SHIPSIDE INCORPORATED, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS [Special Former Twelfth Division], HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 26 (San Fernando City, La Union) & THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. 143377, February 20, 2001
Facts: On October 29, 1958, Original Certificate No. 0-381 was issued in favour of Rafael G alvez, over four parcels of land. On April 11, 1960, Lots No. 1 and 4 were sold by Rafael Galve z to Filipina Mamaril, Cleopatra Llana, Regina Bustos, and Erlinda Balatbat, with deed of sale inscribed as entry no. 9115OCT 0-381 o n August 10,1960. Consequently, Transfer Certificate No. T-4304 was issued in favour of the buyers covering Lots No. 1 and 4. On August 16, 1960, Mamaril, et al. sold Lots No. 1 and 4 to Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company. The deed of sale covering the aforesaid property was inscribed as Entry No. 9173 on TCT No. T-4304. Subsequently, Transfer Certificate No. T-4314 was issued in the name of Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company as owner of Lots 1 and 4. On February 1, 1963, unknown to Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, the Court of First Instance of La Union, Second Judicial District, issued an order in Land registration Case No. N-361 entitled “Rafael Galvez, Applicant, Eliza Bustos, et al., Parties-In- Interest; Republic of the Philippines, Movant” declaring OCT No. 0-381 of the Registry Re gistry of Deeds for the Province of La Union issued in the name of Rafel Galvez, null and void, and ordered the cancellation thereof. On October 28, 1963, Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company sold to the petitioner Lots No. 1 and 4, with the deed being entered in TCT No. 4314 as entry No. 12381. Transfer Certificate of Title No T-5710 was thus issued in favour of the petitioner w hich starting since then exercised proprietary rights over Lots No. 1 and 4. In the meantime, Rafael Galvez filed his motion for reconsideration against the order by the trial court declaring OCT No. 0-381 null and void. The motion was denied on January 25 , 1965. On appeal, the court of Appeals ruled in favor of the Republic of the Philippines Philippines in a resolution promulgated on August 14, 1973 in CA-G.R. No. 36061`-R. Thereafter, the court of Appeals, issued an Entry of judgement, certifying that its decision dat ed August 14, 1973 became final and executor on October 23, 1973. On April 22, 1974, the trial court in L.R.C. Case No. N-361 is sued a writ of execution of t he judgement which was served on the Registe r of Deeds, San Fernando, La Union on April 29, 1974
On January 14, 1999, the office of the Solicitor General received a letter dated January 11, 1999, from Mr. Victor Floresca, Vice-President, John Hay Poro Point Development Corporation, stating that the aforementioned orders and decision of the trial court in L.R.C. No. N-361 have not been exe cuted by the Register of Deeds, San Fernando, La Union despite receipt of the writ of execution. On April 21, 1999, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a complaint for the revival of judgment and cancellation of titles before the Reg ional Trial Court of the First j udicial Region (Branch 26, San Fernando, La Union) docketed therein as Civil Case No., 6346 entitled, “Republic of the P hilippines,
Plaintiff, vs. Heirs of Rafael Galvez, represented by Teresita Tan, Reynaldo Mamaril, Elisa Bustos, Erlinda Balatbat, Regina Bustos, Shipside Incorporated and the Register o f Deeds of La Union, defendants.” In its complaint in Civil Case No. 6346, the Solicitor General argued that since the trial court in LRC Case no. 361 had ruled and declared OCT No. 0381 to be null and void, which r uling was subsequently affirmed by the court of appeals, the defendants-successors-in-interest of Rafael Galvez have no valid title over the property covers by OCT No. 0-381, and the subsequent Torrens titles issued in their names should be consequently cancelled. On July 22, 1999, petitioner S hipside, Inc. Filed its Motion to Dismiss, based on the following grounds: (1) the complaint stated no cause of action because only final and executor judgements may be subject of an action for revival for judgment; (2) the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest because the real property covered by the Torrens t itles sought to be cancelled, allegedly part of Camp Wallace (Wallace Air Station), were under the ownership and administration of the Bases Conversion Development Authority under RA No. 7227; (3) Plaintiff’s cause of action is barred by prescription; (4) twenty-five
years having lapsed since the issuance of the wr it of execution, no action for revival of j udgment may be instituted because under Paragraph 3 of Ar ticle 1144 of the Civil Code, such action may be brought only within ten (10) years from the time the judgement had been rendered. On August 31, 1999, the trial court denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss and on October 14 , 1999, its
motion for reconsideration was likewise turned down. On October 21, 1999, petitioner instituted a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals, docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 55535, on the ground that the orders of the trial court denying its motion to dismiss and its subsequent motion for reconsideration were issued in excess of jurisdiction. On Novemeber 4, 1999, the court of Appeals dismissed the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 55535 on the ground that the verification and certification in the petition, under the signature of Lorenzo Balbin, Jr., was made without authority, there being no proof therein that Balbin was authorized to institute the petition for and in behalf and of petitioner. On May 23, 2000, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on the grounds that: (1) a complaint filed on behalf of a cor poration can be made only if authorized by its Board of Directors, and in the absence thereof, the petition cannot prosper and be granted due course; and (2)
the petitioner was unable to show that it had substantially complied with the rule requiring proof of authority to institute an action or proceeding. In support of its petition, Shipside, Inc. asseverates that: 1. The honourable Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the petition when it made a conclusive legal presumption that Mr. Balbin had no authority to sign the petition despite the clarity of laws, jurisprudence and Secretary’ certificate to the contrary.
2. The honourable Court of Appeals abused its discretion when it dismissed the petition, in effect affirming the grave abuse of discretion committed by the lower court, when it refused to dismiss the 1999 Complaint for Revival of a 1 973 judgment, in violation of clear laws and jurisprudence.
Issues: (1) Whether an authorization from petitioner’s Board of Directors is still required in order for its resident manager to institute or commence a legal action for and in behalf of the corporation; (2) Whether the instant petition should be allowed; and (3) Whether the republic of the Philippines can maintain action for revival of judgment therein.
Held: (1) Yes. The court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari on the ground that Lorenzo Balbin, the resident manager for petitioner, who was the signatory in the verification and cert ification on non-forum shopping, failed to show proof that he was authorized by petitioner’s board of directors to file such a petition. A corporation, such as petitioner, has no power except those expressly conferred on it by the Corporation Code and those that are implied or incidental to its existence. In turn, a corporation exercises said powers through its board of directors and /or its duly authorized officers and agents. Thus, it has been observed that the power of a corporation to sue and be sued in any court is lodged with the board of directors that exercises its corporate powers. In t urn, physical acts of the corporation, like the signing of documents, can be performed only by natural persons duly authorized for the purpose by the corporate by-laws or by a specific act of the board of directors to file said petition. On October 21, 1999, when Balbin filed the petition, there was no proof attached thereto that Balbin was authorized to sign the verification and non-forum shopping certification therein. As a consequence, the petition was dismissed by the Court o f Appeals. However, subsequent to such dismissal, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, attaching to said motion a cert ificate
issued by its board secretary stating that on October 11, 1999, or ten days prior to the filing of the petition, Balbin had been authorized by petitioner’s board of directors to file said petition.
Verification is simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. The court may order the correction of the pleading if verification is lacking or act on the pleading although it is not verified, if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may thereby be served. On the other hand, the lack of certification against forum shopping is generally incurable by the submission thereof after filing of the petition. Section 5, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the failure of the petitioner to submit the required documents that should accompany the petition, including the certification against forum shopping, shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. The same rule applies to cer tifications against forum shopping signed by a person on behalf of a corporation which are unaccompanied by proof that said signatory is authorized to file a petition on behalf of t he corporation. (2) Yes. In the instant case, the merits of the petitioner’s case should be considered special circumstances or compelling reasons that justify tempering the requirement in regard to the certificate of non-forum shopping. With more reason should the instant petition be allowed since the petitioner did submit a certification on non-forum shopping, failing only to show proof that the signatory was authorized to do so. That petitioner subsequently submitted a secretary’s certificate attesting that Balbin was authorized to file an action. It must also be kept in mind that while the requirement of the certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory, nonetheless the requirements should not be inter preted literally and thus defeat the objective of preventing the undesirable practice of forum- shopping. Lastly, technical rules of procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate justice. While the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, the granting of substantial justice is an even more urgent ideal. (3) No. The action instituted by the Solicitor General in the trial court is one for revival of judgment which is governed by Article 1144 (3) of the Civil Code and Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. Article1144 (3) provides that an action upon a judgement “must be brought within 10 years from the time the right of action accrues.” On the other hand, Section 6, Rule 39
provides that a final and executor judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry, but that after the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgement may be enforced by action. Taking those two provisions into consideration, it is plain that an action for rev ival of judgment must be brought within ten years from the time said judgment becomes final.
From the records of the case, it is clear that the judgment sought to be revived became final on October 23, 1973. On the other hand, the action for revival of judgment was instituted only in 1999, or more than 25 uyears after the judgment had become final. Hence, the action is abarred by extinctive prescription considering that such an action can be instituted only within ten (10) years from the time the cause of action accrues. The Solicitor-general’s contention that the state’s cause of action in the cancellation of the land title issued to petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest is imprescriptible because it is included in
Camp Wallace, which belong to the gover nment, is misleading. While it is true that the prescription does not run against the State, the same may not be invoked by the government in this case since it is no longer interested in the subject matter. While Camp Wallace may have belonged to the Government at the time Rafael Galvez’s title was ordered cancelled in Land
Registration Case no N-361, the same no longer holds true today. With the transfer of Camp Wallace to the BCDA, the government no longer has a right or interest to protect. Consequently, the re public is not a real party in interest and it may not institute the instant action. Nor may it raise the defense of imprescriptibility the same being applicable only in cases where the government is a party in interest. Under section 2 of Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil procedure, “eve ry action must be prosecuted or defined in the name of the real party in interest.” And to qualify a person to be a real party in interest whose name in
action must be prosecuted, he must appear to be the present real owner of the right sought to be enforced (Pioneer Insurance v. CA, 175 SCRA 668 [1989]). A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefitted or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. And by real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest (Ibonilla v. Province of Cebu, 210 SCRA 526 [1992]). Being the owner of the areas covered by Camp Wallace, it is the Bases Conversion and Development Authority, not the Government, which stands to be benefited if the land covered by TCT No. T5710 issued in the name of petitioner is cancelled.
