The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace John Garnett Reader’s Guide Scholarship dealing with the causes of war is voluminous voluminous and multidisciplinary. multidisciplinary. This chapter describes and explains theories that have been advanced by biologists, philosophers, political scientists, and sociologists about why wars occur occur. It groups groups their ideas into categories and shows how different explanations of war give rise to different requirements or conditions for peace. Distinctions are drawn between 'immediate' and 'underlying' causes of war between ' permissive' permissive' and 'efficient' 'efficient' causes between 'learned' and 'instinctive' causes and between 'necessary' and !sufficient' !sufficient' causes. The chapter pays particular attention to explanations of war based on 'human nature' and 'instinct', but it also considers those psychological psychological theories that emphasi"e emphasi"e 'misperception' 'misperception' and 'frustration' as causes of aggression. The ideas of those who find the causes of war in human collectives#states, tribes, and ethnic groups and those who favour 'systemic' rather than 'unit' explanations#also are described.
lntroduction Though 'strategy' these days is as much concerned with the promotion of peace as with the conduct of war, the phenomenon phenomenon of war remains a central concern. $revious generations generations might have seen virtues in war, for example, as an instrument of change or as a vehicle for encouraging heroic virtues, but these ideas have been rendered obsolete by the destructiveness of modem warfare. %See &hapter .( In the twentieth century abolishing war became a top priority. The first step in ending war, however, is to identify its causes. )istorians sometimes argue that since wars are unique events, the causes of war are as numerus as the number of wars and nothing in general can be said about them. This chapter ta*es a different view. It identifies similarities and patterns between the causes of wars so that we can group causes under such headings as human nature, misperception, the nature of states, and the structure of the international system. It+s aim is twofold. irst, to relate contemporary scholarship across a range of disciplines#biology, political science, philosophy, and history#to the problem of war causation, causation, and second, to elaborate a number number of distinctions which help us to identify different different *inds of !cause+ %e.g. 'underlying' and 'immediate' causes, or 'conscious' and 'unconscious' motives(. Throughout the chapter these distinctions are used to identify the various causes of war and to discriminate between them. Since there is little scholarly agreement on what causes war, this chapter is directed towards explaining the debate rather than to answering the question in a decisive way. The arguments are more than academic because, if the cure for war is related to its causes will lead to different polity recommendations. lf, on the one hand, wars are caused by arms races, then policies of disarmament and arms control are appropriate solutions to the problem of war. %See &hapter -.( n the other band, if wars are instigated by despotic or authoritarian states, states, then the way to peace lies in the spread of denocracy. If the basic cause of war is deemed to be the 'international anardy' which characteri"es the current system of states, then attempts to rid the world of war /ill be geared towards promoting 'system change'# perhaps ,ln the direction direction of strengthened strengthened international international law or a system of collective collective security or or world government. government. Some explanations for war offer less hope for finding a way to end armed conflict than others. or example, those that locate war in a fundamentally flawed human nature suggest a blea*er future for the human race than those that locate the causes of war in 'learned' behavior. If war is learned rather than instinctive, then there is a possibility that it can be eliminated through social engineering. Three conclusions emerge from this analysis. irst. the search for a single cause appropriate to all wars is futile. Second, because war comes in a variety of forms and has a multiplicity of causes, its elimination will almost certainly require simultaneous simultaneous domestic and international political action. Third, a worldwide '0ust' peace is unattainable. unattainable. %See 1ox 2..( 13 2. ive distinctions which may help clarify our though4s about the causes of war. . 'Instinctive' vs. 'learned' behavior. 5. 'Immediate' vs. 'underlying' 'underlying' causes. 2. '6fficient' vs. 'permissive' causes. 7. '&onscious' vs. 'unconscious' motives
The study of war In the field of international relations no question has attracted more attention than '/hy war8' The reason for this interest is that war is almost universally regarded as a human disaster, a source of misery on a catastrophic scale, and,
in the nuclear age, a threat to the entire human race. 1ut war has not always been viewed so negatively. In the nineteenth century, for example, numerous writers identified virtues in war. %See &hapter .( The philosopher 9. /. . )egel believed that war preserved the ethical health of nations, and in a similar vein ). von Treitsch*e regarded war as 'the only remedy for ailing nations' %9owans, :7, p. 52(. or Treitsch*e, war was one of the conditions for progress, the cut of the whip that prevents a country from going to sleep, forcing satisfied mediocrity to leave its apathy. This *ind of thin*ing alerts us to the idea that war can be thought of as a purposive, functional thing. 6. ). &arr regarded it as 'the midwife of change' %:75, p. 2(; ' /ars ... 1rea* up and sweep away the half#rolled structures of an old social and political order'. These authors suggested that wars herald rapid technological progress, territorial change, strengthened group consciousness, and economic development. The idea of war as a purposive, functional thing, however, sits uneasily in an age that typically interprets war as an abnormal, pathological condition that threatens us all. Idle curiosity or an aimless spirit of enquiry has not motivated most investigations into the causes of war. Theorists have studied war to abolish lt. They have believed that the first step towards eliminating war is to identify its causes because, in much the same way that the cures for disease are related to the causes of disease, so the cures for war are to be found in its causes. So long as students of war do not allow their enthusiasm for prescription to affect their diagnostic s*ills, no harm is done. 1ut there is a danger that researchers may be tempted to gloss over the more intractable causes of war in favour of those which suggest the possibility that solutions to human conflict can be readily found.
ichard Daw*ins has pointed out that 'our genes may instruct us to be selfish but we are not necessarily compelled to obey them all our lives. It may ... be more difficult to learn altruism than it would be if we were genetically programmed to be altruistic, but we should try to teach generosity and altruism, because we are born selfish' %:?@, p. 2(. &ivili"ed societies spend a great deal of energy on ma*ing people behave themselves despite their natures. The law, the police, schools, and churches all play a part in modifying human behavior in the domestic environment. The possibility of modifying state behavior also is widely recogni"ed. Diplomacy, force, trade, aid and propaganda are all instruments used by leaders to affect the behavior of the states they are dealing with. Deterrent strategists, for example, argue that even if human nature is fatally flawed %and most of them thin* it is(, states can still be deterred from aggression by the threat of unacceptable punishment in much the same way that many potential criminals can be deterred from robbing ban*s by the threat of imprisonment. %See &hapter ?.( Anli*e those who believe that peace can best be promoted by removing the causes of war, nuclear deterrent strategists hardly care at all about why wars occur. Their policy is simply to ma*e the consequences of war so bad that nobody will dare fight even if they want to. In other words, the strategy of nuclear deterrence is unique in that its effectiveness does not depend either on particular interpretations of why wars occur or on treating the underlying pathologies that cause people or states to fight. The only assumption that deterrent theorists ma*e about human beings is the fairly uncontroversial one that on the whole people prefer to be alive rather than dead and hence are li*ely to be deterred from aggression by the threat of annihilation.
Difficulties in studying war Bo clear authoritative answer has emerged, and perhaps one never will, to the question '/hy war8' ne of the reasons for this is that the word 'war' is a blan*er term used to describe diverse activities. There are total wars and limited wars, regional wan and world wars, conventional wars and nuclear wars, high#technology war, and low#technology wars, inter#state wars and civil wars, insurgency wars and ethnic wars. In recent years, wars also have been fought by coalitions on behalf of the international community. It would be very surprising if these widely different activities #lin*ed only by the fact that they involve organi"ed military violence # could be explained in the same way. =nother reason for the absence of an authoritive answer is that the question '/hat are the causes of war8' is a complicated, 'cluster' question. Ander its umbrella, as )idemi Suganam has pointed out, we may be as*ing a number of different questions. /e may, for example, be as*ing '/hat are the conditions that must be present for wars to occur8' or we may be as*ing 'Ander what circumstances have wars occurred most frequently8' or we may be as*ing
about how a particular war came about %::@, p. 7(. Cumping these questions together inevitably leads to complicated and unsatisfactory answers. =n additional reason for complex answers to the question of war causation is that the concept of 'causation' is that the concept of !causation+ itself is fraught with philosophical difficulties. ne may note that 3 is often a prelude to , but that is not at all the same as proving that 3 caused . Earious writers, for example, noting that wars are often preceded by arms races between the belligerents, have claimed that arms races cause wars. =rms races sometimes cause war, but an automatic connection has not been conclusively demonstrated. =rguably, human beings do not fight because they have weapons they acquire weapons because they already wish to fight. =nd it is worth pointing out that not all arms races have led to war. =nglo#french naval competition in the nineteenth century led to the 6ntente &ordiale, while the &old /ar arms race between the Anited States and the Soviet Anion led to a deterrent stalemate and one or the most prolonged periods of peace in 6uropean history. 9iven the difficulties inherent in the problem of causation, some writers %particularly historians( have preferred to tal* about the 'origins' of wars rather than 'causes'. They believe that the best way of explaining why wars occur is to describe how they come about in terms of the social context and events from which they spring. Thus, if we are investigating the causes of the Second /orld /ar, we need to loo* at the Treaty of Eersailles, the world depression, the rise of )itler, 9erman rearmament, the foreign policies of 1ritain and rance, etc. /hen we have done this we are well on the way to understanding the circumstances that led to the Second /orld /ar. Those who emphasi"e the 'origins' of wars hold the view that telling the story of how they come about is as close as we can get to understanding why they come about. )istorians who favour this very specific 'case#study' approach to the identification of the causes of war tend to believe that since every war is a unique event with unique causes, the causes of war are as numerous as the number of wars. )ence, providing an authoritative answer to the question '/hat are the causes or war8' would involve a detailed examination of every war that has ever occurred. The uniqueness of every war means that there is nothing in general to be said about them. or investigations concerned with the causes of individual wars this is a fair point. Bevertheless, while ac*nowledging the uniqueness or individual wars, most political scientists see merit in shifting the level of analysis from the particular to the general so that we can see patterns and similarities between the causes of one war and another. =t this more general level of analysis we may identify some causes which are common to many, if not all, wars.
'lmmediate' and 'underlying' causes ne of thc most useful distinctions to be drawn between lhe various causes of war is bcl4veen 'lmmediate', pcox.imate causes and 'underlylng', more fundamental causes. lmmediate causes, the events thal trlggcr wars, may be trivial, cvcn acddental. lor example, the spar* that ignlted the im /orld /ar was the assassinallon of the =4strian =rchdu*e ran" erdlnand who was visltlng Saca0evo and be.ing driven ln an open car. The death of the =rddu*e wns a tragedy, but it was esse.ntFally a trivial evcnt, and no one scriously lGclleves thal its occurrence pcovdes an adcquate explanation for the momentous events that followed. /hat is more, Ir was an 'acddent' whlch mlght easlly not bave happeocd. lf the dulHc's chauffeur had nol deviated from thc planned route and then stopped the car to reclify his crror, thc assassln would have had an opportuntty to shoot the =rchdu*c and his wife. Toe assassination /ilS undoubtedly the lmmt'dlate cause of thc lrst /odd /ar, and it is true to say that r ll had not happened the war which bro*e out ln :7 would not havJ happened. 1ut there Is plenty of evidence suggest thal a wac would have occurred sooner or later. Kn :7 war was ln the air; 6urope waJ diEided by hostile alllance systcms tensions weiLe rising rnoblll;iatlon tlruetablcs wcre pre
uQ(tht be ldentified. ln lhe case of rhe 9ulf war, Saddam )usseln's dccision to scl"e territory in Ruwa.it and the deH'isioo of /estem govcmments nor to 2low him to ger away wlth lt wcre more obvious causes of the 9ulf ,var than any bac*ground circumstances.
'Efficient' and 'permissive' causes =nother useful distinctlon lles bctween 'ef@cicnt' and 'permisslve' causes of war. '6ffi.cFent' causes are cormected to lhe particular circurustances suuounding Individual wars. /ar may cesull because state = has something slale 1 wanls. ln thls situatiou the 'efftcient' cause of the war is thc desire of state 1. 6xamples of these causes abound. The efficient cause of the 9ulf war between lraq and lran was the desire of Saddam ILlusseiFl to rega0n from lran the Shatt# al#=rab waterway thc etfictcnt cause of the l :: war bctween lraq and the /estern coalition was Saddam's desire to acquire RuwaitF territory and resources. '$ermNssivc' causes of war are those reatures of the international system which, while not actively promotlng war, nevertheless allow il to happen. ln this context, the fact that we Mive ln a world of independent sovereign states with no authority above them, and no institutions J#ufficietly powerful to regulate thcir relations, Is a 'permissive' cause of war. Rcnnetb /alt" is renowned for the ernphasis he puts on 'permissive' rather lhan 'efficient' causes of war %:O:(. =lthough the causes of war are bewildering ln their variety, notes /alt", the most persuaslve explanation for it is to be found in international anarchy# the fact that in an ungoverned international system there is noth.ing to prevent confllct from o ccurring. =nel because there is nothing to prevent war there Is, in international rclations, a pennanent cxpectation of violence and a permancut sense of insecurity wh4ch pushes states to behave aggresslvely despitc whatever peacefnl intentions they may have. /alt" uses >ousseau's famous 'stag hunt' analogy %see 1ox 2.5( tu show that warli*e behaviour actses not primarily froln any defect in human nature or some lnherent llaw in states, but from the predlcament in which leaders fmd themselvJs %:O:, pp. @?#-(. ln the face of systemic or structurnl inadequacy, war cannot be avoided forever and is always 0ust around t hc comer
Renneth Thompson has made the sarne polnt ln a sllghtly diNferent way %:@, pp. 5@#?@(. )e imagines a slhaton where, during tlle rush houLr, somrieL waitlng for a traio on the p.latform of ao undcrground callway station finds bimself being pushed hy a surging crowd of fellow travellers towards the electrified Ane. ur passenger is a good man who means no harm. /hat should he do'U The &hristian ethic tells him to lurn lhe other chee*, but lf he does he will cnd up dead on the rail traJ*s. =nd so our good man *ic*s and struggles and fights to stay alive. )e behaves in this aggressive wVy not because heis wic*ed or viole.nt, but. because he fineis hin#elf in an environment where he cannot afford to be good. The Sermon on tbc
>ousseau imagines a situation in which severaF solitary and hungry hunters existing in La state of nature' where there is ncither law, morality, nor government, happen to come together. 6ach of them recogni"es that his hunger could be satisfied by a share of a stag, and so they 'agree' to cooperate to catch one. ln >ousseau's words, li a deer was to be ta*cn, everyone saw thal in order to succeed, he muO abide faithfuliy by his post but if a hare happened to come within reach of any oN them, t is not to be cfoubled that he pursued it without scruple. and, having sei"ed his prey. cared very little J by so doing he caused his companions to miss ll,elrs. M. M. >ou,seau, W= Discourse on the rigin of lnequality', in The Social &ontraer and Discourses, edted by 9. D. ). &ole %Condon MX <. Dcnt, ::2(. p. -?. The point of thc story is t hat in conditions of anarchy, the h unter who grabbed the hare cYlllld not feel confid cnt that one of hls fetlow h unterO would not do li*ewise if presented with the sarne opportunity, in which case he would go hungry. 9iven this predicamentthe sensible thing to do is to behavc selfishly and sei"e the hare.
lf the rnain cause of war is to be found in the anarchic international system in which sovereign states pursue their interests without the costraint of world govemmcnt, then an essential condition of peace is the transformation of that system frorn one of competing states to a unified world ruled by a sinWgle authority sufficiently powerful to compel peaceful behaviour. The trouble with thls reconunendation is that there is no practical way of implementing it.. /e dld not cU.e to live in the world of independent states which emerged from the $eace of /estphalia in @7- and we cannot now choose not to live in it. Though the internatlonal system is constantly changing, for aiF practical purposes it is a given, somcthing we have to accept as a fact of life. /e are where we are, and whatever conditions of peace we may recommend must ta*e that into account. =nother reason for scepticism that 'world government' will solve th.e problem of war is that even if we achieved it we might not li*e it. /orld govemment might tum out to be world dictatorsbip and interstate wars nlight simply become civil wars. Those who regard the ungoverned lnternational system as the rootL cause of war often compare it witb )obbesian anarchy but in reality the society of states bears llttle resemblance to )obbes's 'state of nature'. =lthough it is not an iotegra* d society comparable to domestic society, it is neFther chaotic, nor wholly unpiedictable. States do not live in conditions of permanent terror. lnternational society is a regulated, rule#governed environment in which states &llll builcl upon their conunon inteJests, and in which international organii.ations, customs, habits, mores, and laws built up over hundreds o% years modera te and order tbeir behaviour. f course, no one would daim that the world of sovercign states is the IMest of ali worlcls it may not even be Ae best of ali possible wodds. 1ut ) is better than some im.aginable alternatives#even better, perhaps, than world government##and we ought not to try to 0ettison it without being very sure that wbat succeeds it will be an improvernent.
!ecessary' and 'sufficient' causes of war Earious writers have found it useful to distinguish between 'necessary' anel 'sufficient' causes of w,r. = 'en;ssary' condition for war is une thilt must be presenl if /< is to o&Cl.ll. ln oQer words, if war cannot brea* o ut without that condition exlstlng, then it is a necessary condition. The existence of armam.erlts is a necessary condition of war beca use without them no w,r could be fonght. or wars to occur it also is necessacy for h uman beings to be organi"ed in discrete coAectives#states, trtbes, ethnic groups, nations, or factions. =dditionally, it is a necessary condition of war that there be no effective mecharusm for prevcnting it. =n effeCiive world government, for example, would ma*e it impossible for intersta te wa.rs to occur, and an all#powerful state governm.ent would ma*e it lmpossible for civil wars to occur. Thus, the absence of these mechanisms is a necessary tonclition of war. There is an element of lautology in lhe above analysis in the seme tbat if we define war as organi"ed violence between groups, then it is obvious that wars cannot occur if human beings are not organN.ed in groups that have Che capacity for organi"ed violence. lt is equally obvlous thal wars cannol occur if there is a mech,mism thal prevents them.
P The idea that war is endemic in the human condition is psychologically unpalatable, but it may nevertheless be true. 6ven if human nature cannot be changed, it may be possible to modify human behavior so that wars are less frequent. P Since there are many different *inds of war, it is not surprising that no single cause of war can be identified. P It is often useful to distinguish between underlying causes of war and the events that trigger them. P 6fficient causes of war relate to the particular circumstances surrounding individual wars. $ermissive causes of war are those features of the international system which, while not actively promoting war, allow it to happen. P = 'necessary' condition of war is one which must be present if war is to occur. = 'sufficient' cause of war is one which, if present, guarantees the occurrence of war.
"uman nature e#planations of war There is widespread agreement that one of tlle Fhings that distingutshes hunanL.,,X .,,. X X '4 from anilll.itls is that most of their bellaviour is lcamed ralher than instinctive. Bo onJ J L *nows what lhe relalive per ccntages are and there is an ongoing debate about lhe relative L .,..,,,, J. importanceof 'nature' versus 'nurture' %heredity versus envirornnent( as a determinant of buman behaviour. Inevitably this debate has raised the question of whether war is an example of 'innate' or 'Ieamed' behavioui. Mf il is ilmate then we musl accept ir , since in any reasonable time.scale biological cvolution is too slow Co modify it. lf il is leamed, however, then it can be unlear.ned and Chere is hope for us ali. Ciberal tllin*ers prefer to emphasi"e the hnportaoce of 'nurture' and are naturally attracted to the idea Chat aggression and war can be tamed. &onservative thin*ers tend to throw their weight behind 'natur.e' and are therefore sceptical about the possibilities of ridding lhe world of war . Though they are disposed to minimi"e its signMficance, even commltted liberais ,dmit that there is a genetic, instlnctive element in human behaviour. /e do not sta.rt with clean slates on which life's experiences are wr itten to ma*e us what we are. /e come wlth genetic baggage, biologically pwgammed, wlA builtPin d r ives and instincts, one of wh* h, it is ari,'l.led, is a predllection for aggresslon and violence. ln a cclebrated exchange of letters in :25 both =lbert 6instein and S igmund reud agreed tllat the r oots of war were to be found in an eMemeutal instinct for a.ggression and destruction. 6instein thought ttat 'man has in him ao acuve instinct for hatred anel destruction', and reud bclievcd he had identified a 'death lnstinct' which manifcsted its.elf in homicide and suicide %r eud, :25(. ln the :@s, cthological and soeio#biological resear ch brought new llfe to 'instinct' theories of aggression. Romad Coren" argued, Margely on the basis of bis observalions of the behaviour of blrds and lish, that an aggressive lnstinct is emhedded in thegenetic ma*e#up of allanimals %including man(, and thatthis instinct has been
a prerequisite for survival %:?@(. >obert =rdrey, in The Territorial In,pemtívc , reached a similar conclusion and suggested a 'territorial' instinct to run a longside Coren"'s four inslincts# h ungcr, fear, sex, and aggression ( l:@@(. 6dward /ilson in Hw11qn Nature noted thal human bcings are disposed to react with unreasoning hatred to perceived thrcats to their safety and possessions, and he argued that 'we te.nd to fear deeply the acllons ofstrangers and to solve conflict by aggression' %:?-, p. :(. %See 1ox 2.2.( =lthough >ichard Daw*ins in hls hoo* T/1e S
There is deceit and cunning and from these wars arise. Confuc!us
/hatever can bc said in favour of a balance ot power can be said only because we are wlc*ed. Monathan Dymond steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a paJnership of demXocratic nations. Bo autocratic government could be trusted to *eep faith wthm ,t or observe ts r.ovenants ... nly frec peoples can hold their purpose and their honor steady to a common Jnd and pref er t he interests of man*ind to any narrow intcrests of their own. /oodrow /ilson lt is quite tr ue that it would be much better for ali men to remain a lways "# peace. 1Jt so '.\\: e as there is no secur ity for this, everyone having no guarantee that he can Jvd war, s anx,ous to begin it at the moment which suits his own interest and so forestall a neghbour, who would not fail to forestall the attac* in his tum at any moment favourable to hlmself .
>ousseau orce is a means of achieving the externai ends of states beca use there exists no coJsiJent . reliable pr ocess of reconciling the conf licts of interest that inevitably arisc among Hmlar umts in a condition of anarchy. Renneth /alt"
The 'human nature' e.xplanation of war is a persuasive one, but at lcast two qualificaP t lons need to be made aboul it. irst, we need to as* whcther the evidence produced by the study of anllnals is really relevanl to lhe behaviour of human beings. Tbe animal behaviourists say lt is, beca use man is simply a highcr animal, connected to the rest of the animal *ingdom by evolullon. To dcny that hurnan beings have instincts in lhe sarne way that animais do is to deny the almosl universally accepted principie of evolJtlon, whlch lin*s all life on the planet. .ven so, we cannot hclp wondering whcthcr the *ind of 'cross#s pecies' generali"atlon engaged in by biologists is valid. =fter all, human beings are ve.ry different f rom animais. They are more lotelligent. They Miave a morJ sJnsc. Jhey reflect about what they do they p lan ahead. Some would clalm lhat these dfferences are O important that for ali intents and p urposes tbey ft man out of the animal wor ld and reduce his instincts to no more than vestigial signilicance. /alt" notes ln hls boo* Man, the State and war , that arguing lh at#human nature causes war is not very helpful since lf hurnan nature causes war then, logically, it also causes everything cise thal human belngs do. ln his words, 'hurnan natme ruay in some sensc have been lhe cause ofwar in :7,. but by the sarne to*en lt was the cause of peace in :' %:O:, p. 5X-(X# Xln other words, human nature is a constant and cannot explain the wlde vancty of ,&tiEles that humans exhibil.
'$rustration' e#planations of war Social psychologists, while still locating war in 'man', off;r e.',planations for its occurrence which rely leJ on instinct and more ou socially progrnuuned hwuan behaviour. Typically, they argue that aggression is a result of frustration. /hen individua.Is find themsehPes thwarted in thc achieveruent of their desir es, goals, and ob0ectivcs, they experiencc frustratlon which causes pent#up resentment that needs to fmd an outletand this frequently ta*es the form of aggressive behviour whlch, in tum, has a cathartic effect of releasing tension and ma* ing thnse who eugage in it teci better. Asually aggression is leve.lled at rhose who cause the frustration, but sometimes it is vented against innocents who become scapegoats. This psychological process of tra.nsferring aggression to a secondary group is called 'dhplacernent'. Somellmes individuais pw0ect their frustrated desires and ambitions on to the group or collective, be lt tribe or stare, to which they belong. ln the words of >einhold Blebuhr, 'the man in the street, with his lust for power and prestige thwarted by his own limitations and the necessities of social life, pro0ects his ego upon his natlon and indulges his anar chic Musts vicar iously' %:25, p. :2(. Tbere is a sense in whic.h the 'rustrationU =ggres.Jion ' hypothesls, which emphasi"es the connection between violence and lhe fallurc of human beings to achieve t heiMW ob0ectives,
is somewhat more optimistic than 'lnstNnct, theories of aggression. =lthough fcustration in llfe. is unavoidable, it may be possi ble elther to charme.l aggression into harmless activitics li*e sport %psychologists call Chis sublimation(, or to organi"e society la ways which minimi"e frustratlons %sociologists call this social engineerlng(.
'%ispercept&on' e#planations of war =cce pting that wars cannot occur unFess statesmen decide to wage them, many believe that decislons to go to war are often the reJult of misperception, misunderstanding, misc.altulation and X errors of 0udgcmenl. 6ssentially, those who tlQn* in this way r egard wars as mislaes, the tragic consequences of faillng to appreciate things as tbey are. Tl]s being the case, tlley are caused more by human frailty or fallibility than malice. >obert Mervls %:?@(, bu)ding on the ideas of Renneth 1oulding %:S@(, has contrlbuted enor mously lo our understandlng of these psychological causes of war , )e ma*cs the point that in a rder to ma*e sense of the world around us, all of us deve.lop lmages of reality through which we filter the welter of inf ormation that bombards our senses. These 'images' of realily are mo.r e irnportant than reality itself when it comes to determinlng our behaviour they a
1ut perhaps lhe most criticai misperception of all was Saddam )usseln's failure to anticipate /cstern resolve and the creation of a powcrful military coalition against him. 1efore the Second /or ld /ar, )itler mista*cnly believed that 1rNtaln would not fight and &hambcrlain mista*enly believed thal 9ermany could be appcased by concessions. ther delusions and misconceptions that contr ibuted to the outbrea* of war in :2: have bee.n ide.ntified by =. M. $. lilylor. ussia and the Anited States for mastery of the wor ld' %Belson and lin :?:, pp. O2#7(. ln 1ritain hardly anyone expected that 9erman blit"*riegtactics wollld bring rance down in a matter of wee*s, ,md throughout 6urope peo ple grossly overestimated the power of strateg;ic bombing. 9iven lllis plethora of nisunderstandings, mis0udgl' ments, aud mispcrceptions, it is easy to argue that states.man stumbled into the Second /orld /ar because they were out of touch with reality. hlne.land in :2@, and =ustia and lhe Sudetenland in :2-, he could probably get away with aggression against $oland in :2:. ln the case or the al* lands, the casual pace of .1riAsll diplomacy anct the absence of any serious mllltar y capability in the area may havc suggested to the =rgentines thal f]itain was not much interesled in lhe fale of the al*land lslands and was unli*ely to defend them. $erhaps, in both of thesc cases, it was not so muc.h Chal signals wcr e misrea but that the wrong signals wer e sent. 6ilher way 1r itain's enemies made serious miscalculations of her intentioru and war r esulted.
