Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo G.R. No. 180906 07 October 2008 PONENTE: Puno, C.J. PARTIES: PETITIONERS: SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE and CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES RESPONDENTS: RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO NATURE: Petition for Review on Certiorari PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND: Supreme Court: Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order Supreme Court: Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to treat their Existing Petition as Amparo Petition Court of Appeals: Upon order of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals summarily heard the Petition of Amparo. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals issued a judgment which is the subject of the present Petition for Review on Certiorari. FACTS: On 14 February 2006 , at past noon, Raymond Manalo (hereafter referred to as “Raymond”) and Reynaldo Manalo (hereafter referred to as “Reynaldo”) were abducted by military men belonging to the Citizen Armed Forces
Geographical Unit (CAFGU) on the suspicion that they were memb ers and supporters of the New People’s Army (NPA). After eighteen (18) months of detention and torture, the brothers escaped on 13 August 2007. On 23 August 2007, Raymond and Reynaldo filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order before the Supreme Court to stop the military officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. In a Resolution dated 24 August 2007, the Supreme Court ordered the Secretary of the Department of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), their agents, representatives, or persons acting in their stead, and further enjoined them from causing the arrest of Raymond and Reynaldo. Forthwith, they filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to Treat Existing Petition as Amparo Petition, to Admit Supporting Affidavits, and to Grant Interim and Final Amparo Reliefs. While the aforementioned case was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on 24 October 2007. Raymond and Reynaldo subsequently filed a manifestation and omnibus motion to treat their existing peti tion as amparo petition. On 25 October 2007, the Supreme Court resolved to treat the 23 August 2007 Petition as a petition under the Amparo Rule. The Supreme Court likewise granted the Writ of Amparo and remanded the petition to the Court of Appeals to conduct the summary hearing and decide the petition. On 26 December 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the privilege of the writ of amparo. The Court of Appeals ordered the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP to furnish the Manalos and the court with all official and unofficial investigation reports as to the custody of Raymond and Reynaldo, confirm the present places of official assignment of two military officials involved, and produce all medical reports and records of Raymond and Reynaldo while under military custody.
Aggrieved, the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP filed an appeal with the Supreme Court. PERTINENT ISSUES: Whether or not statements from the victims themselves is sufficient for amparo petitions. Whether or not actual deprivation of liberty is necessary for the right to security of a person may be invoked. ANSWER: It depends on the credibility and ca ndidness of the victims in their statements. No. SUPREME COURT RULINGS: 1.
ON EVIDENCE REQUIRED ON AMPARO PETITIONS
Effect of the nature of enforced disappearance and torture to the quantum of evidence required – With the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and the torture perpetrated on the victim during detention, it logically holds that much of the information and evidence of the ordeal will come from the victims themselves, and the veracity of their account will depend on their credibility and candidness in their written and/or oral statements. Their statements can be corroborated by other evidence such as physical evidence left by the torture they suffered or landmarks they can identify in the places where they were detained. Where powerful military officers are implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to surface and testify against them comes as no surprise. 2.
ON RIGHT TO SECURITY AS A GROUND FOR AMPARO PETITION
Permutations of the Right to Security – A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various permutations of the exercise of this right. First, the right to security of person is “freedom from fear.” In its “whereas” clauses, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that “a world in which human
beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people.” Some scholars postulate that “freedom from fear” is not only an
aspirational principle, but essentially an individual international human right. It is the “right to security of person” as the word “security” itself means “freedom from fear.” Article 3 of the UDHR provides, viz: Everyone has the
right to life, liberty and security of person. Xxx Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security. Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, one’s body cannot be searched or invaded
without a search warrant. Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the body. It may constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the degree of physical injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries constitute a crime against persons because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a person. Xxx Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one’s rights by the government. In the context of the writ of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Article III , Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State “guarantees full respect for human rights” under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987
Constitution. As the government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat. Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, a nd bringing offenders to the bar of justice. Freedom from fear as a right – In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, “freedom f rom fear” is the right and any threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from being baseless to well-founded as people react differently. The degree of fear can vary from one person to another with the variation of the prolificacy of their imagination, strength of character or past experience with the stimulus. Thus, in the amparo context, it is more correct to say that the “right to security” is actually the “freedom from threat.” V iewed in this light, the “threatened with violation” Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation
of the right to security mentioned in the earlier part of the provision. Deprivation of liberty is not necessary before the right to security may be invoked –While the right to security of person appears in conjunction with the right to liberty under Article 9, the Committee has ruled that the right to security of person can exist independently of the right to liberty. In other words, there need not necessarily be a deprivation of liberty for the right to security of person to be invoked. DISPOSITIVE: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26 December 2007.
VINUYA VS EXEC. SEC. ROMULO G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010 FACTS: This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the Office of the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the DFA, the Secretary of the DOJ, and the OSG. Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization registered with the SEC, established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second World War. Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of the “comfort women” stations in the Philippines. But officials of the Executive Department
declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position that the individual claims of the comfort women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japan’s compliance with the Peace Treaty between the
Philippines and Japan. Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of discretion in refusing to espouse their claims for the crimes against humanity and war crimes committed against them; and (b) compel the respondents to espouse their claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international tribunals. Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals relative to the war were dealt with in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral Reparations Agreement of 1956. On January 15, 1997, the Asian Women’s Fund and the Philippine government signed a Memorandum of
Understanding for medical and welfare support programs for former comfort women. Over the next five years, these were implemented by the Department of Social Welfa re and Development. ISSUE: WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing petitioners’ claims for
official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan. RULING: Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners’ claims against Japan. Political questions refer “to those questions which, under the Constitution , are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.”
One type of case of political questions involves questions of foreign relations. It is well- established that “the conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative –’the political’– departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.” are delicate, complex, and involve large
elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil. But not all cases implicating f oreign relations present political questions, and courts certainly possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements. However, the question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question. The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has his confidential sources of information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other officials. The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners’ cause would be inimical to our country’s
foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for stability in this region. For the to overturn the Executive Department’s determination would mean an assessment
of the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment has been constitutionally committed. From a municipal law perspective, certiorari will not lie. As a general principle, where such an extraordinary length of time has lapsed between the treaty’s conclusion and our consideration – the Executive must be given ample
discretion to assess the foreign policy considerations of espousing a claim against Japan, from the standpoint of both the interests of the petitioners and those of the Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies are sufficient, and whether further steps are appropriate or necessary. In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to bring a claim within the international legal system has been when the individual is able to persuade a government to bring a claim on the individual’s behalf. By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or
international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law. Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise diplomatic protection by whatever means and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right that the State is asserting. Should the natural or legal person on whose behalf it is acting consider that their rights are not adequately protected, they have no remedy in international law. All they can do is resort to national law, if means are available, with a view to furthering their cause or obtaining redress. All these questions remain within the province of municipal law and do not affect the position internationally.
Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter this analysis. Petitioners have not shown that the crimes committed by the Japanese army violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes is an erga omnes obligation or has attained the status of jus cogens. The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has been used as a legal term describing obligations owed by States towards the community of states as a whole. Essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another State in the field of di plomatic protection. By their very nature, the former are the concern of all States. I n view of the importance of th e rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes. The term “jus cogens” (literally, “compelling law”) refers to norms that command peremptory authority,
superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are considered peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be modified only by general international norms of equivalent authority. WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Mejoff vs Director of Prisons 90 Phil 70 September 26, 1951 Facts: This is a second petition for habeas corpus by Boris Mejoff, the first having been denied in a decision of this Court on July 30, 1949. "The petitioner Boris Mejoff is an alien of Russian descent who was brought to this country from Shanghai as a secret operative by the Japanese forces during the latter's regime in these Islands. Upon liberation, he was arrested as a Japanese spy by U. S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps. Thereafter, the People's Court ordered his release. But the Deportation Board taking his case up found that having no travel documents, Mejoff was an illegal alien in this country, and consequently referred the matter to the immigration authorities. After the corresponding investigation, the Immigration Board of Commissioners declared on April 5, 1948 that Mejoff had entered the Philippines illegally in 1944, without inspection and admission by the immigration officials at a designated port of entry and, therefore, it ordered that he be deported on the first available transportation to Russia. The petitioner was then under custody, he having been arrested on March 18, 1948. In October 1948, after repeated failures to ship this deportee abroad, the authorities moved him to Bilibid Prison at Muntinglupa where he has been confined up to the present time, inasmuch as the Commissioner of Immigration believes it is for the best interests of the country to keep him under detention while arrangements for his departure are being made. Two years having elapsed since the aforesaid decision was promulgated, the Government has not found ways and means of removing the petitioner out of the country, and none are in sight, although, it should be said in fairness to the deportation authorities that it was through no fault of theirs that no ship or country would take the petitioner. Issue: Whether or not Boris Mejoff should be released from prison pending his deportation. Ruling: The protection against deprivation of liberty without due process of law, and except for crimes committed against the laws of the land, is not limited to Philippine citizens but extends to all residents, except enemy aliens, regardless of nationality. Moreover, Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution of the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the Nation." And in a resolution entitled, "Universal Declaration Of Human Rights," and approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations, of which the Philippines is a member, at its plenary meeting on December 10, 1948, the right to life and liberty and all other fundamental rights as applied to all human beings were proclaimed. It was there resolved that "all human beings are born free and equal in degree and rights" (Art. 1); that "everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedom set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, nationality or social origin, property, birth, or other status" (Art. 2); that "every one has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the Constitution or by law" (Art. 8); that "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile" (Art. 9 ); etc. Premises considered, the writ will issue commanding the respondents to release the petitioner from custody upon these terms: that the petitioner shall be plac ed under the surveillance of the immigra tion authorities or their agents in such form and manner as may be deemed adequate to insure that he keep peace and be available when the Government is ready to deport him. The surveillance shall be reasonable and the question of reasonableness shall be submitted to this Court or to the Court of First Instance of Manila for decision in case of abuse. No costs will be charged.
