Civil and Political Law
DENNIS A. B. FUNA v. THE CHAIRMAN, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III, et. al. G.R. No. 191672, 25 November 2014, EN BANC (Bersamin, J.) Section 1, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions as “independent.” Although their respective functions are essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of t he President of the Philippines in the discharge of such functions. Each of the Constitutional Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules and in the exercise of its own discretion. Facts: In 2010, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Francisco T. Duque III (Duque) as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, which was thereafter confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. Subsequently, President Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 864 (EO 864). Pursuant to it, Duque was designated as a member of the Board of Directors or Trustees in an ex officio capacity of the following government-owned or government-controlled corporations: (a) Government Service Insurance System (GSIS); (b) Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PHILHEALTH), (c) the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC), and (d) the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF). Petitioner Dennis A.B. Funa, in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, filed the instant petition challenging the constitutionality of EO 864, as well as Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (EO 292), otherwise known as The Administrative Code of 1987, and the designation of Duque as a member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the GSIS, PHIC, ECC and HDMF for being clear violations of Section 1 and Section 2, Article IX-A IX -A of the 1987 Constitution. ISSUE: Does the designation of Duque as member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, in an ex officio capacity, impair the independence of the CSC and violate the constitutional prohibition against the holding of dual or multiple offices for the Members of the Constitutional Commissions? RULING: Yes. The Court partially grants the t he petition. The Court upholds the c onstitutionality of Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292, but declares unconstitutional EO 864 and the designation of Duque in an ex officio capacity as a member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF.
Garcia vs. J. Drilon and Garcia, G. R. No. 179267, 25 June 2013 Nature of the Case: Petition for Review of Republic Act (R.A.) 9262 Facts: Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary Protection Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” She claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional, psychological and economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support and also a victim of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner. The TPO was granted but the petitioner fail ed to faithfully comply with the conditions set forth by the said TPO, private-respondent filed another application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court issued a modified TPO and extended the same when petitioner failed to comment on why the TPO should not be modified. After the given time allowance to answer, the petitioner no longer submitted the required comment as it would be an “axercise in futility.” Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO on, questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal protection clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for being “an unwanted product of an invalid law.” The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition for failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and the petition for prohibition to annul protection ord ers issued by the trial court constituted collateral attack on said law. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed. Issues: Whether or no the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of constitutionality was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the petition constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of the law.
WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust and violative of the equal protection clause. WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs counter to the due process clause of the Constitution WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the policy of the state to protect the family as a basic social institution WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and unconstitutional because it allows an undue delegation of judicial power to Brgy. Officials.
Held: 1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and jurisdiction, inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality. Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute. The question of constitutionality must be raised a t the earliest possible time so that if not raised in the pleadings, it may not be raised in the trial and if not raised in the trial court, it may not be considered in appeal. 2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Worker kers’ Union, the Court ruled that all that is re quired of a valid classification is that it be reasonable,
which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; not limited to existing conditions only; and apply equally to each member of the class. Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid classification and did not violate the equal protection clause by favouring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the Senate extends its protection. 3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The essence of due process is in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one’s defense. The grant of the TPO exparte cannot be impugned as violative of the right to due process. 4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioner’s contention that by not allowing mediation, the law vi olated the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution cannot be sustained. In a memorandum of the
Court, it ruled that the court shall not refer the case or any issue therof to a mediator. This is so because violence is not a subject for compromise. 5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legall y demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on any part of any branch of the Government while executive power is the power to enforce and administer the laws. The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is an executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true with the issuance of BPO. Assistance by Brgy. Officials and other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty executive function. The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.
G.R. No. 202809, July 02, 2014 - DENNIS L. GO, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Facts: Petitioner filed a petition for naturalization under Commonwealth Act ( C.A.) No. 473, the Revised Naturalization Law. Aside from his presentation of all other requirements, petitioner presented, as witnesses, Dr. Anlacan, Dr. Tordesillas, Silvino Ong, Teresita Go, and Juan Go. Dr. Anlacan testified that based on the psychiatric examination he conducted on petitioner, he had no psychiatric abnormality at the time of the test. Dr. Tordesillas, on the other hand, reported that petitioner’s medical examination results were normal. Ong, a friend of petitioner’s family, said that he had known petitioner since childhood through his association with the family in times of celebration. Teresita described him as a peace-loving p erson who participated in activities sp onsored by his school and the barangay. Lastly, Juan, a businessman by profession, also claimed that he knew petitioner personally. The RTC rendered a decision granting the petition for naturalization ruling that the petitioner possessed the qualifications set forth by law. But the CA reversed and set aside said decision. Hence, this petition. Issue:
Whether or not Go’s petition for naturalization should be granted.
Ruling: No. Jurisprudence dictates that in judicial naturalization, the application must show substantial and formal compliance with C.A. No. 473. In other words, an applicant must comply with the jurisdictional requirements, establish his or her possession of the qualifications and none of the disqualifications enumerated under the law, and present at least two (2) character witnesses to support his allegations. In Ong v. Republic of the Philippines, the Court listed the requirements for character witnesses, namely: 1. That they are citizens of the Philippines; 2. That they are “credible persons”; 3. That they personally know the petitioner; 4. That they personally know him to be a resident of the Philippines for the period of time required by law;
5. That they personally know him to be a person of good repute; 6. That they personally know him to be morally irreproachable; 7. That he has, in their opinion, all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines; and 8. That he “is not in any way disqualified under the provisions” of the Naturalization Law.
The records of the case show that the joint affidavits executed by petitioner’s witnesses did not establish their own qualification to stand as such in a naturalization proceeding. In turn, petitioner did not present evidence proving that the persons he presented were credible. In the words of the CA, “he did not prove that his witnesses had good standing in the community, known to be honest and upright, reputed to be trustworthy and reliable, and that their word may be taken at face value, as a good warranty of the worthiness of petitioner.” Furthermore, the background checks done on petitioner yielded negative results due to the uncooperative behavior of the members of his household. In fact, petitioner himself disobliged when asked for an interview by BOI agents. To the Court, this is a display of insincerity to embrace Filipino customs, traditions and ideals.
Finally, it is noteworthy that petitioner’s failure to state his former residence in the petition was fatal to his application for naturalization. Indeed, this omission had deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Hence, the petition for naturalization is dismissed without prejudice.
PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM V. ROMARS INTERNATIONAL G.R. No. 189669 February 16, 2015 Venue is jurisdictional
FACTS:
Petitioners received information that respondent was selling, offering for sale, or distributing liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) by illegally refilling the steel cylinders manufactured by and bearing the duly registered trademark and device of respondent Petron. Petron then obtained the services of a paralegal investigation team who went to respondent's premises located in San Juan, Baao, Camarines Sur, bringing along four empty cylinders of Shellane, Gasul, Total and Superkalan and asked that the same be refilled. Respondent's employees then refilled said empty cylinders at respondent's refilling station. Petitioners then requested the NBI to further investigate this matter. They witnessed trucks coming from respondent's refilling facility loaded with Gasul, Shellane and Marsflame cylinders, which then deposit said cylinders in different places, one of them a store called “Edrich Enterprises”. Thus, the NBI, in behalf of Petron and Shell, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Naga City (RTC-Naga), two separate Applications for Search Warrant. The RTC-Naga City issued an Order granting said Applications and Search Warrant Nos. 2002-27 and 2002-28 were issued. On the same day, the NBI served the warrants at the respondent's premises in an orderly and peaceful manner, and articles or items described in the warrants were seized. On November 4, 2002, respondent filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrants, where the only grounds cited were: (a) there was no probable cause; (b) there had been a lapse of four weeks from the date of the test-buy to the date of the search and seizure operations; (c) most of the cylinders seized were not owned by respondent but by a third person; and (d) Edrich Enterprises is an authorized outlet of Gasul and Marsflame. In an Order dated February 21, 2003, the RTC-Naga denied the Motion to Quash. However, on March 27, 2003, respondent's new counsel filed an Appearance with Motion for Reconsideration. It was only in said motion where respondent raised for the first time, the issue of the impropriety of filing the Application for Search Warrant at the RTC-Naga City when the alleged crime was committed in a place within the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC-Iriga City. Respondent pointed out that the application filed with the RTC-Naga failed to state any compelling reason to justify the filing of the same in a court which does not have territorial jurisdiction over the place of the commission of the crime, as required by Section 2 (b), Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. In an Order dated July 28, 2003, the RTC-Naga issued an Order granting respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, thereby quashing the Search Warrants. Petitioner then appealed to the CA, but the appellate court, in its Decision dated March 13, 2009, affirmed the RTC Order quashing the search warrants. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision was denied per Resolution dated September 14, 2009.
ISSUES:
1. Whether venue in an application for search warrant is jurisdictional? - NO 2. Whether the issue of lack of jurisdiction may be waived and may even be raised for the first time on appeal? - NO HELD:
SEC. 2. Court where applications for search warrant shall be filed. - An application for search warrant shall be filed with the following: cralawred (a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed. (b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced. However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the court where the criminal action is pending. However, the CA gravely erred in equating the proceedings for applications for search warrants with criminal actions themselves. Proceedings for said applications are not criminal in nature and, thus, the rule that venue is jurisdictional does not apply thereto. Evidently, the issue of whether the application should have been filed in RTC-Iriga City or RTC-Naga, is not one involving jurisdiction because, as stated in the afore-quoted case, the power to issue a special criminal process is inherent in all courts. Unfortunately, the foregoing reasoning of the CA, is inceptionally flawed, because as pronounced by the Court in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals, and reiterated in the more recent Worldwide Web Corporation v. People of the Philippines, to wit: an application for a search warrant is a “special criminal process,” rather than a criminal action. The basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously equating the application for and the obtention of a search warrant with the institution and prosecution of a criminal action in a trial court. It would thus categorize what is only a special criminal process, the power to issue which is inherent in all courts.
Moreover, the Court must again emphasize its previous admonition in Spouses Anunciacion v. Bocanegra,that:
We likewise cannot approve the trial court's act of entertaining supplemental motions x x x which raise grounds that are already deemed waived. To do so would encourage lawyers and litigants to file piecemeal objections to a complaint in order to delay or frustrate the prosecution of the plaintiff's cause of action.
ARNOLD VICENCIO v . HON. HEYNALOO A. VILLAR, et al.
G.R. No. 182069, 3 July 2012, EN BANC (Sereno, J .)
The mandate of the Commission on Audit is to observe the policy that government funds and property should be fully protected and conserved; and that irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant expenditures or uses of such funds and property should be prevented. The City Council or the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Malabon (SPM), presided by Hon. Benjamin Galauran, then acting Vice-Mayor, adopted and approved City Ordinance No. 15-2003, entitled “An Ordinance Granting Authority to the City Vice -Mayor, Hon. Jay Jay Yambao, to Negotiate and Enter into Contract for Consultancy Services for Consultants in the Sanggunian Secretariat Tasked to Function in their Respective Areas of Concern.” Arnold Vicencio was elected City Vice -Mayor of Malabon. By virtue of this office, he also became the Presiding Officer of the SPM and, at the same time, the head of the Sanggunian Secretariat. Vicencio, representing the City Government of Malabon City, entered into Contracts for Consultancy Service s. After the signing of their respective contracts, the three consultants rendered consultancy services to the SPM. Thereafter, the three consultants were correspondingly paid for their services pursuant to the contracts therefor. However, an A udit Observation Memorandum (AOM) was issued disallowing the amount for being an improper disbursement. Aggrieved by the disallowance, Vicencio appealed it to the Adjudication and Settlement Board (ASB) of the Commission on Audit (COA) which subsequently denied it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Commission on Audit committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction when it affirmed ASB’s decision relative to the disallowance of disbursements concerning the services rendered by hired co nsultants for the Sangguniang
Panlungsod ng Malabon HELD:
Under Section 456 of R.A. 7160, or the Local Government Code, there is no inherent authority on the part of the city vice-mayor to enter into contracts on behalf of the local government unit, unlike that provided for the city mayor. Thus, the authority of t he vice-mayor to enter into contracts on behalf of the city was strictly circumscribed by the ordinance granting it. Ordinance No. 15-2003 specifically authorized Vice-Mayor Yambao to enter into contracts for consultancy services. As this is not a power or duty given under the law to the Office of the Vice-Mayor, Ordinance No. 15-2003 cannot be construed as a “continuing authority” for any person who enters the Office of the Vice-Mayor to enter into subsequent, albeit similar, contracts. The COA’s assailed Decision was made in faithful compliance with its mandate and in judicious exercise of its general audit power as conferred on it by the Constitution. The COA was merely fulfilling its mandate in observing the policy that government funds and property should be fully protected and
conserved; and that irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant expenditures or uses of such funds and property should be prevented. Thus, no grave abuse o f discretion may be imputed to the COA.
GOV. LUIS RAYMUND F. VILLAFUERTE, et al. v. HON. JESSE M. ROBREDO G.R. No. 195390, 10 December 2014, EN BANC, (Reyes, J.) A reading of MC No. 2010-138 shows that it is a mere reiteration of an existing provision in the LGC. It was plainly intended to remind LGUs to faithfully observe the directive stated in Section 287 of the LGC to utilize the 20% portion of the IRA for development projects. It was, at best, an advisory to LGUs to examine themselves if they have been complying with the law. Facts: In 1995, the Commission on Audit (COA) conducted an examination and audit on the manner the local government units utilized their Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the calendar years 1993-1994. The examination yielded an official report, showing that a substantial portion of the 20% development fund of some LGUs was not actually utilized for development projects but was diverted to expenses properly chargeable against the Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses (MOOE), in stark violation of Section 287 of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC). In 2010, Jesse Robredo, in his capacity as DILG Secretary, issued the assailed Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 201083, entitled “Full Disclosure of Local Budget and Finances, and Bids and Public Offerings,” which aims to promote good governance through enhanced transparency and accountability of LGUs. The MC requires the posting within 30 days from the end of each fiscal year in at least three (3) publicly accessible and conspicuous places in the local government unit a summary of all revenues collected and funds received including the appropriations and disbursements of such funds during the preceding fiscal year. The foregoing circular also states that noncompliance will be meted sanctions in accordance with pertinent laws, rules and regulations. On December 2, 2010, the Robredo issued another MC, reiterating that 20% component of the IRA shall be utilized for desirable social, economic and environmental outcomes essential to the attainment of the constitutional objective of a quality of life for all. It also enumerated a list for which the fund must not be utilized. Villafuerte, then Governor of Camarines Sur, joined by the Provincial Government of Camarines Sur, filed the instant petition for certiorari, seeking to nullify the assailed issuances of the respondent for being unconstitutional for violating the principles of local and fiscal autonomy enshrined in the Constitution and the LGC. ISSUE: Did the assailed memorandum circulars violate the principles of local and fiscal autonomy?
RULING: No, a reading of MC No. 2010-138 shows that it is a mere reiteration of an existing provision in the LGC. It was plainly intended to remind LGUs to faithfully observe the directive stated in Section 287 of the LGC to utilize the 20% portion of the IRA for development projects. It was, at best, an advisory to LGUs to examine themselves if they have been complying with the law. It must be recalled that the assailed circular was issued in response to the report of the COA that a substantial portion of the 20% development fund of some LGUs was not actually utilized for development projects but was diverted to expenses more properly categorized as MOOE, in violation of S ection 287 of the LGC.
Contrary to the Villafuerte, et al.’s posturing, however, the enumeration was not meant to restrict the discretion of the LGUs in the utilization of their funds. LGUs remain at liberty to map out their respective development plans solely on the basis of their own judgment and utilize their IRAs accordingly, with the only restriction that 20% thereof be expended for development projects. They may even spend their IRAs for some of the enumerated items should they partake of indirect costs of undertaking development projects. Villafuerte, et al. likewise misread the issuance by claiming that the provision of sanctions therein is a clear indication of the President’s interference in the fiscal autonomy of LGUs. Significantly, the issuance itself did not provide for sanctions. It did not particularly establish a new set of acts or omissions which are deemed violations and provide the corresponding penalties therefor. It simply stated a reminder to LGUs that there are existing rules to consider in the disbursement of the 20% development fund and that non-compliance therewith may render them liable to sanctions which are provided in the LGC and other applicable laws. Villafuerte, et al. claim that the requirement to post other documents in the mentioned issuances went beyond the letter and spirit of Section 352 of the LGC and R.A. No. 9184, otherwise known as the Government Procurement Reform Act, by requiring that budgets, expenditures, contracts and loans, and procurement plans of LGUs be publicly posted as well. Pertinently, Section 352 of the LGC reads that Local treasurers, accountants, budget officers, and other accountable officers shall, within thirty (30) days from the end of the fiscal year, post in at least three (3) publicly accessible and conspicuous places in the local government unit. R.A. No. 9184, on the o ther hand, requires the posting of the invitation to bid, notice of award, notice to proceed, and approved contract in the procuring entity’s premises, in newspapers of general circulation, and the website o f the procuring entity. In particular, the Constitution commands the strict adherence to full disclosure of information on all matters relating to official transactions and those involving public interest. Pertinently, Section 28, Article II and S ection 7, Article III of the Constitution.
Vivares et. Al. vs. St. Theresa College G.R. No. 148194
Facts: In January 2012, Angela Tan, a high school student at St. Theresa’s College (STC), uploaded on Facebook several pictures of her and her classmates (Nenita Daluz and Julienne Suzara) wearing only their undergarments. Thereafter, some of their classmates reported said photos to their teacher, Mylene Escudero. Escudero, through her students, viewed and downloaded said pictures. She showed the said pictur es to STC’s Discipline-in-Charge for appropriate action. Later, STC found Tan et al to have violated the student’s handbook and banned them from “marching” in their graduation ceremonies scheduled in March 2012. The issue went to court but despite a TRO (temporary restraining order) granted by the Cebu RTC enjoining the school from barring the students in the graduation ceremonies, STC still barred said students. Subsequently, Rhonda Vivares, mother of Nenita, and the other mothers filed a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data against the school. They argued, among others, that: 1. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at “Fr iends Only.” They, thus, have a reasonable expectation of privacy which must be respected. 2. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced without their consent. Escudero, however, violated their rights by saving digital copies of the photos and by subsequently showing them to STC’s officials. Thus, the Facebo ok accounts of the children were intruded upon; 3. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of information, data, and digital images happened at STC’s Computer Laboratory; They prayed that STC be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all soft and printed copies of the subject data and have such data be declared illegally obtained in violation of the children’s right to privacy. The Cebu RTC eventually denied the petition. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for writ of habeas data is proper.
HELD: Yes, it is proper but in this case, it will not prosper. Contrary to the arguments of STC, the Supreme Court ruled that: 1. The petition for writ of habeas data can be availed of even if this is not a case of extralegal killing or enforced disappearance; and 2. The writ of habeas data can be availed of against STC even if it is not an entity engaged in the business of “gathering, collecting, or storing data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party”. First, the Rule on Habeas Data does not state that it can be applied only in cases of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances. Second, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the
habeas data protection shall be available only against abuses of a person or entity engaged in the business of gathering, storing, and collecting of data. Right to Privacy on Social Media (Online Networking Sites) The Supreme Court ruled that if an online networking site (ONS) like Facebook has privacy tools, and the user makes use of such privacy tools, then he or she has a reasonable expectation of privacy (right to informational privacy , that is). Thus, such privacy must be respected and protected. In this case, however, there is no showing that the students concerned made use of such privacy tools. Evidence would show that that their post (status) on Facebook were published as “Public”. Facebook has the following settings to control as to who can view a user’s posts on his “wall” (profile page): (a) Public – the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo; (b) Friends of Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends and their friends can view the photo; (c) Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo; (d) Custom – the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of the Facebook user; and (e) Only Me – the digital image can be viewed only by the user. The default setting is “Public” and if a user wants to have some privacy, then he must choose any setting other than “Public”. If it is true that the students concerned did set the posts subject of this case so much so that only five people can see them (as they claim), then how come most of their classmates were able to view them. This fact was not refuted by them. In fact, it was their classmates who informed and showed their teacher, Escudero, of the said pictures. Therefore, it appears that Tan et al never use the privacy settings of Facebook hence, they have no reasonable expectation of privacy on the pictures of them scantily clad. STC did not violate the students’ right to privacy. The manner which the school gathered the pictures cannot be considered illegal. As it appears, it was the classmates of the students who showed the picture to their teacher and the latter, being the recipient of said pictures, merely delivered them to the proper school authority and it was for a legal purpose, that is, to discipline their students according to the standards of the school (to which the students and their parents agreed to in the first place because of the fact that they enrolled their children there).
WILLY TAN y CHUA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 148194: April 12, 2002 FACTS: Willy Tan was found guilty of bigamy, and then he applied for probation which was granted by the trial court but the release was withheld in view of the filing by the prosecution a motion for modification of penalty. He later filed a notice of appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not he is entitled to an appeal after he has applied for probation. HELD: In fine, petitioner had taken an appropriate legal step in filing a notice of appeal with the trial court. Ordinarily, the Court should have the case remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. The clear impingement upon petitioners basic right against double jeopardy, however, should here warrant the exercise of the prerogative by this Court to relax the stringent application of the rules on the matter. When the trial court increased the penalty on petitioner for his crime of bigamy after it had already pronounced judgment and on which basis he then, in fact, applied for probation, the previous verdict could only be deemed to have lapsed into finality. Section 7, Rule 120, of the Rules on Criminal Procedure that states Sec. 7. Modification of judgment. A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probationimplements a substantive provision of the Probation Law which enunciates that the mere filing of an application for probation forecloses the right to appeal. SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best: Provided , That no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment or conviction. Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only. An application for probation shall be filed with the trial court. The filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal. An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable. Such a waiver amounts to a voluntary compliance with the decision and writes finis to the jurisdiction of the trial court over the judgment. There is no principle better settled, or of more universal application, than that no court can reverse or annul, reconsider or amend, its own final decree or judgment. Any
attempt by the court to thereafter alter, amend or modify the same, except in respect to correct clerical errors, would be unwarranted.
