In Compliance with the Requirements in Special Proceedings
ESCHEAT, GUARDIANSHIP AND TRUSTEES CASES (Rule 91 to 98)
Submitted to: Dean Gemy Lito Festin
Submitted by: Elliana S. Bagay Roxanne G. Domingo Mc Anthony M. Liggayu Karen Grace D. Lumberio Andres Viacrusis October 8, 2014
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Table of Contents Part I. DOCTRINES
Page Number
ESCHEAT RP vs. CA…………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 6 (G.R. No. 143483 January 31, 2002) RCBC vs. Hi-Tri Development Corporation and Luz R. Bakunawa………………… 6 (G.R. No. 192413 June 13, 2012)
GUARDIANSHIP Venue Appointment of Guardians Cecilio C. Hernandez, et. al. vs. Jovita San Juan-Santos……………………………… 7 (G.R. No. 166470 August 7, 2009) People vs. Isidro Flores y Lagua……………………………………………………………………..7 (G.R. No. 188315 August 25, 2010) Nilo Oropesa vs. Cirilo Oropesa……………………………………………………………………… 9 (G.R. No. 184528 April 25, 2012)
Selling and Encumbering Property of Ward Jose Uy, et. al. vs.CA…………………………………………………………………………………… 10 (G.R. No. 109557 November 29, 2000) Nelson Cabales and Rito Cabales vs.CA……………………………………………………… .11 (G.R. No. 162421 August 31, 2007) Napoleon D. Neri, et.al. vs. Heirs of Hadji Yusop Uy………………………………… . 13 (Gr. No. 194366, October 10, 2012)
General powers and duties of guardians Termination of Guardianship Eduardo T. Abad vs. Leonardo Biason and Gabriel A. Magno................... 13 (G.R. No. 191993 December 5, 2012)
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TRUSTEE Gertrudes F. Cuaycong, et. al. vs. Luis D. Cuaycong, et. al……………………… 14 (G.R. No. L-21616 December 11, 1967)
Part II. CASE DIGEST ESCHEAT RP vs. CA……………………………………………………………………………………………………… .17 (G.R. No. 143483 January 31, 2002) RCBC vs. Hi-Tri Development Corporation and Luz R. Bakunawa……………… 19 (G.R. No. 192413 June 13, 2012)
GUARDIANSHIP Venue Appointment of Guardians Cecilio C. Hernandez, et. al. vs. Jovita San Juan-Santos…………………………… 23 (G.R. No. 166470 August 7, 2009) People vs. Isidro Flores y Lagua…………………………………………………………………… 25 (G.R. No. 188315 August 25, 2010) Nilo Oropesa vs. Cirilo Oropesa……………………………………………………………………. 27 (G.R. No. 184528 April 25, 2012)
Selling and Encumbering Property of Ward Jose Uy, et. al. vs.CA………………………………………………………………………………………29 (G.R. No. 109557 November 29, 2000) Nelson Cabales and Rito Cabales vs.CA…………………………………………………………31 (G.R. No. 162421 August 31, 2007) Napoleon D. Neri, et.al. vs. Heirs of Hadji Yusop Uy…………………………………… 33 (Gr. No. 194366, October 10, 2012)
General powers and duties of guardians Termination of Guardianship Eduardo T. Abad vs. Leonardo Biason and Gabriel A. Magno.................... 36
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TRUSTEE Gertrudes F. Cuaycong, et. al. vs. Luis D. Cuaycong, et. al……………… …….. 39 (G.R. No. L-21616 December 11, 1967)
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PART I DOCTRINES
Behold my servant, whom I uphold, My chosen, in whom my soul delights; I have put my Spirit upon him; He will bring forth justice to the nations. He will not cry aloud or lift up his voice, Or make it heard in the street; a bruised reed he will not break, and a faintly burning wick he will not quench; He will faithfully bring forth justice. He will not grow faint or be discourage till he has established justice in the earth; and the coastlands wait for his law. Thus says God, the Lord, who created the heavens and stretched them out, who spread out the earth and what comes from it, who gives breath to the people on it and spirit to those who walk in it: “I am the Lord; I have called you in righteousness; I will take you by the hand and keep you; I will give you as a covenant for the people, a light for the nations, to open the eyes that are blind, to bring out the prisoners from the dungeon, from the prison those who sit in darkness.
Isaiah 42: 1-7
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ESCHEAT REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF PASAY CITY vs. COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FORMER 3RD DIVISION) AND AMADA H. SOLANO, assisted by her husband ROMEO SOLANO (G.R. No. 143483 January 31, 2002) Escheat is a proceeding, unlike that of succession or assignment, whereby the state, by virtue of its sovereignty, steps in and claims the real or personal property of a person who dies intestate leaving no heir. In the absence of a lawful owner, a property is claimed by the state to forestall an open "invitation to self-service by the first comers." Since escheat is one of the incidents of sovereignty, the state may, and usually does, prescribe the conditions and limits the time within which a claim to such property may be made. The procedure by which the escheated property may be recovered is generally prescribed by statue, and a time limit is imposed within which such action must be brought. In this jurisdiction, a claimant to an escheated property must file his claim "within five years from the date of such judgment, such person shall have possession of and title to the same, or if sold, the municipality or city shall be accountable to him for the proceeds, after deducting the estate; but a claim not made shall be barred forever." The 5-year period is not a device capriciously conjured by the state to defraud any claimant; on the contrary, it is decidedly prescribed to encourage would-be claimants to be punctilious in asserting their claims, otherwise they may lose them forever in a final judgment. Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs. Hi-Tri Development Corporation and Luz R. Bakunawa (G.R. No. 192413 June 13, 2012) Escheat proceedings refer to the judicial process in which the state, by virtue of its sovereignty, steps in and claims abandoned, left vacant, or unclaimed property, without there being an interested person having a legal claim thereto. In the case of dormant accounts, the state inquires into the status, custody, and ownership of the unclaimed balance to determine whether the inactivity was brought about by the fact of death or absence of or abandonment by the depositor. If after the proceedings the property remains without a lawful owner interested to claim it, the property shall be reverted to the state “to forestall an open invitation to self-service by the first comers.” However, if interested parties have come forward and lain claim to the property, the courts shall determine whether the credit or deposit should pass to the claimants or be forfeited in favor of the state. We emphasize that escheat is not a proceeding to penalize depositors for failing to deposit to or withdraw from their accounts. It is a proceeding whereby the state compels the surrender to it of unclaimed deposit balances when there is substantial ground for a belief that they have been abandoned, forgotten, or without an owner.
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GUARDIANSHIP Venue Appointment Guardians CECILIO C. HERNANDEZ, MA. VICTORIA C. HERNANDEZ and NATIVIDAD CRUZ-HERNANDEZ, vs. JOVITA SAN JUAN-SANTOS (G.R. No. 166470 August 7, 2009) Under Section 50, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, an ordinary witness may give his opinion on the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted. Lulu's attending physicians spoke and interacted with her. Such occasions allowed them to thoroughly observe her behavior and conclude that her intelligence level was below average and her mental stage below normal. Their opinions were admissible in evidence. Furthermore, where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not necessary. The observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence establishing the person's state of mental sanity will suffice. Here, the trial judge was given ample opportunity to observe Lulu personally when she testified before the RTC. Under Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court, persons who, though of sound mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes are incapable of taking care of themselves and their property without outside aid, are considered as incompetents who may properly be placed under guardianship. The RTC and the CA both found that Lulu was incapable of taking care of herself and her properties without outside aid due to her ailments and weak mind. Thus, since determining whether or not Lulu is in fact an incompetent would require a reexamination of the evidence presented in the courts a quo, it undoubtedly involves questions of fact. As a general rule, this Court only resolves questions of law in a petition for review. We only take cognizance of questions of fact in exceptional circumstances, none of which is present in this case. We thus adopt the factual findings of the RTC as affirmed by the CA. Similarly, we see no compelling reason to reverse the trial and appellate courts’ finding as to the propriety of respondent's appointment as the judicial guardian of Lulu. We therefore affirm her appointment as such. Consequently, respondent is tasked to care for and take full custody of Lulu, and manage her estate as well. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ISIDRO FLORES y LAGUA (G.R. No. 188315 August 25, 2010)
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Indeed, it was stipulated during the pre-trial conference that appellant is the guardian of AAA. However, we cannot simply invoke this admission to consider guardianship as a qualifying circumstance in the crime of rape. "Circumstances that qualify a crime and increase its penalty to death cannot be subject of stipulation. The accused cannot be condemned to suffer the extreme penalty of death on the basis of stipulations or admissions. This strict rule is warranted by the gravity and irreversibility of capital punishment. To justify the death penalty, the prosecution must specifically allege in the information and prove during the trial the qualifying circumstances of minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender." The Court notes from the transcripts of the proceedings in Congress on this particular point that the formulators were not definitive on the concept of "guardian" as it now appears in the attendant circumstances added to the original provisions of Article 335 of the Code. They took note of the status of a guardian as contemplated in the law on rape but, apparently on pragmatic considerations to be determined by the courts on an ad hoc basis, they agreed to just state "guardian" without the qualification that he should be a legal or judicial guardian. It was assumed, however, that he should at the very least be a de facto guardian. Indeed, they must have been aware of jurisprudence that the guardian envisaged in Article 335 of the Code, even after its amendment by Republic Act No. 4111, would either be a natural guardian, sometimes referred to as a legal or statutory guardian, or a judicial guardian appointed by the court over the person of the ward. They did agree, however, that the additional attendant circumstances introduced by Republic Act No. 7659 should be considered as special qualifying circumstances specifically applicable to the crime of rape and, accordingly, cannot be offset by mitigating circumstances. The obvious ratiocination is that, just like the effect of the attendant circumstances therefore added by Republic Act No. 4111, although the crime is still denominated as rape such circumstances have changed the nature of simple rape by producing a qualified form thereof punishable by the higher penalty of death. xxxx The law requires a legal or judicial guardian since it is the consanguineous relation or the solemnity of judicial appointment which impresses upon the guardian the lofty purpose of his office and normally deters him from violating its objectives. Such considerations do not obtain in appellant's case or, for that matter, any person similarly circumstanced as a mere custodian of a ward or another's property. The fiduciary powers granted to a real guardian warrant the exacting sanctions should he betray the trust. In results, therefore, that appellant cannot be considered as the guardian falling within the ambit of the amendatory provision introduced by Republic Act No. 7659. He would not fall either in the category of the "common-law
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spouse of the parent of the victim" in the same enumeration, since his liaison is with respect to the aunt of AAA. Since both logic and fact conjointly demonstrate that he is actually only a custodian, that is, a mere caretaker of the children over whom he exercises a limited degree of authority for a temporary period, we cannot impose the death penalty contemplated for a real guardian under the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 7659, since he does not fit into that category.
NILO OROPESA vs. CIRILO OROPESA (G.R. No. 184528 April 25, 2012) In Francisco v. Court of Appeals, we laid out the nature and purpose of guardianship in the following wise: A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character, in which one person, called a "guardian" acts for another called the "ward" whom the law regards as incapable of managing his own affairs. A guardianship is designed to further the ward’s well-being, not that of the guardian. It is intended to preserve the ward’s property, as well as to render any assistance that the ward may personally require. It has been stated that while custody involves immediate care and control, guardianship indicates not only those responsibilities, but those of one in loco parentis as well. In a guardianship proceeding, a court may appoint a qualified guardian if the prospective ward is proven to be a minor or an incompetent. A reading of Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court tells us that persons who, though of sound mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes, are incapable of taking care of themselves and their property without outside aid are considered as incompetents who may properly be placed under guardianship. The full text of the said provision reads: Sec. 2. Meaning of the word "incompetent." – Under this rule, the word "incompetent" includes persons suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to read and write, those who are of unsound mind, even though they have lucid intervals, and persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation. We have held in the past that a "finding that a person is incompetent should be anchored on clear, positive and definite evidence." We consider that
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evidentiary standard unchanged and, thus, must be applied in the case at bar. With the failure of petitioner to formally offer his documentary evidence, his proof of his father’s incompetence consisted purely of testimonies given by himself and his sister (who were claiming interest in their father’s real and personal properties) and their father’s former caregiver (who admitted to be acting under their direction). These testimonies, which did not include any expert medical testimony, were insufficient to convince the trial court of petitioner’s cause of action and instead lead it to grant the demurrer to evidence that was filed by respondent. Even if we were to overlook petitioner’s procedural lapse in failing to make a formal offer of evidence, his documentary proof were comprised mainly of certificates of title over real properties registered in his, his father’s and his sister’s names as co-owners, tax declarations, and receipts showing payment of real estate taxes on their co-owned properties, which do not in any way relate to his father’s alleged incapacity to make decisions for himself. The only medical document on record is the aforementioned "Report of Neuropsychological Screening" which was attached to the petition for guardianship but was never identified by any witness nor offered as evidence. In any event, the said report, as mentioned earlier, was ambivalent at best, for although the report had negative findings regarding memory lapses on the part of respondent, it also contained findings that supported the view that respondent on the average was indeed competent. In an analogous guardianship case wherein the soundness of mind of proposed ward was at issue, we had the occasion to rule that "where sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not necessary and that observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence establishing person’s state of mental sanity will suffice."
the the the the
Thus, it is significant that in its Order dated November 14, 2006 which denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on the trial court’s unfavorable September 27, 2006 ruling, the trial court highlighted the fatal role that petitioner’s own documentary evidence played in disproving its case and, likewise, the trial court made known its own observation of respondent’s physical and mental state, to wit: The Court noted the absence of any testimony of a medical expert which states that Gen. Cirilo O. Oropesa does not have the mental, emotional, and physical capacity to manage his own affairs. On the contrary, Oppositor’s evidence includes a Neuropsychological Screening Report which states that Gen. Oropesa, (1) performs on the average range in most of the domains that were tested; (2) is capable of mental calculations; and (3) can provide solutions to problem situations. The Report concludes that Gen. Oropesa possesses intact cognitive functioning, except for mildly impaired abilities in
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memory, reasoning and orientation. It is the observation of the Court that oppositor is still sharp, alert and able.
Selling and Encumbering property of Ward JOSE UY and his Spouse GLENDA J. UY and GILDA L. JARDELEZA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO L. JARDELEZA (G.R. No. 109557 November 29, 2000) The Court of Appeals ruled that in the condition of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., the procedural rules on summary proceedings in relation to Article 124 of the Family Code are not applicable. Because Dr. Jardeleza, Sr. was unable to take care of himself and manage the conjugal property due to illness that had rendered him comatose, the proper remedy was the appointment of a judicial guardian of the person or estate or both of such incompetent, under Rule 93, Section 1, 1964 Revised Rules of Court. Indeed, petitioner earlier had filed such a petition for judicial guardianship. Article 124 of the Family Code provides as follows: "ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. "In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (165a)." In regular manner, the rules on summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code govern the proceedings under Article 124 of the Family Code. The situation contemplated is one where the spouse is absent, or separated in fact or has abandoned the other or consent is withheld or cannot be obtained. Such rules do not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent. In this case, the trial court found that the subject spouse "is an incompetent" who was in comatose or semi-comatose condition, a victim of stroke, cerebrovascular accident, without motor and mental faculties, and with a diagnosis of brain stem infarct. In such case, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceedings under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court.
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Even assuming that the rules of summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code may apply to the wife's administration of the conjugal property, the law provides that the wife who assumes sole powers of administration has the same powers and duties as a guardian under the Rules of Court. Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real property as such administrator of the conjugal property must observe the procedure for the sale of the ward’s estate required of judicial guardians under Rule 95, 1964 Revised Rules of Court, not the summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code. In the case at bar, the trial court did not comply with the procedure under the Revised Rules of Court. Indeed, the trial court did not even observe the requirements of the summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code. Thus, the trial court did not serve notice of the petition to the incapacitated spouse; it did not require him to show cause why the petition should not be granted. NELSON CABALES and RITO CABALES vs.COURT OF APPEALS, JESUS FELIANO and ANUNCIACION FELIANO (G.R. No. 162421 August 31, 2007) As to Rito, the contract of sale was unenforceable as correctly held by the Court of Appeals. Articles 320 and 326 of the New Civil Code state that: Art. 320. The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance. Art. 326. When the property of the child is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall be considered a guardian of the child’s property, subject to the duties and obligations of guardians under the Rules of Court. In other words, the father, or, in his absence, the mother, is considered legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child under his or her parental authority without need of giving a bond in case the amount of the property of the child does not exceed two thousand pesos. Corollary to this, Rule 93, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, applicable to this case, automatically designates the parent as legal guardian of the child without need of any judicial appointment in case the latter’s property does not exceed two thousand pesos, thus: Sec. 7. Parents as guardians. – When the property of the child under parental authority is worth two thousand pesos or less, the father or the mother, without the necessity of court appointment, shall be his legal guardian x x x x
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Saturnina was clearly petitioner Rito’s legal guardian without necessity of court appointment considering that the amount of his property or oneseventh of subject property was P1,143.00, which is less than two thousand pesos. However, Rule 96, Sec. 1 provides that: Section 1. To what guardianship shall extend. – A guardian appointed shall have the care and custody of the person of his ward, and the management of his estate, or the management of the estate only, as the case may be. The guardian of the estate of a nonresident shall have the management of all the estate of the ward within the Philippines, and no court other than that in which such guardian was appointed shall have jurisdiction over the guardianship. Indeed, the legal guardian only has the plenary power of administration of the minor’s property. It does not include the power of alienation which needs judicial authority. Thus, when Saturnina, as legal guardian of petitioner Rito, sold the latter’s pro-indiviso share in subject land, she did not have the legal authority to do so. Article 1403 of the New Civil Code provides, thus: Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified: (1) Those entered into in the name of another person by one who has been given no authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers; xxxx Accordingly, the contract of sale as to the pro-indiviso share of petitioner Rito was unenforceable. However, when he acknowledged receipt of the proceeds of the sale on July 24, 1986, petitioner Rito effectively ratified it. This act of ratification rendered the sale valid and binding as to him. With respect to petitioner Nelson, on the other hand, the contract of sale was void. He was a minor at the time of the sale. Saturnina or any and all the other co-owners were not his legal guardians with judicial authority to alienate or encumber his property. It was his mother who was his legal guardian and, if duly authorized by the courts, could validly sell his undivided share to the property. She did not. Necessarily, when Saturnina and the others sold the subject property in its entirety to respondentsspouses, they only sold and transferred title to their pro-indiviso shares and not that part which pertained to petitioner Nelson and his mother. Consequently, petitioner Nelson and his mother retained ownership over their undivided share of subject property.
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Napoleon D. Neri, Alicia D. Neri-Mondejar, Visminda D. NeriChambers, Rosa D. Neri-Millan, Douglas D. Neri, Eutropia D. IllutCockinos and Victoria D. Illut-Piala, Petitioners vs. Heirs of Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy, Repondents. (Gr. No. 194366, October 10, 2012) Administration includes all acts for the preservation of the property and the receipt of fruits according to the natural purpose of the thing. Any act of disposition or alienation, or any reduction in the substance of the patrimony of child, exceeds the limits of administration. Thus, a father or mother, as the natural guardian of the minor under parental authority, does not have the power to dispose or encumber the property of the latter. Such power is granted by law only to a judicial guardian of the ward’s property and even then only with courts’ prior approval secured in accordance with the proceedings set forth by the Rules of Court.
General powers and duties of guardians Termination of Guardianship EDUARDO T. ABAD vs. LEONARDO BIASON and GABRIEL A. MAGNO (G.R. No. 191993 December 5, 2012) The court finds Maura’s motion meritorious. An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy, so that a determination of the issue would be without practical use and value. In such cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which the petitioner would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition. In his petition, Eduardo Abad prayed for the nullification of the CA Decision dated August 28, 2009 and Resolution dated April 19, 2010, which dismissed his appeal from the Decision dated September 26, 2007 of the RTC and denied his motion for reconsideration, respectively. Basically, he was challenging Leonardo Biason’s qualifications and the procedure by which the RTC appointed him as guardian for Maura B. Abad. However, with Leonardo Biason’s demise, it has become impractical and futile to proceed with resolving the merits of the petition. It is a well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily terminated by the death of either the guardian or the ward. The supervening event of death rendered it pointless to delve into the propriety of Leonardo Biason’s appointment since the juridical tie between him and Maura has already been dissolved. The petition, regardless of its disposition, will not afford Abad, or anyone else for that matter, any substantial relief.
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Moreover, Eduardo, in his Comment, shared Maura’s belief that the petition has lost its purpose and even consented to Maura’s prayer for the dismissal of the petition.
TRUSTEES GERTRUDES F. CUAYCONG, ET AL. vs. LUIS D. CUAYCONG, ET AL. (G.R. No. L-21616 December 11, 1967) It is one of an Expressed Trust. The Supreme Court in its decision stated that “, if the intention to establish a trust is clear, the trust is express; if the intent to establish a trust is to be taken from circumstances or other matters indicative of such intent, then the trust is implied. From these and from the provisions of paragraph 8 of the complaint itself, We find it clear that the plaintiffs alleged an express trust over an immovable, especially since it is alleged that the trustor expressly told the defendants of his intention to establish the trust. Such a situation definitely falls under Article 1443 of the Civil Code.” In controverting the allegations of the plaintiffs that not only paragraph 8 should be considered but the whole complaint, in which case they argue that an implied trust should be construed to exist, the Supreme Court refuted their argument stating that “even considering the whole complaint. The intention of the trustor to establish the alleged trust may be seen in paragraphs 5 and 6. Article 1453 would apply if the person conveying the property did not expressly state that he was establishing the trust, unlike the case at bar where he was alleged to have expressed such intent. Consequently, the lower court did not err in dismissing the complaint.
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PART II CASE DIGESTS
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ESCHEAT
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF PASAY CITY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FORMER 3RD DIVISION) AND AMADA H. SOLANO, assisted by her husband ROMEO SOLANO, respondents.
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G.R. No. 143483
January 31, 2002
J. Bellosillo Facts: For more than three decades (from 1952 to 1985) private respondent Amada Solano served as the all-around personal domestic helper of the late Elizabeth Hankins, a widow and a French national. During Ms. Hankins' lifetime and most especially during the waning years of her life, respondent Solano was her faithful girl Friday and a constant companion since no close relative was available to tend to her needs. In recognition of Solano's faithful and dedicated service, Ms. Hankins executed in her favor two deeds of donation involving two parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 7807 and 7808 of the Registry of Deeds. Private respondent alleged that she misplaced the deeds of donation and were nowhere to be found. While the deeds of donation were missing, the Republic filed a petition for the escheat of the estate of Elizabeth Hankins before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. During the proceedings, a motion for intervention was filed by Romeo Solano, spouse of private respondent, and one Gaudencio Regosa, but on 24 June 1987 the motion was denied by the trial court for the reason that "they miserably failed to show valid claim or right to the properties in question." Since it was established that there were no known heirs and persons entitled to the properties of decedent Hankins, the lower court escheated the estate of the decedent in favor of petitioner Republic of the Philippines. Issue: Whether or not the escheat proceeding is valid. Ruling: Yes. We rule for the petitioner. Escheat is a proceeding, unlike that of succession or assignment, whereby the state, by virtue of its sovereignty, steps in and claims the real or personal property of a person who dies intestate leaving no heir. In the absence of a lawful owner, a property is claimed by the state to forestall an open "invitation to self-service by the first comers." Since escheat is one of the incidents of sovereignty, the state may, and usually does, prescribe the conditions and limits the time within which a claim to such property may be made. The procedure by which the escheated property may be recovered is generally prescribed by statue, and a time limit is imposed within which such action must be brought. In this jurisdiction, a claimant to an escheated property must file his claim "within five years from the date of such judgment, such person shall have possession of and title to the same, or if sold, the municipality or city shall be accountable to him for the proceeds, after deducting the estate; but a claim not made shall be barred forever." The 5-year period is not a device capriciously conjured by the state to defraud any claimant; on the contrary, it is decidedly prescribed to encourage would-be claimants to be punctilious
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in asserting their claims, otherwise they may lose them forever in a final judgment.
Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation, Petitioner, vs. Hi-Tri Development Corporation and Luz R. Bakunawa, Respondents. G.R. No. 192413 J. Sereno
June 13, 2012
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Facts: Respondent Luz R. Bakunawa and her husband Manuel, now deceased, are the registered owners of six parcels of land covered by their respective Transfer Certificate of Titles. Sometime in 1990, a certain Teresita Millan, through her representative, offered to buy said lots for Php 6,724,085.71 with the promise that she will take care of clearing whatever preliminary obstacles there may be to effect a completion of the sale and to which Millan made a down payment of Php 1, 019, 514.29. However, Millan failed to clear said obstacles so Spouses Bakunawa suggested that the contract between them be rescinded to which Millan refused. The spouses, in order to have their Titles back, issued a Manager’s Check with petitioner RCBC equivalent to the amount deposited by Millan as down payment. While waiting for a compromise agreement in a civil case filed by Spouses Bakunawa against Millan, the Manager of RCBC included the amount stated in the Manager’s Check when he submitted the list to the Treasury of the Republic of the Philippines for escheat. Issues: I.
Whether the Decision and Order of the RTC were void for failure to send separate notices to respondents by personal service
II.
Whether
petitioner
had
the
obligation
to
notify
respondents immediately before it filed its Sworn Statement with the Treasurer III.
Whether or not the allocated funds may be escheated in favor of the Republic
Ruling: I.
No. The Decision and Order to the RTC are not void.
xxx insofar as banks are concerned, service of processes is made by delivery of a copy of the complaint and summons upon the president, cashier, or managing officer of the defendant bank. On the other hand, as to depositors or other claimants of the unclaimed balances, service is made by publication of a copy of the summons in a newspaper of general circulation in the locality where the institution is situated. A notice about the forthcoming escheat proceedings must also be issued and published, directing and requiring all persons who may claim any interest in the unclaimed balances to appear before the court and show cause why the dormant accounts should not be deposited with the Treasurer. Accordingly, the CA committed reversible error when it ruled that the issuance of individual notices upon respondents was a jurisdictional requirement, and that failure to effect personal service on them rendered
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the Decision and the Order of the RTC void for want of jurisdiction. Escheat proceedings are actions in rem, whereby an action is brought against the thing itself instead of the person. Thus, an action may be instituted and carried to judgment without personal service upon the depositors or other claimants. Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the court over the res. Consequently, a judgment of escheat is conclusive upon persons notified by advertisement, as publication is considered a general and constructive notice to all persons interested. II.
Yes. Petitioner has the obligation to notify respondents immediately before it files its Sworn Statement with the Treasurer.
xxx the law sets a detailed system for notifying depositors of unclaimed balances. This notification is meant to inform them that their deposit could be escheated if left unclaimed. Accordingly, before filing a sworn statement, banks and other similar institutions are under obligation to communicate with owners of dormant accounts. The purpose of this initial notice is for a bank to determine whether an inactive account has indeed been unclaimed, abandoned, forgotten, or left without an owner. If the depositor simply does not wish to touch the funds in the meantime, but still asserts ownership and dominion over the dormant account, then the bank is no longer obligated to include the account in its sworn statement. It is not the intent of the law to force depositors into unnecessary litigation and defense of their rights, as the state is only interested in escheating balances that have been abandoned and left without an owner. In case the bank complies with the provisions of the law and the unclaimed balances are eventually escheated to the Republic, the bank “shall not thereafter be liable to any person for the same and any action which may be brought by any person against in any bank xxx for unclaimed balances so deposited xxx shall be defended by the Solicitor General without cost to such bank.” Otherwise, should it fail to comply with the legally outlined procedure to the prejudice of the depositor, the bank may not raise the defense provided under Section 5 of Act No. 3936, as amended. III.
No. The allocated funds may not be escheated in favour of the Republic.
xxx the mere issuance of a manager’s check does not ipso facto work as an automatic transfer of funds to the account of the payee. In case the procurer of the manager’s or cashier’s check retains custody of the instrument, does not tender it to the intended payee, or fails to make an effective delivery, we find the following provision on undelivered instruments under the Negotiable Instruments Law applicable xxx It is undisputed that there was no effective delivery of the check, rendering the instrument incomplete. In addition, we have already settled
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that respondents retained ownership of the funds. As it is obvious from their foregoing actions that they have not abandoned their claim over the fund, we rule that the allocated deposit, subject of the Manager’s Check, should be excluded from the escheat proceedings.
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GUARDIANSHIP
Venue Appointment Guardians CECILIO C. HERNANDEZ, MA. VICTORIA C. HERNANDEZ- and NATIVIDAD CRUZ-HERNANDEZ, Petitioners, vs. JOVITA SAN JUAN-SANTOS, Respondent.
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x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. No. 166470
August 7, 2009
CECILIO C. HERNANDEZ, MA. VICTORIA C. HERNANDEZ-SAGUN and TERESA C. HERNANDEZ-VILLA ABRILLE, Petitioners, vs. JOVITA SAN JUAN-SANTOS, Respondent. G.R. No. 169217 J. Corona Facts: Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez (or Lulu) was born on February 14, 1947 to the spouses Felix Hernandez and Maria San Juan Hernandez. Her maternal uncle, Sotero C. San Juan, took care of her when Maria died. She subsequently became the sole testate heir of her uncle when she started living with her father’s new family. Felix continued to exercise actual administration of Lulu’s properties until her half-siblings namely: Cecilio C. Hernandez, Ma. Victoria C. Hernandez-Sagun and Teresa C. Hernandez-Villa Abrille took over upon their father’s death. During such period of informal administration, they undertook various "projects" involving her real properties so she sought the assistance of her maternal first cousin, Jovita San Juan-Santos on September 1988. She was appalled that Lulu was severely overweight, unkempt and smelled of urine. She was afflicted with tuberculosis, rheumatism and diabetes due to her poor hygiene. She filed a petition for guardianship in the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal alleging that Lulu was incapable of taking care of herself and managing her estate because she was of weak mind. The trial court declared Lulu an incompetent and appointed Jovita as guardian over the person and property of Lulu on a P1 million bond which the appellate court affirmed. Issue: Whether or not Lulu is incompetent. Ruling: We find the petition to be without merit. Under Section 50, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, an ordinary witness may give his opinion on the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted. Lulu's attending physicians spoke and interacted with her. Such occasions allowed them to thoroughly observe her behavior and conclude that her intelligence level was below average and her mental stage below normal. Their opinions were admissible in evidence.
not
Furthermore, where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is necessary. The observations of the trial judge coupled with
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evidence establishing the person's state of mental sanity will suffice. Here, the trial judge was given ample opportunity to observe Lulu personally when she testified before the RTC. Under Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court, persons who, though of sound mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes are incapable of taking care of themselves and their property without outside aid, are considered as incompetents who may properly be placed under guardianship. The RTC and the CA both found that Lulu was incapable of taking care of herself and her properties without outside aid due to her ailments and weak mind. Thus, since determining whether or not Lulu is in fact an incompetent would require a re-examination of the evidence presented in the courts a quo, it undoubtedly involves questions of fact. As a general rule, this Court only resolves questions of law in a petition for review. We only take cognizance of questions of fact in exceptional circumstances, none of which is present in this case. We thus adopt the factual findings of the RTC as affirmed by the CA. Similarly, we see no compelling reason to reverse the trial and appellate courts’ finding as to the propriety of respondent's appointment as the judicial guardian of Lulu. We therefore affirm her appointment as such. Consequently, respondent is tasked to care for and take full custody of Lulu, and manage her estate as well.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ISIDRO FLORES y LAGUA, Accused-Appellant. G.R. No. 188315
August 25, 2010
J. Perez Facts: AAA lived with her adoptive mother, BBB, since she was just a few months old. BBB is married to appellant, who was working abroad for six years. Appellant came home in 1997 and lived with AAA and BBB. BBB was working as a restaurant supervisor from 4:00 p.m. to 2:00 a.m. for six days a week. In February 1999 at around 9:30 p.m., AAA, then 11 years old, felt and saw appellant touch her thighs. Appellant again touched AAA from her legs up to her breast the next day. AAA tried to resist but appellant threatened that he will kill her and BBB. Two weeks after the incident, appellant slowly parted AAA’s legs and inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina. The same occurrence was repeated at least three (3) times a week at around the same time until October 15, 2002. The Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals held that appellant was guilty of rape. Issue: Whether or not appellant is the guardian of AAA. Ruling: We hold that the Court of Appeals erred in considering the qualifying circumstance of relationship. Indeed, it was stipulated during the pre-trial conference that appellant is the guardian of AAA. However, we cannot simply invoke this admission to consider guardianship as a qualifying circumstance in the crime of rape. "Circumstances that qualify a crime and increase its penalty to death cannot be subject of stipulation. The accused cannot be condemned to suffer the extreme penalty of death on the basis of stipulations or admissions. This strict rule is warranted by the gravity and irreversibility of capital punishment. To justify the death penalty, the prosecution must specifically allege in the information and prove during the trial the qualifying circumstances of minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender." The Court notes from the transcripts of the proceedings in Congress on this particular point that the formulators were not definitive on the concept of "guardian" as it now appears in the attendant circumstances added to the original provisions of Article 335 of the Code. They took note of the status of a guardian as contemplated in the law on rape but, apparently on pragmatic considerations to be determined by the courts on an ad hoc basis, they agreed to just state "guardian" without the qualification that he should be a legal or judicial guardian. It was assumed, however, that he should at the very least be a de facto guardian. Indeed, they must have been aware of jurisprudence that the guardian envisaged in Article 335 of the Code, even
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after its amendment by Republic Act No. 4111, would either be a natural guardian, sometimes referred to as a legal or statutory guardian, or a judicial guardian appointed by the court over the person of the ward. They did agree, however, that the additional attendant circumstances introduced by Republic Act No. 7659 should be considered as special qualifying circumstances specifically applicable to the crime of rape and, accordingly, cannot be offset by mitigating circumstances. The obvious ratiocination is that, just like the effect of the attendant circumstances therefore added by Republic Act No. 4111, although the crime is still denominated as rape such circumstances have changed the nature of simple rape by producing a qualified form thereof punishable by the higher penalty of death. xxxx The law requires a legal or judicial guardian since it is the consanguineous relation or the solemnity of judicial appointment which impresses upon the guardian the lofty purpose of his office and normally deters him from violating its objectives. Such considerations do not obtain in appellant's case or, for that matter, any person similarly circumstanced as a mere custodian of a ward or another's property. The fiduciary powers granted to a real guardian warrant the exacting sanctions should he betray the trust. In results, therefore, that appellant cannot be considered as the guardian falling within the ambit of the amendatory provision introduced by Republic Act No. 7659. He would not fall either in the category of the "common-law spouse of the parent of the victim" in the same enumeration, since his liaison is with respect to the aunt of AAA. Since both logic and fact conjointly demonstrate that he is actually only a custodian, that is, a mere caretaker of the children over whom he exercises a limited degree of authority for a temporary period, we cannot impose the death penalty contemplated for a real guardian under the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 7659, since he does not fit into that category.
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NILO OROPESA, Petitioner, vs. CIRILO OROPESA, Respondent. G.R. No. 184528
April 25, 2012
J. Leonardo-De Castro Facts: On January 23, 2004, petitioner Nilo Oropesa filed with the Regional Trial Court of Paranaque City a petition for him and a certain Ms. Louie Ginez to be appointed as guardians over the property of his father, respondent Cirilo Oropesa on the ground that the latter has been afflicted with several maladies and has been sickly for over ten years already making his judgment and memory impaired. The trial court ordered the conduct of a social study case to which the respondent refused to adhere with. The respondent filed his oppositions to the application and later on, when petitioner failed to present his formal offer of evidence, respondent moved for the omnibus dismissal of the case to which the trial court acceded to. On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the ruling of the trial court finding the application for appointment as guardian bereft of merit. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not Cirilo Oropesa is considered an “incompetent” person as defined under Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court. Ruling: The court finds the petition bereft of merit. In Francisco v. Court of Appeals, we laid out the nature and purpose of guardianship in the following wise: A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character, in which one person, called a "guardian" acts for another called the "ward" whom the law regards as incapable of managing his own affairs. A guardianship is designed to further the ward’s well-being, not that of the guardian. It is intended to preserve the ward’s property, as well as to render any assistance that the ward may personally require. It has been stated that while custody involves immediate care and control, guardianship indicates not only those responsibilities, but those of one in loco parentis as well.
In a guardianship proceeding, a court may appoint a qualified guardian if the prospective ward is proven to be a minor or an incompetent.
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A reading of Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court tells us that persons who, though of sound mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes, are incapable of taking care of themselves and their property without outside aid are considered as incompetents who may properly be placed under guardianship. The full text of the said provision reads: Sec. 2. Meaning of the word "incompetent." – Under this rule, the word "incompetent" includes persons suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to read and write, those who are of unsound mind, even though they have lucid intervals, and persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation.
We have held in the past that a "finding that a person is incompetent should be anchored on clear, positive and definite evidence." We consider that evidentiary standard unchanged and, thus, must be applied in the case at bar. With the failure of petitioner to formally offer his documentary evidence, his proof of his father’s incompetence consisted purely of testimonies given by himself and his sister (who were claiming interest in their father’s real and personal properties) and their father’s former caregiver (who admitted to be acting under their direction). These testimonies, which did not include any expert medical testimony, were insufficient to convince the trial court of petitioner’s cause of action and instead lead it to grant the demurrer to evidence that was filed by respondent. Even if we were to overlook petitioner’s procedural lapse in failing to make a formal offer of evidence, his documentary proof were comprised mainly of certificates of title over real properties registered in his, his father’s and his sister’s names as co-owners, tax declarations, and receipts showing payment of real estate taxes on their co-owned properties, which do not in any way relate to his father’s alleged incapacity to make decisions for himself. The only medical document on record is the aforementioned "Report of Neuropsychological Screening" which was attached to the petition for guardianship but was never identified by any witness nor offered as evidence. In any event, the said report, as mentioned earlier, was ambivalent at best, for although the report had negative findings regarding memory lapses on the part of respondent, it also contained findings that supported the view that respondent on the average was indeed competent. In an analogous guardianship case wherein the soundness of mind of the proposed ward was at issue, we had the occasion to rule that "where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not necessary and that the
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observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence establishing the person’s state of mental sanity will suffice." Thus, it is significant that in its Order dated November 14, 2006 which denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on the trial court’s unfavorable September 27, 2006 ruling, the trial court highlighted the fatal role that petitioner’s own documentary evidence played in disproving its case and, likewise, the trial court made known its own observation of respondent’s physical and mental state, to wit: The Court noted the absence of any testimony of a medical expert which states that Gen. Cirilo O. Oropesa does not have the mental, emotional, and physical capacity to manage his own affairs. On the contrary, Oppositor’s evidence includes a Neuropsychological Screening Report which states that Gen. Oropesa, (1) performs on the average range in most of the domains that were tested; (2) is capable of mental calculations; and (3) can provide solutions to problem situations. The Report concludes that Gen. Oropesa possesses intact cognitive functioning, except for mildly impaired abilities in memory, reasoning and orientation. It is the observation of the Court that oppositor is still sharp, alert and able.
Selling and Encumbering Property of Ward JOSE UY and his Spouse GLENDA J. UY and GILDA L. JARDELEZA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO L. JARDELEZA, respondents. G.R. No. 109557
November 29, 2000 J. Pardo
Facts: Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.’s suffered a stroke on March 25, 1991 which left him comatose and bereft of any motor or mental faculties. Upon learning that one piece of real property belonging to his father was about to be sold, Teodoro Jardeleza, on June 6, 1991, filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City which was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 4689, in the matter of the guardianship of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. On June 6, 1991. He averred that the present physical and mental incapacity of Dr. Jardeleza, Sr. prevented him from competently administering his properties. He further prayed that Letters of Guardianship be issued in favor of his mother, Gilda Ledesma Jardeleza. In contrast, Gilda L. Jardeleza filed a petition for the declaration of incapacity of her husband, assumption of sole powers of administration of conjugal properties, and authorization to sell the same several days later. The trial court authorized Gilda L. Jardeleza to assume sole powers of administration of their conjugal properties and sell Lot No. 4291 of the Cadastral Survey of Iloilo. Teodoro Jardeleza filed his Opposition;
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however, the court issued an Order approving the deed of absolute sale. The appellate court reversed the lower court’s ruling. Issue: Whether or not Gilda L. Jardeleza may assume sole powers of administration of the conjugal property. Ruling: The Court of Appeals ruled that in the condition of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., the procedural rules on summary proceedings in relation to Article 124 of the Family Code are not applicable. Because Dr. Jardeleza, Sr. was unable to take care of himself and manage the conjugal property due to illness that had rendered him comatose, the proper remedy was the appointment of a judicial guardian of the person or estate or both of such incompetent, under Rule 93, Section 1, 1964 Revised Rules of Court. Indeed, petitioner earlier had filed such a petition for judicial guardianship. Article 124 of the Family Code provides as follows: "ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. "In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (165a)." In regular manner, the rules on summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code govern the proceedings under Article 124 of the Family Code. The situation contemplated is one where the spouse is absent, or separated in fact or has abandoned the other or consent is withheld or cannot be obtained. Such rules do not apply to cases where the nonconsenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent. In this case, the trial court found that the subject spouse "is an incompetent" who was in comatose or semi-comatose condition, a victim of stroke, cerebrovascular accident, without motor and mental faculties, and with a diagnosis of brain stem infarct. In such case, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceedings under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court.
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Even assuming that the rules of summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code may apply to the wife's administration of the conjugal property, the law provides that the wife who assumes sole powers of administration has the same powers and duties as a guardian under the Rules of Court. Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real property as such administrator of the conjugal property must observe the procedure for the sale of the ward’s estate required of judicial guardians under Rule 95, 1964 Revised Rules of Court, not the summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code. In the case at bar, the trial court did not comply with the procedure under the Revised Rules of Court. Indeed, the trial court did not even observe the requirements of the summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code. Thus, the trial court did not serve notice of the petition to the incapacitated spouse; it did not require him to show cause why the petition should not be granted.
NELSON CABALES and RITO CABALES, Petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JESUS FELIANO and ANUNCIACION FELIANO, Respondents. G.R. No. 162421
August 31, 2007
C.J. Puno Facts: Rufino Cabales died on July 4, 1966. He left a 5,714-square meter parcel of land in Sogod, Southern Leyte to his surviving wife Saturnina and five children namely: Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco, Leonora, Alberto and Rito. Bonifacio, Albino and Alberto sold the subject property to Dr. Cayetano Corrompido for P2,000.00, with right to repurchase within eight years. They
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later redeemed the property when Saturnina paid for the share of her deceased son, Alberto. They subsequently sold the same parcel of land to spouses Jesus and Anunciacion Feliano for P8,000.00. They agreed that Nelson, Alberto’s son, will only receive the difference of P176.34 upon reaching the age of 21. The 24-year old Rito, on the other hand, acknowledged the receipt of P1,143.00 from Jesus Feliano on July 24, 1986. Upon Saturnina’s death, Nelson and Rito initiated a complaint for redemption of the subject land plus damages contending that they could not have sold their respective shares in subject property when they were minors. The trial court ruled against them, but the appellate court modified the decision. Issue: Whether or not the sale executed by the legal guardian Saturnina Cabales is valid. Ruling: The petition is denied. As to Rito, the contract of sale was unenforceable as correctly held by the Court of Appeals. Articles 320 and 326 of the New Civil Code state that: Art. 320. The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance. Art. 326. When the property of the child is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall be considered a guardian of the child’s property, subject to the duties and obligations of guardians under the Rules of Court. In other words, the father, or, in his absence, the mother, is considered legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child under his or her parental authority without need of giving a bond in case the amount of the property of the child does not exceed two thousand pesos. Corollary to this, Rule 93, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, applicable to this case, automatically designates the parent as legal guardian of the child without need of any judicial appointment in case the latter’s property does not exceed two thousand pesos, thus: Sec. 7. Parents as guardians. – When the property of the child under parental authority is worth two thousand pesos or less, the father or the mother, without the necessity of court appointment, shall be his legal guardian x x x x Saturnina was clearly petitioner Rito’s legal guardian without necessity of court appointment considering that the amount of his property or oneseventh of subject property was P1,143.00, which is less than two thousand pesos. However, Rule 96, Sec. 1 provides that:
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Section 1. To what guardianship shall extend. – A guardian appointed shall have the care and custody of the person of his ward, and the management of his estate, or the management of the estate only, as the case may be. The guardian of the estate of a nonresident shall have the management of all the estate of the ward within the Philippines, and no court other than that in which such guardian was appointed shall have jurisdiction over the guardianship. Indeed, the legal guardian only has the plenary power of administration of the minor’s property. It does not include the power of alienation which needs judicial authority. Thus, when Saturnina, as legal guardian of petitioner Rito, sold the latter’s pro-indiviso share in subject land, she did not have the legal authority to do so. Article 1403 of the New Civil Code provides, thus: Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified: (1) Those entered into in the name of another person by one who has been given no authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers; xxxx Accordingly, the contract of sale as to the pro-indiviso share of petitioner Rito was unenforceable. However, when he acknowledged receipt of the proceeds of the sale on July 24, 1986, petitioner Rito effectively ratified it. This act of ratification rendered the sale valid and binding as to him. With respect to petitioner Nelson, on the other hand, the contract of sale was void. He was a minor at the time of the sale. Saturnina or any and all the other co-owners were not his legal guardians with judicial authority to alienate or encumber his property. It was his mother who was his legal guardian and, if duly authorized by the courts, could validly sell his undivided share to the property. She did not. Necessarily, when Saturnina and the others sold the subject property in its entirety to respondentsspouses, they only sold and transferred title to their pro-indiviso shares and not that part which pertained to petitioner Nelson and his mother. Consequently, petitioner Nelson and his mother retained ownership over their undivided share of subject property.
Napoleon D. Neri, Alicia D. Neri-Mondejar, Visminda D. NeriChambers, Rosa D. Neri-Millan, Douglas D. Neri, Eutropia D. IllutCockinos and Victoria D. Illut-Piala, Petitioners
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vs. Heirs of Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy, Repondents. Gr. No. 194366, October 10, 2012 Perlas-Bernabe, J.: Facts: When Anunciacion Neri died intestate in 1977, she was survived by her second husband Enrique Neri and her two children from her first marriage and five children from the second marriage. Throughout the second marriage, Anunciacion and Enrique acquired several homestead which then became the subject of an Extra-judicial Settlement of Estate with Deed of Sale purporting to transfer titles to Spouses Uy, who are now represented by their heirs. Enrique, in his personal capacity and as natural guardian of their two minor children, Rosa and Douglas, and the other three children (Napoleon, Alicia and Visminda) executed the said settlement with deed of sale the validity of which was later questioned in an action for annulment filed by the children including those who were allegedly deprived of their legitime. The trial court ruled that indeed, the Extra-judicial Settlement with Deed of Sale was void as it deprives some of the heirs of their legitime. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial court’s ruling. Issues: I.
Whether Enrique has the capacity to dispose or alienate the share of his minor children in the latter’s share in the estate considering the fact that he was their natural guardian.
II.
Whether in a consequent affidavit executed by Rosa (one of the minors) confirming the Exttra-judicial settlement of Estate with Deed of Sale constitutes her ratification to said agreement.
Ruling: I.
No. Enrique does not have the capacity to dispose or alienate the share of his minor children in the latter’s share in the estate even if he is their natural guardian.
With respect to Rosa and Douglas who were minors at the time of the execution of the settlement and sale, their natural guardian and father, Enrique, represented them in the transaction. However, on the basis of the laws prevailing at that time, Enrique was merely clothed with powers of administration and bereft of any authority to dispose of their 2/16 shares in the estate of their mother, Anunciacion. Articles 320 and 326 of the Civil Code, the laws in force at the time of the execution of the settlement and sale, provide:
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ART. 320. The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance. ART. 326. When the property of the child is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall be considered a guardian of the child’s property, subject to the duties and obligations of guardians under the Rules of Court. Corollarily, Section 7, Rule 93 of the Rules of Court also provides: SEC. 7. Parents as Guardians. – When the property of the child under parental authority is worth two thousand pesos or less, the father or the mother, without the necessity of court appointment, shall be his legal guardian. When the property of the child is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or the mother shall be considered guardian of the child’s property, with the duties and obligations of guardians under these Rules, and shall file the petition required by Section 2 hereof. For good reasons, the court may, however, appoint another suitable persons. II.
Yes. The affidavit executed by Rosa is a ratification on her part.
Ratification means that one under no disability voluntarily adopts and gives sanction to some unauthorized act or defective proceeding, which without his sanction would not be binding on him. It is this voluntary choice, knowingly made, which amounts to a ratification of what was theretofore unauthorized, and becomes the authorized act of the party so making the ratification. Once ratified, expressly or impliedly such as when the person knowingly received benefits from it, the contract is cleansed from all its defects from the moment it was constituted, as it has a retroactive effect. Records, however, show that Rosa had ratified the extrajudicial settlement of the estate with absolute deed of sale. In Napoleon and Rosa’s Manifestation before the RTC dated July 11, 1997,they stated: "Concerning the sale of our parcel of land executed by our father, Enrique Neri concurred in and conformed to by us and our other two sisters and brother (the other plaintiffs), in favor of Hadji Yusop Uy and his spouse Hadja Julpa Uy on July 7, 1979, we both confirmed that the same was voluntary and freely made by all of us and therefore the sale was absolutely valid and enforceable as far as we all plaintiffs in this case are concerned;" (Underscoring supplied) In their June 30, 1997 Joint-Affidavit, Napoleon and Rosa also alleged:
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"That we are surprised that our names are included in this case since we do not have any intention to file a case against Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy and their family and we respect and acknowledge the validity of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale dated July 7, 1979;" (Underscoring supplied) Clearly, the foregoing statements constituted ratification of the settlement of the estate and the subsequent sale, thus, purging all the defects existing at the time of its execution and legitimizing the conveyance of Rosa’s 1/16 share in the estate of Anunciacion to spouses Uy. The same, however, is not true with respect to Douglas for lack of evidence showing ratification.
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General powers and duties of guardians Termination of Guardianship EDUARDO T. ABAD, Petitioner, vs. LEONARDO BIASON and GABRIEL A. MAGNO, Respondents. G.R. No. 191993
December 5, 2012
J. Reyes Facts: Eduardo Abad filed a petition for guardianship over the person and properties of Maura B. Abad on March 19, 2007. He averred that Maura, who is single, more than ninety years old and a resident of Rizal Street, Poblacion, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, is in dire need of a guardian who will look after her and her business affairs. On June 14, 2007, Leonardo Biason filed a Motion for Leave to File Opposition to the Petition alleging he was a nephew of Maura who was not notified of the pendency of the petition for the appointment of the latter’s guardian. He vehemently opposed the appointment of Eduardo as Maura’s guardian because he cannot perform his duties when he resides in Quezon City and Maura maintains her abode in Mangaldan, Pangasinan. He further prayed that he be appointed as Maura’s guardian, since he was previously granted by the latter with a power of attorney to manage her properties. Leonardo died during the pendency of the petition so Maura filed a Manifestation and Motion prayed that the petition be dismissed and the guardianship be terminated. Issue: Whether or not the guardianship is terminated due to Leonardo Biason’s death. Ruling: The court finds Maura’s motion meritorious. An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy, so that a determination of the issue would be without practical use and value. In such cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which the petitioner would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition. In his petition, Eduardo Abad prayed for the nullification of the CA Decision dated August 28, 2009 and Resolution dated April 19, 2010, which dismissed his appeal from the Decision dated September 26, 2007 of the RTC and denied his motion for reconsideration, respectively. Basically, he was challenging Leonardo Biason’s qualifications and the procedure by which
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the RTC appointed him as guardian for Maura B. Abad. However, with Leonardo Biason’s demise, it has become impractical and futile to proceed with resolving the merits of the petition. It is a well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily terminated by the death of either the guardian or the ward. The supervening event of death rendered it pointless to delve into the propriety of Leonardo Biason’s appointment since the juridical tie between him and Maura has already been dissolved. The petition, regardless of its disposition, will not afford Abad, or anyone else for that matter, any substantial relief. Moreover, Eduardo, in his Comment, shared Maura’s belief that the petition has lost its purpose and even consented to Maura’s prayer for the dismissal of the petition.
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TRUSTEES
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GERTRUDES F. CUAYCONG, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. LUIS D. CUAYCONG, ET AL., defendants-appellees. G.R. No. L-21616
December 11, 1967
J. Bengzon Facts: Eduardo Cuaycong, married to Clotilde de Leon, died on June 21, 1936 without issue but with three brothers and a sister surviving him: Lino, Justo, Meliton and Basilisa. Upon his death, his properties were distributed to his heirs as he willed except two haciendas in Victorias, Negros Occidental, devoted to sugar and other crops — the Haciendas Sta. Cruz and Pusod both known as Hacienda Bacayan. Hacienda Bacayan is comprised of eight lots, all of which are titled in the name of Luis D. Cuaycong, son of Justo Cuaycong. Lino Cuaycong died on May 4, 1937. The surviving children of Lino Cuaycong and the surviving children of Anastacio: as well as the children of deceased Praxedes Cuaycong Betia, filed as pauper litigants, a suit against Justo, Luis and Benjamin Cuaycong 1 for conveyance of inheritance and accounting, before the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental (Civil Case No. 6314), alleging Eduardo Cuaycong had an understanding with his father Justo and Luis Cuaycong to partition the said property to his siblings and his wife Clotilde. Luis D. Cuaycong moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of unenforceability of the claim under the statute of frauds, no cause of action (Rule 8, Sec. 1 [f] of the Rules of Court), and bar of causes of action by the statute of limitations. The Court of First Instance ruled that the trust alleged, particularly in paragraph 8 of the complaint, refers to an immovable which under Article 1443 of the Civil Code may not be proved by parole evidence. Plaintiffs were given 10 days to file an amended complaint mentioning or alleging therein the written evidence of the alleged trust, otherwise the case would be dismissed. The court decreed that since there was no amended complaint filed, thus, no enforceable claim, it was useless to declare Benjamin Cuaycong in default. Plaintiff thereafter manifested that the claim is based on an implied
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trust as shown by paragraph 8 of the complaint. They added that there being no written instrument of trust, they could not amend the complaint to include such instrument. The court dismissed the case for failure to amend the complaint; it further refused to reconsider its order denying the motion to declare Benjamin Cuaycong in default, stating that such a default declaration would be of no purpose. Failing in their efforts to have the dismissal reconsidered, plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or Not the trust established in the case is one of Express or Implied. Ruling: It is one of an Expressed Trust. The Supreme Court in its decision stated that “, if the intention to establish a trust is clear, the trust is express; if the intent to establish a trust is to be taken from circumstances or other matters indicative of such intent, then the trust is implied. From these and from the provisions of paragraph 8 of the complaint itself, We find it clear that the plaintiffs alleged an express trust over an immovable, especially since it is alleged that the trustor expressly told the defendants of his intention to establish the trust. Such a situation definitely falls under Article 1443 of the Civil Code.” In controverting the allegations of the plaintiffs that not only paragraph 8 should be considered but the whole complaint, in which case they argue that an implied trust should be construed to exist, the Supreme Court refuted their argument stating that “even considering the whole complaint. The intention of the trustor to establish the alleged trust may be seen in paragraphs 5 and 6. Article 1453 would apply if the person conveying the property did not expressly state that he was establishing the trust, unlike the case at bar where he was alleged to have expressed such intent. Consequently, the lower court did not err in dismissing the complaint.
