Yuchengco v Manila Manila Chronicle Chronicle November 25, 2009 ALFONSO T. YUCHENGCO vs. THE MANILA CHRONICLE PUBLISHING CORPORATION, ROBERTO COYIUTO, JR., NOEL CABRERA, GERRY ZARAGOZA, DONNA GATDULA, RODNEY P. DIOLA, RAUL VALINO and THELMA SAN JUAN CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: SUMMARY: Manila Chronicle, owned by respondent Coyuito and in which respondents are employees, were sued by Yuchengco in a civil action for damages for libelous publication, abuse of right and attorney’s fees and costs. RTC and CA ruled for Yuchengco and found respondents liable as all elements for the action were present including actual malice. However, the CA later reversed in a Resolution ruling that the articles published were qualifiedly privileged communication as they are fair commentaries on matters of public interest despite actual malice being present and therefore exempted for liability for damages. SC held that CA erred in ruling that qualifiedly privileged communications are automatically exempted from liability despite the finding of actual malice. RPC 354 only pertains to presumptions and as exceptions to such presumptions, qualifiedly privileged communications like fair commentaries can still hold a person liable if actual malice is proven as in the case at bar. Even if actual malice is proven, the subject articles cannot be considered as fair commentaries on matters of public interest as Yuchengco is not a public figure or official but a private individual. DOCTRINE: Despite being defined in the Revised Penal Code, Code, libel can also be instituted as a purely civil action, the cause of action for which is provided by Article by Article 33. 33. It adopts the elements of criminal libel and malice is an element in both. When malice in fact is proven, assertions and proofs that the libelous articles are qualifiedly privileged communications are futile, since being qualifiedly privileged communications merely prevents the presumption of malice from attaching in a defamatory imputation. If actual malice is proven, then the person can still be held liable under the Article. While the defamation of a large group does not give rise to a cause of action on the part of an individual, this is subject to exception when it can be shown that he is the target of the defamatory matter. In applying the rules to the language of an alleged libel, the court will disregard any subtle or ingenious explanation offered by the publisher on being called to account. The whole question being the effect the publication had upon the minds of the readers, readers, and they not having been assisted by the offered explanation in reading the article, it comes too late to have the effect of removing the sting, if any there be, from the word used in the publication." NOTE: In a later Resolution in 2011, SC removed Coyuito’s solidary liability under first cause of action because he was not impleaded as chairman of Manila Chronicle but he was still held liable under the 2 nd cause of action under abuse of rights. •
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FACTS: Plaintiff Yuchengco filed a complaint for damages against respondents for publishing a series of defamatory articles against him. Filed under 3separate causes of action: (1) for damages due to libelous publication against Neal H. Cruz, Ernesto o Tolentino, Noel Cabrera, Thelma San Juan, Gerry Zaragoza, Donna Gatdula, Raul Valino, Rodney P. Diola, all members of the editorial editorial staff and writers writers of The Manila Chronicle, Chronicle, and Chronicle Chronicle Publishing; Publishing; (2) for damages due to abuse of right against Robert Coyiuto, Jr. and Chronicle Publishing; and (3) for attorney’s fees and costs against all the respondents. Nov 10 and 12, 1993 issues (“Yuchengko joins forces with Kokoy” and “RCBC probed for violating CB rules” ) rules” ): He alleges that the Chronicle Publishing Corporation published in the Manila Chronicle a series of defamatory articles against him accusing him: To be a "Marcos "Marcos crony" crony" or a "Marcos-Romualdez crony” o when he has never been a Marcos crony nor had been a business partner of the Romualdezes or had personal dealings with them Yuchengco, testified that prior to his appointment as Ambassador to Japan, he was the chairman of various business organizations notably: Benguet Corp., PLDT Company, RCBC, Bank of America Savings Bank, House of Investments, Inc., Dole Philippines and Philippine Fuji Xerox Corporation. He was also the President of the Philippine Ambassadors; chairman or vice president of Bantayog ng Bayan; and chairman of AY Foundation, Inc. He was appointed Philippine Ambassador to People’s Republic of China after the EDSA Revolution. As a dummy for the Marcos and Romualdez clans in Benguet Corp as seen in the election of the 2 sons of Romualdez o which is untrue since his holdings in Benguet Corporation were legally acquired and the 2 sons of Benjamin Romualdez were elected during the shareholders’ meeting as directors of Benguet Corporation pursuant to a Court order Of immoral business practices by insinuatin insinuating g that the grant of interest interest free loan of P101 million million by RCBC to one o company, Piedras Petroleum Corporation, because he wanted to take control of the OMPC shares of Piedras (w/c are were payment for loan) in order to divert its resources to rescue the debt-ridden Benguet Corp in violation of the rule on loans to directors, officers, stockholders and related interests (DOSRI) when he was merely interested in being represented in the board so as to protect his interest as shareholder and he had no intention of taking over Oriental (which defendant Coyiuto owns) and that Benguet Corporation did not lose the amount as stated in the article although the Yuchengco family owns a substantial block of shares of RCBC, Sanwa Bank actually owns 25% and RCBC did not finance his fund but it extended a loan to Piedras Petroleum, a subsidiary of PCGG; Traders Royal Bank also granted a loan to PCGG but such was an independent transaction of RCBC. Intentionally causing the failure of Benguet Corp. Corp . and that if he ever assumed control of Oriental, it would suffer the o same fate as the former •
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when Benguet Corp. was already experiencing financial downturns caused by plummeting world prices of gold and unprofitable investments and liquidity problems, and that before he joined the corporation, it had already diversified into many other financial ventures Of being an unfair and uncaring employer when the employees of Grepalife staged a strike because of company’s o refusal to grant them better salaries and benefits when he had nothing to do with it. Of inducing RCBC to violate the provisions of the General Banking Act on DOSRI loans o when there is nothing irregular in the RCBC-Piedras transaction for the acquisition of shares of Oriental. Of inducing others to disobey lawful orders of the SEC o when the truth is that the officials of RCBC and Alcorn never defied any SEC order, and that if ever they did, he never induced them to do so. The derogatory tag of "corporate raider ," implying that he was seeking to profit for something he did not work for o when he acquired his stake in Oriental for adequate and valuable consideration at the time when no one was willing to bailout the government from its difficult and losing position Nov. 15, 1993 issue (RCBC called to SEC"; subtitled "Yuchengco Bank defies government order" ): He denied any knowledge of what transpired at the Trust Department of RCBC because as Chairman he was not involved in many of the bank’s transactions. Nov. 16, 1993 issue (“Alcorn, RCBC execs own guilt"): The article mentioned 2 officers from AMPC and RCBC who allegedly insinuated that he induced others to disobey the lawful orders of the SEC. He considers the attacks against him to be malicious considering that he does not see any connection between the labor strike at Grepalife with the case of Alcorn and RCBC. The article would like to show that he was the reason for the huge losses incurred by Benguet Corporation. Nov. 22, 1993 issue (“Bank runs and RCBC free loans"): The article accused him of inducing RCBC to violate the provisions of the General Banking Act on DOSRI loans. He denied giving any interest free loan, the fact that they gave a loan to PCGG does not mean that they gave a loan to Benedicto since the latter had already turned over the shares of Piedras to PCGG at that time. Nov. 23, 1993 issue (“RCBC case bugs Bangko Sentral"): The article mentioned that the issue is of national interest because of depositors’ money. He denied extending an interest free loan considering that he is not the only owner of RCBC and that these series of attacks against him and RCBC were intended to cause a "bank run". The article imputes that he was responsible for giving an interest free loan. Dec. 5, 1993 issue ("The Battle for Oriental"): It was insinuated that he was a corporate raider implying that he is seeking to profit from something he did not work for. He said the article was intended to humiliate and embarrass him since he really had no intention of taking over Oriental and the reason for the attack against his person was because he and Coyiuto, Jr. were both rivals in the insurance business and that the latter has always been envious of his position for having owned Malayan Insurance Company. (The Yuchengcos own the Malayan Group of Insurance Companies while the Coyiutos used to control Pioneer Insurance.) He does not consider himself a public figure and that he felt maligned by the references to him as a "Marcos crony". Zaragoza, Exec. VP of RCBC testified that the interest free loan allegedly granted to Piedras Petroleum Co. are false because: Piedras deal was a trust transaction which involved an advance in exchange for shares of stock; that plaintiff Yuchengco o did not have a personal interest in the Piedras deal Piedras shares were not transferred to Yuchengco’s name by virtue of the transaction o Defendants did not approach him or RCBC to check the veracity of the subject articles. o Under the MOA between RCBC and Piedras, should the latter fail to comply with its obligations under the MOA, it will pay o interest at the prevailing market interest rate from the date of advance until full payment; and that there was a complaint filed with the BSP against RCBC by Mr. Felipe Remollo questioning the Piedras deal. Jose Revilla, long-time friend of Yuchengco, having worked for Yuchengco for 32 years in the latter’s credit card company, and he does not believe the truth of the contents of the subject articles and that Yuchengco appeared distressed when he joked about the subject articles and other people approached him to ask whether the subject articles are true. Defendant In their Answer, the defendants deny liability claiming that: articles were not defamatory since they were composed and published in good faith and only after having o ascertained their contents. articles are privileged and/or constitute reasonable and balanced comments on matters of legitimate public interest o which cannot serve as basis for the finding of libel against them. they were acting within the bounds of constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech and of the press. o since plaintiff is a public figure , and assuming that the articles were indeed defamatory, they cannot be held liable for o damages since they were not impelled by actual malice in the composition thereof. they did not compose and/or publish said articles with the knowledge that they contained falsehoods, or with reckless o disregard on whether or not they contained falsehood. As to Coyiuto, one of the owners of Manila Chronicle, he claims that he had no participation in the publication of the subject articles nor consented or approved their publication and that he only saw the records of Exhibits "8" to "10" and "16" to "20" after the publication of Exhibits "A" to "G" (subject articles) Zaragosa, the Managing Editor of Manila Chronicle in charge of the national and political news, testified that: San Juan was the other Managing Editor in charge of the lifestyle section o A story conference is conducted everyday where the articles, including the pages where they will appear, are discussed o The editor-in-chief (Cruz), executive editor (Tolentino) and deputy editor (Cabrera) were the ones responsible for o the decisions of the story conference relative to the printing of the newspaper He was not involved in the writing and editing of the subject articles o
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The news printed was does not implicate him as they are classified as business news, the columns, mentioned are not discussed during story conferences and that which appeared in the "Money Section" did not pass thru him. On cross examination, he testified that except for the columns, the news he referred above as business news are o considered hard news and that he handled the hard news, while San Juan handled the soft news and that Valino was the business editor in charge of the business section. Gatdula, a correspondent for Manila Chronicle assigned to the SEC testified that: she had no participation in the writing or publication o she attended the hearing conducted by the SEC and interviewed the two lawyers of RCBC and SEC Chairman Rosario o Lopez regarding the Oriental Petroleum case Her name appears as a tag line because she only wrote part of the story and she did not write the entire article as some o of the statements therein were added by the editors and she did not discuss it with any of the editors. She does not have a copy of the original article which she wrote and she read it after it was published. She did not o compare her original story with it nor question the authority of the editor to edit her story and that she agreed to put her name thereon Cabrera, deputy editor, contends that: after having gone through the subject articles, he believes that the news stories and commentaries were fair and that o those who wrote the same followed the proper standards as regard the contents of the columns, the opinion of Mr. Raul Valino, as written in the said articles, were valid and based o on documentary facts the article of Ms. Gatdula was based on documents pertaining to the Oriental transaction, other documents, as well as o interviews at the time the subject articles were written, Yuchengco was a public figure, being a very prominent businessman with o vast interest in banks and other businesses during the year 1993, the word "crony" was more or less accepted to mean as a big businessman or close associate of o the late President Marcos, and its use in the column was meant only to supply the perspective as to the figure or subject involved in the news story, and there is thus no malice or derogatory intent when the same was used Valino, the Acting Business Manager and later Managing Editor and Business Editor-in-Chief of Manila Chronicle, testified that: after having consulted several dictionaries as to the meaning of the word "crony", he did not come across a definition o describing the word to mean someone who is a recipient of any undeserving or special favor from anyone, that it merely refers to someone who is a friend or a special friend no mention in the subject article that Yuchengco was being accused of fronting for the late President Marcos OR having o acted as a front to facilitate the acquisition of a prohibited interest in a private corporation by a public official while occupying a public office OR being directly or indirectly involved in unsound business practices whatever imputation of ill-will was only in plaintiff’s mind o he was merely reporting on what transpired at the picket line and what the striking employees answered to him o he did not state in his columns that Yuchengco violated banking laws o RTC: In favor of Yuchengco ordering Chronicle Publishing, Neil H. Cruz, Ernesto Tolentino, Noel Cabrera, Thelma San Juan, Gerry Zaragoza, Donna o Gatdula, Raul Valino and Rodney Diola to pay plaintiff Yuchengco, jointly and severally: P10M as moral and P10M as exemplary damages; ordering Roberto Coyiuto, Jr. and Chronicle Publishing to pay Yuchengco, jointly and severally: P5M as moral and P5M o as exemplary damages ordering all defendants to pay Yuchengco, jointly and severally: P1M as attorney’s fee and legal costs o The respondents appealed to the CA. CA Decision: AFFIRMED RTC. Respondents filed a MR. CA Resolution: Reversed itself in an Amended Decision; Appeal GRANTED; Complaint for Damages DISMISSED Respondents were not liable for damages. o However, it did not modify its earlier ruling affirming the defamatory character of the imputations in the subject articles. o CA merely reversed itself on account of the allegedly privileged nature of the articles, which goes into the element of o malice. o
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ISSUES: Whether all the elements in the civil action for damages under Article 33 are present? (YES) 1) Whether defamatory imputation is present? (YES) 2) Whether publication is present? (YES) 3) Whether malice is present? (YES) a) Whether actual malice is not proven and thus respondents cannot be held liable? (NO) b) Whether the publication falls under qualifiedly privileged communication as fair commentary as decided in Borjal v CA and thus excludes respondents from liability? (NO) c) Whether Yuchengco is a public official or public figure and thus there is no malice in the articles’ publication? (NO) 4) Whether identification of person defamed is present? (YES) RATIO: Libel in RPC 353
Art. 353. Definition of Libel . – A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. FOUR ELEMENTS (People v. Monton): (a) defamatory imputation tending to cause dishonor, discredit or contempt; o (b) malice, either in law or in fact; o (c) publication; and o (d) identifiability of the person defamed. o Libel as a Civil Action Despite being defined in the RPC, libel can also be instituted as a purely civil action, the cause of action for which is provided by Article 33 of the Civil Code. Article 33. In cases of defamation , fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and o distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. Elements of a Civil Action for Damages The above elements of libel (criminal libel) were adopted as well in a purely civil action for damages. (GMA Network, Inc. v. Bustos) An award of damages under the premises PRESUPPOSES the commission of an act amounting to defamatory imputation o or libel, which, in turn, presupposes malice. Libel is the public and malicious imputation to another of a discreditable act or condition tending to cause the dishonor, o discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person. Liability for libel attaches present the following elements: (a) an allegation or imputation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; o (b) publication of the imputation; o (c) identity of the person defamed; and o (d) existence of malice. o •
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1) DEFAMATORY IMPUTATION: PRESENT. Subject articles contain defamatory imputations. All of the following imputations: (1) the labeling of Yuchengco as a Marcos crony, who took advantage of his r elationship with the former President to gain unwarranted benefits; (2) the insinuations that Yuchengco induced others to disobey the lawful orders of SEC; (3) the portrayal of Yuchengco as an unfair and uncaring employer due to the strike staged by the employees of Grepalife; (4) the accusation that he induced RCBC to violate the provisions of the General Banking Act on DOSRI loans; and (5) the tagging of Yuchengco as a "corporate raider" seeking to profit from something he did not work for, all exposed Yuchengco to public contempt and ridicule, for they imputed to him a condition that was dishonorable. Defamatory Imputation Defamation, which includes libel and slander, means the offense of injuring a person's character, fame or reputation through false and malicious statements. It is that which tends to injure reputation or to diminish esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence in the plaintiff, or to excite derogatory feelings or opinions about the plaintiff. It is the publication of anything that is injurious to the good name or reputation of another or tends to bring him into disrepute. (MVRS Publications, Inc., v. Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines) In determining whether certain utterances are defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their entirety and taken in their plain, natural and ordinary meaning, as they would naturally be understood by persons hearing (or reading, as in libel) them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in another sense. (Lacsa v. IAC) •
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Determining Defamatory Character of Words Used In determining the defamatory character of words used, the explanation of the respondent should not prevail over what the utterances (or writing) convey to an ordinary listener (or reader). (Madrona, Sr. v. Rosal) For the purpose of determining the meaning of any publication alleged to be libelous "that construction must be adopted which will give to the matter such a meaning as is natural and obvious in t he plain and ordinary sense in which the public would naturally understand what was uttered. The published matter alleged to be libelous must be construed as a whole. In applying these rules to the language of an alleged libel, the court will disregard any subtle or ingenious explanation offered by the publisher on being called to account. The whole question being the effect the publication had upon the minds of the readers, and they not having been assisted by the offered explanation in reading the article, it comes too late to have the effect of removing the sting, if any there be, from the word used in the publication." (US v. Sotto) RESPONDENTS: Argue that crony does not constitute defamatory imputation as it also means friend (in the dictionary). SC: We are not swayed by the explanations of Cabrera and Valino. "Marcos crony" is derogatory. Judicial notice of the fact that the said phrase, as understood in Philippine context, refers to an individual who was the o recipient of special and/or undeserved favors from the late President Marcos due to a special closeness to the latter. Supported by one of the subject articles in which Jaime Ongpin, an alleged crony, committed suicide after being accused o of being a Marcos-Romualdez crony. This statement highlights the disgrace respondents wanted to associate with the term "crony," which was used to describe Yuchengco in the very same article. Even a cursory reading of the subject articles would show the intention of the writers to injure the reputation, credit and virtue of Yuchengco and expose him to public hatred, discredit, contempt and ridicule. •
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The indirect manner in which the articles attributed the insults to Yuchengco (e.g., "the money involved came from depositors, and not from Yuchengco") does not lessen the culpability of the writers and publishers thereof, but instead makes the defamatory imputations even more effective. Words calculated to induce suspicion are sometimes more effective to destroy reputation than false charges directly made. Ironical and metaphorical language is a favored vehicle for slander . (US v. O'Connell)
2) PUBLICATION PRESENT: Of these 4 elements, the most apparent in the case at bar would be the publication of the alleged imputation. Libel is published not only when it is widely circulated, but also when it is made known or brought to the attention or notice of another person other than its author and the offended party. (United States v. Ubiñana). The circulation of an allegedly libelous matter in a newspaper is certainly sufficient publication. 3) MALICE PRESENT. Publication of the subject articles was attended by actual malice. There is preponderance of evidence showing that there exists malice in fact in the writing and publication of the subject libelous articles. Definition of Malice Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed, and implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. (US v. Cañete) It is present when it is shown that the author of the libelous remarks made such remarks with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity thereof. (Vasquez v. CA) •
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2 Types of Malice There are two types of malice – malice in law and malice in fact. (Lawson v. Hicks) Malice in law is a presumption of law. It dispenses with the proof of malice when words that raise the presumption are shown to have been uttered. It is also known as constructive malice, legal malice, or implied malice. (Reyes, 2007 citing US jurisprudence) On the other hand, malice in fact is a positive desire and intention to annoy and injure. It may denote that the defendant was actuated by ill will or personal spite. It is also called express malice, actual malice, real malice, true malice, or particular malice. (Reyes, 2007 citing US jurisprudence) • •
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Malice in Law In this jurisdiction, malice in law is provided in RPC 354, which also enumerates exceptions thereto. GENERAL RULE: Art. 354. Requirement of publicity . - Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, EXCEPT in the following cases: 1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and o 2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other o official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions. There is, thus, a presumption of malice in the case of every defamatory imputation, where there is no showing of a good intention or justifiable motive for making such imputation. The exceptions provided in Article 354 are also known as qualifiedly privileged communications. • •
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No Presumption of Malice in Qualifiedly PC But Still Liable if Malice in Fact is Proven The enumeration under said article is, however, not an exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged communications since fair commentaries on matters of public interest are likewise privileged. (Borjal v. CA) They are known as qualifiedly privileged communications, since they are merely exceptions to the general rule requiring proof of actual malice in order that a defamatory imputation may be held actionable. In other words, defamatory imputations written or uttered during any of the three classes of qualifiedly privileged communications enumerated may still be considered actionable if actual malice is proven: (1) a private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; o (2) a fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official o proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions; and (3) fair commentaries on matters of public interest. o •
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Qualifiedly Privileged Communications vs. Absolutely Privileged Communications This is in contrast with absolutely privileged communications, wherein the imputations are not actionable, EVEN if attended by actual malice. A communication is said to be absolutely privileged when it is not actionable, even if its author has acted in bad faith. o This class includes statements made by members of Congress in the discharge of their functions as such, official o communications made by public officers in the performance of their duties, and allegations or statements made by the parties or their counsel in their pleadings or motions or during the hearing of judicial proceedings, as well as the answers given by witnesses in reply to questions propounded to them, in the course of said proceedings, PROVIDED that said allegations or statements are relevant to the issues, and the answers are responsive or pertinent to the questions propounded to said witnesses. Upon the other hand, conditionally or qualifiedly privileged communications are those which, although containing defamatory imputations, would not be actionable unless made with malice or bad faith. (Orfanel v. People) •
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a) Actual malice was proven in the case at bar. CA erred when it disregarded the findings of RTC and its own finding on actual malice. As discussed above, whereas there is an absolute bar to an action in the case of absolutely privileged communication, the same is not true with respect to qualifiedly privileged communication, wherein the law merely raises a prima facie presumption in favor of the occasion. In the former, the freedom from liability is absolute, regardless of the existence of actual malice, as contrasted with the freedom in the latter, where it is conditioned on the want or absence of actual malice. Conditionally or qualifiedly privileged communications are actionable when made with actual malice. (Orfanel v. People) When malice in fact is proven, assertions and proofs that the libelous articles are qualifiedly privileged communications are futile, since being qualifiedly privileged communications merely prevents the presumption of malice from attaching to a defamatory imputation. •
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Case At Bar Animated by a desire to inflict unjustifiable harm on his reputation as shown by the timing and frequency of the publication of the defamatory articles Failed to show that they had any good intention and justifiable motive for composing and publishing the vicious and o malicious accusations against Yuchengco. Published or caused the publication of the subject defamatory articles with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity thereof. No proof that the contents of the subject articles are true or that the respondents exercised a reasonable degree of care o before publishing the same. Failed to present evidence showing that they verified the truth of any of the subject articles, especially in light of the o categorical denial by Yuchengcof the accusations made against him. Did not exercise reasonable degree of care or good faith efforts to arrive at the truth before publishing the subject defamatory articles. Did not present any competent evidence to establish the truth of their allegations against Yuchengco. o No showing that they made any attempt to talk to Yuchengco to verify the statements contained in the defamatory articles, o especially considering the gravity of the accusations made against Yuchengco. Respondents should have exercised efforts to talk to Yuchengco to clarify the issues and get his side. o Their failure to verify the truth of the information from Yuchengco himself is in itself an evidence of their lack of o bona fide efforts to verify the accuracy of her information. The incessant publication of the defamatory articles attacking the honor and reputation of Yuchengco is also proof of their malicious scheme to malign and defame the name, honor and reputation of Yuchengco. In a span of 1 month, they wrote and published and/or caused the publication of 7 libelous articles against o Yuchengcoattacking his honor and reputation as a distinguished businessman, philanthropist, his political inclination, and as an employer in his insurance company. The presence of malice is made more evident by their baseless and uncalled for attack on the person of Yuchengcoas an employer. They failed to render an unbiased and fair report as to the real cause of the strike except to lay the blame to Yuchengco, o without stating, much less describing, his participation thereon, knowing fully well that Grepalife is an entity distinct from the plaintiff. In other words, the labor policies implemented by Grepalife as regards its employees are obviously not that of Yuchengco. Such baseless and malicious accusation of respondents on Yuchengco only proves the intention of the respondents in publishing the defamatory articles was not to present an unbiased report on current issues but to launch a personal attack on the very person of Yuchengco Even the timing of the publication of these subject articles is highly suspicious inasmuch as the subject libelous o articles came out in the Manila Chronicle, a newspaper owned and under the control of Coyiuto, around November to December of 1993, a couple of months prior to the January stockholders meeting of Oriental Corporation. Publication of the subject defamatory articles defaming the good name and reputation of Yuchengco is but a part of a o grand scheme to create a negative image of Yuchengco so as to negatively affect Yuchengco’s credibility to the public, more particularly, to the then stockholders of Oriental Corporation. Subject articles did not only portray Yuchengco in a bad light. Coyiuto, a known rival of Yuchengco, was portrayed as the o underdog, the "David" and Yuchengco as the "Goliath" in their battle for control over Oriental Corporation. In In re: Emil P. Jurado: Categorical denials of the truth of allegations in a publication place the burden upon the party publishing it, either of proving the truth of the imputations or of showing that the same was an honest mistake or error committed despite good efforts to arrive at the truth. There is actual malice when there is either (1) knowledge of the publication’s falsity; or (2) reckless disregard of whether the contents of the publication were false or not. (Villanueva v. PDI) Failure to even get the side of Yuchengco in the published articles clearly constituted reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of said articles. •
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b) Even if we assume for the sake of argument that actual malice was not proven in the case at bar, the subject articles were still not fair commentaries on matters of public interest which would make it to fall within the scope of the 3rd type of qualifiedly privileged communications. Fair Commentaries
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Philippine Journalists, Inc. v. Theonen adopted the pronouncement in Gertz v. Robert Welsch, Inc.: In order to be considered as fair commentaries on matters of public interest, the individual to whom the defamatory articles were imputed should either be a public officer or a public figure. Borjal v. CA: "The enumeration under Art. 354 is not an exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged communications since fair commentaries on matters of public interest are likewise privileged. DOCTRINE OF FAIR COMMENTARIES: Means "that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition."
c) Yuchengco is a private individual, and not a public official or public figure. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.: A newspaper or broadcaster publishing defamatory falsehoods about an individual who is neither a public official nor a public figure may not claim a constitutional privilege against liability, for injury inflicted, even if the falsehood arose in a discussion of public interest. CA Resolution: Yuchengco was a public official or public figure, who "must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts." Yuchengco was, at the time of the Amended Decision, appointed as a Presidential Adviser on Foreign Affairs with Cabinet rank, and proceeded to enumerate the public positions held by Yuchengco through the years. SC: An examination of the subject articles reveals that the allegations therein pertain to Yuchengco’s private business endeavors and do not refer to his duties, functions and responsibilities as a Philippine Ambassador to China and Japan, or to any of the other public positions he occupied. •
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Public Official A topic or story should not be considered a matter of public interest by the mere fact that the person involved is a public officer, unless the said topic or story relates to his functions as such. Assuming a public office is not tantamount to completely abdicating one’s right to privacy. Therefore, for the purpose of determining whether or not a topic is a matter of public interest, Yuchengco cannot be considered a public officer. •
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Public Figure Neither is Yuchengco a public figure. Philippine Journalists, Inc. v. Theonen adopted the pronouncement in Gertz v. Robert Welsch More commonly, those classed as public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public o controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved. In either event, they invite attention and comment. Third, this would impose an additional difficulty on trial court judges to decide which publications address issues of o "general interest" and which do not. Even if the foregoing generalities do not obtain in every instance, the communications media are entitled to act on the assumption that public officials and public figures have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood concerning them. No such assumption is justified with respect to a private individual. He has not accepted public office or assumed o an "influential role in ordering society." (Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts) He has relinquished no part of his interest in the protection of his own good name, and consequently he has a more o compelling call on the courts for redress of injury inflicted by defamatory falsehood. Thus, private individuals are not only more vulnerable to injury than public officials and public figures; they are also more o deserving of recovery. It was not shown that Yuchengco had voluntarily thrust himself to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved. He cannot, therefore, be considered a public figure. Since Yuchengco, the person defamed in the subject articles, is neither as public officer nor a public figure, said articles cannot be considered as qualifiedly privileged communications even if they deal with matters of public concern. • •
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4) Yuchengco was clearly identified as the libeled party in the subject defamatory imputations. All but one of the subject articles explicitly mention the name of Yuchengco and that lone article even chided the owners of RCBC, who include Yuchengco. Identification Defamatory words must refer to an ascertained or ascertainable person, and that person must be the plaintiff. Statements are not libelous unless they refer to an ascertained or ascertainable person. (Corpus v. Cuaderno) However, the obnoxious writing need not mention the libeled party by name. It is sufficient if it is shown that the offended party is the person meant or alluded to. The lone article, which does not mention Yuchengco at all, "Bank runs & RCBC free loans," nevertheless chided the owners of RCBC (“liberal with depositors’ money). Identifying Yuchengco in said article by name was, however, not necessary, since the other subject articles, published a few days before and after this one, had already referred to Yuchengco as the owner of RCBC, sometimes explicitly and sometimes implicitly. While the defamation of a large group does not give rise to a cause of action on the part of an individual, this is subject to exception when it can be shown that he is the target of the defamatory matter. •
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DISPOSITIVE: Petition PARTIALLY GRANTED. RTC Decision REINSTATED, but shall be MODIFIED as to damages which the court deemed excessive.
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Ordering defendants to pay: P2M as moral damages and P500K as exemplary damages Ordering defendants Roberto Coyuito, Jr. and Chronicle Publishing to pay Yuchengco, P25 M as moral damages and P10M as exemplary damages Ordering all defendants to pay Yuchengco, P1M as attorney’s fee and legal costs.
