Reyes vs. Barretto-Datu 1967 | JBL Reyes Nature: Direct appeal from judgment of CFI dismissing the complaint of Tirso Reyes and ordering the same to deliver to Lucia Milagros Barretto-Datu the properties received by his deceased wife under the terms of the will of the late Bibiano Barretto. Parties: Tirso Reyes, guardian of minors Azucena, Flordelis and Tirso, all surnamed Reyes y Barretto, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS Lucia Milagros Barretto-Datu, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE Facts: Bibiano Bibiano Barretto was married married to Maria Gerardo. Gerardo. During During their their lifetime, lifetime, they acquired acquired vast estate (real property in Manila, Pampanga and Bulacan). When Bibiano died (Feb. 18, 1936), he left his share in a will to Salud Barretto (mother of the minors) and Lucia Milagros Barretto; and a small portion as legacies to his sisters Rosa Barretto and Felisa Barretto and his nephew and nieces. The usufruct of a fishpond was reserved for Maria (the widow). As appointed administratrix, Maria prepared a project of partition, signed by her in her own beha behalf lf and and as guar guardi dian an of the the mino minorr Mila Milagr gros os.. It was was appr approv oved ed,, and and the the esta estate te was distributed and the shares delivered. Salud took immediate possession of her share and secured the cancellation of OCTs and issuance of new titles in her name.
Upon Maria’s death (Mar. 5, 1948), it was discovered that she executed two wills: in the first, she instituted Salud and Milagros as her heirs; in the second, second, she revoked revoked the same and left all her properties in favor of Milagros alone. The later will was allowed and the first rejected. rejected. In rejectin rejecting g the first will presented presented by Tirso Reyes (as guardian guardian of the children of Salud Barretto), the TC held that Salud was not the daughter of the decedent Maria by her husband Bibiano. The SC affirmed the same.
TC: The project of partition submitted in the proceedings for the settlement of the esta estate te of Bibi Bibian ano o is null null and and void void ab initio (not merely merely voidab voidable) le) becaus because e the initio (not distri distribut butee ee (Salud (Salud), ), predec predecess essor or of Tirso Tirso et. al., al., was not a daught daughter er of the Sps. Bibiano and Maria. The nullity of the project of partition was decreed on the basis of Art. 1081 (OCC) ( A A partition in which a person was believed to be an heir, without being so, has been included, shall be null and void ). As Milagros was the only true heir of Bibiano, she was entitled to recover from Salud and her successors all the properties received by her from Bibiano’s estate, in view of Art. 1456 (NCC) which states that property acquired by mistake or fraud is held by its acquirer in implied trust for the real owner.
Having lost the fight for a share in the estate of Maria as her legitimate heir, Tirso now falls back upon the remnant of the estate of Bibiano (the fishpond), which was given in usufruct to Maria. Hence, this action for the recovery of the one-half portion thereof. This action afforded Milagros an opportunity to set up her right of ownership; not only of the fishpond under litigation, but of all the other properties willed and delivered to Salud, for being a spurio spurious us heir, heir, and not entitled entitled to any share share in the estate estate of Bibian Bibiano, o, thereb thereby y direct directly ly attacking the validity, not only of the project of partition, but of the decision of the court based thereon as well. Issues/Held: (1) W/N the partition from which Salud acquired the fishpond in question is void ab initio and Salud did not acquire valid title to it. NO. (2) W/N Milagros’ action is barred by the statute of limitations. YES.
Ratio
(1) Art. 1081 (OCC) is misapplied!
Salud admittedly had been instituted heir in Bibiano’s last will and testament together with Milagros. Hence, the partition had between them could not be one such had with a party who was believed to be an heir without really being one, and was not null and void under Art. 1081. The legal precept of Art. 1081 does not speak of children, or descendants, but of heirs (without distinction between forced, voluntary or intestate ones), and the fact that Salud did not happen to be a daughter of the testator does not preclude her being one of the heirs expressly named in his testament; for Bibiano was at liberty to assign the free portion of his estate to whomsoever he chose. While the share (½) assigned to Salud impinged on the legitime of Milagros, Salud did not for that reason cease to be a testamentary heir of Bibiano. Nor does the fact that Milagros was allotted in her father’s will a share smaller than her legitime invalidate the institution of Salud as heir, since there was no preterition or total omission of a forced heir here.
The view that the partition in question is void for being a compromise on the civil status of Salud, in violation of Art. 1814 (OCC) is erroneous. A compromise presupposes the settlement of a controversy through mutual concessions of the parties; and the condition of Salud as daughter of the testator Bibiano, while untrue, was at no time disputed during the settlement of the estate of testator. There can be no compromise over issues not in dispute. While a compromise over civil status is prohibited, the law nowhere forbids a settlement by the parties over the share that should correspond to a claimant to the estate. At any rate, independently of the project of partition (a mere proposal for distribution of estate), it is the court alone that makes the distribution of the estate and determines the persons entitled thereto and the parts to which each is entitled. It is that judicial decree of distribution, once final, that vests title in the distributees. Where a court has validly issued a decree of distribution of the estate, and the same has become final, the validity or invalidity of the project of partition becomes irrelevant.
(2) Milagros contends that as Maria could not have ignored that Salud was not her child, the act of Maria in agreeing to the partition and distribution was a fraud on her rights and entitles her to belief. This contention is unfounded. First , there is no evidence that when Bibiano’s estate was judicially settled and distributed, Salud knew that she was not Bibiano’s child. Thus, if fraud was committed, it was Maria who was solely responsible; and neither Salud nor her minor children can be held liable therefor. Second, granting there was such fraud, relief therefor can be obtained within 4 years from its discovery, and the record shows that this period had elapsed a long time ago.
At the time of distribution, Milagros was only 16. She became of age 5 years later (1944). On that year, her cause of action accrued to contest on the ground of fraud the court decree distributing her father’s estate and the 4-year period of limitation started to run, to expire in 1948. Conceding that Milagros only became aware of the true facts in 1946, her action still became extinct in 1950. Her action was barred in Aug. 1956, when she filed her counterclaim in this case contesting the decree of distribution of Bibiano’s estate. There is no evidence of an alleged verbal promise by Tirso to reconvey the properties received by Salud, which allegedly induced Milagros to delay the filing of the action. Granting that there was such promise, it would not bind Tirso’s wards, who are the real parties-in-interest. An abdicative waiver of rights by a guardian, being an act of
disposition, and not of administration, cannot bind his wards, being null and void as to them unless duly authorized by the proper court Dispositive: CFI decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE, insofar as it orders Tirso to reconvey to Milagros the properties enumerated in said decision. The same is AFFIRMED, insofar as it denies any right of Milagros to accounting. The action for partition of the fishpond must be GIVEN DUE COURSE.
