Suggested Answers to 2017 Jurists Civil Mock Bar(h.o.)

JURISTS BAR REVIEW CENTER™ SUGGESTED ANSWERS TO THE 2017 CIVIL LAW MOCK BAR EXAMINATION I (a) Both the marriage between Leandro and Tahiquo and between Lily and Lorenzo are void for being bigamous. The marriage between Leandro and Tahiquo is void. Under the Family Code, a bigamous marriage is void. Here the marriage between Leandro and Tahiquo was contracted while Leandro’s marriage with Lily was still subsisting. Hence the marriage between Leandro and Tahiquo is bigamous and thus void. The marriage between Lily and Lorenzo is also void. The Supreme Court has held that a judgment of presumptive death of a spouse is void and without effect if the petitioner-spouse is aware that the other spouse is still alive. Here the petitioner-spouse Lily at the time she filed the petition was aware of the existence of Leandro and that Leandro is still alive. Hence the judgment of Leandro’s presumptive death is void and without effect and thus the marriage between Lily and Lorenzo is bigamous and hence void. (b) No, the judgment declaring Leandro presumptively dead was not proper. In a case involving similar facts, the Supreme Court held that a judgment of presumptive death is not proper if the judgment is based on the sole testimony of the petitioner-spouse, since there would be no basis to say that her belief that her absent spouse is dead is not well-founded. Hence the judgment declaring Leandro presumptively dead was not proper. (c) The ones who would be entitled to the three parcels of land acquired by Lily and Lorenzo during their brief union would be (1) the absolute community of property between Lily and Leandro, and (2) Lilito. The absolute community of property between Lily and Leandro is entitled to the three parcels of land. Under the Family Code, in case of a bigamous marriage and one of the parties is validly married to another, her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community; Here the marriage between Lily and Lorenzo was bigamous and one of the parties thereto, Lily, is validly married to Leandro. Suggested Answers to the 2017 Jurists Mock Bar Examinations in Civil Law. All rights reserved reserved 2017 by Jurists Review Center Inc. Unauthorized reproduction, use, or dissemination is strictly prohibited and shall be prosecuted to the full extent of the law, including administrative complaints with the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court. Page 1 of 11

Hence Lily’s share shall accrue to the absolute community of property between Lily and Leandro, Lilito is also entitled to the three parcels of land. Under the Family Code, if the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his share in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of the common child. [Article 148] Here Lorenzo acted in bad faith and he is not validly married to another. Hence his share in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of Lilito, his common child with Lily.

II Yes, Jose’s suit for the delivery of the Alfa Romeo will prosper. Under the Law on Property [Art. 748], a donation of a movable with a value exceeding P5,000 requires for its validity that the donation and the acceptance be in writing. Under the Electronic Commerce Act, where the law requires a document to be in writing, that requirement is met by an electronic document. [Sec. 7(a), Electronic Commerce Act] Here the donation of the Alfa Romeo, a movable with a value exceeding P5,000, and its acceptance were in writing as the text messages which were stored were electronic documents under the Electronic Commerce Act. Hence the donation as well as its acceptance were in writing and thus the donation was valid.

III If I were the judge, I would decide the case in favor of the Spouses Limot and Napu Les by dismissing the action for specific performance. The Supreme Court has held that a stipulation wherein the sellers would transfer the title upon the full payment is characteristic of a contract to sell and not a deed of absolute sale. The Supreme Court has also held that the failure of the buyer to comply with his obligation to pay the price in a contract to sell means that the seller’s obligation to transfer ownership to the buyer will not arise. Here there was a stipulation that the sellers (the Spouses Limot) would transfer the title to the buyer Pee Daf only upon full payment and Pee Daf failed to comply with his obligation to pay the price when he failed to pay the installments on the balance. Hence the Spouses Limot remained the owners since their obligation to transfer ownership under the contract to sell never arose and thus they could validly sell the land to Napu Les. Pee Daf’s contention that he has a better right because he was first in possession and because Napoles was in bad faith is misplaced. Pee Daf’s contention is evidently based on the Civil Code provision on double sale. However such provision is inapplicable. The Supreme Court has held that the provision on double sale does not apply if both sales are not absolute. [Coronel v. CA, 7 October 1996] Here the first sale is not an absolute sale but a contract to sell. inapplicable and Pee Daf’s contention is misplaced.

Hence the provision is

Suggested Answers to the 2017 Jurists Mock Bar Examinations in Civil Law. All rights reserved 2017 by Jurists Review Center Inc. Unauthorized reproduction, use, or dissemination is strictly prohibited and shall be prosecuted to the full extent of the law, including administrative complaints with the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court. Page 2 of 11

IV (a) Assuming that the parties are governed by the conjugal partnership of gains, the land would be conjugal property of Kato and Kat. Under the Family Code, property bought on installments paid partly from exclusive funds of either spouse and partly from conjugal funds belongs to the conjugal partnership if the ownership was vested during the marriage. Here while the land was bought on installments paid partly from exclusive funds of Kato and partly from conjugal funds of Kato and Kat, the ownership vested only during the marriage since there was a reservation of ownership by the seller until full payment and full payment was made only during the marriage. Hence the land would be conjugal property of Kato and Kat. (b) The bungalow is likewise conjugal property of Kato and Kat. Under the Family Code, anything acquired using conjugal funds is conjugal property, and the net fruits from exclusive property of each spouse is conjugal. Her e the bungalow was acquired using the net fruit or income from Kato’s exclusive property, that is, his farm. Hence the bungalow was acquired using conjugal funds and thus becomes conjugal property. (c) On the assumption that Kato died in 2013, and left Kat and his brother Kimpy as heirs, the latter may not compel partition of the bungalow and land. Under the Family Code, the family home cannot be partitioned even after the death of either or both spouses for a period of ten years. Here the land and the bungalow are the family home of Kato and Kat. Hence the land and the bungalow cannot be partitioned since ten years have not yet elapsed from 2013.

V I would decide in favor of Bruce in his suit for recovery of possession against Tania. a) The defense that Bruce is not an innocent purchaser for value since he should have inspected the land before buying it is without merit. Under the Law on Land Titles, a purchaser of registered land need only look within the four corners of the certificate of title in order to be considered an innocent purchaser for value.


Here Bruce had looked within the four corners of the certificate of title and found no encumbrance therein. Hence he is an innocent purchaser for value even if he did not inspect the land before buying it. b) The defense of Tania that she had acquired ownership over the land by prescription is also without merit. Under the Property Registration Decree, no title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription. [Sec. 47, P.D. 1529] Here the land was registered in the name of Bruce since the deed of sale was already entered in the primary entry book. Entry in the primary entry book is already deemed as registration under the Property Registration Decree. [Sec. 56]. Hence Tania’s defense that she had acquired ownership over the land by prescription is without merit.

VI (a) If I were the lawyer for Demi, I would counter the suit filed by Polly by filing a motio n to dismiss on the ground that the collection suit is premature. Under the Civil Code provisions on Obligations and Contracts, when the debtor binds himself to pay when his means permit him to do so, the obligation shall be deemed to be one with a period, which period shall first be fixed by the court before the creditor may demand fulfillment. The Supreme Court has held that any action to recover filed before the fixing of the period is premature. [Arts. 1180, 1197; Patente v Omega, 93 Phil. 218]. Here the debtor Demi bound herself to pay when her means permit her to do so since the promissory note states that the note is payable when able. Hence the period should first be fixed by the court and thus the suit filed by Polly is premature and may be dismissed on that ground. (b) Assuming that I were the lawyer for Polly, I would file an action to fix the period of the loan. Under the Civil Code provisions on Obligations and Contracts, the court shall fix the duration of the period when it depends upon the debtor’s will. Here the period provided depends upon the debtor’s will since it provides that the loan is “payable when able.” Hence an action to fix the period may be availed of.

VII Bank of the Philippine Archipelago would have the right to the P40,000,000 proceeds of the foreclosure sale. Under the Law on Credit Transactions, the proceeds from the foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property belong to the mortgagee by virtue of the mortgage lien on the property.


Here the P40,000 were proceeds from the foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property and thus they belong to the mortgagee Bank of the Philippine Archipelago. The Civil Code provisions on concurrence and preference of credit would not apply since there is no in rem proceeding. [Phil. Savings Bank v. Lantin, 124 SCRA 476]. Hence it is only the mortgagee Bank of the Philippine Archipelago who would have a right to the foreclosure proceeds.

VIII (a) No, Norie’s reacquisition of Philippine citizenship would not have any ef fect on the divorce decree she obtained in the U.S. Under the Family Code, a divorce obtained abroad by an alien against her Filipino spouse is valid. The Supreme Court has held that what is material is that the spouse was an alien citizen at the time the divorce was obtained, not the citizenship before or after. [Bayot v. Bayot, 7 November 2008] Here Norie was an alien at the time she obtained the divorce. Hence the fact that she reacquired Filipino citizenship later was not material and would not have any effect on the divorce decree she had obtained. No, the petition for nullity should not be given due course. In a case involving similar facts, the Supreme Court held that the petition for nullification of marriage should be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action since the marriage had already been terminated by divorced and thus there was nothing more to nullify. [Bayot v. Bayot, 7 November 2008] (b) Yes, Norman is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. Under the Family Code, in case of marriage between a Filipino and an alien and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

IX (a) Yes, the contract of sale is valid even it was oral and even if the seller was not the owner at the time of the sale. Under the Civil Code provisions on Obligations and Contracts, an oral sale of real property although unenforceable is still valid as it may be ratified. Hence the sale of Lot 1 is valid even if made in an oral contract. Under the Civil Code provisions on Sales, the seller need not be the owner of the object at the time of the perfection of the sale. Hence the sale is valid even if Dina did not own Lot 1. (b) If I were the judge I would grant Dina’s motion to dismiss. Suggested Answers to the 2017 Jurists Mock Bar Examinations in Civil Law. All rights reserved 2017 by Jurists Review Center Inc. Unauthorized reproduction, use, or dissemination is strictly prohibited and shall be prosecuted to the full extent of the law, including administrative complaints with the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court. Page 5 of 11

Under the Statute of Frauds an agreement for the sale of real property is unenforceable unless the same is in writing. [Art. 1403(e), Civil Code]. Unenforceability of the contract under the Statute of Frauds is a ground of a motion to dismiss under the Rules of Court. Here the sale of Lot 1, which is real property, was not in writing as the same was done through an oral contract. Hence the sale of Lot 1 was unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds. Thus Dina’s motion to dismiss should be granted.

X (a) The doctrine of rebus sic stantibus is the doctrine under public international law in which a treaty or agreement is binding only if the same conditions under which the parties stipulated continue to exist and should these conditions cease to exist, the treaty or agreement itself ceases to have any binding effect. Article 1267 of the Civil Code is based on this doctrine. (b) No, Daimos’ contention that it had been reliev ed of its obligation to deliver the crude oil because of caso fortuito is without merit. Under the Civil Code provisions on Obligations and Contracts, caso fortuito does not extinguish an obligation to deliver a generic thing. [Art. 1263] Here the obligation to deliver barrels of Brent crude oil was a generic obligation since there was no specification of particular barrels of oil to be delivered. Hence the defense of caso fortuito does not lie. Daimos’ contention that it had been relieved of its obligation under the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus is also without merit. The doctrine of rebus sic stantibus, as incorporated in our Civil Code provisions on Obligations and Contracts, applies only to a service or an obligation to do, not an obligation to give. [Art. 1267, Civil Code] Here what was involved is an obligation to give or to deliver crude oil and not an obligation to do or render a service. Hence the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus is inapplicable.

XI (a) No, Felina is not barred from closing the pathway being used by Felipe. The Supreme Court has held that a right of way cannot be acquired by prescription since it is a discontinuous easement. [Ronquillo v Roco, 28 Feb 1958; Art. 620, Civil Code] Here the fact that Felipe has been using the easement for over 35 years will not result in his acquisition by prescription of a right of way since the same is a discontinuous easement.


Hence Felina is not barred from closing the pathway being used by Felipe. (b) Supposing that Felina is not barred, Felipe may not insist on a new pathway that is shorter than that offered by Felina. Under the Civil Code provisions on Property, the easement of right of way shall be established only at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate. [Art. 650, Civil Code] Here the right of way although 500 meters longer would be at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate of Felina as it would not obstruct her from constructing a commercial building on her lot. Hence Felipe cannot demand a shorter route. [Note: The issue in (a) is a voluntary easement of right of way which cannot be acquired by prescription. However Felipe is still entitled to a legal or compulsory easement of right of way under Art. 649 which is the issue in (b). This however is subject to the condition that it is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate]

XII (a) Yes, the holographic will should be allowed. The Supreme Court has held that a holographic will should be allowed even if less than 3 witnesses were presented if the holographic will is uncontested, that is, its authenticity or that of the testator’s signature is not challenged. [Azaola v. Singson, 109 Phil. 102] Here the will was uncontested for the ground of opposition was undue influence, not the authenticity of the will or the testator’s signature therein. Hence the testimony of two witnesses was sufficient and thus the will should be allowed. (b) No, my answer would not be the same, that is, the holographic will should not be allowed. The Supreme Court has held that if a holographic will is contested, the presentation of three witnesses is mandatory for the allowance of the will. [Codoy v. Calugay, 12 Aug 99]. Here the holographic will was contested since i t was challenged on the ground that the testator’s signature was forged. Hence the presentation of three witnesses was mandatory and thus the will should not be allowed. (c) The formal requirement for the validity of a holographic will are the following: [KEYWORD: EDS] 1. The will must be Entirely handwritten by the testator. 2. The will must be Dated by the hand of the testator. 3. The will must be Signed by the hand of the testator himself.


XIII (a) A real contract is perfected only upon delivery of the object of the obligation [Art. 1316] while a consensual contract is perfected by mere consent. [Art. 1315]. (b) Dencio can sue Celso for specific performance. The Civil Code provisions on loan provide that an accepted promise to delivery something by way of loan is binding upon the promissor. Here Dencio had already acce pted Celso’s promise to deliver by way of loan the P100,000. Hence the accepted promise is already binding upon Celso and thus Dencio can sue him for specific performance. [Art. 1934].

XIV The opposition should be denied. a) The ground that the laws of Australia do not allow holographic wills is without merit. Under the Civil Code provisions on Conflict of Laws, the will of an alien abroad should be allowed in the Philippines if it is executed in accordance with the law of the country in which he is domiciled. Here the holographic will was executed by John, an alien, in accordance with the law of Canada, of which John is domiciled. Hence the will may be allowed and probated herein. Thus the ground is without merit. b) The ground that the three sons were deprived of their legitimes under Philippine law is also without merit. Under the Civil Code provisions on Conflict of Laws, the amount of successional rights shall be governed by the law of the decedent. Here the amount of successional rights, including that to the legitime, shall be governed by the law of the decedent John, that is Australian law. Australian law allows John to give his estate to anyone who is alive at the time of his death without regard to legitimes. Hence the ground is without merit.

XV If I were the judge, I will rule in favor of Tacio. Under the Civil Code provisions on Obligations and Contracts, the action for the declaration of nullity of a contract does not prescribe.


Here the contract of sale executed by Tacio in favor of Tirso was not really intended to transfer the ownership of the land to the latter but merely to facilitate the filing of the loan application of Tacio. The sale is absolutely simulated and hence null and void. Hence the action for annulment of title, which in effect seeks to declare the contract of sale null and void, is imprescriptible.

XVI (a) Yes, the Philippine court should allow the will of Torcuato even assuming that Thai law requires four witnesses in the execution of a will. Under the Law on Succession, a will executed abroad by a Filipino in accordance with Philippine law may be allowed probate. Here it may be presumed that the will was executed in accordance with Philippine law since the sole ground for opposing the probate is that it was not executed in accordance with the formalities required by Thai law. Hence the Philippine court should allow Torcuato’s will. (b) No, Ted should not inherit. Tina’s contention that Ted cannot be instituted as an heir of Torcuato on the ground that he is not a compulsory heir of Torcuato is without merit. Under the Civil Code provisions on Succession, a testator is free to institute a person who is not a compulsory heir provided that the institution will not affect the legitimes of the compulsory heirs. Here the estate of Ted is P5M. The legitime of his illegitimate daughter Teresa concurring with his wife, Tina is only 1/3 of the estate and the latter also 1/3 of the estate. Hence since, the institution of Ted will not impair the legitimes of Teresa and Tina, as it covers only the balance of the estate, the contention of Tina is without merit. Nonetheless, Ted should still not inherit. Under the Civil Code provisions on Succession, a devise or legacy in favor of an attesting witness is void. Here Ted is an attesting witness and his institution to the balance of the estate was a devise or legacy and thus void.

XVII My advice to Cocoy would be that he should not file a case against Luis since Luis’ assurance and undertaking are unenforceable. Under the Statute of Frauds, a guaranty and a representation as to the credit of a third person is unenforceable if not in writing.


Here Luis’ undertaking to pay Dencio’s loan in case Dencio is unable to do so is a contract of guaranty. Luis’ assurance to Cocoy that he can safely lend to Dencio is a representation as to the credit of a third person. Both contracts were not in writing. Hence Luis’ undertaking and assurance are unen forceable and thus I would advise Cocoy that he should not file a case against Luis.

XVIII As between Braxton and Clay, it is Braxton who has the better right over the land. The Supreme Court has held that in a double sale over unregistered land, it is the first buyer to whom ownership has been transferred who has a better right since registration of transactions over unregistered land is without prejudice to a party having a better right. [See Sec. 113(b) PD 1529] Here the land involved in unregistered and there was a double sale. It was Braxton who was the first buyer and ownership had been transferred to him by delivery since he took possession. Hence it is Braxton who has the better right over the land.

XIX The defense that I would raise in behalf of Sam would be that the warranty against eviction may not be enforced against him. Under the Civil Code provisions on Sales, the warranty against eviction may not be enforced against the seller, unless he was summoned in the eviction suit at the instance of the buyer. [Art. 1558, Civil Code] Here Brady’s suit against Sam for the recovery of the value of the land sold to him is a suit to enforce the warranty against eviction since it was based on the fact that Brady was deprived of possession because of a final judgment. Sam was not summoned in the suit for eviction at the instance of the vendee Brady. The mere writing by Brady of a letter to Sam regarding the suit was not summoning him in the suit since Sam was neither made a co-defendant or a third-party defendant. Hence the warranty against eviction may not be enforced against the seller Sam and I would raise such defense in his behalf.

XX a) Growing crops mortgaged by a farmer to the bank are personal properties pursuant to the provisions of the Chattel Mortgage Law. b) property.

Unharvested coconuts sold by the plantation owner to Acme Corporation are personal

Under the doctrine of mobilization by anticipation, the consummation of the contract would require that the coconuts be harvested and thus converted into personal property. c) The house is real property. The Supreme Court has held that the execution of a chattel mortgage over a house will not change its nature from real to personal property.


d) The welding machines are personal properties. In a case involving similar facts, the Supreme Court held that the welding machines are not considered as real property by destination since a transportation business is not carried on in a building or on a piece of land. [Mindanao Bus Co. v. City Assessor, 29 September 1962] e) The leasehold right of a lessee over a building by virtue of a one-year lease contract is personal property. Under the Civil Code provisions on Property, in order for a right to be a real property, it must be a real right over real property. Here the right of the lessee over the building is merely a personal right since the lease contract did not exceed one year. -oOo-


Suggested Answers to 2017 Jurists Civil Mock Bar(h.o.)

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