ental passage is per)or-e+. Then an epression o) sensibility co--on to ani-alis- shows itsel) co--only on all )aces9 the eyes are swi--ing with intoication, the open -outh is all +esire, a oluptuous tre-bling ta(es hol+ o) the entire bo+y, the breath is ;uic( an+ )ull, in short, all the sy-pto-s o) intoication appear. This is an ei+ent proo) that the senses swi- in + elight, but that the -in+ or the principle o) )ree+o- in -an has beco-e a prey to the iolence o) the sensuous i-pression. Real taste, that o) noble an+ -anly -in+s, re&ects all these e-otions as unworthy o) art, because they only please the senses, with which art has nothing in co--on. But, on the other han+, real taste eclu+es all etre-e a))ections, which only put sensuousness to the torture, without giing the -in+ any co-pensation. These a))ections oppress -oral liberty by pain, as the others by oluptuousness9 conse;uently they can ecite aersion, an+ not the e-otion that woul+ alone be worthy o) art. Art ought to char- the -in+ an+ gie satis)action to the )eeling o) -oral )ree+o-. This -an who is a prey to his pain is to -e si-ply a torture+ ani-ate being, an+ not a -an trie+ by su))ering. *or a -oral resistance to pain)ul a))ections is alrea+y re;uire+ o) -an00a resistance which can alone allow the principle o) -oral )ree+o-, the intelligence, to -a(e itsel) (nown in it. I) it is so, the poets an+ the artists are poor a+epts in their art when
they see( to reach the pathetic only by the sensuous )orce o) a))ection an+ by representing su))ering in the -ost ii+ -anner. They )orget that su))ering in itsel) can neer be the last en+ o) i-itation, nor the i--e+iate source o) the pleasure we eperience in trage+y. The pathetic only has aesthetic alue in as )ar as it is subli-e. 2ow, e))ects that only allow us to in)er a purely sensuous cau se, an+ that are )oun+e+ only on the a))ection eperience+ by the )aculty o) sense, are neer subli-e, whateer energy they -ay +isplay, )or eerything subli-e procee+s eclusiely )ro- the reason. I i-ply by passion the a))ections o) pleasure as well a s the pain)ul a))ections, an+ to represent passion only, without coupling with it the epression o) the super0sensuous )aculty which resists it, is to )all into what is properly calle+ ulgarity9 an+ the opposite is calle+ nobility. ulgarity an+ nobility are two i+eas which, whereer they are applie+, hae -ore or less relation with the super0sensuous share a -an ta(es in a wor(. There is nothing noble but what has its source in the reason9 all that issues )ro- sensuousness alone is ulgar or co--on. e say o) a -an that he acts in a ulgar -anner when he is satis)ie+ with obeying the suggestions o) his sensuous instinct9 that he acts suitably when he only obeys his instinct in con)or-ity with the laws9 that he acts nobly when he obeys reason only, without haing regar+ to his instincts. e say o) a physiogno-y that it is co--on when it +oes not show any trace o) the spiritual -an, the intelligence9 we say it has epression when it is the -in+ which has +eter-ine+ its )eatures: an+ that it is noble when a pure spirit has +eter-ine+ the-. I) an architectural wor( is in ;uestion we ;uali)y it as co--on i) it ai-s at nothing but a physical en+9 we na-e it noble i), in+epen+ently o) all physical ai-, we )in+ in it at the sa-e ti-e the epression o) a conception. Accor+ingly, I repeat it, correct taste +isallows all painting o) the a))ections, howeer energetic, which rests satis)ie+ with epressing physical su))ering an+ the physical resistance oppose+ to it by the sub&ect, without -a(ing isible at the sa-e ti-e the superior principle o) the nature o) -an, the presence o) a super0sensuous )aculty. It +oes this in irtue o) the principle +eelope+ )arther bac(, na-ely, that it is not su))ering in itsel), but only the resistance oppose+ to su))ering, that is pathetic an+ +esering o) being represente+. It is )or this reason that all the absolutely etre-e +egrees o) the a))ections are )orbi++en to the artist as well as to the poet. All o) these, in )act, oppress the )orce that resists )ro- within or rather, all betray o) the-seles, an+ without any necessity o) other sy-pto-s, the o ppression o) this )orce, because no a))ection can reach this last +egree o) intensity as long as the intelligence in -an -a(es any resistance. Then another ;uestion presents itsel). #ow is this principle o) resistance, this super0sensuous )orce, -ani)este+ in the pheno-enon o)
the a))ections= nly in one way, by -astering or, -ore co--only, by co-bating a))ection. I say a))ection, )or sensuousness can also )ight, but this co-bat o) sensuousness is not carrie+ on with the a))ection, but with the cause that pro+uces it9 a contest which has no -oral character, but is all physical, the sa-e co-bat that the earthwor-, tro++en un+er )oot, an+ the woun+e+ bull engage in, without thereby eciting the pathetic. hen su))ering -an see(s to gie an epression to his )eelings, to re-oe his ene-y, to shelter the su))ering li-b, he +oes all this in co--on with the ani-als, an+ instinct alone ta(es the initiatie here, without the will being applie+ to. There)ore, this is not an act that e-anates )ro- the -an hi-sel), nor +oes it show hi- as an intelligence. Sensuous nature will always )ight the ene-y that -a(es it su))er, but it will neer )ight against itsel). n the other han+, the contest with a))ection is a contest with sensuousness, an+ conse;uently presupposes so-ething that is +istinct )ro- sensuous nature. $an can +e)en+ hi-sel) with the help o) co--on sense an+ his -uscular strength against the ob&ect that -a(es hi- su))er9 against su))ering itsel) he has no other ar-s than those o) reason. These i+eas -ust present the-seles to the eye in the portraiture o) the a))ections, or be awa(ene+ by this portraiture in or+er that the pathetic -ay eist. But it is i-possible to represent i+eas, in the proper sense o) the wor+, an+ positiely, as nothing correspon+s to pure i+eas in the worl+ o) sense. But they can be always represente+ negatiely an+ in an in+irect way i) the sensuous pheno-enon by which they are -ani)este+ has so-e character o) which you woul+ see( in ain the con+itions in physical nature. All pheno-ena o) which the ulti-ate principle cannot be +erie+ )ro- the worl+ o) sense are an in+irect representation o) the upper0sensuous ele-ent. An+ how +oes one succee+ in representing so-ething that is aboe nature without haing recourse to supernatural -eans= hat can this pheno-enon be which is acco-plishe+ by natural )orces00otherwise it woul+ not be a pheno-enon00an+ yet which cannot be +erie+ )ro- physical causes without a contra+iction= This is the proble-9 how can the artist sole it= It -ust be re-e-bere+ that the pheno-ena obserable in a -an in a state o) passion are o) two (in+s. They are either pheno-ena connecte+ si-ply with ani-al nature, an+ which, there)ore, only obey the physical law, without the will being able to -aster the-, or the in+epen+ent )orce in hi- being able to eercise an i--e+iate in)luence oer the-. It is the instinct which i--e+iately pro+uces these pheno-ena, an+ they obey blin+ly the laws o) instinct. To this (in+ belong, )or ea-ple, the organs o) the circulation o) the bloo+, o) respiration, an+ all the sur)ace o) the s(in. But, -oreoer, the other organs, an+ those sub&ect to the will, +o not always await the +ecision o) the will9 an+ o)ten
instinct itsel) sets the- i--e+iately in play, especially when the physical state is threatene+ with pain or with +anger. Thus, the -oe-ents o) -y ar- +epen+, it is true, on -y will9 but i) I place -y han+, without (nowing it, on a burning bo+y, the -oe-ent by which I +raw it bac( is certainly not a oluntary act, but a purely instinctie pheno-enon. 2ay -ore, speech is assure+ly sub&ect to the e-pire o) the will, an+ yet instinct can also +ispose o) this organ accor+ing to its whi-, an+ een o) this an+ o) the -in+, without consulting be)orehan+ the will, +irectly a sharp pain, or een an energetic a))ection, ta(es us by surprise. Ta(e the -ost i-passible stoic an+ -a(e hi- see su++enly so-ething ery won+er)ul, or a terrible an+ unepecte+ ob&ect. *ancy hi-, )or ea-ple, present when a -an slips an+ )alls to the botto- o) an abyss. A shout, a resoun+ing cry, an+ not only inarticulate, but a +istinct wor+ will escape his lips, an+ nature will hae ac te+ in hi be)ore the will: a certain proo) that there are in -an pheno-ena which cannot be re)erre+ to his person as an intelligence, but only to his instinct as a natural )orce. But there is also in -an a secon+ or+er o) pheno-ena, which are sub&ect to the in)luence an+ e-pire o) the will, or which -ay be consi+ere+ at all eents as being o) such a (in+ that will -ight always hae preente+ the-, conse;uently pheno-ena )or which the person an+ not instinct is responsible. It is the o))ice o) instinct to watch with a blin+
betray the presence o) su))ering9 an+ i) those, on the contrary, that escape the blin+ sway o) instinct, that only obey physical nature, show no trace, or only a ery )eeble trace, o) su))ering, an+ conse;uently appear to hae a certain +egree o) )ree+o-. 2ow this want o) har-ony between the )eatures i-printe+ on ani-al nature in irtue o) the laws o) physical necessity, an+ those +eter-ine+ with the spiritual an+ in+epen+ent )aculty o) -an, is precisely the point by which that super0sensuous principle is +iscoere+ in -an capable o) placing li-its to the e))ects pro+uce+ by physical nature, an+ there)ore +istinct )rothe latter. The purely ani-al part o) -an obeys the physical law, an+ conse;uently -ay show itsel) oppresse+ by the a))ection. It is, there)ore, in this part that all the strength o) passion shows itsel), an+ it answers in so-e +egree as a -easure to esti-ate the resistance00 that is to say, o) the energy o) the -oral )aculty in -an00which can only be &u+ge+ accor+ing to the )orce o) the attac(. Thus in proportion as the a))ection -ani)ests itsel) with +ecision an+ iolence in the )iel+ o) ani-al nature, without being able to eercise the sa-e power in the )iel+ o) hu-an nature, so in proportion the latter -a(es itsel) -ani)estly (nown00in the sa-e proportion the -oral in+epen+ence o) -an shows itsel) gloriously: the portraiture beco-es pathetic an+ the pathetic subli-e. The statues o) the ancients -a(e this principle o) aesthetics sensible to us9 but it is +i))icult to re+uce to conceptions an+ epress in wor+s what the ery inspection o) ancient statues -a(es the senses )eel in so liely a -anner. The group o) 4aocoon an+ his chil+ren can gie to a great etent the -easure o) what the plastic art o) the ancients was capable o) pro+ucing in the -atter o) pathos. inc(el-ann, in his #istory o) Art,, says: 4aocoon is nature sei
against an un+esere+ su))ering, an+ is reeale+ in the nostrils, which swell out an+ enlarge an+ +raw upwar+s. @n+er the )orehea+, the struggle between pain an+ -oral strength, unite+ as it were in a single point, is represente+ with great truth, )or, while pain contracts an+ raises the eyebrows, the e))ort oppose+ to it by the will +raws +own towar+s the upper eyeli+ all the -uscles aboe it, so that the eyeli+ is al-ost coere+ by the-. The artist, not being able to e-bellish nature, has sought at least to +eelop its -eans, to increase its e))ect an+ power. here is the greatest a-ount o) pain is also the highest beauty. The le)t si+e, which the serpent besets with his )urious bites, an+ where he instils his poison, is that which appears to su))er the -ost intensely, because sensation is there nearest to the heart. The legs strie to raise the-seles as i) to shun the eil9 the whole bo+y is nothing but -oe-ent, an+ een the traces o) the chisel contribute to the illusion9 we see- to see the shu++ering an+ icy0col+ s(in. #ow great is the truth an+ acuteness o) this analysis In what a superior style is this struggle between spirit an+ the su))ering o) nature +eelope+ #ow correctly the author has sei
li-its that separate partial +escription )ro- painting, an+ not to -a(e the notion o) the pathetic issue )ro- it. et the passage o) irgil +oes not appear to -e less aluable )or this latter ob&ect, an+ I crae per-ission to bring it )orwar+ again un+er this point o) iew:00 Ecce aute- ge-ini Tene+o tran;uilla per alta >#orresco re)erens? i--ensis orbibus angues Incu-bunt pelago, pariter;ue a+ litora ten+unt9 %ectora ;uoru- inter )luctus arrecta &ubae;ue Sanguineae esuperant un+as9 pars caetera pontu%one legit, sinuat;ue i--ensa olu-ine terga. *it sonitus spu-ante salo, &a-;ue ara tenebant, Ar+entes oculos su))ecti sanguine et igni, Sibila la-bebant linguis ibrantibus ora Aenei+, ii. FG70FHH. e )in+ here reali
It is no -ore in our power to -easure this )orce with ours, an+ to re)er it or not to our own eistence. This happens without our co0operation, an+ is gien us by the ob&ect itsel). Accor+ingly our )ear has not, as in the prece+ing -o-ent, a purely sub&ectie groun+, resi+ing in our soul9 it has an ob&ectie groun+, resi+ing in the ob&ect. *or, een i) we recognithe +isposition, the -oral )aculty? has beco-e to a +egree +eelope+ in the soul, there is le)t -ore or less space )or passie nature, an+ there re-ains -ore or less o) the in+epen+ent principle in the a))ection. In the truly -oral soul the terrible trial >o) the i-agination? passes ;uic(ly an+ rea+ily into the subli-e. In proportion as i-agination loses its liberty, reason -a(es its own preail, an+ the soul ceases not to enlarge within when it thus )in+s outwar+ li-its. rien )ro- all the intrench-ents which woul+ gie physical protection to sensuous creatures, we see( re)uge in the stronghol+ o) our -oral liberty, an+ we arrie by that -eans at an absolute an+ unli-ite+ sa)ety, at the ery -o-ent when we see- to be +eprie+ in the worl+ o) pheno-ena o) a relatie an+ precarious ra-part. But precisely because it was necessary to hae arrie+ at the physical oppression be)ore haing recourse to the assistance o) our -oral nature, we can only buy this high senti-ent o) our liberty through su))ering. An or+inary soul con)ines itsel) entirely to this su))ering, an+ neer co-prehen+s in the subli-e or the pathetic anything beyon+ the terrible. An in+epen+ent soul, on the contrary, precisely seithe )ather? 3see Aenei+, ii. FH70FH8 is here attac(e+ be)ore the physical -an, an+ that has a gran+ e))ect. All the a))ections beco-e -ore aesthetic when we receie the- secon+0han+9 there is no
stronger sy-pathy than that we )eel )or sy-pathy. The -o-ent 3see Aenei+, ii. FH60FH8 ha+ arrie+ when the hero hi-sel) ha+ to be reco--en+e+ to our respect as a -oral personage, an+ the poet sei
In)ernal worl+, an+ thou, pro)oun+est #ell9 Receie thy new possessor00one who brings A -in+ not to be change+ by place or ti-e9 The -in+ is its own place, an+ in itsel) Can -a(e a #eaen o) #ell. . . . #ere at least e shall be )ree, etc. The reply o) $e+ea in the trage+y belongs also to this or+er o) the subli-e. The subli-e o) +isposition -a(es itsel) seen, it is isible to the spectator, because it rests upon co0eistence, the si-ultaneous9 the subli-e action, on the contrary, is conceie+ only by the thought, because the i-pression an+ the act are successie, an+ the interention o) the -in+ is necessary to in)er )ro- a )ree + eter-ination the i+ea o) preious su))ering. It )ollows that the )irst alone can be epresse+ by the plastic arts, because these arts gie but that which is si-ultaneous9 but the poet can eten+ his +o-ain oer one an+ the other. Een -ore9 when the plastic art has to represent a subli-e action, it -ust necessarily bring it bac ( to subli-ity. In or+er that the subli-ity o) action shoul+ ta(e place, not only -ust the su))ering o) -an hae no in)luence upon the -oral constitution, but rather the opposite -ust be the case. The a))ection is the wor( o) his -oral character. This can happen in two ways: either -e+iately, or accor+ing to the law o) liberty, when out o) respect )or such an+ such a +uty it +eci+es )ro- )ree choice to su))er00in this case, the i+ea o) +uty +eter-ines as a -otie, an+ its su))ering is a oluntary act00or i--e+iately, an+ accor+ing to the necessity o) nature, when he epiates by a -oral su))ering the iolation o) +uty9 in this secon+ case, the i+ea o) +uty +eter-ines hi- as a )orce, an+ his su))ering is no longer an e))ect. Regulus o))ers us an ea-ple o) the )irst (in+, when, to (eep his wor+, he gies hi-sel) up to the engeance o) the Carthaginians9 an+ he woul+ sere as an ea-ple o) the secon+ class, i), haing betraye+ his trust, the consciousness o) this cri-e woul+ hae -a+e hi- -iserable. In both cases su))ering has a -oral course, but with this +i))erence, that on the one part Regulus shows us its -oral character, an+ that, on the other, he only shows us that he was -a+e to hae such a character. In the )irst case he is in our eyes a -orally great person9 in the secon+ he is only aesthetically great. This last +istinction is i-portant )or the tragic art9 it conse;uently +eseres to be ea-ine+ -ore closely.
$an is alrea+y a subli-e ob&ect, but only in the aesthetic sense, when the state in which he is gies us an i+ea o) his hu-an +estination, een though we -ight not )in+ this +estination reali
Accor+ingly eery )eeling, whether o) pleasure or approbation, rests +e)initiely on an agree-ent between the contingent an+ the necessary. I) the necessary has thus an i-peratie character, the )eeling eperience+ will be that o) approbation. I) necessity has the character o) a want, the )eeling eperience+ will be that o) pleasure, an+ both will be strong in proportion as the satis)action will be contingent. 2ow, un+erlying eery -oral &u+g-ent there is a re;uire-ent o) reason which re;uires us to act con)or-ably with the -oral law, an+ it is an absolute necessity that we shoul+ wish what is goo+. But as the will is )ree, it is physically an acci+ental thing that we shoul+ +o in )act what is goo+. I) we actually +o it, this agree-ent between the contingent in the use o) )ree will an+ the i-peratie +e-an+ o) reason gies rise to our assent or approbation, which will be greater in proportion as the resistance o) the inclinations -a+e this use that we -a(e o) our )ree will -ore acci+ental an+ -ore +oubt)ul. Eery aesthetic &u+g-ent, on the contrary, re)ers the ob&ect to the necessity which canno t help willing i-peratiely, but only +esires that there shoul+ be an agree-ent between the acci+ental an+ its own interest. 2ow what is the interest o) i-agination= It is to e-ancipate itsel) )ro- all laws, an+ to play its part )reely. The obligation i-pose+ on the will by the -oral law, which prescribes its ob&ect in the strictest -anner, is by no -eans )aorable to this nee+ o) in+epen+ence. An+ as the -oral obligation o) the will is the ob&ect o) the -oral &u+g-ent, it is clear that in this -o+e o) &u+ging, the i-agination coul+ not )in+ its interest. But a -oral obligation i-pose+ on the will cannot be conceie+, ecept by supposing this sa-e will absolutely in+epen+ent o) the -oral instincts an+ )rotheir constraint. Accor+ingly the possibility o) the -oral act re;uires liberty, an+ there)ore agrees here in the -ost per)ect -anner with the interest o) i-agination. But as i-agination, through the -e+iu- o) its wants, cannot gie or+ers to the will o) the in+ii+ual, as reason +oes by its i-peratie character, it )ollows that the )aculty o) )ree+o-, in relation to i-agination, is so-ething acci+ental, an+ conse;uently that the agree-ent between the acci+ental an+ the necessary >con+itionally necessary? -ust ecite pleasure. There)ore, i) we bring to bear a -oral &u+g-ent on this act o) 4eoni+as, we shall consi+er it )ro- a point o) iew where its acci+ental character stri(es the eye less than its necessary si+e. I), on the other han+, we apply the aesthetical &u+g-ent to it, this is another point o) iew, where its character o) necessity stri(es us less )orcibly than its acci+ental character. It is a +uty )or eery will to act thus, +irectly it is a )ree will9 but the )act that there is a )ree will that -a(es this act possible is a )aor o) nature in regar+ to this )aculty, to which )ree+o- is a necessity. Thus an act o) irtue &u+ge+ by the -oral sense00by reason00will gie us as its only satis)action the )eeling o) approbation, because reason can neer )in+ -ore, an+ sel+o- )in+s as -uch as it re;uires. This sa-e act, &u+ge+, on the contrary, by the aesthetic sense00by i-agination00will gie us a positie pleasure, because the i-agination, neer re;uiring the en+ to
agree with the +e-an+, -ust be surprise+, enrapture+, at the real satis)action o) this +e-an+ as at a happy chance. ur reason will -erely approe, an+ only approe, o) 4eoni+as actually ta(ing this heroic resolution9 but that he coul+ ta(e this resolution is what +elights an+ enraptures us. This +istinction between the two sorts o) &u+g-ents beco-es -ore ei+ent still, i) we ta(e an ea-ple where the -oral sense an+ the aesthetic sense pronounce a +i))erent er+ict. Suppose we ta(e the act o) %erigrinus %roteus burning hi-sel) at ly-pia. 1u+ging this act -orally, I cannot gie it -y approbation, inas-uch as I see it +eter-ine+ by i-pure -oties, to which %roteus sacri)ices the +uty o) respecting his own eistence. But in the aesthetic &u+g-ent this sa-e act +elights -e9 it +elights -e precisely because it testi)ies to a power o) will capable o) resisting een the -ost potent o) instincts, that o) sel)0preseration. as it a -oral )eeling, or only a -ore power)ul sensuous attraction, that silence+ the instinct o) sel)0preseration in this enthusiast. It -atters little, when I appreciate the act )ro- an aesthetic point o) iew. I then +rop the in+ii+ual, I ta(e away the relation o) his will to the law that ought to goern hi-9 I thin( o) hu-an will in general, consi+ere+ as a co--on )aculty o) the race, an+ I regar+ it in connection with all the )orces o) nature. e hae seen that in a -oral point o) iew, the preseration o) our being see-e+ to us a +uty, an+ there)ore we were o))en+e+ at seeing %roteus iolate this +uty. In an aesthetic point o) iew the sel)0preseration only appears as an interest, an+ there)ore the sacri)ice o) this interest pleases us. Thus the operation that we per)or- in the &u+g-ents o) the secon+ (in+ is precisely the inerse o) that which we per)or- in those o) the )irst. In the )or-er we oppose the in+ii+ual, a sensuous an+ li-ite+ being, an+ his personal will, which can be e))ecte+ pathologically, to the absolute law o) the will in general, an+ o) uncon+itional +uty which bin+s eery spiritual being9 in the secon+ case, on the contrary, we oppose the )aculty o) willing, absolute olition, an+ the spiritual )orce as an in)inite thing, to the solicitations o) nature an+ the i-pe+i-ents o) sense. This is the reason why the aesthetical &u+g-ent leaes us )ree, an+ +elights an+ enraptures us. It is because the -ere conception o) this )aculty o) willing in an absolute -anner, the -ere i+ea o) this -oral aptitu+e, gies us in itsel) a consciousness o) a -ani)est a+antage oer the sensuous. It is because the -ere possibility o) e-ancipating ourseles )ro- the i-pe+i-ents o) nature is in itsel) a satis)action that )latters our thirst )or )ree+o-. This is the reason why -oral &u+g-ent, on the contrary, -a(es us eperience a )eeling o) constraint that hu-bles us. It is because in connection with each oluntary act we appreciate in this -anner, we )eel, as regar+s the absolute law that ought to rule the will in general, in a position o) in)eriority -ore or less +eci+e+, an+ because the constraint o) the will thus li-ite+ to a single +eter-ination, which +uty re;uires o) it at all
costs, contra+icts the instinct o) )ree+o- which is the property o) i-agination. In the )or-er case we soare+ )ro- the real to the possible, an+ )ro- the in+ii+ual to the species9 in the latter, on the contrary, we +escen+ )ro- the possible to the real, an+ we shut up the species in the narrow li-its o) the in+ii+ual. e cannot there)ore be surprise+ i) the aesthetical &u+g-ent enlarges the heart, while the -oral &u+g-ent constrains an+ straitens it. It results, there)ore, )ro- all that which prece+es, that the -oral &u+g-ent an+ the aesthetic, )ar )ro- -utually corroborating each other, i-pe+e an+ hin+er each other, because they i-press on the soul two +irections entirely opposite. In )act, this obserance o) rule which reason re;uires o) us as -oral &u+ge is inco-patible with the in+epen+ence which the i-agination calls )or as aesthetic &u+ge. It )ollows that an ob&ect will hae so -uch the less aesthetic alue the -ore it has the character o) a -oral ob&ect, an+ i) the poet were oblige+ notwithstan+ing that to choose it, he woul+ +o well in treating o) it, not to call the attention o) our reason to the rule o) the will, but that o) our i-agination to the power o) the will. In his own interest it is necessary )or the poet to enter on this path, )or with our liberty his e-pire )inishes. e belong to hi- only inas-uch as we loo( beyon+ ourseles9 we escape )ro- hi- the -o-ent we re0enter into our inner-ost seles, an+ that is what in)allibly ta(es place the -o-ent an ob&ect ceases to be a pheno-enon in our consi+eration, an+ ta(es the character o) a law which &u+ges us. Een in the -ani)estation o) the -ost subli-e irtue, the poet can only e-ploy )or his own iews that which in those acts belongs to )orce. As to the +irection o) the )orce, he has no reason to be anious. The poet, een when he places be)ore our eyes the -ost per)ect -o+els o) -orality, has not, an+ ought not to hae, any other en+ than that o) re&oicing our soul by the conte-plation o) this spectacle. $oreoer, nothing can re&oice our soul ecept that which i-proes our personality, an+ nothing can gie us a spiritual &oy ecept that which eleates the spiritual )aculty. But in what way can the -orality o) another i-proe our own personality, an+ raise our spiritual )orce= That this other one acco-plishes really his +uty results )ro- an acci+ental use which he -a(es o) his liberty, an+ which )or that ery reason can proe nothing to us. e only hae in co--on with hi- the )aculty to con)or- ourseles e;ually to +uty9 the -oral power which he ehibits re-in+s us also o) our own, an+ that is why we then )eel so-ething which upraises our spiritual )orce. Thus it is only the i+ea o) the possibility o) an absolutely )ree will which -a(es the real eercise o) this will in us char-ing to the aesthetic )eeling. e shall be still -ore conince+ when we thin( how little the poetic )orce o) i-pression which is awa(ene+ in us b y an act or a -oral
character is +epen+ent on their historic reality. The pleasure which we ta(e in consi+ering an i+eal character will in no way be lessene+ when we co-e to thin( that this character is nothing -ore than a poetic )iction9 )or it is on the poetic truth, an+ not on historic truth, that eery aesthetic i-pression o) the )eelings rest. $oreoer, poetic truth +oes not consist in that this or that thing has e))ectually ta(en place, but in that it -ay hae happene+, that is to say, that the thing is in itsel) possible. Thus the aesthetic )orce is necessarily oblige+ to rest in the )irst place in the i+ea o) possibility. Een in real sub&ects, )or which the actors are borrowe+ )ro- history, it is not the reality o) the si-ple possibility o) the )act, but that which is guarantee+ to us by its ery reality which constitutes the poetic ele-ent. That these personages hae in+ee+ eiste+, an+ that these eents hae in truth ta(en place, is a circu-stance which can, it is true, in -any cases a++ to our pleasure, but that which it a++s to it is li(e a )oreign a++ition, -uch rather un)aorable than a+antageous to the poetical i-pression. It was long thought that a great serice was ren+ere+ to 'er-an poetry by reco--en+ing 'er-an poets to treat o) national the-es. hy, it was as(e+, +i+ 'ree( poetry hae so -uch power oer the -in+= Because it brought )orwar+ national eents an+ i--ortali
which poetry obtains ecellently by in+irect -eans it woul+ acco-plish ery ba+ly as an i--e+iate en+. %oetry is not -a+e to sere in -an )or the acco-plish-ent o) a particular -atter, nor coul+ any instru-ent be selecte+ less )itte+ to cause a particular ob&ect to succee+, or to carry out special pro&ects an+ +etails. %oetry acts on the whole o) hu-an nature, an+ it is only by its general in)luence on the character o) a -an that it can in)luence particular acts. %oetry can be )or -an what loe is )or the hero. It can neither counsel hi-, nor stri(e )or hi-, nor +o anything )or hi- in short9 but it can )or- a hero in hi-, call hi- to great +ee+s, an+ ar- hi- with a strength to be all that he ought to be. Thus the +egree o) aesthetical energy with which subli-e )eelings an+ subli-e acts ta(e possession o) our souls, +oes not rest at all on the interest o) reason, which re;uires eery action to be really con)or-able with the i+ea o) goo+. But it rests on the interest o) the i-agination, which re;uires con)or-ity with goo+ shoul+ be possible, or, in other ter-s, that no )eeling, howeer strong, shoul+ oppress the )ree+o- o) the soul. 2ow this possibility is )oun+ in eery act that testi)ies with energy to liberty, an+ to the )orce o) the will9 an+ i) the poet -eets with an action o) this (in+, it -atters little where, he has a sub&ect suitable )or his art. To hi-, an+ to the interest we hae in hi-, it is ;uite the sa-e, to ta(e his hero in one class o) characters or in another, a-ong the goo+ or the wic(e+, as it o)ten re;uires as -uch strength o) character to +o eil conscientiously an+ persistently as to +o goo+. I) a proo) be re;uire+ that in our aesthetic &u+g-ents we atten+ -ore to the )orce than to its +irection, to its )ree+o- than to its law)ulness, this is su))icient )or our ei+ence. e pre)er to see )orce an+ )ree+o- -ani)est the-seles at the cost o) -oral regularity, rather than regularity at the cost o) )ree+o- an+ strength. *or +irectly one o) those cases o))ers itsel), in which the general law agrees with the instincts which by their strength threaten to carry away the will, the aesthetic alue o) the character is increase+, i) he be capable o) resisting these instincts. A icious person begins to interest us as soon as he -ust ris( his happiness an+ li)e to carry out his pererse +esigns9 on the contrary, a irtuous person loses in proportion as he )in+s it use)ul to be irtuous. engeance, )or instance, is certainly an ignoble an+ a ile a))ection, but this +oes not preent it )ro- beco-ing aesthetical, i) to satis)y it we -ust en+ure pain)ul sacri)ice. $e+ea slaying her chil+ren ai-s at the heart o) 1ason, but at the sa-e ti-e she stri(es a heay blow at her own heart, an+ her engeance aesthetically beco-es subli-e +irectly we see in her a ten+er -other. In this sense the aesthetic &u+g-ent has -ore o) truth than is or+inarily beliee+. The ices which show a great )orce o) will ei+ently announce a greater aptitu+e )or real -oral liberty than +o irtues which borrow support )ro- inclination9 seeing that it only re;uires o) the -an who persistently +oes eil to gain a single ictory oer hi-sel), one si-ple
