[G.R. No. 113216. September 5, 1997]
espondents
RHODOR RHO DORA A M. LEDE LEDESMA SMA,, petitioner, vs. CO COR R! ! O" A# A##E #EAL ALS S $% $%& & HO HON. N. MA'(M(ANO C. ASNC(ON, )% *)+ $p$)t- $+ #re+)&)% /0&e o R!C, 0eo% C)t-, respondents respondents.. DEC(S(ON
Dr. Juan F. Torres, Jr., &!ief, uclear "edicine Section
Dr. )restes '. "on%on, Staff &onsultant Dear Dr. &abral,
#ANGAN(4AN, J. J.
When confronted with a motion to withdraw an information on the ground of lack of probable cause based on a resolution of the secretary of justice, the bounden duty of the trial court is to make an independent assessment of the merits of such motion. Having acquired jurisdiction over the case, the trial court is not bound by such resolution but is required to evaluate it before proceeding proceeding further with the trial. While the secretary’s secretary’s ruling is persuasive, persuasive, it is not binding on courts. courts. A trial court, however, commits commits reversible reversible error or even grave abuse of discretion discretion if it refusesneglects to evaluate such recommendation and simply insists on proceeding with the trial on the mere prete!t of having already acquired jurisdiction over the criminal action. "his principle is e!plained in this #ecision resolving a petition for review on certiorari of of the #ecision of the 'ourt of Appeals, Appeals, promulgated on )eptember %*, %++ in 'A-./. )0 1o. 23( which which in effect effect affirmed affirmed an order order of the /egional /egional "rial "rial 'ourt of 4ue5on 4ue5on 'ity denying denying the prosecution’s withdrawal of a criminal information against petitioner. $%&
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!*e A%tee&e%t "$t+ 6rom the pleadings submitted in this case, the undisputed facts are as follows7
Sometime in April 1992, a complaint for libel was filed by Dr. Juan F. Torres, Jr. against Dr. !odora ". #edesma, petitioner !erein, before t!e $ue%on &it y 'rosecutor(s )ffice, doc*eted as +.S. o. 92-/00A. 'etitioner filed !er counter-affidait to t!e complaint.
T!is is to demand t!e return of all professional fees due me as a consultant in uclear "edicine, t!is &enter, since January 01, 199 until my resi gnation effectie January 01, 1991, amounting to at least '155,555.55 for t!e year 1995 alone. ecords in t!e uclear "edicine Section will s!ow t!at from January 199 to January 1991, a total of 2,05 patients were seen. )f t!ese, + !ad officially superised, processed, and interpreted approBimately a total of 1,1 cases as against approBimately 3/ and ;0 cases done by Dr. "on%on and Dr. Torres respectiely. >ntil my resignation + !ad receied a mont!ly s!are of professional fees aeraging '1,113.95@mont! '1,113.95@mont! supposedly representing 25C of t!e total mont!ly professional fees. T!e rest were diided eually between Dr. "on%on and Dr. Torres. T!ere was neer any agreement between us t!ree consultants consultants t!at t!is s!ould be t!e arrangement arrangement and + am certain t!at t!is was not wit! your approal. T!e burden of unfairness would !ae been lesser if t!ere was an eual distribution of labor and t!e sc!edule sc!edule of duties were strictly followed. As it was, t!e sc!edule of duties submitted mont!ly to t!e office of t!e Asst. Director for "edical Serices was simply a dummy to comply wit! administratie reuirements rat!er t!an a guideline for strict compliance. 4ot! consultants !ae complete daily time records een if t!ey did not come regularly. Dr. Torres Torres came for an !our eery wee*, Dr. "on%on came sporadically during t!e wee* w!ile + was l eft wit! eeryt!ing from training t!e residents and superising t!e Tec!s to processing and interpreting t!e results on a regular basis. + !ad a part time appointment appointment ?ust li*e Dr. "on%on and Dr. Torres.
Finding sufficient legal and factual basis,( t!e $ue%on &ity 'rosecutor(s )ffice filed on July 3, 1992 an +nformation for libel against petitioner wit! t!e egional Trial &ourt of $ue%on &ity, 4ranc! 15/. T!e +nformation filed by Assistant &ity 'rosecutor Augustine A. 8estil reads
+n t!e interest of fairness and to set a precedent for t!e protection of future '=& uclear "edicine Alumni + am calling your attention to t !e unfair and in!uman conditions + went t!roug! as a &onsultant in t!at Section. + trust t!at your sense of professionalism will put a stop to t!is corruption.
:T!at on or about t!e 2;t! day of June 1991, in $ue%on &it y, "etro "anila, '!ilippines, t!e said accused, acting wit! malice, did, t!en and t!ere, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously send a letter addressed to Dr.
A F. T)
+ suggest t!at a committee be formed to ma*e an audit of t!e distribution of professional fees in t!is Section. At t!is point, let me stress t!at since professional fees ary according to t!e type of procedure done and since t!ere was no euity of labor labor between us + am not settling for an an eual percentage s!are. + demand t!at + be indemnified of of all professional fees due me on on a case to case basis.
2;June 1991
#et me ma*e clear my intention of pursuing t!is matter legally s!ould t!ere be no faorable action in my be!alf. #et me state at t!is point3 t!at t!e actions of Dr. Torres and Dr. "on%on "on%on are bot! unprofessional and unbecoming unbecoming and are clearly iolating t!e code of et!ics of t!e medical profession and t!e '!ilippine &iil Serice ules and egulations related related to graft and corruption.
607
6/7
Dr.
T!an* you.( Sub?ect eturn of all professional fees due Dr. !odora ". ". #edesma, uclear "edicine Specialist@&onsultant, '!ilippine =eart &enter, from January 01, 199 to January 01, 1991.
and ot!er words of similar import, w!en in trut! and in fact, as t!e accused ery well *new, t!e same are entirely false and untrue but were publicly made for no ot!er purpose t!an to eBpose
said D. J>A F. T)
t!is )ffice. +n t!e issuance of its order, t!e court recogni%es t!at t!e Secretary of Justice !as t!e power and aut!ority to reiew t!e resolutions of prosecutors w!o are under !is control and superision.
A petition for review of the resolution of Assistant 'ity 0rosecutor 8estil was filed by petitioner before the #epartment of 9ustice pursuant to 0.#. 1o. :: as amended by 0.#. 1o. +%%. "he #epartment of 9ustice gave due course to the petition and directed the 4ue5on 'ity prosecutor to move for deferment of further proceedings and to elevate the entire records of the case. Accordingly, a <=otion to #efer Arraignment> dated )eptember :, %++( was filed by 0rosecutor "irso =. avero before the court a quo. @n )eptember +, %++(, the trial court granted the motion and deferred petitioner’s arraignment until the final termination of the petition for review.
+n iew of t!e foregoing, t!e appealed resolutions are !ereby reersed. Hou are directed to wit!draw t!e +nformations w!ic! you filed in &ourt. +nform t!is )ffice of t!e action ta*en wit!in ten 15G days from receipt !ereof.(
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Without the consent or approval of the trial prosecutor, private complainant, through counsel, filed a =otion to ift the @rder dated )eptember +, %++( and to )et the 'ase for Arraignment"rial .
Bn obedience to the above directive, 4ue5on 'ity "rial 0rosecutor "irso =. avero filed a =otion to Withdraw Bnformation dated 6ebruary %:,%++, attaching thereto the resolution of )ecretary #rilon. "he trial judge denied this motion in his @rder dated 6ebruary ((, %++, as follows7 $%%&
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@n 9anuary 3, %++, the trial court issued an @rder setting aside its earlier @rder of )eptember +, %++( and scheduling petitioner’s arraignment on 9anuary %3, %++ at two o’clock in the afternoon. $+&
Bn a resolution dated 9anuary (:, %++, then 9ustice )ecretary 6ranklin =. #rilon reversed the 4ue5on 'ity investigating prosecutor. 0ertinent portions of #rilon’s ruling read7
T!e motion of t!e trial prosecutor to wit!draw t!e information in t!e aboe-entitled case is denied. +nstead, t!e trial prosecutor of t!is court is !ereby directed to prosecute t!e case following t!e guidelines and doctrine laid down b y t!e Supreme &ourt in t!e case of &respo s. "ogul, 11 S&A /32.(
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0etitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial judge in the @rder dated =arch ;, %++, as follows7 $%&
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:From t!e circumstances obtaining, t!e sub?ect letter was written to bring to t!e attention of t!e Director of t!e '!ilippine =eart & enter for Asia and ot!er responsible aut!orities t!e un?ust and unfair treatment t!at Dr. #edesma was getting from complainants. Since complainants and respondent are goernment employees, and t!e sub?ect letter is a complaint to !ig!er aut!orities of t!e '=&A on a sub?ect matter in w!ic! respondent !as an interest and in reference to w!ic! s!e !as a duty to uestion t!e same is definitely priileged >S s. 4ustos, 0; '!il. 101G. "oreoer, in Ang s. &astro, 103 S&A /, t!e Supreme &ourt, citing Santiago s. &alo, / '!il. 922, ruled t!at A communication made in good fait! upon any sub?ect matter in w!ic! t!e party ma*ing t!e communication !as an interest or concerning w!ic! !e !as a duty is priileged... alt!oug! it contains incriminatory or derogatory matter w!ic!, wit!out t!e priilege, would be libelous and actionable. T!e follow-up letter sent by respondent to t!e director of t!e '=&A, is a direct eidence of respondent(s rig!teous disposition of following t!e rule of law and is a clear indication t!at !er purpose was to see* relief from t!e proper !ig!er aut!ority w!o is t!e Director of '=&A.
:Finding no cogent reason to ?ustify t!e reconsideration of t!e ruling of t!is &ourt dated February 22, 1990, t!e "otion for econsideration dated "arc! 1, 1990 filed by t!e accused t!roug! counsel is !ereby denied.E Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the )upreme 'ourt. Bn a /esolution dated =arch %, %++, this 'ourt referred the case to the 'ourt of Appeals for proper determination and disposition pursuant to )ection +, paragraph % of C.0. %(+. $%;&
/espondent 'ourt dismissed the petition holding that it had no jurisdiction to overturn the doctrine laid down in Crespo vs. Mogul -- once a complaint or information has been filed in court, any disposition of the case, i.e., dismissal, conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests on the sound discretion of the trial court. $%?&
Hence, this recourse to this 'ourt. !*e (++0e+
T!e same interpretation s!ould be accorded t!e ciil and administratie complaints w!ic! respondent filed against complainants. T!ey are mere manifestations of !er earnest desire to pursue proper relief for t!e alleged in?ustice s!e got from complainants. +f s!e was motiated by malice and ill-will in sending t!e sub?ect communication to t!e Director of t!e '=&A, s!e would not !ae sent t!e second letter and filed t!e administratie and ciil cases against complainants. "oreoer, it is unbelieable t!at it too* complainants one year to reali%e t!at t!e uestioned letter sub?ected t!em to public and malicious imputation of a ice or omission. +t is beyond t!e ordinary course of !uman conduct for complainants to start feeling t!e effects of t!e alleged libelous letter - t!at of eBperiencing sleepless nig!ts, wounded feelings, serious anBiety, moral s!oc* and besmirc!ed reputation - one year after t!ey read t!e communication in uestion. T!e claim t!at t!e case of &respo s. "ogul, 11 S&A /32 is applicable to t!e instant case is unfounded. +n t!e first place, t!e instant cases are not being reinestigated. +t is t!e resolutions of t!e inestigating prosecutor t!at are under reiew. Furt!er, t!e record s!ows t!at t!e court !as issued an order suspending t!e proceedings pending t!e resolutions of t!e petitions for reiew by
6or une!plained reasons, petitioner failed to make an assignment of errors against the appellate court. Her counsel merely repeated the alleged errors of the trial court7 $%:&
:+. T!e )rders, dated February 22, 1990 and "arc! , 1990, of respondent Judge Asuncion relied solely on t!e &respo s. "ogul( 11 S&A /32G decision. +t is respectfully submitted t!at said case is not applicable because 1. +t infringes on t!e constitutional separation of powers between t!e eBecutie and ?udicial branc!es of t!e goernmentI 2. +t constitutes or it may lead to misuse or misapplication of ?udicial power( as defined in t!e &onstitutionI
0. +t goes against t!e constitutional proscription t!at rules of procedure s!ould not diminis! substantie rig!tsI /.
+t goes against t!e principle of non-delegation of powersI
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+t sets aside or disregards substantie and procedural rulesI
3.
+t depries a person of !is constitutional rig!t to procedural due processI
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+ts application may constitute or lead to denial of eual protection of lawsI
. +t depries t!e secretary of ?ustice or t!e president of t!e power to control or reiew t!e acts of a subordinate officialI 9. +t will lead to, encourage, abet or promote abuse or een corruption among t!e ran*s of inestigating fiscalsI 15.
Cefore discussing the substance of this case, the 'ourt will preliminarily address a procedural matter. 0rior to the effectivity of the %++: /ules of 'ivil 0rocedure on 9uly %, %++:, )ection ( of /ule *;, which governed appeals from the 'ourt of Appeals to the )upreme 'ourt, provided7
:S<&. 2. Contents of petition. KT!e petition s!all contain a concise statement of B B B t!e assignment of errors made in t!e court below B B B.E A petition for review on certiorari under /ule *; requires a concise statement of the errors committed by the 'ourt of Appeals, not of the trial court. 6or failure to follow this /ule, the petition could have been dismissed by this 'ourt motu proprio, considering that under )ection * of the same /ule, We take this occasion to stress the need for precision and clarity in the assignment of errors. /eview under this rule is unlike an appeal in a criminal case where the death penalty, reclusión perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed and where the whole case is opened for review. Ender /ule *;, only the issues raised therein by the petitioner will be passed upon by the 'ourt, such that an erroneous specification of the issues may cause the dismissal of the petition. We stressed this in 'ircular 1o. (-+2, entitled <uidelines to be @bserved in Appeals to the 'ourt of Appeals and to the )upreme 'ourt,> as follows7
+t does not subsere t!e purposes of a preliminary inestigation because :/.
15.aG +t sub?ects a person to t!e burdens of an unnecessary trial, specially in cases w!ere t!e inestigating fiscal recommends no bail for t!e accusedI 15.bG +t sub?ects t!e goernment, bot! t!e eBecutie and t!e ?udiciary, to unnecessary time and eBpenses attendant to an unnecessary trialI 15.cG 11. ++.
+t contributes to t!e clogging of ?udicial doc*etsI and +t !as no statutory or procedural basis or precedent. )n t!e assumption t!at &respo s. "ogul( is applicable, it is submitted t!at -
1. espondent Judge Asuncion committed grae abuse of discretion, amounting to lac* of ?urisdiction, w!en !e denied t!e "otion to it!draw +nformation since !e !ad already deferred to, if not recogni%ed, t!e aut!ority of t!e Secretary of JusticeI and 2. T!e facts in &respo s. "ogul( are different from t!e instant case. =ence, respondent Judge Asuncion committed grae abuse of discretion, amounting to lac* of ?urisdiction, w!en !e relied solely on said case in denying t!e "otion to it!draw +nformation.E Bn sum, the main issue in this petition is7 #id /espondent 'ourt commit any reversible error in affirming the trial court’s denial of the prosecution’s =otion to Withdraw BnformationD
Erroneous Appeals. B B B B
eG Duty of counsel.K+t is t!erefore incumbent upon eery attorney w!o would see* reiew of a ?udgment or order promulgated against !is client to ma*e sure of t!e nature of t!e errors !e proposes to assign, w!et!er t!ese be of fact or of lawI t!en upon suc! basis to ascertain carefully w!ic! &ourt !as appellate ?urisdictionI and finall y, to follow scrupulously t!e reuisites for appeal prescribed by law, eer aware t!at any error or imprecision in compliance may well be fatal to !is client(s cause. F) ST+&T &)"'#+A&<.E Ce that as it may, the 'ourt F noting the importance of the substantial matters raised F decided to overlook petitioner’s lapse and granted due course to the petition per /esolution dated 9uly %;, %++?, with a warning that henceforth petitions which fail to specify an assignment of errors of the proper lower court may be denied due course motu proprio by this 'ourt. Determ)%$t)o% o #rob$be C$0+e (+ $% E8e0t)e "0%t)o% "he determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation is judicially recogni5ed as an e!ecutive function and is made by the prosecutor. "he primary objective of a preliminary investigation is to free a respondent from the inconvenience, e!pense, ignominy and stress of defending himselfherself in the course of a formal trial, until the reasonable probability of his or her guilt has been passed upon in a more or less summary proceeding by a competent officer designated by law for that purpose. )econdarily, such summary proceeding also protects the state from the burden of unnecessary e!pense and effort in prosecuting alleged offenses and in holding trials arising from false, frivolous or groundless charges. $%3&
!*e Co0rt+ R0)% "he petition is impressed with merit. We answer the above question in the affirmative. #re)m)%$r- M$tter
)uch investigation is not a part of the trial. A full and e!haustive presentation of the parties’ evidence is not required, but only such as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. Cy reason of the abbreviated nature of preliminary investigations, a dismissal of the charges as a result thereof is not equivalent to a judicial pronouncement of acquittal. Hence, no double jeopardy attaches. $%+&
Bn declaring this function to be lodged in the prosecutor, the 'ourt distinguished the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest or a search warrant from a preliminary investigation proper in this wise7 $(2&
“BBB Judges and prosecutors ali*e s!ould distinguis! t!e preliminary inuiry w!ic! determines probable cause for t!e issuance of a warrant of arrest from a preliminary inestigation proper w!ic! ascertains w!et!er t!e offender s!ould be !eld for trial or released. BBB T!e determination of probable cause for t!e warrant of arrest is made by t!e Judge. T!e preliminary inestigation proper--w!et!er BBB t!ere is reasonable ground to beliee t!at t!e accused is guilty of t!e offense c!arged and, t!erefore, w!et!er BBB !e s!ould be sub?ected to t!e eBpense, rigors and embarrassment of trial--is t!e function of t!e prosecutor.
e reiterate t!at preliminary inestigation s!ould be distinguis!ed as to w!et!er it is an inestigation for t!e determination of a sufficient ground for t!e filing of t!e information or it is an inestigation for t!e determination of a probable cause for t!e issuance of a warrant of arrest. T!e first *ind of preliminary inestigation is eBecutie in nature. +t is part of t!e prosecutor(s ?ob. T!e second *ind of preliminary inestigation w!ic! is more properly called preliminary eBamination is ?udicial in nature and is lodged wit! t!e ?udge.E )ound policy supports this distinction. @therwise, judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary e!amination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts. "he )eparate @pinion of =r. 'hief 9ustice Andres /. 1arvasa in Roberts, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals stressed that the determination of the e!istence of probable cause properly pertains to the public prosecutor in the and that the proceedings therein are $(%&
Bn Crespo vs. Mogul , the 'ourt emphasi5ed the cardinal principle that the public prosecutor controls and directs the prosecution of criminal offenses thus7
prosecute or file an information wit!in a certain period of time, since t!is would interfere wit! t!e fiscal(s discretion and control of criminal prosecutions. T!us, a fiscal w!o as*s for t!e dismissal of t!e case for insufficiency of eidence !as aut!ority to do so, and &ourts t!at grant t!e same commit no error. T!e fiscal may re-inestigate a case and subseuently moe for t!e dismissal s!ould t!e re-inestigation s!ow eit!er t!at t!e defendant is innocent or t!at !is guilt may not be establis!ed beyond reasonable doubt. +n a clas! of iews between t!e ?udge w!o did not inestigate and t!e fiscal w!o did, or between t!e fiscal and t!e offended party or t!e defendant, t!ose of t!e fiscal(s s!ould normally preail. B B B B.E Appe$ $+ $% E8er)+e o t*e /0+t)e Seret$r-+ #o:er o Co%tro Oer #ro+e0tor+ #ecisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the secretary of justice who, under the /evised Administrative 'ode, e!ercises the power of direct control and supervision over said prosecutorsG and who may thus affirm, nullify, reverse or modify their rulings. )ection +, 'hapter 3, Cook B8 in relation to )ection ;, 3, and +, 'hapter (, "itle BBB of the 'ode gives the secretary of justice supervision and control over the @ffice of the 'hief 0rosecutor and the 0rovincial and 'ity 0rosecution @ffices. "he scope of his power of supervision and control is delineated in )ection 3, paragraph %, 'hapter :, Cook B8 of the 'ode7
:1G Supervision and Control. K Superision and control s!all include aut!ority to act directly w!eneer a specific function is entrusted by l aw or regulation to a subordinateI direct t!e performance of dutyI restrain t!e commission of actsI reiew, approe, reerse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or unitsI BBBB.E )upplementing the aforequoted provisions are )ection of /.A. :3 and )ection : of Act *22:, which read7
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:+t is a cardinal principle t!at all criminal actions eit!er commenced by complaint or by information s!all be prosecuted under t!e direction and control of t!e fiscal. T!e institution of a criminal action depends upon t!e sound discretion of t!e fiscal. =e may or may not file t!e complaint or information, follow or not follow t!at presented by t!e o ffended party, according to w!et!er t!e eidence in !is opinion, is sufficient or not to establis! t!e guilt of t!e accused beyond reasonable doubt. T!e reason for placing t!e criminal prosecution under t!e direction and control of t!e fiscal is to preent malicious or unfounded prosecution by priate persons. +t cannot be controlled by t!e complainant. 'rosecuting officers under t!e power ested in t!em by law, not only !ae t!e aut!ority but also t!e duty of prosecuting persons w!o, according to t!e eidence receied from t!e complainant, are s!own to be guilty of a crime committed wit!in t!e ?urisdiction of t!eir office. T!ey !ae eually t!e legal duty not to prosecute w!en after an inestigation t!ey become coninced t!at t!e eidence adduced is not sufficient to establis! a prima facie case.E Bn the same case, the 'ourt added that where there is a clash of views between a judge who did not investigate and a fiscal who conducted a reinvestigation, those of the prosecutor should normally prevail7
:Section 0. B B B B T!e &!ief State 'rosecutor, t!e Assistant &!ief State 'rosecutors, t!e Senior State 'rosecutors, and t!e State 'rosecutors s!all B B B perform suc! ot!er duties as may be assigned to t!em by t!e Secretary of Justice in t!e interest of public serice.E !!! !!!
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:Section 0;. T!e proisions of t!e eBisting law to t!e contrary notwit!standing, w!eneer a specific power, aut!ority, duty, function, or actiity is entrusted to a c!ief of bureau, office, diision or serice, t!e same s!all be understood as also conferred upon t!e proper Department =ead w!o s!all !ae aut!ority to act directly in pursuance t!ereof, or to reiew, modify, or reo*e any decision or action of said c!ief of bureau, office, diision or serice.E <)upervision> and of a department head over his subordinates have been defined in administrative law as follows7 $(*&
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:B B B B T!e &ourts cannot interfere wit! t!e fi scal(s discretion and control of t!e criminal prosecution. +t is not prudent or een permissible for a &ourt to compel t!e fiscal to prosecute a proceeding originally initiated by !im on an information, if !e finds t!at t!e eidence relied upon by !im is insufficient for coniction. eit!er !as t!e &ourt any power to order t!e fiscal to
:+n administratie law superision means oerseeing or t!e power or aut!ority of an officer to see t!at subordinate officers perform t!eir duties. +f t!e latter fail or neglect to fulfill t!em, t!e former may ta*e suc! action or step as prescribed by law to ma*e t!em perform suc! duties. &ontrol, on t!e ot!er !and, means t!e power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside w!at a subordinate officer !ad done in t!e performance of !is duties and to substitute t!e ?udgment of t!e former for t!at of t!e latter.E
/eview as an act of supervision and control by the justice secretary over the fiscals and prosecutors finds basis in the doctrine of e!haustion of administrative remedies which holds that mistakes, abuses or negligence committed in the initial steps of an administrative activity or by an administrative agency should be corrected by higher administrative authorities, and not directly by courts. As a rule, only after administrative remedies are e!hausted may judicial recourse be allowed. Appe$ to t*e Seret$r- o /0+t)e (+ Not Foreclosed by the Ruling in Cre+po Bn Marcelo vs. Court of Appeals, the 'ourt clarified that Crespo did not foreclose the power or authority of the secretary of justice to review resolutions of his subordinates in criminal cases. "he 'ourt recogni5ed inCrespo that the action of the investigating fiscal or prosecutor in the preliminary investigation is subject to the approval of the provincial or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor. "hereafter, it may be appealed to the secretary of justice. $(;&
appellant !ad already been arraigned. +f t!e appellant isG arraigned during t!e pendency of t!e appeal, B B B appeal s!all be dismissed motu proprio by t!e Secretary of Justice. An appeal@motion for reinestigation from a resolution fi nding probable cause, !oweer, s!all not !old t!e filing of t!e information in court.E Apart from the foregoing statutory and administrative issuances, the power of review of the secretary of justice is recogni5ed also by )ection * of /ule %%( of the /ules of 'ourt7
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"he justice secretary’s power of review may still be availed of despite the filing of an information in court. Bn his discretion, the secretary may affirm, modify or reverse resolutions of his subordinates pursuant to /epublic Act 1o. ;%32, as amended, specifically in )ection % dI7 $(:&
:dG B B B 'roided, finally, T!at w!ere t!e resolution of t!e 'roincial or &ity Fiscal or t!e &!ief State 'rosecutor is, upon reiew, reersed by t!e Secretary of Justice, t!e latter may, w!ere !e finds t!at no prima facie case eBists, aut!ori%e and direct t !e inestigating fiscal concerned or any ot!er fiscal or state prosecutor to cause or moe for t !e dismissal of t!e case, or, w!ere !e finds a prima facie case, to cause t!e fil ing of an information in court against t!e respondent, based on t!e same sworn statements or eidence submitted wit!out t!e necessity of conducting anot!er preliminary inestigation.E 0ursuant thereto, the #epartment of 9ustice promulgated 'ircular 1o. : dated 9anuary (;, %++2 governing appeals in preliminary investigation. Appeals under )ection ( are limited to resolutions dismissing a criminal complaint. However, )ection * provides an e!ception7 appeals from resolutions finding probable cause upon a showing of manifest error or grave abuse of discretion are allowed, provided the accused has not been arraigned. Bn the present case, petitioner’s appeal to the secretary of justice was given due course on August (?, %++( pursuant to this 'ircular.
:S<&. /. Duty of investiatin fiscal.--B B B B !!!
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+f upon petition by a proper party, t!e Secretary of Justice reerses t!e resolution of t!e proincial or city fiscal or c!ief state prosecutor, !e s!all direct t!e fiscal concerned to file t!e corresponding information wit!out conducting anot!er preliminary inestigation or to dismiss or moe for dismissal of t!e complaint or information.E "his appeal rests upon the sound discretion of the secretary of justice arising from his power of supervision and control over the prosecuting arm of the government, not on a substantial right on the part of the accused as claimed by petitioner. Appe$ D)& Not D)e+t t*e !r)$ Co0rt o /0r)+&)t)o% Where the secretary of justice e!ercises his power of review only after an information has been filed, trial courts should defer or suspend arraignment and further proceedings until the appeal is resolved. )uch deferment or suspension, however, does not signify that the trial court is ipso facto bound by the resolution of the secretary of justice. 9urisdiction, once acquired by the trial court, is not lost despite a resolution by the secretary of justice to withdraw the information or to dismiss the case. /0&))$ Re)e: o t*e Re+o0t)o% o t*e Seret$r- o /0+t)e
@n 9une 2, %++, 'ircular 1o. : was superseded by #epartment @rder 1o. ((G however, the scope of appealable cases remained unchanged7
:S<&T+) 1. !at "ay 4e Appealed. -- )nly resolutions of t!e &!ief State 'rosecutor@egional State 'rosecutor@'roincial or &ity 'rosecutor dismissing a criminal complaint may be t!e sub?ect of an appeal to t!e Secretary of Justice eBcept as ot!erwise proided in Section / !ereof. Appeals from t!e resolutions of proincial@city prosecutors w!ere t!e penalty prescribed for t!e offense c!arged does not eBceed prisión correccional, regardless of t!e imposable fine, s!all be made to t!e egional State 'rosecutors w!o s!all resole t!e appeals wit! finality, pursuant to Department )rder o. 01 dated August 2, 1991 as amended by D.). o. 0/ dated February /, 1992, D.). o. 220 dated August 11, 1992 and D.). o. / dated February 2, 1990. Suc! appeals s!all also be goerned by t!ese rules. S<&. /. Non-Appealable Cases; Exceptions.--o appeal may be ta*en from a resolution of t!e &!ief State 'rosecutor@egional State 'rosecutor@'roincial or &ity 'rosecutor finding probable cause eBcept upon s!owing of manifest error or grae abuse of discretion. otwit!standing t!e s!owing of manifest error or grae abuse of discretion, no appeal s!all be entertained w!ere t!e
9udicial power is defined under the %+3: 'onstitution as the duty of courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. )uch power includes the determination of whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or e!cess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. Ender this definition, a court is without power to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or e!ecutive branch of the government. Bt is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of 'ongress or of the 0resident. Bt may, however, look into the question of whether such e!ercise has been made in grave abuse of discretion. $(3&
9udicial review of the acts of other departments is not an assertion of superiority over them or a derogation of their functions. Bn the words of 9ustice aurel in Angara vs. Electoral Commission: $(+&
:B B B 67!en t!e ?udiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not in reality nullify or inalidate an act of t!e legislature, but only asserts t !e solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by t!e &onstitution to determine conflicting claims of aut!ority under t!e &onstitution and to establis! for t!e parties in an actual controersy t!e rig!ts w!ic! t!at instrument sources and guarantees to t!em. T!is is in trut! all t!at is inoled in w!at is termed ?udicial supremacy( w!ic! properly is t!e power of t!e ?udicial reiew under t!e &onstitution. B B B.E Bt is not the purpose of this 'ourt to decrease or limit the discretion of the secretary of justice to review the decisions of the government prosecutors under him. BnCrespo, the secretary was merely advised to restrict such review to e!ceptionally meritorious cases. /ule %%(, )ection * of the /ules of 'ourt, which recogni5es such power, does not, however, allow the trial court to automatically dismiss the case or grant the withdrawal of the information upon the resolution of the secretary of justice. "his is precisely the import of Crespo, Marcelo, Martinez vs. Court of Appeals and the recent case of Roberts, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, which all required the trial court to make its own evaluation of the merits of the case, because granting the motion to dismiss or to withdraw the information is equivalent to effecting a disposition of the case itself. $2&
!*e M$reo $%& M$rt)%e C$+e+ Are Co%+)+te%t Bn Marcelo vs. Court of Appeals, this 'ourt ruled that, although it is more prudent to wait for a final resolution of a motion for review or reinvestigation from the secretary of justice before acting on a motion to dismiss or a motion to withdraw an information, a trial court nonetheless should make its own study and evaluation of said motion and not rely merely on the awaited action of the secretary. "he trial court has the option to grant or deny the mo tion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal, whether before or after the arraignment of the accused, and whether after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the secretary who reviewed the records of the investigationG provided that such grant or denial is made from its own assessment and evaluation of the merits of the motion. $%&
Bn Martinez vs. Court of Appeals , this 'ourt overruled the grant of the motion to dismiss filed by the prosecuting fiscal upon the recommendation of the secretary of justice because such grant was based upon considerations other than the judge’s own assessment of the matter. /elying solely on the conclusion of the prosecution to the effect that there was no sufficient evidence against the accused to sustain the allegation in the information, the trial judge did not perform his function of making an independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of the case. $(&
#espite the pronouncement in Marcelo that a final resolution of the appeal to the #epartment of 9ustice is necessary, both decisions followed the rule in Crespo vs. Mogul: @nce a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case such as its dismissal or its continuation rests on the sound discretion of the court. "rial judges are thus required to make their own assessment of whether the secretary of justice committed grave abuse of discretion in granting or denying the appeal, separately and independently of the prosecution’s or the secretary’s evaluation that such evidence is insufficient or that no probable cause to hold the accused for trial e!ists. "hey should embody such assessment in their written order disposing of the motion. "he above-mentioned cases depict two e!treme cases in complying with this rule. Bn Marcelo, the dismissal of the criminal action upon the favorable recommendation of the /eview 'ommittee, @ffice of the 'ity 0rosecutor, was precipitate in view of the pendency o f private complainant’s appeal to the secretary of justice. Bn effect, the secretary’s opinion was totally disregarded by the trial court. Bn contrast, in Martinez the dismissal of the criminal action was an as the trial court relied hook, line and sinker on the resolution of the secretary, without making its own independent determination of the merits of the said resolution. No Grave Abuse of Discretion in theResolution of the Secretary of Justice
Bn the light of recent holdings in Marcelo and Martinez and considering that the issue of the correctness of the justice secretary’s resolution has been amply threshed out in petitioner’s letter, the information, the resolution of the secretary of justice, the motion to dismiss, and even the e!haustive discussion in the motion for reconsideration J all of which were submitted to the court -the trial judge committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the motion to withdraw the information, based solely on his bare and ambiguous reliance on Crespo. "he trial court’s order is inconsistent with our repetitive calls for an independent and competent assessment of the issuesI presented in the motion to dismiss. "he trial judge was tasked to evaluate the secretary’s recommendation finding the absence of probable cause to hold petitioner criminally liable for libel. He failed to do so. He merely ruled to proceed with the trial without stating his reasons for disregarding the secretary’s recommendation. Had he complied with his judicial obligation, he would have discovered that there was, in fact, sufficient ground to grant the motion to withdraw the information. "he documents before the trial court judge clearly showed that there was no probable cause to warrant a criminal prosecution for libel. Ender the in criminal prosecutions, this 'ourt would normally remand the case to the trial judge for his or her independent assessment of the motion to withdraw the information. However, in order not to delay the disposition of this case and to afford the parties complete relief, we have decided to make directly the independent assessment the trial court should have done. "he petitioner has attached as anne!es to the present petition for review the information, which contains a complete and faithful reproduction of the subject letter, the resolution of the secretary of justice, the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s @rder of 6ebruary ((, %++, and even the private complainant’s opposition to said motion. "he records below have been reproduced and submitted to this 'ourt for its appreciation. "hus, a remand to the trial court serves no purpose and will only clog the dockets. We thus proceed to e!amine the substance of the resolution of the secretary of justice. "he secretary reversed the finding of probable cause on the grounds that %I the subject letter was privileged in nature and (I the complaint was merely a countercharge. Bn every case for libel, the following requisites must concur7
:aG
it must be defamatoryI
bG
it must be maliciousI
cG
it must be gien publicityI and
dG
t!e ictim must be identifiable.E
At the preliminary investigation stage, th ese requisites must show prima facie a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused probably committed it. A cursory reading of the information immediately demonstrates a failure on the part of the complainant to establish the foregoing elements of libel. Kvery defamatory imputation, even if true, is presumed malicious, if no good intention or justifiable motive for making it is shown. "here is malice when the author of the imputation is prompted by personal ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely to injure the reputation of the person who claims to have been defamed. Bn this case however, petitioner’s letter was written to seek redress of proper grievance against the inaccurate distribution and payment of professional fees and against unfair treatment in the 1uclear =edicine #epartment of the 0hilippine Heart 'enter. Bt is a qualified privileged communication und er Article ;*%I of the /evised 0enal 'ode which provides7 $&
:AT. 0/. !e"uirement of publicity. -- <ery defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, een if it be true, if no good intention and ?ustifiable motie for ma*ing it is s!own, eBcept in t!e following cases
making the defamatory matter, after it has been written, known to someone other than the person to whom it has been written. "he reason for such rule is that Bn this case, petitioner submitted the letter to the director of said hospitalG she did not disseminate the letter and its contents to third persons. Hence, there was no and the matter is clearly covered by paragraph % of Article ;* of the 0enal 'ode. $?&
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1. A priate communication made by any person to anot!er in t!e performance of any legal, moral or social dutyI and !!! !!!>
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"he rule on privileged communication is that a communication made in good faith on any subject matter in which the communicator has an interest, or concerning which he has a duty, is privileged if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it contains incriminatory matter which, without the privilege, would be libelous and actionable. 0etitioner’s letter was a private communication made in the performance of a moral duty on her part. Her intention was not to inflict an unjustifiable harm on the private complainant, but to present her grievance to her superior. "he privileged nature of her letter overcomes the presumption of malice. "here is no malice when justifiable motive e!istsG and in the absence of malice, there is no libel. We note that the information itself failed to allege the e!istence of malice.
6urther, we note that the information against petitioner was filed only on 9uly (:, %++( or one year after 9une (:, %++%, the date the letter was sent. Bt is obviously nothing more than a countercharge to give 'omplainant "orres a leverage against petitioner’s administrative action against him. Bneluctably, 9udge Asuncion’s denial of the motion to withdraw the information and the reconsideration thereof was not only precipitate but manifestly erroneous. "his is further compounded by the fact that he did not e!plain his grounds for his denial inasmuch as he did not make an independent assessment of the motion or the arguments in the resolution of the secretary of justice. All in all, such rash action did not do justice to the sound ruling in Crespo vs. Mogul upon which, ironically, he supposedly rested his action, or to the directive in Marcelo and Martinez where this 'ourt required trial courts to make an independent assessment of the merits of the motion.
"hus, we agree with the ruling of the secretary of justice7
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:B B B TG!e sub?ect letter was written to bring to t!e attention of t!e Director of t!e '!ilippine =eart &enter for Asia and ot!er responsible aut!orities t!e un?ust and unfair treatment t!at Dr. #edesma was getting from goernment employees, and t!e sub?ect letter is a complaint B B B on a sub?ect matter in w!ic! respondent !as an interest and in reference to w!ic! s!e !as a duty to uestion t!e same is definitely priileged >S s. 4ustos, 0; '!il. 101G. "oreoer, in Ang s. &astro, 103 S&A /, t!e Supreme &ourt, citing Santiago s. &alo, / '!il. 922, ruled t!at a communication made in good fait! upon any sub?ect matter in w!ic! t!e party ma*ing t!e communication !as an interest or concerning w!ic! !e !as a duty is priileged alt!oug! it contains incriminatory or derogatory matter w!ic!, wit!out t!e priilege, would be libelous and actionable.
;HERE"ORE, the assailed #ecision is hereby /K8K/)K# and )K" A)B#K. "he =otion to Withdraw the Bnformation dated 6ebruary %:, %++ filed before the trial court is /A1"K#. 1o costs. SO ORDERED. "avi#e, Jr., Melo, and $rancisco, JJ., concur. %arvasa C.J., no part7 'lose relation to a party7
T!e follow-up letter sent by respondent to t!e director of t!e '=&A, is a direct eidence of respondent(s rig!teous disposition of following t!e rule of law and is a clear indication t!at !er purpose was to see* relief from t!e proper !ig!er aut!ority BBB. T!e same interpretation s!ould be accorded t!e ciil and administratie complaints w!ic! respondent filed against complainants. T!ey are mere manifestations of !er earnest desire to pursue proper relief for t!e alleged in?ustice s!e got fromcomplainants. +f s!e was motiated by malice and ill-will in sending t!e sub?ect communication to t!e Director of t!e '=&A, s!e would not !ae sent t!e second letter and filed t!e administratie and ciil cases against complainants.E Bn Alonzo, the settled rule is that, when a public officer, in the discharge of his or her official duties, sends a communication to another officer or to a body of officers, who have a duty to perform with respect to the subject matter of the communication, such communication does not amount to publication within the meaning of the law on defamation. !ublication in libel means $;&
$%&
Rollo , pp. +-*+.
$(&
"he )pecial Kighth #ivision is composed of JJ. 'orona Bbay-)omera, ponente , and Arturo C. Cuena and Cuenaventura 9. uerrero.
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0resided by then 9udge now 9ustice of the 'ourt of AppealsI =a!imiano '. Asuncion.
$*&
Rollo , pp. ;-;;.
Anne! <#,> rollo, p. ;?.
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