CRIMINAL LAW 2
Prof. Ildefonso Jimenez UP LAW – C2013
Art. 365: RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE CALIMUTAN v. PEOPLE [482 SCRA 44] :difference between an intentional felony and a culpable felony. Throwing of a stone.
Ruled that the retaliatory act of throwing the stone at Cantre was unlawful and as established by Mendez as the proximate cause of death, is guilty of the consequences of throwing the stone even if different from intended (RPC 4) 29 August 2001 – CA sustained conviction as the autopsy conducted by Ulanday cannot be given more credence than the autopsy conducted by Mendez -
ISSUES: (1) WON the throwing of the stone was the proximate cause of death as found by Mendez‘ autopsy
(2) WON Calimutan is guilty of homicide
PONENTE: CHICO-NAZARIO, J NATURE: petition for review on certiorari
HELD: (1) YES
FACTS: Feb 4, 1996 – witness Rene L. Sañano was walking home with victim PHILIP CANTRE when Cantre saw Michael Bulalacao walking with petitioner ROLLIE CALIMUTAN. Cantre then punched Bulalacao. Calimutan to defend Bulalacao threw a stone hitting the back of Cantre. Afterwards, they were pacified by the witness and went their separate ways Cantre complained of back pains and afterwards died the next day - Dr. Ulanday - did the initial autopsy and stated that the cause of death was cardio-respiratory arrest due to food poisoning - Dr. Ronaldo B. Mendez – conducted a separate autopsy and concluded that Cantre died due to a ruptured spleen caused by the trauma of the stoning 19 November 1998 – RTC found Calimutan guilty of homicide
RATIO: -
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The autopsy report conducted by Ulanday was lacking compared to the extensive autopsy conducted by Mendez This was even testified by Ulanday who only found that the food poisoning MAY have been the cause of cardiac arrest and should be investigated more. Spleen is a fragile organ -> stoning was proximate cause
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Proximate cause has been defined as "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.‖
(2) NO
RATIO:
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Court finds petitioner Calimutan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the culpable felony of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. It was
To avoid a head-on collision, Yu swerved to the right, hitting an old man who was about to cross the street. The old man was pinned between her car and the rear end of a parked jeep that, in turn, moved, hitting the truck parked in front of it. The old man was rushed to the hospital but pronounced dead on arrival.
not established by prosecution that Calimutan had the specific intent of killing Cantre
Only a chance encounter victim Cantre was the initial aggressor. victim Cantre was considerably older and bigger, at 26 years of age and with a height of five feet and nine inches, compared to Bulalacao, the boy he attacked, who was only 15 years old and stood at about five feet throwing stone at back does not immediately equate to treachery, he only threw the stone rashly and impulsively Only guilty of inexcusable lack of precaution. Did not consider the amount of injury the stoning would cause Is civilly liable for the death.
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HEDY GAN y YU v. CA and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILS.
On appeal, the CA found the petitioner guilty of Homicide through Simple Imprudence.
W/N petitioner is guilty of reckless imprudence.
HELD: NO RATIO:
The SC believed that the ―emergency rule‖ is applicable in
this case. The petitioner/accused had no time to rationalize the situation because the car coming from the opposite direction suddenly suddenly overtook overtook the other. There was was only
PONENTE: Fernan, C.J. NATURE: Appeal for complete reversal of the judgment by the trial
enough time for her to ―heed the very powerful instinct of
self-preservation‖. Yu cannot be considered negligent in this case.
court
Trial court rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUE(s):
[G.R. No. L-44264 (Sept. 19, 1988)]
FACTS:
An information for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was filed, pleaded not guilty.
Yu is acquitted and her civil liability is waived (by choice of the heirs of the victim).
Petitioner was driving along North Bay Blvd., Tondo, Manila. In the opposite direction were two oncoming cars, one trying to overtake the other, encroaching the lane of the accused.
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PEOPLE VS AGLIDAY [367 SCRA 273] Ponente: Panganiban Nature: Reckless imprudence
RATIO ◦
FACTS ◦
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The accused quarreled with his wife over her working as a laundrywoman and his drinking habits. The son, Richard, interfered and and for that reason, the father got his shotgun and shot his son. The medico-legal officer found a gunshot wound in the buttock of the victim (richard). The son died in the emergency room. Father interposed the defense that he was cleaning his gun at the time and he accidentally squeezed the trigger and the gun fired. Because of the freak accident, his son was hit while he was about to go upstairs.
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The lower court gave credence to the prosecution's version and convicted the father with parricide.
ISSUE
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Whether the facts point to accident, reckless imprudence, or parricide
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no accident because from the declarations of his wife and son, he purposely shot his son. Accident presupposes doing a lawful act with due care. Their was no lawful act because the testimonies point that he was not holding his gun because he was cleaning it, but because he actually intended to shoot his son. Their was no cleaning of the gun. During the fight where the son tried to pacify him, he actually went to the room to retrieve the gun. An accident is an occurrence that "happens outside the sway of our will, and although it comes about through some act of our will, lies beyond the bounds of humanly foreseeable consequences.‖It connotes the absence of criminal intent. The shotgun was the type which required it to be cocked before firing. The act of cocking the gun and aiming it in front of his son shows the intent to fire it. It cannot be accident and it cannot be reckless imprudence if the son was shot immediately afterwards. Imprudence and accident neccesitate criminal intent. In cocking and aiming, intent was proved. In this case, resenting his son's meddling in his argument with his wife, appellant purposely took his gun and shot his son
RAMOS v. CA [321 SCRA 584]
HELD ◦
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The appeal has no merit
convicted of parricide
Ponente: Kapunan, J. Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA
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FACTS: Erlinda Ramos, a robust 47-year old woman was advised by Dr. Hosaka to undergo an operation to remove a stone in her gall bladder due to the discomfort she felt that somehow interfered with her normal ways. The scheduled operation would be on June 17, 1985 9 am at DLSMC. When asked for an anesthesiologist, Dr. Hosaka claimed he would get a good one without giving a name. At around 7:30 am of June 17, she was prepared for the operation by the hospital staff. Her sister-in-law, Herminda Cruz, Dean of the College of Nursing of Capitol Medical Center, was there and was allowed to be in the operating room to give moral support. Cruz saw two or three nurses and Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez, another defendant, who was to administer the anesthesia. By 9:30 am, Dr. Hosaka was still not around. He got there at almost 12 noon and then by 12:15, final preparations for the operation began. They had problems intubating the patient and Dr. Gutierrez noticed that the patient's tummy was getting bloated and that her nailbeds had a bluish discoloration. Dr. Hosaka then called for another anesthesiologist, Dr. Calderon.
Rogelio Ramos who was outside of the operating room then saw a respiratory machine being rushed into the O.R. At almost 3 pm of that day, the patient was taken to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU). Erlinda stayed at the ICU for a month. Four months later, the patient was released from the hospital. She has been brain damaged ever since, and comatose. Petitioners then filed a civil case for damages on January 1986. Petitioners proved that the damage sustained by Erlinda was due to lack of oxygen in her brain caused by the faulty management of her airway by private respondents during the anesthesia phase. Respondents claimed that the damage was Erlinda‘s allergic reaction
to the anesthetic agent, Thiopental Sodium (Penthonal). RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners.CA overturned the decision hence this appeal. Issue: WON the surgeon, the anesthesiologist and the hospital should be made liable for the unfortunate comatose condition of a patient scheduled for cholecystectomy (surgical excision of the gall bladder)
HELD: Yes RATIO: The Supreme Court disagrees with the CA.
The patient was placed in a tredelenburg position - a position where the head of the patient is placed in a position lower than her feet which is an indication that there is a decrease of blood supply to the patient‘s brain.
Dr. Gutierrez was negligent. Witness Cruz, although not an anesthesiologist, is capable of observing the acts of the physician and surgeon, external appearances, and manifest conditions which are observable by any one. Res ipsa loquitor allows this where the
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testimony of expert witness is not required. Cruz, as an experienced clinical nurse whose long experience and scholarship, delivered her statements in a straightforward manner. Plus, her testimony was affirmed by Dr. Gutierrez herself. Anesthesiologists should have assessed their patients before operation to secure the success of the operation. Dr. Gutierrez saw the patient on the day of the operation itself, only an hour before the scheduled operation. This is an act of exceptional negligence and professional irresponsibility. The operation was elective and not emergency therefore the doctor has all the time in the world to make a thorough evaluation. Dr. Jamora‘s testimony (a pulmonologist) that the comatose
condition was brought about by Penthonal is unacceptable simply because the anesthetic drug-induced allergic mediated bronchospasm alleged in this case is within the disciplines of anesthesiology, allergology, and pharmacology, and not in pulmonology. Furthermore, there was no support in evidence of the alleged allergic reaction. No evidence of stridor, skin reactions, or wheezing appears on record. No laboratory data were ever presented on court. The wrongful intubation caused some delay in oxygen delivery into the lungs as the tube which carries oxygen is in the wrong place. The delay led to cyanosis, the bluish discoloration of the nailbed.
late for the latter‘s operation. Because of this, he had little or no
time to confer with his anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery. The hospital exercises significant control in hiring and firing consultants and in the conduct of their work within the hospital premises. For the purpose of allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians. Art 2180 of the Civil Code is the basis for holding an employee solidarily responsible for the negligence of its employee. While the burden of proving negligence rests on the plaintiffs, once negligence is shown, the burden shifts to the respondents (employer) who should prove that they observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. Respondent hospital failed to adduce evidence that it exercised the diligence of a good father and with regard to the degree of supervision which it exercised over its physicians. Having failed to do so, hospital is consequently solidarily liable with its physicians for Erlinda‘s condition.
SPS. FLORES v. SPS. PINEDA, ET AL. [G.R. No. 158996 (Nov. 14, 2008)]
Dr. Orlino Hosaka as head of the surgical team is negligent , as can be found in his failure to exercise the proper authority in not determining if his anesthesiologist observed proper anesthesia protocols. He performed another operation in another hospital at the
Ponente: Brion, J. Nature: Appeal by certiorari
same time as Erlinda‘s cholecystectomy, and was in fact three hours
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Facts:
such as Teresita who is suffering from diabetes, is justified if shown to be life-threatening.
Teresita Pineda, 51, consulted Dr. Flores about her medical condition saying she was experiencing general body weakness, loss of appetite, frequent urination and thirst, and on-and-off vaginal bleeding. The latter advised her to go to UDMC for a general check-up because she was suspected to have diabetes.
Both RTC and CA ruled in favor of the relatives of Teresita.
Issue(s): W/N the negligence of the doctors caused her death thus
April 28, 1987, Teresita went to UDMC (she was very
rendering them liable to pay damages?
weak). After Dr. Flores did a routine check-up, he ordered her admission to the hospital and directed the staff to prepare her for an ―on call‖ D&C operation (dilatation and curettage) to be performed by his wife, Dr. Felicisima
Flores. Samples were taken for lab test.
April 29, 1987, results of blood tests showed that the sugar in her urine was very high and further results showed she was suffering from Diabetes Mellitus Type II. I nsulin was given but it might have been too late because she died on May 6, 1987 due to complications induced by diabetes.
Her family, believing that negligence caused her death, filed an action for damages against Dr. Flores and Felicisima.
FAMILY : They should have waited for lab results before
Held: YES, their decision to proceed with the operation, notwithstanding her hypoglycemia and without preparing her for the procedure, was contrary to the standards observed by the medical profession. Deviation from this standard led to a breach of duty resulting to death, thus, the spouses are liable.
Ratio:
The critical and clinching factor in a medical negligence case is proof of the causal connection between the negligence which the evidence established and the plaintiff's injuries; the plaintiff must plead and prove not only that he had been injured and defendant has been at fault, but also that the defendant's fault caused the injury.
Medical Negligence is a wrong committed by a medical
performing D&C. Since she is already suspected of diabetes, it should have been given more attention.
DOCTORS: D&C is the immediate answer to vaginal bleeding. And that operation on a hypoglycemic patient,
professional causing harm or death to a patient. The
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elements of which are: duty, breach, injury and
proximate causation. o
Duty: Standard behavior which imposes restrictions on ones conduct (the amount of competence associated with the proper discharge of a profession)
o
Breach: When physician fails to comply with these professional standards. If injury results from this, he is liable for negligence.
It must be proven that: 1) Physician either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or did something a reasonably prudent provider would not have done. 2) This failure or action caused injury to the patient. (best shown through expert testimony)
In this case: 1) Felicisima did not even check on her patient or talk to her before the operation (I think the SC is wrong here, because the case was an emergency and usually someone else does it for them – but then again, that‘s just me ) 2) The spouses were not able to prove that the bleeding was life-threatening. Dr. Flores should not have made the decision to operate on her because he was not an expert in the field of gynecology.
IBABAO v. PEOPLE [132 SCRA 216] Nature: Petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of the then Court of Appeals
Facts: Jose Patalinghog, Jr., a bystander, testified that while he was at Bankerohan terminal at about 11:00 p.m., he clearly saw an owner-type jeep bump a person. That the said jeep did not stop. Upon request of a security guard, he gave chase, wrote down the plate number, overtook it, and recognized the driver as the petitioner, and thereafter reported the incident to the Matina Police Sub-Station.
Issue: Whether or not the failure of petitioner to lend aid to his victim justifies the imposition of the penalty next higher in degree to that provided for in paragraph 2 of Article 365, as amended, of the Revised Penal Code
Decision/Ratio
: No. The increased penalty is inapplicable to him because the failure to give aid to the injured on the spot has not been alleged in the Information. So far as the Court has been able to ascertain, this question has not been definitely passed upon by the Court.
The court agrees with the then Court of Appeals when it ruled in People vs. Beduya that "the failure to render assistance, constitutes a qualifying circumstances because the presence thereof raises the penalty by one degree (like treachery which qualifies homicide to murder). The same must be alleged in the information to apprise the defendant of this charge unlike an ordinary aggravating circumstance which even if not alleged in the information, can be taken into account if proved at the trial without objection.
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The court is neither inclined to consider such failure to lend assistance as a generic aggravating circumstance that would justify the imposition of the penalty in its maximum period, since it is not an aggravating circumstance listed in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code.
Issue(s): 1. WON defendant can still be held liable for Murder of an Unborn Child notwithstanding his contention that the fetus lacks personhood. 2. WON the defendant is liable for Murder of an Unborn Child even if he did not know that the victim was pregnant
Title 8: CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS Chapter 1: Destruction of Life
Held: 1. Yes. The statutes in question impose the criminal penalty
Arts. 256-259: ABORTION
for murder on whoever causes the death of the ―unborn
STATE v. MERRILL [No. C7-89-766 (January 19, 1990)] Ponente: Simonett, J. Facts:
The statutes do not raise the issue of when life as a human person begins or ends. The state must prove only that the implanted embryo or the fetus in the mother‘s womb was living. It is not necessary to prove that the living organism in the womb be considered a person or a human being.
Ms. Anderson died from gunshot wounds allegedly inflicted by the defendant Merrill. Autopsy revealed that the victim was pregnant with 27 or 28-day-old embryo. There was no abnormality which would have caused a miscarriage and that death of the embryo resulted from the death of Ms. Anderson. The embryo was not viable; medical science generally considers a fetus viable at 28 weeks following conception. The
offspring of a human being conceived, but not yet born.‖
2. Yes. The harm to the mother and the harm to the fetus are similar. The possibility that a female homicide victim of childbearing age may be pregnant is a possibility that an assaulter may not safely exclude.
record is unclear whether either Ms. Anderson or defendant knew she was pregnant .
PEOPLE v. PAYCANA [G.R. No. 179035 (April 16, 2008)] Facts: The accused Jesus Paycana Jr. was charged of parricide and
Defendant was indicted for the death of the unborn child under two statutes, Murder of an Unborn Child in the First Degree and Murder of an Unborn Child in the Second Degree.
unintentional abortion after stabbing his 7-month pregnant wife thereby causing his wife‘s and the fetus‘ death. Paycana posed self defense, saying that his wife attacked him first after having an altercation with her the other day (he allegedly saw a young man leaving their house and after confronting her, she remained quiet.
Defendant contends that a nonviable fetus is not a person for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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The next day when he was supposedly leaving the house with his things, she stabbed him, and only then did he defended himself).
Issue: WON Paycana is guilty of parricide and unintentional abortion Held: YES. Pleading self-defense, he was not able to discharge the burden of proof as the courts found no unlawful aggression. Moreover, he was held guilty of parricide because the requisites for parricide were present, i.e. a) a person is killed b) the deceased is killed by the accused c) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate (key element is relationship). He was also guilty of unintentional abortion as the requisites for such were present, i.e. a) that there is a pregnant woman b) that violence is subjected on the woman without intending abortion c) violence intentionally exerted d) that because of such violence, the fetus dies either in the womb or was expelled therefrom.
intimidation because of his alleged bad attitude towards them and tied Sadca and his wife. Paicaoan handed Sadca a wood and asked him to kill Paiking but Sadca refused. They then took Paiking to Cuplat (an old woman) and then t o Donglayan and asked them to kill Paiking but they also refused. Paiking was taken to a place named Sococ for the night and then to Kaingyan where Sadca saw him for the last time in October 1910. Bugaoen, one of Paicaoan's companions, later informed Sadca that Paiking was killed by Paicaoan and his companions. Neither Sadca nor the other witnesses saw Paiking killed and no one testified as to who did the killing. The TC held that Paicaoan is guilty of murder.
Issue(s): WON Paicaoan is guilty of murder. /WON the evidence proves that Paicaoan killed Paiking.
Held: No. The evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction. The accused is acquitted.
ART. 249: HOMICIDE US v. PAICAOAN [GR No. L-11506 or 34 Phil 594 (July 22, 1916)] Ponente: Moreland, J.
Ratio: Before an accused person may be convicted of homicide, the prosecution must establish beyond a reasonable doubt the death of the person alleged to have been killed. ―When it is observed that nobody testified to having seen Paiking
killed, and nobody testified that the accused killed Paiking, and nobody has even testified that Paiking is dead, it is difficult to reach the conclusion that a murder has been committed.‖
Nature: Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Mountain Province
Facts: Paicaoan and companions went to the house of Sadca, Paiking‘s father (an Igorrote). They took Paiking by force and
PEOPLE v. PUGAY [167 SCRA 439 (November 17, 1988)] Ponente: Medialdea, J. Nature: Appeal from the judgment of the Cavite CFI
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Facts:
Issue:
The deceased Bayani Miranda was a 25-year-old retardate. He was friends with the accused Fernando Pugay. Miranda used to run errands for Pugay and they sometimes slept together. 19 May 1982: In a town fiesta fair in the public plaza of Rosario, Cavite, there were different kinds of rides, including a ferris wheel. Sometime after midnight of said date, Eduardo Gabion was in the ferris wheel reading a comic book with his friend Henry. The accused Pugay and Benjamin Samson arrived with several companions, very boisterous and appearing to be intoxicated. When the group saw Miranda walking by, they started making fun of him by poking him with a piece of wood in the ass. Not content with their merrymaking, Pugay suddenly took a gun of gasoline from under the engine of the ferris wheel and poured its contents poured its contents upon the body of the retardate. Gabion told Pugay not to do so while the latter was already doing it. Samson set Miranda on fire, making a human torch of the latter.
W/N Pugay and Samson are guilty of the felony of homicide
Held: Pugay is guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide under RPC365 while Samson is guilty of homicide under RPC249.
Ratio: Pugay averred that he thought that the can contained only water. However, the Court held that he failed to exercise the diligence necessary to avoid the undesirable consequences of his type of merrymaking. Pugay should have ordinarily smelled the
characteristic odor of the gasoline and known at once that the can did not contain water, but a flammable substance. Samson, on the other hand, is guilty of the felony of homicide, with the mitigating circumstance of praeter intentionem. The Court held that ―there can be no doubt that the accused Samson
knew very well that the liquid poured on the body of the deceased was gasoline and a flammable substance for he would not have committed the act of setting the latter on fire if it were otherwise.‖
Given that they were only making fun of the deceased, their only intent was to set Miranda‘s clothes on fire and not to make a human
torch of him.
Penalty
Pugay: 4mos arresto mayor as minimum to 4y2mos prisión correccional as maximum Samson: 8y prisión mayor as minimum to 14y of reclusion temporal as maximum
PEOPLE v. EULO [63 N.Y.2d 34 (1984)] Ponente: NY Court of Appeals (en banc) Nature: Appeals from conviction: 1st and 2nd degree manslaughter (Eulo), 1st degree manslaughter and second degree criminal possession of a weapon (Bonilla).
Facts: Eulo case; defendant shoots his girlfriend in the head after a heated argument over the latter‘s former suitor. The victim is rushed
to the hospital and is stabilized with an artificial respirator and medication to keep her cardiovascular functions but suffers massive and irreversible brain injuries. She is later examined twice by two neurosurgeon‘s and is twice declared brain dead (complete cessation of brain functions, even those for involuntary actions, controlled by the brain stem such as breathing etc.) After the second examination, four days after the shooting, her parents allow her organs to be donated and for artificial respiration to cease. Bonilla case; a NYC police officer finds a man lying on the street in Brooklyn with a bullet
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wound to the head. He was later rush to an ICU but became comatose upon arrival. He was similarly hooked up to an artificial respirator and given medication to keep his heart pumping. Later he is examined by a neurologist and declared brain dead (tests include a check of the reflexes with painful stimuli and an EEG which measures electrical activity in the brain) the bullet wound caused the victim‘s entire brain to cease functioning. The next day tests were again done with similar results. At this point the victim‘s mother consented to the donation of her son‘s organs and the termination of
his artificial respiration. Defendant’s in both cases argue: that the victim‘s deaths were not attributable to them since the victim‘s cardio-respiratory
functions were still operable even after the attack and that it was the transplantation which ended the lives of the victim‘s. Thus they claim
that they should not be liable for homicide. Issue(s): WON ―death‖ corresponds to the cessation of
cardio-respiratory functioning rather than the cessation of brain activity. Held: No Ratio: The court held that with the shifts in technology and the
PEOPLE v. BONILLA [Court of Appeals of New York (1984)] Chief Judge Cooke Appeal from Appellate Court Decision
Facts: 1. A man was found with a shot in the head but still alive. He was brought to the hospital where he became comatose. He was placed on a respirator w/o w/c he would not be able to breathe on his own. Tests were conducted and repeated but showed same result - his entire brain ceased functioning due to the bullet wound. His mother consented to a transfer of his kidneys and spleen. (1)Death was pronounced following the 2nd battery of tests; (2) then the victim's kidneys and spleen were removed for transplantation; (3) then the respirator was disconnected so his breathing and heartbeat stopped. 2. Bonilla, who admitted to the shooting, was convicted by a jury of criminal possession of a weapon and of first degree manslaughter. A divided Appellate Division affirmed the said conviction.
capability of modern medicine to prolong life even when the brain has ceased any and all functions, the legal definition of ―death‖
should be reassessed in terms of a definitive t ime, in this case the court approves of the attribution of death to the complete cessation of brain functions even though cardio-respiratory functions persist through artificial means. The point of this ruling is to clarify the terms of a person‘s passing to avoid confusion as to the time of a person‘s expiry. In this light factors such as the lack of even the
most basic brain activity (that attributed to the brain stem as basic involuntary actions), the inability to breath independently and the lack of a reflex reaction to painful stimuli are determinative of a state of ―death‖ under the brain-based criteria for death.
Issue: W/N Bonilla is liable for his death or what constitutes a person's death, the time at which criminal liability for a homicide would attach.
Held: Yes, Bonilla‘s act of shooting caused the death of victim Ratio: The term ―death‖ as used in New York statutes may be construed to embrace a determination, made according to accepted medical standards, that a person has suffered an irreversible cessation of breathing and heartbeat or, when those functions are artificially maintained, an irreversible cessation of the functioning of the entire brain, including the brain stem. Furthermore, modern
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medical thought has established that the traditional ―vital signs‖ of breathing and heartbeat are not independent indicia of life, but are instead, part of an integration of functions in which the brain is dominant. Thus, his conduct caused the death of victim (who was pronounced brain dead and whose breathing and heart functions were artificially maintained), and that medical procedures in removing vital organs were not superseding causes of death, as determining death by brain-based criteria has long been an accepted medical practice and attending physicians were not acting without some legal authority in grounding their determinations on brainbased criteria. Affirmed
STATE OF MARYLAND v. LARRY EDMUND MINSTER [No. 86, Sept. Term, 1984. (Jan. 24, 1985)]
Facts: Larry Edmund Minster shot Cheryl Dogson in the neck with a handgun that caused her to become a quadriplegic (paralyzed from the neck down). He had been convicted of attempted murder and was serving his sentence when Dogson died 1y87d later, allegedly resulting from the actions of Minster. The State thus indicted Minster for the murder of Dogson.
Issue: WON Minster can be charged with murder for the victim‘s death which occurred 1y87d after the injury
Art. 248 Murder PEOPLE v. CAGOCO [58 Phil 524 (1933)]: c/o ADAPT PONENTE: Vickers, J. FACTS: On July 24, 1932, Yu Lon and Yu Yee, father and son, stopped to talk on the sidewalk. While they were talking, a man passed back and forth behind Yu Lon once or twice, and when Yu Yee was about to leave his father, the man that had been passing back and forth (Francisco Cagoco) approached Yu Lon from behind and suddenly and without warning struck Yu Lon with his fist on the back part of the head. Cagoco immediately ran away. Yu Yee and two other witnesses pursued him and then lost sight of him. The blow caused Yu Lon to fall on the ground. As a consequence of which he suffered a lacerated wound on the scalp and a fissured fracture on the left occipital region which were necessarily mortal and caused his immediate death. The next day, Yu Yee promptly reported the incident to the police. Cagoco was later apprehended and identified by Yu Yee as his father‘s assailant.
ISSUES: 1. Was the felony committed with treachery? YES.
Held: Minster can no longer be indicted for murder because the victim‘s death occurred more than 1y1d after the injury had been inflicted. The US SC upheld the 1y1d rule which bars a prosecution for murder when the victim dies more than a year and a day after being injured in order to give justice to the accused (but balanced with the adequate protection of society).
2. Is the accused liable for murder or slight physical injuries?
MURDER.
RATIO:
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Yu Yee had the exceptional opportunities for observing his father‘s
In the case at bar, there is nothing to indicate that Yu Lon‘s death
assailant, because while that person was walking back and forth behind Yu Lon, Yu Yee was facing the assailant. Further, the testimonies of the three Chinese (Yu Yee and the other two Chinese witnesses who pursued the accused) was corroborated by the testimony of a 15-year old boy, Dominador Sales.
was due to some extraneous case. It was clearly the direct consequence of the accused‘s felonious act and the fact that he did not intend to cause so great an injury does not relieve him from the consequence of his unlawful act, but is merely a mitigating circumstance.
As to the contention that the deceased would have fallen on his face if he had been struck on the back of the head, the expert testimony shows that in such a case, a person instinctively makes an effort to regain his balance. As a result, the deceased may have fallen downwards. Further, the sidewalks almost invariably slop towards the pavement so that when the deceased straightened up, he naturally tended to fall backwards. The accused struck the deceased on the back of the head because it would have been necessary for him to go between the deceased and Yu Yee who were then conversing.
Since the accused committed the felony with treachery, he is guilty of murder.
HELD: Judgment modified. Penalty reduced (mitigated) US v. BURNS [41 Phil 418] Ponente: Street, J. Facts: Frank Burns was found guilty of the crime of arson when he
There is treachery when the offender commits a crime employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tends directly to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended part might make.
In order that a person may be criminally liable for felony different from that which he proposed to commit, these two requisites should be present: 1. that a felony was committed 2. that the wrong done to the aggrieved person be the direct consequence of the crime committed by the offender
burned the car of Pedro de la Cruz. The said car was parked in the basement of the house and the fire ate up the entire house as well as neighboring houses. Due to the conflagration, Cipriano Jazmin, a servant of the de la Cruz family was burned to death. The testimony of Frank Burns‘ employee, Casimiro Breva, proved that it was indeed
Frank who caused the fire as he wanted to teach Pedro a lesson for competing with him in his automobiles-for-hire business. Breva warned Burns that he may cause the death of persons upon burning the car parked in the basement of the house. Burns replied that ―Let whatever burns burn, and those die who ought to die‖. It is now
prayed that Burns be properly convicted not only of arson but also for the death of Cipriano Jazmin.
WON Burns is guilty of murder for the death of Cipriano Jazmin
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1.
for the death of Delfina Gatillo - Paterno was sentenced to reclusion perpetua, 5 co-defendants sentenced to indeterminate penalty of reclusion temporal for murder
2.
for the death of the child - all defendants were sentenced to reclusion perpetua
3.
for the death of Primo Jurolan - the defendants were granted amnesty because Jurolan was a Japanese spy
Held: No. Although the nature of the death of Cipriano Jazmin can be qualified as murder which resulted from a fire set by Burns, the Court was of the opinion that the offense must only be considered as homicide since there was no actual design to kill and that the use of fire should be purposely adopted as a means to that end. The statement of Burns ―Let those die who ought to die‖ may be
indicative of a spirit of reckless bravado rather than of a determinate purpose to take life. However, since two different crimes (arson and homicide) resulted from a single act, the penalty for the more serious crime shall be imposed.
PEOPLE v. PATERNO [85 Phil 722 (March 6, 1950)]
Ponente: J. Tuason Facts: The accused, all volunteer guards, were attacked by a Japanese Patrol guided by Primo Jurolan and Demenciano Chavez. 4 days later, the appellants and other volunteer guards marched to the barrio of Jurolan to search for Jurolan and Chavez who betrayed them. Upon finding Jurolan and his wife, the appellants tied Jurolan‘s
hands behind his back and took him and his wife upstairs where they were stabbed and killed with daggers. Accused Talbin set fire to the house, killing Jurolan‘s 3-year old infant. The 2 other children survived.
Note: No reference to the burning of the house was made.
IssueS: (1) Whether the accused are murder of Delfina Gatillo (wife of Jurolan) in different degrees. - No. (2) For the death of the child, whether the accused are guilty of arson, and not murder. - Yes.
Ratio: (1) All the accused are guilty of murder of Delfina Gatillo, and they have the same degree of participation in the crime and all should be sentenced to Reclusion perpetua. (2) For setting fire to the house, resulting in the death of the child, the accused are guilty of arson, and not murder. Murder or homicide is absorbed in arson. Murder or homicide in a juridical sense would exist if the killing were the objective of the malefactor and the burning of a building were resorted to only as the means of accomplishing his purpose. The rule is otherwise when arson, as in this case, is itself the end and the death is a mere consequence.
The defendants‘ plea is that they acted in obedience to the
orders and threats of one Anselmo Onofre for fear of being slain by the latter if they refused to comply, however the defendants did not introduce any evidence to support this claim.
Art. 247 Death or Physical Injuries under Exceptional Circumstances
The trial court sentenced as follows:
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PEOPLE v. GONZALES [68 Phil 66 (1939)]
Facts: At midday of June 2, 1938, on returning to his house from the woods, Marciano Gonzales surprised his wife, Sixta Quilason, and Isabelo Evangelio in the act of adultery, the latter having escaped by jumping through the door of the house. He scolded his wife for such act, told her that the man was the very one who used to ask rice and food from them, and counseled her not to repeat the same faithlessness. His wife, promised him not to do the act again. Thereafter - the accused continued testifying - he left the house and went towards the South to see his carabaos. Upon returning to his house at about five o'clock in the afternoon, and not finding his wife there, he looked for her and found her with Isabelo near the toilet of his house in a place covered with underbush. When he saw them, his wife was rising up, while Isabelo, who was standing and buttoning his drawers, immediately took to his heels. The accused went after him, but unable to overtake him, he returned to where his wife was and, completely obfuscated, attacked her with a knife without intending to kill her. Thereafter, he took pity on her and took her dead body to his house. –court‘s version
Issue: WON Gonzales is entitled to the privilege granted by RPC 247 "Any legally married person who, having surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill either of them or both of them in the actor immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro.‖
Decision: Majority said that Gonzales is not covered by RPC 247, primarily because he did not surprise his spouse in the act. He did not actually witness that his spouse and the paramour are having sexual
intercourse. What he witnessed was his wife getting up and Isabelo buttoning his drawers. The majority said that this was not contemplated by RPC 247 because the article contemplates situations where what was witnessed was the consummation of adultery. Moreover, the court said that it was improbable that the lovers would have sex near the toilet when it was a place where a lot of people pass by.
Dissents (by Imperial, J. and Laurel, J.) The RPC provision should not be interpreted too narrowly and strictly. Such interpretation is against the intent of the legislators. RPC 247 also contemplates situations where no doubt is left that the spouse and the paramour were engaged in the commission of the act. Witnessing the consummation of the sexual intercourse is not really necessary before the surprised spouse raise the ―chastising hand‖. ―Taking into consideration the acts of the parties, their behavior and
appearances, the surrounding circumstances, the entire res gestae, it is clear to a rational mind that they had committed the adulterous act. It is not necessary that the husband should be actual and living witness to the act of copulation to entitle him to the benefits of article 247 of the Revised Penal Code.‖
Arts. 251 and 252 Death & Physical Injuries in a Tumultuous Affray Chapter 2: Physical Injuries
Art. 262-266
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AGUIRRE v. SEC. OF JUSTICE [G.R. No. 170723 (March 3, 2008)] Nature : Petition on Certiorari Ponente:Chico-Nazario Facts: Larry Aguirre is petitioner's common law brother, he is a mentally deficient 24 year old. The parents of pettioner Aguirre had him vasectomized as they had become too old to take care of him and a vasectomy in order to ―protect‖ him. Due to this psychiatric
counseling was sought in order that his consent may be secured for the procedure. The vasectomy eventually proceeded. Petitioner claims that such consent was secured via falsification of documents by the doctors who did psychiatric testing and charged the defendants with mutilation because of the vasectomy. Issue: W/N Vasectomy is mutilation.
Held: It is not mutilation Ratio: Mutilation consists in the complete deprivation of an organ that is necessary for generation (reproduction). What was merely operated on was Larry's vas deferens which, while it made him sterile, did not deprive him of his reproductive organ. A vasectomy is also reversible. What is contemplated as mutilation in Art 262 is castration, meaning the lopping off of the testes.
US v. PUNSALAN [23 Phil 375 (November 5, 1912)] Ponente: Carson, J
Nature: Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Tarlac Facts: 1. On August 11, 1910, Ciriaco Punsalan, defendant and appellant attacked Juan de Jesus with a penknife, inflicting
upon him injuries in 3 fingers of his left hand and as a result of which said fingers have become useless. 2. He was charged with the crime of lesions graves (serious physical injuries) in the CFI of Tarlac and sentenced to prision correccional in its medium period (in accordance with Art 416, par 2 of the RPC)
Issue(s): W/N trial court judge erred in charging Punsalan with the penalty of prision correccional, medium period (under par 2) instead of prision correccional, minimum period (under par 3)
Held: YES Ratio: 1. True, it was conclusively established that the defendant did attack Juan de Jesus in which he suffered injuries on his left hand. 2. However, the Supreme Court is of the opinion that he should have been punished under par 3 because the allegation contained in the information is only to the effect that the injured party lost the use of 3 of the fingers of his left hand, not the allegation touching the loss of the use of the hand itself. 3. Par 2 states that prision correccional medium period should be imposed if in consequence of the physical injuries, the person injured shall have lost any principal member or shall have lost the use of such member; 4. Par 3 states that prision correccional minimum period should be imposed if in consequence of the physical injuries the person injured shall have become deformed, or shall have lost some member other than a principal member or shall have lost the use of such member.
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5. In this case, three fingers aren‘t considered principal members and without an allegation that as a result of the loss of the use of the three fingers, the hand itself (a principal member) has been lost, the information charges only the infliction of injuries as defined in par 3 and not of par 2. Judgment affirmed, penalty reduced to min.
*Note: The Supreme Court gave an example of a case it decided on August 1874 where it held that the injured party having three of his fingers cut-off resulting in the loss of the use of his hand itself, the accused would have to be charged with prision correccional in its medium period (under par 2). It was included in the information that due to the loss of 3 of the fingers of the injured party‘s hand, it had lost the use of the hand
itself. In the case at bar, it was only alleged that there was a loss in the use of three of the injured party‘s fingers.
Hand – considered as principal member (par 2) Fingers – member other than a principal member (par 3)
Contapay pushed Aviles who ran away. Arenas was brought to the hospital but died. Aviles was convicted by the RTC of murder for the killing of Arenas and of slight physical injuries for stabbing Contapay.
Issue: W/N the conviction for slight physical injuries with respect to the stabbing of Contapay was correct
Held: Yes. While the prosecution sufficiently established that Aviles stabbed Contapay, it failed to prove intent to kill , which is an element of both frustrated and attempted homicide. The evidence shows that Contapay on the knee only for the purpose of preventing the latter from further helping Arenas. Since there was no proof of the extent of the injury or the period of incapacity for labor or of the required medical attendance, Aviles can only be convicted of slight physical injuries.
Chapter 3: Rape Art. 266-A to Art. 266-D Rape
PEOPLE v. AVILES [541 SCRA 265] Ponente: CHICO-NAZARIO, J Nature : appeal from a decision of the CA Facts: While Aviles was stabbing Arenas (the passenger of a passenger jeep), driver Contapay halted the jeep tried to help the latter by holding the hand of Aviles. Aviles stabbed Contapay on his left knee.
PEOPLE v PEÑA [80 SCRA 589] Facts: This is a case of forcible abduction with rape. The trial court convicted the accused, Rolando Peña, of rape only. It found that forcible abduction was not proven because lewd designs were absent in the taking by the accused of the complainant, Esther Tayag, from
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Ocampo Street, Caloocan City to an isolated hut in Manila Bay near Lido Beach, Noveleta, Cavite, where she was allegedly raped. Peña, twenty-eight years old, single, a native of General Trias, Cavite, formerly a second year college student at the Feati University and a resident of 3435 A. B. Tan Street, Barrio Obrero Tondo, Manila, was a security guard of the Hercon Security Agency, 158 Lakandula Street, Bulakena Restaurant, North Harbor, Tondo, Manila. Esther Tayag, twenty-three years old, single and a resident of 133 Macabalo Street, Caloocan City, was a sales girl since 1966 of the Shelton Department Store located at Carriedo Street, Quiapo, Manila, with office hours from nine o'clock in the morning to eight-thirty in the evening. She came to know Peña in April 1971 when her friend Oscar introduced him to her at her residence. They were not sweethearts. Peña said that his love for Esther extended up to heaven and that he was ready to marry her so that she would be his wife and would be on his side as long as he lived ("Sapagkat hanggang langit po ang pagmamahal ko sa kanya at handa ko siyang pakasalan upang maging asawa ko siya at maging kapiling ko habang buhay."
o
o
o
o
o
1. W/N there was corpus delicti in the rape case? YES.
Appellant's voluntary extrajudicial confession, that he raped Esther, was, therefore, corroborated by evidence of the corpus delicti.
2. W/N there was forcible abduction? NO.
As to the rape, the evidence of the prosecution consists of Peña's extrajudicial confession and the offended girl's testimony.
Issues :
The result is that the fact of the commission of the rape or the corpus delicti was proven by the testimony of Esther Tayag and the medical certificate and testimony of the medicolegal officer of the Constabulary crime laboratory.
Although the forcible abduction, which was supposedly commenced in Manila, was not proven and although the rape, which was proven, was actually committed in Cavite, still the Court of First Instance of Manila had jurisdiction to convict the accused of rape. The complex crime of forcible abduction was charged in the complaint on the basis of which the case was tried. That complex crime is a transitory offense. The Court of First Instance of Manila had jurisdiction over that complex crime because an essential element of the abduction took place in Manila. Moreover, the averments in the complaint or information characterize the crime to be prosecuted and the court before which it must be tried. The complex crime of forcible abduction with rape was explicitly spelled out in the complaint of Esther Tayag.
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Conviction: GUILTY of Rape committed with the use of a deadly weapon punishable by RECLUSION PERPETUA
PEOPLE v MARIANO [368 SCRA 636 (Nov. 14, 2001)] Pardo, J .
Nature: Automatic Review of the decision of the RTC of San Pablo City
Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness. For consummated rape to be established, what is essential is that there be penetration of the female organ no matter how slight. There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and not merely stroked the external surface thereof.
Facts:
Mariano was charged with three counts of rape against his own daughter. The three occasions have almost identical set of facts: o Mariano would go home drunk and would order his daughter to sleep. o While she was sleeping, he would place himself on top of her. o He would then take off her pants and panty. She would call out for help but he would poke a knife at her. o He would then try to insert her penis into her vagina. However, the penis would not be able to penetrate her vagina, as his organ was big. o He would then stand up and masturbate until he would ejaculate. The trial court found the accused guilty of three counts of consummated rape and sentenced him to death.
In this case, the accused did not succeed in inserting his penis into the vagina of her daughter. o
o
The victim only said that ―his penis is touching my vagina.‖ There was no penetration, however slight.
The victim said that there was indeed no penetration because the penis of the accused was too big. The penis of the accused did not enter the labia majora of the victim but merely stroked the surface of the female organ.
o
In the first try, the penis stroked only her singit (groin). Neither was there penile penetration of her vagina on the second and third attempts.
Judgment: Accused guilty of three counts of attempted rape, not consummated rape
Issue: Whether the accused is guilty of consummated rape, or attempted rape
PEOPLE v DAGAOJO [G.R. No. 137834-40 (December 3, 2001)]
Held: ATTEMPTED RAPE Per Curiam
Ratio:
Nature: AUTOMATIC REVIEW of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan.
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FACTS: -
The accused Domingo Dogaojo is the FATHER of the victim Melinda, who accused him of 7 counts of rape. (1st: March 21. 1996; 2nd: March 22; 3rd: March 26; 4th: April 13; 5th: April 21; 6th: May 21; 7th: December 17) In the first 6 accounts, Melinda was only 11 years old and she was 12 years old. She did not report any of the incidents to her mother because her father threatened to harm them if she did. After the last incident, she went to live with her sister, Vangie. During her stay with her, Melinda recalled all incidents.
-
-
Vangie accompanied her to the police authorities (their mother did not believe them) and Melinda subjected herself to a physical examination by the NBI medico-legal, Dr. Vertido.
-
The results of the examination showed that her hymen was intact.
-
RTC found Domingo guilty of 7 counts of rape and sentenced him to 7 death penalties.
ISSUE: WON the offense was rape (or merely attempted rape as contended by the Sol Gen).
HELD: YES, the offense is rape. To convict the accused of the offense, the prosecution must allege and prove the ordinary elements of (1) sexual congress, (2) with a woman, (3) by force and without consent, and in order to warrant the imposition of death penalty , the additional elements that (4) the victim is under
eighteen years of age at the time of t he rape, and (5) the offender is a parent (whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted) of the victim. The age of the victim (11 and 12 years old) were never questioned by the defendant, her birthday being November 19, 1984. And the relationship that she was the DAUGHTER of the defendant was confirmed by Domingo and his wife‘s testimony.
The absence of bleeding affirms the fact that the hymen has not been torn, thus the medical finding that Melinda's physical virginity has been preserved. The lack of laceration in the hymen, however, is not incompatible with the fact of rape. Hymenal laceration is not an element of rape for even the slightest penetration of the labia by the male organ is equivalent to consummated rape. Dr. Vertido admitted upon inquiry by the trial court that it is possible that the male organ touches the opening of the vagina and not cause laceration. Melinda categorically stated that her father inserted his organ into her vagina on all seven occasions of rape. She was certain that her father was able to penetrate her because she felt pain in her genitalia. This refutes the theory of the Solicitor General that there was no penetration of the male organ into the labia of the female organ, but merely a touching of its outer surface. The pain in Melinda's private part could only be caused by the penetration, albeit slight, of the male organ into its opening.
Rape under the first paragraph of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659 is consummated when there is penetration, no matter how slight, of the victim's genitalia under any of the circumstances enumerated therein.
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In their defense, the accused said that on the night in question, (Six members of the Court are of the view that the act committed by accused-appellant was attempted rape, not consummated rape. They hold that there was no evidence of sexual congress however slight. Four members of the Court maintain their position that Republic Act No. 7659, insofar, as it prescribes the death penalty, is unconstitutional. Nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the Court, by a majority vote, that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty should be accordingly imposed.)
Decision of the RTC AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to damages. PEOPLE v SALOMON [229 SCRA 403 (1994)]
PONENTE: Cruz, J. FACTS: While walking along a highway in Samar, mental retardate Sylvia Soria was accosted and forcibly taken to a ricefield by accused Alejandro Salomon and Feliciano Conge, who were apparently waiting for her. There, she was raped by Salomon with Conge‘s assistance. Soria‘s family reported the incident to the police. Soria
was also medically examined by a Dr. Tanseco. The principal witness was Soria herself, who recounted in detail how she was ravished by Salomon. Dr. Tanseco also testified that the laceration in Soria‘s vagina could have been caused by penetration
of a blunt instrument such as an average-sized penis. Spermatoozoa was not found during Soria‘s medical exam.
Soria was asking for a lamp from the people in Epifanio de Guzman‘s
house. When Conge told her that there was no lamp to spare, Soria hit him with a piece of wood. In reaction, he pushed her to the ground and angrily shoved his five fingers into her vagina (as she was not wearing any underwear). The trial court found the accused guilty of rape (as conspirators), hence this appeal.
ISSUES: WON Soria‘s testimony shoul d be given credence given that she is a
mental retardate. WON there is truth to the accused‘s allegation that Soria‘s father is merely using her to get back at Salomon‘s father.
WON the accused should be found liable for the rape of Soria.
RATIO: A mental retardate is not for this reason alone disqualified from being a witness. As in the case of other witnesses, acceptance of his testimony depends on its nature and credibility. It is unnatural for a parent to use his offspring as an engine of malice, especially if it will subject a daughter to embarrassment and even stigma. This allegation is unlikely. The lack of finding of spermatozoa simply points to the fact that the doctor did not have the necessary equipment to make a more thorough report. Regarding the unusual defense, it is too comical for
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words. The Court is satisfied with the findings of the trial court that the appellants, in conspiracy with each other, committed the crime of rape upon Soria. The crime was committed with force and intimidation against a mental retardate, who fortunately was able to narrate the details of the outrage.
HELD: Decision of the trial court is affirmed. PEOPLE v SILVANO [309 SCRA 362 (1999)]
NATURE: Automatic review of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 95
PER CURIAM FACTS:
On January 23, 1996 at 10:30 pm, Sheryl Silvano was awakened by her father, accused David Silvano. He scolded her for coming home late. The accused (who appeared tipsy) lifted her shirt(which she said was her usual punishment since she was 13). He proceeded to touch her private parts saying, ―You did something wrong and I told you I would do that as a punishment to you.‖ He then inserted his private organ into Sheryl‘s private organ and went through the
motions of sexual intercourse. The following morning Sheryl went to school at Jose Abad Santos Memorial School in Quezon City. On February 12, Sheryl left their house at Scout Rallos, Quezon City and stayed at her maternal grandmother‘s house at Scout Lozano,
Quezon City. She could no longer bear the punishment in the form of sexual abuse which she had been getting since she was 13. When she was asked to go back to her parents‘ house, Sheryl confided to her mother and grandmother the real reason why she didn‘t want to
go back home. Thereupon, the mother and grandmother sought the
assistance of General Hercules Cataluna, CPD Chief, who is married to the mother‘s cousin. It must be noted that after cops ―invited‖ the
accused to the precinct without a warrant of arrest. The accused was charged with rape by his daughter to which he pleaded not guilty. The RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced him to death. On automatic appeal, appellant David Silvano denied the accusation and argued that the charge leveled against him was a mere ploy of his wife and the latter‘s relatives for the purpose of severing their marital
relationship.
ISSUE : WON David Silvano is liable for the rape of his daughter. YES.
RATIO: The qualified rape of an underaged relative for which appellant was charged is classified as a heinous crime and penalized under Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Section 11, Republic Act 7659. (please see) In proving such felony, the prosecution must allege and prove the ordinary elements of 1) sexual congress 2) with a woman 3) by force and without consent, and in order to warrant the imposition of death penalty, the additional elements that 4) the victim is under 18 years of age at the time of the rape and 5) the offender is a parent (whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted) of the victim should also be alleged and proven. All such elements are undisputedly present in this case. The victim herein at the age of 16 years was subjected to forced sexual intercourse by appellant, as duly shown in her testimony.
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The victim‘s claim that she was ravished is corroborated by the
his daughter a very sick notion of sex and an even sicker notion of discipline.
medical findings of the physician who examined her. Findings include the discovery of deep healed lacerations on the victim‘s hymen.
organ. Rupture of the hymen is not required. Absence of fresh lacerations does not disprove rape.
The imputation by appellant of wrongful motive to his wife who allegedly used their daughter to sever their marital ties is too shallow. It is unnatural for a mother to subject her daughter to such humiliation and trauma. Furthermore, the appellant failed to prove this allegation, and thus, the victim‘s testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.
Appellant claims that the victim offered only token resistance. However, this cannot be construed as a voluntary submission to
Since rape is crime to which only two people are privy, the case revolves around the credibility of the complainant. The trial court
It is settled that carnal knowledge is consummated by the mere touching of the woman‘s labia of the pudendum by the male sex
appellant‘s desires. The force, violence or intimidation in rape is a
relative term, depending not only on age, size and strength but also no their relationship. Here, the accused outweighs and is older than the victim. Furthermore, the accused is the victim‘s father. The latter‘s moral ascendancy over the former substitutes for violence or
found the victim‘s testimony to be logical, straightforward and candid. Even if victim‘s testimony is uncorroborated, the accused
may be convicted solely on the basis thereof so long as it meets the test of credibility, and the prosecution is not bound to present witnesses other than the victim.
intimidation. Appellant contends that it would have been impossible for him to have raped his daughter so early in the evening in a room where her brothers are sleeping. However, there is no rule that rape can only be committed in seclusion. When charged before the court, appellant denied the accusation and asserted that he gave the victim financial, material and educational support. His excuse regarding support is non-sequitur. The fact that he supports her does not give him the license to rape her. He is obliged to support her under Art 195 and Art 220 of the Family Code. The court even said that the accused violated the obligations of parents enumerated in the Family Code since he was instilling in
When the victim is under 18 years of age and the offender is a parent, the court has no option but to apply the penalty of death. (Art. 47 RPC) Again a little note, since the ―arrest‖ of the accused was without a warrant the evidence gathered from the ―arrest‖ should have been
inadmissible. However, the counsel for the accused was not able to allege such fact. Further, the Court made sure the accused was aware of this omission in their plea, despite this they still weren‘t
able to act on it. Thus he was enjoined from raising such issue. Besides, even if all the evidence gathered from the ―arrest‖ were to be made inadmissible, the conviction would still sustain since the Court relied heavily(almost solely) on the victim‘s testimony.
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HELD: Conviction affirmed.
ISSUE: Was there rape here?
PEOPLE v SIAO [G.R. No. 126021 (March 3, 2000)]
GONZAGA-REYES, J.: FACTS: 1. Private complainant Estrella Raymundo and Reylan Gimena worked for accused Rene as househelpers. 2. Appellant ordered Reylan Gimena, a houseboy of the Siaos, to pull Estrella to the room of the women househelpers. 3. Gimena dragged her toward the women's quarters and once inside, appellant pushed her to the wooden bed.
HELD: Yes. Appellant is guilty of rape, with the aggravating circumstance of ignominy (dog style sex). The qualifying circumstance of use of deadly weapon was not alleged; therefore, such circumstance cannot serve to aggravate the liability of the accused. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
4. Appellant pointed a pistol at Gimena and the face of Estrella.
1. By using force or intimidation;
5. He ordered them to have sexual intercourse thrice.
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
a. During the first time, Rene was holding both of complainant‘s legs. b. They were also made to do it dog style. 6. While they were having sex, Siao was watching them intently.
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
7. When Siao was satisfied, he let them leave.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua .
8. Appellant then warned them: "If you will tell the police , I will kill your mothers ."
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
9. While Estralla was going home that evening, an old man saw her. She was crying and she told him what happened.
It has been held that where the accused in committing the rape used not only the missionary position, i .e . male superior, female inferior but also the dog position as dogs do, i .e . entry from behind, as was proven like the crime itself in the instant case, the aggravating circumstance of ignominy attended the commission thereof. 24
10. They reported the incident to the police. 11. Hence, this case.
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Callejo, Sr., J. Use of a deadly weapon: Considering that the complaint failed to allege the use of a deadly weapon, specifically, that herein accusedappellant was armed with a gun, the penalty to be reckoned with in determining the penalty for rape would be reclusion perpetua , the penalty prescribed for simple rape. Note: I leafed through the whole case and I found no explanation why there was rape in the instant case. All the SC did was set straight the conflicting facts then said that there was rape. Although the accused never had sexual intercourse with the complainant , MAYBE he was still convicted because he was a principal by inducement and/or principal by indispensible cooperation (holding of legs).
Appeal from a decision of the RTC
Facts: -
February 6, 1991 victim, Marina Cano Dapo who‘s 24 years old but with the mentality of a child, was raped by accused in her home
-
Adelaida narrated the event to her mother: accused made her lie down and inserted his private organ into her vagina
-
Adelaida‘s knees sustained contusions when accused pinned
her knees with his leg -
July 31, 1991 a criminal complaint was filed, alleging that accused raped victim through force, violence, threat and intimidation (RPC 335 par. 1)
OBITER:
-
a 14-year old girl from the province, naïve and innocent to the ways of the world, is incapable of concocting serious charges against her employer and fabricating a story of aberrant sexual behavior as can only be told by one who has been subjected to it.
Accused filed a Demurrer to Evidence, claiming that Marina failed to prove by her testimony that he threatened, forced or intimidated the her into having sexual intercourse with him
-
RTC ruled in favor of the victim, finding that accused raped victim under RPC 335 par. 2 (when the woman is deprived of reason or unconscious)
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The accused contends that the prosecutor merely proved that the victim was a mental retardate and that he had sexual intercourse with her he canot be convicted of rape under RPC 335 par. 2 for otherwise, he would be deprived of his right to be informed of the nature of the crime charged against him
OBITER2: First of all, the important consideration in rape is not the emission of semen but the penetration of the female genitalia by the male organ. 16 Well-settled is the rule that penetration, however slight, and not ejaculation, is what constitutes rape.
PEOPLE v BALATAZO [421 SCRA 298 (January 29, 2004)]
Issue: W/N the trial court erred in convicting the accused for a crime to which he was not charged for a crime not included and different from the crime he was charged.
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Ratio: NO -
-
-
-
It bears stressing that force or intimidation may be actual or constructive. In this case, the victim is a mental retardate. The appellant took advantage of her condition and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. Hence he is guilty of forcible rape. The use of roce by the appellant in achieving his lust is belied by the testimony of Adelaida that when she hurried home on the day that the appellant abused Marina, she noticed contusions on her daughter‘s knees. Commonwealth vs. Stephens: o
-
-
June 23, 1998. Naomi Dacanay, a mental retardate, was selling fried bananas at the Frisco Market. Then accused-appelant Magabo approached her and invited her to go with him to his house. Noemi accepted to go to the house. When they arrived in the house of accused-appelant, he began kissing her and fondling her breasts. He made her lie down and had sex with her on the floor. Magobo, in defense, said that Freddie Magobo, (kaaway niya dati) informed Noemi‘s father of the rape to get back at him.
It was not required that the indictment allege that the victim was insane and incapable of giving her conscious consent. A forcible ravishment is one done
Issues: Can Magabo be guilty of raping a mental retardate? Held: NO Ratio: The prosecution failed to allege it in the information. It is
against a woman‘s will; if it is done against her will,
Magabo‘s inherent right to know the nature of the accusations
it is of necessity without her consent; if she is insane or too weak of mind to give a rational consent, then it follows that she has been forcibly ravished.
against him. Hence, even though the medico-legal and the court verified that Dacanay was indeed a mental retardate, the accused cannot be convicted of rape of a mental retardate because it was NOT alleged in the information.
furthermore, accused did not dispute the RTC‘s findings that
Marina was suffering from a mental deficiency and that she was a mental retardate failed to adduce any controverting evidence; opted to merely file a Demurrer to Evidence
PEOPLE v DE LA CRUZ [359 SCRA 667 (2001)] (c/o Adapt)
Held: Accused found guilty under RPC 335 par. 1. Sentenced to
NATURE: Accused-appellant Domingo dela Cruz was charged in two
reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay P50k as civil indemnity and
separate informations filed for two (2) counts of rape by a minor 17 years of age, while the latter was unconscious or otherwise deprived of reason and under the custody of the accused and his wife, punishable under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code.
P50k as moral damages.
PEOPLE v MAGABO [350 SCRA 129] Facts:
PONENTE: Gonzaga-Reyes, J.
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FACTS: On 18 February 1998, her aunt, Rosalina Lamsen, and her uncle, a certain SPO1 Juan Lamsen, took complainant to the house of Virginia dela Cruz, a known faith healer in the municipality and the wife of accused-appellant. Complainant was then suffering from fainting spells and she often lost consciousness. Because allegedly the complainant was being possessed by bad spirits, it was decided that she was to stay at the house of Virginia dela Cruz for observation and treatment of her illness. The eventually stayed at the house of the dela Cruz spouses until 22 June 1998. It was during this period that she was allegedly raped twice by accused-appellant. The accused-appellant allegedly threatened that he would kill her if she would report the incident. She finally told her aunt, Rosalina Lamsen, about her horrific ordeal. Allegedly, when asked about the incidents, accused-appellant admitted that he committed the rapes but that he was only tempted by complainant The defense presented a different version of what transpired. While accused-appellant admitted previously having sexual intercourse with the victim, he claims that these were consensual as they were having an illicit affair. In support of his claim that they were lovers, he recalled particular instances where he and complainant accused-appellant were intimate and he produced a letter allegedly written by complainant confirming their relationship. The trial court rendered judgment finding accused-appellant Domingo dela Cruz guilty of the two counts of rape. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: WoN the accused dela Cruz should be convicted for rape under Article 266-A of the RPC.
RATIO: (Under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of rape is committed, among others, by a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman when the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious or through force, threat or intimidation. In the case at bar, it was successfully proven that in both instances, accused-appellant took advantage of complainant's state of unconsciousness in raping her. Additionally, in the rape which occurred on 8 June 1998, accused-appellant likewise threatened complainant with death and used force on her in consummating his crime. The trial court thus correctly convicted accused-appellant of two counts of rape and sentencing him to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count.) In reviewing the evidence in rape cases, the Court is guided by three (3) settled principles, namely: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where two (2) persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. As correctly found by the trial court, private complainant's narration of the events is more credible and real because it is more in accord with human experience and with the evidence presented, unlike accused-appellant's version. For one thing, it is not disputed that complainant suffered from fainting spells as this was the very reason why she was left by her guardians at the house of accusedappellant. And it is because of such fainting spells that accusedappellant was able to consummate his sexual assault on complainant. Moreover, we have often repeated that under no circumstance would a young Filipina of decent repute publicly admit
HELD: YES.
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that she has been criminally abused and ravished unless that is the truth. This description and narration of accused-appellant of his alleged affair with complainant is quite hard to accept as true. It is difficult enough to give credence to his allegation that a 17 year-old barrio lass would consent to have an amorous affair with a married man almost twice her age. Appellant would want this Court to further believe that it was actually the complainant who was the aggressor and who initiated their romantic liaisons. In support of his "sweetheart theory", accused-appellant presented the testimonies of his wife and brother-in-law and a letter allegedly written by complainant. Also, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's finding that accused-appellant failed to substantiate his "sweetheart theory." Aside from the letter, the existence of which was successfully explained, there are no other letters or notes, photographs or mementos to evidence the alleged love relationship. It is apparent that the alleged affair was merely concocted by accused-appellant to exculpate him from any criminal liability.
PEOPLE V ALCOREZA [GR Nos. 135452-53 (October 5, 2001)] Ponente: Puno, J.
Nature: Automatic Review of decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan
Facts:
Accused Ireneo Alcoreza was charged with rape by his 14year old stepdaughter Estrella Manila and two counts of statutory rape by his 11-year old stepdaughter Mary Joy Manila. Melita Gonzales bore 5 children (2 of which are the victims) in her marriage with Benito Manila. After Benito‘s death, she
married accused Ireneo Alcoreza.
Mary Joy: o
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, accused-appellant Domingo dela Cruz
o
is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count.
Chapter 2: (Rape and) Acts of Lasciviousness Art. 336 Acts of Lasciviousness
September 27, 1997 – she was again left alone the house with the accused. When t he accused mounted her, his penis touched her organ but he failed to insert it as he heard her 8-year old brother arrive. Benito saw Mary Joy naked on the bed.
Estrella: o
Title 11: CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
September 21 1997 – she was left alone the house with the accused. Accused inserted her penis into her organ
October 28, 1996 – no penetration. Testimony: appellant only got as far as raising her shirt up to her abdomen for Estrella resisted the advances and cause Melita to awaken and enter the room; appellant touched her private parts
Benito Gonzales, the grandfather helped the two file the cases against the accused
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Gynecological examination of the two revealed that they were in a non-virgin state.
Guilty of attempted rape in the case of Estrella – indeterminate sentence o
o
Guilty of statutory rape filed by Mary Joy – death penalty
WON prosecution presented evidence of guilt beyond reasonable doubt
o
WON the qualifying circumstance of relationship is present WON the conviction of attempted rape in the case of Estrella was erroneous
Yes No Yes
o
o
Yes o
People vs Campuhan touching of the labia majora or minora of the pudendum constitutes consummated rape
Appellant can only convicted of attempted rape
1st count of statutory rape
Failed to offer the marriage contract of the appellant and Melita which would establish that Mary Joy is the stepdaughter of the appellant. The relationship as a qualifying circumstance in rape must not only be alleged clearly. It must also be proved beyond reasonable doubt, just as the crime itself.
Yes o
Ratio:
2 count of statutory rape (Sept. 27)
No
Held:
Consummated Rape
nd
Moral Damages
Issue(s):
RTC Decision:
o
The testimony, coupled with the medical findings, prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was able to consummate the sexual assault of his hapless victim Mary Joy.
Accused simply denied the rape charges
o
Prosecution evidence failed to prove that rape, at whatever stage, was committed Acts described by Estrella are insufficient to prove that the appellant intended to have carnal knowledge of her.
Appellant can only be convicted of acts of lasciviousnes
It isn‘t unnatural to find minor discrepancies
in the testimony of a rape victim.
US v BAILOSES [2 Phil 49 (1903)]
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The lower court assumed in its judgment that the
defendant‘s purpose was to take revenge upon the prosecuting
Ponente: Ladd, J . Nature : appeal from a decision of the lower court Facts: Saturnina Emiterio owed the defendant a peso
witness for her failure to pay him, and that may doubtless have been one motive, and it may even have been admitted that it was the dominating motive of his conduct, still it cannot be believed that there was no admixture of lasciviousness in the thoughts and purposes of a man who could devise such a method to exact satisfaction from a woman for the nonpayment of a debt.
The defendant Isaac Bailoses, the president of the pueblo, ordered several policemen to her house to arrest her
They brought her to defendant‘s house and beat her with a
stick
The defendant then compelled her to take off all her clothes and dance before himself and many others Lower
court convicted the defendant deshonestos under Art. 439 of the Code.
with
abusos
Defense: The facts do not show the commission of the offense of abusos deshonestos because what defendant did was not by libidinous motives but by the desire to punish the prosecuting witness for not returning the peso
The defect was both cured and waived - waived because no objection was taken at the trial, and cured because the complaint having been adopted by the provincial fiscal in writing signed by him and filed in court, may be regarded for all material purposes as an information (under General Orders, No. 58, Section 6). Judgment affirmed with costs, the cause will be returned to the lower court for the execution of such judgment.
PEOPLE v BALBAR [21 SCRA 1119]
Facts
Defense: The complaint was not sworn to by the prosecuting witness therefore vitiating all the proceedings.
Tiburcio Balbar in Aug. 20 (Aug 29 sa information filed), 1960 went inside the classroom where teacher, Ester Gonzales was in during school classes.
Issue: WON abusos deshonestos could be said to be committed
Without warning after Ester finished writing on the board, Balbar placed his arms around her and kissed her on the eye. Ester pushed him away and tried to flee. Balbar then brought out his daga (a knife) and pursued Ester and embraced her while holding the daga . They fell on the floor and Ester suffered slight physical injuries.
Two informations were made from the same incident.: One for Direct Assault Upon a Person in Authority the other for Acts of Lasciviousness.
where the sole motive of acts such as those under consideration appeared to be anger, curiosity or the like.
Held: YES. Ratio:
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The accused filed a motion to quash arguing that the Direct Assault charge had no sufficient cause of action and that it charges two offenses in a single complaint. Secondly, that the charge of acts of Lasciviousness would place him in Double Jeopardy. Lower court found for arguments of the accused.
lascivious acts and acts of an amorous lover.‖ (citing US v Gomez)
Issue WON the Lower court made an error in quashing the information for the said reasons above.
The presence or absence of lewd designs is inferred from the nature of the acts and circumstances. In this case, taking the manner, place and time, the acts as
The factual setting of the schoolroom with the presence of the students and within the hearing distance of co-teachers rules out the purpose of lewd or lustful designs. Hugging or kissing a girl by surprise is not automatically punishable within Art. 336. lewd designs can‘t be attributed to the accused.
YES
That she is a teacher inside her classroom during school hours in the performance of her duty makes the fact known to the accused. There is no need for the allegation in the info of the knowledge of the accused of the authority of the teacher.
WON the dismissal of the information for lack of lasciviousness is correct. YES WON acts of lasciviousness have been committed. NO.
The SC agrees with this conclusion, that although some acts lead to more than one offense, upon examination of the events, it seems that the acts of lasciviousness do not appear to have been committed. ―It is somewhat difficult to lay down any rule specifically
establishing what conduct makes one amendable to Art 336, which constitutes lewd or lascivious conduct. It is varied from case to case, the demarcation line is difficult to pinpoint between
The case is remanded but the quashing of the Direct Assault charge is set aside. The quashing of the charge Act of Lasciviousness is affirmed.
PEOPLE v CEBALLOS [533 SCRA 493] Note: this is not a long case, but facts therein are important enough to list down
Nature of case: automatic review by the SC after intermediate review by CA On November 23, 1998, six Informations were filed in a Caloocan RTC against Enrique Ceballos Jr for rape. Five counts were charged on complaint of his 14 year old daughter AAA, and one on other 17 year old daughter, BBB. The Informations filed alleged that Ceballos, sexually assaulted AAA repeatedly from December 1997 up to November 1998 and BBB since 1995, on different dates and occasions, usually in the early morning. All of the following
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included the age and relation, and the additional circumstance of grave abuse of authority:
She did not report the incident since Ceballos warned her against doing so.
C-55119
C-55122
December 1997, AAA and her four siblings were sleeping at the second floor when Ceballos touched her breasts and vagina, catching her by surprise. He then removed her clothes, but after trying unsuccessfully to insert his organ in hers, he instead inserted his finger in her vagina and mashed her breasts. She offered resistance by boxing him but was subdued, and he covered her mouth to stop her from crying, making it difficult for her to breathe. He then went to sleep afterwards.
March 1998, 3 days before graduation, AAA was again raped, this time she was told to lie down on her side. He inserted his organ from the back, and she could not offer any resistance on account of her position. She initially cried but stopped for fear of having her mouth getting covered again. After ejaculating, Ceballos went back to sleep.
C-55120 January 1998, AAA was sleeping with her 5 siblings when she was awaken and Ceballos undressed her forcibly and succeeded in inserting his organ into hers. She tried boxing him but to no avail, and he covered her mouth when she tried to cry out. AAA did not narrate this to her siblings; she could not confide in them because they would often quarrel over the household chores.
C-55123 November 1998, between 2 and 3 in the morning, she was raped in more or less then same way. She offered no resistance this time as she felt it was futile, and after he went to sleep, AAA put on her shorts and went downstairs to clean the house. A few days later, AAA narrated the incidents to her classmates and after 2 days, SPO4 Bayani Feria of the Northern Police District, who had been informed of AA‘s plight, accompanied her to the NDP HQ where she executed
a sworn statement charging Ceballos, who was soon after arrested. C-57126
C-551121 February 14, 1998, again AAA was sleeping with her siblings. She awakened as Ceballos touched her organ, removed her underwear, then inserted his finger then his organ into hers. Again, she tried boxing him but he held her hands and told her to give in or he would harm her. She was frightened and did not cry anymore for fear of having her mouth covered and finding it difficult to breathe again.
December 25, 1995, BBB arrived home and learned that her mother CCC had left the conjugal house and went to her parents‘ after a quarrel with Ceballos, bringing along her siblings. At about 2 in the morning BBB awoke to find Ceballos on top of her, and he succeeded inserting his organ into hers, then he went to sleep. BBB did not inform her mother CCC before she left for Qatar in May 1996 as she was threatened by Ceballos that he would kill them and create a scandal in the neighborhood. BBB would go on to say that she was raped an average of ten times every month and every
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birthday of his on except in 1998 when BBB allowed her boyfriend to sleep in their house, but Ceballos raped her the next day anyway. BBB eventually learned that her younger sister was being raped too, and at least once AAA even witnessed Ceballos having sex with BBB. But BBB warned her to not tell anybody what she had witnessed, and this prompted AAA to break her silence.
DDD, Ceballos‘ mother, said the rape was improbable
because of the people in the house, saying instead that CCC instigated her daoughters to file charges in view of her husband‘s objections to CCC going abroad. She also claimed that AAA and BBB were frequently scolded by both herself and Ceballos for not doing chores. Sister EEE affirmed that she lived with the family, and she
AAA was subjected to medico-legal examination, with a finding by Dr. Madrid of the PGH Child Protection Unit that ―physical findings are highly suspicious of sexual abuse‖. BBB was no longer
examined because she was already co-habiting with her boyfriend. CCC said that she left for Qatar on May 1996 and returned to the Philippines on November 1998. While her husband was in jail, Ceballos sent her and her daughters letters asking for forgiveness. Ceballos‘ defense consisted of his testimony as well as DDD‘s, his mother, and sister EEE‘s. He asserted that it was
impossible for him to rape his daughters as there were people living with them, including his sister EEE. He denied the alleged rape of BBB on the 25th of December saying he went after his wife and kids to Malabon that day. Ceballos also denied asking forgiveness for rape; he was asking for forgiveness apparently because he was strict on them and that AAA had filed charges against him. He also said he could not think of any reason why BBB would file a case against him.
witnessed quarrelling in the family because of the children‘s
hardheadedness. She asked AAA and BBB to withdraw the charges but they refused, saying it would infuriate their mother CCC and some of the relatives. Caloocan RTC found the testimonies of AAA and BBB . Ceballos was ―straightforward, categorical, and convincing‖ convicted of all charges except for C-55119 where it convicted appellant for acts of lasciviousness instead of consummated rape. The sentences included prision correccional, 5 deaths by lethal injection, and varying amounts of moral and ex emplary damages. Upon modified provisions of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the case was allowed intermediate review by the CA before it was elevated to the SC. The CA affirmed the RTC with modification of the penalty for the acts of lasciviousness from arresto mayor to prision correccional , and modified the amounts of exemplary damages. This case is now before the SC for final review, and the six cases have been given one docket number.
ISSUE: WON Ceballos was guilty of the offenses charged -_-
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Held/Ratio: Yes. In rape cases, the credibility of the victim is almost always the single most important issue. If the testimony of the victim passes the test of credibility, which means it is credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things, the accused may be convicted solely on that basis.
―Parental punishment or disciplinary chastisement is not enough for a daughter in a Filipino family to falsely accuse her father of rape… It takes depravity for a young girl to concoct a tael of defloration, which would put her father on death row, drag herself and the rest of her family to a lifetime of shame, and make them the object of gossip among their classmates and friends‖.
The finding of the RTC that their testimony was
straightforward, categorical and convincing was given great weight and respect by the SC, especially if affirmed by the CA. The Court listed other reasons to believe AAA and BBB, citing several reasons:
People v Briones: ― A daughter would not accuse her own father of a serious offense like rape had she not been aggrieved. Her testimony against him is entitled to greater weight, since reverence and respect for elders is too deeply ingrained in Filipino children and is even recognized by law… That she would accuse of her own father of this heinous crime had she not been aggrieved would be absurd .‖ Ceballos‘ argument that the acts complained of could not
have been committed due to the presence of other people FAILS. As
repeatedly held by the SC, lust is no respecter to time and place. The nearby presence of the relatives, a cramped room, or the risk of being caught, have been held as not sufficient and effective to deter the commission of rape.
As for appellant‘s allegation that AAA and BBB falsely
charged him as he was strict and he quarreled with his wife, the CA brushed this aside as ―puerile and flimsy‖, and the SC agreed by citing People v. Bidoc:
Also, the letters sent to CCC and her children strongly indicate his admission of guilt thus negating his professed innocence: ―matawana na ninyo ako… kung nagawa ko man ang bagay na iyon… inaamin ko ako‘y nalulon sa bawal na gamut at ito rin ang nagging dahilan kaya ako nakagawa ng di ko gusto. Patawarin niyo ako kung di ko kayang aminin sa korte ang kasalanan ko…‖
(Important doctrine of the case below) The offenses of rape of four of the criminal cases having been commiited in 1998, Ceballos should have been charged under Article 266-A, not Article 335 of the RPC. RA 8353 introduced 266-A. –B, -C, and –D on Rape, and effective October 22, 1997, rape was reclassified as a crime against persons. Since, of rape and information in the same as
as the OSG observes, the acts constituting the crime its qualifying circumstances as averred in the each of the cases filed under 335, are substantially those required under 266-A par. 1 and 266-B,
appellant‘s right to be informed of the charges against him was not
violated (Sir may ask why: in the rules of Criminal Procedure, an accused generally cannot be convicted of a crime not alleged in the information, with exceptions).
The conviction of acts of lasciviousness is in order. While under 8353 was already in effect, and inserting a finger into
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another‘ s genital is considered as rape by sexual assault, the
information charged appellant with rape STILL under 335. Thus, he cannot be convicted of rape by means of sexual assault because it would violate his constitutional right to be informed of the nature of the charge against him. The act of lasciviousness however, is deemed included in rape, so he can be convicted of that. The CA made a mistake finding that no aggravating circumstance was alleged: it was in fact alleged in the information and admitted by the appellant that they were in fact father and daughter.Since RA 9346 suspended the death penalty, he is sentenced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
CA Affirmed, modified aggravating circumstance of Acts of Lasciviousness. RR Chapter 3: Seduction, Corruption of Minors and White Slave Trade Child Prostitution
RA 7610 Special Protection of Children PEOPLE v OPTANA [G.R. No. 133922 (February 12, 2001)]
Ponente: Kapunan -four (4) Informations for violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7610, or known as the Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse and four (4) Informations for Rape were filed against herein accused-appellant Deolito Optana
Facts:
-Maria Rizalina Onciano is the daughter of Nida A. Onciano who was born on December 13, 1981 at Tondo General Hospital. -She was raped by her stepfather, Deolito Optana, in September 1993 and on other several occasions. -On February 23, 1996, Maria Rizalina delivered a baby boy -Accused-appellant was charged for violation of Section 5(b) of R.A. 7610 and Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code for rape
RTC: Charging the accused with two different offenses for the same act committed on the same date against the said victim is erroneous as it is illegal, except where the law itself so allows. Section 5 (b) Republic Act 7610, however, does not so allow. The said law in fact provides that if the child is below 12 years old, the accused must be prosecuted under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. Conversely, if the child is above 12 years old but below 18 years old, then the accused must be prosecuted under Republic Act 7610 for the so called "child abuse
SC: -The trial court correctly convicted the accused for Rape under Article 335 of the RPC in Criminal Case No. 485-95 since it was proved that he raped her in September, 1993. She was below 12 years old at that time. -While Maria Rizalina also testified that she was raped several times after September, 1993, the prosecution, however, failed to establish the material details as to the time, place, and manner by which these offenses were committed. Thus, the trial court acquitted the accused under Criminal Case Nos. 482-95, 483-95, 484-95, 486-95, 488-95, 489-95 for want of sufficient evidence. -Aside from the first incident of rape, all what Maria Rizalina could say was that she was molested by the accused for the last time on October 28, 1995. (She was 14 then) Whether there was force and intimidation to qualify this incident as rape was, unfortunately, not
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proven. Nonetheless, there is no dispute that Maria Rizalina was sexually abused by the accused on this occasion. Hence, the trial court convicted the accused under Criminal Case No. 487-95 for violation of Sec. 5(b) of R.A. 7610 or the Child Abuse Law.
Article 59(2) and (4) of PD 603.
DE GUZMAN v PEREZ [496 SCRA 474 (July 25, 2006)] Ponente: CORONA, J .
Nature: certiorari Facts:
Petitioner Roberto De Guzman and private respondent Shirley F. Aberde became sweethearts while studying law in the University of Sto. Tomas. Their studies were interrupted when private respondent became pregnant. She gave birth to petitioner‘s child, Robby Aberde de Guzman, on October
2, 1987. De Guzman married another woman and had two children with her.
On August 15, 2000, the City Prosecutor of Lipa City issued his resolution dismissing the complaint for abandonment but finding probable cause to charge petitioner with neglect of child punishable under Article 59(4) of PD 603 in relation to Section 10(a) of RA 7610. He appealed to the Secretary of Justice (Hernando Perez) for review. In his appeal to Perez he insisted that (1) he is financially incapable to give support. One can only be charged with neglect if he has the means but refuses to give it. (2) Robby is not a neglected child. He has been given, albeit by private respondent who is the financially capable parent, the requisite education he is entitled to. Perez denied petition.
Petitioner sent money for Robby‘s schooling only twice. In
1994, when Robby fell seriously ill, petitioner gave private respondent P7,000 to help defray the cost of the child‘s hospitalization and medical expenses. Other than these instances, petitioner never provided any other financial support for his son.
Petitioner claims that there was no abandonment or neglect because he is incapable of supporting Robby (he's merely living of his father's wealth blah blah). He further claims that Aberde has capacity to give support to Robby and that he gave money before when he had the means.
Demands for support by private respondent were dismissed by the petitioner despite his capacity to give support (lives in an exclusive village, owns five luxury cars, travels a lot, other children studying in expensive schools). Robby was only able to attend highschool because of the charity of Aberde's relatives. On June 15, 2000, private respondent filed a criminal complaint for abandonment and neglect of child under
Issues 1: Whether or not petitioner can be charged with neglect of child punishable under Article 59(4) of PD 603.
Held/Ratio: Yes. The neglect contemplated in said article has the following elements: (1) the offender is a parent; (2) he or she neglects his or her own child; (3) the neglect consists in not giving education to the child and (4) the offender‘s station in life and financial condition
permit him to give an appropriate education to the child.
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Here, petitioner acknowledged Robby as his son. He has not denied that he never contributed for his education except in two instances (1992 and 1993). He admitted that the boy‘s education was being financed by private respondent and her relatives. He stated under oath that the last time he sent material support to his son was in 1994 when he gave P7,000 for the latter‘s hospitalization and medical expenses. There is a prima facie showing from the evidence that petitioner is in fact financially capable of supporting Robby‘s education. The
notarized GIS of the RNCD Development Corporation indicates that petitioner owns P750,000 worth of paid-up shares in the company.
amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period. The law expressly penalizes any person who commits other acts of neglect, child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child‘s development including those covered by Article 59 of PD 603 "but not covered by the Revised Penal Code ."
The "neglect of child" punished under Article 59(4) of PD 603 is also a crime (known as "indifference of parents") penalized under the second paragraph of Article 277 of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, it is excluded from the coverage of RA 7610.
The argument that criminal liability for neglect of child under Article 59(4) of PD 603 attaches only if both parents are guilty of neglecting
MALTO V PEOPLE [G.R. No. 164733 (September 21, 2007)]
the child‘s education does not hold water. The law intends to punish
the neglect of any parent, which neglect corresponds to the failure to give the child the education which the family‘s station in life and
Ponente: Corona, J.
financial condition permit. The irresponsible parent cannot exculpate himself from the consequences of his neglect by invoking the other parent‘s faithful compliance with his or her own parental duties.
Nature: Petition for review of CA‘s decision convicting Malto (July
Issue 2 (pertinent to our topic): Whether petitioner can be
Facts:
charged under Section 10(a) of RA 7610.
Held/Ratio: NO. Section 10(a) of RA 7610 provides: SEC. 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child‘s Development. –
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child‘s development including those covered by
Article 59 of PD No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as
30, 2004)
28-year old Michal Malto (petitioner) was the professor of 17-year old AAA (private respondent) in Philosophy class, first semester of events occurred SY ‗97- ‗98, in Assumption College. The ollowing f until the filing of the Information: 1. Oct. 3, 1997 – AAA and her friends were talking about the movie Kama Sutra. Malto then butted in and said his xxxrated film collection was better, and he invited them to watch it. 2. Oct. 10, 1997 – Malto reiterated his invitation to AAA and her friends. AAA and one of her friends went with Malto to Anito Lodge, where the accused pulled both of them to the bed but they resisted, and nothing happened. They agreed
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to keep it secret. After, petitioner started to show amorous attention to her, and they became sweethearts. 3. Nov. 19, 1997 – Malto invited AAA to lunch off campus. They went to Queensland Lodge where Malto again tried, but failed, to have sexual intercourse with her. 4. Nov. 26, 1997 – Malto asked AAA to come with him to talk in private, and he brought her to Queensland Lodge. AAA wanted to have sex only after her debut, but upon threats by Malto that he would break up with her, she agreed. 5. July, 1999 – AAA broke up with Malto. She found out that he had been either intimately involved with or sexually harassing his other students. Depressed, she told her mother, BBB, about all that had happened. BBB then filed an administrative complaint in Assumption College against Malto. She also lodged a complaint with the City Prosecutor.
Change in Information : 1. 1st Information: ―…MICHAEL JOHN Z. MALTO of VIOLATION OF SECTION 5(b) , ARTICLE III, REPUBLIC ACT 7610…‖
2. 2nd Information: ―…MICHAEL JOHN Z. MALTO of VIOLATION OF SECTION 5(a), ARTICLE III, REPUBLIC ACT 7610…‖ He was convicted by the trial court, for violation of Paragraph 3, Section 5a, Article 3 of RA 7610. This was affirmed by the CA, only that it found him liable under Section 5b, not 5a. Petitioner contends that there was no rape, and that it was consensual.
Issues: 1. W/N Petitioner could be convicted of an offense not designated in an Information
2. W/N Petitioner violated Sec. 5b, Article 3, RA 7610, as found by the CA
3. W/N The ―sweetheart theory‖may be invoked in cases of child prostitution and other sexual abuse prosecuted under Section 5, Article III of RA 7610
Held/Ratio: 1. YES. The failure to designate the offense by statute, or to mention the specific provision penalizing the act, or an erroneous specification of the law violated does not vitiate the information if the facts alleged clearly recite the facts constituting the crime charged. The facts stated in the amended information against petitioner correctly made out a charge for violation of Section 5(b), Article III, RA 7610, so he could be convicted of the offense on the basis of the facts recited in the information and duly proven during trial.
2. YES. All the 3 elements of Sec. 5b are present in this case: a. Accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
b. Act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse,
c. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
Paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct not only with a child exploited in prostitution but also with a child subjected to other sexual abuse, i.e. when a child, through coercion, intimidation or influence, engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct. While Paragraph (a) essentially punishes acts pertaining to or connected with child prostitution, abused primarily for profit.
3. NO. A child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse cannot validly give consent to sexual intercourse with another person. Unlike rape,
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therefore, consent is immaterial in cases involving violation of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 . The mere act of having sexual intercourse or committing lascivious conduct with a child who is exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse constitutes the offense. It is a malum prohibitum , an evil that is proscribed.
The municipal court found Fontanilla guilty of qualified seduction, hence this appeal.
ISSUE: WON Fontanilla should be held liable for qualified seduction. YES.
Other Notes: Violation of Sec. 5b, Article 3, RA 7610 and Rape are separate & distinct crimes. 1. Violation of Sec. 5b is under special law, and Rape is punished by the RPC. They both have different elements and are separate & distinct. So he can be held liable under Sec. 5b even after finding that there was no rape.
RATIO: Fontanilla contends that the court erred in finding that there is evidence to show that he had sexual intercourse many times with the complainant. After a thorough study of the record, the Court found that the complainant‘s testimony, in direct as well as in crossexamination, is entitled to credence.
Art. 337 Qualified Seduction The appellant further contends that the complainant‘s testimony
PEOPLE v FONTANILLA (1968) PONENTE: Castro, J. FACTS: Fe Castro, a 15-year old virgin, worked for the appellant Mariano Fontanilla and his wife. Just a week after she arrived at their home, Fontanilla intruded into her bedroom, place himself on top of her and fondled her nipples. Prior to this, the accused had made amorous overtures and advances toward her. Aside from giving her money, the accused repeatedly promised to abandon his wife to live with her. The accused succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her repeatedly, as she was induced by his acts of intimidation. The accused made love to her during the day when his wife as away and at night when the latter was already asleep. Castro returned to her parents after Fontanilla‘s wife caught them in f lagrante delicto.
does not merit credence because it is hazy and self-contradictory. He argues that if it is true that he repeatedly promised to marry her, why would she continue having sexual relations with him when it became apparent that he did not mean to make good on his promise? The answer is that Castro had begun to like him and to enjoy the sexual intercourse. This statement by Castro evinces basic honesty and sincerity of Castro‘s part.
It is settled that deceit, although an essential element of ordinary or simple seduction, does not need to be proved or established in a charge of qualified seduction. It is replaced by abuse of confidence. The seduction of a virgin over twelve and under eighteen years of age, committed by any of the persons enumerated in art. 337 ―is constitutive of the crime of qualified seduction … even though no
deceit intervenes or even when such carnal knowledge were voluntary on the part of the virgin, because in such a case, the law
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takes for granted the existence of the deceit as an integral element of the said crime and punishes its with greater severity than it does the simple section … taking into account the abuse of confidence on the part of the agent (culprit), and abuse of confidence which implies deceit or fraud.‖
HELD: Judgement appealed from is affirmed. Art. 338 Simple Seduction Art. 339 Corruption of Minors
Pedro Crisostomo and his companions met them on the way and dragged Macaria Gabriel along and took her against her will to a rice field. The other defendants, Segundo Espiritu, Primitivo Alcoba, and Bartolome Caguiat, caught hold of Candida Acuña, thus preventing her from helping her niece until Gregoria Acuña, attracted by the cries of Candida, went to the scene and attacked with a club the defendants. Candida Acuña was released by her aggressors, and she went immediately to the house of Macaria Gabriel and reported the matter to the latter's brother, Constantino, who ran after the ‗abductors‘ of
Art. 340 White Slave Trade
Chapter 4: Abduction Art. 342 Forcible Abduction
PEOPLE v CRISOSTOMO (1923) (c/o Adapt) PONENTE: Romualdez, J. FACTS: Macaria Gabriel, 30-year old, and her aunt Candida Acuña were on their way to their house after visiting a certain Gregoria Acuña in Barangay Salinas, Bacoor, Cavite.
his sister. The defendants immediately released Macaria. The record as a whole does not leave room for doubt that the defendants took away Macaria Gabriel against her will. The defendant Pedro Crisostomo testified that his elope with Macaria and to get married with Furthermore, Crisostomo spontaneously admitted abduct Macaria in view of the fact that she firmly negative to his proposal of marriage.
intention was to her in Bacoor. his intention to answered in the
In order that this fact may constitute abduction , however, it is necessary that the other element thereof should have been proven, to wit, that if unchaste designs as provided.
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Macaria alleged that Crisostomo kissed her many times while he was holding her and that she was seasick and passed out as a result of the assault.
ISSUES: 1. WON the defendants are liable for the felony of abduction. NO. 2. WON the intention to marry constitutes an unchaste design necessary in the felony of abduction.
corrupt her (libidinis causa ). But when, in explaining abduction through violence , he specifies the elements constituting the same, he says: ―The elements constituting this crime are these: . . . 3. That it be committed with unchaste designs, that is to say, with intent to abuse her . If such an intention does not exist, the
act will no longer constitute the crime of abduction, but a crime against liberty, or that of illegal detention defined and punished in article 495 and following of this Code.‖
RATIO: The defendants are liable only of illegal detention. Crisostomo admitted that his intention in eloping with Macaria was to get married with her. In this particular case, the intention to marry does not constitute an unchaste design necessary in the felony of abduction because Macaria had the required age for consenting to marriage, and it does not appear that either of them had any impediment to contracting it. In arriving at this conclusion the court is not unmindful of the fact that as a general proposition the intention to marry may sometime constitute unchaste which may vitiate such an intention, as in the case of abduction of a minor with the latter's consent, in which the male knows that she cannot legally consent to the marriage and yet he elopes with her. In an abduction of this nature seduction is presumed by the law which may very well be covered by the intention to her married. For this reason, Viada, in defining abduction under the old Spanish laws, says in general as follows: ―By abduction is meant the taking away of a woman from
her house or the place where she may be for the purpose of carrying her to another place with intent to marry or to
Consequently, the unchaste designs that constitute the essential elements of the crime of abduction through violence is the intention to abuse the abducted woman. The court held that those acts that Macaria thought were kisses under those circumstances in which she was seasick and unconscious cannot be considered proven so as to constitute the intention to abuse the abducted woman and thus the unchaste design , and the kissings cannot be held to be such in fact and not merely accidental collisions of heads or faces in those moments in which, according to her, Pedro Crisostomo had caught hold of her by the waist and the back and her head was hanging; and much less can such kissings be held proven over the categorial denial of Pedro Crisostomo of having kissed her. It was incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that the defendants were actuated by unchaste designs, but such unchaste designs were not proven. Therefore, the accused are not liable for the felony abduction but only for illegal detention as provided for by law.
PEOPLE V JOSE [37 SCRA 450 (Feb 6, 1971)]
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Plaintiff: People of the Philippines Defendants: Jaime Jose, Basilio Pineda, Edgardo Aquino, Rogelio Canal
Publicity of the case / 5. Aggravating Circumstances / 6. Imposition of death penalty)
Held / Ratio: Appellants are guilty of the complex crime of forcible Facts: -
-
-
-
June 26, 1967 – As Maggie de la Riva (beauty queen/host/celebrity) was on her way home with her maid, she was chased down by a car, overtaken at her gate and abducted by 4 men (defendants)
abduction with rape, and there being a conspiracy, each is guilty of 3 other crimes of rape. Each sentenced to 4 death penalties. -
o
Blindfolding Maggie, they brought her to Swanky Hotel and took turns having carnal knowledge with her with the use of physical force.
o
o
After the affair, the group ordered Maggie to dress up, pretend nothing happened, threatened her if she went to the authorities and finally, dropped her off in Free Press Building, near EDSA and told her to go home. She informed her mother of the incident when she got home, after consulting with family, she went to the authorities a couple of days after
-
The men were soon caught, with everyone but Pineda pleading not guilty
-
Lower Court: guilty of forcible abduction with rape – death penalty
The evidence is clear that the appellants committed forcible abduction. From the testimony of Maggie:
o
Men helped one another into dragging her into the car against her will She did not know them personally While in the car, Jose and Aquino toyed with her sexually All four of them took turns raping her at the Swanky Hotel
-
Forcible abduction was a necessary step to enable to the accused to commit the acts of rape.
-
Hence while the first act of rape was being performed, the crime of forcible abduction had already been consummated, so that each of the three succeeding crimes of rape cannot legally be considered as still connected with the abduction
Given then the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, the latter crime being more serious, it should be the penalty followed – hence death penalty
Issues: -
What is the crime committed and are the accused proven guilty?
(Note: Court discusses a lot of issues, most of which are irrelevant to the topic of forcible abduction. These issues are 1. Motive and Lewd Design / 2. Admissibility of extrajudicial statements / 3. Mistrial / 4.
PEOPLE v GODINES [G.R. No. 93410 (May 7, 1991)]
Ponente: Gancayco, J.
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Art. 343 Consented Abduction Facts: Esther Ancajas witnessed Rolando Godines and Danny Moreno talking with the Vilaksi couple, then Godines hacked the wife Milagros -- he got some money from them while Moreno stood as lookout. Ancajas tried to escape with her small child, but the men saw them, grabbed them and forcibly brought them to a nearby vacant lot with tall grasses. The men were both armed, and threatened to kill her if she resisted. They took turns raping her; one holding the child while the other was doing it. She tried to resist but they overpowered her. Then they threatened her with death and warned her not to go to the authorities, but she did anyway. In the medical examination, the health officer said it is possible that she had been raped. Godines' defense was that he was in Moreno's house at the time, recuperating from an illness, and that he knew her since they were kids and they never had a misnderstanding. Trial court found both accused guilty of rape, and held that the crime of forcible abduction is absorbed in the crime of rape if the main purpose of the accused is to rape the victim. Issue: W/N forcible abduction is absorbed in the crime of rape. Held: YES.
PEREZ v CA [G.R. No. L-80838 (November 29, 1988)]
Ponente: CORTES, J. Nature: petition to review the decision of Court of Appeals Facts: October 21, 1974 - Yolanda Mendoza filed a criminal complaint against Eleuterio Perez for Consented Abduction in the CFI of Pampanga June 28, 1980 - a judgment of conviction was rendered against Perez. October 29, 1982 - Court of Appeals reversed, and acquitted Perez of the crime of Consented Abduction since they ruled that he should be guilty of seduction and not abduction July 22, 1983 – Mendoza thus filed another criminal complaint this time for qualified seduction.
Issue(s): WON Mendoza can file for qualified seduction using the same evidence she presented for the crime of consented abduction
Ratio: Forcible abduction is absorbed in the crime of rape if the main objective of the appellant is to rape the victim. No doubt the evidence show the appellants through force and intimidation and conspiring with each other successfully raped the victim by taking turns in raping her while the other held the child of the victim and threatened her against resisting.
Held: YES Ratio: While double jeopardy states that "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense" it does not apply in this case because even if the same evidence will be used, it is to
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prove two distinct offenses who have different natures and
which require different elements.
Nature: Automatic review of the decision of the RTC of Legazpi City, Albay
Facts: The nature of the offenses would negate any identity between them since the wrong done in consented abduction is the alarm caused to the parents and family whereas in seduction
the wrong done is to the young woman herself who is seduced.
Consented Abduction and Qualified Seduction share similar elements: 1) that the offended party is a virgin, and, (2) that she must be over twelve (12) and under eighteen (18) years of age. But for consented abduction, the following still has to also occur: - 1) the taking away of the offended party must be with her consent, after solicitation or cajolery from the offender, and, (2) the taking away of the offended party must be with lewd designs. On the other hand seduction requires: 1) the crime be committed by abuse of authority, confidence or relationship, and, (2) the offender has sexual intercourse with the woman.
Chapter 1: Adultery and Concubinage Art. 344-345
Victim Lorielyn Nardo was 14 years old on Feb. 24, 1996 when her father, appellant Alfredo Nardo forced her to have sexual intercourse, threatening her with a knife. She was warned not to say anything or else he‘d kill their whole family. A month later, he
wanted to have sexual intercourse again but she left the house to stay with her aunt. She told her mother about the incident but her mother refused to believe her. With her aunt, the victim was able to file a formal complaint in court. Testimonies for the defendant showed that she had a habit of lying and had a boyfriend. The defendant also had an alibi, saying he was at the farm where he worked at the time the victim claimed she was raped. The RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentenced him to death. For humanitarian reasons, he was sentenced to reclusion perpetua . While her father was in jail, she wrote letters to the attorney of Na rdo, concerned about her father‘s situation in prison.
Issue(s): 1.) W/N she was recanting her claims that her father raped her 2.) W/N there was sufficient evidence established by the victim that her father was indeed guilty of rape.
Chapter 5: Provisions Relative to the Preceding Chapters of Title 11 PEOPLE V NARDO [G.R. No 133888 (1 Mar 2001)]
Ponente: Per Curiam (unanimous decision of the court)
Held: YES (to both) Ratio: 1.) The fact that she had written letters showing concern for her father being in prison does not mean that she recants or retracts her clear testimonies in front of the trial court. Also, a recantation or an affidavit of such must be have been
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sworn to by Lorielyn, which wasn‘t done. In general, it is a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before a court of justice just because the witness or victim ―changed her mind‖. A person testifying that the courts found credible
Complainant alleged 6 instances when respondent judge sexually harassed her. Respondent Judge gives his own version. Justice Salonga was tasked by SC to Report on Investigation and Recommendation. They find in favor of Judge Acosta.
should be taken into consideration by the courts. 2.) Nothing seems to show that the findings of the trial court are not supported by the evidence and testimonies presented to it. A daughter, a minor at that, would not testify against her father if she had really not been aggrieved. She maintained her story throughout the whole trial, even facing her father and knowing he was in jail. Courts usually take into credit the testimony of a girl who is victim of sexual assault. Nardo is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE, with the qualifying circumstances of the victim‘s minority (14) and her
relationship to the appellant. He is sentenced sentenced to DEATH, plus P50,000 for moral damages. And P75,000 as indemnity.
RA 7877, Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995 AQUINO v ACOSTA [380 SCRA 1] NATURE: Administrative Matter in the SC on Sexual Harassment PONENTE: Sandoval-Gutierrez, J. FACTS: The present administrative case filed with this Court originated from a sworn affidavit-complaint of Atty. Susan M. Aquino, Chief of the Legal and Technical Staff of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), charging Judge Ernesto Acosta, Presiding Judge of the same court, with sexual harassment under R.A. 7877 and violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics and Code of Professional Responsibility.
COMPLAINANT: Atty. Susan Aquino st
1 : Nov. 21, 2001
she reported for work after her vacation in the United States, bringing gifts for the 3 judges of the CTA, including respondent. In the afternoon of the same day, he entered her room and greeted her by shaking her hand. Suddenly, he pulled her towards him and kissed her on her cheek
RESPONDENT :
RESPONDENT :
Judge Acosta
Judge Acosta
he explained that it complainant was quite unlikely failed to show by that complainant convincing would ask him to go evidence that the to her office on such acts of Judge date in order to give Acosta him a ―pasalubong.‖ greeting her with a kiss on the cheek, in a 'besobeso' fashion, were carried out with lustful and lascivious desires or were motivated by malice or illmotive. It is clear under the circumstances that most of the kissing incidents were done on festive and special occasions. *complainant's testimony that she was sexually harassed on, is
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in
hardly believable. Notably, complainant declared in her affidavitcomplaint that she brought some 'pasalubongs' for the respondent judge from her trip abroad. Therefore, Atty. Aquino could not have been 'taken aback' by the respondent's act of greeting her in a friendly manner and thanking her by way of a kiss on the cheek
2nd: Dec. 28, 2000
while respondent was on official leave, he called complainant by phone, saying he will get something in her office. Shortly thereafter, he entered
it could not have happened as he was then on official leave
it was established that Judge Acosta was on official leave of absence from December 26-29, 2000.
her room, shook her hand and greeted her, "Merry Christmas." Thereupon, he embraced her and kissed her. her. She was able to free herself by slightly pushing him away 3rd: Jan. 2001
4th: Weeks later
This was corroborated by Ricardo Hebia, the driver of respondent judge, in his Panunumpa (Affidavit)
respondent phoned complainant, asking if she could see him in his chambers in order to discuss some matters. When complainant arrived there, respondent tried to kiss her but she was able to evade his sexual attempt. She then resolved not to enter his chambers alone
respondent explained that he went to the various offices of the CTA to
after the approved proposed
he and complainant * claim of the had been attending complainant that the deliberations of she was sexually
Senate the bill
extend New Year‘s
greetings to the personnel. He also also greeted complainant with a casual buss on her cheek and gave her a calendar. In turn, she also greeted him
respondent admitted that when he handed a calendar and greeted complainant with a buss, complainant reciprocated by greeting him a Happy New Year. allegation of Atty. Aquino that the respondent merely used the calendars as 'props' to kiss her on the cheek and that she was singled out by respondent is not supported by any convincing evidence
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The
expanding the the Bicameral jurisdiction of the Conference CTA, while Committee at the complainant and her Senate on the bill companions were expanding the congratulating and jurisdiction of the kissing each other, CTA. Hence, when respondent suddenly the bill was finally placed his arms approved that around her shoulders particular day, and kissed her respondent, in jubilation and in the presence of other people, gave complainant a spontaneous peck on her cheek. He could not recall any resentment on her part when he kissed her. She even congratulated him in return, saying ―Justice ―Justice Judge .‖ .‖
ka Then
na he
treated her to a lunch to celebrate the event. Respondent recounted several times when they would return to the CTA in the evening after attending the committee hearings in Congress to retrieve complainant‘s
personal belongings
harassed immediately after the final reading of the bill anent the expansion of the CTA at the Senate, can not be accorded great evidentiary value. The alleged kissing incident took place in the presence of other people and the same was by reason of the exaltation or happiness of the moment, due to the approval of the subject bill. Quite interesting to note, is that Atty. Aquino reciprocated by congratulating respondent and remarking " justice ka na judge " after the latter had bussed her on the cheek *Complainant even failed to dispute the fact that after the kissing incident, she joined Judge
from her office. Acosta and his Surely, if he had driver for lunch malice in his mind, at a seafood those instances restaurant in would have been the Luneta. There perfect opportunities was even a time for him to sexually that she allowed harass her the respondent judge accompany her to the office alone and at nighttime at that, to retrieve her car keys and bag when they returned to the CTA after the hearing at the Senate on the CTA expansion bill *these acts are not at square with the behavior of one who has been sexually harassed, for the normal reaction of a victim of sexual harassment would be to avoid the harasser or decline his invitations after being offended. In fact, this
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to
occasion could have provided the respondent judge with the right opportunity to commit malicious acts or to sexually harass complainant, but then Judge Acosta never even attempted to do so 5th: Feb. 14, 2001
6th: Feb.15, 2001
respondent called complainant, requesting her to go to his office. She then asked Ruby Lanuza, a clerk in the Records Section, to accompany her. Fortunately, when they reached his chambers, respondent had left
respondent alleged that he did not call complainant to harass her, but to discuss with her and 2 other CTA employees; this was confirmed by 1 of the CTA employees
Atty. Aquino failed to state categorically in her affidavitcomplaint that respondent demanded sexual advances
respondent called complainant and asked her to see him in his office to discuss the Senate bill on the
Complainant arrived while Judge in his office followed Acosta admitted by court employee, having pecked Ruby Lanuza. He Atty. Aquino on proceeded to discuss her cheek, which
or that the former had committed physical conduct of sexual nature against her. The telephone calls were attributed malicious implications by the complainant
CTA. She again requested Ruby to accompany her. The latter agreed but suggested that they should act as if they met by accident in respondent‘s office. Ruby then approached the secretary‘s
table
which was separated from
respondent‘s
office by a transparent glass. For her part, complainant sat in front of respondent's table and asked him what he wanted to know about the Senate bill. Respondent seemed to be at a loss for words and kept glancing at Ruby who was searching for something at the secretary's desk. Forthwith, respondent approached Ruby, asked her what she was looking for and stepped out of the office. When he returned, Ruby said she found what she was looking for and left. Respondent
the CTA Expansion was avoided by Bill with the latter, the complainant. Then same was not he went for a while meant to sexually to the rest room. harass her. When he returned, Judge Acosta's Ruby had already act of extending left but complainant his post was still there. Valentine Forthwith, he greeting to remarked that he complainant was forgot to greet her done in good on Valentine‘s Day, faith and sans the day before. He any malice. This approached is so because complainant to give immediately after her a casual buss on the complainant the cheek. cheek. But she had displayed suddenly stood and annoyance to the raised her arms to kissing episode, cover her face, Judge Acosta causing her to lose immediately her balance. balance. So he extended an held her arms to apology by way prevent her from of a handwritten falling. Her rejection note saying that came as a surprise the incident to him and made won't happen him feel quite again embarrassed. Shortly, complainant excused herself and left the room. Thinking that she might misinterpret his gesture, he sent her a short note of apology. Respondent further
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then approached complainant saying,
explained that the structure of his ―me gusto akong office, being seen gawin sa iyo kahapon through a glass pa.‖ Thereupon, he transparent tried to ―grab‖ her. divider, makes it Complainant impossible for instinctively raised anyone to commit her hands to protect any improper herself but conduct inside. respondent held her arms tightly, pulled her towards him and kissed her. She pushed him away, then slumped on a chair trembling. Meantime, respondent sat on his chair and covered his face with his hands. Thereafter, complainant left crying and locked herself inside a comfort room. After that incident, respondent went to her office and tossed a note stating, ―sorry, it won‘t happen again.‖
SC reviewed carefully the records of this case and found no convincing evidence to sustain complainant‘s charges. What it perceives to have been committed by respondent judge are casual
gestures of friendship and camaraderie, nothing more, nothing less. In kissing complainant, SC finds no indication that respondent was motivated by malice or lewd design. Evidently, she misunderstood his actuations and construed them as work-related sexual harassment under R.A. 7877. Indeed, from the records on hand, there is no showing that
respondent judge demanded, requested or required any sexual favor from complainant in exchange for ―favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotion or privileges‖
specified under Sec. 3 of R.A. 7877 . Nor did he, by his
actuations, violate the Canons of Judicial Ethics or the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD: The administrative complaint for sexual harassment and violations of the Canons of Judicial Ethics and the Code of Professional Responsibility be DISMISSED . Judge Acosta is WARNED to refrain from doing similar acts, or any act for that matter on the complainant and other female employees of the Court of Tax Appeals, which in any manner may be interpreted as lustful advances.‖
PAAUC v NLRC [331 SCRA 237]
Ponente: Bellosillo, J. Nature: Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari Facts: Rosalinda Perez , hired as a nurse, was fired from work effective November 4, 1994 on grounds of gross and habitual neglect of duties, serious misconduct and fraud or willful breach of
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trust. She filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal but the Labor Arbiter held it to be valid and legal. On appeal to the NLRC they found petitioner corporation guilty of illegal dismissal. Perez contends that she threw the staple and uttered abusive language at her Plant Manager, William Chua because he was sexually harassing her. He manifested a special liking for her during her first year of employment and would sometimes ask her out which she would refuse. He touched her hands, put his arms around her, ran his fingers on her arms, and telling her she looked beautiful. His attitude later changed. He made her understand that if she did not give in, he would cause her termination. NLRC questioned why it took her four years to expose such harassment.
Sexual harassment is an imposition of misplaced ―superiority‖ which
is enough to dampen an employee's spirit in her capacity for advancement. It affects her sense of judgment; it changes her life.
FLORALDE v CA [337 SCRA 371]
Ponente: Pardo, J. Nature: Review on certiorari of a decision of the CA Facts:
Issue(s): WON Perez was justified for such outburst? YES
Ratio: The gravamen of the offense of sexual harassment is not the provided the claim is well substantiated. There is no time period within which he or she is expected to complain through the proper channels. The time to do so may vary vary depending upon the needs, circumstances, and more importantly , the emotional threshold of the employee.
Floralde's version: repeatedly touched her butt and made nasty comments like: Maswerte ka type kita, yung iba may Velsaco: Accused repeatedly touched her breasts and even made comments about her organ: mamula-mula na iyong pag-aari at fresh na fresh ka pa
The uneasiness in her place of work thrived in an atmosphere of tolerance for 4 years. Since the Plant Manager, realized that she would probably never give in, he provoked her, harassed her, and finally dislodged her.
The Civil Service Commission found him guilty by the CA reversed saying there was lack of substantial evidence.
gusto sakin pero hindi ko type
violation of the employee's sexuality but the abuse of power by the employer. Any employee, male or female, may rightfully cry ―foul‖
Yolanda Floralde, Nida Velasco and Normelita Alambra, employees of the Agricultural Training Institute filed Sexual Harrassment cases against their superior Paulino Rema.
Alambra: alleges the same and said accused told her he liked her big butt DEFENSE: it was instigated by his rival Atty. Ola.
Issue:
W/N there was substantial evidence
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TITLE IX: CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY AND SECURITY
Held: YES. CA set aside.
Chapter 1: Crimes against liberty
Ratio:
Sexual harrasment in the workplace is not about a man taking advantage of a woman by reason of sexual desire; it is about power being exercised by a superior officer over gis women subordinates. The court does not believe in the defense that the charges were only instigated by Resma's rival because the case entails going under publicn scrutiny, and as in rape, the court believes that no woman would allow herself to be subject to such if it were not true. There is preponderance of evidence: evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than that offered in opposition to it.
Art 267. Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention
PEOPLE v. DOMASIAN (1993)
PONENTE: Cruz, J. FACTS:
Enrico Paulo Agra, 8 yrs old and son of Dr. Enrique Agra, was walking w/a classmate, Tirso Ferreras, along Roque street when he was approached by a man who requested his help in getting his father‘s signature on a medical certificate. He agreed and
rode in a tricycle with the man to Calantipayan. Enrico became apprehensive & began to cry when instead of taking him to the hospital, the man flagged a minibus & forced him inside, holding him firmly.
The CA erred in reversing the CSC because: ◦
― Well-settled is the rule in our jurisdiction that the
findings of fact of an administrative agency must be respected, as long as such findings are supported by substantial evidence, even if such not be overwhelming or preponderant. It is not the task of an appelate
court to weigh once more the evidence submitted before the administrative body and to substitute its own judgment in respect of sufficiency of evidence.
They took another tricycle and later walked to the market where the man handed a jeepney driver an envelope addressed to Dr. Agra. Then they boarded another tricycle to San Vicente. The driver, Alexander Grate, became suspicious as Enrico would not stop crying. He asked about their relationship & the man claimed they were brothers. Grate became more suspicious as they did not resemble each other. Grate immediately reported the matter to 2 baranggay tanods when the passengers alighted. Grate & the tanods pursued the 2 and somehow the man was able to escape, leaving Enrico behind.
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At about 1:45 pm of the same day, after Enrico‘s return, Agra
received the envelope containing a ransom note demanding P1M for Enrico‘s release. The handwriting was familiar to Dr. Agra & the NBI test showed it belonged Dr. Samson Tan, a resident
examination & analysis ―was more comprehensive than the one
conducted by the PC/INP handwriting expert who disregarded the basic principle in handwriting identification that it is not the form alone nor anyone feature but rather a combination of all the qualities that identify.
physician in the hospital owned by Enrico‘s parents. On t he other
hand, Enrico was able to identify Pablito Domasian as his abductor from mug shots.
NO. The TC chose to believe the NBI expert because his
Domasian and Tan were subsequently charges with the crime of kidnapping with serious illegal detention The defense of both was denial and alibi, Domasian claiming her
Significantly, the NBI opinion was bolstered by the testimony of Agra who believed the ransom note was written by Tan, w/ whose handwriting he was familiar w/ since they were working together in the hospital for 4 yrs.
was watching a mahjong game in a friend‘s house and later
went to an optical clinic w/ his wife and Tan claiming he was in Manila.
TC found them guilty as charged to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and all accessory penalty with P200K as actual and moral damages plus attorney‘s fees
WON crime alleged is only grave coercion & not kidnapping w/ serious illegal detention as no detention in an enclosure was involved.
only in placing a person in an enclosure but also in detaining him or depriving him in any manner of his liberty. Enrico was deprived of his liberty when Domasian restrained him from going home & dragged him first into the minibus that took them to the municipal building in Gumaca, thence to the Market and then to the tricycle bound for San Vicente. The detention was committed by Domasian, a private individual, and Enrico was a minor at the time. Clearly it comes under Art. 267, par. 4, RPC.
ISSUES : WON the defense and not the prosecution witnesses are more credible
NO. Enrico, Ferreras (the classmate) and Grate (the driver) positively identified Domasian as the abductor. They did not know him til that same morning & could have no ill motive whereas Eugenio Agtay, defense witness, can hardly be considered disinterested having known Domasian for 3 yrs. Domasian and Tan‘s alibi cannot stand against the positive
identification by Enrico, Grate and Ferreras. WON PC/INP‘s findings that he was not the writer of the ransom
note & not NBI findings should be believed
NO. Contrary to Tan‘s submission, this crime may consist n ot
WON sending of the ransom note was an impossible crime which is not punishable
NO. Tan claims that since the crime alleged is not against person or property but against liberty, it is not covered by Art. 4, par. 2. But, pursuant to Art. 4, par. 1, even before the ransom note was received, the crime of kidnapping w/ serious illegal detention had already been committed.
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It cannot be considered an impossible crime since there was no inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or the employment of inadequate or ineffective means The delivery of the ransom note after the rescue of the victim did not extinguish the offense, w/c had already been consummated when Domasian deprived Enrico of his liberty. Sending the ransom note only had the effect only of increasing penalty to death as per the last par. of Art. 267
WON there was no basis for finding of a conspiracy between them to make them criminally liable in equal degree.
NO. SC held that the TC correctly held that conspiracy was proved by the act of Domasian in detaining Enrico; the writing of the ransom note by Tan; and its delivery by Domasian to Agra. These were acts complementary to each other and geared toward the attainment of a common objective —to extort the ransom of P1M in exchange for Enrico‘s life.
brought to an abaca plantation where he stayed from 9 A.M. to 1 P.M. of the same day, guarded by Jarang and Ahaddin. When Jamiri Hawadji came, Isirani Sakili was brought to the former's house upon Jamiri's own suggestion. At about 6 P.M. that day he was released, after his brother Hadji Hassan and father-in-law came and gave to Jarang Askali P1,000, promising that the remaining P600 will be given the next day. Isirani Sakili identified among his kidnappers the four accused: Jarang Askali , Ahaddin Panning, Kastiri Sappari , Isirani Askali, Abdusali Jadji, Alammara Dumpas , Jammang Dahim, Kamad Akiran and Ammang Akiran, claiming that he knew them because they were neighbors and grew up together. Defense contends that granting that there was kidnapping, there was no conspiracy to extort ransom. It is urged that only Jarang Askali was active while the rest remained passive and silent. It is further maintained that the accused should not be convicted of kidnapping with ransom because the intention was at most merely to compel Isirani to fulfill his promise of defraying Hayani's hospital expenses.
HELD: Decision of TC affirmed. Domasian & Tan, in conspiracy with each other, committed the crime of kidnapping as defined and penalized under Art. 267 of the RPC.
ISSUE : PEOPLE vs. KAMAD AKIRAN Benzon, J. P., J.
WON the accused except Askali should be charged with kidnapping and not kidnapping with ransom
FACTS: Isirani Sakili, his brother Hadji Hassan, and his driver were on their way to Jolo when they were stopped by a group of armed men, led by Askali. Askali told Hassan to go home and get P1,600 that very day or else Sakili will be killed. Isirani Sakili was then
HELD: NO
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Heavily armed, they all waited for Isirani's truck and stopped it when it came. The others fully concurred in Jarang's criminal resolution when he demanded P1,600 for Isirani's release and affirmed their assent when they escorted Isirani to the abaca plantation where he was confined. Even if they went home afterwards or did not get any part of the money, the fact is that they fully and directly cooperated and did their part so that Jarang's resolution would be carried out. Even if the purpose alleged by the defense be accepted — that is, to compel the alleged payment — under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 1084 effective June 15, 1954, the offense is still kidnapping for ransom. Said amended last paragraph, which increased the penalty for kidnapping and serious illegal detention, provides: The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person.
PEOPLE v. SABARDAN (2004)
PONENTE: Callejo Sr., J. FACTS: Richelle Banluta was born on August 10, 1979. When she was about four (4) years old, Nimfa Banluta allowed saud child to stay in their house and considered her as a natural daughter. At about 10:00 p.m. on September 15, 1991, Nimfa berated Richelle for playing with the diaper of her niece. Richelle, who was then a
little more than twelve years old, placed some underwear, shorts, long pants, and four shirts in her school bag and surreptitiously left the house. She passed by an apartment ownded by Domingo Sabardan, then a 50 year old catechist and herein defendant, while the latter was on his way out to throw garbage. Sbardan inquired where she was going, and Richelle replied that she was earlier berated by her mother and was leaving the house. The appellant invited Richelle to his apartment, and to spend the night therein. Richelle agreed. She felt happy, thinking that she was in good hands. Besides, she had nowhere to go. The appellant led Richelle to a room on the second floor of the apartment, where she slept without removing her pants and underwear. The following morning, the appellant served breakfast to Richelle in her room. He told Richelle that Ella, who stayed in the house, had left earlier at 5:00 a.m. The room where Richelle slept had three padlocked windows with jalousies. Later that day, the appellant served lunch and dinner to Richelle in her room. That night, the appellant entered the room completely naked. Surprised, Richelle asked what he was doing in the room, but the appellant did not respond. Richelle kicked him and pulled his hair, and told him to get out. The appellant left the room. The next morning, Richelle told the appellant that she wanted to go home already. The appellant dissuaded her from leaving and told Richelle that her mother might get angry if she found out that she had slept in his apartment. The appellant later left the house. When Richelle tried to open the door, she found out that it was locked from the outside.
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In the evening of the fourth day of her detention, or on September 18, 1991, Richelle was seated on a coach in the sala on the ground floor of the apartment. The appellant forced her to drink a glass of ice cold beer. When she refused, the appellant threatened to kill her. Afraid for her life, she drank the beer from a glass. The appellant then embraced her, kissed her and touched her breasts. Richelle resisted. Momentarily, she felt dizzy and fell unconscious.
Richelle‘s. She looked out of the window of her house and saw the
appellant in the upper floor of his apartment, walking to and fro. Elizabeth subsequently called the attention of Richelle‘s brothers and the police, and Richelle was subsequently rescued from her captivity.
ISSUE : Early the next morning, Richelle woke up and found herself lying in bed completely naked. She felt severe pains in her vagina. She saw the appellant beside her, also completely naked. She noticed that her vagina was bleeding profusely. She asked Sabardan what he did to her and he told her nothing. Richelle washed her vagina with water.
Whether Sabardan is liable for serious illegal detention with rape or for rape only? RAPE.
In the evening of the fifth day of her detention, or on September 19, 1991, while Richelle was sitting on the sofa on the ground floor, the appellant again forced her to drink beer. She resisted but the appellant threatened to kill her anew. She drank the beer, but consumed only about one-half of the contents of the glass. She felt dizzy and lost consciousness. When she woke up in the morning, she again felt severe pains in her vagina and saw blood in it.
detention. The court agrees with the appellant‘s assertion that he is
The appellant forced Richelle to drink either beer or juice on four other occasions. Richelle felt dizzy afterwards, and would wake up completely naked, feeling pains in her vagina.
her brother‘s friend. However, when the appellant sat on her bed in
On September 30, 1991, the appellant left the house, but closed the door outside with three padlocks. At about 5:00 a.m. on that same day, Elizabeth de Luna, a housewife who lived about thirty meters away from the appellant, heard someone hysterically shouting, "Mang Domeng!." Elizabeth sensed that the voice was that of
RATIO: The appellant contends that Richelle consented to stay in his apartment; hence, he cannot be convicted of serious illegal not guilty of serious illegal detention, but it does not agree that Richelle consented to stay in his apartment until she was rescued. Understandably, Richelle did not leave the appellant‘s apartment on
the first day. She had just surreptitiously left their house in a rebellious mood and had nowhere to go. She believed, at that time, that she was safe with the appellant, who was their neighbor and the evening of the same day, completely naked, Richelle decided to leave the next day. She balked at leaving only when the appellant warned her that her mother, Nimfa, would berate her for sleeping at his apartment. Obviously, in warning Richelle of what to expect from her mother, the appellant wanted to instill fear in her mind to force her to remain in his apartment.
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404 SCRA 275 (June 18, 2003)
Richelle should have left the apartment and returned home that day, and contend with her mother‘s anger for leaving their house and sleeping in the appellant‘s apartment. However, Richelle, then barely
twelve years old and a mere grade six pupil, cannot be expected to react and decide like an adult would. She could not have foreseen the appellant‘s evil intent of raping her.
PONENTE: Callejo, Sr. , J. NATURE: Automatic review of decision of RTC of General Santos City
Moreover, even if she wanted to leave the appellant‘s apartment,
she could not do so because the appellant did not allow her to leave. Frustrated in his first attempt, the appellant was determined to deflower Richelle. And the appellant succeeded, because on the
FACTS: Spouses George and Desiree Lim have 3 children, one of them is 10 yr old Christopher.
fourth day of Richelle‘s stay in the appellant‘s apartment, the
appellant forced her to drink beer which caused her to feel dizzy and rendered her unconscious. The appellant forthwith raped her. In light of the evidence on record, the original and primordial intention of the appellant in keeping Richelle in his apartment was to rape her and not to deprive her of her liberty. Hence, the appellant is guilty only of rape under Article 335, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, and not of the complex crime of serious illegal detention with rape under Article 267, in relation to Articles 335 and 48 of the Code. Hence, the trial court correctly sentenced the appellant to reclusion perpetua . Richelle could not have escaped from the appellant‘s apartment
during her stay therein because the appellant locked the door from the outside whenever he would go out. Richelle could move around the house, but the windows on the ground and second floors had grills with smoked glass; Richelle tried to open the windows, but she could not.
PEOPLE v PAGALASAN GR No. 131926 & 138991
Sept 4, 1994- Their maid was in their kitchen when someone knocked. She opened the door thinking that it was Fernando Cortez, their security guard. Instead, 4 masked men armed with handguns and grenades barged in. Fernando was with them tied behind his back. The men asked the maid to knock at the bedroom where the family was. One of the men were left in the sala while the 3 others went into the bedroom and informed t he Lims that nobody will get hurt if they are given what they want. They took money and valuables. They gave Desiree a note and took with them George and Christopher. One of the men asked George for the key to his Nissan car and they asked George and son to occupy the backseat of the car. 2 of the men sat on either side of the Lims and one occupied the passenger seat beside the driver. After about 15 minutes at Sitio Tupi, the 3 men alighted with Christopher and George was transferred to the front seat beside the driver. He was told that he will be brought to Maasim. The police were informed of what happened. They established a mobile checkpoint. When the driver of the Nissan saw the checkpoint 30 meters ahead, he stopped removed his mask and told George not make any false move. The police questioned them. George told them that his name is Albert Lim for fear of the driver, Michael Pagalasan.
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The police noticed that George is trembling. They got Pagalasan out of the car and George identified himself. They saw a handgun and grenade when they searched the car. They were taken to the police station where the security guard was being investigated. Sept 5, 1994- In his extrajudicial confession, Michael said that he with 3 others, Aladin, Ferdinand (a muslim) and Bong (resident of Purok Islam) kidnapped the Lims upon the order of Aladin‘s brother,
Ronnie Cabalo. (Note: He withdrew this confession saying he was forced and intimidated into making it and he was not provided with counsel of his own choice during custodial investigation). Because of this confession, farmer Hadji Aladin Malang Cabalo, Ronie Puntuan and Fernando Quizon were arrested and detained at Camp Fermin Lira Barracks, General Santos City. Sept 6- They received a letter ―supposedly‖ from the kidnappers ordering the release of Michael and Ronnie Puntuan and asking for 3M pesos for the release of Christopher Sept 9- received another letter signed by Mubarak II or 2 (same sign as the note given by the masked men). It says that they don‘t want the military to be involved neither to prejudice innocent people. They demanded the release of Ronnie Putuan in 3 days or their son would not be released alive. Sept 10- Christopher was rescued by police without any ransom being paid. (How and where? It didn‘t say)
Fernando Cortez (security guard)-he was washing the car. The gate was surrounded by 10 foot wall. The gate was locked. He was shocked when masked men, armed with handguns, suddenly arrived. They poked their guns at him, maltreated him, and tied his hands behind his back. The masked men knocked at the door of the house and when the housemaid Julita Sarno opened it, the men dragged Ferdinand towards the entrance, to make it appear that he was the one knocking. The masked men then barged into the sala and tied Julita‘s hands. Ferdinand claimed he never met any of the kidnappers before September 4, 1994. He was puzzled why he was being implicated in the case.----------->>>>> acquitted. Michael Pagalasan-He is a conductor of his uncle‘s jeepney. He made a living as a conductor of his uncle‘s jeepney. On the evening of September 4, 1994, at about 9:00 p.m., he was in their house. His friend Bong arrived, and invited him for a stroll and to accompany the latter to get a motorcycle. Michael agreed. They took a tricycle and arrived at the Villa Consuelo Subdivision. Michael was surprised when the tricycle stopped near the gate of the Lim residence and masked men suddenly appeared, poking their guns at him. Bong fled, leaving Michael alone to fend for himself. The masked men ordered Michael to drive a car, and warned him that if he refused, he would be killed. Momentarily, one of the men emerged from the house, with George Lim in tow. George gave the key to his Nissan car to one of the kidnappers, who in turn handed it over t o Michael. The men forced George and his son Christopher to board the car. Father and son were seated between two masked men. Afraid for his life, Michael was forced to drive the car with one of the kidnappers pointing a gun at him, seated to his right at the passenger‘s side. The kidnappers ordered Michael to drive the car towards the direction of Barangay Ligaya
DEFENSE Three of the men alighted, bringing Christopher with them. Michael then pleaded to George to bring him first to Tambler, where the
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jeepney of his uncle was parked. Michael wanted to sleep there instead of going home. George agreed, and drove the car himself through Barangay Makar. George told Michael that they had to travel along Espina road, a dirt road, instead of the regular road because they might encounter policemen, and Christopher might be killed by his kidnappers. However, the car had to stop at the intersection of the national highway and Espina Road when George saw policemen and the mobile police car parked at the intersection. Michael was arrested by the police, blindfolded, and brought to the mobile car where he was also mauled. His head was banged against the sides of the mobile car. (then the extrajudicial confession….) RTC October 17, 1994- Case No. 11062- Information filed in RTC for violation of PD 1866 against Michael (judgment: Sept. 24, 2007- for failure of the prosecution to prove the accusation against the accused Michael Pagalasan beyond reasonable doubt, he is hereby acquitted of the crime charged.) On November 3, 1994-Case No. 11098, Michael, Ronnie Cabalo, Aladin Cabalo, Ferdinand Cortez, a certain John Doe identified as Fernando, and Peter Doe were charged with kidnapping for ransom in an Information in RTC (judgment: the accused Michael Pagalasan is hereby found guilty of the crime of kidnapping for ransom as defined and penalized under Article 267 as amended by Section 8 of Republic Act 7659, and there being no modifying circumstance to consider, he is sentenced to suffer the EXTREME PENALTY OF DEATH insofar as the case of George Lim is concerned. The same penalty of death shall also be imposed against Michael Pagalasan in the case of Christopher Neal Lim who was kidnapped
on the same occasion and was released only on the sixth day after his captivity.) Issue(s): WON Pagalasan is guilty of kidnapping for ransom under A267.
HELD: NO. He is guilty of kidnapping (no ransom) of Christopher under A267 and guilty of slight illegal detention of George under A268.
RATIO: For Christopher (A267 par. 4- kidnapping): Pagalasan and others conspired to kidnap George and Christopher and detain them illegally but prosecution failed to prove that they intended to extort ransom. (see the 3 letters below). Of the 3 letters only the second letter is asking for ransom and it is not signed by MUBARAK II or 2. It is possible that it did not come from the kidnappers or others are acting independently to benefit from the situation. Even if the letter asking for ra nsom came from the kidnappers, Pagalasan‘s conspiracy with them already ended at the time of his arrest. There is no proof that what is contained in the second and third letters is with the knowledge and concurrence of Pagalasan. For George (A268-slight illegal detention): George had been kidnapped and detained illegally by the appellant and his cohorts, but only for less than a day. George regained his freedom after the appellant had been arrested at the intersection of the national highway and Espina Road. There is no evidence that the appellant and his cohorts kidnapped George for the purpose of extorting ransom for his release. There is likewise no evidence that they inflicted any serious physical injuries on George, or simulated public authority, or threatened to kill him. Furthermore, there is no
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evidence that the appellant and his cohorts intended to detain the victim for more than three days. The appellant is not entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance under the second paragraph of Article 268 of the Revised Penal Code because he did not voluntarily release George within three days from the kidnapping.
2. The letter received by George on September 6, 1994, ―second letter‖ for brevity, reads: Ronie Puntuan
LETTERS
Michael Pagalasa n
1. The handwritten letter received by Desiree on September 4, 1994, ―first letter‖ for brevity, reads:
Para Sa Inyo Mr. & Mrs. Lim, Una wag na wag kayong gumawa ng hakbang na hindi namin alam o gusto, lalong-lalo na sa pakikipag-usap sa militar o magkoordinate sa militar ay hindi namin gustong mangyari ang ganon mga sistem. Ang pangalawa, wag na wag kayong tumanggap ng negotiator na walang palatandaan na galing sa amin, pakiusap lang yon na dapat
Mr. G. Lim palayain ninyo ang suspek ninyo. Wala silang kasalanan bago natin tapusin ang usapan tatlong milyong piso (3,000, 000) katumbas ng kalayaan ng mahal ninyong anak. Paalisin ang mga sundalo. Kailangan ang Black Out News. Huwag kang magkakamali Mr. Lim. Kunting sipyot mo patay ang anak mo. Isang araw lamang ang tagal namin sa inyo. (Sgd.)
ninyong sundin, madidisgrasya ang aming dala kung kayo‘y
magkakamali ng hakbang. Maliwanag sana sa inyo ang aming mga salaysay.
3. The handwritten letter received by George on September 9, 1994, ―third letter‖ for brevity, reads:
Note…
Para sayo Mr. & Mrs. Lim, Palatandaan na galing sa aming hakbang ay ito – MR. MUBARAK II or 2 Sulat man o telephone
Mr. Lim, gusto ko lang ipaabot sayo ang maikli kong kataga. Unanguna, ayaw namin na mga asong militar na makialam. Pangalawa, ayaw namin sa grupo na idamay ang tao na walang-alam. Alalahanin mo mabuti lahat ng mga kataga na iniwan ko sayo, Mr. Lim. Ang taong dinampot ng militar sa purok islam na si Ronie, ang taong yan walang conection ( sic ) sa grupo, sa madaling usapan, Mr. Lim, alalahanin mo ang anak mo sa oras na tatlong araw na taong
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yan hindi makalabas. Ang isipin mo ang anak mo hindi rin makalabas hanggat sa mabulok sa lupa (maliwanag).
1. YES 2. NO (Sign)
RATIO: Palatandaan MUBARAK II – 2
PEOPLE V. CASTILLO 10 March 2004, Per Curiam decision
FACTS: The Information against Castillo and Padayhag contains the following: On March 1, 1995, in Paranaque, Metro Manila, Elizabeth Castillo and Evangeline Padayhag allegedly kidnapped, carried away and seriously detained Horacio ―Rocky‖ Cebrero IV, a boy of five years old. He was detained for a period of more than 3 days, depriving him of his liberty. Said kidnapping was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the parents of Rocky.
ISSUES : 1. W/N the felony of kidnapping and serious illegal detention was committed 2. W/N Padayhag can be convicted of said crime
HELD:
1. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court‘s judgment convicting Castillo. Padayhag was acquitted. To sustain a conviction for kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, the prosecution must establish the following: (a) offender is a private individual; (b) offender kidnaps or detains victim in any manner depriving him of his liberty; (c) act of kidnapping or detention is illegal; and (d) in the commission of the offense any of the following circumstances is present: (i) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (ii) it is committed by simulating public authority; (iii) serious physical injuries are inflicted on the victim or threats to kill are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female or a public officer. In the case at bar all the foregoing requisites were met. Castillo will have the Court believe that the victim‘s parents did not pay her wages when she worked as a maid of the victim‘s family. (Kidnapping occurred March 1995; Her
services as maid ended on January 1995). She claims the kidnapping was only because of this injustice which the Cebreros inflicted upon her. However, whether or not her employer failed to pay her salary is irrelevant. No amount of perceived injustice can serve as justification for any person to retaliate through the commission of another crime. Castillo‘s claim of injustice cannot justify in any way her demand for ransom. RANSOM is ―money, price or
consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a captured person or persons, a payment that releases from captivity.‖ Thus, even if she had a right to demand her
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unpaid wages, the money she actually demanded and eventually received, is still ransom. Also, for kidnapping to exist, it is not necessary that the offender kept the victim in an enclosure or treated him harshly. Leaving a child in a place from which he did not know the way home, even if he had the freedom to roam around the place of detention, would still amount to deprivation of liberty. Castillo avers that Rocky came along freely with them, was not harmed, and was even cared for during his detention. This is immaterial. The essence of kidnapping is the deprivation of liberty. For under such a situation, the child‘s freedom remains at the mercy and
control of the abductor. 2. Padayhag was acquitted because the prosecution failed to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. That she accompanied Rocky to meet Castillo on that fateful day does not necessarily show conspiracy between the two accused. There must be singularity of intent and unity in the execution of an unlawful objective.
PEOPLE V. JATULAN 2007 PONENTE: Justice Garcia NATURE: mandatory review of CA decision affirming the RTC guilty verdict against the defendant‘s for kidnapping for ransom.
2) The next day the ransom letter is given and the date and place of the exchange is set outside a school on the 15th at 3pm to be delivered by the victim‘s 16 y.o. sister for the price of P250,000. Having no such money the victim‘s
mother asks help from the PACC. 3) On the day of the exchange the accused uses 3 boys to go between him and the courier of the money 4) The police move in and arrest 2 of the boys, the accused and another boy get away. The accused is later arrested in a nipa hut in the mountains where the victim is rescued. 5) A certain Benjamin Ponce, J.r. a relative of the victim is identified as the mastermind of the crime. 6) The accused alleges that he was not involved and that he was arrested only due to his presence in the nipa hut which was said to belong to suspect Ponce. 7) Moreover they aver that no kidnapping/ deprivation of liberty was ever proven beyond reasonable doubt since the victim voluntarily went with his captor (whom the accused claims was Ponce).
ISSUE(s): WON Kidnapping requires force in effecting the detainment. Held: No Ratio: Art. 267 stipulates that for kidnapping or serious illegal detention to be proven beyond reasonable doubt the ff should concur:
FACTS: 1) Feb 13, 95‘ 5 y.o. victim Karwin Amado was kidnapped by the accused (he offered the kid a toy ―shadier‖ which they
would get somewhere)
1. The offender is a private individual who is not a parent nor a female
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2. He kidnaps or detains another or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty 3. The act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal 4. In the commission the ff circumstances any of the ff is present a. The detention lasts for more than 3 days b. It is committed by simulating public authority c.
Serious physical injuries are inflicted or the offender threatens to kill the victim.
d. The victim is a minor, female, or a public official The accused claims that there is no deprivation of liberty occurred in as much as the victim voluntarily went with his captor and while in custody no force was imposed to keep the victim against his will. The SC disagrees saying that the victim‘s compliance was gained by
fraud and that the case pertaining to a 5 y.o. no actual force was necessary to maintain custody over him against his will.
Chapter 2: Crimes Against Security Art 280. Qualified Trespass to Dwelling
US v. ARCEO [G.R. No. 1491/ March 5, 1904] J. Johnson Facts: 1. Feb. 20, 1903; 8-9PM – Arceo and companions, armed, entered the house of Tiongson w/ his wife and sis-in-law w/o first
obtaining the permission of any person. When the accused entered, they (1) put out the burning light in the house (2) wounded Tiongson (3) took money and (3) carried out sis-in-law to the fields and ill-treated her. 2. 2. Lower Court: guilty of entering the house of another w/ violence and intimidation, [(punishable under Penal Code Art. 491, subsec. 2) + nighttime (aggravating Circ.) + (extenuating circ.) Penal Code Art. 11
Issue: W/N trial court justified in finding that the accused were guilty of the crime of entering the residence of another against his will and with violence or intimidation
Held: Yes, affirmed minus extenuating circumstance under PC11. Ratio: 1. Statute does not simply relate to the method by which one may pass the threshold of the residence of another w/o his consent but also the conduct, immediately after entrance, of him who enters the house of another w/o his consent. He who being armed with deadly weapons enters the residence of another in the nighttime, without consent, and immediately commits acts of violence and intimidation, is guilty of entering the house of another with violence and intimidation 2. The inviolability of the home is one of the most fundamental of all the individual rights declared and recognized in the political codes of civilized nations. No one can enter into the house of another without the consent of its owners or occupants. 3. However, under the police power of the state the authorities may compel entrance to dwelling houses against the will of the owners for sanitary purposes. The government has this right upon grounds of public policy. It has a right to protect the health and lives of all of its people.
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4. No one can enter the dwelling house of another, without rendering himself liable under the law, unless he has the express consent of the owner and unless the one seeking entrance comes within some of the exceptions dictated by t he law or by a sound public policy.
Candida Acuña was released by her aggressors, and she went immediately to the house of Macaria Gabriel and reported the matter
5. PC491 vs. Burglary: burglary – there‘s intent to enter for the purpose of committing a felony, while under PC491 - entrance against the will of the owner simply is punishable.
The record as a whole does not leave room for doubt that the defendants took away Macaria Gabriel against her will.
PEOPLE v. CRISOSTOMO (1923)
PONENTE: Romualdez, J. FACTS: Macaria Gabriel, 30-year old, and her aunt Candida Acuña were on their way to their house after visiting a certain Gregoria Acuña in Barangay Salinas, Bacoor, Cavite. Pedro Crisostomo and his companions met them on the way and dragged Macaria Gabriel along and took her against her will to a rice field.
to the latter's brother, Constantino, who ran after the ‗abductors‘ of
his sister. The defendants immediately released Macaria.
The defendant Pedro Crisostomo testified that his elope with Macaria and to get married with Furthermore, Crisostomo spontaneously admitted abduct Macaria in view of the fact that she firmly negative to his proposal of marriage.
intention was to her in Bacoor. his intention to answered in the
In order that this fact may constitute abduction , however, it is necessary that the other element thereof should have been proven, to wit, that if unchaste designs as provided. Macaria alleged that Crisostomo kissed her many times while he was holding her and that she was seasick and passed out as a result of the assault.
ISSUES: The other defendants, Segundo Espiritu, Primitivo Alcoba, and Bartolome Caguiat, caught hold of Candida Acuña, thus preventing her from helping her niece until Gregoria Acuña, attracted by the cries of Candida, went to the scene and attacked with a club the defendants.
1. WON the defendants are liable for t he felony of abduction. NO. 2. WON the intention to marry constitutes an unchaste design necessary in the felony of abduction. 3. WON there is coercion. OF COURSE NOT.
RATIO:
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The defendants are liable only of illegal detention. Crisostomo admitted that his intention in eloping with Macaria was to get married with her. In this particular case, the intention to marry does not constitute an unchaste design necessary in the felony of abduction because Macaria had the required age for consenting to marriage, and it does not appear that either of them had any impediment to contracting it. In arriving at this conclusion the court is not unmindful of the fact that as a general proposition the intention to marry may sometime constitute unchaste which may vitiate such an intention, as in the case of abduction of a minor with the latter's consent, in which the male knows that she cannot legally consent to the marriage and yet he elopes with her. In an abduction of this nature seduction is presumed by the law which may very well be covered by the intention to her married. For this reason, Viada, in def ining abduction under the old Spanish laws, says in general as follows: ―By abduction is meant the taking away of a woman from
her house or the place where she may be for the purpose of carrying her to another place with intent to marry or to corrupt her ( libidinis causa ). But when, in explaining abduction through violence , he specifies the elements constituting the same, he says: ―The elements constituting this crime are these: . . . 3. That it be committed with unchaste designs, that is to say, with intent to abuse her . If such an intention does not exist, the
act will no longer constitute the crime of abduction, but a crime against liberty, or that of illegal detention def ined and punished in article 495 and following of this Code.‖
Consequently, the unchaste designs that constitute the essential elements of the crime of abduction through violence is the intention to abuse the abducted woman. The court held that those acts that Macaria thought were kisses under those circumstances in which she was seasick and unconscious cannot be considered proven so as to constitute the intention to abuse the abducted woman and thus the unchaste design , and the kissings cannot be held to be such in fact and not merely accidental collisions of heads or faces in those moments in which, according to her, Pedro Crisostomo had caught hold of her by the waist and the back and her head was hanging; and much less can such kissings be held proven over the categorial denial of Pedro Crisostomo of having kissed her. It was incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that the defendants were actuated by unchaste designs, but such unchaste designs were not proven. Therefore, the accused are not liable for the felony abduction but only for illegal detention as provided for by law.
WHY NO COERCION: There is no (attempted) coercion because the allegation that the accused tried to compel the victim into contracting marriage was not proven. The acts proven were merely external acts, which by themselves are insufficient to constitute the crime because they might not be connected with the crime of coercion absent intent. There must be both the external and internal aspect whereby the coercive acts must be direct, must be the beginnings of the
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execution of the crime with a direct, rational and necessary tendency to produce the result.
ISSUE : WON the obstruction constituted a violation of Sec 27 of Ordinance No. 11 of the city of Manila NO.
US v. ALEXANDER (1907)
NATURE: Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Manila. PONENTE: Willard, J. FACTS: On November 22, 1904, Asuncion Zamora de Paterno, wife of a member of the advisory board in Quiapo, was standing in the door of her house, No. 162 Calle San Sebastian, in the city of Manila. While standing there the defendant seized her by the wrist, dragged her from the doorway into the street, along the street for 40 or 50 ft, and with the assistance of a third person, placed her in a public carromata. Paterno made such resistance as she could to these acts of defendant.
RATIO: Sec 27 states: ―It shall be unlawful to place or erect any post, fence, stand,
building, or other obstruction, in whole or in part, upon a street, sidewalk, or public way, or to obstruct any street, drain, or gutter, without first obtaining a permit from the department of streets, parks, fire and sanitation.‖
The Court does not think the ordinance in question in this case was ever intended to apply to the use of sidewalk for the temporary purpose for which it was used in this case. To hold that every time that cleanliness required that the wall of the house or the ceiling or the arcade be cleaned of dust and cobwebs, it was necessary to secure a permit from the department of public works would be give the ordinance an unreasonable construction.
Such acts constitute the crime of coacción, unless the defendant was justified in what he did. The defendant‘s (a policeman) justification:
At about 11 am, servants were cleaning and brushing the wall of the house and the part projecting over the sidewalk. He saw that a couple of scaffolds standing on the sidewalk were an obstruction to the sidewalk such that it was impossible to get by. When he went on to ask for the owner (the complainant) and ask her if they had permission for obstructing the street, she answered in an overbearing manner. Sensing that she was to be arrested (for obstructing the street), she started to resist. She was placed in a carromata and was brought to the police station.
The complainant had committed no offense, nor was she found in a suspicious place or under suspicious circumstances reasonably tending to show that she had committed, or was about to commit, any offense. The defendant did not have any right to arrest her, was not justified in his act. If he had doubt if there was an offense or not, then he could have procured a warrant of arrest to protect himself. It impresses the Court that the defendant did not arrest the complaining witness because these ladders were on the sidewalk. We are inclined to think that the real cause of the detention was the
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conversation had between the defendant and complaining witness when the latter came to t he door in response to the summons of the defendant. Aggravating circumstance of public office is noted, penalty is increased from 2 months and one day to 4 months and one day.
SARABIA v. PEOPLE (2001)
PONENTE: Mendoza, J.
Held: Yes. The Court held that Sarabia was only desperately raising minor details in order to impair the credibility of the Mapalad spouses and other witnesses. Furthermore, the court took into consideration the circumstances involved. Sarabia was a city police force member and a neighbour of Josephine. Both complainants were unschooled. At the time of the commission of the crime, Josephine was a 17-year old laundry woman while Anastacio was a simple grocery bagger. Hence, it needs no stretch of imagination that when Sarabia threatened to kill them if they reported the matter, they believed that he could and would make good on his threat. There is also no double jeopardy as there is no same offense alleged. Chapter 3: Discovery and Revelation of Secrets RA 4200, Anti-wiretapping
FACTS: Josephine Picos-Mapalad and her then boyfriend, Anastacio Mapalad (now her husband) were forced to have sexual intercourse in one of the grandstands inside the Garcia Sports Complex by city police force member Sarabia by pointing his gun at them. After having sex, Sarabia ordered Anastacio to buy cigarettes for him while Josephine masturbated his penis. He then threatened them that he will kill them if they tell anyone about what happened. Several days after the incident, the Mapalads filed three informations for grave coercion. Sarabia contends that there were lots of discrepancies in the testimonies of the witnesses and according to him, this impaired their credibility. He also argues that this is a case of double jeopardy.
WON Sarabia is guilty of grave coercion
GANAAN v. IAC (1986)
PONENTE: Feria, J. FACTS: Following are the undisputed facts of the case. Atty. Pintor and his client Montebon discussed the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint of direct assault they filed against Atty. Leonardo Laconico. After deciding the proposed conditions, Montebon made a telephone call to Laconico, who then discussed the matter with his lawyer appellant Atty. Gaanan. When complainant Montebon called up, Laconico talked to him. On the advice of Laconico, Gaanan, using an extension phone, secretly listened to the conversation, where the conditions for the withdrawal of the complaint were discussed. Part of such conditions was the payment of P8,000 to Montebon, to which Laconico was amenable. Montebon was arrested in a
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restaurant by elements of the Phil. Constabulary when Laconico handed to him the said amount. The following day, Gaanan executed an affidavit stating he heard a demand of P8,000 was made by Montebon for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Complainant then charged Gaanan and Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act. Both were found guilty by the lower lower court as charged and were sentenced to one year imprisonment with costs. Gaanan appealed to the CA, but it affirmed the decision of the trial court.
cannot be considered as ―tapping‖ the wire or ca ble of a telephone
line for it was not made for such purpose.
SC RESOLUTION 3 & RATIO: On the issue whether the petitioner
ISSUES :
had authority to listen to the telephone conversation, the SC said the our lawmakers intended to discourage, through punishment, persons such as government authorities or representatives of organized groups from installing devices in order to gather evidence for use in court or intimidate, blackmail or gain some unwarranted advantage over the telephone users. Testimonies under these conditions could be falsified and there is no way of checking it.
1. Whether the telephone conversation between the complainant and accused was private
SC RESOLUTION 4 & RATIO: The Anti-Wiretapping Act is
2. Whether an extension telephone is covered by the term ―device or arrangement‖ under the Anti-Wiretapping Act 3. Whether the petitioner had authority to listen or e\overhear said telephone conversation 4. Whether the Anti-Wiretapping Act is ambiguous and, therefore, should be construed in favor of the petitioner.
SC RESOLUTION 1 & RATIO :
The telephone conversation between the complainant and accused was private. The words uttered in the conversation were made between one person and another as distinguished from words between a speaker and a public. Also, only one of the parties gave the petitioner the authority
ambiguous and, therefore, should be construed in favor of the petitioner. It is general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused (p. 121). Thus in case of doubt, as in the case at bar, the penal statute must be construed as not including an extension telephone.
Title 10: CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY Chapter 1: Robbery in General Art. 293 Robbery
to listen to the caller‘s message with the use of extension telephone.
US vs SANA LIM Nov 19, 1914
SC RESOLUTION 2 & RATIO: An extension telephone is NOT covered by the term ―device or arrangement‖ under the Anti -
Wiretapping Act. It cannot be placed under the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or other devices cited in the said Act. It‘s use
PONENTE: Torres
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NATURE: Appeal FACTS: A certain Moro named Jamilassan with other Moros disembarked at Cebu. They had 101 tins of opium which they wanted to sell. Jamilassan then went to a certain alias Esteban to sell the opium. Esteban didnt want to buy the opium so he went to another Chinese man by the name Sionga (One of the accused) to offer the sale of opium. Sionga didn't have enough money so he went to the the municipal treasurer of the pueblo (Tiburcio Ricablanca) in order to report the attempted sale of opium. Ricablanca then conceived of a plan to seize the opium and appropriate the opium for himself and his co-conspirators. This plan involved seizing the opium tins and replacing some tins with molasses, Ricablanca and his coconspirators would keep some of the tins for themselves and turn over around 23 tins, of which 12 were filled with opium and 11 with molasses. Ricablanca along with a few policemen then seized the opium and continued with their plan. Due to this the fiscal charged them with robbery and they were convicted of it.
ISSUE: Was the felony robbery or estafa?
HELD: The felony was robbery. Appellants argue that because their coaccused were authorized to seize the opium they could only be charged with estafa not robbery because the taking was lawful, the opium was merely misappropriated. However, it must be noted that their intent to gain was conceived even before the seizure of the opium, this classifies their crime as robbery as intent to gain preceded the seizure.
Dissent: Seizure was lawful, it was the duty of the appellants to seize the opium, their misappropriation came only after the lawful seizure hence it is estafa. It was first their object to gain legal possession of the opium by first seizing it, only afterwards did they take advantage of their position to profit illegally. Art. 294 Robbery with Violence/Intimidation against Persons
PEOPLE V. JAVA (November 10, 1993) Nocon, J:
FACTS: 1. At a gravel and sand establishment, 2 men appearing to be customers arrived. One of them went to the office building while the other approached Salvador Cambaya, a truck helper. 2. He then poked a gun at Cambaya, announced a hold-up, divested him of his 20 pesos and ordered him to enter the office where he and other employees employees and customers were gathered gathered in front of the counter by the man identified as Felimon Java. 3. The other guy ransacked the drawers, found some money and took them. They were robbed of 50,000 pesos. The robbers then fled. 4. Michael Valdez, son of the owner, went after the holduppers. He was shot and as a result, he died.
ISSUE :
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W/N the prosecution proved that those who committed the robbery and those who killed the victim are one and the same persons as to establish the crime of robbery with homicide.
HELD: RATIO: 1. Cambaya positively identified the accused as one oft hose who held him up as well as the establishment where he works. Mrs. Valdez identified the same accused appellant as the jeep passenger who shot and killed his son. Hence the connection between the robbery and the homicide was sufficiently established. 2. It is settled that Michael attacked and stopped the robbers when they had already come out of the store where the robbery was committed and got killed in the process; it cannot be denied that the act of killing was done in order to repel an aggression which would have endangered the whole success of the robbery committed. It was done in order to defend the possession of the stolen property. It has also been held that where the deceased followed the robbers after he had been robbed and by reason thereof, he was fired upon by one of the robbers, the crime is robbery with homicide. 3. The same is true even if the murder was perpetrated at a place different from that of the robbery and after an appreciable interval of time.
Robbery with homicide PEOPLE V. AGUSTIN MANGULABNAN, ET AL. G.R. No. L-8919 September 28, 1956
PONENTE: Felix, J. FACTS: 5 November 1953 The spouses Vicente Pacson, Cipriana Tadeo, their 4 minor children and Monica del Mundo (Cipriana‘s mother) were roused by reports of gunfire. Upon realizing that persons were going up their house, Vicente hid himself inside the ceiling. Mangulabnan broke the wall to enter the house, and removed the iron bar from the door leading to the balcony, and after opening said door, 2 unidentified persons entered. The intruders took pieces of jewelry worn by Cipriana as well as some cash. One of the unidentified intruders also asked Monica to give her diamond ring which the latter could not produce, and for this reason, he struck her twice on the face. Terrified, one of t he children called to his mother . Irked by the boy‘s imprudence, the
same unidentified person moved to strike him, but Monica warded off the blow. At this juncture, the other unidentified person put his companion aside and climbing on the table, fired his gun at the ceiling. The three intruders then left the place. After they were gone, Cipriana called to her husband and receiving no answer, climbed the ceiling and found Vicente lying facedown already dead.
ISSUE WON Mangulabnan and company are guilty of robbery with homicide
HELD: Yes. In robbery with homicide, it is enough that a homicide would result by reason or on the occasion of the robbery. It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident, provided that the homicide be produced by reason or on occasion of the robbery, inasmuch as it is only the result obtained , without reference or
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distinction as to the circumstances, causes, modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime.
PEOPLE vs. MARQUEZ April 11, 2002 MENDOZA, J.
Prosecution: The victim, Pampilo Aclan,3 was a businessman engaged in the buying and selling of jewelry, for which he had a store in the market of San Pablo City. Before leaving for home at around 5:00 p.m. on September 22, 1995, Aclan placed the jewelry in two (2) boxes. Then, with his son Jerwin 4 and salesgirl Rizza Cervantes, he went home carrying the two boxes and a shoulder bag containing cash. The three took a tricycle driven by Jimmy Soriso. 5 Aclan, who held the two boxes, occupied the main seat inside the tricycle, while Rizza sat on the small seat to the left of the main seat. Jerwin took a seat behind Jimmy. As the tricycle was negotiating a curve near the entrance to their residence in Francisco Terrace, it was blocked by five armed men, who ordered the driver to stop. Stating that it was a hold-up, accused-appellant pointed his gun at Aclan and demanded that he hand over the bag. When Aclan refused to part with the bag, one of the hold-uppers grabbed it, and a struggle ensued.6 Rizza tried to help the victim keep the bag, but one of the holduppers pushed her inside the tricycle and succeeded in getting the bag. When the victim tried to run after the hold-upper, accusedappellant shot him. The victim fell to the ground, and the holduppers fled with the bag and the two boxes on board the tricycle.7
Jerwin Aclan testified that a hold-upper poked a fan knife (balisong ) at his back. When his attacker was distracted, he punched him, but in the course of the fight he was stabbed on the right arm. Jerwin said he ran to the nearest store, leaving his father and one of the hold-uppers fighting for the possession of the bag. Then a shot rang out. When he turned around, Jerwin said he saw accusedappellant with his gun, standing over the fallen body of his father. Accused-appellant then fled on board the tricycle with his companions, carrying with them the two boxes containing the jewelry and his father‘s bag. Jerwin rushed to his father and, with the help of his elder brother Jomar, took him to the hospital . However, Pampilo Aclan died shortly after.8 SPO2 Rolito Alinea, leader of the investigating team, testified that accused-appellant was apprehended in Batangas City and taken to the Batangas City Provincial Command where he was identified by both Rizza Cervantes and Jerwin Aclan from a police line-up, consisting of accused-appellant and four civilian employees. The parties stipulated, subject to the sound discretion of the Court, that the pieces of jewelry and the cash stolen from the victim
were worth P2.5 million.
Defense: Alibi and Denial On September 18, 1995, accused said he went to his brother Arcadio Marquez‘s house in Taguig, Metro Manila to borrow money because
he needed capital in buying and selling of fruits. Arcadio allegedly told him that the money would come from his wife‘s salary which
would be paid on September 24, 1995 yet. Accused-appellant, therefore, decided to stay and in the meantime help his brother in the construction of a septic tank. After receiving the money from his brother, accused-appellant said he left for Mabini, Batangas. To reinforce his alibi, accused-appellant claimed that while in Taguig on September 22, 1995, the date of the crime in question, he in fact participated in the settlement of a case between the spouses
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Marayan. Barangay officials and other individuals who, together with accused-appellant, claimed to have participated in the settlement of dispute in their barangay corroborated accused-appellant‘s alibi.
Oct. 29, 1992; Gutierrez, Jr., J .
FACTS:
ISSUE: W/N accused committed robbery with homicide?
HELD: Yes
Accused Lagmay, Baetiong and Padullana rode in a passenger jeepney. They brought out their unlicensed firearm and bladed weapons and told the passengers that it was a holdup and threatened them with death if they resisted. They then took away the personal properties of the passengers. When Patrolman
Pedrano resisted, Baetiong stabbed him in the chest while Lagmay shot him on his thighs. The accused were convicted with
Robbery with Frustrated Homicide and sentenced to reclusion perpetua .
RATIO: The evidence on record fully supports the trial court‘s judgment of
conviction. A conviction for robbery with homicide requires proof of the following elements: (a) the taking of personal property with violence or intimidation against persons or with force upon things; (b) the property taken belongs to another; (c) the taking be done with animus lucrandi (intent to gain); and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, homicide in its generic sense was committed. The offense becomes the special complex crime of robbery with homicide under Art. 294 (1) of Revised Penal Code if the victim is killed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery.
ISSUE: WON the felony committed is Robbery with Frustrated Homicide (NO) RATIO: There is no such felony as Robbery with Frustrated Homicide.
In the case at bar, based on the positive identification of Riza and victim‘s son, and on the Necropsy Report of the victim, there was
violence and intimidation employed against the victims and homicide was committed on the occasion of the robbery (i.e. initially pointed a gun at the victim, a struggle ensued when victim refused to hand his bag, pushed Riza inside the tricycle and eventually shooting the victim).
Sec. 2, Art. 294 penalizes robbery that is accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation, or on the occasion of or by reason of which any of the physical injuries resulting in insanity, imbecility, impotency or blindness is inflicted, is certainly not applicable in this case.
PEOPLE V. LAGMAY
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Inasmuch as the prosecution did not establish with absolute certainty the gravity or seriousness of the physical injuries suffered by Patrolman Pedrano, it is proper that the accused be held liable under Sec. 4, Art. 294 (―if the violence or intimidation
employed in the commission of the robbery shall have been carried to a degree clearly unnecessary for the commission
of the crime‖). Sec. 4, Art. 294 penalizes robbery, in the course of
the execution of which, the accused shall have inflicted upon any person not responsible for the commission of robbery, serious
physical injuries defined in pars. 3 and 4 or Art. 263.
The felony was also committed under at least two of the circumstances mentioned in Art. 295. The robbery was consummated by attacking a motor vehicle such that its passengers were taken by surprise. It was also committed along a street on the regular route taken by the passenger jeepney with the use of a firearm.
Judgment: Accused are guilty of the felony of robbery defined in Sec. 4, Art. 294 in the course of the execution of which serious physical injuries enumerated in pars. 3 and 4 of Art. 263 were inflicted and the circumstances mentioned in Art. 295 were present.
PEOPLE v CABBAB, JR.
FACTS: 1. Victim Winner Agbulos went with Eddie Quindasan, William Belmes and others to a y fiesta in a nearby town. Upon arriving they found out that the celebrations were over. 2. During their stay, they met accused-appellant Juan Cabbab, Jr. and his cousin-in-law Sagundino Calpito, who invited them to play ―pepito‖ a local version of Russian poker.
3. Winner was the winner (hahahaha) of about P12,000. After playing, the group of Winner Agbulos decided to head home. On their way, they were ambushed by Cabbab, Jr. and Calpito. Winner died instantaneously because of multiple gunshot wounds. Quindasan died shortly thereafter. The accused got away with the money won by Winner. 4. William Belmes was able to escape death (either due to his alertness or due to the poor marksmanship of the accused). 5. The information filed was for the crimes of Double Murder and Attempted Murder with Robbery. Trial court acquitted Calpito but found Cabbab, Jr. guilty of two crimes (Robbery with double Homicide and Attempted Murder). 6. CA modified the decision and found appellant guilty of the
special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide (reclusion perpetua) and affirmed Attempted Murder .
7. The case was then elevated to the SC for automatic review.
ISSUES: [527 SCRA 589 (July 12, 2007)]
Ponente: J. Garcia Nature: Automatic Review of a decision of the CA.
1. WON he was rightly accused of the complex crime of Robbery with Homicide.
HELD/RATIO:
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NATURE: Appeal from the decision of the RTC of Valenzuela, Metro YES. The crime committer by appellant was correctly characterized by the appellate court as Robbery with Homicide under Art. 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.
Manila.
PONENTE: GUTTIEREZ, JR., J .:
The elements of this special complex crime are: 1. the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons; 2. the property taken belongs to another; 3. the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animo lucrandi; and 4. by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is committed. In Robbery with Homicide, so long as the intention is to rob, the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery. It is immaterial that the death should supervene by mere accident, or that the victim of homicide is other that the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed. Once a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide. Attempted homicide or attempted murder committed during or on occasion of the robbery is absorbed in the crime of Robbery with Homicide which remains fundamentally the same regardless of the number of homicides or injuries committed in connection with the robbery.
PEOPLE v. PONCIANO (1991)
FACTS: Information filed against the appellant states that he took away the following: 1 Sony Betamax, 1 transformer, 1 rewinder, and 2 wristwatches; that during the commission of the robbery and/or by reason/on occasion thereof, the accused stabbed and assaulted Regina Villanueva, Ricardo Rivera, and Alicia Rivera with a bladed weapon. The trial court based its finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt: Eulogio Sanchez substantially testified that in the evening on July 29 1986, he and the accused were in the house of Ricardo (Carding) Rivera, drinking beer; that he felt asleep and when someone woke him up, he saw Lotlot on the floor near his feet; wounded and asking him to help her bring to the hospital; that he tried to lift her but he cannot carry her because he was heavily drunk; that he asked the help of one Zosimo Mediola; that he called for police assistance; that he do not know Lotlot (Alicia Rivera) was wounded; that it was only Lotlot he saw wounded; that when he woke up, he saw the accused standing in the kitchen holding a knife; that they partook a bottle of White Castle Whisky and a Tanduay.
Rowena Fernandez-Rivera substantially testified that she was residing at Balangcas, Valenzuela together with her late husband Ricardo Rivera, his niece Alicia Rivera and her mother-in-law Brigida Rivera; that the accused together with her husband, Eulogio Sanchez and Orlando Silvestre were having a drinking session in their house;
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that Alicia entered the room and asked her why Ricardo was already lying down; that it might have been probably because he was already drunk; that he and Alicia went down to tell everyone to go home; that the accused took out a bladed weapon, approached her and Alicia and brandished the weapon at them; that Eulogio Sanchez was then sitting at the main door and Orlando Silvestre was standing by the window looking outside; that the accused lunged at Alicia; that she ran and went inside her mother-in- law‘s room; that she heard Alicia cry for help; that she did not come out of the room; that when she did, there were already policemen, and the policemen presented to her the accused; that when she went downstairs, she noticed things were not in their proper places; that her husband was sprawled on the bed with a piece of wood on one side of the body; that their Sony Betamax set, the transformer, the rewinder and the remote control were all placed on one side of the table; that the policemen told her Alicia and her husband was dead; hat she noticed the wristwatch of her husband missing; that the Betamax set was on the side of a round table about 7 to 8 steps away from its original place; that the wristwatch of her husband and Alicia‘s watch were recovered from the Fiscal‘s office in Malolos, Bulacan; that the
policemen informed her and her mother-in-law that Alicia, Regina and Ricardo were killed; that Regina is a friend of Alicia; that that all the items were originally placed in the sala; that she saw these items at the side of the round table after the incident
Amelita Rivera substantially testified that she is the brother of Ricardo and Alicia is her neice; that Alicia is the daughter of her brother Reynaldo; that she spent for the funeral and burial of Ricardo.
Benjamin Rivera substantially testified that he is the brother of Ricardo and Alicia is his neice; that he also spent for their funeral and wake.
Valenzuela Pat. Ildefonso Orig, Jr. substantially testified that in the early morning of July 29 1986, he and other police authorities went to the place of the incident; that they found the accused in the terrace of the house of the victim; that he asked the accused to surrender and he did; that he appeared to be high on drugs; that he was holding a stainless kitchen knife before he surrendered; he found the Carding dead with a stab wound; other victims in the back of the house, one already dead and the other (Dina) was still alive and had to be taken to the hospital that Pfc. Chua frisked the
accused and found in his possession two writstwatches, a lady‘s watch and man‘s wristwatch and the push button of the Betamax
machine. Orlando Silvestre testified that in the evening on July 29 1986 he, Eulogio Sanchez, the accused and Carding Rivera were in the
On cross-examination, she said that she did not know whether her husband and her friends had any misunderstanding before the incident; x x x that her husband went up and asked her to prepare coffee for him; that when she returned to their room, her husband was already sleeping; that the accused asked her to wake her husband up but he cannot be awakened; that Alicia went upstairs; that she and Alicia went downstairs to request the accused and his companions to go home.
latter‘s house and had a drinking session; that Carding was drunk
and the accused accompanied him to his room; that he urinated outside of the house; that after he had urinated, the accused called him to say ―Look, he‘s already dead‖; that the accused was holding a
knife with blood; that he was on his way out and saw Lotlot (Dina) and noticed her to have stab wounds; that Lotlot suddenly fell and he tried to lift her but the accused admonished him not to or else he will attack him; that he left the place
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Susana Torres-Villanueva substantially testified that Regina Villanueva is her daughter; that she spent for the wake and funeral of her daughter
The designation of the crime as robbery with multiple homicide is incorrect. Assuming that a complex crime was committed, it should be categorized as robbery with homicide regardless of the number of persons killed by reason or on occasion of the robbery.
Dr. Rodolfo Lezondra, NBI medico-legal officer, substantially testified that he conducted autopsy on the cadavers of Alicia Rivera, Regina Villanueva and Ricardo Rivera on July 30 1986; that in all three, cause of death was hemorrhage, secondary to multiple stab wounds in the neck, chest, abdomen
The appellant was caught red-handed in possession of wristwatches, belonging to the victims Ricardo and Alicia Rivera, and the remote control of the Betamax machine. Such testimony of Orig is not hearsay as Orig was personally present when Pfc. Chua frisked the
appellant and found the aforementioned articles in the appellant‘s Defense
Lawrence Pociano had a drinking session; that they drank whisky; that after drinking for about two hours, he became drunk and was under the influence of drugs; that he do not know what happened afterwards; that before drinking he took plenty of blue max or tribo thrill tablets. On cross-examination, he said that after drinking, he felt sleepy, he went out to the garage and slept; that he do not know what happened anymore; that he was awakened by the police officer that arrested him; that he noticed his pants was covered with blood; that every time he drank liquor and took drugs, he felt drowsy and felt asleep.
ISSUES : 1. Did the court a quo err in finding the accused guilty? NO. 2. Did it err in imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua on three counts? NO.
possession. He is presumed to be the taker in the absence of satisfactorily explanation of his possession. This is in accordance with Rule 131 Sec 3 (j) of the Revised Rules of Court. The appellant did not offer any explanation as to the property found on him. Although no eyewitnesses, there are several circumstances when pieced together will lead to a definite conclusion that the appellant perpetuated the killing. These circumstances are 1. the prosecution witnesses placed the appellant at the scene of the crime; he himself testified that he was there 2. Sanchez and Orig saw the appellant with a knife 3. Fernandez-Rivera stated that the appellant took out a bladed instrument, approached her and Alicia brandished the weapon at them; she saw the appellant lunged at Alicia 4. Silvestre saw Ricardo already dead, saw the appellant holding a knife stained with blood and saw that the appellant had bloodstains on the upper portions of his pants
RATIO:
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Direct evidence is not necessary when circumstantial evidence sufficiently establishes that fact. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: 1. there is more than one circumstance 2. the facts from which all inferences are derived are proven 3. the combination of all the circumstances is such to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt (Rule 133, Sec 4, Revised Rules on Evidence) However, that conviction should not be special complex crime of robbery with homicide. The original criminal design of the culprit must be robbery and the homicide is perpetrated with a view of the consummation of the robbery, by reason or on the occasion of the robbery. When a person is charged with robbery, the intent to rob must be proven. In the case at bar, the requisite criminal design to rob was not duly proven. The appellant‘s taking of the wristwatches was an afterthought. Following People v. Manalang , the appellant is thus
convicted of three separate crimes of homicide and another offense of theft. Notwithstanding the information differently charged, it is a wellsettled rule that that when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint, and the accused fails to object before trial, the Court may convict the accused as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for each and every one of them, setting out the findings of fact and law in each case. Each separate homicide and the crime of theft have been proved.
The aggravating circumstances of dwelling and abuse of confidence or obvious ungratefulness are appreciated in Ricardo‘s killing. The
circumstance of intoxication is not mitigating since appellant failed to prove that the liquor he drunk impaired his mental faculties and that his drinking was not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit the felony. It is aggravating because of the appellant‘s admission of
drinking liquor for a long time and he took part in at least 10 drinking sessions held in R icardo‘s house. Not only was the appellant drunk, but he testified that it was his habit to take prohibited drugs while drinking liquor.
PEOPLE v. ARIZOBAL (2000)
PONENTE: Davide Jr., J. FACTS: In this case, 2 separate Informations were filed before the trial court. The accused, Arizobal, Lignes, Rogelio Gemino and 2 John Does, were charged with Robbery in Band with Homicide for robbing and slaying Laurencio Gimenez and his son Jimmy Gimenez. The 2 cases were tried jointly. The charges against Gemino were dismissed for lack of evidence. Lignes attended the trial until its conclusion, whereas, Arizobal escaped from detention and was tried in absentia. The 2 John Does were never apprehended as they were not sufficiently identified. Evidence shows that several armed men, entered the house of Laurencio Geminez. Clementina, wife of Laurencio, testified that she recognized Arizobal and Lignes as among those who robbed them. When the robbers left with their loot, they took Laurencio with them to the house of Jimmy Geminez. Later, Clementina heard some gunshots, which, she believed, killed her husband. Erlinda Gimenez, Jimmy‘s wife, testified they were also
robbed by the same armed men who brought Laurencio into their house. Erlinda testified that she also recognized Arizobal and Lignes as among those who robbed them. Erlinda believed that the
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gunshots she heard killed Jimmy and Laurencio when the 2 were taken away by the armed men. Lignes in his defense said he was in another place cooking and serving in a house blessing occasion. A witness testified that Lignes was present in the said occasion when the robbery was happening. The trial court gave full credence to the testimony of the prosecution witness and rejected the alibi of Lignes. The trial court found the accused Arizobal and Lignes guilty of robbery with homicide. They were sentenced to die and to indemnify the legal heirs of their victims.
ISSUES : The issues raised in this case are factual and involve the credibility of the witness. 1. Was the assertion of Lignes that the failure of Clementina to actually witness the killing of he son and her husband an adequate proof that she failed to identify him as the killer? 2. Was the alibi of Lignes sufficient to rule out criminal liability on his part? 3. Was there treachery on the part of the robbers? 4. Was the case a case of robbery in band ? 5. Can we cite nighttime as an aggravating circumstance?
GENERAL SC RESOLUTION & RATIO: It is doctrinally settled that in the absence of any showing that the trial court‘s calibrat ion1 of factual issues, particularly on the matter of credibility, is flawed the SC is bound by its assessment. The rationale is the presumption that the trial court is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witness and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. The SC finds 1
To calibrate is to ensure accuracy of something.
no plausible reason to deviate from the trial courts decision that the accused are indeed guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide and it should be punished by death penalty.
SC RESOLUTION & RATIO 1: The failure of Clementina to actually witness the killing of her son and her husband is NOT an adequate proof that she failed to identify Lignes as the killer. As a rule for collective criminal liability, it is not necessary to show that all the conspirators actually hit and killed the victim. It is enough an evidence that all participants performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as unmistakably to indicate a common purpose or design in bringing about the death of the victim.
SC RESOLUTION & RATIO 2: The alibi of Lignes is INSUFFICIENT to rule out criminal liability on his part. His alibi that he was in San Pedro, which is supposedly 1 hour by horseback or 1.5 hours by foot from Tuybo, the location of the scene of the crime, is not a credible and tangible proof of physical impossibility for the accused to be at the scene of the crime.
SC RESOLUTION & RATIO 3: There was no treachery on the part of the robbers; treachery was INCORRECTLY considered by the trial court. The accused stand charged with, tried and convicted of robbery with homicide. This special complex crime is primarily classified in this jurisdiction as a crime against property and not against persons. Homicide here is merely an incident of robbery, the main purpose and object of the criminals. As such treachery cannot be validly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance under Art. 14 of the Revised Penal Code.
SC RESOLUTION & RATIO 4: The case does not constitute a case of robbery in band . The evidence does not disclose that more
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than 3 persons were armed. Robbery in band means more than 3
a sharp instrument at her neck and announcing it was a "hold-up."
armed malefactors united in the commission of robbery. ―Band‖
cannot thus be aggravating where no proof is adduced that at least 4 of the 5 perpetrators involved in this case were armed.
SC RESOLUTION & RATIO 5: The SC held that the aggravating circumstance of nighttime DID NOT attend the commission of the crime. The fact that the offense was committed at 9:30 p.m. does not suffice to sustain nocturnidad for, by itself, nighttime is not an aggravating circumstance. To be properly so considered, it must be shown that nocturnidad was deliberately and intentionally sought by the robbers to facilitate their crime. In fact the scene was lighted; hence nighttime was merely an incidental element to the whole drama.
4.
He grabbed her and brought her to his house.
5.
Once inside the house, he started divesting her of her watch, ring, earrings, and necklace
6.
While pointing an ice pick at her he ordered her to undress.
7.
She acceded for fear that he would kill her as she was under constant threat.
8.
When she was completely naked, he made her lie down
9.
They had sexual intercourse, without the complainant putting up any fight.
10. After 11.
PEOPLE v SULTAN
they had sex, Sultan told her he loved her and that they were to elope
13.
NATURE: appeal from the Decision of the trial court finding him guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with rape
FACTS:
He came back and she sexually abused her once again
12. After
[G.R. No. 132470. April 27, 2000] Belosillo, J.
the first congress, he went out to smoke
In her effort to release herself from his clutches, she ―agreed.‖
14.
She went to her house to get her stuff
15.
She told her sister what happened and together with her brother, they arrested the accused
16.
He was charged with robbery with rape
Respondent:
1.
Private complainant Juditha M. Bautista was on her way home from a visit to her cousin.
2.
She passed by an alley
3.
when she passed the dark alley in her cousin's compound she met accused-appellant Fernando L. Sultan, who pointed
1. there is no convincing proof that he is guilty of the crime charged. 2. On the charge of rape, it was simply a sexual congress of consenting adults. 3. On robbery, she did not even attempt to get her things back
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ISSUE:
Accused-appellant might not have employed force in committing the rape but he definitely used intimidation which was sufficient
Did he commit robbery with rape?
to make complainant submit herself to him against her will for fear of life and personal safety. Accused-appellant grabbed
HELD:
her and dragged her to his house. He was armed with an ice pick and threatened to kill her with it if she did not follow his wishes.
Yes. Under Art. 294, par. (1), of the Revised Penal Code, "x x x [a]ny person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of persons shall suffer: 1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, x x x when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape x x x x"
Robbery While there may have been no effort on the part of complainant to retrieve her personal belongings from accused-appellant even after all threats had ceased, her failure to do so does not under the circumstances necessarily dispute the commission of robbery. Note: The crime has already been consummated . Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "[a]ny person who, with intent to gain, shall take any personal property belonging to another, by means of violence against or intimidation of person, or using force upon anything, shall be guilty of robbery." When accused-appellant divested complaining witness of her personal belongings he committed the crime of robbery. All the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment were present, i.e., (a) personal property belonging to another, (b) unlawful taking, (c) intent to gain, and (d) violence or intimidation.
On rape
ISSUE2: What about the second rape committed? HELD: No effect. In past jurisprudence, the additional rapes that were committed were treated as aggravating circumstance but this should be changed. In the recent case of People v. Regala, the Court held that the additional rapes committed should not be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance despite a resultant "anomalous situation" wherein robbery with rape would be on the same level as robbery with multiple rapes in terms of gravity. The Court realized that there
was no law providing for the additional rape/s or homicide/s for that matter to be considered as aggravating circumstance. It further observed that the enumeration of aggravating circumstances under Art. 14 of the Revised Penal Code is exclusive, unlike in Art. 13 of the same Code which enumerates the mitigating circumstances where analogous circumstances may be considered, hence, the remedy lies with the legislature. Consequently, unless and until a law is passed providing that the additional rape/s or homicide/s may be considered aggravating, the Court must construe the penal law in favor of the offender as no person may be brought within its terms if he is not clearly made so by the statute.
RESULT:
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Applying Art. 63, par. (2), of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "(i)n all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof x x x x 2. (w)hen there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied," the lower penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed on accused-appellant.
Callejo, Sr., J. Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA
FACTS: -
January 13, 1996 (around 7:15 pm) Clarissa Angeles, a third year student of St. Paul University was with her boyfriend William Ferrer
-
They were inside a pick-up truck in a vacant lot near the Office of the Commission on Audit and the DepEd in Tuguegarao, Cagayan
-
Rommel Macarubbo, who pointed a gun at them, together with Willy Suyu and Francis Cainglet robbed the two of the following items:
OBITER on rape Intimidation is subjective so it must be viewed in the light of the victim’s perception and judgment at the time of the
commission of the crime, and not by any hard and fast rule . It is enough that it produces fear, as in the present case, fear that if the complainant does not yield to the bestial demands of accused-appellant something would happen to her at that moment or even thereafter. Thus, it is irrelevant that she was not certain when cross-examined that accusedappellant was armed with an ice pick when the rape commenced; it was enough that he was holding something that looked like an ice pick which engendered fear in her. With fear instilled in her
mind, it is understandable that she did not offer any resistance since any attempt to do so would only be futile.
Such failure on her part should not be taken to mean consent so as to make her a willing participant in the sexual confrontation. Rule: if there is fear, no need to put up resistance.
-
A pair of gold earring= P1,500
-
A gold ring= P1,000
-
A wallet containing cash (from William)= P150
-
Willy Suyu clubbed William and draged him out of the truck but the latter was able to escape
-
The three accused then dragged Clarissa to a hilly place and brought her to a house where they met Rodolfo Suyu, halfbrother of Willy
-
Rodolfo and Cainglet then raped Clarissa with the aid of Macarubbo and Willy Suyu (who held her and also served as lookouts (although Suyu was able to put up a struggle she bit the tongue of Rodolfo and Cainglet, but was nevertheless unsuccessful)
-
The RTC found the 4 accused guilty of robbery with rape (and that they conspired in the robbery with rape)
PEOPLE VS. RODOLFO SUYU August 16, 2006
Cash money (from Clarissa)= P10
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-
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC
3. The taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi 4. The robbery is accompanied by rape
ISSUE: W/N the trial court erred in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
HELD:
-
the intent to rob must preced the rape
-
the intention of the felony is to rob and the felony is accompanied by rape
-
the rape must be contemporaneous with the commission of the robbery
-
there is only one single and indivisible felony of robbery with rape and any crimes committed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery are merged and integrated into a single and indivisible felony of robbery with rape
NO -
conspiracy to commit the crime was correctly appreciated by the trial court
-
at the time of the commission of the crime, accused acted in concert, each doing his part to fulfill their common design to rob the victim and although only two of them, through force and intimidation, raped Clarissa, the failure of Macarubbo and willy Suyu to prevent its commission although they were capable would make their act to be the act of all
-
-
-
once conspiracy is established between several accused in the commision of the crime of robbery, they would all be equally culpable for the rape committed by any of them on the occasion of the robberjy, unless any of them proves that he endeavored to prevent the other from committing rape the conviction thus of appellants for robbery with rape defined and penalized in Art. 294 is correct
PEOPLE VS NAAG G.R No. 136394 February 15, 2001
PONENTE: Justice Puno FACTS: -
Elements of Rape with Robbery: 1. The taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons 2. The property taken belongs to another
-
-
Desiree Gollena was a singer in a band which regularly plays in Albay. In 1996, she decided to go home to Sipi Albay to visit her family. She rode a tricycle to Sipi Albay, but when she paid her fare, what she got in exchange was a slap and not her change. Herson Naag then began to abuse her, he punched her in different parts of her body and kept stabbing her with his screwdriver. Desiree Gollena, realizing that it would be futile to defend, pretended that she was dead.
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-
Naag brought her to another place. And laid her to the ground and raped her. After satisfying his lust, the driver took her wristwatch, bracelet and her wallet. RTC found Naag guilty of Robbery AND Rape, not of Robbery WITH Rape
ISSUE: WON Naag should be guilty of Robbery AND Rape
HELD: Yes, he must be convicted of Robbery AND Rape
requiring a police line-up for proper identification in every case.) Escote et al boarded a 5 star bus > along the highway in Plaridel, Bulacan, Juan and Victor suddenly stood up, whipped out their handguns and announced a holdup > Juan fired his gun upward to awaken and scare off the passengers > Victor followed suit and fired his gun upward > Juan and Victor then accosted the passengers and divested them of their money and valuables > Juan divested Romulo of the fares he had collected from the passengers > Victor and Juan ignored the plea of the police officer and shot him on the mouth, right ear, chest and right side of his body Escote was accosted when he showed the slain police‘s ID
when his taxi cab was waived by an authority for traffic violation (SC: The recovery of part of the loot gave rise to a legal presumption of his guilt)
RATIO: Because the primary intent of the appellant was to rape her. To prove the point, Justice Puno mentions 3 reasons. First, the degree and character of violence that appellant employed upon Desiree shows that his intent was to rape her (Bat mo pa kailangan bugbugin at saksakin ng screwdriver kung gusto mo lang naman siya nakawan diba?) The excessive force was clearly meant to attain his lustful scheme. Second, Appelant transported her to ANOTHER place. Third, appellant did not ask for the belongings of Desiree at any time..
PEOPLE V ESCOTE
HELD:
WoN Treachery is a generic AC in RwithH if the victim of homicide is killed treacherously or treachery is applicable only to crimes against persons (they were rather sorry but they are going to kill him with his own gun; and thereafter, they simultaneously fired point blank at the hapless policeman who was practically on his knees begging for his life. Afterwhich, they calmly positioned themselves at the front boasting for all to hear, that killing a man is like killing a chicken)
FACTS:
Robbery with homicide – death; defense – deprivation of constitutional rights (SC: There is no law or police regulation
YES. In fine, in the application of treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance to robbery with homicide, the law looks at the constituent crime of homicide which is a crime against persons and
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not at the constituent crime of robbery which is a crime against property. Treachery is applied to the constituent crime of "homicide" and not to the constituent crime of "robbery" of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide . The crime of robbery with homicide does not lose its classification as a crime against property or as a special complex and single and indivisible crime simply because treachery is appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance. Treachery merely increases the penalty for the crime conformably with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code absent any generic mitigating circumstance.
Vitug dissents: Unlike ordinary complex crimes, robbery with homicide, defined by Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, is a special complex crime against property , explicitly carrying a corresponding penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. There being just an independent prescribed penalty for the offense, any circumstance that can aggravate that penalty should be germane and generic not to one but to both of the constituent offenses that comprise the elements of the crime. The killing was just incidental, on occasion of the robbery, why consider treachery as AC?
robbery, nevertheless, there is only one single and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide
Chapter 2: Brigandage PEOPLE vs. PUNO [GR No. 97471 (February 17, 1993)]
PONENTE: Regalado, J. Nature: Appeal from the judgment of the RTC of QC, Branch 103
FACTS:
Mrs. Socorro that he will be her temporary driver.
BUT Be that as it may, treachery cannot be appreciated
against Juan and Victor in the case at bar because the same was not alleged in the Information. Although at the time the crime was committed, generic aggravating circumstance need not be alleged in the Information, however, the general rule had been applied retroactively because if it is more favorable to the accused. Death -> RP
The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life. In robbery with homicide, so long as the intention of the felons was to rob, the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery Even if the victim of robbery is other than the victim of the homicide committed on the occasion of or by reason of the
Accused Puno, the victim‘s (Socorro) husband‘s driver, told
At the corner of Araneta Ave, Puno stopped the car and coaccused Amurao boarded the car. Amurao poked a gun at Socorro. Puno asked for money and Socorro gave P7,000.00 from her bag. Puno asked for P100,000.00 more. Socorro drafted 3 checks totaling 100k. According to Socorro, she jumped out of the car and crossed to the other side of the highway. Information was filed for Kidnapping with Ransom RTC found guilty of robbery with extortion committed on a highway, punishable under PD 532
ISSUE(s):
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WON PD 532 repeals RPC 267 (Kidnapping and serious illegal detention)
HELD/RATIO:
P.D. 532 Highway Robbery Chapter 3: Theft
No o
It repeals RPC 306 and 307 on Brigandage
o
Highway robbers and brigands are synonymous
o
Brigandage vs. Robbery:
Main object of Brigandage Law is to prevent the formation of bands of robbers.
If robbery is committed by a band, whose members were not primarily organized for the purpose of committing robbery or kidnapping, etc., the crime would not be brigandage, but only robbery.
o
o
Simply because robbery was committed by a band of more than 3 persons, it would not follow that it was committed by a band of brigands.
The purpose of brigandage is indiscriminate highway robbery The essence of brigandage under the Code as a crime of depredation wherein the unlawful acts are directed not only against specific, intended or preconceived victimes, but against any prospective victims anywhere on the highway and whosoever they may potentially be, is the same as the concept of brigandage which is maintained in PD532
PEOPLE V. GULINAO Facts: On March 3, 1987, at about 9:00 P.M., Dr. Chua, Isagani Gulinao (driver-bodyguard of Dr. Chua) and some politicians were having a caucus in Malabon. At about 11:00 P.M., the group of Dr. Chua proceeded to the Bar-Bar Disco House. Upon arriving at the disco house, G ulinao, who had in his possession an Ingram machine pistol, swapped the same with a .45 caliber pistol in possession of Dante Reyes. He then tucked the .45 caliber pistol in his right waist. Gulinao went to the comfort room and cocked the .45 caliber pistol. He then returned to his seat beside Dr. Chua. While Dr. Chua was watching the floor show, Gulinao stood up and shot him on the head at close range with the .45 caliber pistol. When Gulinao was about to leave the disco house, he turned back to Dr. Chua and took the latter's gold ring embedded with 12 diamonds. Thereupon, Gulinao rushed outside the disco house to the car of Dr. Chua. Poking the gun at Caguioa (Dr. Chua‘s secretary) who was inside the car, Gulinao ordered the former to leave the car. While Caguioa was getting out of the car, Gulinao fired at him but missed. On the other hand, Dante Reyes tried to fire at Gulinao with the Ingram machine pistol, but the Ingram jammed.
Guilty of Simple Robbery
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Gulinao drove the car but figured in an accident in Malabon so he was constrained to leave it and ride a taxi instead. Dr. Chua was brought to Our Lady of Fatima Hospital where he died on arrival. Three separate informations were filed before the RTC of Valenzuela: Illegal Possession of Firearm with Murder under PD 1866, Robbery and Carnapping. Gulinao pleaded ―not guilty‖ to the
robbery and carnapping but refused to enter any plea to the charge of illegal possession of firearm with murder, hence the RTC entered a plea of ―not guilty‖ for him pursuant to the Rules on Criminal
Procedure. Gulinao instead moved to quash the information charging him of illegal possession with murder on the ground that there was another case against him for illegal possession of firearm before the RTC of Manila. The RTC of Valenzuela denied the motion to quash and the CA dismissed his petition for certiorari regarding the same. The 3 criminal cases were jointly tried and the prosecution completed its presentation for evidence but Gulinao refused to take the witness stand and even refused to be interviewed. The hearing was reset for four times but still he refused. His lawyers withdrew their appearance because of his uncooperativeness. The RTC of Valenzuela deemed his failure to present evidence without valid ground a waiver of his right to present evidence, then rendered a decision convicting him of all the crimes charged. Life imprisonment for illegal possession of firearm with murder, maximum period of prision correcional (4y2m1d) to medium period of prision mayor (6y1m10d) for robbery, 14y8m as minimum to 17y4m as maximum for carnapping, and civil indemity of P500K and costs. Issue: WON Gulinao was not allowed to present evidence WON the conviction of illegal possession of firearm with murder under PD 1866 constitutes double jeopardy WON he was guilty of robbery (the only relevant issue) WON he was guilty of carnapping
Held: No, No, No, Yes Ratio: The record shows that he was given several opportunities to present his evidence but it was he who refused to take the witness stand or to present any evidence. The issue of double jeopardy had already been dismissed by the CA which held that there is no possibility of double jeopardy as the possession thereof had taken place in two separate and distinct places and jurisdiction and the two informations state different dates of commission. He is guilty of THEFT. On the basis of testimony, the taking of the ring was merely an afterthought. The force employed in the killing of the victim has no bearing on the taking of the ring. Under this crime, he was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 3y6m21d - 4y9m10d of prision correcional as minimum and 7y4m1d - 8y8m of prision mayor as maximum. Gulinao contends that there was no proof of intent to gain in the taking of the car. But intent to gain, being an internal act, is a presumption from the unlawful taking which was unrebutted.
PEOPLE vs. CONSEJERO FACTS:
May 25, 1989 – Melchor Pulido was invited by Consejero, a CAFGU member, to gather fish caught in the Cagayan River. Melchor Pulido agreed, and, together with Consejero, who was then carrying an M-14 armalite rifle, rode a banca towards Barangay Jurisdiccion, Lal-lo, Cagayan. That was between the hours of 8:00 o'clock and 9:00 o'clock in the evening. With them was accused Rommel Malapit, who was also carrying an M-14 armalite.
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After emptying the contents of the fishnets, they noticed at a distance a motorized banca carrying two persons. They paddled towards the motorized banca. When they got nearer Consejero asked the two persons in the boat, "Were you not
September 12, 1990 – Pulido executed a sworn statement. He explained that he was afraid that accused-appellant would make good his threat to kill him and his family if he would reveal what he knew. In fact, they had to move to the house of his parents-in-law in order to avoid accusedappellant, who happened to be their neighbor. It was only when accused-appellant was no longer a member of the CAFGU that he gathered enough courage to report t o the authorities.
The trial court convicted them of the crime of robbery with homicide.
the ones who usually demand quota from Barangay Captain Bacuyan?" The two replied, "No." Then, accused-appellant
asked the two if there was a nearby store. They answered in the affirmative, Consejero told them to accompany him and to the store. The two bancas then proceeded to the river bank. Upon reaching the bank, however, Consejero said that only one should accompany them. Thus, Dionisio Usigai1, went with Larry Consejero and Rommel Malapit towards the northeast direction. Left behind were Melchor Pulido and Modesto Castillo. After ten (10) minutes, accused-appellant and accused Rommel Malapit returned holding an armalite, rifle and a ten-inch bolo, respectively. Dionisio Usigan was not with them anymore.
Upon orders of Consejero, Rommel Malapit tied the hands of Modesto Castillo at his back using a portion of a fishnet and, thereafter, they brought him to the same northeast direction where Usigan was taken. Again, only Larry Consejero and Rommel Malapit came back; Modesto Castillo was no longer with them.
ISSUE: WON the accused is guilty of the complex crime of Robbery with homicide? NO
RATIO:
o
Consejero detached the engine of the motorized banca ridden by Usigan and Castillo, while Melchor Pulido was told to stand as look-out. After they loaded the engine in their banca, the three of them headed home. On the way, the two accused told Melchor Pulido that Usigan and Castillo were already dead. Consejero threatened to kill Melchor Pulido and his family if Pulido reveals what he knew. May 26, 1989 – body of Modesto Castillo and Dionisio Usigan were found not far from the river bank of Barangay Jurisdiccion, Lal-lo, Cagayan. The motorized banca ridden by the two deceased was nowhere to be found.
Elements of robbery with homicide: the taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against a person
o
the property thus taken belongs to another
o
the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrand
o
on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide, which is therein used in a generic sense, was committed
People vs. Amania – Court had occasion to rule that in robbery with homicide, the killing must have been directly connected with the robbery. It is necessary that there must have been an intent on the part of the offenders to commit
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robbery from the outset and, on occasion or by reason thereof a killing takes place. The original design must have been robbery, and the homicide, even if it precedes or is subsequent to the robbery, must have a direct relation to, or must be perpetrated with a view to consummate the robbery. The taking of the property should not be merely an afterthought which arose subsequent to the killing
The primary purpose of Consejero in accosting the two deceased was to rob the engine of the motorized banca. From all indications Consejero was primarily interested in taking the life of the two deceased whom he suspected of exacting quota from the Barangay captain, and the t aking of the sub1ect engine was merely an afterthought that arose subsequent to the killing of the victims. Criminal acts of Consejero constitute not a complex crime of robbery with homicide, but three separate offenses two crimes for the killing of the two deceased, and one for the taking of the Briggs and Straton engine of Jaime Israel. People vs. Basao - the Court ruled t hat where the taking of the personal property was merely an afterthought and was done after the culprit has successfully carried out his primary criminal intent to kill the victim, and hence, the use of violence or force is no longer necessary, the crime committed is theft. Conformably, since the taking of the engine in the present case was merely an afterthought, and was perpetrated after accused-appellant had already accomplished his original criminal purpose of killing the two deceased, the felony committed is theft.
PEOPLE v ESCARDA FACTS:
Late July 1987, at about 2am in the morning, Dionesio Himaya was watching over his cornfield when he saw Joselito Escarda and Jose Villacastin remove the cyclone wire used for the corral of 2 carabaos of Rosalina Plaza, with Himaya testifying that he was only four arm‘s-length away from them. They untied the carabaos and rode away on it, and afterwards Himaya woke Plaza, who then went to inform Joel Barrieses, the carabaos‘ owner, of the theft.
Later, Plaza would testify later that Himaya only mentioned Villacastin (There were four persons charged in the complaint: Escarda and Villacastin, and the two at-large at the time, Hernani Alegre and Rodolfo Cañedo). After informing Barrieses, she went to the PC to report the incident. Escarda and Villacastin denied the charges, saying they were sleeping at different houses at the time. Escarda and Villacastin each testified he did not know the others, that each was also maltreated repeatedly by the PC who arrested them at a fiesta. Escarda claimed no medical attention was given to him, that he made a confession but did not sign. Both said that they were forced to admit to the crime, and that they did not know who the complainant was (Barrieses). The TC found them guilty as charged, believing the prosecution witnesses‘ testimony over the defense of denial and alibi by Escarda and Villacastin. Only the two were convicted of cattle-rustling, as the charges against Cañedo and Alegre were dismissed for lack of evidence. While both appealed initially, Escarda would later withdraw his appeal, and now Villacastin appeals to the SC.
ISSUE: WON the TC erred in convicting him of cattle rustling. NO
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OBITER: the TC erred in appreciating recidivism.
HELD/RATIO: P.D. 1612 Anti-Fencing Law Villacasta argues that the element of ―taking away by any means, method or scheme w/out the consent of the owner‖ was not proven
by the prosecution, that his identity was not established beyond reasonable doubt, that the prosecution failed to prove ownership of the stolen carabaos by presenting the certificate of ownership, as required by PD 533, the Anti-Cattle Rustling law. In this case, the over act was the taking away of the carabaos by Villacasta by cutting the wire and untying the carabaos, then riding them. These were confirmed by Plaza, the caretaker of the carabaos. Regarding the identity, Himaya said the moonlight and the short distance, plus the fact that he knew Villacasta long before as his
Chapter 4: Usurpation Chapter 5: Culpable Insolvency Chapter 6: Swindling and Other Deceits Art. 315 Estafa
ERQUIAGA v CA
wife‘s nephew, made the identification positive.
October 17, 2001
Probably most relevant: Villacasta asserts that the certificate of
QUISUMBING, J .
ownership should have been presented to warrant his contention. This is untenable: the gravamen of the crime is the taking or killing of large cattle or their meat without the consent of the owner. The
FACTS:
―owner‖ includes the caretaker, in this case, Plaza, who informed
Barrieses the owner of the theft. Nor was this issue ever put before the TC, and cannot be raised now. His alibi also fails. Sleeping for eleven hours straight is unbelievable, and Villacasta failed to demonstrate satisfactorily that it was physically impossible for him to be in the crime scene at the time of the incident, being only a 15 minute walk away fom his house.
DECISION AFFIRMED.
-Honesta Bal was contacted by Manuel Dayandante @ Manny Cruz who offered to buy her land in Pili, Camarines Sur. He told Honesta that the company he represented was interested in purchasing her property. On May 5, 1989, Honesta‘s daughter, Josephine Tapang, received a telegram from Dayandante informing Honesta that the sale had been approved and that he would arrive with the inspection team on May 12, 1989.2 On May 19, 1989, Honesta received a call from Dayandante. Her daughter and she met Dayandante and a certain Lawas @ Rodolfo Sevilla at the Aristocrat Hotel. Dayandante and Lawas said they were field purchasing representative and field purchasing head, respectively, of the Taiwanese Marine Products.
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They persuaded Honesta to purchase cans of a marine preservative which, could be bought for P1,500 each from a certain peddler. In turn, they would buy these cans from her at P2,000 each. -The following day, May 20, 19893 Glenn Orosco, one of herein petitioners, appeared at Honesta‘s store and introduced himself as an agent, a.k.a. "Rey," who sold said marine preservative. Like a fish going after a bait, Honesta purchased a can which she sold to Dayandante for P1,900. The following day, May 21, Orosco brought five more cans which Honesta bought and eventually sold to Lawas. It was during this transaction that petitioner Roberto Erquiaga, a.k.a. "Mr. Guerrerro," was introduced to Honesta to ascertain whether the cans of marine preservative were genuine or not. 4 -On May 24, Orosco delivered 215 cans to Honesta. Encouraged by the huge profits from her previous transactions, she purchased all 215 cans for P322,500. She borrowed the money from a Jose Bichara at 10% interest on the advice of Erquiaga who lent her P5,000.00 as deposit or earnest money and who promised to shoulder the 10% interest of her loan. Soon after the payment, Lawas, Dayandante, Erquiaga, and Orosco vanished. Realizing that she was conned, Honesta reported the incident to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which, upon examination of the contents of the cans, discovered that these were nothing more than starch. The NBI likewise uncovered that the modus operandi and sting operation perpetrated on Honesta had been going on in other parts of the country, in particular, Cebu, Batangas, Dagupan, Baguio and Olongapo.5 -On December 4, 1989, an Information for Estafa was filed against Roberto Erquiaga, Glenn Orosco, Pastor Lawas and Manuel Dayandante. - RTC promulgated its decision finding the petitioners guilty of estafa .
-The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court but modified the penalty imposed -SC: We find that the following circumstances together, conclusively show petitioner Glenn Orosco‘s role in defrauding Honesta: (1) Glenn a.k.a. "Rey" acted as salesman of the marine preservative. (2) He providentially surfaced after Dayandante and Lawas had already primed up Honesta regarding profits she would make buying and selling the product. (3) He conveniently had available a can of the marine preservative after Dayandante and Lawas told her of the business possibility. (4) He led Honesta to believe that the contents of the cans were indeed marine preservatives. At the very least, he kept silent on the real contents of the cans. (5) He pretended to refuse the P5,000 down payment from Honesta while inducing her to borrow the larger sum of P322,500. (6) He assured Honesta he still had 50 cans and convinced her to shell out another P1,000 for him to deliver them. (7) He disappeared with the other accused after their nefarious designs had been unearthed. -Petitioner Roberto Erquiaga, for his part, actively connived with Orosco. He did the following: (1) He posed as "Mr. Guerrero", a "verifier" of the contents of the cans allegedly containing marine preservative. (2) He also induced complainant to borrow more money and to hold on to the 215 cans. (3) He offered the P5,000 as down payment for the 215 cans. (4) He made the deal more enticing for Honesta by promising to pay the 10% interest rate on the loan himself.
ISSUE : W/N did the acts of petitioners constitute estafa ?
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HELD: YES
RATIO:
US vs SEVILLA (March 16, 1922)
PONENTE: Ostrand, J. FACTS:
The elements of estafa or swindling under paragraph 2 (a) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code 18 are the following: 1. That there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means.
2. That such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud. 3. That the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means.
4. That as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.19 As earlier discussed, Erquiaga misrepresented himself as a "verifier" of the contents of the cans. He encouraged Honesta to borrow money. Petitioner Orosco misrepresented himself as a seller of marine preservative. They used aliases, Erquiaga as "Mr. Guerrero"; and Orosco as "Rey". Honesta fell for these misrepresentations and the lure of profits offered by petitioners made her borrow money upon their inducement, and then petitioners disappeared from the scene after taking the money from her.
The accused-appellant Angel Sevilla was the treasurer and responsible financial officer of the Manila Railroad Company. One of his subordinates was the denominated cashier, having charge of the cash and the disbursements under the immediate direction of the treasurer. Sevilla on three different occasions took, through the cashier, sums of money (totalling Php 12,000) out of the funds of the Railroad Company, giving in return therefor his personal check for the same amount, drawn on the Philippine National Bank. In all instances he directed the cashier to hold the checks and not to deposit them on the current bank account of the Railroad Company until the end of June. It is admitted that the appellant used the money for his personal or private purposes . The Insular Auditor made an examination of the accounts of the Company in July of that year. He found out about the personal checks that Sevilla issued in exchange for the funds of the Company. When they checked with the PNB they found out that Sevilla only P125.66 credit on his account. They also found out that later that day Sevilla deposited P12, 000 on said account. Sevilla is charged with the crime of estafa under paragraph 5 of article 535 of the Penal Code.
ISSUE: WON Sevilla is guilty of estafa
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nine paragraphs of article 535, the paragraph here under discussion (paragraph 5) is the only one in which the words "fraud" or "defraud" do not occur.
HELD: YES. RATIO:
Art. 535, RPC. The penalties prescribed by the next preceding article shall be imposed upon:
Any persons who, to the prejudice (perjuicio) of another, shall convert or misappropriate any money, goods, or other personal property received by such person for safe keeping, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other circumstances giving rise to the obligation to make delivery of or to return the same, or shall deny having received such money, goods, or ot her property.
There are three essential elements in the offense here defined:
All elements present:
1. He was the responsible financial officer of the corporation and as such had immediate control of the current funds for the purposes of safe-keeping and was charged with the custody of the same. 2. In taking money for his personal use, from the funds entrusted to him for safe-keeping and substituting his personal checks therefor with instructions that the checks were to be retained by the cashier for a certain period, the appellant misappropriated and diverted the funds for that period. The checks did not constitute cash and as long as they were remained by the appellant or remained under his personal control they were of no value to the corporation; he might as well have kept them in his pocket as to deliver them to his subordinate with instructions to retain them.
(a ) Money, goods, or other personal property received for safekeeping or on commission or for administration or for any other purpose giving rise to the obligation to make delivery, or to return, the same; (b ) conversion or diversion of such money or property by the person who has so received it, or denial on his part of such receipt; and
3. The disturbance in property rights caused by the misappropriation, though only temporary, is in itself sufficient to constitute injury within the meaning of paragraph 5
(c ) that such conversion, diversion or denial is the injury of another.
G.R. No. 5840 (September 17, 1910)
Fraudulent intent in committing the conversion or diversion is very evidently not a necessary element of the form of estafa here discussed; the breach of confidence involved in the conversion or diversion of trust funds takes the place of fraudulent intent and is in itself sufficient. Grave as the offense is, comparatively few men misappropriate trust funds with the intention of defrauding the owner; in most cases the offender hopes to be able to restore the funds before the defalcation is discovered. The view here expressed is further strengthened by the fact that of the
US vs. CLARIN
PONENTE: Arellano, C.J. FACTS: Pedro Larin delivered to Pedro Tarug personally the amount of P172, so that Tarug, Eusebio Clarin & Carlos de Guzman could buy and sell mangoes. Larin made an agreement with the three men that the profits would be divided equally between him and them.
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The three men obtained from the business P203, but did not comply with the terms of the contract by delivering to Larin his half of the profits. Neither did they render him any account of the capital. Larin charged them with the crime of estafa , but the provincial fiscal filed an information only against Eusebio Clarin in which he accused him of appropriating to himself not only the P172 but also the share of the profits that belonged to Larin, amounting to P15.50. Clarin was sentenced arresto mayor , to suffer the accessory penalties, and to return to Pedro Larin P172, besides P30.50 as his share of the profits, or to subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The defendant appealed.
be done by one of the three specifically, it would be Tarug, who, according to the evidence, was the person who received the money directly from Larin. No. 5 of article 535 of the Penal Code, according to which those are guilty of estafa "who, to the prejudice of another, shall appropriate or misapply any money, goods, or any kind of personal property which they may have received as a deposit on commission for administration or in any other character producing the obligation to deliver or return the same." does not include money received for
a partnership Eusebio Clarin is acquitted. The complaint for estafa is dismissed without prejudice to the institution of a civil action.
ISSUES/HELD: W/N Clarin was rightfully convicted of estafa --- NO.
BATULANON VS PEOPLE
RATIO:
PONENTE: Ynares-Santiago, J.
When Larin put the P172 into the partnership which he formed with Tarug, Clarin, and Guzman, he invested his capital in the risks or benefits of the business of the purchase and sale of
FACTS:
mangoes. ―When two or more persons bind themselves to contribute money, property, or industry to a common fund, with the intention of dividing the profits among themselves, a contract is formed which is called partnership. (Art. 1665, Civil Code.)‖
The action that lies with the partner who furnished the capital for the recovery of his money is not a criminal action for estafa , but a civil one arising from the partnership contract for a liquidation of the partnership and a levy on its assets if there should be any. The P172 having been received by the partnership, it would not devolve upon his three partners to return his capital to him, but upon the partnership of which he himself formed part, or if it were to
Leonila Batulanon was the Cashier/Manager of the Polomolok Credit Cooperative Incorporated (PCCI). She was in charge of receiving deposits from and releasing loans to the members of the cooperative. Four informations of falsification of commercial documents were filed against her after issuing vouchers to four different people (Omadlao, Oracion, Arroyo and Leonila‘s son), three
of which are not members of the cooperative, even though these people never really applied for and received the said loans. The posting clerk, Medallo, testified that he witnessed Batulanon forging the signatures of the different individuals. On the other hand, Batulanon argues that in any falsification case, the best witness is the person whose signature was allegedly forged, thus the prosecution should have presented Omadlao, Oracion and Arroyo instead of relying on the testimony of an unreliable and biased
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witness such as Medallo. She avers that the crime of falsification of private document requires as an element prejudice to a third person and PCCI has not been prejudiced by these loan transactions because such loans were reflected as accounts receivable by the cooperative.
ISSUE: WON Batulanon was guilty of falsification of private documents HELD: Yes. The elements of falsification of private document under Article 172, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that the offender committed any of the acts of falsification, except those in paragraph 7, Article 171; (2) that the falsification was committed in any private document ; and (3) that the falsification caused damage to a third party or at least the falsification was committed with intent to cause such damage . Batulanon's act of falsification falls under paragraph 2 of Article 171, i.e., causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate. This is because by signing the name of Omadlao, Oracion, and Arroyo in cash vouchers as payees of the amounts appearing in the corresponding cash vouchers, Batulanon made it appear that they obtained a loan and received its proceeds when they did not in fact secure said loan nor receive the amounts reflected in the cash vouchers. Furthermore, the prosecution is not duty-bound to present the persons whose signatures were forged as Medallo's eyewitness account of the incident was sufficient. As there is no complex crime of estafa through falsification of private document, it is important to ascertain whether the offender is to be charged with falsification of a private document or with estafa. I f the falsification of a private document is committed as a means to commit estafa, the proper crime to be charged is falsification. If the estafa can be committed without the necessity of falsifying a
document, the proper crime to be charged is estafa. In the instant case, there is no doubt that as Cashier/Manager, Batulanon holds the money for administration and in trust for PCCI. Knowing that she is no longer qualified to obtain a loan, she fraudulently used the name of her son who is likewise disqualified to secure a loan from PCCI. Her misappropriation of the amount she obtained from the loan is also not disputed as she even admitted receiving the same for personal use. Although the amount received by Batulanon is reflected in the records as part of the receivables of PCCI, damage was still caused to the latter because the sum misappropriated by her could have been loaned by PCCI to qualified members, or used in other productive undertakings.
CENIZA-MANANTAN V. PEOPLE FACTS:
Alberto Carilla, a jeweler, entered into agreement with Marissa and Regina. Marissa and Regina would act as agents in selling pieces of jewelry worth P1,079,000. They were given 2 weeks to sell and remit the proceeds, plus 2 more weeks to return the pieces unsold. They were to earn by adding an amount to the original price. (Commission basis) Marissa and Regina did not remit nor return the jewelry. After several verbal demands, they issued several checks to Alberto but were dishonored by the bank because the account was closed. Alberto filed estafa. Marissa denied her business transaction with Alberto.
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RTC convicted them of Estafa. CA affirmed with modification. Sentence was changed to the period of imprisonment under the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
ISSUE: Were the elements of Estafa established?
HELD: Yes. Elements of Estafa 1. That money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust or commission or for administration or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same.
-Manantan received in trust the jewelry from Carilla for the purpose of selling them. Two weeks were given to remit the proceeds and two more weeks to return the unsold pieces. It was also agreed that Manantan will earn from the amount she will add to the original sale price. -Absence of a written document as a receipt for the jewelry in trust does not necessarily mean that no such contract exists. CONTRACTS can be made verbally as long as there is a meeting of minds of the parties (NCC1305) hahahaha!
denied having received jewelries from Carilla. This denial is unsubstantiated and therefore cannot prevail over categorical declarations of Carilla that the jewelries were turned over in trust to Manantan. 3. That such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another.
- Manantan’s failure or refusal to account for or return the jewelries to Carilla had prejudiced the rights and interests of Carilla. CArilla did not just fail to recover his investment but also lost the opportunity to realize profits from the sales of the jewelries. He further incurred expenses in hiring a lawyer and in litigating the case. Petition Denied.
DELA CRUZ vs PEOPLE FACTS: -
Erlinda Dela Cruz proposed to Victor Bellosillo a business transaction wherein the former would cause the release from customs of used gas engines, which the latter would buy for 700k
-
That first transaction did not push through, so Dela Cruz offers another transaction for the release of another set of used engines from five container vans, saying that she can do it because she is a representative of a broker and presents a calling card as proof
-
Furthermore, Dela Cruz claims that she has strong connections with the Bureau of Customs and had power and influence over them
2. That there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt.
- it is the agent’s duty to return the jewelry upon demand of the owner. Failure to do so is evidence of conversion of the property by the agent. Estafa may also be committed by denying truthfully that the thing was received. Manantan
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-
Bellosillo agrees and pays an additional 100k for demurrage and storage fees, because Dela Cruz says that by funding the business deal, Bellosillo can double his money right away once the transaction takes place.
-
However, Dela Cruz fails to deliver yet again
-
Dela Cruz then offers the release of a Mercedes Benz car, which can come along with the previously agreed upon container vans, to which Bellosillo agrees and pays 175k more
-
Dela Cruz ended up not delivering anything
-
Trial Court and CA both find Dela Cruz Guilty of estafa
and qualifications‖ to cause the release of the five container -
-
vans of used engines. She made Bellosillo believe that his money would be used to pay for storage and demurrage fees with the Bureau of Customs, and yet she could not produce any proof that she actually paid the amount to said government office. Dela Cruz‘ only proof was a receipt which did not even show that
she transacted/paid as a broker (which she claims she is) -Issue2-
Dela Cruz‘ obviously had no intention of facilitating the release of
the container vans and the car.
ISSUES : 1. W/n Dela Cruz employed false pretense of influence and connection as a way of defrauding the complainant? 2. W/n the business transaction entered into by Dela Cruz with Bellosillo was fraudulently designed to damage the latter.
-
Bellosillo, by the accused‘s fraudulent pretensions of alleged
possession of power and influence over government authorities, was persuaded to part with large sums of money. Held: Petition denied. Decision affirmed.
MONTANO v. PEOPLE
RATIO: -Issue 1The elements of estafa are as follows:
(2001)
1. that the accused defrauded another
PONENTE: De Leon, Jr., J. FACTS:
a. by abuse of confidence, or b. by means of deceit; and 2. that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third party. -
Dela Cruz‘ deceit through false pretenses is clearly shown by her having assured Bellosillo that she ―possessed power, influence
On June 2, 1988, the private complainants, Dra. Rosario Ballecer and her mother, Lourdes Ballecer, each entered into separate contracts with the petitioner in his capacity as general manager of Legarda Pine Home involving two (2) townhouse units valued at Seven Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P750,000.00) per unit. Under the contract, the management of Legarda Pine Home, represented by the petitioner, promised to deliver possession of the two (2)
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townhouse units to the private complainants after one year from October 1, 1988. Accordingly, Dra. Ballecer and her mother paid the petitioner the sums P375,000 and P250,000 respectively, as down payment. On September 4, 1988, a Contract to Sell was executed by and between the Legarda Pine Home, represented by the petitioner, and KRC Trading Corporation, represented by private complainant, Dra. Rosario Ballecer, covering the same townhouse units. As in the contract of June 2, 1988, the Contract to Sell also contains a stipulation wherein petitioner promised to deliver possession of the subject townhouse unit to the private complainant after one year from October 1, 1988. Despite the lapse of one year from October 1, 1988, the petitioner failed to deliver to the private complainants the two (2) townhouse units. Petitioner also failed to return the money he received, as down payment, from the private complainants notwithstanding verbal and written demands.
From the respective testimonies of the private complainants which were found to be credible, it has been established that on June 2, 1988, the petitioner induced the private complainants to buy two (2) townhouse units to be constructed on a lot situated at the corner of Marcos Highway and Legarda Road in Baguio City which he misrepresented to be owned by Legarda Pine Home of which the petitioner claimed to be the general manager. To further induce the private complainants, petitioner informed them that the lot in question would be developed into an exclusive community; and that he undisputedly promised to turn over to the private complainants the possession of the two (2) townhouse units one year from October 1, 1988. Consequently, private complainants paid the petitioner the total amount of P625,000 as down payment. After the lapse of one year from October 1, 1988, petitioner failed to deliver the possession thereof contrary to his written promise. It was also established that no construction of townhouse was undertaken; that Legarda Pine Home of which petitioner is the sole owner and general manager, is not actually the owner of the subject lot in Baguio City; and that petitioner has no right or authority to offer for sale the proposed townhouse units in question.
The private complainants then filed before the City Prosecutor‘s
Office of Makati City complaints against the petitioner for two (2) counts of the crime of estafa. However, the petitioner contends that his liability is only civil in nature on the grounds of simple breach of contract.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is guilty of the crime of estafa. YES.
RATIO:
The elements of the crime of estafa, are: 1) there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; 2) such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; 3) the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means; and 4) as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage. The act of the petitioner of deliberately and fraudulently misrepresenting to the private complainants that Legarda Pine Home
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of which he is the general manager, is the owner of the subject lot in Baguio City on which townhouse units would be built and that he has the right and authority to offer for sale the proposed townhouse units, when in fact he has none, so that he could, as in fact he collected money as down payment for two (2) townhouse units from the private complainants and his failure to return the amounts that he had collected from them despite several demands, and considering that the townhouse units were never constructed, constitute the crime of estafa as defined and penalized under Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.
ILAGAN v CA PONENTE: REGALADO, J. NATURE: appeal FACTS: 1st case July, 1990 - December, 1991 - Geruncio H. Ilagan, Claro Piñon and Rosendo Piñon as the President, Finance Manager and Sales Director, respectively, of the Apple Realty and Development Corporation represented themselves that they are authorized to collect/receive and issue receipts of payments from buyers Erlinda Sayasa, Rogelio Damasco, Gina G. Teston, Filomena Lanoz(o), Natividad Diaz, Florida Gargoles and Marce(l)ita Ranar, accused knowing fully well that they are not authorized to do so, received an amount of P353,500.
2nd case
June to Nov. 23, 1991 - Apple Realty and Development Corporation, defrauded and deceived the HOMETRUST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, represented by its MANAGER, SALLY S. GO by lying that they were authorized to sell lots and/or houses and lots to prospective buyers from Apple Realty knowing fully well that they cannot receive any form of payment from buyers, induced and convinced one MARCELITA RANARA to buy and purchase lots and/or house and lots and receive payments and issue receipts, as in fact in the total amount of P24,000.00. 6 other cases had the same
issue just with different people and dates.
July 21, 1992 - eight informations were filed and docketed as Criminal Cases charging petitioners Geruncio H. Ilagan, Claro Piñon and Rosendo Piñon as co-conspirators in the crime of estafa ISSUE(s): WON accused should be charged with only one offense of estafa since all cases are against the Hometrust Development Corporation
HELD: NO. they should be charged for each offense separately since they were committed through different modes of estafa .
RATIO: The crime of estafa committed against Hometrust Development Corporation and those committed against the lot buyers are separate felonies. They were dictated by different criminal intents,
committed under different modes of commission provided by the law on estafa, perpetrated by different acts,
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consummated on different occasions, and caused injury to different parties. In the first case, the Crime of Estafa against Hometrust Development Corporation was committed through unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, as provided in Paragraph 1(b) of Article 315, Revised Penal Code. The operative act in the perpetration was the failure to turn over or deliver to HOMETRUST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION the amounts collected by Ilagan, despite their duty to do so. In the second case, the offense of swindling was committed by deceit or false pretenses employed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, more specifically as provided in Paragraph 2(a) of Article 135 of the Code, that is, by the accused falsely pretending to possess the power to collect the payments due from said buyers, despite the peculiar but specific prohibition imposed by their said principal. The felony was
perpetrated through the deceitful misrepresentations which made the unauthorized collections possible . The offense was consummated upon receipt by Ilagan and co. of the amounts in the different occasions and places where the payments were made by the lot buyers who were deprived of both their money and property rights. There are then two modes to commit estafa (1) abuse of confidence and damage for the corporation (2) elements of deceit and damage for the lot buyers. In estafa through abuse of confidence prior demand should be made by the offended party on the accused to comply with the obligation before the latter may be charged criminally, but there is no such requirement where the estafa was committed through deceit.
Thus, where an agent deliberately misrepresented to the landowner the real position of the prospective buyer of the land in order to induce said owner to agree to a lower price and, thereafter, the agent sold the land for the higher amount which was actually agreed upon by him and the buyer, and he then clandestinely misappropriated the excess, the crime of estafa was committed
under both modes and he could be charged under either. PEOPLE v. GULION (2001)
NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA. PONENTE: Gonzaga-Reyes, J. FACTS: Three criminal cases were filed against Danilo Gulion on three counts of estafa under Art. 315, paragraph 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code. The RTC convicted him, the CA affirmed. Marilyn Miones is accusedat-large. Gulion and Miones had separate checking accounts with the Far East Bank and Trust Co. (FEBTC) in Tagum, Davao: Gulion had Account No. 0093-00276-9 while Miones had Account No. 0093-00406-0. The three checks (P15T, P15T, and P5T) subject of this case, while bearing the signature of accused-appellant, came from the check booklet of accused-at-large, as clearly indicated by the fact that all three checks bore that account number on their upper left corners. The checks were given to private complainant Roselier Molina by accused-at-large sometime on February 1990 to Molina‘s residence. On due date, all three checks were dishonored on the ground of
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―Account Closed and Signature Differs on File.‖ Molina demanded
from accused-appellant to pay but the latter refused, maintaining that the checks were not his but accused-at- large‘s, and disowning that he issued any check in favor of Molina or that he had any outstanding obligations with him. Defense version: He signed the checks that were on his table, thinking them to be his, prepared by his trusted secretary for the payment of the usual office bills and commissions. He was only notified of the irregularity of the checks from Molina‘s lawyer on
June 18, 1990, and no notice after their dishonor on March 13, 18 and 26, 1990. Miones was a client of his insurance business, also acted as an agent for him in selling insurance, and thus habitually visited him in his office. He further claims of no conspiracy happening as he also filed a criminal case against Miones. RTC: accused-appellant was the drawer, the other was a general indorser. CA: their closeness of personal association, concerted action and community of design – they conspired to defraud Molina.
ISSUES: 1. CA erred in not applying the best evidence rule. YES. 2. CA erred in applying the rulings on conspiracy. YES.
3. Knowledge on the part of the drawer of checks of such lack or insufficiency of funds; and 4. Damage capable of pecuniary estimation to the payee thereof. In the case at bar, the dishonor of the checks will not only be on account of lack or insufficiency of funds in Miones‘s account but also because the checks are invalid for having been issued by an unauthorized person. Accused could still be guilty if he conspired with accused-at-large. The existence of conspiracy may be implied from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime, showing that the accused had acted under a common purpose or design. Like the crime itself, conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Prosecution failed to show by the conduct of appellant that there was conspiracy. No evidence that Miones authorized by appellant to exchange in his behalf the checks, no evidence that appellant received from Miones any portion of the proceeds of said checks. It is principal in a case of estafa through postdated checks that the accused must have been shown to have obtained money or property from the offended party because of the issuance of the check. Appellant‘s explanation is fairly cohesive and logical. As proprietor of
an insurance agency, he habitually signed blank checks. There was inadvertence or mistake, Miones abused their confidence. The first six figures of his and Miones‘s account are the same.
RATIO: Underlying estafa is fraud or deceit. Its elements are: 1. Postdating or issuing checks in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the checks were issued; 2. Lack or insufficiency of funds to cover said checks;
He filed a case against Miones on Feb. 1990, or about the same time as the checks in the instant case were issued and negotiated. In this case where there is no direct proof of conspiracy between the accused, and where an implied conspiracy is sought to be proved by an evaluation of the conduct of appellant before, during, and after the commission of the crime, the appellant‘s acts of filing estafa charges against his supposed co-conspirator, and his actively seeking
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her arrest and participating in the operations that led to her arrest, cast doubt on the prosecution‘s theory of implied conspiracy.
closed accounts, according to the bank.
HELD: Guilon was acquitted. RECUERDO V. PEOPLE [G.R. No. 168217 (Date)]
PONENTE: Callejo, Sr., J. NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari of the reolution and decision of the CA
Floro‘s demands for payment were unheeded by Recuerdo
so she finally filed a case against her in court. Recuerdo pleads not guilty.
RTC and CA found her guilty of Estafa.
ISSUE(s): W/N Recuerdo is guilty of committing the felony of estafa.
HELD: YES.
FACTS:
o
Sept. 1994: three separate Criminal Information were f iled against Joy Lee Recuedero involving 18 worthless bank checks, accusing her of estafa under Art. 315 2 d of the RPC. o
PR Yolanda Floro is in the business of buying and selling jewelry. On December 1993, Recuerdo bought 2 pieces of jewelry from her. o
o
o
6 Unitrust Checks, 6 PCI Bank Checks and 6 Prudential Bank Checks
2.19 carat diamond stone, P22,000, delivered payment in 10 postdated checks drawn against Unitrust Bank. 6 were worthless checks. 1.55 carat marquez loose diamond, P130,000, also paid through 10 postdated checks drawn against PCI Bank. 6 checks were worthless. Feb 1994: Diamond Earrings, P768,000, 7 postdated checks drawn against Prudential Bank, 6 worthless.
o
o
o
The elements of estafa are: (a.) postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted simultaneously at the time the check was issued; (b.) the postdating or issuance was done when the offender had no funds or was insufficient in the bank; and (c.) damage was caused to the payee. Clearly, the elements of estafa are present in the case of Recuerdo. For the crime of estafa, it is the criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of the check that is made punishable under the RPC. Just because Recuerdo‘s a dentist and is fairly establishe d in
her profession does not automatically mean that she would not have intention to commit estafa: According to the provision, ―…The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within 3 days from receipt of notice from the bank….shall be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.‖
Checks were dishonored due to having been drawn against
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o
o
A prima facie evidence need not be rebutted by a preponderance of evidence, nor by evidence of greater weight. Although good faith would negate all accusations of intent, in this case, the SC believes that Recuerdo raising the issue of good faith was ―a mere afterthought in a last ditch effort
o
o
Raffy Juta. Before proceeding to the casino, petitioner suggested that they go to his friend, Chito Areola‘s house first as they would
teach him how to gamble & win in the casino. Petitioner, together with Rey Santos & Areola taught complainant the rudiments of the games of blackjack & baccarat as well as how to cheat by using certain tricks and signals.
to secure her acquittal. (She only raised this i n the motion for reconsideration of the appellate court‘s decision.)
Thereafter, petitioner & his friends informed complainant that before
EVIDENCE: she refused to pay after Floro demanded payment and never offered to pay after discovering that her checks were dishonored. It was only after the case was file against her and that the CA INCREASED her penalty that she started making partial payments. The term in prison was what scared her into paying.
named Minong w/ Areola acting as the dealer & requested complainant to deposit his money to them. He deposited P10K and U.S.$350 or a total of P17K were replaced w/ plastic chips, to petitioner & his friends on their assurances that he will win in the card game by using the pre-arranged signals & tricks taught to him.
While she has made partial payments, this cannot excuse her from criminal liability, only civil liability. CA decision is AFFIRMED.
EVANGELISTA v. PEOPLE
proceeding to the casino, he‘ll play against a rich man from Bacolod
At first, complainant was winning as petitioner & his friends were employing the tricks & signals they taught him. But he started losing when petitioner et. al stopped giving him the pre-arranged signals. With a few remaining chips left from his winnings worth P20,000.00, complainant decided to stop playing for fear of losing his capital but petitioner and his friends refused &, instead, stared menacingly at him.
(1993)
PONENTE: Nocon, J. FACTS: Complainant Virgilio Mercado was introduced to petitioner Jeng Evangelista by the latter's co-worker, Ben Magalong. During said meeting, complainant & Magalong talked about the casino & petitioner told them that he has a friend who frequents the casino. Thereafter, complainant asked petitioner to introduce him to his friend & the latter agreed. One time, complainant met petitioner who told him to accompany him to the casino at the Phil. Village Hotel & they boarded a taxi w/
Thereafter, complainant asked them to return his money w/c he had earlier deposited but they told him he had lost all his money in the card game. As soon as complainant realized that he was being cheated, he asked permission to leave with Raffy Juta & was allowed after he had executed a letter, the content of w/c he can‘t remember
since it was only dictated to him by Santos. Petitioner was arrested at the Phil. Banking Corp. by policemen who accompanied complainant. Corporal Rogelio Castillo testified during the trial that when he investigated petitioner, the latter verbally admitted his guilt to him. Petitioner denied participating in the alleged deceitful and fraudulent card game and maintained that he saw them play "Black Jack" while
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he only watched the game and that when he lost, Mr. Mercado still wanted to play, but had no more money, so, they set another date for them to play. In fact, Mr. Mercado prepared a letter to his playmates asking them to play again.
Fact that complainant was lured by petitioner in a fraudulent card game can‘t serve as a ground for discrediting complainant's testimony, rather his inveiglement to participate in the fraudulent card game was part of the scheme to defraud him.
RTC convicted him for estafa. CA affirmed RTC decision
HELD: Petition for review on certiorari, DENIED for lack of merit.
Petitioner now contends that he should be acquitted on the ground that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUE:
P.D. 818 P.D. 1869 P.D. 2018
WON, by consenting to petitioner's fraudulent scheme of cheating Minong, complainant was a willing party and conspirator in the card game he played with Mining and thus complainant's testimony should not be given credence by the Court. NO.
RATIO:
Under Art. 315, par. 3(b), RPC, estafa is committed by any person who shall defraud another by resorting to some practice to insure success in a gambling game. Evidence for prosecution proved that complainant was deceived into parting with his money on petitioner's assurance that he would win in the card game by using the pre-arranged signals and tricks taught to him. While it is true that complainant consented to petitioner's scheme to defraud Minong, fact remains that it was complainant who ended up being cheated by petitioner and his friends since the latter helped one another to victimize complainant and to divest him of all his money. All the essential elements of estafa are present in instant case. Thus, party responsible for such fraud or damage, cannot escape criminal responsibility even though the offended party consented to participate in the illegal or amoral transaction.
PEOPLE v. ARABIA & TOMAS September 12, 2001
NATURE: Appeal from a decision of the RTC PONENTE: Gonzaga-Reyes, J. FACTS: In October 1992, Violeta de la Cruz with four other individuals were introduced to Arabia, a recruiter of job applicants for a factory in Taiwan. At Arabia's house, Arabia and Tomas convinced them to apply for jobs in Taiwan that would give them 22K monthly pay with 2 months advance. Service fees would be collected for processing. Each of the 5 complainants were convinced to give the necessary amount with Arabia assuring them that she will not fool them. No receipts were issued. She also told them that the service fees will be reimbursed by their employer in Taiwan. On December 18, 1992 the departure of the respondents were canceled because the person who was supposed to accompany them to Taiwan did not arrive.
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Their departure was rescheduled to Jan. 16, 1993. The 5 eventually asked for the money back as they were no longer interested in working abroad. They learned that Arabia was arrested by the NBI and that she and Tomas were neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment. Arabia and Tomas denied everything saying that they never recruited the private respondents and that they themselves were victims of illegal recruiters. The defendants contend that none of the respondents were able to present any receipt and it runs counter to the presumption that persons take ordinary care of their concerns. The RTC held that they were guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale and 5 counts of estafa.
ISSUE:
and rules of evidence do not require the presentation of receipts in order to prove the recruitment agreement. It may be proved by the testimony of witnesses. The respondents in this case were positive and categorical in their testimonies. They have no motive to testify falsely against the defendants. The mere denial and pinpointing of the defendants to another person cannot prevail since they were not able to present the person allegedly responsible for the crime. As for the estafa, it has been held that a person convicted of illegal recruitment can also be convicted of estafa provided that the elements of estafa are present in the case. The elements of estafa are 1. the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit 2. the damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or to the third person.
Were the defendants guilty beyond reasonable doubt? YES.
B.P. 22 The Bouncing Checks Law RATIO: LOZANO V. MARTINEZ
Elements of large-scale illegal recruitment:
the accused undertook recruitment activity defined under Art. 13 or any prohibited practice under Art. 34 of the Labor Code He did not have license or the authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers He committed the same against three or more persons, individually or as a group.
It has been held that the fact that an accused in an illegal recruitment case did not issue any receipt for the amount received has no bearing on his culpability so long as complainants show through their respective testimonies and affidavits that the accused was involved in the illegal recruitment. Also, the Statute of Frauds
Ponente: Yap Nature: Review of RTC order
FACTS: -
The case has no facts. It is a discussion of the validity of BP 22
ISSUES: -
Is BP 22 unconstitutional on the ff grounds: o (1) it offends the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt;
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o o o
o
(2) it impairs freedom of contract; (3) it contravenes the equal protection clause; (4) it unduly delegates legislative and executive powers; and (5) its enactment is flawed in that during its passage the Interim Batasan violated the constitutional provision prohibiting amendments to a bill on Third Reading.
at putting a stop to or curbing the practice of issuing checks that are worthless. (1) it does not offend the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt -
HELD: NO. It is NOT unconstitutional. RATIO: BP 22 punishes a person "who makes or draws and issues any check on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of said check in full upon presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment. It also punishes "any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.‖ EXCEPT: if within five (5) banking
days from receipt of the notice of dishonor, the maker or drawer makes arrangements for payment of the check by the bank or pays the holder the amount of the check. Knowledge is an essential element. And the check, dishonored by the bank, must be presented as evidence. The reason for being dishonored must be written at the back of the check. BP 22 is aimed
-
-
-
The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. Because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum . The state can do this i n the exercise of its police power. The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions. The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very wen pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.
(2) it does not impair freedom of contract;
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-
The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into "lawful" contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. 33 Besides, we must bear in mind that checks can not be categorized as mere contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this modem day and age, has become a convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the banking system and therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state.
executive power. The suggestion that the statute unlawfully delegates its enforcement to the offended party is farfetched. (5) its enactment is flawed in that during its passage the Interim Batasan violated the constitutional provision prohibiting amendments to a bill on Third Reading. -
(3) it does not contravene the equal protection clause; -
This argument is tantamount to saying that, to give equal protection, the law should punish both the swindler and the swindled. The petitioners' posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause "equal protection of the laws." The clause does not preclude classification of individuals, who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is no unreasonable or arbitrary
(4) it does not unduly delegate legislative and executive powers; and -
It is also suggested that BP 22 constitutes undue or improper delegation of legislative powers, on the theory that the offense is not completed by the sole act of the maker or drawer but is made to depend on the will of the payee. If the payee does not present the check to the bank for payment but instead keeps it, there would be no crime. The logic of the argument stretches to absurdity the meaning of "delegation of legislative power." What cannot be delegated is the power to legislate, or the power to make laws, which means, as applied to the present case, the power to define the offense sought to be punished and to prescribe the penalty. By no stretch of logic or imagination can it be said that the power to define the crime and prescribe the penalty therefore has been in any manner delegated to the payee. Neither is there any provision in the statute that can be construed, no matter how remotely, as undue delegation of
In any event, before the bill was submitted for final approval on Third Reading, the Interim Batasan created a Special Committee to investigate the matter, and the Committee in its report, which was approved by the entire body on March 22, 1979, stated that "the clause in question was ... an authorized amendment of the bill and the printed copy thereof reflects accurately the provision in question as approved on Second Reading
MAGNO VS CA FACTS -
Petitioner and LS Finance entered into a leasing agreement whereby LS Finance would lease the garage equipments and petitioner would pay the corresponding rent with the option to buy the same. After the documentation was completed, the equipment were delivered to petitioner who in turn issued a postdated check and gave it to Joey Gomez who, unknown to the petitioner, delivered the same to Corazon Teng. When the check matured, Petitioner requested through Joey Gomez not to deposit the check as he (Magno) was no longer banking with Pacific Bank.
-
To replace the first check issued, petitioner issued another set of six (6) postdated checks. Two (2) checks dated July 29, 1983 were deposited and cleared while the four (4) others, which were the subject of the four counts of the
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aforestated charges subject of the petition, were held momentarily by Corazon Teng, on the request of Magno as they were not covered with sufficient funds.
the "actual and potential wrongdoers." In the instant case, there is no doubt that petitioner's four (4) checks were used to collateralize an accommodation, and not to cover the receipt of an actual "account or credit for value" as this was absent, and therefore petitioner should not be punished for mere issuance of the checks in question. Following the aforecited theory, in petitioner's stead the "potential wrongdoer", whose operation could be a menace to society, should not be glorified by convicting the petitioner.
ISSUE -
Whether or not the decision of CA is valid
RATIO -
-
-
No. Under the utilitarian theory, the "protective theory" in criminal law, "affirms that the primary function of punishment is the protective ( sic ) of society against actual and potential wrongdoers ." It is not clear whether petitioner could be considered as having actually committed t he wrong sought to be punished in the offense charged, but on the other hand, it can be safely said that the actuations of Mrs. Carolina Teng amount to that of potential wrongdoers whose operations should also be clipped at some point in time in order that the unwary public will not be failing prey to such a vicious transaction Corollary to the above view, is the application of the theory that "criminal law is founded upon that moral disapprobation . . . of actions which are immoral, i.e., which are detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society. This disappropriation is inevitable to the extent that morality is generally founded and built upon a certain concurrence in the moral opinions of all. . . . That which we call punishment is only an external means of emphasizing moral disapprobation the method of punishment is in reality the amount of punishment," It behooves upon a court of law that in applying the punishment imposed upon the accused, the objective of retribution of a wronged society, should be directed against
Judgment -
Appealed decision is REVERSED -
SC Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 ONG v PEOPLE [GR No. 139006 or 346 SCRA 117 (November 27, 2000)]
PONENTE: Kapunan, J. NATURE: Petition for certiorari filed by ONG to reverse and set aside the decision of CA
FACTS: That private complainant Marcial de Jesus and accused Remigio Ong are both businessmen who came to know each other since 1988 as suppliers of some companies. Marcial de Jesus owns the Sevrin Integrated Resources and accused Remigio Ong owns the Master
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Metal Craft. Remigio Ong, at one time retained the services of Marcial de Jesus as adviser on technical and financial matters and as President of Erocool Industries, a company controlled by the former. On December 17, 1992, Remigio Ong approached Marcial de Jesus requested to be accommodated a loan of P130,000.00 which he needed to pay the 13th month pay of his employees at the Master Metal Craft. Complainant De Jesus obliged by issuing Ong Producers Bank check No. 489427 payable to Ong's Master Metal Craft. In order to insure the repayment, complainant required Mr. Ong to issue a post-dated check for the same amount to become due on January 16, 1993. Mr. Ong therefore issued FEBTC Check No. 381937, dated January 16, 1993. De Jesus‘ check was encashed for
value and debited to Ong's account. In the meanwhile, Ong's FEBTC check dated January 16, 1993 was deposited by Marcial De Jesus in his account at Producers Bank on May 26, 1993 (same date Remigio Ong deposited De Jesus' check) which was promptly returned the following day by FEBTC for reason that it was drawn against insufficient funds (DAIF). Thereafter, De Jesus verbally notified Remigio Ong of his bounced check several times but Ong did not act until de Jesus made a written formal demand on September 10, 1993. For failure of Ong to make arrangement for the payment or replacement of the bounced check, De Jesus filed this case. After trial, the court rendered a decision finding Ong guiltiy for violation of BP 22 or the Bouncing Checks Law. On appeal, petitioner alleged that the subject check was not issued "on account or for value;" and, that a mere photocopy of the demand letter is not admissible in evidence. The Court of Appeals, however, dismissed the appeal for lack of merit and affirmed the trial court's decision, dated May 5, 1995, in toto. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: WON there was evidence that the Producers Bank check issued by private complainant in his favor was ever encashed by him. (If none, Ong alleges, the subject check cannot be considered drawn and issued "to apply on account or for value.")
RATIO: Petitioner's contentions are devoid of merit. The trial court (as well as the Court of Appeals) has found that the prosecution clearly established the existence of the loan and the subsequent encashment of the Producers Bank check. It has also been established that petitioner issued the subject FEBTC check, and that said check was subsequently dishonored for being drawn against insufficient funds. These facts irretrievably bring petitioner within the purview of Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22. On petitioner's contention that the check was not drawn on account or for value, the law and jurisprudence is clear on this matter. In the case of Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, this Court had occasion to rule that: What the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check, not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum. The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Petitioner's argument that the subject check was issued without consideration is inconsequential. The law invariably declares the
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mere act of issuing a worthless check as malum prohibitum. SC quotes with approval the appellate court's findings on this matter: In actions based upon a negotiable instrument, it is unnecessary to aver or prove consideration, for consideration is imported and presumed from the fact that it is a negotiable instrument. The presumption exists whether the words "value received" appears on the instrument or not (Agbayani, A.F., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Commercial Laws of the Philippines, 1989 Ed., Vol. 1, p. 227, emphasis supplied). Furthermore, such contention is also inconsequential in Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
PONENTE: Vitug, J. FACTS
As regards to the alleged inadmissibility of a Xerox copy of the demand letter in the absence of proof of loss of the original, said objection is unavailing in the light of the fact that the original has already been shown and identified in Court when complainant Marcial De Jesus testified on it on direct examination and cross examined on it by defense counsel. It is well-settled in criminal jurisprudence that where the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, the appellate court will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court, considering it was in a better position to settle such issue. In the case at bar, the trial court had seen the original copy of the demand letter and had been satisfied with the identification thereof by complainant Marcial De Jesus.
Josephine Domagsang was convicted by the Makati Regional Trial Court of having violated Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, (AntiBouncing Checks Law), on 18 counts, to suffer the penalty of one year imprisonment for each count . It would appear that petitioner approached complainant Ignacio Garcia, an Assistant Vice President of METROBANK, to ask for financial assistance. Garcia accommodated petitioner and gave the latter a loan in the sum of P573,800.00. In exchange, petitioner issued and delivered to the complainant 18 postdated checks for the repayment of the loan. When the checks were, in time, deposited, the instruments were all dishonored by the drawee bank for this reason: Account closed. The complainant demanded payment allegedly by calling up petitioner at her off ice. Failing to receive any payment for the value of the dishonored checks, the complainant referred the matter to his lawyer who supposedly wrote petitioner a letter of demand but that the latter ignored the demand.
HELD: Judgment affirmed with modification that imprisonment is deleted.
ISSUE SCAC 12-2000, B.P. 22
W/N Domagsang can be rightfully charged of violation of B.P. Blg. 22
DOMAGSANG V. COURT OF APPEALS HELD/RATIO Date: 5 December 2000
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NO. The law enumerates the elements of the crime to be (1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for t he same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment. There is deemed to be a prima facie evidence of knowledge on the part of the maker, drawer or issuer of insufficiency of funds in or credit with the drawee bank of the check issued if the dishonored check is presented within 90 days from the date of the check and the maker or drawer fails to pay thereon or to make arrangement with the drawee bank for that purpose. The statute has created the prima facie presumption evidently because "knowledge" which involves a state of mind would be difficult to establish.[7] The presumption does not hold, however, when the maker, drawer or issuer of the check pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon or makes arrangement for payment in full by the drawee bank of such check within 5 banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee bank .
afford her the opportunity to avert prosecution under B.P. Blg. 22. Petitioner counters that the lack of a written notice of dishonor is fatal. The Court agrees. While, indeed, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 does not state that the notice of dishonor be in writing, taken in conjunction, however, with Section 3 of the law, i.e ., "that where there are no sufficient funds in or credit with such drawee bank, such fact shall always be explicitly stated in the notice of dishonor or refusal,"[11] a mere oral notice or demand to pay would appear to be insufficient for conviction under the law. The Court is convinced that both the spirit and letter of the Bouncing Checks Law would require for the act to be punished thereunder not only that the accused issued a check that is dishonored, but that likewise the accused has actually been notified in writing of the fact of dishonor.[12] The consistent rule is that penal statutes have to be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. Domagsang was acquitted of all 18 counts of violation of B.P. 22 or reasonable doubt, but is ordered to pay P563,800.0 0 with 12% legal interest, per annum , from the filing of the informations until the finality of this decision, the sum of which, inclusive of the interest, shall be subject thereafter to 12%, per annum , interest until the due amount is paid.
It has been observed that the State, under this statute, actually offers the violator a compromise by allowing him to perform some act which operates to preempt the criminal action, and if he opts to perform it the action is abated. The absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity to preclude a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, procedural due process clearly enjoins that a notice of dishonor be actually served on petitioner. Petitioner
has a right to demand and t he basic postulates of fairness require that the notice of dishonor be actually sent to and received by her to
LIM V. CA ISSUE : WON an employee who, as part of her regular duties, signs blank corporate checks -- with the name of the payee and the amount drawn to be filled later by another signatory -- and, therefore, does so without actual knowledge of whether such checks are
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funded and without the notice mandated in Section 2 of BP 22, be held criminally liable for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. 22)
FACTS: 1) Petitioner was a junior officer of Premiere Investment House (Premiere) in its Binondo Branch. She is authorized to sign checks for and in behalf of the corporation 2) The complainant, Fr. Pelijo SVD, is a investor of the corporation where the petitioner is employed, holding an investment of P514,484.04 worth of donations in the said bank. 3) The corporation issues three Traders Royal Bank checks as payment for the interest on the investment (the three checks which are subject to the prosecution) 2 for P150k and 1 for 26k. All 3 are signed by the petitioner and Asprec who has evaded arrest. 4) The complainant presented the checks for encashment but they were dishonoured for the lack of funds. 5) The complainant demands from premiere the money due him, he is given 5k for his trouble and sent off with a promise that he will be paid 6) He is not paid and PREMIER goes in to receivership because of the crisis ensuing due to the Ninoy Aquino Assassination wherein many clients of the corporation withdrew their investments from the company leading to its illiquidity. 7) The complainant files 3 counts of BP22 violations against Asprec and the petitioner. 8) The petitioner claims that the regular procedure of her company required her to co-sign unfilled checks that the
company gives out. As such she is not aware of the funds for the checks (treasury department was in Cubao while she worked in Binondo) neither was she involved at any time in the transaction with the complainant. She was never informed by the complainant of the bouncing of the checks neither did the Cubao branch inform her. 9) Moreover the complainant never claimed a check issued to him by the receiver but instead chose to pursue the instant case.
HELD: NO, she is not liable. The elements of BP 22 are ―(1) the making, drawing and issuance
of any check to apply to account or for value; (2) the knowledge
of the maker, drawer or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and (3) subsequent dishonor of the check by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.‖
The prosecution had failed to maintain the presumption of knowledge when they stuck to the contention that BP22 violations being a malum prohibitum offense did not require proof of intent. This contention while being true does not preclude the need to prove the elements of the crime the second element being absent in this particular case as the petitioner was in fact unaware of the state of corporate funds at the time she signed the check (she did not even know the complainant neither did she know the nature of the
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transaction). Primarily she signed only as compliance with her duties as a bank employee and from the organizational structure of the corporation was not privy thereto. Moreover the was no knowledge of insufficiency of funds in this case because there was no notice of dishonor delivered to the petitioner either by complainant of the petitioner‘s employer thus she could not
have been expected to know the insufficiency pursuant to Section 2 of B.P. 22 clearly provides that the presumption of knowledge arises not from the mere fact of drawing, making and issuing a bum check; there must also be a showing that, within five banking days from receipt of the notice of dishonor , such maker or drawer failed to pay the holder of the check the amount due thereon or to make arrangement for its payment in full by the drawee of such check.
TAN V. PEOPLE [(2001) G. R. No. 141466] J. Pardo
FACTS: 1. Eliza = Hometown Development, Inc. (HDI) VP and South Garden Homes, Cavite owner/developer. Fidel M. Francisco, Jr. = construction firm F.M. Francisco & Associates (FMF) Pres. 2. 1992 - Eliza, representing HDI, and Fidel, for FMF, entered into a Construction Agreement whereby the FMF was hired by Eliza to undertake land dev't. at the South Garden Homes. Construction Agreement: the manner of payment would be on a monthly progress billing based on accomplishment reports to be submitted by the FMF.
3. Accdg. to Fidel, when Eliza failed to pay, both parties terminated the contract. For its accomplishment for the month of November 1992, FMF was paid P23, 739.09 by Eliza with Philtrust Bank Check dated February 28, 1993. Upon presentment for payment, however, subject check was dishonored. After receipt of the notice of dishonor, Fidel verbally notified Eliza and the latter promised to pay. Later on, when Eliza still did not pay, Fidel sent her a demand letter by registered mail. Failing to heed his demand letter, Eliza was charged in court. 4. Accdg. to Eliza, she initially issued 4 checks w/ P50K each to FMF as advance partial payment. When FMF failed to accomplish land dev't. in Cavite, the Construction Agreement was terminated and Eliza asked for the return of the four (4) above-mentioned checks. With the excuse, however, that Check No. 861776 dated August 15, 1992 got lost, Fidel gave back only three (3) of the for (4) checks. As their accounting records reflected that HDI still had an account of P46, 000.00 with FMF, and at the behest of Fidel, Eliza issued to the latter, two (2) checks each for P23,739.09, as replacement checks for the one that got lost. She replaced later on these two (2) checks with cash as evidenced by the acknowledgement signature of Fidel on Voucher No. 2028 dated March 30, 1993. Subsequently, it was realized by HDI‘s accounting department that Philtrust Bank Check Nos. A000904 and A000913 had already been replaced with cash and so a request to stop payment of these two (2) checks were made by Eliza to the bank. Eliza maintains that Philtrust Bank Check No. A000913 was dishonored not because it was drawn against insufficient funds but precisely because of her order to stop payment therefor. She stressed that although that bank had stamped ―DAUD‖
in subject check upon its presentment on March 2, 1993, she had sufficient funds to cover the check because at that time, she had a credit limit of P25 million with Philtrust Bank. This allegation was supported by Aileen Sy, representative of the Philippine Trust Bank who confirmed in Court that had there been no stop payment request received by their bank as early as January 27, 1993, the amount of P23, 739.09 covered by subject Philtrust Bank Check No.
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A000913 could have been withdrawn on March 2, 1993 because of the available credit limit of P5 million. This was the reason why, at the dorsal portion of subject check is written under the column Reason for Return, at No. 1 thereof: ―Payment Stopped Funded.‖
5. Erlinda, Fidel's wife disputes the allegation of Eliza who used to be her friend and asserts that whenever she pays them (FMF) Eliza paid in checks and never in cash and vouchers were already prepared typewritten unlike Voucher No. 2028 where the data are handwritten. After Eliza issued 2 checks in December 1992, the Franciscos no longer saw her, not even after the demand letter had been sent on March 18, 1993.
ISSUE/HELD: W/N Eliza is guilty of violation of B.P. 22 because when she issued Philtrust Bank Check No. A000913 to FMF on February 28, 1993, she knew that there were insufficient funds on deposit with the bank to honor the check upon presentment- No.
RATIO: The elements of the offense defined and penalized in Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 are: 1. That a person makes or draws and issues any check. 2. That the check is made or drawn and issued to apply on account or for value. 3. That the person who makes or draws and issues the check knows at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment. 4. That the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment. In this case, the 3 rd and 4th elements of the offense charged were not established or proved. In the first place, the bank‘s representative testified that petitioner‘s
account at the time of the presentment of the check she issued was funded, as she had a credit line to the extent of P25 million, much more than the amount of the check issued. In the second place, even without relying on the credit line, petitioner‘s bank account
covered the check she issued because even though there were some deposits that were still uncollected the depos its became ―good‖ and the bank certified that the check was ―funded.‖ Actually, the check in
question was not issued without sufficient funds and was not dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. What was stamped on the check in question was ―Payment Stopped-Funded‖ at the same time ―DAUD‖ meaning drawn against uncollected deposits.
Even with
uncollected deposits, the bank may honor the check at its discretion in favor of favored clients, in which case there would be no violation of B.P. 22
LIM v. PEOPLE (2000)
NATURE: Appeal from a decision of the RTC of Cebu City, Br. 23. PONENTE: Pardo, J. FACTS: On Aug. 25, 1990, petitioner Rosa Lim went to Maria Antonia Seguan‘s store where she bought various kinds of jewelry Singaporean necklaces, bracelets and rings worth P300,000. She wrote a check date Aug. 25, 1990, payable to cash drawn on Metrobank in the amount of P300,000 and gave the check to Seguan. On Aug. 26, 1990, petitioner again went to Seguan‘s store and
purchased jewelry valued at P241,668.00. Petitioner issued another check dated Aug. 16, 1990 drawn on Metrobank in the amount of P241,668.00 and sent the check to Seguan through a certain Aurelia Nadera.
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Seguan deposited the two checks with her bank, which was not honored. Petitioner‘s account I the bank from which the checks were drawn was closed. Upon demand, petitioner promised to pay Seguan the amounts of the two dishonored checks. She never did.
The first and last elements of the offense are admittedly present. To escape liability, she must prove that the second element was absent, that is, at the time of issue of the checks, she did not know that her funds in the bank account were insufficient. She did not prove this.
On June 5, 1991, a case was filed against petitioner for the two cases. Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded ―not guilty‖ in both cases. Trial court convicted the petitioner. Upon appeal, CA dismissed the appeal.
B.P. No. 22, Section 2 creates a presumption juris tantum that the second element prima facie exists when the first and third elements of the offense are present. If not rebutted, it sustains a conviction.
ISSUE: WON the accused is guilty of violation of the Bouncing Checks Law.
YES.
RATIO: The elements of BP Blg 22 are: 1. The making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; 2. The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and 3. The subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment Petitioner never denied issuing the checks.
The gravamen of B.P. No. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or one that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment. And the accused failed to satisfy the amount of the check or make arrangement for its payment within five (5) banking days from notice of dishonor. The act is malum prohibitum, pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Laws are created to achieve a goal intended and to guide and prevent against an evil or mischief. Why and to whom the check was issued is irrelevant in determining culpability. The terms and conditions surrounding the issuance of the checks are also irrelevant. Unlike in estafa, under B.P. No. 22, one need not prove that the check was issued in payment of an obligation, or that there was damage. The damage done is to the banking system.
DE JOYA v. JAIL WARDEN OF BATANGAS CITY (2003)
PONENTE: Callejo, Sr., J. FACTS: Norma de Joya was charged separately with 2 violations of BP 22. On both accounts, she issued checks that were dishonored upon presentment on the ground of ―account closed.‖ When the trial was
going on, she jumped bail. The trial court found her guilty and sentenced her to suffer 1 yr imprisonment for each count plus
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indemnities. No appeal was filed. In the meantime, the Supreme Court issued SC Circular 12-2000 enjoining all courts and judges to take notice of the ruling and policy of the Court enunciated in Vaca v CA and Lim v People. Five yrs after finality of the decision, she was arrested. In her urgent motion, she prayed for the retroactive application of SC Circ 12-2000 and for her release from detention positing that the Circular deleted the penalty of imprisonment and allows only the imposition of a fine.
TITLE XIII - CRIMES AGAINST HONOR I. LIBEL A. Nature 1. Civil 2. Criminal 3. Constitutional
ISSUES/RATIO:
US v. BUSTOS [37 Phil. 731(March 8, 1918)]
1. WON SC Circ 12-2000 should be given retroactive application.
NO.
The Circular is NOT a penal law hence Art. 22 of the RPC is NOT applicable. It is applicable only to those cases pending as of the date of its effectivity and not to cases already terminated by final judgment. 2. WON the SCC 12-2000 amended BP 22. NO. The Circular merely lays down a RULE of PREFERENCE in the application of the penalties for violation of BP 22. It does not amend nor defeat the legislative intent behind the law. It simply urges the courts to take into account the circumstances of the accused as well – whether he acted in good faith or on a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence- and such other circumstance which the trial court or the appellate court believes relevant to the penalty to be imposed.
HELD: Petition dismissed. RA 8484 Access Devices Regulation Act
FACTS: 1. A number of the Province of Pampanga assembled, and prepared and signed a petition to the Executive Secretary charging Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance in office and asking for his removal. 2. The petition transmitted by these attorneys was signed by thirtyfour citizens apparently of considerable standing, including councilors and property owners (now the defendants), and contained the statements set out in the information as libelous 3. There were three charges: a certain Francisca Polintan, filing a complaint against de los Reyes, was asked to pay by the justice of peace for him to draw up the complaint. But then Francisca was also made as a servant in the justice of peace‘s house and
took from her two chickens and 12 gandus. 4. 2nd charge: a certain Valentin Sunga who was interested in land in litigation visited the justice of peace to ascertain the result of the trial and was told that if he wanted to win, he must pay 50 pesos. However since he didn‘t have the money, he lost the
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5.
6. 7. 8.
case. The justice of peace told him he could still win if he would pay 50 pesos. 3rd charge: a certain Leoncio Quiambao, who filed a complaint for assault against 4 persons, on the day of the trial the justice called him to his house, secretly paid him 30 pesos and the complaint was abandoned. The justice of peace was notified and he denied the charges. The 2nd and 3rd charges were proven and it was recommended that he be removed from his position. the justice of the peace filled a motion for a new trial; the judge of first instance granted the motion and reopened the hearing He filed a complaint asserting that he was the victim of prosecution and that the auxiliary justice of peace had instituted the charges for personal reasons. Thus, he filed a complaint for libel against the petitioners: That on or about the month of December, 1915, in the municipality of Macabebe, Pampanga, P. I., the said accused, voluntarily, illegally, and criminally and with malicious intent to prejudice and defame Mr. Roman Punsalan Serrano who was at said time and place justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol of this province, wrote, signed, and published a writing which was false, scandalous, malicious, defamatory, and libelous against the justice of the peace Mr. Roman Punsalan Serran
ISSUE: W/N the petition against Justice Serran could be considered as libelous
2.
3. 4. 5.
6.
HELD: NO (as it was made in good faith, believing Serran to be corrupt)
RATIO: 1. The court went into a discussion of freedom of speech: The Filipino patriots in Spain, through the columns of "La Solidaridad" and by other means invariably in exposing the wants of the Filipino people demanded "liberty of the press, of cults, and associations." The Malolos Constitution, the work of the
7.
Revolutionary Congress, in its Bill of Rights, zealously guarded freedom of speech and press and assembly and petition. The Constitution of the United States and the State constitutions guarantee to the right of freedom of speech and press and the right of assembly and petition. The Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, and the Jones Law, the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, in the nature of organic acts for the Philippines, continued this guaranty. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. Men may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation. A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts. But criticism though does not authorize defamation. The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct as the administration of law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced, is a fit subject for proper comment. Public opinion will be silenced if there would be no one to criticize. On the contrary, it is a duty which every one owes to society or to the State to assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all who know of any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to the notice of t hose whose duty it is to inquire into and punish them. The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican institutions and the complement of the part of free speech. Petition means that any person or group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch or office of the government for a redress of grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility for the charges made. Even when the statements are found to be false, if there is probable cause for belief in their truthfulness and the charge is
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made in good faith, the mantle of privilege may still cover the mistake of the individual. 8. It is true that the particular words set out in the information, if said of a private person, might well be considered libelous per se. The charges might also under certain conceivable conditions convict one of a libel of a government official. 9. Express malice has not been proved by the prosecution. Further, although the charges are probably not true as to the justice of the peace, they were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action. Probable cause for them to think that malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is apparent 10. The ends and the motives of these citizens — to secure the removal from office of a person thought to be venal — were justifiable. In no way did they abuse the privilege.
B. Elements - Art. 353 2. Malice
[142 SCRA 171(May 30, 1986)]
The article supposedly portrayed the island province of Negros Occidental as a place dominated by big landowners or sugarcane planters who not only
with imprunity.
3. Defamatory imputation
NEWSWEEK vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
They alleged that Newsweek et al committed libel against them by the publication of the article "An Island of Fear" in the February 23, 1981 issue of petitioner's weekly news magazine Newsweek.
exploited the impoverished and underpaid sugarcane workers/laborers, but also brutalized and killed them
1. Publicity
4. Identity of offended person
March 5, 1981, private respondents, incorporated associations of sugarcane planters in Negros Occidental claiming to have 8,500 members and several individual sugar planters, filed a Civil Case in their own behalf and/or as a class suit in behalf of all sugarcane planters in the province of Negros Occidental, against petitioner and two of petitioners' non-resident correspondents/reporters Fred Bruning and Barry Came.
Complainants therein alleged that said article, taken as a whole, showed a o
deliberate and malicious use of falsehood,
o
slanted presentation
o
and/or misrepresentation of facts
PONENTE: FERIA, J. NATURE: Petition
intended to:
FACTS:
expose them to public ridicule, discredit and humiliation here in the Philippines and abroad, and
put them (sugarcane planters) in bad light,
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make them objects of hatred, contempt and hostility of their agricultural workers and of the public in general.
o
They prayed for PlM as damages
Petitioner defense: 1. They pointed out the non-libelous nature of the article 2. Failure to state a cause of action because the complaint made no allegation that anything contained in the article complained of regarding sugarcane planters referred specifically to any one of the private respondents; 3. Libel can be committed only against individual reputation 4. in cases where libel is claimed to have been directed at a group, there is actionable defamation only if the libel can be said to reach beyond the mere collectivity to do damage to a specific, individual group member's reputation.
ISSUE:
In the case of Corpus vs. Cuaderno, Sr. (16 SCRA 807) this Court ruled that "in order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable (People vs. Monton, L-16772, November 30, 1962), although it is not necessary that he be named (19 A.L.R. 116)." In an earlier case, this Court declared that" ... defamatory matter which does not reveal the Identity of the person upon whom the imputation is cast, affords no ground of action unless it be shown that the readers of the libel could have Identified the personality of the individual defamed." (Kunkle vs. Cablenews-American and Lyons 42 Phil. 760).
2. Defamatory remarks directed at a group of persons is not actionable unless the statements are all embracing or sufficiently specific for victim to be identifiable. o
WON article is libelous?
Where the defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group or class, it is essential that the statement must be so sweeping or all-
embracing as to apply to every individual in that group or class , or sufficiently specific so that each individual in the class or group can prove that the defamatory statement SPECIFICALLY POINTED TO HIM, so that he can
HELD: No. RATIO:
bring the action separately, if need be. 1. To maintain a libel suit, the specific victim must be identifiable.
o
Private respondents filed a "class suit" in representation of all the 8,500 sugarcane planters of
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Negros Occidental. The absence of any actionable basis in the complaint cannot be cured by the filing of a class suit on behalf of the aforesaid sugar planters.
OUT plaintiff Sola as a sugar planter.
The case at bar is not a class suit . It is not a case where one or more may sue for the benefit of all (Mathay vs. Consolidated Bank and Trust Company, 58 SCRA 559) or where the representation of class interest affected by the judgment or decree is indispensable to make each member of the class an actual party (Borlaza vs. Polistico, 47 Phil. 348). We
have here a case where each of the plaintiffs has a separate and distinct reputation in the community. They DO NOT HAVE A COMMON OR GENERAL INTEREST in the subject matter of the controversy. 4. A public officer cannot complain of libel on a news report of his performance of an official duty. o
The report, referring as it does to an official act performed by an elective public official, is within
the realm of privilege and protected by the constitutional guarantees of free speech and press because
The news report merely stated that the
victim had been arrested by members of a special police unit brought into the area by Pablo Sola, the mayor of Kabankalan.
3. An action for libel allegedly directed at a group of sugar planters in Negros cannot be done by resort to filing of a class suit as each victim of libel has his specific reputation to protect. o
The disputed portion of the article which refers to plaintiff Sola and which was claimed to be libelous never SINGLED
5. Caveat. Press freedom should be exercised responsibly. Petitioner would do well to heed the admonition of the President to media that they should check the sources of their information to ensure the publication of the truth. Freedom of the press, like all freedoms, should be exercised with responsibility. C. Defenses 1. Privileged communication a. Absolute privilege b. Qualified privilege - Art. 354, pars. (1) and (2)
RAFAEL MERCADO vs. CFI OF RIZAL, VIRGINIA MERCADO [116 SCRA 93(August 25, 1982)]
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NATURE: petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition to
review CFI decision denying motion to dismiss
PONENTE: Fernando
Resp: absence of any privilege; communication made by pet with malice and bad faith CFI denied motion to dismiss
ISSUE/S FACTS
1. W/N CFI erred in denying pet‘s motion to dismiss 14 Oct 1972 pet filed a complaint with the Chairman of the Board of Transportation against resp for alleged violations of RA2260 and civil service rules
28 Oct 1972 pet sent subject libelous telegram to the Secretary of Public Works and Communication, in which he requested investigation of resp as she allegedly enriched herself through corrupt practices 23 Nov 1972 pet filed amended complaint with Board of Transportation, charging resp with dishonesty, corrupt practices and misconduct 27 June 1973 complaint
BoT found resp innocent, dismissed
pet for reconsideration (which was subsequently denied) but pending case filed with the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group a complaint alleging that resp and her husband sold a Ford Willys engine which was carnapped; CHPG closed case for lack of evidence
pending BoT case against resp, pet also filed with the Criminal Investigation Service a complaint for corrupt practices against resp, CIS also dismissed case for lack of evidence
Resp filed complaint pet for libel
Pet‘s filed motion to dismiss on the ground that the telegram
was privileged communication
2. W/N telegram was proper subject of complaint against pet, for being privileged
HELD 1. No. 2. Yes. Justice Malcolm: qualified privilege may be lost by proof of malice Qualified privilege is a complaint made in good faith and without malice in regard to the character or conduct of a public official when addressed to an officer or board having some interest or duty in the matter. The tenacity with which pet pursued a course of
conduct (his successive complaints against resp), cast a doubt upon the good faith of pet . The prosecution should be given opportunity of proving malice.
DISPOSITION Petition dismissed
SANTOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS [203 SCRA 110 (October 21, 1991)]
PONENTE: C.J. Fernan NATURE: Petition for review of the decision of the CA
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FACTS:
Petitioner Nanerico Santos is a business columnist for the then Manila Daily Bulletin , while private respondents (Carlos Moran Sison , Luis Sison) are the officers and controlling stockholders of CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc . In the Feb. 23, 2970 issue of the Manila Daily Bulletin, Santos published an article entitled ―Charges Against CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc. In this article, he quoted verbatim an unverified complaint filed with the SEC by a certain Sandejas charging CMS and its chairman and controlling stockholder (CM Sison) and its president-general manager (L Sison) of engaging in fraudulent practices in the stock market. CM Sison wanted Santos to publish the very next day a reply to his column. Santos it was too late since the issue was already at the printers so he said he would publish it in the Feb. 25th issue instead. The reply was not published. CM Sison called petitioner Santos to tell him not to publish the reply anymore for it would only rekindle the talks. Sison informed him that he would also be sued for libel. (Santos actually reminded Sison to sue him. Hahaha.) CMS files a complaint for libel in the CFI Rizal.
TC: convicted of libel. CA: affirmed. Cited Barreto vs. Phil. Publishing Co. and Choa Tek Hee vs. Phil. Publishing Co. o
o
ISSUE/HELD:
These two cases say that an article based upon a complaint before a court and before any judicial action is taken thereon is NOT privileged speech (report of judicial proceeding).
1. WON the publication of a complaint filed with the SEC (quasi-judicial) before any judicial action is taken thereon is privileged as a report of judicial proceeding. YES 2. WON Santos was motivated with malice when he released the article (to be convicted of libel). NO
RATIO: 1. The idea of Justice Moreland embodied in the Barreto and Choa Tek Hee cases saying that: ―The right of the public to be informed of the
proceedings in court is NOT founded in the desire or necessity of the people to know about the doings of others, but in the necessity of knowing whether the judge is properly doing his duty. xxx The right to publish without liability for damages does not extend to mere pleadings file in court.‖
is now overturned by the SC through Justice Esguerra in Cuenco vs. Cuenco : ―…a fair report of a complaint filed in court without
remarks nor comments even before an answer is filed or a decision is promulgated should be covered by the privilege.‖
The publication of a complaint, being a true and fair report of a judicial proceeding, made in good faith and
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without comments or remarks, is privileged and comes under RPC 354(2) .
Art. 354: Requirement for publicity . – Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive is shown, except in the following cases: xxx (2)A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, administrative or other official proceedings which are of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA. PONENTE: Hermosisima, Jr., J. FACTS: Petitioner Fernando Sazon and private complainant Abdon Reyes were members of the PML-Parang Bagong Lipunan Community Association, Inc. (PML-BLCA), an association of homeowners of PML Homes. The association had a monthly newsletter, the PMLHomemaker, of which the petitioner was the editor. Dec. 11, 1983: Both ran in the election of its board of members. Petitioner was elected as director and was also elected by the new board as president of the homeowners‘ association. Private
complainant lost. 2. The article itself is but a reproduction of the pleading filed before the SEC. It was verbatim , no comments or embellishments were added thereto. The petitioner merely furnished the readers with information that a complaint has been filed against a brokerage firm. NO MALICE in his acts.
NO LIBEL. DISPOSITIVE : Conviction of petitioner Santos set aside and he is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of libel.
Complainant then on Jan. 16, 1984 wrote a protest letter to the Estate Management Office of the Home Financing Corporation (EMOHFC). Two days later, he wrote his co-homeowners explaining his election protest and urging them not to recognize the petitioner and the others who won. Meanwhile, in response to the election protest, EMO-HFC ordered the PML-BLCA to conduct a referendum to be supervised by the EMO-HFC. Complainant requested then his co-homeowners to attend a general meeting with the reps of the EMO-HFC which was to be held before the referendum.
SAZON v. CA [255 SCRA 692 (March 29, 1996)]
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Soon after the meeting, leaflet ―PML Scoop‖ were received by the homeowners. The leaflet was e ntitled ―Supalpal si Sazon,‖ obviously
referring to the affirmative action of EMO-HFC. Thinking that only complainant was capable of such acts, petitioner Sazon started writing, publishing, and circulating newsletters to his co-homeowners, culminating in the appearance in the Feb. 10, 1984 issue of the PML-Homemaker of which the libel case is based upon. The trial court found petitioner guilty, to which CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Petitioners used the following words: ―mandurugas,‖ ―mag-ingat sa panlilinlang,‖ ―matagal na tayong niloloko,‖ ‖may kasamang pagyayabang,‖ ―an gating pobreng super kulit,‖ ―patuloy na kabalastugan,‖ mastermind sa paninirang puri,‖ etc. The test is laid
down as [Lacsa v IAC (1988)]: ―… A charge is sufficient if the words are calculated to
induce the hearers to persons against whom certain offenses, or are virtue, or reputation, or
suppose and understand that the they were uttered were guilty of sufficient to impeach their honesty, to hold the person or persons up to
public ridicule.‖
The test was satisfied.
WON the questioned article written by the petitioner is libelous. YES. Art. 345 meanwhile provides:
RATIO: Art. 353 of the RPC defines libel. For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must concur: a. it must be defamatory b. it must be malicious c. it must be given publicly
Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown. Prosecution need not prove malice on the part of the defendant (malice in fact), for the law already presumes that the defendant‘s
imputation is malicious (malice in law). The burden is on the side of the defendant to show good intention and justifiable motive in order to overcome the legal inference of malice.
d. the victim must be identifiable In libel cases, the question is not what the writer of an alleged libel means, but what the words used by him mean. Here, the defamatory character of the words used by the petitioner are shown by the very recitals thereof in the questioned article.
Art. 354 has exceptions if the article is a privileged communication. In the instant case, none of the homeowners for whom the newsletter was published was vested with the power of supervision over the private complainant or the authority to investigate the charges made against the latter. Moreover, a written letter
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containing libelous matter cannot be classified as privileged when it is published and circulated among the public.
NEW YORK TIMES v. SULLIVAN [376 US 254 (March 9, 1964)]
Lastly, the rule is that defamatory remarks and comments on the conduct or acts of public officers which are related to the discharge of their official duties will not constitute libel if the defendant proves the truth of the imputation . But any attack upon the private character of the public officer on matters which are not related to the discharge of their official functions may constitute libel. The article attacked solely the private character of the complainant and delved on matters completely unrelated to his official functions.
PONENTE: Brennan, J. KEY CONCEPTS: Actual malice requires that an untrue statement was made
with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of whether it was true or false
Libelous per se, under Alabama law, is implied by published words that ―tend to injure a person in his reputation‖
Clearly, there was malice in fact on the part of the petitioner as he was driven by revenge and that the objective was to malign and to injure the reputation of the complainant. 2. Truth a. Imputation of a crime, if made in good motives and with justifiable ends - Art. 361, par. 1 b. Imputation not of a crime, if made against a Government employee and related to the discharge of his duties Art. 361, par. 2 D. Rebuttal - Art. 362 1.
Actual malice
2.
Constructive malice
or to ―bring him into public contempt (p. 267).
FACTS: Respondent Sullivan was a commissioner in the City of Montgomery, Alabama. One of his duties is the supervision of the Police Dept. Sullivan brought this libel suit against four petitioners and against the New York Times Company, publisher of the newspaper NY Times. Sullivan believed he was libeled in a NY Times advertisement, which included statements, some of which are false, about police action allegedly directed against students who participated in a civil rights demonstration and against a leader of the civil rights movement, Dr. Luther. At the bottom of the advertisement were the names of the 4 petitioners and others. Sullivan said the alleged libelous statements referred to him because the police dept. is under his supervision. 2 The trial judge instructed the jury that such 2
The 3rd paragraph of the advertisement said armed police officers “ringed” the Alabama State Campus, and when the students refused to yield, a dining hall was padlocked in an attempt to starve the protesters into submission.
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statements are ―libelous per se,‖ legal injury being implied without
proof of actual damages and that for the purpose of compensatory damages malice was presumed. As to punitive damages, the judge instructed that mere negligence was not evidence of actual malice and would not justify an award of punitive damages. The judge refused to instruct that actual intent to harm or recklessness had to be found before punitive damages could be awarded, or that a verdict for respondent should differentiate between compensatory and punitive damages. The jury found for respondent Sullivan and the State Supreme Court affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether the rule of liability that was as applied to the libel suit of Sullivan against the critics of his official conduct abridges the freedom of speech and of the press that is guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. (see p. 268 )
RATIO: Jury judgment and State Supreme Court judgment is reversed and remanded. The rule of liability that was as applied to the matter of Sullivan and the critics of his official conduct ABRIDGES THE Sullivan argued that the word “police” in the 3 rd paragraph referred to him because he supervised the Police Dept; in effect, he was being accused of “ringing” the campus with Police. He added that the paragraph would be read as imputing to the police, and hence to him, the padlocking of the dining hall in order to starve the th students into submission. The 6 paragraph states that the Southern violators/police used intimidation and violence in responding to Dr. King’s peaceful protests. The 6 th paragraph went on to say they, allegedly referring to the police, bombed King’s home, assaulted his person, arrested him 7 times, and charged him with perjury. th Sullivan said in the 6 paragraph the word “they” referred to him; in effect it accused the Montgomery Police, and hence him. Several statements, however, in both paragraphs were false.
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS THAT IS GUARANTEED BY THE FIRST AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS. The rule of law applied by the Alabama courts is deficient for failure to provide the safeguards for freedom of speech and of the press that are required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments (p. 264). A State cannot award damages to Sullivan for defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct because ― actual malice ‖ was not proved . Moreover, factual error or content defamatory of official reputation, or both, are insufficient to warrant an award of damages for the false statements about Sullivan‘s official function. The thing is, there was no reference —b y name or official position —t o Sullivan in the allegedly libelous parts of the advertisement (p. 288; see footnote; or read pp. 256-259). Sullivan simply inferred the alleged reference to him from the word ―police‖ and ―they.‖
OTER OPINIONS: Black, J, concurring: The Times advertisement and individual defendants had an absolute, unconditional constitutional right to publish in the Times advertisement their criticisms of the Montgomery agencies and officials (see p. 293). Goldberg, J, concurring: The First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution afford to the citizen and to the press an absolute, unconditional privilege to criticize official conduct despite the harm which may flow from excesses and abuses (p. 298). In a democratic society, one who assumes to act for the citizens in an executive, legislative, or judicial capacity must expect that his official acts will be commented upon and criticized. Such criticism cannot be muzzled or deterred by the
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courts at the instance of public officials under the label of libel (p. 299). E. Offenses and Penalties 1. Libel in writing, etc. - Art. 355 2.
Threatening to publish, and offer to prevent publication - Art. 356
3.
Prohibited publication of acts referred to in official proceedings - Art. 357
During the hearing, Atty Castillo presented an urgent motion to disqualify Judge Avancena to hear the admin case, who apparently taken aback, lectured Atty Castillo. Atty Ruiz, counsel for Judge Guiang, moved that Castillo be cited for contempt of court. After the hearing, Father(Exequiel) and Son(Daniel) Victorio uttered the following defamatory words in a loud voice and in the presence of at least 10 persons, without provocation on the part of Ruiz:
Daniel: ―Kayabang ng putang-inang abogadong Ruiz na iyan, tunaw naman ang utak, suwapang at estapador.‖
Exequiel: translated in Tagalog- Mayabang yang putang-inang 4. Grave Slander - Art. 358 5. Simple Slander - Art. 358
VICTORIO v. CA [173 SCRA 645 (May 11, 1989)]
PONENTE: Bidin, J. FACTS: 3
Atty Ruiz had been the lawyer of the Victorios from 1953 to 1963 when they decided to hire the services of another lawyer, Atty Castillo, to take the place of Ruiz and his collaborator Judge Guiang. The Victorios filed an administrative charge (for investigation & disbarment proceedings against Atty Ruiz, then pending in the OSG) against Judge Guiang which was assigned to Judge Avancena. 3
Former Justice of the Peace, member of the Provincial Board of N. Ecija, professor of law and former Pres. Of the N. Ecija Bar Assn.
abogado Ruiz na iyan, babariling ko and putang inang iyan, suwapang at estapador.
ISSUE: WON the defamatory words constitute serious oral defamation or simply slight oral defamation. SERIOUS ORAL DEFAMATION.
RATIO:
Guidelines adopted by the Court to determine whether the offense committed is serious or slight: classification would depend upon their sense and grammatical meaning judging them separately; also upon the special circumstances of the case, antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the offender, which might tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time. Imputing the crime of estafa (considered serious and insulting) against a prominent lawyer strikes deep into the character of the victim; hence, no special circumstance need be shown for the
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defamatory words uttered to be considered grave oral defamation.
The totality of such words as ―kayabang‖, ―tunaw ang utak‖, ―suwapang at estapador‖ imputed against Ruiz has the import of
charging him with dishonesty or improper practice in the performance of his duties.
No merit in the claim that the defamatory words were uttered in the heat of anger thus constituting merely slight oral defamation as there was no reason for the petitioners to be angry at the offended party who was simply performing his duties as a lawyer in defense of his client. Their anger then was not lawfully caused considering that there was no provocation on Ruiz‘ part.
by COA personnel of election returns in the May 14, 1984 Batasan elections at his residence in Tacloban City and in the COA Regional Office in Palo, Leyte. Tantuico sought to assure the victory of certain candidates in the said Batasan elections. Soriano filed a motion to quash the Information on the ground of improper venue. He contends that the libel case should have been filed at Quezon City where Tantuico holds office and where the publication house of the ―Guardian‖ is located. The ―Guardian‖
published the articles against Tantuico.
ISSUE: Should the Information for libel against Soriano be quashed? YES.
HELD: Petition denied. 6. Slander by Deed - Art. 359 F. Procedural rules 1. Persons responsible 2. Jurisdiction and venue
SORIANO v. IAC [167 SCRA 222(November 9, 1988)]
PONENTE: Gutierrez, J. FACTS:
RATIO: The liability of a Quezon City must be deemed as commencing with the publication of the allegedly libelous material in his newspaper and not with the typing or mimeographing of press releases by interested persons in different municipalities or cities, copies of which are sent to metropolitan newspapers for national publications. The amendments to the law on libel were intended to free media persons from the intimidating harassment of libel suits filed in any place where a newspaper happens to be sold or circulated and to avoid the harassment of media persons through libel suits instituted in distant or out-of-the-way towns by public officers who could more conveniently file cases in their places of work.
Tantuico, the then Chairman of the Commission on Audit (COA) filed an Information for libel against Soriano and six others in connection with press releases and articles imputing to Tantuico the tampering
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As Tantuico held office in Quezon City and the offending newspaper is published in Quezon City, the case should be filed with a Quezon City court.
HELD: The petition is granted. The RTC is directed to dismiss the complaint against petitioner.
ISSUE: WON there is a complex crime of unlawful arrest and incriminatory machinations?
HELD: Yes RATIO:
NOTES: The Philippines follow the ‗multiple publication‘ rule in that each and
every publication of the same constitutes a distinct offense. 3. Imputation of a private offense
II. INCRIMINATORY MACHINATIONS A. Incriminating innocent persons - Art. 363
1. A perusal of the charge shows that it is a complex crime in the sense that the unlawful arrest was used as a means to commit the crime of incriminatory machinations. The accused had to detain the complainant through the unlawful arrest first before they proceeded with the planting. 2. Solicitor-General points out that the unlawful arrest was a necessary act in order for the planting of the evidence to have been committed. The trial courts finding that the planting happened long after the unlawful arrest was not proven by evidence and even assuming that it was, it still doesn‘t disprove the necessity of the unlawful arrest in committing the evidence planting
PEOPLE vs. ALAGAO
B. Intriguing against honor - Art. 364
[16 SCRA 879 (April 30, 1966)]
FACTS: The said accused, being members of the Manila Police Department, were charged with the complex crime of incriminatory machinations through unlawful arrest. The allegedly unlawfully arrested complainant, Marcial Apolonio y Santos, and planted on his person a marked P1.00 bill in order to impute to him the crime of bribery. The accused filed a motion to quash said information on the grounds that said crime does not exist.
PEOPLE V. VICTORIA (1947) PONENTE: Perfecto, J. FACTS: Carmelito Victoria was charged with treason for acting as a spy and aiding the Japanese Forces.
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October 6, 1944- Federico Unson, Isaias Perez and Ruben Godoy were accused of hiding guerillas. Their house was burnt and they were arrested and tortured. December 21, 1944- Jose Unson was arrested on the charge that he had a short wave radio and that he was furnishing radio information to guerillas. February 10, 1945- Felixberto Romulo was placed under arrest as a guerilla suspect. December 21, 1944- HErmogenes Caluag was arrested and subjected to inhuman torture for allegedly being pro-American and adviser of Guerillas. March 9. 1944- Antonio San Agustin was arrested, tortured and unlawfully detained. June 1944- Melecio Labalan, Sr. was arrested and charged with of being a guerilla. February 1945- Carmelito joined Makapili Organization and trained as a Japanese military.
killing of a single human being to give aid and comfort to the enemy, he is, nonetheless a traitor. However, penalty must be reduced to reclusion perpetua since the circumstances considered as aggravating are actually essential elements of treason. The crime is of such nature that it may be committed by one single act, by series of acts or by several series thereof, not only in a single time, but in different times, it being a continuous crime.
Feria, concurring: Penalty must be death. The two circumstances
prisoners.
of treachery and aid of armed persons to insure or afford impunity must be considered as aggravating. The killing of the victim was unquestionably attended by treachery, by means, method or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly to insure its execution without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make, and by a deliberate augment of the wrong done by the offense by causing other wrongs not necessary for its commission. Treason is different from treachery as defines by the RPC.
Lower Court: Accused was guilty in five counts. Counts 5 and 7
Paras, concur and dissent : Information sufficiently make out at
were not proven.
least a case of murder qualified by treachery. As a spy he might be tried in a military tribunal. Provision regarding fine must be eliminated.
Defense: He was also a guerilla and acted in behalf of other guerilla
ISSUE: Is he guilty of treason?
PEOPLE VS. ADRIANO
HELD: His claim of helping guerillas does not relieve him from criminal responsibility. The performance of righteous action, no matter how meritorious they may be, is not a justifying, exempting or mitigating circumstance in the commission of wrongs, and even if appellant had saved the lives of a thousand and one persons, if he had caused the
[GR No.L-477 (June 30, 1947)]
PONENTE: Tuason, J. NATURE: Appeal from a judgment of conviction for treason by the People‘s Court
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FACTS:
Apolinario Adriano, a Filipino citizen accused of treason through adhering to the Military Forces of Japan, against which the Philippines and the US were then at war, giving said enemy aid and comfort Adriano was allegedly a member of the Makapili, a military organization established and designed to assist and aid militarily the Japanese Imperial forces No two of the prosecution witnesses testified to a single one of the various acts of treason imputed by them to the appellant.
No o o
ISSUE(s):
WON mere membership in Makapili is evidence of adherence to enemy WON mere membership in Makapili is an overt act WON the two-witness requirement was fulfilled by the testimony of one witness who saw the appellant in Makapili uniform bearing a gun one day, another witness another day, and so forth
o
o
HELD/RATIO:
Yes o
Mere fact of having joined a Makapili org. is evidence of adherence to enemy and giving him aid and comfort; it imports treasonable intent, considering the purposes for which the org was created Adherence, unlike overt acts, need not be proved by the oaths of two witnesses.
Yes o
Being a Makapili is in itself constitutive of an overt act. The crime of treason was committed if he placed himself at the enemy's call to fight
side by side with him when the opportune time came even though an opportunity never presented itself. Such membership by its very nature gave the enemy aid and comfort. Membership in Makapili as an overt act must be established by the deposition of two witnesses
Philippine law on treason is of Anglo-American origin The rule as adopted in this country by all the constitutional provisions, both state and Federal, properly requires that two witnesses shall testify to the same overt act. Each of the witnesses must testify to the whole of the overt act; or, if it is separable, there must be two witnesses to each part of the overt act. The United States Supreme Court saw the obstacles placed in the path of the prosecution by a literal interpretation of the rule of two witnesses but said that the founders of the American government fully realized the difficulties and went ahead not merely in spite but because of the objections.
Appellant Acquitted
US vs. CAAPILLO AND PADUGA [GR No.L-9279 (March 25, 2915)]
PONENTE: Carson, J. FACTS:
Capillo and Paduga charged with the crime of exposing a legitimate child to lose his civil status
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Capillo took his 1 month old child without the permission of Vicenta (mother) or the authority of the courts and agreed with Chua Pue Tee to deliver the child and never to claim it again; Capillo and Paduga asked from Chua Pue Tee P150 to defray the expenses incurred by Capillo during the last sickness and death of Vicenta and received P106 (P50-Capillo; P56Paduga) Information: the living of said child under such circumstances in the possession of Chua Pue Tee and his wife exposes the child to lose his civil status
ISSUE(s):
WON the accused are guilty of the crime under Art. 248, par. 24
HELD/RATIO:
No o
door of hospitals, churches and other religious institutions o The real object sought to be attained by the prosecution is to penalize, under the provisions of article 468 of the code, the conduct of the father in turning over his new-born child to the Chinaman and his wife, with a promise not to reclaim it, taking from the Chinaman for so doing money by way of loan or otherwise. But it is very clear that it was not the intention of the authors of the coded to penalize such conduct by the provisions of the article relied upon by the prosecution. o Our ruling at this time is merely that the offense defined and penalized in article 468 of the Penal Code is not the unlawful sale of a child by its father, and that such conduct cannot properly be penalized under its provisions. CASE DISMISSED
Proper meaning that should be given to ―expusiere‖
to abandon Having in mind the qualifying phrase which provides that the offense is committed when
TITLE III: CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER
the child is exposed ―with intent to expose it to lose its civil status‖, the word must be
held to have been used by the authors of the code in the sense of to "abandon," ―To expose‖ peculiar and special sense with reference to the practice of abandoning new-born infants and young children at the
4
The simulation of births, or the substitution of one child for another, shall be punished by presidio mayor and a fine of not less than six hundred and twenty-five and not more than six thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who shall conceal or abandon any legitimate child with intent to cause such child to lose its civil status.
Chapter 1: REBELLION, COUP D’ETAT, SEDITION AND
DISLOYALTY
Art. 134. Rebellion or insurrection; How committed. — The crime of rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Philippine Islands or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives. (As amended by R.A. 6968).
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Article 134-A. Coup d'etat; How committed. — The crime of coup d'etat is a swift attack accompanied by violence, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, directed against duly constituted authorities of the Republic of the Philippines, or any military camp or installation, communications network, public utilities or other facilities needed for the exercise and continued possession of power, singly or simultaneously carried out anywhere in the Philippines by any person or persons, belonging to the military or police or holding any public office of employment with or without civilian support or participation for the purpose of seizing or diminishing state power. (As amended by R.A. 6968).
Art. 135. Penalty for rebellion, insurrection or coup d'etat . — Any person who promotes, maintains, or heads rebellion or insurrection shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Any person merely participating or executing the commands of others in a rebellion shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal. Any person who leads or in any manner directs or commands others to undertake a coup d'etat shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Any person in the government service who participates, or executes directions or commands of others in undertaking acoup d'etat shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period. Any person not in the government service who participates, or in any manner supports, finances, abets or aids in undertaking a coup d'etat shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period. When the rebellion, insurrection, or coup d'etat shall be under the command of unknown leaders, any person who in fact directed the others, spoke for them, signed receipts and other documents issued in their name, as performed similar acts, on behalf or the rebels shall
be deemed a leader of such a rebellion, insurrection, or coup d'etat. (As amended by R.A. 6968, approved on October 24, 1990).
PEOPLE v. DASIG (1993)
PONENTE: Nocon, J. FACTS: In the afternoon of Aug. 4, 1987, police officers Redempto Manatad, Ninah Tizon and Rene Catamora were tasked by their commanding officer to assist in maning the traffic at M. N. Briones and Bonifacio Streets in Mandaue City. At about 4 pm, Catamora noticed 8 persons acting suspiciously, one of whom he identified as Edwin Nunez. He noticed one of them giving instructions to two of the men to approach Manatad. He followed the two, but sensing that they were being followed, they immediately proceeded to the middle of the road and engaged Cotamora to a gun battle. At that instant, Catamora heard a series of shots from the other group and thereafter saw Manatad sprawled on the ground. Thereafter, the Nunez group commandeered a vehicle and fled from the scene of the shooting. Catamora testified that he can identify Nunez because of the mole at the bridge of his nose near the left eye which he noticed when the accused passed 2 to 3 meters in front of him together with his companions. In a follow up operations, Nunuez and accused Rodrigo Dasig were apprehended, while the others escaped. As the suit was progressing Nunez died without issue. Dasig was charged with Murder with direct assault upon a person in authority. The accused contested the charge and confessed that he is a member of the sparrow unit of the New People‘s Army, and claimed that he should rather be charged with the crime of rebellion.
ISSUE:
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Whether Dasig is liable for Murder with direct assault upon a person in authority or the crime of rebellion . REBELLION.
RATIO: Dasig not only confessed voluntarily his membership with the sparrow unit of the NPA but also his participation and that of his group in the killing of Manatad while manning the traffic in Mandaue City. It is of judicial notice that the sparrow unit is the liquidation squad of the NPA with the objective of overthrowing the duly constituted government. It is therefore not hard to comprehend that the killing of police officer Manatad was committed as a means to or in furtherance of the subversive ends of NPA. Consequently, Dasig is liable for the crime of rebellion, not murder with direct assault upon a person in authority. The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is a vast movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots. Acts committed in furtherance of rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed absorbed in one single crime of rebellion. The act of killing a police officer, knowing too well that the victim is a person in authority, is a mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot be made the basis of a separate charge.
ENRILE v SALAZAR Ponente: Narvasa, J. June 5, 1990
Facts: •February 27, 1990 - Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce
Enrile was arrested by officers led by Director Alfredo Lim on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City. The warrant had issued on an information charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990. •Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI
headquarters without bail. The following morning, February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City. On the same date, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition for habeas corpus. The Court issued the writ prayed for, returnable March 5, 1990 and set the plea for hearing on March 6, 1990. •The Solicitor General distinguished between the complex crime
("delito complejo") arising from an offense being a necessary means for committing another, which is referred to in the second clause of Article 48, Revised Penal Code, and is the subject of the Hernandez ruling, and the compound crime ("delito compuesto") arising from a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave offenses referred to in the first clause of the same paragraph, with which Hernandez was not concerned and to which, therefore, it should not apply. Enrile and Co. were charged in the information on the occasion , but not in furtherance, of rebellion . Hernandez ruling charged murders and other common crimes committed as a
necessary means for the commission of rebellion. ISSUE : WON Hernandez ruling should still apply? WON the crime is rebellion? HELD: (1)Yes Court was given several options:
(a) abandon Hernandez and adopt the minority view expressed in the main dissent of Justice Montemayor in said case that rebellion
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cannot absorb more serious crimes, and that under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code rebellion may properly be complexed with common offenses. (b) hold Hernandez applicable only to offenses committed in furtherance, or as a necessary means for the commission, of rebellion, but not to acts committed in the course of a rebellion which also constitute "common" crimes of grave or less grave character;
(c) maintain Hernandez as applying to make rebellion absorb all other offenses committed in its course, whether or not necessary to its commission or in furtherance thereof. - The majority held that the Hernandez ruling should apply especially considering that Art 48 should be favorable to the accused, and thus to rule that rebellion can be complexed with other crimes would therefore result in a penalty that is higher than if he was charged with separate crimes. - Ratio - When two or more crimes are the result of a single act, the offender is deemed less perverse than when he commits said crimes thru separate and distinct acts (2) Yes, although the information stated that the crime is rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, it is still considered to fall under simple rebellion and the murders etc are its ingredients.
5 years after his arrest, he requests for bail which was denied on the basis of the nature of the offense (since his crime was complex, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed). He filed a petition to the Supreme Court. The prosecution maintains that Hernandez is charged with, and has been convicted of, rebellion complexed with murders, arsons and robberies, for which the capital punishment, it is claimed, may be imposed, although the lower court sentenced him merely to life imprisonment. Upon the other hand, the defense contends, among other things, that rebellion cannot be complexed with murder, arson, or robbery.
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that: "When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period."
It is obvious, from the language of this article, that the same presupposes the commission of two (2) or more crimes, and, hence, does not apply when the culprit is guilty of only one crime.
PEOPLE v HERNANDEZ [99 Phil 515 (1956)] Ponente: Concepcion, J. FACTS:
Hernandez was arrested because as president of the Congress of Labor Relations (CLO) and a member of the Communist Party, he was alleged to be guilty of the crime of rebellion along with others.
Article 134 of said code reads: "The crime of rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Philippine Islands or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or of depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives."
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ISSUE: WON Hernandez can be charged of rebellion complexed with murder, arsons and robbery.
were out to get Magbojos. Before leaving his house, Oliva warned him not to report to the police authorities otherwise Inopia will be killed.
HELD: NO. RATIO:
Rebellion in itself would include and absorb the said crimes, thus granting the accused his right to bail. Murder and arson are crimes inherent and concomitant when rebellion is taking place. Rebellion in the Revised Penal Code constitutes one single crime and that there is no reason to complex it with other crimes. As basis, the Court cited several cases convicting the defendants of simple rebellion although they killed several persons .
Edgardo Labajata, a farmer, testified that he saw Magbojos (then hogtied) in the company of 5 persons. Magbojos appeared weak & w/abrasions on both sides of his face & can hardly talk. Oliva questioned Labajata & when the former learned that the latter knew Magbojos, he was also hogtied but was subsequently released on the condition that he will leave their brgy. Magbojos‘ brother, Renato, a policeman was informed by one
Levelito Tuberion that he knew where Magbojos was buried since he was the one asked by Oliva‘s group to accompany them to the burial
site. Graveyard was dug & they found human bones, a shirt, short pants, coralon rope, a brief & black rubber band. Magbojos‘ wife
PEOPLE v. OLIVA
testified that these were personal belongings of her husband.
(2001)
PONENTE: Quisumbing, J. FACTS: May 26, 1986: Jacinto Magbojos, Jr. went out of their house early morning to count the coconuts in his dad‘s coconut land uphill. At around 8 a.m., Cinco & Ibaya went to Magbojos‘ house, however,
they left after learning that he was not home. A few minutes after Magbojos got home, 4 persons entered their house, hogtied him and took him away walking towards the western direction.
Original charge: murder amended to kidnapping w/murder against Oliva, Salcedo & Cinco. All of them pleaded not guilty. Oliva‘s defense: he was an NPA commanding officer in the
Masbate area. Thus, he should be charged w/rebellion. Tuberion is in the list of shoot-to-kill order while Inopia was a member of a group called Walang Patawad, pretending to be an NPA member for business extortion. Salcedo‘s defense: at the date of the incident, he was staying w/his
Arturo Inopia, a farmer, testified that Ka Ambot (Oliva) & company visited him at about 8:30 or 9 a.m. They informed him that they
cousin in another barangay w/c was about 5 km away from Magbojos‘ brgy or it would take approximately 5 hours to get there
by walking.
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Lower Court: Oliva & Salcedo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and not kidnapping w/murder. Cinco acquitted.
HELD: RTC decision modified. Oliva & Salcedo guilty of homicide.
ISSUE:
CARIÑO v. PEOPLE & CA
WON Oliva should be charged w/rebellion. NO.
RATIO:
April 30, 1963
NATURE: Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the CA Contentions of the Defense
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Claim lacks factual & legal basis. No rebellion in this case since the killing was not committed in furtherance of rebellion but for personal reasons/other motives. Thus, killing must punished separately even if committed simultaneously w/the rebellious acts there being no proof that the killing was in connection w/or in furtherance of the rebellious acts. It was not indubitably proven that Oliva was indeed a member of the NPA.
Circumstancial evidence proves that Ka Ambot & Oliva are one & the same and that he took part in the commission of the crime. Alibi can‘t stand since it was not impossible for them to be at the
scene of the crime and they were positively identified by witnesses. ◦
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No treachery, evident premeditation & use of superior strength since there‘s no proof at all on how the killing was done. (from CD) absence of further proof, the crime of attempt under Arts 249 and 250 of the Penal Code.
PONENTE: Labrador, J. FACTS: Cariño was charged with the crime of rebellion with murders, arsons, robberies and kidnappings as a high ranking official of the Hukbalahaps. The specific acts of rebellion which the accused, Francisco Cariño, committed in conspiracy with other members of the Communist Party, between the period from May 6, 1946 to Sept. 12, 1950, include raids, ambush, and seizures. Accused vigorously denied any participation therein. Appellant was not a member of the Hukbalahap organization. He did not take up arms against the government nor did he openly take part in the commission of the crime of rebellion or insurrection as defined in Art. 134 of the RPC, without which said crime would not have been committed. The only acts he was shown to have performed were the sending and furnishing of the cigarettes, powdered milk and canned goods to a Huk leader, the changing of dollars into pesos for a top level communist and the helping of Huks in the opening of accounts in a bank of which he was an official.
ISSUE :
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WON the acts of the accused constitute rebellion. NO.
1. To prevent the promulgation or execution of any law or the holding of any popular election;
RATIO:
2. To prevent the National Government, or any provincial or municipal government or any public officer thereof from freely exercising its or his functions, or prevent the execution of any administrative order;
These facts, by themselves do not prove criminal intent of helping the Huks in committing the crime of insurrection or rebellion. Good faith is presumed and no presumption of this existence of criminal intent can arise from acts which are in themselves legitimate even if appellant had the intent of aiding the communists in their unlawful designs to overthrow the Government. The assistance does extended by him was not efficacious enough to help in the successful prosecution of the crime so as to make him an accomplice therein.
3. To inflict any act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of any public officer or employee; 4. To commit, for any political or social end, any act of hate or revenge against private persons or any social class; and 5. To despoil, for any political or social end, any person, municipality or province, or the National Government (or the Government of the United States), of all its property or any part thereof.
Appellant‘s acts did not constitute acts of cooperation in the
execution of the acts of overthrowing the Government even if considered an indirect help or aid in the rebellion they cannot constitute previous or simultaneous acts of rebellion, for, unlike in the crime of treason the act of giving comfort or moral aid is not criminal in the case of rebellion or insurrection where the RPC expressly declares that there must be a public uprising and the taking up of arms. Appellant is therefore absolved from the charge.
GONZALES v ABAYA [498 SCRA 445] Art. 139. Sedition; How committed. — The crime of sedition is committed by persons who rise publicly and tumultuously in order to attain by force, intimidation, or by other means outside of legal methods, any of the following objects:
PEOPLE v. UMALI (1954) PONENTE: Montemayor, J.
BACKGROUND: Umali (one of the accused) is the Congressman of Quezon while Punzalan is the Mayor. They were former friends. Umali helped Punzalan win for mayor in 1947; Punzalan helped Umali win for Congressman in 1949. The friendly relations however did not endure like any other ordinary political allies na mag-aaway din eventually (u know). According to Punzalan, Umali became jealous for his fast growing popularity among the people of Tiaong Quezon for political guidance, political leadership and favors. In Nov. 1951, to oppose Punzalan for reelection, Umali picked Pasumbal, his
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trusted leader to run. Sa case story, is the usual political campaign scenario – nagsisiraan si Umali at Punzalan pag kampanya. Umali would say – if Punzalan would win, blood will flow and a gold coffin will be waiting for him. Punzalan would say on the other hand, Umali as Congressman was useless at nagkakaroon na ng dust upuan niya sa Congress, even cobwebs! hehe exaj, kasi hindi nag aatend sa sessions daw. Nov. 12, 1951 – Nagplano ng raid si Umali & Pasumbal (planning to kill Punzalan) Nov. 13, 1951 – Punzalan won by overwhelming majority. Nov. 14, 1951 – Naganap ang raid. Swerte si Punzalan wala siya sa bahay niya nung pinagbabaril at sinunog pa. Mabuti Wife and kids niya nakatakas at nagpunta sa bahay ng kapitbahay. Tapos may mga natamaan ng baril, namatay, physically injured, tapos ninakawan pa bahay ni Punzalan habang itoy nasusunog.
How was there sedition? Please read the provisions to know the elements of Sedition (it‘s different from those of Rebellion and
Treason).
FACTS: Going back to the raid staged in Tiaong, it is well to make a short narration of the happenings shortly before it (as stated in the background), established by the evidence, so as to ascertain and be informed of the reason or purpose of said raid, the persons behind it, and those who took part in it. According to the testimony of Amado Mendoza (a compadre of Pasumbal and helped in the UmaliPasumbal campaign), on the eve of the election, at the house of Pasumbal's father, then being used as his electoral headquarters , he heard Umali instruct Pasumbal to contact the Huks through Commander Abeng so that Punzalan will be killed, Pasumbal complying with the order of his Chief (Umali) went to the mountains
which were quite near the town and held a conference with Commander Abeng. It would seem that Umali and Pasumbal had a feeling that Punzalan was going to win in the elections the next day, and that his death was the surest way to eliminate him from the electoral fight.
Continuing with the testimony of Amado Mendoza, he told the court that as per instructions of Umali he went to the house of the latter, on the day following the election, with the result of the election already known, namely, the decisive victory of Punzalan over Pasumbal. He was told by Umali to come with him, and Pasumbal and the three boarded a jeep with Pasumbal at the wheel: 1. They drove toward the Tiaong Elementary School 2. Once there he (Mendoza) was left at the school premises with instructions by Umali to wait for Commander Abeng and the Huks and point to them the house of Punzalan. 3. After waiting for sometime, Abeng and his troops numbering about fifty, armed with garands and carbines, arrived and 4. after explaining his identity and his mission to Abeng, he led the dissidents or part of the contingent in the direction of Punzalan's house 5. and on arriving in front of the bodega of Robles, he pointed out Punzalan's house and then walked toward his home, leaving the Huks who proceeded to lie flat in a canal. 6. Before reaching his house, he already heard shots, so, he evacuated his family to their dugout in his yard. 7. While doing so he and his wife Catalina Tinapunan saw armed men in the lanzones grove just across the street from their house, belonging to the father of Umali, and among those men they saw Congressman Umali holding a revolver, in the company of Huk Commander Torio and about 20 armed men.
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8. Afterwards they saw Umali and his companions leave in the direction of Taguan, by way of the railroad tracks.
ISSUE: 1.
Was there rebellion or sedition on the part of Umali and Pasumbal? SEDITION.
2.
Can Sedition absorb other crimes that concurred with it? NO.
RATIO: First Issue
The Court is convinced that the principal and main, though not necessarily the most serious, crime committed here was not rebellion but rather that of sedition. The purpose of the raid and the act of the raiders in rising publicly and taking up arms was not exactly against the Government and for the purpose of doing the things defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code under rebellion. The raiders did not even attack the Presidencia, the seat of local Government. Rather, the object was to attain by means of force, intimidation, etc. one object, to wit, to inflict an act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of a public official, namely, Punzalan who was then Mayor of Tiaong. As to defendants Pasumbal and Capino, their participation in and responsibility for the raid was duly established not only by the going of Pasumbal to the mountains following instructions of Umali, and conferring with Commander Abeng asking him to raid Tiaong and kill Punzalan, but also by the fact that Pasumbal and Capino in the afternoon or evening of November 14 th (day raid happened) met the Huks at the Osiw River as the dissidents were on their way to Tiaong and later Pasumbal and Capino were seen in the yard of Punzalan firing at the house with automatic weapons and hand grenades.
What about Umali? His criminal responsibility was also established, tho indirectly. We have the testimony of Amado Mendoza who heard him instructing Pasumbal to contact Commander Abeng and ask him to raid Tiaong and kill Punzalan. The rest of the evidence is more or less circumstantial, but nonetheless strong and convincing. No one saw him take part in the firing and attack on the house of Punzalan; nor was he seen near or around said house. Because of his important position as Congressman, perchance he did not wish to figure too prominently in the actual raid. Besides, he would seem to have already given out all the instructions necessary and he could well stay in the background. However, during the raid, not very far from Punzalan's house he was seen in the lanzonesan of his father, holding a revolver and in the company of about 20 armed men with Huk Commander Torio, evidently observing and waiting for developments. Second Issue
Under Article 139 of the same Code this was sufficient to constitute sedition. As regards the crime of robbery with which appellants were charged and of which they were convicted, we are also of the opinion that it was not one of the purposes of the raid, which was mainly to kidnap or kill Punzalan and destroy his house. The robberies were actually committed by only some of the raiders, presumably dissidents, as an afterthought, because of the opportunity offered by the confusion and disorder resulting from the shooting and the burning of the three houses, the articles being intended presumably to replenish the supplies of the dissidents in the mountains. For these robberies, only those who actually took part therein are responsible, and not the three appellants herein. With respect to the crime of multiple frustrated murder, while the assault upon policeman Pedro Lacorte with a hand grenade causing him injuries resulting in his blindness in one eye, may be regarded
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as frustrated murder; the wounding of Ortega, Aselo, Rivano, Garcia and Lector should be considered as mere physical injuries.
HELD: In conclusion, the court finds appellants guilty of sedition, multiple murder, arson, frustrated murder and physical injuries.
PEOPLE v. TAHIL (1928) PONENTE: Avancena, C.J. FACTS: The appellants, Datu Tahil and Datu Tarson, were convicted in the Court of First Instance of Sulu of the crime of rebellion.
soldiers, stationed themselves about 50 meters in front of the fort where he found a red flag flying and demanded the surrender of Datu Tahil. He did not receive any reply to his intimation, and, in turn, a group of armed Moros appeared at the left flank of the Constabulary soldiers in the act of attacking them, but were repelled. It was again intimated that Datu Tahil surrender, but again no answer was received, and then a larger group of Moros appeared in an aggressive attitude, being likewise repelled. For the purpose of frightening the Moros, the Constabulary soldiers fired the stoke mortar, which caused the defenders of the fort to flee, leaving the Government forces in possession thereof, where they found only the bodies of those who had been killed in this affray.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused are guilty of the crime of rebellion or sedition. YES,
RATIO: Datu Tahil and Datu Tarson started the propaganda which extended the movement, to obtain the abolition of the land tax and besides, other pretentions in connection with the attendance of children at school, the privilege of carrying arms and the removal of certain provincial officials, amongst whom, Governor Moore, with the threat that if their request were not granted, they would oppose the Government by forcible means. Datu Tahil made them all, including Datu Tarson, take an oath on the Koran to this effect. From then on they took turns in guarding the fort and its surroundings under the orders of Datu Tahil, who always carried a rifle and a revolver About the middle of January, 1927, the provincial fiscal filed a complaint against Datu Tahil and his followers charging them with sedition.The following day Commander Green with a group of
Datu Tahil failure to surrender with the object of complying with a judicial warrant of arrest against him and his followers, he resisted this order by means of force, thus preventing the officer charged with this duty from performing it. This already constitutes a crime. In regard to Datu Tarson, it appears that he was one of those who took an oath on the Koran to oppose the Government by force; that he took part in all the activities of the movement, assisting in the construction of the fort; that in the day preceding the incident he was in the fort; and while he left in the afternoon, he returned early the following morning and was found in the fort when the Government forces appeared.
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The facts proven, however, constitute the crime of sedition, defined in section 5 of Act No. 292, and not of rebellion according to section 3 of the same law, the acts committed being limited to preventing the Government officials, throught force, from complying with their duties in connection with the judicial order, the enforcement of which was entrusted to them.
Art. 142. Inciting to sedition. — The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine not exceeding 2,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, without taking any direct part in the crime of sedition, should incite others to the accomplishment of any of the acts which constitute sedition, by means of speeches, proclamations, writings, emblems, cartoons, banners, or other representations tending to the same end, or upon any person or persons who shall utter seditious words or speeches, write, publish, or circulate scurrilous libels against the Government (of the United States or the Government of the Commonwealth) of the Philippines, or any of the duly constituted authorities thereof, or which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing the functions of his office, or which tend to instigate others to cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes, or which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots, or which lead or tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the community, the safety and order of the Government, or who shall knowingly conceal such evil practices. (Reinstated by E.O. No. 187).
PRIMICIAS v. FUGOSO (1948)
PONENTE: Ferias, J. FACTS:
Petitioner Cipriano Primicias is the campaign manager of the Coalesced Minority Parties. Respondent Valeraino Fugoso is the Mayor of Manila. Primicias would like to compel Fugoso, by means of a mandamus, to issue a permit for the holding of a public meeting in Plaza Miranda, as respondent Fugoso has denied the request.
ISSUE: WON the denial of the permit for holding a public meeting is proper.
NO.
RATIO: The court first states the importance of the right of freedom of speech and to peacefully assemble, stating, however, that these rights have their limits in that they should not be injurious to the rights of the community or society. Then they discuss the other side, the right to regulate these rights. This brings a discussion of police power, saying that the legislature delegated police power to the Municipal Board of the City of Manila, giving it regulatory powers regarding the use of public places. These powers, however, according to the court, are not absolute. If these powers were absolute, then the Municipal or City government would have sole and complete discretion as to what to allow and what not to allow. This would be wrong as it would leave decisions open to the whims of those in power. While these rights should be regulated, they should be regulated in a reasonable manner, and giving unbridled deciding power to the government is not reasonable. Also, looking at the ordinance Sec. 1119, the courts said there there were 2 ways to interpret such an ordinance:
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The mayor has unregulated discretion
hours prior to the holding of such parade or procession.
Applications are subject to reasonable discretion to determine which areas to use to avoid confusion and minimize disorder
PEOPLE v PEREZ [GR No. L-21049 or 45 Phil 599 (December 22, 1923)]
The court took the 2nd interpretation. To justify their stand, the court went through a series of U.S. cases that handled similar circumstances. Many of these cases struck down ordinances and laws requiring citizens to obtain permits for public meetings, events, parades, processions, and the like. Lastly, the court states that there is no reasonable reason to deny this public meeting. As such, the mandamus is granted. Note: SEC. 1119 Free for use of public — The streets and public places of the city shall be kept free and clear for the use of the public, and the sidewalks and crossings for the pedestrians, and the same shall only be used or occupied for other purposes as provided by ordinance or regulation: Provided, that the holding of athletic games, sports, or exercise during the celebration of national holidays in any streets or public places of the city and on the patron saint day of any district in question, may be permitted by means of a permit issued by the Mayor, who shall determine the streets or public places or portions thereof, where such athletic games, sports, or exercises may be held: And provided, further, That the holding of any parade or procession in any streets or public places is prohibited unless a permit therefor is first secured from the Mayor who shall, on every such occasion, determine or specify the streets or public places for the formation, route, and dismissal of such parade or procession: And provided, finally, That all applications to hold a parade or procession shall be submitted to the Mayor not less than twenty-four
PONENTE: Malcolm, J. NATURE: Appeal from a decision of CFI of Sorsogon FACTS: Isaac Perez, the municipal secretary of Pilar, Sorsogon, and Fortunato Lodovice, a citizen of that municipality, met on the morning of April 1, 1992, in the presidencia of Pilar, they engaged in a discussion regarding the administration of Governor-General Wood, which resulted in Perez shouting ―And the Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off Wood's head for having recommended a bad thing for the Philippines.‖ This has been proved beyond a
reasonable doubt even though the defense claimed that the discussion was held in a peaceful manner, and that what Perez wished to say was that the Governor-General should be removed and substituted by another. Charged with violation of Article 256 of the Penal Code having to do with contempt of ministers of the Crown or other persons in authority, and convicted thereof, Perez has appealed the case saying that article 256 of the Penal Code is no longer in force.
ISSUE(s): WON accused Perez is liable for violation of the A292: Treason and Sedition Law
HELD:
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Yes.
RATIO: The words of the accused did not so much tend to defame, abuse, or insult, a person in authority, as they did to raise a disturbance in the community. In criminal law, there are a variety of offenses which are not directed primarily against individuals, but rather against the existence of the State, the authority of the Government, or the general public peace. The offenses created and defined in Act No. 292 are distinctly of this character. Among them is sedition, which is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the State. It is a revolt against legitimate authority. Though the ultimate object of sedition is a violation of the public peace or at least such a course of measures as evidently engenders it, yet it does not aim at direct and open violence against the laws, or the subversion of the Constitution. It must not be interpreted so as to abridge the freedom of speech and the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances. Criticism is permitted to penetrate even to the foundations of Government. Criticism, no matter how severe, on the Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary, is within the range of liberty of speech, unless the intention and effect be seditious . But when the intention and effect of the act is seditious, the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and press and of assembly and petition must yield to punitive measures designed to maintain the prestige of constituted authority, the supremacy of the constitution and the laws, and the existence of the State. The attack on the Governor-General passes the furthest bounds of free speech was intended. There is a seditious tendency in the words used, which could easily produce disaffection among the people and a state of feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the Government and obedient to the laws. A seditious attack on the
Governor-General is an attack on the rights of the Filipino people and on American sovereignty. In the words of the law, Perez has uttered seditious words. He has made a statement and done an act which tended to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes. He has made a statement and done an act which suggested and incited rebellious conspiracies. He has made a statement and done an act which tended to stir up the people against the lawful authorities. He has made a statement and done an act which tended to disturb the peace of the community and the safety or order of the Government. All of these various tendencies can be ascribed to the action of Perez and may be characterized as penalized by section 8 of Act No. 292 as amended.
Section 8 of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, as amended by Act No. 1692, appears to have been placed on the statute books exactly to meet such a situation. This section reads as follows: Every person who shall utter seditious words or speeches, or who shall write, publish or circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States or against the Government of the Philippine Islands, or who shall print, write, publish utter or make any statement, or speech, or do any act which tends to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office or in performing his duty, or which tends to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes, or which suggests or incites rebellious conspiracies or which tends to stir up the people against the lawful authorities, or which tends to disturb the peace of the community or the safety or order of the Government, or who shall knowingly conceal such evil practices from the constituted authorities, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars United States currency or by
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imprisonment not exceeding two years, or both, in the discretion of the court.
TEXAS v JOHNSON Date
21 June 1989
Ponente
Brennan, J.
FACTS
During the 1984 Republican National Convention in Dallas, Texas, respondent Johnson participated in a political demonstration to protest the policies of the Reagan administration and some Dallas-based corporations. After a march through the city streets, Johnson burned an American flag while protesters chanted. No one was physically injured or threatened with injury, although several witnesses were seriously offended by the flag burning. Johnson was convicted of desecration of a venerated object in violation of a Texas statute, and a State Court of Appeals affirmed. However, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, holding that the State, consistent with the First Amendment, could not punish Johnson for burning the flag in these circumstances. The court first found that Johnson's burning of the flag was expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment. The court concluded that the State could not criminally sanction flag desecration in order to preserve the flag as a symbol of national unity. It also held that the statute did not meet the State's goal of preventing breaches of the peace, since it was not drawn narrowly enough to encompass only those flag burnings that would likely result in a serious disturbance, and since the flag burning in this case did not threaten such a reaction. Further, it stressed
that another Texas statute prohibited breaches of the peace and could be used to prevent disturbances without punishing this flag desecration.
ISSUE W/N Texas may punish flag burning on the basis that it tends to incite breaches of the peace
HELD/ RATIO NO. Citing the test laid down in Brandenburg v. Ohio , the U.S. Supreme Court held that the state may only punish speech that would incite "imminent lawless action," finding that flag burning does not always pose an imminent threat of lawless action. The Court noted that Texas already punished "breaches of the peace" directly. The most contentious issue before the Court, then, was whether states possessed an interest in preserving the flag as a unique symbol of national identity and principles. Texas argued that desecration of the flag impugned its value as such a unique national symbol, and that the state possessed the power to prevent this result. The majority opinion viewed flag burning as falling within the purview of the First Amendment, protecting the right to free speech. In determining the case, the court first considered the question of whether the First Amendment reached non-speech acts, since Johnson was convicted of flag desecration rather than verbal communication, and, if so, whether Johnson's burning of the flag constituted expressive conduct, which would permit him to invoke the First Amendment in challenging his conviction. The First Amendment literally does not allow the abridgment only of "speech", but the court reiterated their long recognition that its protection does not end at the spoken or written word.
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Chapter 2: CRIMES AGAINST POPULAR REPRESENTATION Chapter 3: ILLEGAL ASSEMBLIES AND ASSOCIATIONS Chapter 4: ASSAULT UPON, AND RESISTANCE AND DISOBEDIENCE TO PERSONS IN AUTHOITY AND THEIR AGENTS Art. 148. Direct assaults . — Any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purpose enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition, or shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not exceeding P1,000 pesos, when the assault is committed with a weapon or when the offender is a public officer or employee, or when the offender lays hands upon a person in authority. If none of these circumstances be present, the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period and a fine not exceeding P500 pesos shall be imposed.
PEOPLE v. RODIL (1981)
PONENTE: Makasiar, j. FACTS: At about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 24, 1971, the deceased, PC Lt. Guillermo Masana, together with PC soldier Virgilio Fidel, Philippine Coast Guard serviceman Ricardo Ligsa, and
Patrolman Felix Mojica of Indang, Cavite, was having lunch inside a restaurant in front of the Indang market. While they were eating, they saw, through the glass panel of the restaurant, appellant outside the restaurant blowing his whistle. Their attention having been drawn to what appellant was doing, Lt. Masana, then in civilian clothing, accompanied by PC soldier Virgilio Fidel, went out of the restaurant, approached appellant and asked the latter, after identifying himself as a PC officer, whether the gun that was tucked in his waist had a license. Instead of answering the question of Lt. Masana, appellant moved one step backward and attempted to draw his gun. PC soldier Virgilio Fidel immediately grabbed appellant's gun from appellant's waist and gave it to Lt. Masana. After that, Lt. Masana told the appellant to go inside the restaurant. PC soldier Virgilio Fidel followed. Lt. Masana and the appellant occupied a separate table about one and one-half (1 1/2 ) meters from the table of Lt. Masana's three companions — Fidel, Ligsa and Mojica (p. 10, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971). A fter the two were already seated, Lt. Masana placed appellant's gun on the table. After that Lt. Masana pulled out a piece of coupon bond paper from his pocket and wrote thereon the receipt for the gun, and after signing it, he asked appellant to countersign the same, but appellant refused to do so. Instead, he asked Lt. Masana to return the gun to him. Lt. Masana rejected appellant's plea, telling the latter that they would talk the matter over in the municipal building of Indang, Cavite. When Lt. Masana was about to stand up, appellant suddenly pulled out a doublebladed dagger and with it he stabbed Lt. Masana several times, on the chest and stomach causing his death several hours thereafter. While the stabbing incident was taking place, the three companions of Lt. Masana — PC soldier Virgilio Fidel, Coast Guard Ricardo Ligsa and policeman Felix Mojica — who were all seated at a separate table about one and one-half (1 1/2) meters away from that occupied by the accused and Lt. Masana, stood up to assist Lt. Masana; but Chief of Police Primo Panaligan of Indang, Cavite, who happened to be taking his lunch in the same restaurant, was quicker than any of them in going near the combatants and embraced
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and/or grabbed the accused from behind, and thereafter wrested the dagger from the accused-appellant. Immediately thereafter, the Chief of Police brought the accused to the municipal building of Indang, Cavite. The accused claimed self-defense and stated that, inside the restaurant, the accused saw three persons to his right, eating, while to his left he saw a person whom he later learned to be Lt. Guillermo Masana drinking beer alone. While the accused and his wife were waiting for the food to be served, Lt. Masana approached him and asked him whether he was Floro Rodil and whether he was a member of the Anti-Smuggling Unit. After receiving an affirmative answer, Lt. Masana invited the accused to join him in his table. The accused accepted the invitation, so the two moved over to the officer's table where the deceased offered beer to the accused who, however, refused saying he was still hungry. In the course of their conversation, Lt. Masana told the accused not to report any matter about smuggling to the PC. The accused informed the officer that he had not reported any smuggling activity to the authorities. Lt. Masana then asked the accused for his identification card as a member of the Anti-Smuggling Unit, which the latter did by showing his ID card. hereupon, Lt. Masana told the accused that the latter's ID was fake, and after the accused insisted that it was genuine, Lt. Masana tried to take it away from the accused when the latter was about to put it back in his pocket. Because of his refusal to give his ID card to Lt. Masana, the latter got mad and, in an angry tone of voice, demanded: "Will you give it to me or not?" (p. 71, Ibid). Still the accused refused to surrender his ID to Lt. Masana. Thereupon, the latter pulled a gun from his waist and hit the accused on the head with its handle two (2) times. Immediately, blood gushed from his head and face. When Lt. Masana was about to hit the accused for the third time, the latter parried the right hand of the officer, pulled his "pangsaksak" and stabbed the officer two or three times and then pushed him away from him and ran out of the restaurant.
ISSUE: WON Rodil is guilty of murder or homicide complexed with assault upon an agent of authority. NO. (simple homicide only)
RATIO: The information does not allege the fact that the accused then knew that, before or at the time of the assault, the person was an agent of a person in authority. It is essential that the accused must have knowledge that the person attacked was a person in authority or his agent in the exercise of his duties, because the accused must have the intention to offend, injure or assault the offended party as a person in authority or his agent. But the failure to expressly allege in the information that the accused had knowledge that the person attacked was person in authority does not render the information defective so long as there are facts alleged therein from which it can be implied that the accused knew that the person attacked was a person in authority. (People vs. Balbar).
PEOPLE v BALBAR (1967) FACTS: 1. While teacher was holding a class, accused entered the classroom, hugged her, tried to kiss her (kissed eye), chased after her while holding his knife "daga" they fell she suffered slight physical injuries. 2. 2 Infos filed: Direct Assault Upon a Person in Authority and Acts of Lasciviousness
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3. Defense: Direct Assault - no sufficient cause of action and charges 2 offenses in a single complaint. Acts of Lasciviousness – placed him in double jeopardy. 4. Lower Court quashed Direct Assault charge bec. Info lacks the express allegation of the element knowledge that that victim was a person in authority
NATURE: Automatic review of the decision of RTC of Romblon, Romblon. Br. 81
PONENTE: Panganiban, J. FACTS:
HELD: Case remanded. LC erred in quashing.
April 2, 1997: Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Romblon (Branch 81), which found Julio Recto y Robea guilty beyond reasonable doubt of: 1. two counts of the complex crime of qualified direct assault with frustrated homicide (Criminal Case Nos. 1970 and 1971)
RATIO: 1. Direct assault is committed "by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, . . . shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties or on occasion of such performance.
2. the complex crime of qualified direct assault with murder (Criminal Case No. 1972)
2. "teachers, professors, and persons charged with the supervision of public or duly recognized private schools, colleges and universities shall be deemed persons in authority,
For the prosecution, SolGen summarized the evidence:
3. Complainant was a teacher. Info sufficiently alleges that the accused knew that fact, since she was in her classroom and engaged in the performance of her duties. He therefore knew that she was a person in authority, as she was so by specific provision of l aw. It matters not that such knowledge on his part is not expressly alleged, complainant's status as a person in authority being a matt er of law and not of fact, ignorance whereof could not excuse non-compliance on his part.
PEOPLE v. RECTO
3. homicide (Criminal Case No. 1973)
In the early afternoon of April 18, 1994 at Ambulong, Magdiwang, Sibuyan Island, Romblon, Barangay Captain Percival Orbe was in his residence together with Barangay Kagawad Antonio Macalipay and Barangay Tanod Melchor Recto, appellant‘s cousin. They were trying
to settle a land dispute involving Linda Rance and Cornelio Regis, Jr. While the meeting was in progress, Orbe was summoned by SPO4 Fortunato Rafol to proceed to the bodega of Rance. There, they noticed that the padlock of the bodega was destroyed, and the palay stored therein, stolen. Forthwith, Barangay Kagawad Macalipay, who happened to be the chairman of the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC), conducted an investigation.
(2001)
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SPO4 Rafol and SPO1 Male, also made their investigation and reported their findings to Linda Rance. At this point, Barangay Tanod Melchor Recto passed by. He saw SPO4 Rafol, Wilfredo Arce, spouses Crestito and Linda Rance at the bodega. He went to Barangay Captain Orbe and inquired why they were there. Barangay Captain Orbe told him that the padlock of the bodega was destroyed and the palay, stolen. Orbe requested Melchor Recto to stay as he might be needed. Thereupon, Barangay Tanod Melchor Recto began his own ocular investigation. While SPO4 Rafol and SPO1 Male were leaving the premises, the group of [A]ppellant Julio Recto, Cornelio Regis, Jr., Dante Regis, Melvar Relox, Teodoro de la Serna, Enrica Regis and Nida Regis arrived. The group stopped at the first ‗trampa‘ near the bodega.
Barangay Captain Orbe advised them not to create trouble, but, Dante Regis pulled a piece of wood and threw it towards them. Thereafter, [A]ppellant Recto, while holding a balisong or fan knife, approached Barangay Captain Orbe. The latter responded by telling the former to surrender the balisong. Appellant stepped backward, opened his jacket and pulled out a gun, a de sabog. Upon seeing the gun, Barangay Captain Orbe retreated, while Barangay Kagawad Antonio Macalipay stepped forward with both arms raised and uttered the words: ‗Do not do it. We‘ll just settle this. (Ayoson ta lang ine).‘ Julio Recto, however, immediately pulled the trigger,
hitting Barangay Kagawad Macalipay, causing him to fall down on the ground. Then Cornelio Regis, Jr. approached the fallen Macalipay and flipped his bolo at the latter who rolled and fell into the rice paddy. Melchor Recto saw the shooting from his hiding place behind a concrete pillar. He then ran inside the old dilapidated bathroom of the bodega. Barangay Captain Orbe also followed. Inside the bathroom, Melchor Recto peeped through the window and saw Julio Recto fire his gun at Emilio Santos. Santos also fired his revolver at
appellant and later, turned around and crawled. While crawling, Santos fired another shot towards Regis, Jr., but, the latter was able to reach and hack the former with a bolo. Amidst the din, Percival Orbe and Melchor Recto heard Julio Recto saying: ‗Where is that kapitan?‘ When Melchor could no longer see
Julio Recto, he jumped out of the bathroom window and ran. While running, Julio Recto shot him hitting the latter‘s thigh. Barangay
Captain Orbe also got out of the bathroom through the top and landed onto the ricefield. Before he could take a step, he was also shot by Julio Recto at his right elbow, but was still able to continue running and cross the southern portion of the ricefield. He caught up with the wounded Melchor Recto and both went their separate ways. On the other hand, both Barangay Kagawad Antonio Macalipay and Emiliano ‗Renato‘ Santos died due to multiple wounds
inflicted on them by herein appellant. Recto raises for his defense, self-defense and defense of relative. The trial court found that appellant had fired at a barangay tanod, Melchor Recto, who was at the crime scene ―on the occasion of the
performance of his official duties. It added that appellant had shot a barangay captain, Percival Orbe, also ―on the occa sion of the performance of his official duties. The lower court ruled out treachery in the killing of Emiliano Santos, because there had been a gun duel between him and appellant. However, it convicted and sentenced appellant to death for the murder of Antonio Macalipay.
ISSUES:
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1. RTC erred in convicting accused of direct assault in Crim. Cases 1970 and 1971. YES and NO. 2. RTC erred in finding the aggravating circumstance of treachery in Crim. Case 1972 which accordingly resulted in murder in conviction.
YES.
RATIO: Appellant contends that he committed the crimes attributed to him in self-defense and in defense of his uncle, Cornelio Regis Jr. By invoking self-defense and defense of a relative, appellant plainly admits that he killed Antonio Macalipay and Emiliano ―Renato‖ Santos and fired the shots that injured Melchor Recto and Percival Orbe. Thus, appellant has shifted the burden of evidence to himself. Appellant miserably failed to discharge this burden. In fact, he was clearly the aggressor. Without unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, there can be no viable self-defense or defense of a relative. In this case, Antonio Macalipay was unarmed and actually trying to pacify appellant when the latter shot him. After shooting Antonio, appellant again cocked his gun, pointed it at Emiliano Santos and shot him. The latter‘s act of drawing his gun and firing at him was
merely self-defense. As for Melchor Recto and Percival Orbe, no aggression ever emanated from them during the entire incident. They were unarmed and in fact already running away from appellant when he shot them. Clearly, there was no unlawful aggression from any of the victims.
Qualified Direct Assault with Frustrated Homicide (Criminal Case Nos. 1970 and 1971) In Criminal Case No. 1970 , the trial court erred in convicting appellant of qualified direct assault with frustrated homicide. Direct assault, a crime against public order, may be committed in two ways: first, by ―any person or persons who, without a public
uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition;‖ and second, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, ―shall attack, employ force, or seriously inti midate or
resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance.‖ The first mode is tantamount to rebellion or sedition,
without the element of public uprising. The second mode, on the other hand, is the more common form of assault, and is aggravated when: (a) the assault is committed with a weapon, or (b) when the offender is a public officer or employee, or (c) when the offender lays a hand upon a person in authority. An agent of a person in authority is ―any person who, by direct
provision of law or by election or by appointment by competent authority, is charged with the maintenance of public order and the protection and security of life and property, such as barrio councilman, barrio policeman and barangay leader, and any person who comes to the aid of persons in authority.‖
In the case at bar, the victim, Melchor Recto -- being then the barangay chief tanod of Ambulong, Magdiwang, Romblon -- was clearly an agent of a person in authority. However, contrary to the findings of the trial court, he was not ―engaged in the performance
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of his official duties‖ at the time he was shot. Neither was he attacked ―on the occasion of such performance.‖ It must be
emphasized that Melchor Recto was on his way home when he happened to pass by the bodega of the Rance couple. He testified that after appellant fired his de sabog, and thinking that appellant had already left the bodega, Melchor, while hiding inside the old bathroom for several minutes, decided to jump out of a broken down window and ran towards the national road. Clearly, from his arrival at the scene of the crime to his departure therefrom, Melchor was not engaged in the performance of his official duties. Neither was he attacked on the occasion thereof. This fact was corroborated further by the testimony of Linda Rance, who said that it was Orbe and Macalipay who had pacified appellant and his six companions. We now determine the criminal liability of appellant with respect to the attack. He shot Melchor only once, but the latter sustained five gunshot entry wounds all located at his backside, at the vicinity of his buttocks. A single shot from a de sabog results in the spewing of several pellets. The nature of the weapon used for the attack and the direction at which it was aimed -- the victim‘s back --
authority -- amounted to qualified direct assault, because he was attacked on the occasion of the performance of his duty. At the time, he was attempting to pacify appellant and to keep the peace between the two groups. Similarly, the nature of the weapon used by appellant unmistakably shows that he intended to kill Orbe. However, like the wounds inflicted by the accused on Melchor Recto, those on Orbe were not fatal. Although appellant had already directly commenced the commission of a felony by overt acts (shooting Orbe with a de sabog), he was not able to consummate that felony for some reason other than his spontaneous desistance. Thus, he committed attempted homicide. Given these circumstances, appellant should therefore be convicted of the complex crime of qualified direct assault with attempted homicide. To be imposed therefor should be the penalty for the most serious crime -- in this case qualified direct assault -- the same to be imposed in its maximum period. Qualified Direct Assault with Murder
unmistakably showed appellant‘s intent to kill.
(Criminal Case No. 1972)
However, for reasons other than his own desistance, appellant was not able to perform all the acts of execution necessary to consummate the killing, since the wounds he inflicted were not
In Criminal Case No. 1972 , appellant does not question the finding of the trial court that he shot Antonio Macalipay. However, he submits that it erred in finding the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery. We agree.
mortal. Thus, appellant‘s liability amounted only to attempted, not
frustrated, homicide. In Criminal Case No. 1971 , the trial court was correct in ruling that the attack on Percival Orbe – then a barangay captain, a person in
Evidently, the victim had all the opportunity to escape or defend himself from the aggression that was to ensue, yet chose not to grab the opportunity and instead placed himself in a position more open
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to attack. Equally important, his vulnerable position had not been deliberately sought by appellant. It was thrust on the latter by the former himself. In short, appellant did not deliberately choose the mode of attack to kill the victim with impunity and without risk to himself.
was a gun duel between the two.‖ In his Brief, appellant hardly
disputed this holding. Neither do we.
US v. GARCIA (1911)
In this case, appellant was out in the open during the entire span of time from the heated discussion, to the brewing of the violence, and up to the shooting of Macalipay. At the time, his every action, which indicated the imminence of more violence, was visible to them -- to the victim and the latter‘s companions.
Appellant was actually
vulnerable to any attack that they could have made at the time, had they chosen to. His mode of attack was therefore not without risk to himself. Absent treachery, the killing is homicide, not murder. Considering that Antonio Macalipay was a kagawad who was in the actual performance of his duties when he was shot, the attack on him constituted direct assault.
PONENTE: Arellano, C.J. FACTS: The accused was ordered by the justice of peace to leave the courtroom because he was causing some interference in a case to which he was not a party. On leaving he threatened the justice and later waited on a street corner where he imputed an indecent epithet to said justice and then attacked him, striking him with a cane he was carrying and also slapping his face.
ISSUE: What did accused Garcia violate? ARTICLE 249, RPC.
Applying the provisions of Articles 148 (direct assault), 249 (homicide) and 48 (penalty for complex crimes), appellant should be held liable for the complex crime of qualified direct assault with homicide. Homicide (Criminal Case No. 1973) We sustain appellant‘s conviction for homicide in Criminal Case No. 1973 because, in the words of the trial judge: ―The late Emiliano
Santos was only beaten to the draw by co-accused Julio Recto. It
RATIO: He committed a violation of Art 249 of the Penal Code, case 2, attempt against an authority , by attacking an officer in the discharge of his duties as justice of the peace, with the third of the aggravating circumstances in Art 250, in that he placed his hands upon an officer of the law . Mere fact that the accused admitted that he struck an officer of the law while the latter was discharging the duties of his office constitutes, in the absence of further proof , the crime of attempt
under Arts 249 and 250 of the Penal Code.
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HELD: Judgment affirmed. Chapter 5: PUBLIC DISORDERS Chapter 6: EVASION OF SERVICE OF SENTENCE Art. 156. Delivery of prisoners from jails. — The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period of prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any person who shall remove from any jail or penal establishment any person confined therein or shall help the escape of such person, by means of violence, intimidation, or bribery. If other means are used, the penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed. If the escape of the prisoner shall take place outside of said establishments by taking the guards by surprise, the same penalties shall be imposed in their minimum period.
One of the evidences presented during the trial was a note purportedly written by Governor Cledera. Cledera was asking Esmeralda to send five men to wordk in the construction of a fence at his house at Taculod, Canaman, Camarines Sur. Esmeralda declared the he could not remember who handed him the note and that he was not sure as to the genuineness of the signature. The defense, believing that the escape of Denaque was made possible by the note of Cledera to Esmeralda, filed a motion in court seeking the amendment of the information so as to include Cledera and Esmeralda. The Fiscal manifested in court that after conducting a reinvestigation of the case and a thorough and intelligent analysis of thee facts and law involved, no prima facie case against Cledera and Esmeralda exist, hence they cannot be charged. Orbita field an MFR and the Court issued an order to amend the information so as to include Cledera and Esmeralda.
ALBERTO v. DELA CRUZ (1980)
PONENTE: Concepcion, J. FACTS: Eligio Orbita is a provincial guard who is being prosecuted for the crime of Infidelity in the Custody of Prisoner as punished by art. 224 of the RPC. Orbita is charged with the duty of keeping
Fiscal filed an MFR but it was denied.
ISSUE: WON Cledera and Esmeralda should be included in the information?
NO.
RATIO: Rule: Fiscal is under no compulsion to file a particular criminal information where he is not convinced that he has evidence to
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support the allegations thereof Although this power and prerogative of the Fiscal, to determine whether or not the evidence at hand is sufficient to form a reasonable belief that a person committed an offense, is not absolute and subject to judicial review, it would be embarrassing for the prosecuting attorney to be compelled to prosecute a case when he is in no position to do so, because in his opinion, he does not have the necessary evidence to secure a conviction, or he is not convinced of the merits of the case. The better procedure would be to appeal the Fiscal's decision to the Ministry of Justice and/or ask for a special prosecutor. The fiscal was not capricious or whimsical when he refused to prosecute Cledera and Esmeralda. A reinvestigation was conducted conducted but no additional additional fact was was elicited. There is also also no sufficient sufficient evidence in record to show a prima facie case against the two. Art. 156 of the RPC: ―Delivering ―Delivering prisoners from jails. - The penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be unposed upon any person who shall remove from any jail or penal establishment any person confined therein or shall help the escape of such person, by means of violence, intimidation, or bribery. If other means are used the penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed. If the escape of the prisoner shall take place outside of sad establishments by taking the guards by surprise, the same
Helping such a person to escape
Offense under art. 156 is s usually committed by an outsider who removes from jail any person therein confined or helps him escape. If the offender is a public officer who has custody or charge of the prisoner, he is liable for infidelity in the custody of prisoner defined and penalized under Article 223 of the Revised Penal Code. Since Gov. Cledera, as governor, is the jailer of the province, and Jose Esmeralda is the assistant provincial warden, they cannot be prosecuted for the escape of Pablo Denaque under Article 156 of the Revised Penal Code. There is no sufficient evidence to warrant their prosecution under article 223. ART. 223. Conniving with or consenting to evasion.-Any public officer who shall consent to the escape of a prisoner in his custody or charge, shall be punished: 1.
By prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and temporary disqualification in its maximum period to perpetual special disqualification, if the fugitive shall have been sentenced by final judgment to any penalty.
2.
By prision correccional in its minimum period and temporary special disqualification, in case the fugitive shall not have been finally convicted but only held as a detention prisoner for any crime or violation of law or municipal ordinance
penalties shall be imposed in their minimum period.‖
Offense in art. 156 can be committed in 2 ways:
By removing a person in any jail or penal establishment.
Under article 223 it is necessary that the public officer had consented to, or connived in, the escape of the prisoner under his custody or charge. Connivance in the escape of a prisoner on the part of the person in charge is an essential condition in the
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commission of the crime of faithlessness in the custody of the prisoner. If the public officer charged with the duty of guarding him does not connive with the fugitive, then he has not violated the law and is not guilty of the crime. No evidence to prosecute prosecute the two under article 224. article 224 punishes the public officer in whose custody or charge a prisoner has escaped by reason of his negligence.
Chapter 7: COMMISSION OF ANOTHER CRIME DURING SERVICE OF PENALTY Art. 160.Commission of another crime during service of penalty imposed for another offense; Penalty. — Penalty. — Besides the
provisions of Rule 5 of Article 62, any person who shall commit a felony after having been convicted by final judgment, before beginning to serve such sentence, or while serving the same, shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony.
PEOPLE v. DIOSO (1964)
ISSUE: Whether the accused are quasi-recidivist. YES.
RATIO: The accused are quasi-recidivist, having committed the crime charged while serving sentence for a prior offense. As such, the maximum penalty prescribed by law for the new felony [murder] is death, regardless of the presence or absence of mitigating (voluntary plea of guilt and voluntary surrender) or aggravating circumstance (aleviosia) or the complete absence thereof. But for lack of the requisite votes, the Court is constrained to commute the death sentence imposed on each of the accused to reclusion perpetua.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8294: ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES Section 1. Sec. 1 Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows: "Sec. 1. Unlawful manufacture, sale, acquisition, disposition
PONENTE: Escolin, J. FACTS: Teofilo Dioso and Jacinto Abarca Abarca were charged with with for the crime of murder which was committed inside the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinglupa, Rizal where both accused were serving sentence, Abarca having been previously convicted by final judgment of the crime of homicide, and Dioso, of robbery.
or possession of firearms or ammunition or instruments used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms or ammunition. — ammunition. — The penalty of prision correccional in its
maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower,
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part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed. "The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person arrested. "If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. "If the violation of this Sec. is in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the crime of rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d'etat, such violation shall be absorbed as an element of the crime of rebellion, or insurrection, sedition, or attemptedcoup d'etat . "The same penalty shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or other responsible officer of any public or private firm, company, corporation or entity, who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such firm, company, corporation or entity to be used by any person or persons found guilty of violating the provisions of the preceding paragraphs or willfully or knowingly allow any of them to use unlicensed firearms or
firearms without any legal authority to be carried outside of their residence in the course of their employment. "The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry any licensed firearm outside his residence without legal authority therefor."
Sec. 2. Sec. 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows: "Sec. 3. Unlawful manufacture, sale, acquisition, disposition or possession of explosives. — explosives. — The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal and a fine of not less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, assemble, deal in, acquire, dispose or possess hand grenade(s), rifle grenade(s), and other explosives, including but not limited to 'pillbox,' 'molotov cocktail bombs,' 'fire bombs,' or other incendiary devices capable of producing destructive effect on contiguous objects or causing injury or death to any person. "When a person commits any of the crimes defined in the Revised Penal Code or special laws with the use of the aforementioned explosives, detonation agents or incendiary devices, which results in the death of any person or persons, the use of such explosives, detonation agents or incendiary devices shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. "If the violation of this Sec. is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d'etat, such violation shall be absorbed as an element of the crimes of rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d'etat.
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"The same penalty shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or other responsible officer of any public or private firm, company, corporation or entity, who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the explosives owned by such firm, company, corporation or entity, to be used by any person or persons found guilty of violating the provisions of the preceding paragraphs."
Sec. 3. Sec. 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows: "Sec. 5. Tampering of firearm's serial number. — number. — The penalty of prision correccional shall shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully tamper, change, deface or erase the serial number of any firearm."
Sec. 4. Sec. 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is
of both Houses of Congress copies of such rules and regulations within thirty (30) days from the promulgation hereof.
Sec. 7. Separability clause. — clause. — If, for any reason, any Sec. or provision of this Act is declared to be unconstitutional or invalid, the other Sec.s or provisions thereof which are not affected thereby shall continue to be in full force and effect.
Sec. 8. Repealing clause. — clause. — All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed, amended, or modified accordingly.
Sec. 9. Effectivity. — Effectivity. — This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
hereby further amended to read as follows: "Sec. 6. Repacking or altering the composition of lawfully manufactured explosives. — explosives. — The penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully repack, alter or modify the composition of any lawfully manufactured explosives."
Approved: June 6, 1997
PEOPLE v. LADJAALAM (2000)
Sec. 5. Coverage of the Term Unlicensed Firearm . — The term unlicensed firearm shall include: 1) firearms with expired license; or 2) unauthorized use of licensed firearm in the commission of the crime.
Sec. 6. Rules and regulations . — The Department of Justice and the Department of the Interior and Local Government shall jointly issue, within ninety (90) days after the approval of this Act, the necessary rules and regulations pertaining to the administrative aspect of the provisions hereof, furnishing the Committee on Public Order and Security and the Committee on Justice and Human Rights
PONENTE: Panganiban, J. FACTS: A group of policemen, armed with a search warrant, proceeded to the house of accused when they were met with a rapid burst of gunfire coming from the second floor of the house. Eventually, they were able to arrest the accused. A search of his house yielded several arms including an M14 rifle. Also found were aluminum foils containing shabu.
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The records of the Regional Operation and Plans Division of the PNP Firearm and Explosive Section show that accused had not applied/filed any application for license to possess firearm and ammunition or been given authority to carry firarm outside of his residence. The trial court deemed the appellant‘s arrest valid. It emphasized
that the accused shot the officers while they were trying to serve a search warrant. The seizure of the arms was also deemed valid because said items were in plain view of the officers. Such were seized as evidence of the commission of a crime and/or contraband (because he didn‘t have a license). (The case discusses issues that are not very relevant. Please refer to the case for details. I have included the pertinent points.)
ISSUES/RATIO: The evidence duly proves the two elements of the crime of illegal possession of firearms. The elements as stated in People vs. Molina (July 22, 1998) are: 1. the existence of the subject firearm 2.
the fact that the accused, who owned or possessed the firearm, did not have the corresponding license or permit to possess or carry the same outside his residence.
The trial court convicted accused of three crimes: 1) maintenance of a drug den, 2) direct assault with attempted homicide, and 3) illegal possession of firearms. RE: Illegal Possession of Firearms
The trial court convicted the accused of the separate offense of illegal possession of firearms under PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294. RA 8294 states that the respective penalties for violation of the provision will be imposed provided that no other crime was committed. Moreover, it states that if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. A simple reading of the provision shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any crime, there can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. The appealed decision is hereby affirmed with modification that appellant is found guilty only of two offenses: 1) direct assault and multiple attempted homicide with the used of a weapon, and 2) maintaining a drug den.
TITLE II: CRIMES AGAINST THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF THE STATE Chapter 2: Arbitrary Detention or Expulsion, Violation of Dwelling, etc. Art. 124. Arbitrary detention. — detention. — Any public officer or employee who, without legal grounds, detains a person, shall suffer; 1. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, if the detention has not exceeded three days;
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2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the detention has continued more than three but not more than fifteen days; 3. The penalty of prision mayor, if the detention has continued for more than fifteen days but not more than six months; and 4. That of reclusion temporal, if the detention shall have exceeded six months. The commission of a crime, or violent insanity or any other ailment requiring the compulsory confinement of the patient in a hospital, shall be considered legal grounds for the detention of any person.
PEOPLE v BURGOS [144 SCRA 1 (September 4, 1986)]
NATURE: Appeal from the decision of the RTC of Davao del Sur.
Upon the info, on May 13, 1982 the next day a team of fifteen members was dispatched to arrest accused. Right in the house of the accused, latter was called by the team and was asked about it. At first he denied but later the wife of the accused pointed to a place below their house where a gun was buried in the ground. The firearm was recovered there. After the recovery of the firearm, accused pointed to the team subversive documents which he allegedly kept in a stock pile of cogon, at a distance of 3 m from their house. Pamphlets were about organized groups of Marxist, etc. thought. Masamlok was allegedly threatened by Burgos and his companions to become an NPA lest he and his family will be harmed. He was also warned not to reveal anything with the government authorities. On Apr. 19, 1982, he attended a seminar about NPAs a the house of the accused together with his father and two more people. In the seminar, Burgos said distinctly that he was an NPA. On May 12, 1982 Masamlok surrendered himself to the authorities.
PONENTE: Gutierrez, Jr. J. FACTS: Defendant-appellant Ruben Burgos y Tito was convicted for the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms in Furtherance of Subversion. One Cesar Masamlok personally and volunteered surrendered to the authorities, stating that he was forcibly recruited by accused Ruben Burgos as member of the NPA, threatening him with the use of firearm against his life, if he refused.
In his defense, accused denied that the firearm was his and he was mauled and hit repeatedly until he would admit. He was brought to the barracks at around 3 pm at that date. From May 13 to May 14, the ordeal would be repeated until he would lose consciousness. Only when he regained consciousness that the cycle happens again. Finally on May 15, he was threatened of being salvaged until he admits, which he did. He was made to sign an affidavit for the prosecution, including the certification of the administering officer.
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His neighbors defended him and were presented as witnesses that he was in any way not involved with any subversive activities.
ISSUES :
RTC erred in holding that the arrest without valid warrant to be lawful. YES. RTC erred in holding the search of the house of accusedappellant for firearm without valid warrant to be lawful. YES. RTC erred in holding accused-appellant to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of PD No. 9 in relation to General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 (the firearm violation). YES.
RATIO: Records of the case show that the police authorities did not have any warrant of arrest with them. Art. IV, Sec. 3* of the Constitution provides the safeguard against wanton and unreasonable invasion of the privacy and liberty of a citizen as to his person, papers, and effects. Trial court justified the arrest as falling under under one of the instances when arrests may be validly made without a warrant. Rule 113, Sec. 6 provides the exceptions:
When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an offense in his presence
Under Sec. 6 (a)of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be committed I his presence or within his view. The knowledge here was furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The location of the firearm was given by the appellant‘s wife. At the time of the
arrest, he was not in actual possession of any firearm or subversive document. Neither was he committing any act which could be described as subversive. He was in fact plowing his field at the time of his arrest. Under Sec. 6 (b) of Rule 113, it is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. That a crime has actually been committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough to suspect. No compelling reason for the haste of the arresting officers. No showing that there was real apprehension that the accused was on the verge of flight or escape. No showing that the whereabouts of the accused are unknown. Allegations of Masamlok not sworn under oath.
When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed it
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Neither can it be presumed that here was a waiver, or that consent was given by the accused to be searched simply because he failed to object. The accused-appellant was not apprised of any of his constitutional rights at the time of his arrest. Considering that the firearm and the alleged subversive documents
poof to sustain the charge of Illegal Possession of Firearm in Furtherance of Subversion is the testimony of Masamlok. His testimony is inadequate to convict Burgos beyond reasonable doubt. Considering that he surrendered to the military, certainly his fate depended on how eagerly he cooperated with the authorities. Otherwise, he would also be charged with subversion. The trade-off appears to be is membership in the Civil Home Defense Force.
were obtained in violation of the accused‘s constitutional rights
against unreasonable searches and seizures, it follows that they are inadmissible in evidence.
The prosecution never presented any other witnesses, who could have corroborated Masamlok‘s testimony despite the fact that there
were other persons present during the alleged NPA seminar. When the accused allegedly admitted ownership of the gun and pointed to the location of the subversive documents after questioning, the admissions were obtained in violation of the constitutional right against self-incrimination under Sec. 17 5 of the Bill of Rights. Consequently, the testimonies of the arresting officers as to the admissions made by the appellant cannot be used against him.
Art. 128.Violation Violation of domicile. — domicile. — The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who, not being authorized by judicial order, shall enter any dwelling against the will of the owner thereof, search papers or other effects found therein without the previous consent of such owner, or having surreptitiously entered said dwelling, and being required to leave the premises, shall refuse to do so.
the failure to present the investigator who conducted the investigation gives rise to the ―provocative presumption‖ that indeed
torture and physical violence may have been committed as stated. During custodial investigation, the accused-appellant was not accorded his constitutional right to be assisted by counsel. With the extra-judicial confession, the firearm, and the alleged subversive documents inadmissible in evidence, the only remaining
5
Article III, Section 17, 1987 Constitution. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
If the offense be committed in the night-time, or if any papers or effects not constituting evidence of a crime be not returned immediately after the search made by the offender, the penalty shall be prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
US v DE LOS REYES AND ESGUERRA [20 SCRA 383 (November 16, 1911)]
NATURE: Appeal from a CFI judgment
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PONENTE: J. Moreland FACTS: November 5, 1910, certain revenue officials went to the house of defendant De Los Reyes to search for opium. The latter refused to admit the former upon the ground that they were not authorized to search his premises since they have no search warrant. However, upon the assertion of the officials t hat they were officers of law, De Los Reyes let them come in and search. Some officers who stayed outside to ensure that no one left the house saw defendant Esguerra throw a package from the window of the kitchen into the backyard. All the while De Los Reyes was in the front yard and no direct evidence was presented showing that he knew that Esguerra had possession and tried to hide the drug.
ISSUE: 1. Is Valeriano De Los Reyes guilty of violation of section 31 of Act No. 1761 (an act prohibiting the possession of drugs) 2. Were the revenue officials guilty of violation of domicile? (the issue relevant to our class)
HELD: 1. NO. Court believed that there was no sufficient evidence to establish that Delos Reyes was in possession of drugs. The fact that Esguerra, the actual possessor caught in flagrante delicto was in their house during the time she possessed the drugs do esn‘t warrant conviction of De Los Reyes. 2. YES. The fact that De Los Reyes refused to allow the officers to execute the search of his house for opium cannot be taken against him. No public official or other person has a right to enter the premises of another without his consent for the purpose of search
and seizure, without first being provided with the proper search warrant for the purpose, obtained in the manner provided by law. The act of the officers were in violation of Article 205 of the then Penal Code. The home is the sanctuary of an individual and the protection of such is the protection of the person‘s right to security. Within his own house a man‘s person is sacred and he may cnduct himself as
he pleases. Still he cannot use his house as a citadel for aggression against his neighbors, nor can he create disorder affecting their peace. In this case, the defendants behaviour amounted to more than private misconduct and already constituted a public annoyance and breach to his neighbourhood. The warrant is not given for the purpose of fishing evidence of an intended crime; it can only issue after lawful evidence that an offense has been committed. Only Esguerra was eventually held guilty.
Art. 129. Search warrants maliciously obtained and abuse in the service of those legally obtained . — In addition to the
liability attaching to the offender for the commission of any other offense, the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period and a fine not exceeding P1,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who shall procure a search warrant without just cause, or, having legally procured the same, shall exceed his authority or use unnecessary severity in executing the same.
STONEHILL v. DIOKNO [20 SCRA 383 (June 19, 1967)]
PONENTE: Castro, J.
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FACTS: Upon application of respondents-prosecutors, several judges issued, on different dates, 42 search warrants against petitioners and/or the corporations of which they were officers to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize documents and papers ―showing all business transactions‖ of petitioners as the subject of the offense in violating ―Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Cust oms Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and the RPC.‖
Petitioners alleged that the search warrants are null & void as contravening the Constitution and Rules of Court (ROC) because: 1. they do not describe w/ particularity the documents, books, and things to be seized 2. cash money not mentioned in the warrants were actually seized 3. they were issued to fish evidence against the petitioners in deportation cases filed against them 4. searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner 5. the things seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with the law Respondents-prosecutors alleged: 1. the search warrants are valid & issued in accordance with the law
The SC issued writ of prelim injunction prayed for. However, it was partially lifted insofar as the papers, documents, and things seized from the offices of the corporations are concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards those seized in the residences of petitioners herein. Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized may be split into 2 groups: 1) those found and seized in the offices of the corporations, and 2) those seized in the residences of petitioners. ON FIRST GROUP Petitioners have no cause of action to assail the legality of the warrants and seizures made for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of petitioners. The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity.
2. the defects, if any were cured by petitioners‘ consent
(Thus, the issues pert ain to the second group…)
3. the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners regardless of the alleged illegality of the searches and seizures
ISSUES: 1. WON the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures are valid. NO.
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2. if invalid, WON said documents, papers, and things may be used in evidence against petitioners. NO.
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental Const‘l rights, for it
would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil
RATIO: Art III, Sec 1, par 3: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon a probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. First Issue
Constitution requires: 1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manners set forth; and 2) the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
sought to be remedied by the quoted provision – to outlaw the so-called general warrants .
The grave violation of the Consti made in the application for the search warrants was compounded by the description made of the effects to be searched for and seized. The warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights – that the things to be seized be particularly described – as well as tending to defeat its major objective, the elimination of general warrants. Second Issue
None of these has been complied with in the contested warrants. They were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical persons named had committed a ―violation of CB Laws,
The ruling in Moncado v. People‘s court relied upon by respondents – that illegally seized documents, papers and things are admissible in
Tariff and Custom Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and RPC.‖ In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a
just ―because the constable has blundered‖ upon the theory that the
consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against who it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws.
evidence must be abandoned. This ruling is in line with American common law rule that the criminal should not be allowed to go free constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means other than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained (i.e. action for damages against searching officer).
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Most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually adopted the exclusionary rule (exclusion of illegally obtained evidence), realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. Mapp vs. Ohio: All evidence obtained by searches and seizures in
violation of the Constitution, is, by that same authority, inadmissible. The non-exclusionary rule is contrary to the spirit of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. If the applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of the crime. But then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.
On 7 December 1982, Judge Ernani Cruz-Paño, Executive Judge of the then CFI Rizal [Quezon City], issued 2 search warrants where the premises at 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized. A petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction was filed after 6 months following the raid to question the validity of said search warrants, and to enjoin the Judge Advocate General of the AFP, the city fiscal of Quezon City, et.al. from using the articles seized as evidence in Criminal Case Q-022782 of the RTC Quezon City (People v. Burgos). The prayer of preliminary prohibitory injunction was rendered moot and academic when, on 7 July 1983, the Solicitor General manifested that said articles would not be used until final resolution of the legality of the seizure of said articles.
BURGOS v CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP [G.R. No. 64261 (December 26, 1984)]
En Banc, Escolin (J): 10 concur, 1 took no part FACTS:
ISSUE : Whether or not the search warrants were valid
Held: NO, lack of probable cause (warrants were general)
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Article IV, Section 3 of the 1973 Constitution; Finding of probable cause required to issue warrant Section 3 provides that no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the j udge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. In the present case, a statement in the effect that the petitioner "is in possession or has in his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which were used and are all continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under PD 885, as amended" is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant.
Probable cause for search defined; Application to searches against newspaper publisher/editor Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are i n the place sought to be searched. When the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive materials, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with
particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice.
General warrants invalid In Standford v. State of Texas, the search warrant which authorized the search for 'books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written instruments concerning the Communist Parties of Texas, and the operations of the Communist Party in Texas," was declared void by the U.S. Supreme Court for being too general. It is that it is not the policy of the government to suppress any newspaper or publication that speaks with "the voice of non-conformity" but poses no clear and imminent danger to state security.
Machines not sequestered under PD 885; Lack of IRR, contrary claim by Marcos and Romulo Sequestration under Section 8 of PD 885, as amended, which authorizes "the sequestration of the property of any person, natural or artificial, engaged in subversive activities against the government and its duly constituted authorities in accordance with implementing rules and regulations as may be issued by the Secretary of National Defense" could not validly be effected in view of the absence of any implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the Minister of National Defense. Further, no less than President Marcos himself denied the request of the military authorities to sequester the property seized as reported in the 10 December 1982 issue of the Daily Express. This was confirmed by Foreign Minister Carlos P.
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Romulo on 10 February 1982, reiterating Marcos‘ claims, in his letter
to US Congressman Tony P. Hall. The Supreme Court declared the search warrants 20-82(a,b) issued on 7 December 1982 null and void, and granted the writ of mandatory injunction for the return of the seized articles, such articles seized ordered released to the petitioners; without costs.
ADDITIONAL INFO ON SEARCH WARRANTS: Property seized need not be owned by person against whom the warrant is directed Petitioners wanted to annul the search warrants since although the warrants were directed against Jose Burgos, Jr. alone, articles b belonging to his co-petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. were seized. Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the personal properties that may be seized under a search warrant, such as [a] Property subject of the offense; [b] Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and [c] Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense. The rule does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is directed. It may or may not be owned by him. Ownership is of no consequence, and it i s sufficient that the person against whom the warrant is directed has control or possession of the property sought to be seized was alleged to have in relation to the a rticles and property seized under the warrants.
Constitution requires personal knowledge of complainant / witnesses to justify issuance of warrant In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce‖; the Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge
by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified. In Alvarez v. CFI, it was ruled that "the oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause."
Art. 131.Prohibition, interruption and dissolution of peaceful meetings. — The penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum period shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who, without legal ground, shall prohibit or interrupt the holding of a peaceful meeting, or shall dissolve the same. The same penalty shall be imposed upon a public officer or employee who shall hinder any person from joining any lawful association or from attending any of its meetings. The same penalty shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who shall prohibit or hinder any person from addressing, either alone or together with others, any petition to the authorities for the correction of abuses or redress of grievances.
DAVID v MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
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[GR No. 171396 (May 3, 2008)]
Take Care" Power of the President
Powers of the Chief Executive
The power to promulgate decrees belongs to the Legislature
FACTS: These 7 consolidated petitions question the validity of PP 1017 (declaring a state of national emergency) and General Order No. 5 issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. While the cases are pending, President Arroyo issued PP 1021, declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist, thereby, in effect, lifting PP 1017.
will, among others, ―execute its laws.‖ In the exercise of such
function, the President, if needed, may employ the powers attached to his office as the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the country, including the Philippine National Police under the Department of Interior and Local Government. The specific portion of PP 1017 questioned is the enabling clause: ―to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.‖ Is it within the domain of President Arroyo to promulgate ―decrees‖?
The President is granted an Ordinance Power under Chap. 2, Book
ISSUE:
formulate policies to be embodied in ex isting laws. He sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. Before assuming office, he is required to take an oath or affirmation to the effect that as President of the Philippines, he
III of E.O. 292. President Arroyo‘s ordinance power is limited to
Whether or not PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 arrogated upon the President the power to enact laws and decrees If so, whether or not PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional
HELD: ―Take-Care‖ Power
This refers to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed, based on Sec. 17, Art. VII: ―The President shall
have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.‖ As the Executive in whom the executive power is vested, the primary function of the President is to enforce the laws as well as to
those issuances mentioned in the foregoing provision. She cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by Former President Marcos under PP 1081. Presidential Decrees are laws which are of the same category and binding force as statutes because they were issued by the President in the exercise of his legislative power during the period of Martial Law under the 197 3 Constitution. This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate ―decrees.‖
Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Sec. 1, Art. VI categorically states that ―the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.‖ To be sure, neither Martial
Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyo‘s exercise of legislati ve power by issuing decrees. But can President Arroyo enforce obedience to all decrees and laws
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through the military? As this Court stated earlier, President Arroyo has no authority to enact decrees. It follows that these decrees are void and, therefore,
passed through private property without permission, but not an offense within the ambit of Art. 133 of the RPC, since the acts complained of don‘t involve making light of religious dogma, or of scoffing at religious objects, or destroying an object of veneration.
cannot be enforced. With respect to ―laws,‖ she cannot call the
military to enforce or implement certain laws, such as customs laws, laws governing family and property relations, laws on obligations and contracts and the like. She can only order the military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence.
Art. 133. Offending the religious feelings. — The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon anyone who, in a place devoted to religious worship or during the celebration of any religious ceremony shall perform acts notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful.
PEOPLE v BAES [68 Phil 203 (May 25, 1939)] PONENTE: Concepcion, J. FACTS: Parish priest Jose Baes filed a complaint against three individuals for causing the funeral of a member of the Church of Christ to pass through the churchyard fronting and belonging to the Roman Catholic Church. The churchyard is devoted to religious worship. The accused passed through the churchyard against his opposition and effected the same through force and threats of physical violence. Baes contended that this was an act in violation of Art. 133 of the Revised Penal Code. The fiscal put out a motion to dismiss on the ground that the act may constitute an offense of threatening the priest or of having
The case was dismissed, hence this appeal.
ISSUE: WON the act done by the accused constituted an act which offends or ridicules the religious feelings of those who belong to the Roman Catholic Church.
RATIO: Whether or not the act complaint of is offensive to the religious feelings of Catholics may be judged only according to the feelings of the Catholics and not those of others. The churchyard in question is owned by the church and is used in religious worship. The SC takes the view that the facts alleged in the complaint constitute the offense defined and penalized in Art 133.
OTHER OPINIONS: Laurel, J. (Dissenting Opinion) The two essential elements of the offense are: 1) That the acts complained of were performed in a place devoted to religious worship or during the celebration of any religious ceremony; and 2) That the said act or acts must be notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful. At the time of the said offense, no religious ceremony was being celebrated in the churchyard. While occasional ceremonies may be performed in the churchyard, it is no more a place devoted to worship than any other place occasionally used for
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that purpose. As for the second element, for an act to be notoriously offensive to the religious feelings, it must be directed against religious practice, or dogma, or ritual for the purpose of ridicule. This requisite is not met by the facts of this case. Offense to religious feelings should not be made to depend upon the more or less broad or narrow conception of any particular religion, but should be based on an unbiased judicial criterion. Otherwise, the offense would hinge on the subjective characterization of the act from the point of view of a given denomination or sect, and is such a case, the application of the law would be partial and arbitrary.
TITLE 7: CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS Chapter 1: Preliminary Provisions Art. 203. Who are public officers. — For the purpose of applying the provisions of this and the preceding titles of this book, any person who, by direct provision of the law, popular election or appointment by competent authority, shall take part in the performance of public functions in the Government of the Philippine Islands, of shall perform in said Government or in any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate official, of any rank or class, shall be deemed to be a public officer.
On June 13, 1991, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 223 "constituting a Committee for the preparation of the National Centennial Celebration in 1998." The Committee was mandated "to take charge of the nationwide preparations for the National Celebration of the Philippine Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine Independence and the Inauguration of the Malolos Congress." Subsequently, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 128, "reconstituting the Committee for the preparation of the National Centennial Celebrations in 1988." It renamed the Committee as the "National Centennial Commission." Appointed to chair the reconstituted Commission was Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel. Presidents Diosdado M. Macapagal and Corazon C. Aquino were named Honorary Chairpersons. Characterized as an "ad hoc body," the existence of the Commission "shall terminate upon the completion of all activities related to the Centennial Celebrations." Like its predecessor Committee, the Commission was tasked to "take charge of the nationwide preparations for the National Celebration of the Philippine Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine Independence and the Inauguration of the Malolos Congress." Subsequently, a corporation named the Philippine Centennial Expo ‘98 Corporation (Expocorp) was created.4 Petitioner was among the nine (9) Expocorp incorporators, who were also its first nine (9) directors. Petitioner was elected Expocorp Chief Executive Officer.
LAUREL v. DESIERTO [381 SCRA 48 (April 12, 2002)] PONENTE: Kapunan, J. FACTS:
On August 5, 1998, Senator Ana Dominique Coseteng delivered a privilege speech in the Senate denouncing alleged anomalies in the construction and operation of the Centennial Exposition Project at the Clark Special Economic Zone. The privilege speech was referred to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
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Investigation (The Blue Ribbon Committee) and several other Senate Committees for investigation. On March 23, 1999, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee filed with the Secretary of the Senate its Committee Final Report No. 30 dated February 26, 1999. Among the Committee‘s recommendations was
"the prosecution by the Ombudsman/DOJ of Dr. Salvador Laurel, chair of NCC and of EXPOCORP for violating the rules on public bidding, relative to the award of centennial contracts to AK (Asia Construction & Development Corp.); for exhibiting manifest bias in the issuance of the NTP (Notice to Proceed) to AK to construct the FR (Freedom Ring) even in the absence of a valid contract that has caused material injury to government and for participating in the scheme to preclude audit by COA of the funds infused by the government for the implementation of the said contracts all in violation… of the anti-graft law." Petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman on the ground that he is not a public officer because: a.
EXPOCORP, THE CORPORATION CHAIRED BY PETITIONER LAUREL WHICH UNDERTOOK THE FREEDOM RING PROJECT IN CONNECTION WITH WHICH VIOLATIONS OF THE ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES WERE ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED, WAS A PRIVATE CORPORATION, NOT A GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATION.
b.
THE NATIONAL CENTENNIAL COMMISSION (NCC) WAS NOT A PUBLIC OFFICE.
c.
PETITIONER, BOTH AS CHAIRMAN OF THE NCC AND OF EXPOCORP WAS NOT A "PUBLIC OFFICER" AS DEFINED UNDER THE ANTI-GRAFT & CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT.
WON petitioner Laurel is a public officer so as to be under the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman. YES.
RATIO: The characteristics of a public office, according to Mechem (not stated who this person is), include the delegation of sovereign functions, its creation by law and not by contract, an oath, salary, continuance of the position, scope of duties, and the designation of the position as an office. Did E.O. 128 delegate the NCC with some of the sovereign functions of government? Certainly, the law did not delegate upon the NCC functions that can be described as legislative or judicial. May the functions of the NCC then be described as executive? The NCC performs executive functions. The executive power "is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance." The executive function, therefore, concerns the implementation of the policies as set forth by law. The Constitution provides in Article XIV (Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Culture, and Sports) thereof: Sec. 15. Arts and letters shall enjoy the patronage of the State. The State shall conserve, promote, and popularize the nation‘s historical and cultural heritage and resources, as
well as artistic creations. In its preamble, A.O. No. 223 states the purposes for the creation of the Committee for the National Centennial Celebrations in 1998, which are in line with the aforequoted Consitutional mandate. And the NCC was precisely created to execute the foregoing policies and objectives, to carry them into effect.
ISSUE:
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That petitioner allegedly did not receive any compensation during his tenure is of little consequence. A salary is a usual but not a necessary criterion for determining the nature of the position. It is not conclusive. The salary is a mere incident and forms no part of the office. Where a salary or fees is annexed, the office is provided for it is a naked or honorary office, and is supposed to be accepted merely for the public good. Hence, the office of petitioner as NCC Chair may be characterized as an honorary office, as opposed to a lucrative office or an office of profit, i.e., one to which salary, compensation or fees are attached. But it is a public office, nonetheless. Neither is the fact that the NCC was characterized by E.O. No. 128 as an "ad-hoc body" make said commission less of a public office. The term office, it is said, embraces the idea of tenure and duration, and certainly a position which is merely temporary and local cannot ordinarily be considered an office. "But," says Chief Justice Marshall, "if a duty be a continuing one, which is defined by rules prescribed by the government and not by contract, which an individual is appointed by government to perform, who enters on the duties pertaining to his station without any contract defining them, if those duties continue though the person be changed, -- it seems very difficult to distinguish such a charge or employment from an office of the person who performs the duties from an officer."At the same time, however, this element of continuance can not be considered as indispensable, for, if the other elements are present "it can make no difference," says Pearson, C.J., "whether there be but one act or a series of acts to be done, -- whether the office expires as soon as the one act is done, or is to be held for years or during good behavior ."
Having arrived at the conclusion that the NCC performs executive functions and is, therefore, a public office, the Court no longer needs to delve at length on the issue of whether Expocorp is a private or a
public corporation. Even assuming that Expocorp is a private corporation, petitioner‘s position as Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Expocorp arose from his Chairmanship of the NCC. Consequently, his acts or omissions as CEO of Expocorp must be viewed in the light of his powers and functions as NCC Chair.
MACALINO v. SANDIGANBAYAN [376 SCRA 452 (February 6, 2002)]
PONENTE: Pardo NATURE: Petition for certiorari assailing the jurisdiction of Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan
FACTS:
Felicito Macalino is the Assistant Manager of the Treasury Division and the Head of Loans Administration and Insurance Section of the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC). Macalino was charged by the Office of Ombudsman , filed with the Sandiganbayan, two informations with Estafa through falsification of documents (public and mercantile documents). Macalino and his wife, Liwayway Tan allegedly defrauded PNB Buendia by altering the payee indicated in vouchers to make it appear that the demand drafts to be issued by the bank were payable to Wacker Marketing, a corporation owned by the spouses. During the presentation of evidence for the defense, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Sandiganbayan has no jurisiction over him since he is not a public officer because PNCC (formerly Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines) is not a
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government-owned or controlled corporation with original charter. Petitioner cites section 2 of RA 3019:
o
―Public Officer includes elective and appointive
officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the unclassified or classified or exempted service receiving compensation even nominal, from the government as defined in the preceding paragraph.‖
Sandiganbayan denied motion.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner,an employee of PNCC, is a public officer within the coverage of RA 3019? Held: No. Cases dismissed against petitioner.
RATIO:
Article 9 (Accountability of Public Officers) of the 1987 Constitution provides that the Ombudsman is responsible for complaints in any form against public officials of employees of the government. Article 9-B recognizes all offices of the government including government owned/controlled corporations with original charters as part of the civil service. PNCC has no original charter as it was incorporated under the general law on corporations. Thus, Macalino is not a public officer within the coverage of RA 3019. the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over him. The only instance when the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a private individual is when the complaint charges him either as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer who has been charged with a crime within the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan.
REPUBLIC ACT No. 7975 AN ACT TO STRENGTHEN THE FUNCTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, AMENDING FOR THAT PURPOSE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606, AS AMENDED Section 1. Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Executive Order No. 184, is hereby further amended to read as follows: "Sec. 3. Division of the Court; Quorum. - The Sandiganbayan shall sit in five (5) divisions of three justices each. The five (5) may sit at the same time. "The first three divisions shall be stationed in the Metro Manila area, the fourth division shall be in Cebu City for cases coming from the Visayas region, and the fifth division shall be in Cagayan de Oro City for cases coming from the Mindanao region. "Three Justices shall constitute a quorum for sessions in divisions: Provided, That when the required quorum for the particular division cannot be had due to the legal disqualification or temporary disability of a Justice or of a vacancy occurring therein, the Presiding Justice may designate an Associate Justice of the Court, to be determined by strict rotation on the basis of the reverse order of precedence, to sit as a special member of said division with all the rights and prerogatives of a regular member of said division in the trial and determination of a case or cases assigned thereto, unless the operation of the court will be prejudiced thereby, in which case, the President shall, upon the recommendation of the Presiding Justice, designate any Justice or Justices of the Court of Appeals to sit temporarily therein."
Section 2. Section 4 of the same Decree is hereby further amended to read as follows:
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"Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving: "a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: "(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: "(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads; "(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; "(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher; "(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; "(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank; "(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; "(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
"(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989; "(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; "(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and "(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989; "b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office. "c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. "In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. "The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on appeals from the final judgments, resolutions or orders of regular courts where all the accused are occupying positions lower than salary grade "27", or not otherwise covered by the preceding enumeration. "The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunction, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction: Provided, That the
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jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court. "The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the people of the Philippines except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. "In case private i ndividuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them. "Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized: Provided, however, That where the civil action had heretofore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court as the case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned."
Section 3. Section 7 of the same decree is hereby amended to read
"Sec. 7. Form, Finality and Enforcement of Decisions. - All decisions and final orders determining the merits of a case or finally disposing of the action or proceedings of the Sandiganbayan shall contain complete findings of the facts and the law on which they are based, on all issues properly raised before it and necessary in deciding the case. "A petition for reconsideration of any final order or decision may be filed within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of the final order or judgment, and such motion for reconsideration shall be decided within thirty (30) days from submission thereon. "Decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari raising pure questions of law in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Whenever, in any case decided by the Sandiganbayan, the penalty of reclusion perpetua or higher is imposed, the decision shall be appealable to the Supreme Court in the manner prescribed in the Rules of Court. In case the penalty imposed is death, review by the Supreme Court shall be automatic, whether or not the accused filed an appeal. "Judgments and orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be executed and enforced in the manner provided by law. "Decisions and final orders of other courts, in cases cognizable by said courts under this Act shall be appealable to the Sandiganbayan within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice to the parties."
Section 4. Section 9 of the same Decree is hereby amended to read as follows: "Sec. 9. Rules of Procedure. - The Rules of Court promulgated by the Supreme Court shall apply to all cases and proceedings filed with the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan shall have no power to promulgate its own rules of procedure, except to adopt internal rules governing the allotment of cases among the divisions, the rotation of justices among them, and other matters relating to the internal
as follows:
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operations of the court which shall be inforced until repealed or modified by the Supreme Court."
But the articles of incorporation say that the purpose of PPSB is primarily for business
o
Section 5. Section 10 of the same Decree is hereby repealed. Section 6. Presidential Decrees Nos. 1486, 1606 and 1861,
Scrutiny of the purposes show that its functions are not
o
involved in any exercise of gov‘t power
Executive Orders Nos. 101 and 184 and all other laws, decrees, orders and rules of which are inconsistent therewith are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Sandiganbayan then goes to cite previous SC rulings
o
that state Civil Service is not under the former‘s
jurisdiction
Section 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts.
Section 8. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.
ISSUE: Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over presidents, directors, or trustees, or managers of gov‘t -owned or controlled corporations (GOCC) organized under the Corporation Code for purposes of RA 3019 (Anti Graft Law)
Approved: 30 March 1995
PEOPLE v SANDIGANBAYAN AND EFREN ALAS
HELD/RATIO:
Petition
granted.
Sandiganbayan
decision
REVERSED.
[451 SCRA 413 (February 16, 2005)] On PPSB being a GOCC
FACTS: -
9/30/99 – 2 informations filed against Alas, President and COO of the Phil Postal Savings Bank (PPSB), in the Sandiganbayan for alleged anomalous contracts he entered into with the Bagong Buhay Publishing Company which caused damage/prejudice to
-
as a stock / non stock corp vested with functions related to public needs, and owned by the gov‘t directly / indirectly or
through its instrumentalities, in case of stock corps to the extent of at least 51% share.
gov‘t. -
10/30/02 – Alas files motion to quash
-
Respondent court rules that PPSB is a private corp and its officers do not fall under Sandiganbayan jurisdiction
-
Summary of Sandiganbayan judgment in favor of Alas: o
PPSB is a subsidiar y of Phil Postal Corp, w/c is a gov‘t owned corp.
Sec 2(13) of EO 292 defines GOCC‘s – ―..any agency organized
-
Hence PPSB is a GOCC, organized under the Corp Code as a subsidiary of Philpost and 99% of capital stock belongs to the gov‘t
-
Creation of PPSB was thru RA 7354 Sec 32 – for the purpose of ―encouraging the virtue of thrift and the habit of savings among the general public‖
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On Sandiganbayan‘s jurisdiction -
Consti – Art 9, Sec 4 states that ―..the present anti-graft court known as Sandiganbayan shall continue its function and exercise its jurisdiction
-
2/5/1997 – Congress enacted 8249 – Sandiganbayan shall
Art. 204. Knowingly rendering unjust judgment. — Any judge who shall knowingly render an unjust judgment in any case submitted to him for decision, shall be punished by prision mayor and perpetual absolute disqualification.
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving…
EVANGELISTA v. HON. BAES
Violation of RA 3019 (Anti Graft)…Presidents, directors, trustees,
[61 SCRA 475 (December 26, 1974)]
managers, of GOCC‘s. -
The legislature has refrained from making a distinction of GOCC‘s with respect to their manner of creation – therefore whether incorporated thru the Corp Code or RA – all GOCC‘s are under Sandiganbayan.
NATURE: Administrative cases in the SC (Resolution) PONENTE: Castro, J.
-
Statcon – Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos .
FACTS:
Anti-Graft Law -
Gov‘t policy – w/c is to remove / minimize graft and corruption
would be seriously undermined if we remove it under the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction -
In fact – Sec 1 of the law on policies says that the gov‘t wants to repress the acts not only of public officers but also of private persons
-
If not for our ruling here in this present case, G OCC‘s may create
as many subsidiary corporations under the Corp code and use public funds while disclaiming public accountability. -
By including the concerned officers of GOCC‘s organized under the Corp Code within the Sandiganbayan‘s jurisdiction, the aim
of the law is achieved.
Case 1: Ferardo Baeuan failed to appear at the pre-trial of his case but Paciano Basuan, his co-plaintiff appeared, although without a lawyer. Judge Baes ordered the dismissal of the entire case. The record indicates that the hearing of the case had been postponed several times at the behest of the plaintiffs; that they were previously warned that the pre-trial would proceed whether they had a lawyer or not. Case 2: in an eviction case, the accused granted the motion for reconsideration filed by the plaintiff with the justification that the decision of the first judge became final and executory because the mfr granted by the 2nd judge was fatally defective for lack of proof of service. Case 3: (dismissed because premature)
Chapter 2: Malfeasance and Misfeasance in Office
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Case 4: The information alleged that the accused ordered the arrest Geromino de los Reyes for disobedience of court without giving him a chance to explain. The facts state that the accused issued an order requiring de los Reyes to appear in court and the latter failed to appear. The accused issued an order for de los Reyes to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt. He then ordered the arrest of de los Reyes.
ISSUE: WON accused was guilty of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment.
NO.
RATIO: 1. The motivation of the issuance excludes malice or a deliberate attempt on the part of the accused to cause injustice. It is a fundamental rule that a judicial officer, when required to exercise his judgment or discretion, is not liable criminally for any error he commits provided he acts in good faith. He will only be held criminally liable if it is shown beyond cavil that the judgment is unjust as being contrary to law or is not supported by the evidence on record and the same was rendered with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. 2. While the accused acted in abuse of discretion, it does not necessarily follow that he acted in bad faith or that his abuse of discretion signifies ignorance of the law on his part. Abuse of discretion by a trial court does not necessarily mean ulterior motive, arbitrary conduct or willful disregard of a litigant‘s rights.
3. Premature 4. It was not true that de los Reyes was denied an opportunity to be heard. The order of arrest was within the judge‘s authority to
the court‘s efforts to settle the matter of execution of the
unsatisfied judgment rendered against him.
Art. 210. Direct bribery. — Any public officer who shall agree to perform an act constituting a crime, in connection with the performance of this official duties, in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present received by such officer, personally or through the mediation of another, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods and a fine [of not less than the value of the gift and] not less than three times the value of the gift in addition to the penalty corresponding to the crime agreed upon, if the same shall have been committed. If the gift was accepted by the officer in consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime, and the officer executed said act, he shall suffer the same penalty provided in the preceding paragraph; and if said act shall not have been accomplished, the officer shall suffer the penalties of prision correccional, in its medium period and a fine of not less than twice the value of such gift. If the object for which the gift was received or promised was to make the public officer refrain from doing something which it was his official duty to do, he shall suffer the penalties of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine [of not less than the value of the gift and] not less than three times the value of such gift. In addition to the penalties provided in the preceding paragraphs, the culprit shall suffer the penalty of special temporary disqualification.chan robles virtual law library The provisions contained in the preceding paragraphs shall be made applicable to assessors, arbitrators, appraisal and claim commissioners, experts or any other persons performing public duties. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 872, June 10, 1985).
issue and for good reason because de los Reyes was thwarting
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Art. 211. Indirect bribery. — The penalties of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, and public censure shall be imposed upon any public officer who shall accept gifts offered to him by reason of his office. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 872, June 10, 1985).
Art. 212. Corruption of public officials. — The same penalties imposed upon the officer corrupted, except those of disqualification and suspension, shall be imposed upon any person who shall have made the offers or promises or given the gifts or presents as described in the preceding articles.
agreed to perform must be criminal. The dismissal of the complaint is not necessarily criminal and may be proper since there is no allegation to the contrary. It also cannot fall under the second paragraph of Art 210 since the information does not state whether the act was executed or not. Thus the facts the information provides may only convict Abesamis of indirect bribery where the receiving of any gift already consummates the crime.
FORMILLEZA v. SANDIGANBAYAN [159 SCRA 1 (18 Mar 1988)]
PEOPLE v ABESAMIS [93 Phil 712 (September 11, 1953)]
PONENTE: Reyes, J. FACTS: Eduardo Abesamis, a Justice of the Peace, was charged with direct bribery by demanding and receiving from Marciana Sauri P1,000 to dismiss the case for Robbery in Band with Rape against Emiliano Castillo, son of said Marciana Sauri.
PONENTE: Gancayco, J. NATURE: Petition for review of a Decision of the Sandiganbayan FACTS:
Leonor Formilleza has worked for the government for around 20 years already as the personnel supervisor of the regional office of the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) in Tacloban City, Leyte. o
ISSUE: WON he is guilty of direct bribery
HELD: NO, he is guilty of indirect bribery Ratio: The crime charged does not come under the first paragraph of RPC Art 210 which states that the act which the public officer has
Her duties include processing of appointment papers of employees
A certain Mrs. Estrella Mutia was an employee of the NIA for almost 10 years while Formilleza was in her position. At one point, she testified that she wanted to renew her appointment or obtain a permanent one in the NIA so she was told to approach Formilleza. According to Mrs. Mutia, Formilleza refused to attend to her papers unless she was given money.
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Upon reporting this to the Philippine Constabulary (NOTE:her husband works for the PC), they formulated a plan to entrap Formilleza for the alleged felony.
o
They would have marked paper money bills and even a photographer at the area where they were to entrap the accused.
At the canteen where they were supposed to meet to pay Formilezza, Mutia and Formilezza were seated with two of Formilleza‘s colleagues, PC officials and the photographer
were stationed around them.
As soon as Mrs. Mutia slipped the money into the hand of the accused under the table, PC arrested Formilleza and there were photographs taken of the arrest.
Formilleza vehemently denied taking any bribe money from Mutia, despite the fact that her hands were covered with the powder from the marked paper money bills. Sandiganbayan ruled against Formilleza using the evidence of the photographs and the marks on her hand against her. She was charged with Indirect Bribery under Art. 211 of the RPC.
ISSUE:
Was Formilleza guilty of the crime she was charged with?
HELD: NO. Leonor Formilleza is AQUITTED on the basis of reasonable doubt.
RATIO:
The SC believes that the trial court may have overlooked substantial facts and circumstances that are favorable to the accused. An essential element to the crime of Indirect Bribery is that the public officer must have accepted the bribe with intent to take it as such. (for example, he should have been seen pocketing or putting away the gift for safe keeping.) Did the petitioner accept the bribe? There is no certainty that she did. The Sandiganbayan took as evidence the photographs of the entrapment but the photos only showed the accosting of Formilleza by the soldiers and not of her actually accepting it. Formilleza asserts that she did not even know that she had money in her hand because it was only when she was standing up that Muti suddenly slipped something in her hand. She even stresses that as soon as she saw that it was money, she threw it on the floor. Also, in such a public place and in the presence of two other companions in the same table, why would the accused agree to get the bribe there? One of her companions, Mrs. Sevilla says she did not see that money was handed over to the accused. And as the soldiers were taking her away, she was shouting ―What are you trying to do to me?‖ to Mrs. Mutia. Her reaction is far
from what one who is guilty would react.
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 46 November 10, 1972 MAKING IT PUNISHABLE FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES TO RECEIVE, AND FOR PRIVATE PERSONS TO GIVE, GIFTS ON ANY OCCASION, INCLUDING CHRISTMAS
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WHEREAS, under existing laws and the civil service rules, it is prohibited to receive, directly or indirectly, any gift, present or any other form of benefit in the course of official duties; WHEREAS, it is believed necessary to put more teeth to existing laws and regulations to wipe out all conceivable forms of graft and corruption in the public service, the members of which should not only be honest but above suspicion and reproach; and WHEREAS, the stoppage of the practice of gift-giving to government men is a concrete step in the administration's program of reforms for the development of new moral values in the social structure of the country, one of the main objectives of the New Society; NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972, and General Order No. 1 dated September 22, 1972, do hereby make it punishable for any public official or employee, whether of the national or local governments, to receive, directly or indirectly, and for private persons to give, or offer to give, any gift, present or other valuable thing to any occasion, including Christmas, when such gift, present or other valuable thing is given by reason of his official position, regardless of whether or not the same is for past favor or favors or the giver hopes or expects to receive a favor or better treatment in the future from the public official or employee concerned in the discharge of his official functions. Included within the prohibition is the throwing of parties or entertainments in honor of the official or employees or his immediate relatives. For violation of this Decree, the penalty of imprisonment for not less than one (1) year nor more than five (5) years and perpetual disqualification from public office shall be imposed. The official or employee concerned shall likewise be subject to administrative disciplinary action and, if found guilty, shall be meted out the penalty of suspension or removal, depending on the seriousness of the offense.
Any provision of law, executive order, rule or regulation or circular inconsistent with this Decree is hereby repealed or modified accordingly. This Decree shall take effect immediately after its publication. Done in the City of Manila, this 10th day of November, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-two.
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 749 July 18, 1975 GRANTING IMMUNITY FROM PROSECUTION TO GIVERS OF BRIBES AND OTHER GIFTS AND TO THEIR ACCOMPLICES IN BRIBERY AND OTHER GRAFT CASES AGAINST PUBLIC OFFICERS WHEREAS, public office is a public trust: public officers are but servants of the people, whom they must serve with utmost fidelity and integrity; WHEREAS, it has heretofore been virtually impossible to secure the conviction and removal of dishonest public servants owing to the lack of witnesses: the bribe or gift-givers being always reluctant to testify against the corrupt public officials and employees concerned for fear of being indicted and convicted themselves of bribery and corruption; WHEREAS, it is better by far and more socially desirable, as well as just, that the bribe or gift giver be granted immunity from prosecution so that he may freely testify as to the official corruption, than that the official who receives the bribe or gift should be allowed to go free, insolently remaining in public office, and continuing with his nefarious and corrupt practices, to the great detriment of the public service and the public interest. NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers in me vested by the Constitution, do hereby decree and order that:
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Section 1. Any person who voluntarily gives information about any
Section 2. The immunity granted hereunder shall not attach should
violation of Articles 210, 211, and 212 of the Revised Penal Code; Republic Act Numbered Three Thousand Nineteen, as amended; Section 345 of the Internal Revenue Code and Section 3604 of the Tariff and Customs Code and other provisions of the said Codes penalizing abuse or dishonesty on the part of the public officials concerned; and other laws, rules and regulations punishing acts of graft, corruption and other forms of official abuse; and who willingly testifies against any public official or employee for such violation shall be exempt from prosecution or punishment for the offense with reference to which his information and testimony were given, and may plead or prove the giving of such information and testimony in bar of such prosecution: Provided; that this immunity may be enjoyed even in cases where the information and testimony are given against a person who is not a public official but who is a principal, or accomplice, or accessory in the commission of any of the above-mentioned violations: Provided, further, that this immunity may be enjoyed by such informant or witness notwithstanding that he offered or gave the bribe or gift to the public official or his accomplice for such gift or bribe-giving; and Provided, finally, that the following conditions concur:
it turn out subsequently that the information and/or testimony is false and malicious or made only for the purpose of harassing, molesting or in any way prejudicing the public officer denounced. In such a case, the public officer so denounced shall be entitled to any action, civil or criminal, against said informant or witness.
1. The information must refer to consummated violations of any of the above-mentioned provisions of law, rules and regulations; 2. The information and testimony are necessary for the conviction of the accused public officer; 3. Such information and testimony are not yet in the possession of the State; 4. Such information and testimony can be corroborated on its material points; and 5. The informant or witness has not been previously convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.
Section 3. All preliminary investigations conducted by a prosecuting fiscal, judge or committee, and all proceedings undertaken in connection therewith, shall be strictly confidential or private in order to protect the reputation of the official under investigation in the event that the report proves to be unfounded or no prima facie case is established.
Section 4. All acts, decrees and rules and regulations inconsistent with the provisions of this decree are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 5. This Decree shall take effect immediately. DONE in the City of Manila, this 18th day of July, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-five.
Chapter 3: Frauds and Illegal Exactions and Transactions Chapter 4: Malversation of Public Funds and Property Art. 217.Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation. — Any public officer who, by reason of
the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds, or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:
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1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved in the misappropriation or malversation does not exceed two hundred pesos. 2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount involved is more than two hundred pesos but does not exceed six thousand pesos. 3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period, if the amount involved is more than six thousand pesos but is less than twelve thousand pesos. 4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved is more than twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two thousand pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled. The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use. (As amended by RA 1060).
The accused were audit clerks of the Bureau of Public Works. They were charged with malversation of public funds. They verified the correctness of the figures and total sums in a laborers‘ payroll in a carel ess, reckless and imprudent manner. This resulted in the padded total amount in the said payroll. The defendants contend that the acts imputed to them does not constitute a crime. The CFI-Manila dropped the defendants from the informations filed against them.
ISSUE: Can the defendant audit clerks be held criminally liable under the informations? YES.
RATIO: The crime may also be committed by one who is not in a public position but aids, induces, or conspires with another who is, or cooperates with him in its commission by acts without which it could not have been accomplished. They cooperated in the commission of the crime by acts – the initialing of the payrolls without verification – without which the crime could not have been perpetrated.
PEOPLE v. RODIS, ET. AL. [105 Phil 1294 (April 30, 1959)]
PONENTE: Paras, C.J. FACTS:
Defendants may also be held guilty for the crime of estafa through falsification of a public document by reckless negligence.
HELD: The orders of the CFI-Manila were set aside.
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RATIO: QUINON v. PEOPLE [389 SCRA 412 (September 19, 2002)]
PONENTE: Ynares-Santiago, J. FACTS: Former Station Commander, Police Sergeant Pablo N. Quiñon of Calinog, Iloilo PNP by reason of his functions as Station Commander, he was issued the following firearms and ammunitions under Memorandum Receipts duly signed by him. He was later replaced by Police Sergeant Emilio Aviador and Quiñon was transferred to Camp Tirador, Iloilo. After an inventory of the firearms of the Calinog, Iloilo Police Station, it was discovered that Quiñon did not turn over the firearms issued to him. Thus, Police Sergeant Aviador sent a radio message to petitioner demanding the return of the unaccounted firearms. Police Sergeant Aviador likewise sought the help of the Provincial Commander/Police Superintendent of the Iloilo PC-INP for the return of said firearms and ammunition. Subsequently, petitioner surrendered some of the firearms. However, he failed to return the two remaining .38 caliber pistolsdespite demands of the Calinog Police Station. The value of the unaccounted firearms per the updated cost valuation dated July 30, 1984 of the Ministry of National Defense, amounted to P5,500.00 each, or a total of P11,000.00.
ISSUES: WON petitioner is an accountable public officer. YES.
First Issue
An accountable public officer, within the purview of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, is one who has custody or control of public funds or property by reason of the duties of his office. To be liable for malversation, an accountable officer need not be a bonded official. The name or relative importance of the office or employment is not the controlling factor. What is decisive is the nature of the duties that he performs and that as part of, and by reason of said duties, he receives public money or property which he is bound to account. In the case at bar, the delivery to petitioner of the firearms belonging to the Government, by reason of his office as Station Commander of Calinog, Iloilo, PC-INP, necessarily entailed the obligation on his part to safely keep the firearms, use them for the purposes for which they were entrusted to him, and to return them to the proper authority at the termination of his tenure as commander, or on demand by the owner, the duty to account for said firearms. Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code is designed to protect the government and to penalize erring public officials and conspiring private individuals responsible for the loss of public funds and property by reason of corrupt motives or neglect or disregard of duty. Its all encompassing provision cannot be limited by petitioner's absurd interpretation of the provisions of the Administrative Code restricting the application thereof only to government funds and to bonded public officials.
WON petitioner is guilty of malversation. YES. Second Issue
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The elements of malversation, essential for the conviction of an accused under the above penal provision are:
that the money might be lost if left in the office steel cabinet, which had no lock.
That the offender is a public officer; That he has the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office;
ISSUE:
That the funds or property are public funds or property for which he is accountable; and
RATIO:
That he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them.
WON Malversation occurred. NO. The amount deposited with the court was merely in the custody of the court and not in custodia legis hence, it never became public fund. Therefore, there was no misappropriation.
Under Article 217 of the Code, the failure of the public officer to have duly forthcoming such public funds or property, upon demand by a duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use. Considering that petitioner failed to adduce evidence on why he failed to produce, after the expiration of his term and despite lawful demand, the two .38 caliber pistols with Serial Nos. 310136 and 310150 issued to him by reason of his duties as Station Commander of the Calinog, Iloilo, PC-INP, the Sandiganbayan correctly convicted him of malversation of public property.
CASTILLO v. BUENCILLO [354 SCRA 641 (March 20, 2001)]
PONENTE: Melo, J. FACTS: The OIC – Branch Clerk of Court deposited in her personal bank account the sum of money offered by the accused as settlement in an Estafa case. She claims that she did so because she was fearful
Custody – to have the court in charge of safekeeping and implies temporary control Custodia legis – property lawfully seized and taken by legal
process and authority, and placed in the possession of a public officer such as a sheriff or an officer of the court empowered to hold it such as a receiver. Even if what she did were done in good faith, still it was not appropriate and was without justification. She should have informed the presiding judge of the circumstance so that proper arrangements could have been made. If it were at all necessary to deposit the money in the bank, it should have been deposited in an account in the name of the court and partaking the nature of a fiduciary fund. Interest earned should have accrued to the general fund of the gov‘t. instead of to the personal account of the respondent.
HELD: Accused was found guilty of simple misconduct. MADARANG v. SANDIGANBAYAN [355 SCRA 525 (March 28. 2001)]
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PONENTE: Melo, J. FACTS: Petitioner Vicente R. Madarang was charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of Malversation. The accused is a public officer, a Barangay Captain of Barangay Pahina Central, Cebu City, and as such, is accountable for public funds received by him in such capacity, and having received the total amount of Twenty Thousand Seven Hundred Pesos (P20,700.00) from a lessee as rentals of the real property owned by the City of Cebu, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, with grave abuse of confidence, misappropriate, embezzle and take away the aforesaid funds which he misappropriated and converted to his own use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforestated amount.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused Madarang should be convicted for Malversation. NO.
RATIO: The crime of malversation is defined and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, the pertinent provisions of which read: Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property – Presumption of malversation. – Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall
otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer: 4. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved is more than 12,00 0 pesos but is less than 22,000 pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled. The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal uses. (As amended by Rep. Act No. 1060.) The elements common to all acts of malversation under Article 217 are that: (a) the offender be a public officer; (b) he had custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; (c) those funds or property were public funds or property for which he was accountable; and (d) he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them (Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Criminal Law, Vol. II, 1993 ed., p. 363). Concededly, the first three elements are present in the case at bar. Lacking any evidence, however, of shortage, or taking, appropriation, or conversion by petitioner or loss of public funds, there is no malversation. True, the law creates a presumption that
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the mere failure of an accountable officer to produce public funds which have come into his hand on demand by an officer duly authorized to examine his accounts is prima facie evidence of conversion. The presumption is, of course, rebuttable. Accordingly, if petitioner is able to present adequate evidence that can nullify any likelihood that he had put the funds or property to personal use, then that presumption would be at an end and the prima facie case is effectively negated. Too, petitioner did not receive the P20,700.00 all in cash owing to the deduction from the rentals due of P12,300.00 by Mrs. Lim to cover the cost of medicines advanced to the barangay residents and tanods. Collection notices were even in fact sent to those with unpaid accounts. Verily, petitioner cannot be faulted, much less
HELD: Petition is granted. AGULLO v SANDIGANBAYAN [361 SCRA 556 (July 20,2001)]
FACTS:
Petitioner, Disbursing Officer of the Ministry of Public Works and Highways, was charged for malversation of public funds
Audit was conducted on July 14, 1986 by Auditing Examiner Gerez, as a result of which a Php26,404.26 cash shortage was discovered on petitioner‘s accountability. On the same
date, Gerez sent letter of demand and required petitioner to submit written explanation of the cash shortage. Gerez said the amount was misappropriated about the period October 22, 1985 – July 14, 1986.
convicted, in consequence. Petitioner‘s act of guaranteeing the
payment thereof in order to assist his constituents who are in dire need of medicines but lack financial capacity to pay therefore was done in good faith under the belief that he was acting correctly for the good of the residents in his community. The fact is that there is no evidence that petitioner ever put the public funds in his custody to his personal use. The failure of petitioner to deposit the amount with the City Treasurer of Cebu City could be explained as it was satisfactorily explained by petitioner.
Petitioner: Cash shortage was due to a fortuitous event. The amount could have been stolen on the day she suffered a stroke on October 22, 1985.
October 21- she went to PNB to encash 13 checks (total amount = 26,404.26) because the next day is the payday; she felt dizziness, chest pain. October 22 – she strove to report for work. She brought with her the bag containing the money. On her way to the office, she suffered a stroke. She reported back to work Feb 2, 1986.
Prosecution‘s evidence was limited to Report of Cash
Undoubtedly, no malice or fraud can be imputed to him. Petitioner‘s
display of benevolence, commitment to and compassion for the poor may run counter to certain provisions of law and to some auditing rules and regulations, resulting in possible administrative sanctions. However, these certainly do not amount to the embezzlement of the funds of his office to merit prosecution and conviction. Mere absence of the funds is not sufficient proof of conversion. Neither is the mere failure of petitioner to turn over the funds at any given time sufficient to make even a prima facie case
Examination and Letter of Demand
ISSUE :
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WON prima facie presumption of malversation under A217 is sufficient to convict petitioner
HELD:
NO. Presumption of conversion is REBUTTABLE. If the accused is able to present adequate evidence that can nullify any likelihood that he had put the funds or property to personal use, prima facie case is negated.
Petitioner has successfully overcome the prima facie evidence of conversion
Prosecution merely relied on the statutory presumption and failed to present any substantial evidence to indicate that petitioner had used the funds for personal gain.
QUERIJERO v. PEOPLE [397 SCRA 465 (February 14, 2003)]
PONENTE: Mendoza, J. FACTS: Flordeliza F. Querijero, an accountable public officer being the Cashier of Integrated Provincial Health Office, Lucena City, was accused for ―malversing, converting, and misappropriating for her personal use and benefit the amount P165,722.78.‖ The prosecution‘s lone witness was Patricio C. Haway, Assistant
Provincial Auditor of Quezon Province. Haway testified that he was head of a team of COA auditors, which included Auditors Susana P. Salibio and Dalmacio Aspi. The team conducted an examination of the cash and accounts of petitioner from April 7, 1986 to July 9, 1986.
On July 29, 1986, the team went to the office of petitioner, but she was absent that day. The auditors were later informed that petitioner had not reported for work since July 9, 1986. For this reason, they sealed the safe of petitioner, in the presence of administrative officer Teodoro Melichala and a certain Ofelia Villapando. They also asked petitioner to attend the opening of her safe on August 5, 1986. Petitioner did not report. So, the auditors decided to open petitioner‘s safe without her. They prepared an inventory of the contents of the safe and a Schedule of Cash. Auditor Dalmacio G. Aspi prepared the Statement of Cash Advances and Disbursements and the Statement of Deposits and Disbursements by Checks for the period April 7, 1986 to July 9, 1986, while Auditor Susana P. Salibio prepared the List of Unrecorded Collections. Based on the audit conducted, Patricio C. Haway prepared a Report of Cash Examination, showing a shortage of P165,722.78. The shortage consisted of undeposited/unremitted cash collections amounting to P102,106.89, unaccounted/unrecorded GSIS/SSS checks in the amount of P30,748.85, and unliquidated cash advances amounting to P32,867.04. The defense presented five witnesses, including petitioner Flordeliza F. Querijero. Petitioner claimed she had been on sick leave for sometime before the audit team first went to her office on July 29, 1986. She complained that she had not been given an opportunity to go over the Report of Cash Examination of the audit team and that the amounts of P100,000.00 and P43,899.33 in the List of Unrecorded Collections were checks representing provincial aid which had already been deposited and recorded, as shown in the Statement of Deposits and Disbursement by Checks No. 8-70-300 Accounts of Auditor Dalmacio G. Aspi. Teresita L. Palentinos, who was Record and Filing Clerk assigned at the Cashier‘s Office. According to her, there were two (2) vaults in
their office, the big one, which was used by petitioner, and the small
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one, which was used by Ofelia Villapando. She was present during the opening of the safe of petitioner on August 21, 1986. She testified that the safe of Ofelia Villapando was never opened by the audit team.
accountable officers in the office and failing to open the other safe
Rosalinda Lusterio, collecting officer of the Quezon Integrated Provincial Health Office, testified that there were several collectors in their office. She was in charge of summarizing the official receipt duplicates, while Ofelia Villapando collected the GSIS and SSS payments in representation of their office. According to her, petitioner had nothing to do with the GSIS and SSS checks, and that the latter was no longer working in the office on July 8, 1986. She likewise testified that Ofelia Villapando, who was in charge of the collection of Provincial Aid, deposited the same in the bank.
is a public officer; (b) he has the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; (c) the funds or property involved are public funds or property for which he is accountable; and (d) he has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented to, or through abandonment or negligence permitted, the taking by another person of such funds or property. ―The failure of a
Evelyn A. Cabana testified that she was detailed to the Cashier‘s
Office from 1985 to 1990 as Clerk I. She said that sometimes Ofelia Villapando assigned her to issue receipts for the Medicare income. However, she said it was Ofelia Villapando who regularly issued the receipts for the collection of Medicare claims and deposited the corresponding payments to the bank.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is guilty based on the accounts of the witnesses.
NO.
RATIO: ―The shortage of funds which was attributed to petitioner was not
indubitably established considering that the audit conducted was incomplete, irregular, and inaccurate and did not follow standard auditing procedures by excluding from the examination the other
used in the office.‖
Conviction for malversation of public funds or property under Art. 217 of the Revised Penal Code requires proof that (a) the offender
public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal uses.‖ This presumption is negated
when the accused is able to present sufficient evidence that can nullify any likelihood that he had put the funds or property to personal use. And petitioner was able to do so. Indeed, the records show that aside from petitioner, there were other accountable officers in the Cashier‘s Office, among whom were Ofelia Villapando,
who collected GSIS and SSS payments, Provincial Aid, and Medicare Claims and deposited the corresponding payments in the bank; Rosalinda Lusterio, who had been collecting officer since 1975; and Luisito Rivamonte, who had been designated Acting Cashier on July 10, 1986. However, only the cash and accounts of petitioner were examined by the COA auditors. Such incomplete audit, which resulted in an alleged shortage that was attributed solely to petitioner‘s accountability, is susceptible to errors and inaccuracies .
The audit team should have been more efficient, accurate, and thorough in its job by making sure that all of the accountable officers in that office are included in the audit to avoid irregularity and injustice. Thus, if there are several accountable officers in the same place and they are so near each other as to allow the possibility of
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one borrowing from another, a simultaneous cash count of all the accountable officers in the vicinity should be conducted in order to assure accuracy and at the same time prevent a cover-up of possible shortage in their accounts. Another irregularity in the audit conducted was that the auditors did not open the other vault which was also located in the same office. No explanation was given by the audit team as to why the smaller vault was not opened. The audit team should have inspected the total contents of the safes and other cash receptacles of each accountable officer or employee to establish absolute certainty that no other cash, checks, warrants, or valid cash items had been left out of the count and inventory. That the audit made was incomplete, irregular, and inaccurate is made more evident when the audit report included in the shortage allegedly incurred by petitioner the amount of P30,748.85 representing unaccounted/unrecorded GSIS/SSS checks. As mentioned, the records show that it was Ofelia Villapando, and not petitioner, who was in charge of this account. Besides, petitioner‘s last day in office was on July 8, 1986, but in the
List of Unrecorded Collections, the dates stated in the official receipt of the GSIS and SSS checks were July 8, 1986 and July 9, 1986.
Art. 218. Failure of accountable officer to render accounts. — Any public officer, whether in the service or separated therefrom by resignation or any other cause, who is required by law or regulation to render account to the Insular Auditor, or to a provincial auditor and who fails to do so for a period of two months after such accounts should be rendered, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum period, or by a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both.
PONENTE: Quisumbing, J. NATURE: This petition for review seeks to reverse the decisions of Sandiganbayan convicting Rosulo L. Manlangit for violation of Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code, and denied his motion for reconsideration.
FACTS: October 16, 1998- Manlangit, as Officer-in-Charge for Information, Education and Communication of the Pinatubo Commission, received money to fund the 6th Founding Anniversary Info-Media Activities of the Commission. A few months after, he resigned without accounting for the fund. April 12, 2000- he was charged by the Executive Director of the Commission for violation of RPC 217 and 218. The Director said that he must follow the OCA circulars and render a true and correct account of all public funds entrusted to him. July 11, 2000- Manlangit filed a counter affidavit and averred that he had no intention to appropriate the funds for himself. He failed to submit on time the liquidation report because of the following reasons: a) a new management took over, and reorganized the Commission causing some organizational confusion; b) he resigned and had to look for another employment; and c) he had some personal and family problems. He said that he submitted his liquidation report on July 12, 2000 and settled the account. The Deputy Executive Director of the Commission, said that Manlangit had not submitted any liquidation report. And she underscored the inconsistency between the date of petitioner‘s
counter-affidavit, July 11, 2000, and the date when he supposedly submitted his report, July 12, 2000.
MANLANGIT v SANDIGANBAYAN [GR No. 158014 (August 28, 2007)]
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March 5, 2001- the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon filed an information against petitioner for violation of RPC 218.
1.
that the offender is a public officer, whether in the service or separated therefrom;
August 12, 2001- Undersecretary of the Department of Budget and Management Task Force Mt. Pinatubo in a letter informed Ombudsman Desierto that petitioner had already rendered an accounting and requested the withdrawal of the case.
2.
that he must be an accountable officer for public funds or property;
3.
that he is required by law or regulation to render accounts to the Commission on Audit, or to a provincial auditor; and
4.
that he fails to do so for a period of two months after such accounts should be rendered.
Manlangit filed a demurrer to evidence and insisted that there was no criminal delay on his part since there was no demand from the COA for an accounting. Manlangit argues that according to the Saberon case he cannot be convicted of the crime unless the prosecution has proven that there was a demand for him to render an account. Moreover, petitioner averred that the case was rendered moot and academic by the letter of the Undersecretary. February 28, 2002- Sandiganbayan denied the demurrer to evidence. It ruled that demand was not an element of Article 218 and that the letter of Undersecretary Relampagos had no bearing on the offense of petitioner. Motion for recon also denied and he was found guilty of violating RPC 218 and suffer imprisonment of one year. Motion for recon was denied hence this case.
ISSUE(s): W/N demand is necessary for a conviction of a violation of Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code.
Nowhere in the provision does it require that there first be a demand before an accountable officer is held liable for a violation of the crime. The law is very clear. Where none is provided, the court may not introduce exceptions or conditions, neither may it engraft into the law qualifications not contemplated. Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says and the court has no choice but to see to it that its mandate is obeyed. There is no room for interpretation, but only application. Statutory construction tells us that in the revision or codification of laws, all parts and provisions of the old laws that are omitted in the revised statute or code are deemed repealed, unless the statute or code provides otherwise. Petitioner‘s reliance on Saberon is misplaced. It involves a violation
HELD: No RATIO: Article 218 consists of the following elements:
of Act No. 1740. RPC 218 merely provides that the public officer be required by law and regulation to render account. Under COA Circular No. 90-331, petitioner was required to render an account of the fund disbursed for the Commission‘s Info -Media Activities within 20 days after the end of the year. In this case, he should have
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submitted his liquidation report not later than January 20, 1999 since the fund was issued on October 16, 1998. Article 218 penalizes the accountable officer‘s failure to render an account within a period of two months after such accounts should be rendered. Clearly, petitioner‘s submission of his liquidation report on July 12, 2000 was beyond the two-month period allowed by the provision. Dispositive: Petition is DENIED. The Decisions of the Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the accused is sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor as minimum to one (1) year, one (1) month and eleven (11) days of prision correccional as maximum. (He was originally sentenced to 1 year imprisonment by Sandiganbayan. May discussion on how they arrived at the proper penalty using RPC 65 and 67 and the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hindi ko na isinama.)
REPUBLIC ACT No. 3019 ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT Section 1. Statement of policy. It is the policy of the Philippine Government, in line with the principle that a public office is a public trust, to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto.
Section 2. Definition of terms. As used in this Act, that term (a) "Government" includes the national government, the local governments, the government-owned and governmentcontrolled corporations, and all other instrumentalities or agencies of the Republic of the Philippines and their branches. (b) "Public officer" includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the
classified or unclassified or exempt service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government as defined in the preceding subparagraph. (c) "Receiving any gift" includes the act of accepting directly or indirectly a gift from a person other than a member of the public officer's immediate family, in behalf of himself or of any member of his family or relative within the fourth civil degree, either by consanguinity or affinity, even on the occasion of a family celebration or national festivity like Christmas, if the value of the gift is under the circumstances manifestly excessive. (d) "Person" includes natural and juridical persons, unless the context indicates otherwise.
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: (a) Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit such violation or offense. (b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the Government and any other part, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law. (c) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present or other pecuniary or material benefit, for himself or for another, from any person for whom the public officer, in any manner or capacity, has secured or obtained, or will
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secure or obtain, any Government permit or license, in consideration for the help given or to be given, without prejudice to Section thirteen of this A ct. (d) Accepting or having any member of his family accept employment in a private enterprise which has pending official business with him during the pendency thereof or within one year after its termination. (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. (f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on any matter pending before him for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage, or for the purpose of favoring his own interest or giving undue advantage in favor of or discriminating against any other interested party. (g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby. (h) Director or indirectly having financing or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest.
(i) Directly or indirectly becoming interested, for personal gain, or having a material interest in any transaction or act requiring the approval of a board, panel or group of which he is a member, and which exercises discretion in such approval, even if he votes against the same or does not participate in the action of the board, committee, panel or group. Interest for personal gain shall be presumed against those public officers responsible for the approval of manifestly unlawful, inequitable, or irregular transaction or acts by the board, panel or group to which they belong. (j) Knowingly approving or granting any license, permit, privilege or benefit in favor of any person not qualified for or not legally entitled to such license, permit, privilege or advantage, or of a mere representative or dummy of one who is not so qualified or entitled. (k) Divulging valuable information of a confidential character, acquired by his office or by him on account of his official position to unauthorized persons, or releasing such information in advance of its authorized release date. The person giving the gift, present, share, percentage or benefit referred to in subparagraphs (b) and (c); or offering or giving to the public officer the employment mentioned in subparagraph (d); or urging the divulging or untimely release of the confidential information referred to in subparagraph (k) of this section shall, together with the offending public officer, be punished under Section nine of this Act and shall be permanently or temporarily disqualified in the discretion of the Court, from transacting business in any form with the Government.
Section 4. Prohibition on private individuals. (a) It shall be unlawful for any person having family or close personal relation with any public official to capitalize or exploit or take advantage of such family or close personal relation by directly or indirectly requesting or
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receiving any present, gift or material or pecuniary advantage from any other person having some business, transaction, application, request or contract with the government, in which such public official has to intervene. Family relation shall include the spouse or relatives by consanguinity or affinity in the third civil degree. The word "close personal relation" shall include close personal friendship, social and fraternal connections, and professional employment all giving rise to intimacy which assures free access to such public officer. (b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or cause any public official to commit any of the offenses defined in Section 3 hereof.
Section 5. Prohibition on certain relatives. It shall be unlawful for the spouse or for any relative, by consanguinity or affinity, within the third civil degree, of the President of the Philippines, the VicePresident of the Philippines, the President of the Senate, or the Speaker of the House of Representatives, to intervene, directly or indirectly, in any business, transaction, contract or application with the Government: Provided, That this section shall not apply to any person who, prior to the assumption of office of any of the above officials to whom he is related, has been already dealing with the Government along the same line of business, nor to any transaction, contract or application already existing or pending at the time of such assumption of public office, nor to any application filed by him the approval of which is not discretionary on the part of the official or officials concerned but depends upon compliance with requisites provided by law, or rules or regulations issued pursuant to law, nor to any act lawfully performed in an official capacity or in the exercise of a profession.
Section 6. Prohibition on Members of Congress. It shall be unlawful hereafter for any Member of the Congress during the term for which he has been elected, to acquire or receive any personal pecuniary interest in any specific business enterprise which will be directly and particularly favored or benefited by any law or resolution authored
by him previously approved or adopted by the Congress during the same term. The provision of this section shall apply to any other public officer who recommended the initiation in Congress of the enactment or adoption of any law or resolution, and acquires or receives any such interest during his incumbency. It shall likewise be unlawful for such member of Congress or other public officer, who, having such interest prior to the approval of such law or resolution authored or recommended by him, continues for thirty days after such approval to retain such interest.
Section 7. Statement of assets and liabilities. Every public officer, within thirty days after the approval of this Act or after assuming office, and within the month of January of every other year thereafter, as well as upon the expiration of his term of office, or upon his resignation or separation from office, shall prepare and file with the office of the corresponding Department Head, or in the case of a Head of Department or chief of an independent office, with the Office of the President, or in the case of members of the Congress and the officials and employees thereof, with the Office of the Secretary of the corresponding House, a true detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year: Provided, That public officers assuming office less than two months before the end of the calendar year, may file their statements in the following months of January.
Section 8. Dismissal due to unexplained wealth. If in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act Numbered One thousand three hundred seventy-nine, a public official has been found to have acquired during his incumbency, whether in his name or in the name of other persons, an amount of property and/or money manifestly out of proportion to his salary and to his other lawful income, that fact shall be a ground for dismissal or removal. Properties in the name of the spouse and unmarried children of such public official
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may be taken into consideration, when their acquisition through legitimate means cannot be satisfactorily shown. Bank deposits shall be taken into consideration in the enforcement of this section, notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary.
Section 9. Penalties for violations. (a) Any public officer or private person committing any of the unlawful acts or omissions enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than ten years, perpetual disqualification from public office, and confiscation or forfeiture in favor of the Government of any prohibited interest and unexplained wealth manifestly out of proportion to his salary and other lawful income. Any complaining party at whose complaint the criminal prosecution was initiated shall, in case of conviction of the accused, be entitled to recover in the criminal action with priority over the forfeiture in favor of the Government, the amount of money or the thing he may have given to the accused, or the value of such thing. (b) Any public officer violation any of the provisions of Section 7 of this Act shall be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred pesos nor more than one thousand pesos, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the Court. The violation of said section proven in a proper administrative proceeding shall be sufficient cause for removal or dismissal of a public officer, even if no criminal prosecution is instituted against him.
Section 10. Competent court. Until otherwise provided by law, all prosecutions under this Act shall be within the original jurisdiction of the proper Court of First Instance.
Section 11. Prescription of offenses. All offenses punishable under this Act shall prescribe in ten years.
Section 12. Termination of office. No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.
Section 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.
Section 14. Exception. Unsolicited gifts or presents of small or insignificant value offered or given as a mere ordinary token of gratitude or friendship according to local customs or usage, shall be excepted from the provisions of this Act. Nothing in this Act shall be interpreted to prejudice or prohibit the practice of any profession, lawful trade or occupation by any private person or by any public officer who under the law may legitimately practice his profession, trade or occupation, during his incumbency, except where the practice of such profession, trade or occupation involves conspiracy with any other person or public official to commit any of the violations penalized in this Act.
Section 15. Separability clause. If any provision of this Act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstances is declared invalid, the remainder of the Act or the application of such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected by such declaration.
Section 16. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect on its approval, but for the purpose of determining unexplained wealth, all property
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acquired by a public officer since he assumed office shall be taken into consideration. Approved: August 17, 1960
SAYSON v SANDIGANBAYAN [359 SCRA 595 (June 26, 2001)]
PONENTE: Pardo, J. FACTS:
ISSUE
In 1977, petitioner Jose Sayson y Delarmente was a budget examiner, Ministry of Public Highways, Region VII, Cebu City. In a set of 64 related cases (Criminal Cases Nos. 25622624 and 2990) and 143 related cases (Criminal Cases Nos. 4277-4413; 4415-4420), the prosecutor (Tanodbayan) charged petitioner acting in conspiracy with several other public officers of the Ministry of Public Highways, assigned at MPH, Region VII and MPH, Central Office, Manila with causing undue injury to the Philippine government by causing, allowing, approving and receiving the illegal, irregular and unauthorized disbursement and expenditure of public funds, out of the National Treasury, from the period April 1, 1977 to May 31, 1977, in the amount of P 47,583.31 through the issuance of General Voucher No. 0105 and Treasury Check No. SN-3 2402412, and the period August to November 30, 1977, in the amount of P49,725.00 through the issuance of General Voucher No. 2517 and Treasury Check No. 7933671.
W/N Sayson‘s guilt of the charges against him has been established
on the basis of the lone testimony of Delia Preagido, an accused turned State witness
HELD/RATIO NO. After carefully reviewing the facts of the cases herein involved, the Court is convinced that petitioner had no part in the simulation and negotiation of fake LAAs. The only evidence linking him to a conspiracy to defraud the government was the testimony of Delia Preagido, a previously convicted co-accused, who was discharged from the informations and utilized as State witness. Does the fact that she has been convicted of cases involving moral turpitude and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, similar to the instant cases, affect her credibility as a witness? The Court found Delia Preagido not a credible witness. She was convicted of several cases of estafa through falsification of public documents and of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Her discharge as an accused to be utilized as State witness was improper. She was one of the most guilty. In fact, she was given conditional pardon to induce her to testify against her co-accused. The Sandiganbayan itself found her testimony against the other accused to be incredible. How come that she was credible as against the petitioner? The Sandiganbayan erred in giving credence to her testimony against petitioner. The Sandiganbayan erred in finding petitioner Sayson guilty of violation of Republic Act 3019, Section 3(e). The elements of the offense are: (1) that the accused are public officers or private persons charged in conspiracy with them; (2) that said public
officers commit the prohibited acts during the performance of their official duties or in relation to their public positions; (3) that they cause undue injury to any party, whether the Government or a private party; (4) that such injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such
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parties; and (5) that the public officers have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. The last two elements were not established in the cases at bar. Accused Jose Sayson y Delarmente was with the Ministry of Public Highways, Region VII, as Budget Examiner III. As such, he preaudited disbursement of salaries and supplies of the Regional Office in amounts not exceeding P6,000.00. Disbursements in excess of P6,000.00 were forwarded to the COA resident auditor for pre-audit. His duty did not include allocation of amounts to different districts but only to disbursements within the regional office. He had no hand in the preparation of LAAs and CDCs, a task relegated to the accounting and budget section of the ministry where he was not connected. His immediate superior was Angelina Escaño, head of the Accounting and Finance Division. He denied meeting accused Mangubat, Preagido and Cruz at the Town and Country Restaurant or receiving any money in connection with the anomalies. He said that accused Preagido had been convicted in the other highway cases and simply wanted to implicate him and his co-accused to the anomalies. Sayson was acquitted.
PELIGRINO v. PEOPLE [362 SCRA 683 (August 13, 2001)]
PONENTE: Panganiban, J. FACTS: The accused is convicted for violating Sec. 3(b) of R.A. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Practices Act. He is a public officer being then an BIR officer and as such tasked among others, to examine or investigate Books of Accounts for Income and Business tax returns earned by professionals (medical practitioners) in order to determine their
compliance and/or tax deficiencies and to collect payments thereof. That while in the performance of his official duties as such public officer, he unlawfully demanded the amount of P200,000.00 from Dr. Antonio N. Feliciano, a practicing genetology doctor holding office at Pasong Tamo, Makati, Metro Manila, found by the accused to have incurred an allege[d] deficiency income tax assessment of P500,000.00 for the calendar years 1988-1989, received P200,000.00, P51,858.57 was in the form of Prudential Bank Check No. 914077 dated October 15, 1991 payable to the Bureau of Internal Revenue as full payment of Dr. Feliciano's tax liabilities and the remaining balance to be appropriated to himself, to the damage and prejudice of Dr. Antonio Feliciano in the amount of P148,141.43 and the government in the amount equal to the deficiency income tax due it." On February 25, 1992, the Information was amended to include Buenaventura V. Buenafe as co-accused. It states that on or about October 15, 1991unlawfully and criminally demand directly from taxpayer Antonio N. Feliciano, a practicing genetology doctor holding office at Pasong Tamo, Makati, Metro Manila, found by both accused to have incurred an alleged deficiency income tax assessment of P500,000.00 for the calendar years 1988 and 1989, the amount of P200,000.00 Philippine currency, for the purpose of applying a portion thereof in the amount of P51,858.57 as full payment for deficiency income tax due from said taxpayer for fiscal years 1988 & 1989 and the balance of P148,141.43 to be appropriated by both accused for themselves as gift or consideration for their promise to make as they did lower assessment for said fiscal years 1988 & 1989 in the amount of P51,858.57, which request or demand for money was in connection with a transaction between the government and Dr. Antonio N. Feliciano wherein both accused in their official capacities had to intervene under the law, and thereafter, accused Peligrino unlawfully received the amount of P200,000.00 in behalf of both accused, to the damage and prejudice of Dr. Antonio Feliciano
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in the amount of P148,141.43 and the government in the amount equal to the deficiency income tax due it. However, petitioner disputes the prosecution evidence establishing that he demanded and received grease money in connection with the transaction. Specifically, he contends that the Sandiganbayan's conclusion that he demanded money from complainant was based merely on an assumption that was not supported by any evidence. He avers that he merely informed complainant of his tax deficiencies, and that it was the latter who requested the reduction of the amount claimed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused Peligrino should be convicted for violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. YES.
RATIO: Section 3(b) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019, as amended) provides: "SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. -- In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: (b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the Government and any other party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law. ‖
Petitioner is a BIR examiner assigned to the Special Project Committee tasked "to undertake verification of tax liabilities of various professionals particularly doctors within the jurisdiction of Revenue Region No. 4-A, Manila." Since the subject transaction involved the reassessment of taxes due from private complainant, the right of petitioner to intervene in his official capacity is undisputed. Therefore, elements (1), (4) and (5) of the offense are present. However, petitioner disputes the prosecution evidence establishing that he demanded and received grease money in connection with the transaction. The Court is not convinced. Section 3(b) of RA 3019 penalizes three distinct acts -- (1) demanding or requesting; (2) receiving; or (3) demanding, requesting and receiving -- any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit for oneself or for any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the government and any other party, wherein a public officer in an official capacity has to intervene under the law. These modes of committing the offense are distinct and different from each other. Proof of the existence of any of them suffices to warrant conviction. The lack of demand is immaterial. After all, Section 3 (b) of RA 3019 uses the word or between requesting and receiving.
HELD: Petition is denied. Republic Act No. 7080 July 12, 1991 AN ACT DEFINING AND PENALIZING THE CRIME OF PLUNDER Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled: :
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Section 1. Definition of Terms - As used in this Act, the term a) Public Officer means any person holding any public office in the Government of the Republic of the Philippines by virtue of an appointment, election or contract. b) Government includes the National Government, and any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including government-owned or -controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. c) Person includes any natural or juridical person, unless the context indicates otherwise. d) Ill-gotten wealth means any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of any person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes: 1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury; 2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer concerned; 3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; 4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other
form of interest or participation including promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking; 5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or 6) By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines. See Section 2 As amended by Section 12 of RA No.7659 Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties - Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires illgotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1(d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or total value of at least Seventy-five million pesos (P75,000,000.00), shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by life imprisonment with perpetual absolute disqualification from holding any public office. Any person who participated with said public officer in the commission of plunder shall likewise be punished. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stock derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State.
Section 3. Competent Court - Until otherwise provided by law, all prosecutions under this Act shall be within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
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Section 4. Rule of Evidence - For purposes of establishing the
Approved: July 12, 1991
crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
J. Bellosillo
Section 5. Suspension and Loss of Benefits - Any public officer
FACTS:
against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and other benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime, administrative proceedings have been filed against him.
Section 6. Prescription of Crimes - The crime punishable under this Act shall prescribe in twenty (20) years. However, the right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officers from them or from their nominees or transferees shall not be barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel.
Section 7. Separability of Provisions - If any provisions of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remaining provisions of this Act and the application of such provisions to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.
Section 8. Scope - This Act shall not apply to or affect pending prosecutions or proceedings, or those which may be instituted under Executive Order No. 1, issued and promulgated on February 28, 1986.
Section 9. Effectivity - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days from its publication in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation.
ESTRADA v. SANDIGANBAYAN [369 SCRA 394 (2001)]
1. 4/4/01 - Ombudsman filed in the Sandiganbayan 8 separate Infos for violation of RA 7080 (Plunder Law), RA 3019, RA 6713, Perjury and Illegal Use of an Alias. 2. Motion to Quash the Plunder Info because Plunder Law was unconstitutional for vagueness, dispenses reasonable doubt standard, abolishes mens rea in crimes under RPC and charged more than 1 offense - violations of the accused's fundamental rights to to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him
ISSUE/HELD: W/N RA 7080 unconstitutional – No.
RATIO: 1. Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards & well-defined parameters w/c would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation. Sec. 2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and conditions, required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime w/ reasonable certainty and particularity. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the
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counsel, in defending one charged with its violation; and more importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct. It can be understood w/ little difficulty that what the assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing/ accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least P50M through a series or combination of acts enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of the Plunder Law. SC: nothing in the foregoing that is vague/ ambiguous as there is obviously none that will confuse petitioner in his defense. It cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence w/c is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof BRD that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal.
said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder." There is no reason to believe that it does not apply as well to the public officer as principal in the crime. J. Holmes: "We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws w/ what they omit, but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean." Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Other heinous crimes are punished with death as a straight penalty in R.A. There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide for its poor and underprivileged masses. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the effects and repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving government officials, employees or officers, that their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further destruction and damage to society.
EJERCITO v SANDIGANBAYAN [509 SCRA 190 (November 30, 2006)]
Plunder is a malum in se w/crequires proof of criminal intent. The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the RPC to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal intent. It is true that Sec. 2 refers to "any person who participates with the
SUMMARY : The Supreme Court upheld Sandiganbayan resolutions which denied JV Ejercito‘s motion to quash s ubpoenas that order the production of
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documents about bank accounts in the Export and Import Bank and PCI-Equitable Bank.
already pertaining to him when he qualified for public office or employment, or the fruits and income of the exclusive property of the respondent's spouse. It shall not include:
ISSUE: The accused claimed that information about his bank accounts i.e. trust funds, was obtained in violation of the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law ( R.A. 1405) and moved to have them be excluded as evidence.
1. Property unlawfully acquired by the respondent, but its ownership is concealed by its being recorded in the name of, or held by, the respondent's spouse, ascendants, descendants, relatives, or any other person.
HELD: R.A. 1405 nowhere provides that an unlawful examination of
2. Property unlawfully acquired by the respondent, but transferred by him to another person or persons on or after the effectivity of this Act.
bank accounts shall render the evidence there from inadmissible in evidence. If Congress has both established a right and provided exclusive remedies for its violation, the court would encroaching upon the prerogatives of congress if it authorizes a remedy not provided for by statute. Absent a specific reference to an exclusionary rule, it is not appropriate for the courts to read such a provision into the act.
REPUBLIC ACT No. 1379 AN ACT DECLARING FORFEITURE IN FAVOR OF THE STATE ANY PROPERTY FOUND TO HAVE BEEN UNLAWFULLY ACQUIRED BY ANY PUBLIC OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE AND PROVIDING FOR THE PROCEEDINGS THEREFOR. Section 1. Definitions. (a) For the purposes of this Act, a "public officer or employee" means any person holding any public office or employment by virtue of an appointment, election or contract, and any person holding any office or employment, by appointment or contract, in any State owned or controlled corporation or enterprise. (b) "Other legitimately acquired property" means any real or personal property, money or securities which t he respondent has at any time acquired by inheritance and the income thereof, or by gift inter vivos before his becoming a public officer or employee, or any property (or income thereof)
3. Property donated to the respondent during his incumbency, unless he can prove to the satisfaction of the court that the donation is lawful.
Section 2. Filing of petition. Whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property, said property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired. The Solicitor General, upon complaint by any taxpayer to the city or provincial fiscal who shall conduct a previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal cases and shall certify to the Solicitor General that there is reasonable ground to believe that there has been committed a violation of this Act and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, shall file, in the name and on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, in the Court of First Instance of the city or province where said public officer or employee resides or holds office, a petition for a writ commanding said officer or employee to show cause why the property aforesaid, or any part thereof, should not be declared property of the State: Provided , That no such petition shall be filed within one year before any general election or within three months before any special election.
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The resignation, dismissal or separation of the officer or employee from his office or employment in the Government or in the Government-owned or controlled corporation shall not be a bar to the filing of the petition: Provided, however , That the right to file such petition shall prescribe after four years from the date of the resignation, dismissal or separation or expiration of the term of the office or employee concerned, except as to those who have ceased to hold office within ten years prior to the approval of this Act, in which case the proceedings shall prescribe after four years from the approval hereof.
Section 3. The petition. The petition shall contain the following information: (a) The name and address of the respondent. (b) The public officer or employment he holds and such other public offices or employment which he has previously held. (c) The approximate amount of property he has acquired during his incumbency in his past and present offices and employments. (d) A description of said property, or such thereof as has been identified by the Solicitor General. (e) The total amount of his government salary and other proper earnings and incomes from legitimately acquired property, and (f) Such other information as may enable the court to determine whether or not the respondent has unlawfully acquired property during his incumbency.
Section 4. Period for the answer. The respondent shall have a period of fifteen days within which to present his answer.
Section 5. Hearing. The Court shall set a date for a hearing, which
given ample opportunity to explain, to the satisfaction of the court, how he has acquired the property in question.
Section 6. Judgment. If the respondent is unable to show to the satisfaction of the court that he has lawfully acquired the property in question, then the court shall declare such property, forfeited in favor of the State, and by virtue of such judgment the property aforesaid shall become property of the State: Provided , That no judgment shall be rendered within six months before any general election or within three months before any special election. The Court may, in addition, refer this case to the corresponding Executive Department for administrative or criminal action, or both.
Section 7. Appeal. The parties may appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance as provided in the Rules of Court for appeals in civil cases.
Section
8. Protection against self-incrimination. Neither the respondent nor any other person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from producing books, papers, correspondence, memoranda and other records on the ground that the testimony or evidence, documentary or otherwise, required of him may tend to incriminate him or subject him to prosecution; but no individual shall be prosecuted criminally for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing concerning which he is compelled, after having claimed his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise, except that such individual so testifying shall not be exempt from prosecution and conviction for perjury or false testimony committed in so testifying or from administrative proceedings. Section 9. Immunity. The Solicitor General may grant immunity from criminal prosecution to any person who testifies to t he unlawful manner in which the respondent has acquired any of the property in question in cases where such testimony is necessary to prove violations of this Act.
may be open to the public, and during which the respondent shall be
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